Legal Matters - Personal Injury and Insurance - Issue 24 - Q2 2012

Legal Matters Personal Injury and Insurance

Issue 24 Quarter 2 2012

Our quarterly newsletter aims to highlight developments and recent case law in the areas of personal injury and insurance in a concise and readable style. We hope that you find it informative and useful.

Parent company owes duty of care to Inside: Plexus Law success in employee of subsidiary company manual handling cases The Claimant was employed by Cape Products (CP) between 1959 - 1962.

He was exposed to asbestos dust and developed asbestosis. CP had been dissolved some years previously and in any event did not have EL cover for asbestosis. CP was a wholly owned subsidiary of Cape (C).

This case is not concerned with piercing the corporate veil which treats parent and subsidiary companies as separate entities.

The issue was whether a duty of care was owed by a parent company to the employees of a subsidiary.

The 3 stage test established in Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2 for determining whether there was a duty of care was considered. The 3 ingredients are that the damage should be foreseeable; there should be proximity between the parties and it should be fair, just and reasonable for a duty to be imposed.

The Court of Appeal rejected the submission by C that a duty of care could only exist in cases where the parent company had absolute control of the subsidiary.

It was held that a duty of care may be imposed on a parent company in certain circumstances which would include where:

the parent company knew or ought to have foreseen, that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on it using that superior knowledge for the employees’ protection.

C was not responsible for the implementation of health and safety at CP but it did maintain a certain level of control over its asbestos business. C did have superior knowledge about the nature and management of asbestos risks and advised CP on what steps it had to take to provide employees with a safe system of work. In these circumstances a direct duty of care was owed by C to the employees of CP. This is the first case in which a parent company has been found to owe a duty of care to an employee of a subsidiary.

It will be of particular relevance to disease claims where it is often difficult for claimants to trace the EL insurers of their past employers.

The way is not open for claims against any parent company but the Judgment confirms that in certain circumstances a duty of care could be established.

In the future a parent company may be sued instead of a subsidiary if the subsidiary is in a different jurisdiction and it is easier for the claimant to claim against the UK based parent company.

The courts may also be asked to find that parent companies owe a duty of care to third parties not just employees who are injured by the negligence of their subsidiaries.

the businesses of the 2 companies are in a relevant respect, the same;

the parent company had or should have had, superior knowledge of a relevant aspect of health and safety For further information contact Lynn in the particular industry; Watts - details on page 8

the parent company knew or ought to have known, that the system of work at the subsidiary was unsafe;

Chandler v Cape PLC [2012] EWCA Civ 525

Causation not proved by chambermaid

2

Employer’s training prevails

2

Claimant unable to vary costs order

3

Shotgun appeal

3

Highway maintenance and motor vehicles - a different perspective?

4

Boots unsuitable for riding off road

4

A commonsense approach to ‘reasonable care’

5

Contraction of Legionnaire’s Disease on holiday not an accident

5

Limitation hope for defendants

6

Mother negligent for using booster seat

7

No damages for Claimant injured in getaway

7

Partner Perspective

8

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Plexus Law success in manual handling cases Causation not proved by chambermaid The Claimant was employed as a chambermaid by the Defendant.

Her duties included moving beds to vacuum underneath.

She sustained an injury whilst moving a bed. She claimed that she had received no manual handling training.

The Defendant represented by Plexus Law, alleged that this was not a manual handling task which gave rise to a real risk of injury and even if it was, the Claimant had been trained

correctly. Causation was also disputed.

The Trial Judge found in favour of the Clamant. He concluded that whilst she had received initial training she had not been provided with refresher training, and that lack of training, had resulted in the Claimant moving the bed incorrectly causing her injury.

The Defendant appealed the decision.

Hughes LJ determined that while the Defendant was in breach of the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992 by failing to provide refresher training there was no evidential basis for the finding that her injury would have been prevented had she been given refresher training. The

Claimant had said in evidence that she had not lifted the bed but had rather rolled it. The appeal was therefore allowed.

This case is a reminder to employers that they need to provide regular refresher training on manual handling in order to comply with their duty under the regulations to reduce the risk of injury to the lowest level reasonably practicable.

It also demonstrates that claimants must establish causation in order to prove liability and that establishing breach of duty alone is not sufficient.

For further information contact James Kingston - see page 8 Costa v Imperial London Hotels Ltd CA [2012] EWCA Civ 672

Employer’s training prevails The Claimant, a Transport Manager (C) was delivering equipment which included a double ladder.

The ladder was loaded onto a lorry and tied to the tail lift.

When unloading the ladder he untied it and rested it, unsecured, on 1 of its rungs on a post at the rear of the lorry ‘the post method’.

He stood underneath the ladder to operate the tail lift. As the tail lift lowered, the ladder fell onto his head.

C alleged that the Defendant (D) should have provided a horizontal support bar, which would have allowed him to rest the ladder without having to rely on the tail lift. It was also alleged that D had failed to carry out an adequate risk assessment as well as breaching the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992.

The Experts agreed that C was not carrying out a manual handling operation; therefore

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the regulations did not apply.

They also agreed that there were 2 ways in which ladders could be transported safely, by either using a horizontal bar or resting the ladder on the tail lift. D’s Expert did not believe that the absence of the horizontal support bar was a negligent omission, whereas C’s Expert considered that its use would have been preferable.

D, represented by Plexus Law, maintained that C was the author of his own misfortune as he caused the accident by resting an unsecured ladder on a post.

In dismissing the claim, the Trial Judge held that the accident occurred because C chose to use the post method, which he knew to be inherently dangerous and which he had not been taught to use. C was properly trained to use the tail lift method, which was a safe method of loading/unloading ladders and had it been used,

would have prevented the accident. He did not consider that it was reasonably foreseeable that C would use the post method instead of the tail lift method.

It was held that the unloading of ladders by using the tail lift was not a breach simply because there was another method, which was equally safe. If the horizontal support bar had been used the accident wouldn’t have happened but it did not follow that failure to provide it was a breach of regulations.

D had carried out a risk assessment and there was therefore no evidence of a causative link between a failure to risk assess and the accident.

For further information contact Natacha Kikkine - see page 8 Mcauley v HSS Hire Service Group Ltd, Central London County Court, January 2012

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Claimant unable to vary costs order Plexus Law acted for the successful Respondent to an appeal concerning the Court’s power when varying or revoking a previous Court Order.

Mr Tibbles (T) brought an action following an injury at work. The matter was allocated to the Small Claims Track.

T successfully applied to set aside the Order and the case was reallocated to the Fast Track.

T was subsequently damages of £750.

awarded

A Bill of Costs totalling £30,000 was served.

Plexus Law contended that all the costs up to the date of reallocation were incurred under the Small Claims Track and therefore approximately £20,000 was not recoverable.

T applied to vary the Order to provide that the costs incurred prior to reallocation be treated as arising under the Fast Track.

The application was initially granted, overturned on appeal and then came before the Court of Appeal (CA).

The CA found that there had been a long delay in making the a p p l i c a t i o n w h i c h c ri t i c a l l y extended over a period when the case was tried and Judgment given. The Defendant would have been prejudiced if the variation was permitted as they would face the £20,000 costs incurred prior to reallocation. The matter did not arise from a change in circumstances but arose due to T’s Solicitors’ ignorance of the CPR. The question was not only what the

right Order ought to have been, but what should be done at the time of the application to vary/revoke given any delay and prejudice.

The CA dismissed the appeal.

The case highlights that any application under CPR 3.1(7) must be made promptly.

A key consideration by the court will be the prejudice caused to the parties.

The court is likely to be less sympathetic to such applications if the need to vary arises due to the failings by a legal representative.

For further information Chris White - see page 8

contact

Tibbles v SIG Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 518

Shotgun appeal A recent claim brought by a gamekeeper at the Chatsworth Hall Estate, is useful for defendants when appropriate training and instructions have been provided to control and minimise health and safety risks.

Defendant employers had distributed instructions to gamekeepers on how best to carry guns when negotiating obstacles and that the removal of the cartridges was entirely under the Claimant’s control.

In the case of Mark Whitehead v Trustees of the Chatsworth Settlement [2012] the Claimant gamekeeper was employed to patrol the Chatsworth Estates.

Unfortunately, an accident occurred when he was carrying a shotgun broken over his arm with a live cartridge in the breach of each barrel. The Claimant fell over a wall which caused the gun to close and discharge both cartridges into his calf.

The Claimant contended that, although he realised it was not best practice to approach an obstacle without removing the cartridges, this was common practice that other gamekeepers followed when working alone.

The Claimant appealed unsuccessfully and the Court of Appeal found the central question of fact was that the Claimant had been trained to adopt the best practice and express instructions had been given. The Court of Appeal found that there was no cause for the Defendant employers to believe that, despite specific instructions regarding the carrying of shotguns, the Claimant and other gamekeepers were in private adopting an unsafe practice and there was therefore no need or reason to make unusual and surreptitious investigations of their employees. The Claimant had accepted on cross examination that if he had been accompanied by a senior member of staff he would have removed the cartridges from the shotgun.

At first instance the claim was dismissed on the basis that the

What constitutes adequate training and instructions is case sensitive

and always depends upon the nature of the risk. In other cases, courts have found that employers need to go to greater lengths and employ independent experts to evaluate risks as PUWER 1998 imposes a duty to assess not only risks known about but also investigate risks not known about and take professional advice (Allison v London Underground [2008] EWCA Civ 71).

This shotgun case is however useful for defendants where there has been:

suitable and sufficient training and instruction provided and documented;

a full assessment of risk in order to eliminate or reduce this;

no knowledge by the employer of unsafe practices being undertaken by employees contrary to their specific training and instruction.

For further information contact Anthony Baker - see page 8 Whitehead v Trustees of the Chatsworth Settlement [2012] EWCA Civ 263

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Page 4

Highway maintenance and motor vehicles - a different perspective?

The Defendant (TR) was travelling along a rural road when he lost control of his vehicle.

His 2 passengers were catastrophically injured.

He alleged that the accident occurred because the edge of the carriageway was dangerous. TR brought a claim for an indemnity against Devon County Council (Devon) as the Highway Authority. Devon denied that it was in breach of its duty under Section 41 of the Highways Act 1980 and furthermore relied on the statutory defence under Section 58 of the Act.

Devon contended that TR could not prove that the specific point which caused the loss of control was dangerous following the requirements of James v Preseli Pembrokeshire DC [1993] PIQR P114. The Judge’s view was that cars were different to pedestrians.

An accident to a car may be caused by the state of repair of a stretch of road and not only that of a particular spot. It was therefore material to consider whether the condition of the relevant stretch of road and not just 1 spot, was dangerous.

The damage to the edge of the carriageway was over 50m long and varied in width and depth.

Much of the damage was beyond the edge of the carriageway but at several points it did encroach into it. The Judge found the vehicle entered the damaged area before the point of maximum intrusion and travelled along a rutted potholed area and then regained the carriageway beyond the point of maximum intrusion.

The Code of Practice recommended monthly inspections but it was only inspected 6 monthly. Devon was unable to provide any good evidence explaining why they had departed from the guidance. Subject to causation the Section 58, defence failed.

Devon accepted that the obligation to maintain the highway did not stop at the white edge lines, however it contended that a distinction should be made between carriageway defects that fell inside the edge line and those that were on and outside it.

TR contended that Devon’s argument that even a monthly inspection would not have identified the defect, was not available. The Judge considered conflicting dicta in the cases of Griffiths v Liverpool Corporation [1967] 1 QB 374 and Rance v Essex County Council (unreported) CA 21 February 1997. Whilst not ruling definitively on the point because he considered the defects would have

taken time to materialise, the Judge implied that a causation defence would be open to Devon.

The Judge found that the highway was dangerous and liability for the accident rested entirely with Devon.

Subject to any appeal, this case shows that a slightly differing standard will apply to highway c l a i m s i n v o l vi n g v e h i c l e s .

Claimants will need only to point to a stretch of road and not a specific point of danger. It would seem that pedestrians will still have to identify a particular defect over which they fell. Further, where Councils do deviate from the guidance in the Code of Practice they must be able to lead cogent evidence as to why that was done.

Without such evidence it is likely to be found that a maintenance regime is wanting. On a positive note it seems that Councils may be able to avail themselves of a causation defence. In our view that is not a logical defence but this case provides ammunition to continue to seek to rely on it.

For further information contact Simon Hills - see page 8 AC and DC v TR and Devon County Council [2012] EWHC 796 (QB)

Boots unsuitable for riding off road The Court of Appeal (CA) reversed a decision that Sussex Police Force was not liable for injuries sustained by a police officer, for failing to provide alternative protective boots during an advanced motorcycle course, undertaken as part of his police training.

The training involved riding off road. The Claimant’s motorcycle tilted and he lost control of it falling to the ground with the motorcycle

landing on, and breaking his lower leg.

Although the Claimant had been issued with Alt-berg boots, he alleged that they were defective and unsuitable contrary to the Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992. He contended that he should have been provided with motocross boots.

The Claimant’s orthopaedic Expert

provided evidence that the injuries would have been minimised had he been wearing stronger boots.

The CA found that the Defendant had not properly addressed this issue and was therefore liable for the Claimant’s injuries.

The Trial Judge had failed to adopt a structured approach to the 1992 Regulations. It was first necessary to identify the risk of injury and then to ask if the equipment p ro vi d ed w as , s o f ar a s Continued on page 5...

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Continued from page 4...

Boots unsuitable for riding off road practicable, suitable to prevent or adequately control that risk.

It is only if the equipment was effective or it was not practicable to make the equipment effective, that there is any need to consider whether the equipment is appropriate or take account of ergonomic requirements or the Claimant’s state of health pursuant to the Regulations.

The CA found the boots were not suitable so as to ensure that serious injury was prevented.

This case illustrates the onerous nature of the Regulations, as foreseeability or the likelihood of injury is irrelevant. As Longmore LJ commented “this is a sea change from the old concepts of common law negligence.”

It is important for defendants to plead and to provide evidence to prove, that it was not practicable for the protective equipment to be used for the prevention of significant injury.

This was not done in this case.

Motocross boots may have been

impractical because of the necessity for the police trainees to walk in the boots as well as ride in them.

However this was not properly addressed at the Trial.

For further information contact Mark Dyson - see page 8 Blair v Chief Constable of Sussex CA [2012] EWCA Civ 633

A common sense approach to ‘reasonable care’ Over a 5 year period, a small Co-op store in Heaton Moor, Manchester was repeatedly targeted by armed robbers.

Cowardly threats of violence (with screwdrivers, knives etc) were made against members of staff, to secure access to goods and the content of the till.

security guards), the existing risk a s s e s s me n t a n d s u b s e q u e n t protective measures were adequate safeguards to deter a would be robber and there were unlikely to be any truly preventative measures capable of eradicating the risk altogether.

3 employees subsequently suffered PTSD and other psychiatric injury from the trauma of those events, claiming against their employer for having failed in its duty to take reasonable care for their safety.

Their criticisms centred on the lack of a security screen at the till or any enduring security guard presence.

Commercial factors were also considered. An already loss making vent u re co uld h a ve bec o me untenable had the employer been compelled to introduce all the possible measures open to it.

At first instance and then unanimously in the Court of Appeal the claims were dismissed. While there was more that the employer could have done (the security screening and provision of full time

The courts have been ready to impose strict liability on the operators of commercial ventures in many instances, belying the principle that regardless of ‘fault’ if you take the ‘rewards’ you also shoulder the risk.

The hard working ladies of the Heaton Moor Co-op may feel aggrieved when their employer could

have done more to protect them and yet they remain uncompensated, but the Court of Appeal has taken a step to redress the balance.

Subsequent application of the decision will be telling, but there is a clear willingness to set realistic and effective standards that reduce risk without fundamentally prejudicing commercial sustainability.

The principles set out by Lord Young of Graffham in his ‘Common Sense, Common Safety’ report pre empted the outcome of the Court of Appeal’s decision and insurers, businesses and all the people they continue to gainfully employ will ultimately benefit from that realistic approach.

For further information contact Chris Gough - see page 8 Mitchell v United Co-operatives Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 348

Contraction of Legionnaire’s Disease on holiday not an accident Plexus Law has had recent trial success defending an interesting claim on behalf of Chartis Insurance concerning a travel policy dispute.

A claim for damages was brought against Chartis by the Claimant (C) af te r h e r h usb a nd all eg e dl y contracted Legionnaire’s Disease (the Disease) whilst on holiday in

Egypt. This is a respiratory illness which can develop following the inhalation of contaminated water droplets. The deceased (D) died from the effects of the disease within a few weeks of returning to the UK.

payment of £150,000 if D was involved in an accident on holiday which resulted in his death within 12 months of the accident date. The policy was silent on the definition of an ‘accident’.

D had taken out a travel insurance policy, which was underwritten by Chartis. The policy provided for a

C argued that D had died as a result of an accident. The success of the Continued on page 6...

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Continued from page 5...

Contraction of Legionnaire’s Disease on holiday not an accident claim rested on whether the contraction of the Disease by D could be defined as an ‘accident’ pursuant to the policy.

Whilst it was conceded that D had, on the balance of probabilities, contracted the Disease whilst in Egypt, the claim was defended on the ground that the word ‘accident’ should be given its ordinary and natural meaning and that it was not the intention of the policy to provide cover for diseases contracted whilst on holiday.

At trial in Luton County Court, HHJ Everall found that D could be said

to have accidentally inhaled contaminated water droplets and this was an unexpected occurrence. However, this did not satisfy the terms of the policy which required D to have been involved in an accident and the inhalation of water droplets did not amount to an accident.

The trial involved interesting submissions on W orkmen’s Compensation cases for diseases contracted at work and recent cases of deep vein thrombosis under the Montreal Convention with regard to the meaning of the word ‘accident’.

This case highlights that where there is a dispute on the terms of an insurance policy, words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning and consideration should be given to the true intention of the policy.

For further information contact Rebecca Gibb - see page 8 Susan Payne (Widow and Executrix of the Estate of John Payne (deceased)) v Chartis Insurance UK Limited, Luton County Court, January 2012

Limitation hope for defendants The 3 Claimants, who had been in considering proportionality employed by the Defendant, had failed to take into account developed Hand Arm Vibration that these were lead cases in a Syndrome. The Defendant ceased group action; trading in 2005. Another 26 claims had been notified to the company h a d o v e r e s t i m a t e d t h e difficulties faced by the and these 3 cases were being Defendant in defending the treated as lead cases for the claims. others.

2 other Claimants had issued proceedings in time and their cases were proceeding. Elias LJ accepted that the Judge Plexus Law represented the had made a technical error in not focusing in detail on the period of Defendant. delay after the expiry of the However the The Judge concluded that the limitation period.

Claimants had constructive delay between the date of knowledge that they had sustained c o n s t r u c t i v e a n d / o r a c t u a l an injury that could be partly knowledge could be taken into attributable to the negligence of the account when considering all of the Defendant in 1998/99 and actual circumstances in accordance with knowledge in 2007. The delay Donavon v Gwentoys Ltd [1990] between the expiry of the limitation 1 WLR 472. These delays were period and the issuing of highly material in assessing the proceedings varied between 1 forensic prejudice to the Defendant.

The limited delay after the expiry of month and 4.5 years. the limitation period was of no real The Claimants appealed on the significance and didn’t prejudice grounds that the Judge: the Defendant.

had failed to take into account that the appropriate period for considering the question of delay, was from the expiry of the limitation period and not from the date of constructive knowledge;

The Claimants’ own Expert had assessed the Claimants’ likely exposure at around 1m/s². Elias LJ held that the Judge was entitled to conclude that there was considerable uncertainty as to whether the claims would succeed and that the Defendant would face h a d u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e serious problems in defending the strength of the Claimants’ cases as a result of the delay. The cases; issue of liability would be

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determined by detailed evidence about the use of vibrating tools.

The Claimants argued that as there were 2 claims proceeding on the issue of breach of duty; the prejudice to the Defendant and the additional cost that it would have to incur would be limited. This was rejected by the Judge who considered that each case would turn on its own facts. He also took into account that the parties would incur a disproportionate amount of costs compared to the amount of likely recovery.

It is particularly helpful to defendants that the Court of Appeal accepted that it was appropriate for the Judge to consider proportionality. All of the appeals failed including for the Claimant whose delay had only been for 1 month.

This decision should encourage defendants to contest claims on limitation grounds even where the delay after the expiry of the limitation period is modest.

For further information contact Elmira Adams - see page 8 Cairns-Jones & ORS v Christie Tyler South Wales West Division [2010] EWCA Civ 1642

Page 7

Mother negligent for using booster seat The Claimant was 3 years and 2 months old when she was seriously injured whilst travelling on a booster seat in her mother’s car which was in collision with the Defendant. Liability was admitted on behalf of the Defendant who was killed in the accident.

A contribution was sought from the Claimant’s mother under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 on the grounds that she was negligent in using a booster seat as a restraint for the Claimant rather than a child seat.

The manufacturer’s instructions stated that the booster seat was suitable for children aged 4 - 10 years old and weighing 15kgs - 36kgs and being 101 - 145cm tall. The Claimant weighed 15kgs but did not meet the other 2 criteria. The warning given by the manufacturers was that if the booster seat was not used in accordance with the guidelines, there was an increased risk of serious injury or even death.

The Claimant’s mother argued that she was entitled to make a judgement as to which restraint was more suitable.

Blair J held that the issue was whether the Claimant’s injuries would have been entirely avoided, less severe or the same if the booster seat had been used. He held that whilst manufacturer’s instructions should not be determinative of liability in all c as es, the instructions could not have been more explicit in this case.

There were no circumstances which would override the stated requirements for child safety.

R.T.R 19 and Stanton v Collinson EWCA Civ 81. It was held in these cases that a contribution of 25% was appropriate where a child was travelling on the lap of a passenger at the time of the accident with a seatbelt around them.

Negligence had already been conceded by the Defendant and Blair J held that on the balance of probabilities, had the Claimant been secured in a child seat, her injuries would have been largely avoided and a contribution of 25% was appropriate in line with Froom v Butcher [1976] 1QB 826.

For further information contact Sally Richmond - see page 8 Emma Hughes (by her aunt & litigation friend Anne Marie Armstrong) v Estate of Dayne Joshua Williams, Deceased & Louise Emma Williams [2012] EWHC 1078 (QB)

Blair J considered the causation of the injury and reviewed the cases of J (A child) v Wilkins [2001]

No damages for claimant injured in getaway The Claimant (C) was holding onto the back of a van, driven by the First Defendant (D1), when he fell sustaining a severe head injury. C had no recollection of the accident but pleaded that he fell from the rear footplate because of D1’s negligent driving.

D1 pleaded guilty to dangerous driving, however, his motor insurer, D2, declined indemnity on the grounds that the van was being used outside the scope of the policy; namely that C and D1 were jointly engaged in the theft of ladders and the accident occurred as C and D1 sought to escape the scene of the crime.

D2 sought to rely upon the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, ie that an individual knowingly engaged in an illegal activity may not recover damages arising out of that activity. Cooke J concluded

that C was positioned on the footplate to enable a swift getaway.

Cooke J surmised that in recent decisions, the key to recoverability under the doctrine has been causation and referred to the Judgments of Vellino v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [2001] EWCA Civ 1249 and Gray v Thames Trains [2008] EWCA Civ 713.

Cooke J found that D1’s driving was dangerous due to C’s position on the footplate, the unsecured ladders and the speed of the van, all of which were essential to the getaway. The unlawful activity of C in the theft and getaway was as directly causative as the driving of D1 and as such the claim failed on causation.

Cooke J rejected C’s submissions in respect of proportionality of the

tortuous activity of D1 against the criminality of C, on the basis that Gray adopted a test of causation.

Similarly, C’s arguments in respect of duty of care failed because D1 and C were jointly engaged and C had voluntarily assumed the risk as per Vellino.

This case can be distinguished from the recent case of Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532 where the Claimant was carrying drugs in a car with the intent to supply. The doctrine did not apply as the injuries were caused by the negligent driving and not the criminal activity.

For further information contact Joanne Pizzala - see page 8 Joyce (by his litigation friend Tarrant) v O’Brien & Tradex Insurance Co. Ltd. [2012] EWHC 1324(QB) Legal Matters Personal Injury and Insurance

Partner Perspective Simon Hills, Partner, comments on developments in the Plexus Public Sector Team Working for the public sector has been a core part of our business for a quarter of a century. It involves a fascinating and rewarding area of law which has spawned many ground breaking legal cases over this period, often under intense public scrutiny and media glare.

Protecting the public purse from claims for damages and costs is vital, more so now than ever, but there are many other facets to consider when defending claims such as staff morale, ethics and precedents. The wide variety and complexity of claims arising requires a team of highly experienced and technically proficient lawyers, balanced against the need to provide best value through realistic and innovative costs structures.

We were therefore delighted to have our ability to achieve that balance recognised by the recent appointments to the panel for the Metropolitan Police led National Framework Agreement and the Law Cost Draftsman framework for Central Government and wider public sector.

Claims against police forces, as with all public authorities, constitute a significant demand on resources, financial and manpower, at a time when both are stretched to the limit. Clients want us to identify early, and compensate fairly, meritorious claims but in order to protect public funds in the long term unmeritorious claims must be defended vigorously even if that may not be economically viable in the short term. I do not envisage the volume of

claims decreasing so the challenges to the public sector will only increase; more so at a time when the legal landscape is set to change following the Jackson reforms.

At Plexus we strive continuously to develop our working practices and work closely with clients to ensure that our services will meet the demands they will face in the future. In the public sector we have always had innovative charging structures and were one of the first to use defendant CCFAs. This introduces an element of risk sharing into our relationship and ensures that, provided we continue to win cases on their behalf, a significant proportion of our income is paid for by losing claimants’ insurers, not our clients.

In changing times I look forward to working with our public sector clients to develop new strategies to meet the increasing demands upon them, through risk management, novel claims procedures, and innovative charging structures which will continue to achieve that vital balance between quality and value.

For further information contact Simon Hills - details below.

Contact Information If you have any queries or require advice on any of the matters discussed in this issue, please see contact details below :

Lynn Watts

Mark Dyson

Natacha Kikkine

E: lynn.watts@plexuslaw.co.uk DDI: 0844 245 4143

E: mark.dyson@plexuslaw.co.uk DDI: 0844 245 5430

E: natacha.kikkane@plexus-law.co.uk DDI: 0207 763 6104

James Kingston

Chris Gough

Elmira Adams

E: james.kingston@plexuslaw.co.uk DDI: 0844 245 4621

E: chris.gough@plexuslaw.co.uk DDI: 0844 334 1007

E: elmira.adams@plexus-law.co.uk

Chris White

Rebecca Gibb

E: chris.white@plexuslaw.co.uk DDI: 0844 245 4159

E: rebecca.gibb@plexuslaw.co.uk DDI: 0844 245 4214

Anthony Baker

Sally Richmond

E: anthony.baker@plexuslaw.co.uk DDI: 0844 245 4202

E: sally.richmond@plexuslaw.co.uk DDI: 0844 984 5390

If you have any suggestions for future issues, please email jason.omalley@parabis.co.uk

Simon Hills

Joanne Pizzala

www.parabislaw.co.uk

E: simon.hills@plexuslaw.co.uk DDI: 0844 245 4133

E: joanne.pizzala@plexuslaw.co.uk DDI: 0844 245 4772

DDI: 01386 769166

The content of this newsletter is merely informative and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice.

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