JS 44 (Rev. 1/2013)
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CIVIL COVER SHEET
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS
EARLINE SKATES
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF FREEPORT
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff
County of Residence of First Listed Defendant
NASSAU
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) NOTE:
NASSAU
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY) IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.
Attorneys (If Known)
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) HENRY LAW GROUP,825 E. GATE BLVD.,STE 106, GARDEN CITY, NY 11530 | Ph: 516-366-4367 Fax: 516-688-3955
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an “X” in One Box Only) ’ 1
U.S. Government Plaintiff
’ 3
Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)
’ 2
U.S. Government Defendant
’ 4
Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)
III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an “X” in One Box for Plaintiff (For Diversity Cases Only) PTF Citizen of This State ’ 1
DEF ’ 1
and One Box for Defendant) PTF DEF Incorporated or Principal Place ’ 4 ’ 4 of Business In This State
Citizen of Another State
’ 2
’
2
Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State
’ 5
’ 5
Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country
’ 3
’
3
Foreign Nation
’ 6
’ 6
IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an “X” in One Box Only) CONTRACT ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
’ ’ ’ ’ ’
TORTS
110 Insurance 120 Marine 130 Miller Act 140 Negotiable Instrument 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment 151 Medicare Act 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans) 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran’s Benefits 160 Stockholders’ Suits 190 Other Contract 195 Contract Product Liability 196 Franchise
’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
REAL PROPERTY 210 Land Condemnation 220 Foreclosure 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 240 Torts to Land 245 Tort Product Liability 290 All Other Real Property
’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
PERSONAL INJURY 310 Airplane 315 Airplane Product Liability 320 Assault, Libel & Slander 330 Federal Employers’ Liability 340 Marine 345 Marine Product Liability 350 Motor Vehicle 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability 360 Other Personal Injury 362 Personal Injury Medical Malpractice CIVIL RIGHTS 440 Other Civil Rights 441 Voting 442 Employment 443 Housing/ Accommodations 445 Amer. w/Disabilities Employment 446 Amer. w/Disabilities Other 448 Education
FORFEITURE/PENALTY
PERSONAL INJURY ’ 365 Personal Injury Product Liability ’ 367 Health Care/ Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability ’ 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY ’ 370 Other Fraud ’ 371 Truth in Lending ’ 380 Other Personal Property Damage ’ 385 Property Damage Product Liability PRISONER PETITIONS Habeas Corpus: ’ 463 Alien Detainee ’ 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence ’ 530 General ’ 535 Death Penalty Other: ’ 540 Mandamus & Other ’ 550 Civil Rights ’ 555 Prison Condition ’ 560 Civil Detainee Conditions of Confinement
’ 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 ’ 690 Other
BANKRUPTCY ’ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 ’ 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 PROPERTY RIGHTS ’ 820 Copyrights ’ 830 Patent ’ 840 Trademark
’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
LABOR 710 Fair Labor Standards Act 720 Labor/Management Relations 740 Railway Labor Act 751 Family and Medical Leave Act 790 Other Labor Litigation 791 Employee Retirement Income Security Act
’ ’ ’ ’ ’
SOCIAL SECURITY 861 HIA (1395ff) 862 Black Lung (923) 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) 864 SSID Title XVI 865 RSI (405(g))
FEDERAL TAX SUITS ’ 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) ’ 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609
OTHER STATUTES ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
’
375 False Claims Act 400 State Reapportionment 410 Antitrust 430 Banks and Banking 450 Commerce 460 Deportation 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 480 Consumer Credit 490 Cable/Sat TV 850 Securities/Commodities/ Exchange 890 Other Statutory Actions 891 Agricultural Acts 893 Environmental Matters 895 Freedom of Information Act 896 Arbitration 899 Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes
IMMIGRATION ’ 462 Naturalization Application ’ 465 Other Immigration Actions
V. ORIGIN (Place an “X” in One Box Only) ’ 1 Original Proceeding
’ 2 Removed from State Court
’ 3
Remanded from Appellate Court
’ 4 Reinstated or Reopened
’ 5 Transferred from Another District (specify)
’ 6 Multidistrict Litigation
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
42 USC 2000e - 2000e-17
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:
Disparate treatment; FMLA; ADA
’ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION VII. REQUESTED IN UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. COMPLAINT: VIII. RELATED CASE(S) (See instructions): IF ANY JUDGE DATE
CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: ’ Yes ’ No JURY DEMAND:
DEMAND $
DOCKET NUMBER
SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
/s/ Chauncey D. Henry, Esq.
03/04/2015 FOR OFFICE USE ONLY RECEIPT #
AMOUNT
APPLYING IFP
JUDGE
MAG. JUDGE
Case 2:15-cv-01136 Document 1-1 Filed 03/04/15 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 36 CERTIFICATION OF ARBITRATION ELIGIBILITY
Local Arbitration Rule 83.10 provides that with certain exceptions, actions seeking money damages only in an amount not in excess of $150,000, exclusive of interest and costs, are eligible for compulsory arbitration. The amount of damages is presumed to be below the threshold amount unless a certification to the contrary is filed.
I, ______________________, counsel for __________________, do hereby certify that the above captioned civil action is ineligible for compulsory arbitration for the following reason(s): monetary damages sought are in excess of $150,000, exclusive of interest and costs, the complaint seeks injunctive relief, the matter is otherwise ineligible for the following reason DISCLOSURE STATEMENT - FEDERAL RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE 7.1 Identify any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more or its stocks:
RELATED CASE STATEMENT (Section VIII on the Front of this Form) Please list all cases that are arguably related pursuant to Division of Business Rule 50.3.1 in Section VIII on the front of this form. Rule 50.3.1 (a) provides that “A civil case is “related” to another civil case for purposes of this guideline when, because of the similarity of facts and legal issues or because the cases arise from the same transactions or events, a substantial saving of judicial resources is likely to result from assigning both cases to the same judge and magistrate judge.” Rule 50.3.1 (b) provides that “ A civil case shall not be deemed “related” to another civil case merely because the civil case: (A) involves identical legal issues, or (B) involves the same parties.” Rule 50.3.1 (c) further provides that “Presumptively, and subject to the power of a judge to determine otherwise pursuant to paragraph (d), civil cases shall not be deemed to be “related” unless both cases are still pending before the court.”
NY-E DIVISION OF BUSINESS RULE 50.1(d)(2) 1.)
Is the civil action being filed in the Eastern District removed from a New York State Court located in Nassau or Suffolk County:_________________________
2.)
If you answered “no” above: a) Did the events or omissions giving rise to the claim or claims, or a substantial part thereof, occur in Nassau or Suffolk County?_________________________ b) Did the events or omissions giving rise to the claim or claims, or a substantial part thereof, occur in the Eastern District?_________________________
If your answer to question 2 (b) is “No,” does the defendant (or a majority of the defendants, if there is more than one) reside in Nassau or Suffolk County, or, in an interpleader action, does the claimant (or a majority of the claimants, if there is more than one) reside in Nassau or Suffolk County?______________________ (Note: A corporation shall be considered a resident of the County in which it has the most significant contacts). BAR ADMISSION I am currently admitted in the Eastern District of New York and currently a member in good standing of the bar of this court. Yes No Are you currently the subject of any disciplinary action (s) in this or any other state or federal court? Yes (If yes, please explain) No
I certify the accuracy of all information provided above.
/s/ Chauncey D. Henry, Esq. Signature:____________________________________________
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------X EARLINE SKATES,
Index No.: 15 cv 1136
Plaintiff, COMPLAINT -againstJury Trial Demanded INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF FREEPORT, Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------X ! ! Plaintiff, EARLINE SKATES, by and through her attorney CHAUNCEY D. HENRY, ESQ., OF HENRY LAW GROUP, alleges and complains of the Defendant as follows: INTRODUCTION 1. This action is brought against Defendant on the basis of it discriminating against the Plaintiff! based on race and disability. Defendant engaged in discrimination by inflicting willful and deliberate disparate treatment of Plaintiff during the course of her employment, subjecting Plaintiff to a hostile work environment fraught with racial discrimination, wrongfully terminating the plaintiff for reasons driven by discriminatory animus based on Plaintiff’s disability and/or perceived disability status and/or participation in protected activity.!Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), as codified 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), as codified 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. §1983; New York State, Executive Law, Article 15, Human Rights Executive Law § 296, under Pendant Jurisdiction. Plaintiff seeks to recover monetary damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements. Claims asserted under the 1 !
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foregoing causes of action(s) are for those non-time barred periods to which Plaintiff has fully exhausted all administrative requirements thereunder, or to those claims that are reasonably related to Plaintiff’s underlying claims. Plaintiff seeks to recover monetary damages, front pay, back pay, emotional damages, equitable relief, reinstatement, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and disbursements. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. Jurisdiction is specifically, and properly, conferred upon this United States District Court by the aforementioned statutes, as well as under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. 3. Jurisdiction may also be appropriate under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985(3), as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, and any related claims under New York law conferred upon this United States District Court by Pendant Jurisdiction. 4. This action is brought against Defendant for employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, Disparate Treatment under Title VII, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117, Retaliation under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, as codified, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, as codified, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601 et seq. 5. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) in light of the fact that the events described herein all occurred within the territorial confines of the Eastern District of New York. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 6. Plaintiff filed a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and was issued a Right to Sue letter dated December 3, 2014, receiving it in or
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about December 7, 2014, therefore permitting Plaintiff to properly bring suit in an appropriate United States District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 7. Said Right to Sue letter is attached herewith as Exhibit A, and is incorporated herein by reference. As such, Plaintiff has therefore exhausted all required administrative remedies. PARTIES 8. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff Earline Skates, ( “Plaintiff,” or “Skates”) is an African American female, belonging to those classes of female individuals of African American origin, residing in the State of New York, with an address of 182 Putnam Ave., Freeport, New York 11520. 9. Upon information and belief, during the relevant period herein, Plaintiff was an “employee” of Defendant within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.A § 2611(2)(A) and at all times relevant in this action. Upon information and belief, during the relevant period herein, Defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.A § 2611(4)(A) and at all times relevant to this action. 10. Defendant, the Incorporated Village of Freeport (“Defendant” or “Freeport”) is a municipal entity in the State of New York, with a headquarters located at 46 N. Ocean Ave, Freeport, NY 11520. 11. Upon information and belief, during the relevant period herein, the Defendant employed in excess of fifteen (15) employees at any given time, and is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 12. Upon information and belief, during the relevant period herein, the Defendant employed in excess of fifty (50) employees at any given time, and is an employer within the meaning of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.
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13. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was employed by Freeport, first, as a seasonal employee, then, as a permanent clerk, and later, as a recreational attendant. 14. During the course of her time as an employee of Freeport, Plaintiff was assigned to work at the Defendant’s Assessor’s Office, and later, the Freeport Recreation Center (hereinafter “the FRC”). 15. Upon information and belief, within all times mentioned herein, Defendant Freeport employed Victoria Dinielli ( “Dinielli”) as Manager of the FRC. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Nature of Freeport’s Business 16. Defendant is a municipal entity with its principal place of business in New York, located at 46 N. Ocean Avenue, Freeport, NY 11520. Upon information and belief, the FRC is under the direct supervision of Freeport. 17. Defendant, Freeport, during the relevant period complained of herein, was an employer as defined and codified within the aforementioned statutes. 18. Plaintiff, during the relevant period herein, was first employed by Defendant Freeport at the Freeport Village Assessor’s Office, located at 46 North Ocean Avenue in Freeport, New York until April 3, 2013, when she was ordered to report to work at the FRC, located at 130 E. Merrick Road in Freeport, New York. Plaintiff’s Membership in a Protected Class 19. Plaintiff is an African American and disabled. 20. Upon information and belief, during the period relevant herein, Plaintiff Skates suffered from a qualified disability following the injury sustained to her right wrist. Plaintiff’s Qualifications and Employment History with Defendant Freeport
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21. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant, Freeport, in or about July 2009, initially assuming the title of seasonal employee at Defendant’s Assessor’s Office, located at 46 N. Ocean Ave, Freeport, NY 11520. 22. Plaintiff received an Associate’s Degree in Paralegal Studies from Nassau Community College in 2005. 23. Plaintiff received a Bachelor’s Degree in Paralegal Studies from Kaplan University in 2012. 24. Upon information and belief, from July 20, 2010 to April 2, 2013, Plaintiff was assigned to work in the Village of Freeport’s Assessor’s Office. 25. During the relevant period hereto, Plaintiff Skates served as an employee at the Village of Freeport’s Assessor’s Office until June 8, 2012, when she became a full-time permanent clerk for one (1) year and four (4) months, earning an annual salary of $35,200 exclusive of overtime, stock options, and other fiscal benefits of employment. 26. Upon information and belief, as a full-time permanent clerk, Plaintiff Skates’ work duties were primarily comprised of paralegal tasks. 27. Plaintiff’s duties included, inter alia, assisting seniors with applications for tax reductions, preparing paperwork for assessor hearings, clerical work, data entry, and working with the building department in the issuance of permits. Plaintiff’s Satisfactory Job Performance 28. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff executed her duties in the Assessor’s Office conscientiously for several years. 29. Upon information and belief, aside from the circumstances giving rise to the instant complaint, Plaintiff enjoyed a blemish-free four (4) year career with the Village of Freeport. Plaintiff Skates’ Constitutionally Protected Activity
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30. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff actively participated in Freeport politics, and was a member of the legal team of “The Friends of Andrew Hardwick,” a group dedicated to the reelection of Defendant’s former Mayor, Andrew Hardwick, in the March 19, 2013 mayoral election. 31. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff’s political activism also included participation in a local campaign in support of “Resolution 18/44” to keep broadcasts of Defendant’s Board of Trustees meetings on local Cablevision channels 18 and 44. 32. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff attended the Defendant’s Memorial Day Parade in 2012, collecting residents’ signatures in support of Resolution 18/44, when she was observed by Trustee Jorge Martinez and Trustee Carmen Piñeyro. Upon further information and belief, Defendant’s Superintendent of Department of Public Works, Scott Richardson, was instructed by Trustee Martinez to order Skates to cease collecting signatures. 33. At a June 4th, 2012 meeting of the Defendant’s Board of Trustees immediately following the 2012 Memorial Day Parade, during public comments, Trustee Martinez voiced his disapproval of Plaintiff’s behavior at the parade, and publicly declared that Plaintiff Skates should not have been employed by the Village. 34. In the course of Plaintiff’s work on the legal team of “Friends of Andrew Hardwick,” Plaintiff investigated mayoral candidate Robert T. Kennedy’s legal residency, as it was rumored that he lived in Lynbrook, New York, rather than in the Village of Freeport. 35. Plaintiff’s investigation of Mayor Hardwick’s opponent led her to the deed office where she discovered some discrepancies on Mr. Kennedy’s property. 36. Upon information and belief, while she reviewed Mr. Kennedy’s petitions, Plaintiff found approximately 300 illegal signatures, including signatures from unregistered voters and
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deceased persons, a fifty thousand dollar contribution to a political party, instances of nonresidents using the addresses of the families ousted from Freeport by Hurricane Sandy in order to vote, votes cast by deceased persons, non-resident voting by absentee ballot, and the total number of popular votes exceeding the signatures in the election books. Defendant Retaliates against Plaintiff Skates for Participation in Protected Activity 37. Plaintiff filed a charge with the New York State Division of Human Rights on or about August 17th, 2012 in response to being targeted for discipline and ostracism by Defendant following the aforementioned events. 38. Upon information and belief, on or about November 2012, Plaintiff was physically assaulted by Freeport resident Mark Davella (“Davella”). Davella was a supporter of Mayor Hardwick’s opponent, and was aware of Plaintiff Skates’ participation in the incumbent Mayor’s political campaign. 39. Upon information and belief, Davella used abusive and profane language, poked Plaintiff, and jabbed her arms. 40. Upon further information and belief, Davella had access to Plaintiff’s personal information, including work hours, personal work schedule, and personal information on file with Defendant’s human resources. 41. Upon information and belief, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is currently conducting an ongoing investigation into the 2013 mayoral election and the illegal practices found by the New York State Comptroller’s Office. 42. Upon information and belief, on or about the time of the election, Defendant’s Village Attorney Howard E. Colton was aware that Plaintiff had recently come out of foreclosure in
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2012, was in a precarious financial position, and that she had filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights in August of that year. 43. Plaintiff's reassignment from her position as a Permanent Clerk at Defendant Freeport's Assessor's Office, to the position of Recreation Attendant at the FRC, took place a mere two (2) weeks after Mayor Hardwick's opponent won the election. Plaintiff Suffers Adverse Employment Action Based on Race 44. Robert Kennedy was elected Mayor after the March 19, 2013 Village mayoral election, and upon information and belief, shortly thereafter, all African Americans appointed or hired under former Mayor Hardwick, some of whom had worked for the Village of Freeport for years, were either transferred out of their positions, or fired. 45. On or about April 2, 2013, two weeks after Andrew Hardwick was defeated in the mayoral election and succeeded by Robert T. Kennedy, Plaintiff was informed by Defendant Freeport’s Director of Human Resources, Connor Kirwan, that she was being transferred to the FRC to work as a Recreation Attendant beginning on April 3, 2013. 46. Upon information and belief, had Plaintiff refused to transfer departments, she would’ve been terminated from employment with Defendant. 47. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff’s transfer to the FRC involved a change in schedule, as well as a drastic and substantial alteration of the conditions of her employment. 48. Whereas Plaintiff had previously been responsible for clerical and paralegal tasks as a Permanent Clerk at Defendant’s Assessor’s Office, Plaintiff was now expected to perform janitorial work as a Recreation Attendant at the FRC. Defendant Sustains a Hostile Work Environment
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49. Upon information and belief, during her time as a Recreation Attendant at the FRC, Plaintiff continued working alongside employees of the Defendant; her immediate Supervisor was initially James Buford, who was later replaced by Supervisor John Henry, and the Manager at the FRC was Dinielli. 50. Plaintiff’s reassignment, and the subsequent mistreatment to follow, were causes of considerable stress and anxiety for her, and would impact her sleeping and eating habits, as well as her emotional stability, requiring her to seek therapy throughout the relevant period hereto. 51. Upon information and belief, throughout the relevant period hereto, Plaintiff suffered verbal insults and abuse from some of her co-workers. 52. Upon information and belief, all of Plaintiff’s superiors were Caucasian, except for James Buford, who was of mixed ancestry, and who was later replaced by John Henry. 53. Plaintiff’s duties as Recreation Attendant at the FRC were comprised of menial, physically demanding tasks including sweeping, dusting, painting, cleaning recreation center equipment, mopping floors, cleaning paint off of walls and tables, cleaning bathrooms, and cleaning the parking lot of the FRC, which extended from Merrick Road to Mill Road. 54. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff was assigned especially difficult tasks, including scraping paint off of tables and walls using a knife, cleaning gym lockers with a toothbrush, and cleaning the FRC’s parking lot, an area roughly the size of two football fields. 55. The position of Recreation Attendant demanded considerable physical exertion from Plaintiff, who is right-handed, in cleaning large areas on the FRC’s premises, which caused the ligaments of her right wrist to tear, a disability necessitating treatment which continues to this day.
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56. On or about April 4, 2013, the second day of Plaintiff’s new job as Recreation Attendant, Dinielli asked Plaintiff for her attendance card, which was in the possession of Plaintiff’s previous department head, Paul Nehrich. 57. Upon information and belief, on or about April 11, 2013, Dinielli approached Plaintiff in the rink area of the FRC where Plaintiff was working alongside a co-worker, Victoria “Vicky” Groden (“Groden”). Dinielli began to publicly discuss Plaintiff’s personal business matters in the presence of Groden, particularly Plaintiff’s accumulated vacation days and comp time, stating “[Skates’s] attendance card was not found, so we are going to start you at zero.” 58. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff had, up to the aforementioned time, accumulated five (5) vacation days and thirty-six (36) hours of comp time since December of 2012. 59. On or about April 17, 2013, Dinielli wrote up Plaintiff for insubordination due to a verbal altercation with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was put on probation for twelve (12) months and made to attend Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) counseling beginning April 19, 2013 and concluding on May 10, 2013. 60. Upon information and belief, on or about April 30, 2013, Skates complained to her union about the work environment she had been experiencing as a Recreational Attendant at the FRC, as an employee of Defendant. 61. Plaintiff grieved that she had been refused a key card to the employee parking lot, been reprimanded by Dinielli in a letter dated April 17, 2013, was forced to undergo workplace sensitivity training and twelve (12) months of probation, and was subjected to a hostile work environment.
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62. Upon information and belief, on or about May 8, 2013, Dinielli reassigned Plaintiff’s tasks from cleaning the senior room to cleaning the exercise room, ostensibly due to an incident involving a verbal disagreement with a senior citizen that had occurred a day prior. 63. Upon information and belief, during the aforementioned May 8, 2013 exchange between Plaintiff and Dinielli regarding Skates’s reassignment, Dinielli raised her voice and became hostile towards Plaintiff, and Plaintiff consequently began to experience chest pains and had to leave to seek medical attention. After receiving medical attention for her chest pains, Skates was advised by her treating doctor not to return to work for one week. 64. It was not until May 15, 2013, when Plaintiff met with her union president, Peter Reinke, Supervisor James Buford, and Dinielli, that Defendant acknowledged Plaintiff’s deserved accumulation of work hours and its agents signed an affidavit stating that Skates’s attendance card was accurate. 65. On May 30, 2013, Plaintiff was admitted for therapy with Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Rockville Centre, due to work-related anxiety, stress, and depression. 66. On or about this time, Plaintiff was also prescribed Xanax by her primary care physician, Dr. Gupta, to aid Plaintiff in coping with work-related anxiety. Defendant's Disparate Treatment of Plaintiff 67. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff was the only employee with whom Dinielli spoke with publicly regarding private matters such as accumulated work hours. 68. Upon information and belief, another Recreation Attendant, Naomi, enjoyed fewer, less onerous responsibilities than Plaintiff, having been assigned to clean the showers in the women’s locker room.
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69. Upon further information and belief, another Recreation Attendant, Gwen, was responsible for cleaning the daycare room. 70. Upon information and belief, Dinielli’s reprimand of Plaintiff, requiring that she undergo workplace sensitivity training and twelve months of probation, due to one incidence of insubordination, was disparate from the penalties awarded to employees who were not members of Plaintiff’s protected class. 71. Upon information and belief, on or about April 16, 2013, Plaintiff Skates requested a key card for access to the FRC’s employee parking lot from Dinielli, and was told that no parking spaces were available despite vacant spaces visible in the lot, and the fact that other employees had received key cards in the past. 72. On or about May 22, 2013, Plaintiff was informed by Dinielli that her Monday through Friday, 8:30AM to 4:30PM work schedule had been changed, providing that Plaintiff would work Sunday through Thursday, from 7:00AM to 3:00PM, forcing Plaintiff to work on Sundays in violation of her religious prohibition against working on the Sabbath, even though she had requested that she not be required to work on Sundays. 73. Upon information and belief, during the aforementioned May 22, 2013 meeting, when Skates informed Dinielli that she could not work on Sunday due to her religious convictions, Dinielli responded “[t]hat is the schedule and I am not going to change it.” Upon information and belief, other employees of Defendant who worked at the FRC had requested Sundays off for religious reasons and were accommodated accordingly. 74. Towards the end of May 2013, Plaintiff’s schedule was adjusted again by Dinielli such that Skates would no longer work on Wednesdays and Sundays, although upon information and
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belief, at the time this new schedule was made, she was the only employee at the FRC who did not have two consecutive days off in her weekly work schedule. Plaintiff Suffers Adverse Employment Action for Medical Leave 75. Between June 7, 2013 and July 2, 2013, Skates was staying intermittently at the hospital due to various medical conditions, including severe stomach and back pains which were reportedly stress induced, and for possible suicidal ideation brought on by work-related stress, for which Plaintiff, upon information and belief, submitted the required medical documents to Defendant. 76. Upon information and belief, on July 5, 2013, Skates responded to a letter she had received from Dinielli that same day, informing Plaintiff that she had “abandoned” her job. Skates replied that she had been staying in the hospital and would return to work on July 8, 2013. 77. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff returned to work on July 8, 2013, however, the following day, July 9, 2013, Skates, upon instruction, attended a meeting with Dinielli, Mr. Kirwan, and Mr. Reinke during which she was informed that she would be suspended for two (2) days without pay because she had allegedly failed to call in sick during the aforementioned absences. 78. By September of 2013, Plaintiff, upon information and belief, Plaintiff was not allowed to go on breaks, had nowhere on the FRC property to park her car, and had been isolated from her coworkers. Plaintiff Suffers a Qualified Disability 79. Upon information and belief, on or about October 20, 2012, Plaintiff suffered a work related injury to her right wrist. 80. Plaintiff’s wrist required surgery, and Plaintiff’s right arm was placed in a sling.
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81. Plaintiff would also undergo physical therapy for her right wrist. 82. Upon information and belief, upon notifying Defendant of the work related injury sustained to her wrist, Plaintiff sought medical treatment. 83. Upon information and belief, as a result of said injury, Plaintiff had limited use of her right wrist and limited use of her right hand, being unable to lift anything weighing above two (2) pounds and being unable to make a range of motions with said hand. Freeport's Business Justification Mere Pretext 84. Defendant, in justifying its business decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment, cited Plaintiff's alleged failure submit medical documentation, and alleged use of derogatory comments as its primary reasons, amounting to mere pretext and innuendo. Plaintiff's Wrongful Termination by Defendant 85. Plaintiff sought treatment for the pain in her wrist on or about October 22, 2013, and was informed by the treating doctor that she had suffered torn ligaments. The doctor advised Skates that she would need to be out of work for months in order for the damaged ligaments to heal. 86. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff’s arm was placed in a sling, and her ability to perform the physically demanding tasks required of Recreational Attendants was severely limited by her injury. 87. On the same day, October 22, 2013, Plaintiff applied for Worker’s Compensation. 88. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff also supplied Dinielli with a doctor’s note, specifying that she would have to be out of work for at least three months.
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89. Upon further information and belief, the same day, October 22, 2013, Plaintiff called into work from the hospital emergency room, and spoke with her supervisor, John Henry. Mr. Henry informed Plaintiff that if she did not report to work immediately, she would be fired. 90. Upon information and belief, later on that same day, Plaintiff, who reported to the FRC after being contacted by Mr. Henry, was informed that Conor Kirwan from Human Resources wanted to speak with her, and she was met by representatives from her union. 91. Later the same day, when Plaintiff met with Mr. Kirwan, she was notified by Howard Colton, corporate counsel for Defendant, that she was being terminated from her employment with Freeport for having made derogatory comments and her failures to call in sick. 92. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff duly and timely called in to notify Defendant of her absence on October 22nd, 2013, and never made the derogatory comments alleged by corporate counsel when she was informed of her termination from employment. 93. Upon information and belief, the allegations that Plaintiff used derogatory language and ethnic slurs were based entirely on the accusations of Groden and another FRC employee, Annique Adams, both of whom bore personal animosity towards the Plaintiff. 94. Upon further information and belief, Defendant Freeport continued to hire non-disabled, nonAfrican American Recreational Attendants subsequent to Plaintiff's wrongful termination. Plaintiff’s Damages 95. As a result of the Defendant’s wrongful, willful, malicious, reckless and/or otherwise intentional discriminatory conduct, Plaintiff was wrongfully reassigned from a position in which she was fully qualified and worked with incredible diligence to attain; the Plaintiff was subsequently terminated from the position to which she was transferred; the Plaintiff’s opportunities for advancement have been foreclosed due to discriminatory reasons; the
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Plaintiff’s membership in a protected class, work related disability and the circumstances surrounding her medical leave and subsequent termination, exposed her to ridicule, harassment, embarrassment, serious physical and mental anguish as a result of the constant harassment, ridicule, and embarrassment perpetuated by Defendant and/or its agents, subordinates or the like, as well as compensatory damages all occurring as a direct result of Defendant’s discriminatory acts and/or omissions; loss of promotional opportunities; retirement and employment benefits; back pay and front pay; emotional damages; punitive damages and attorney fees and costs. Federal Causes of Action COUNT I TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) FOR UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS MAKING CHARGES, TESTIFYING, ASSISTING, OR PARTICIPATING IN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS: Retaliation 96. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 through paragraph 95 inclusive of the instant complaint, with the same force, effect, and veracity as though fully set forth hereto. 97. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, national origin, and/or Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s discriminatory practices and participation in protected conduct. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 98. Defendant Freeport, through its agents and employees, retaliated against Plaintiff based upon Plaintiff’s participation in protected activity and/or opposition to discrimination in direct violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 42.U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Plaintiff 16 !
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opposed Defendant’s discriminatory acts and/or omissions, in the form of filing a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”), alleging in pertinent part, that she had been treated differently and more harshly in the terms of employment and the application of employee discipline, respectively, on the basis of race. Defendant, upon its knowledge and awareness of Plaintiff’s complaint, caused Plaintiff to suffer reassignment less than eight (8) months after first acquiring said knowledge, sufficiently creating a strong and compelling inference of retaliation. But for Plaintiff’s complaint with the NYSDHR, Plaintiff would not have endured a subsequent reassignment and eventual termination, in addition to the foregoing discriminatory set forth in greater detail hereto. 99. As a direct or proximate result of said acts, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer considerable loss of income; loss of other employment benefits, a diminution and reduction of retirement accounts, in addition to suffering from distress, humiliation, embarrassment, great financial expense, and damages to her reputation. 100. As a result of Defendant’s acts and/or omissions, Plaintiff is entitled to the maximum monetary damages and penalties available by law, as well as costs and reasonable attorney fees, the sum of which shall be determined by Jury Trial. COUNT II HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 101. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 100, inclusive of this complaint, with the same force, veracity and effect as though herein fully set forth. 102. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to discriminate against any individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 17 !
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employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The scope of protection provided by Title VII includes protection against a hostile work environment. As a direct result of Defendant's negligence, (1) Plaintiff suffered intentional discrimination because of her protected class; (2) the discrimination was pervasive or regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the Plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same race in Plaintiff’s position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability, in that the Defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. 103. As a direct result of said acts, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer loss of income, loss of other employment benefits, and has suffered and continues to suffer distress, humiliation, embarrassment, great financial expense, and damage to her reputation. 104. As a result of Defendant Freeport’s acts, Plaintiff is entitled to the maximum monetary damages and penalties available by law, as well as costs and attorneys fees, the sum to be determined by jury trial. COUNT III DISPARATE TREATMENT UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq: Race Based Discrimination 105. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 through paragraph 104 inclusive of the instant complaint, with the same force, effect, and veracity as though fully set forth hereto. 106. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 18 !
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107. Defendant Freeport, through its agents and employees discriminated against the Plaintiff in her employment based upon Plaintiff’s race, color, age, and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, as amended. Defendant Freeport caused Plaintiff to endure disparate treatment during the course of her employment with Defendant. Defendant Freeport discriminated against Plaintiff with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment due to Plaintiff’s Race. Plaintiff, as a member of the protected class of those African American employees, was subject to uneven, excessively harsh and racially motivated disciplinary action, that being, reassignment, suspension and termination for an alleged violation of Defendant Freeport's attendance policy. Plaintiff was treated more harshly than similarly situated employees who were not part of Plaintiff’s protected group. Defendant Freeport's similarly situated non-African American employees were treated more favorably than Plaintiff although having willfully violated Defendant’s employment policy. Defendant Freeport collectively attempted to, and succeeded in, bringing about Plaintiff’s untimely and wrongful termination for reasons motivated purely by discriminatory animus, while possessing no rational legitimate basis for doing so. Defendant Freeport subjected Plaintiff, and other African American employees, to an increased level of job scrutiny in comparison to Plaintiff’s non-African American and Caucasian counterparts. 108. Plaintiff was subject to disparate treatment over the course of her employment under Defendant, by and through its agents and/or administrators discriminated against Plaintiff with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment due to Plaintiff’s race and color.
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109. Upon information and belief, during the relevant period hereto, Defendant transferred Plaintiff and altered her employment responsibilities for discriminatory reasons premised on Plaintiff's race, having no legitimate reason to do so. 110. Plaintiff was publicly humiliated and denied the privileges of employment based on her race. 111. Upon information and belief, Defendant, through its agent, Dinielli, treated Plaintiff differently from her coworkers when she publicly and knowingly discussed Plaintiff’s personal business matters in the presence of others. 112. Upon information and belief, in addition to denying Plaintiff access to the employee parking lot, which was accessible to other members of the FRC’s Staff, Defendant, through its agent, Dinielli, subjected Plaintiff Skates to increased job scrutiny compared to her counterparts. 113. Upon information and belief Dinielli treated Plaintiff differently from similarly situated Recreation Attendants when disciplined Plaintiff for insubordination due to a single instance of a verbal disagreement she had had with Plaintiff Skates, and subsequently placed Plaintiff on probation for twelve (12) months and mandated that she attend Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) counseling. 114. Plaintiff’s schedule, as prepared by Defendant on May 22, 2013, through its agent, Dinielli, unjustly and discriminatorily provided that Plaintiff would work during the Sabbath, in violation of Plaintiff’s religious beliefs. Upon information and belief, when Plaintiff confronted Dinielli regarding the alteration to her work schedule, Dinielli told her “that is the schedule, and I am not going to change it.”
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115. Plaintiff’s schedule, which required her to work during the Sabbath, was only re-adjusted, upon information and belief, at the end of May, providing that she would no longer work on Wednesdays and Sundays, although at the time she was the only employee at the FRC who did not have two consecutive days off in her weekly work schedule. 116. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff’s Caucasian counterparts were treated more favorably than Plaintiff in the course of her employment at the FRC. 117. On or about October 22, 2013, Howard Colton, corporate counsel for Defendant, notified the Plaintiff that she was being terminated from her employment with Freeport for alleged derogatory comments and failure to call in sick after being in the hospital, despite having called in to notify Defendant of her absence, and having never made the derogatory comments attributed to her by Defendant. 118. Upon information and belief, Defendant has hired and/or sought applicants whom are not members of the same class as Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s old position since Plaintiff was terminated in October of 2013. 119. As a direct or proximate result of said acts, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer considerable loss of income; loss of other employment benefits, a diminution and reduction of Pension value, in addition to suffering from distress, humiliation, embarrassment, great financial expense, and damages to her reputation. 120. As a result of Defendant’s acts and/or omissions, Plaintiff is entitled to the maximum monetary damages and penalties available by law, as well as costs and reasonable attorney fees, the sum of which shall be determined by Jury Trial. COUNT IV VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981
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121. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 120, inclusive of this complaint, with the same force, veracity and effect as though herein fully set forth. 122. The above discriminatory pattern and practice based on race as committed and practiced by Defendant Freeport, its agents and employees violates 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991 (Publ. Law No. 102-406). 123. As a direct and proximate result of said acts, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer loss of employment, loss of income, loss of employment benefits, and has suffered and continues to suffer emotional distress, humiliation, great expense, embarrassment, and damage to her reputation. 124. Because of Plaintiff’s race she has been subjected to reassignment, abuse and mistreatment as detailed above and has been treated differently than those non-African American individuals who worked for Defendant at the FRC. 125. As a result of Defendant Freeport’s acts, Plaintiff is entitled to the maximum monetary damages and penalties available by law, as well as costs and attorneys fees, and punitive damages, the sum to be determined by jury trial. COUNT V FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT § 29 U.S.C. §2601 ET. SEQ. – RETALIATION AND DISCRIMINATION CLAIM 126. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 through paragraph 125 inclusive of the instant complaint, with the same force, effect, and veracity as though fully set forth hereto. 127. The Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) prohibits discrimination and retaliation against any qualified individual, exercising rights protected under the FMLA -so qualified for her 22 !
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position- suffering an adverse employment action occurring under circumstances giving rise to an inference of retaliatory intent. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, § 105(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A § 2615(a)(5). 128. Defendant Freeport, a public agency, is subject to the provisions of the FMLA. 129. Defendant had re-assigned Plaintiff from her position as full-time permanent clerk to the position of Recreation Attendant, in which capacity Plaintiff performed laborious tasks which caused significant fatigue and strain and thereby exacerbated the fragile condition of her right wrist, necessitating treatment. 130. Plaintiff suffered from a debilitating work related injury to her wrist, mandating that she utilize her medical leave in order to receive the appropriate and necessary treatment. 131. Between June 7, 2013 and July 2, 2013, Plaintiff, suffering from various ailments including severe stomach and back pains, was in and out of the hospital, for which Plaintiff did submit the necessary medical documentation to Defendant. 132. Plaintiff properly complied with policies set forth by Defendant for the reporting of injuries requiring leave, however was required to undergo differing terms, conditions and benefits of employment than those of her similarly situated non-minority colleagues. 133. On July 5, 2013, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant through its agent, Dinielli informing her that she had “abandoned” her job, to which Plaintiff responded that she had been hospitalized, and would return to work on July 8, 2013. 134. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff returned to work on July 8, 2013 as instructed, however, the following day, July 9, 2013, Plaintiff attended a meeting with Dinielli, Mr. Kirwan, and Mr. Reinke, where she was informed that she would be suspended for two (2) days without pay because she had not called in sick during the aforementioned absences.
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135. Despite her illnesses, Plaintiff had capably and dutifully carried out her assigned duties at all times as a Recreational Attendant, as she had during her employment with the Defendant at the Assessor’s Office, both as a seasonal employee and later as a full-time permanent clerk. 136. On or about October 21, 2013, Plaintiff began to sense considerable pain in her right wrist. 137. The following day, October 22, 2013, Plaintiff visited the hospital for treatment for her right wrist, and was informed by the treating doctor that she had suffered torn ligaments, a condition which required her to be out of work for months in order for the ligaments to heal. 138. Plaintiff applied for Worker’s Compensation on the same day, October 22, 2013. 139. Later that day, Plaintiff’s supervisor informed her that if she did not report to work immediately, she would be fired. 140. Plaintiff met with Defendant’s Human Resources Director, Mr. Kirwan, and she was notified by Howard Colton, corporate counsel for Defendant, that she was terminated from her employment with Freeport for having made derogatory comments and failure to call in sick when she had visited the hospital. 141. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff called in to notify Defendant of her absence on October 22nd, 2013, and never made the derogatory comments cited by corporate counsel as a reason for her termination. 142. Prior to the events giving rise to the instant action, Defendant possessed no reason or basis to terminate Plaintiff’s employment prematurely. But for Plaintiff’s injury, and subsequent medical leave, Defendant possessed no legitimate purpose for taking any adverse action against Plaintiff furthering evincing its discriminatory animus towards Plaintiff.
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143. Defendant, by and through several members of its supervisory and/or managerial staff, exhibited perverse and severe retaliatory animus towards Plaintiff evident from the conduct complained of herein. 144. Defendant’s proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff for an alleged failure to submit medical documentation, and alleged use of derogatory language was illegitimate, retaliatory and pretextual under the FMLA. 145. The temporal proximity of the adverse action taken by Defendant and against Plaintiff sufficiently creates an inference of Defendant’s retaliatory intent. 146. As a direct result of the foregoing, Plaintiff suffered enormous injury mandating an award of back pay, reinstatement or front pay, injunctive relief, reasonable attorney fees and court costs, compensatory damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages. 147. As a direct and/or indirect result of Plaintiff’s serious medical condition, and subsequent medical leave due to same, Defendant concocted and fabricated pre-textual reasons for bringing about Plaintiff’s wrongful termination. 148. As a proximate result of Defendant’s discriminatory acts as committed against Plaintiff on the basis of her exercise of rights under the FMLA, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer substantial loss, including the loss of past and future earning, bonuses, deferred compensation, and other employment benefits, severe and lasting embarrassment, humiliation and anguish. COUNT VI DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117, AS AMENDED BY THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 (“ADAAA”)
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149. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 through paragraph 148 inclusive of the instant complaint, with the same force, effect, and veracity as though fully set forth hereto. 150. The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 151. Defendant, a local government with more than fifteen (15) employees, is subject to the provisions of the ADA. 152. Plaintiff Skates suffered from a physical impairment that resulted in substantial limits on certain major life activities. 153. Plaintiff was a qualified individual, possessing the requisite skills needed for performing her duties at the time of Defendant’s adverse decision. 154. Plaintiff suffered from a qualified disability although capable of performing her job functions with or without reasonable accommodation. 155. Defendant, by and through its managerial staff, discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability status. 156. Plaintiff was meant to endure substantially differing terms, conditions, and privileges of employment due to her disability status. 157. Plaintiff was scrutinized, falsely accused of making derogatory statements, and singled out for termination based on Defendant’s discriminatory animus towards the Plaintiff and her disability.
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158. Through its actions, Defendant unilaterally denied Plaintiff equal terms, conditions, and benefits of employment as a direct and/or indirect result of Plaintiff’s disability and/or perceived disability. 159. Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action due to her disability or perceived disability in that she was terminated from her employment under differing terms and conditions. 160. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, loss of employment, loss of income, loss of other employment benefits, promotional opportunities as well as emotional distress, great financial expense, damages to reputation, and has incurred damages thereby. 161. As a direct result of Defendant’s acts and and/or failure to act, Plaintiff is entitled to the maximum monetary damages and penalties available by law, equitable remedies, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees. COUNT VII FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 42 U.S.C. §1983: Retaliation 162. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 through paragraph 161 inclusive of the instant complaint, with the same force, effect, and veracity as though fully set forth hereto. 163. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits retaliation against public employees for protected speech regarding matters of public concern. 164. Plaintiff, a public employee, exercised her protected free speech rights regarding matters of public concern, to wit, matters in which the general public might be interested in, namely support for the incumbent Mayor and participation in a campaign to maintain public access to Defendant’s Board of Trustees’ meetings on local television channels. 27 !
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165. Subsequently, Defendant, a municipality, subjected Plaintiff to an adverse employment action when was reassigned to a comparatively poor position, from that of Permanent Clerk at Defendant Freeport’s Assessor’s Office, to a Recreational Attendant at the FRC. 166. Plaintiff was meant to endure substantially differing terms, conditions, and privileges of employment due to her exercise of protected speech. 167. Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action due to her exercise of protected, nondisruptive political speech regarding a matter of public concern, in that she was reassigned from her employment under differing terms and conditions. 168. Plaintiff’s reassignment coincided with the electoral victory of Mayor Robert T. Kennedy, a candidate whom the Plaintiff had opposed as a member of incumbent Mayor Andrew Hardwick’s campaign legal team. 169. Plaintiff’s political speech was a substantial and motivating factor in Defendant’s adverse employment action, as demonstrated by the temporal proximity of two (2) weeks between the electoral defeat of Plaintiff’s favored candidate and Plaintiff’s reassignment. 170. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, loss of employment, loss of income, loss of other employment benefits, promotional opportunities as well as emotional distress, great financial expense, damages to reputation, and has incurred damages thereby. 171. As a direct result of Defendant’s acts and and/or failure to act, Plaintiff is entitled to the maximum monetary damages and penalties available by law, equitable remedies, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees. State Pendant Causes of Action COUNT VIII
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NEW YORK STATE, EXECUTIVE LAW, ARTICLE 15, HUMAN RIGHTS EXECUTIVE LAW §296(1)(a): Race Discrimination 172. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 through 171 inclusive of the instant complaint, with the same force, effect and veracity as though fully set forth hereto. 173. The New York State Executive Law; Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) prohibits unlawful discriminatory employment practices. Section § 296 of the NYSHRL, provides in pertinent part that, “[I]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of an individual's age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, marital status, or domestic violence victim status, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” Defendant has engaged in violation of the foregoing statute by virtue of its unlawful discriminatory employment practices as more fully detailed and emphasized above. 174. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, loss of employment, loss of income, loss of other employment benefits, promotional opportunities as well as emotional distress, great financial expense, damages to reputation, and has incurred damages thereby. 175. As a direct result of Defendant and and/or failure to act, Plaintiff is entitled to the maximum monetary damages and penalties available by law, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees. COUNT IX NEW YORK STATE, EXECUTIVE LAW, ARTICLE 15, HUMAN RIGHTS EXECUTIVE LAW § 296(1)(e): Retaliatory Discrimination
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176. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 through 175 inclusive of the instant complaint, with the same force, effect and veracity as though fully set forth hereto. 177. That the above discriminatory pattern and practice based on age, race, creed, color, religion, national origin as committed by Defendant Freeport, its agents and employees, violates New York State Human Rights Law Section 296(1)(e). 178. Defendant Freeport unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff’s employment as a direct result of Plaintiff opposing Defendant Freeport’s discriminatory and/or retaliatory practices forbidden under New York State Human Rights Law Section 296(1)(e), in that Plaintiff filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights on or about August 17, 2012 against Defendant Freeport, and was reassigned less than eight (8) months thereafter. 179. That by reason of the aforesaid discriminatory practices and/or retaliation, in the terms, conditions or privileges of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer loss of income and loss of other employment benefits, and has suffered and continues to suffer distress, humiliation, embarrassment, great financial expense, and damage to her reputation. 180. As a result of Defendant Freeport’s acts, Plaintiff is entitled to the maximum monetary damages and penalties available by law, as well as costs and attorneys fees, the sum to be determined by jury trial. RELIEF REQUESTED WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court grant judgment to her containing the following relief:
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a) An award to Plaintiff of her actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial for loss of wages, benefits, and promotional opportunities, including an award of front pay compensating Plaintiff for loss of future salary and benefits; b) Declaring that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for Retaliation against Plaintiff; c) Declaring that Defendant violated Title VII of Civil Rights Acts of 1964 for the Disparate Treatment of the Plaintiff; d) Declaring that Defendant violated the Family and Medical Leave Act, as codified, 29 U.S.C.A §§ 2601 et seq.; e) Declaring that Defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; f) Declaring the Defendant violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, as codified 42 U.S.C. § 1983; g) Declaratory relief; h) Equitable relief; i) Awarding damages to Plaintiff, retroactive to the date of her discharge and prior to, for loss of wages and benefits resulting from Defendant’s unlawful employment practices and to otherwise render her whole for all and any losses sustained and suffered as a result of Defendant’s unlawful employment practices; j) An award to Plaintiff of the costs of this action, together with reasonable attorney fees; interest and the cost of disbursements of the action; and k) Such other and future relief that this Honorable Court deems just and proper. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 38(b) of the Local Rules, Plaintiff demands trial by jury for all the issues leaded herein so triable. Dated: Garden City, New York March 4, 2015 Respectfully Submitted, HENRY LAW GROUP /s/_____________________ CHAUNCEY D. HENRY, ESQ. (CH2982) Attorney for Plaintiff, Earline Skates 825 E. Gate Blvd., Suite 106 Garden City, New York 11530 Phone: (516) 366-4367 Fax: (516) 688-3955 Chauncey.Henry@hlawg.com
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EXHIBIT A
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