Ground Truth in Building Human Security by Peace Operations Training Institute

Ground Truth in Building Human Security

Douglas E. Batson U.S. Department of Defense A T H E S I S P R E S E N T E D I N PA R T I A L C O M P L E T I O N O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S O F

The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations

Ground Truth in Building Human Security A Thesis By Douglas E. Batson U.S. Department of Defense presented in partial completion of the requirements of The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations Submitted: Douglas E. Batson, 17 August 2012 Forwarded Recommending Approval: [Signature of Thesis Adviser Date] Approved: [Signature of Thesis Coordinator Date] For inclusion in the joint Foreword, acknowledgments for seeing this 2.5 year endeavor through to completion: NGA: Darma Bennett, Karen Pauer, Randy Headrick, Jim Crawford, Rich Ilvarsonn, Gary Hacker. Special thanks to Mr. Collin Agee, Senior Advisor for Intelligence Community Engagement, U.S. Army G-2, and Mr. Christopher W. Williams, Washington D.C. Representative for the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT).

The following caveat is not needed for the PKSOI publication, which has its own version, but is required for POTI to post the thesis on-line: Approved for Public Release, NGA Case Number 12360. The opinions expressed are his own and do not represent the positions of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

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Introduction During the Cold War, United Nations (UN) peacekeepers patrolled buffer zones between warring interstate parties who had signed a peace agreement and consented to the UN’s “blue helmet” presence. Post-Cold War conflicts, on the other hand, have been chiefly of the intrastate variety with its attending complexities. When UN peacekeepers deploy today, they often find no uniformed enemy to contain and no peace to keep. Donning instead blue berets, as befitting their peacebuilding1 vice peacekeeping role, they encounter populations disillusioned with governments that have failed to protect them from 21st century internal threats to peace: political repression, organized criminal violence, and civil unrest from economic crises. Many countries and sub-national areas are fragile, with one in four people on the planet at risk from repeated violence, weak governance, and instability.2 These terms are admittedly vague, and offer few clues to the underlying drivers of the conflict. In many cases, it is latent conflict over land. For example, Syria’s current social unrest is, in the most direct sense, a reaction to a brutal and out-of-touch regime and a response to the political wave of change that began in Tunisia early last year. However, that’s not the whole story...Significant social, economic, environmental and climatic changes in Syria have 2

eroded the social contract between citizen and government.3 How many of the estimated 19,0004 Syrians killed in clashes with a regime indifferent to their plight numbered among the several million recently displaced from their rural livelihoods5 will remain unknown. What is known is that Syrian rural-to-urban migrants were not accounted for in any UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations plans for protection of civilians. This paper is divided into two complementary sections. In part one (Chapters One and Two), I argue that rapid urbanization, the emergence of sub-state entities, trends toward privatization, decentralization, and participatory governance typify a peace operations environment unrecognizable from a decade ago, the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks with its rush to aid post-Taliban Afghanistan. These socio-political trends complicate peacebuilding and underscore why it is doomed to failure in the absence of functioning land governance. Chapter One explores the systemic inability and, at times, unwillingness on the part of international actors to address post-conflict land tenure and property rights (LTPR) in Iraq and Afghanistan. It asserts that the endemic problems encountered there are shared by an additional 1.5 billion people whom, although not dwelling in war zones, lack good land governance and are thus 3Â Â

vulnerable to repeated criminal and political violence. Chapter Two highlights the changing roles for the two largest international actors, the United States and the UN, as each wrangles with how to address future human security6 challenges. One challenge is to overcome the previous lack of focus on and capacity to deal with LTPR issues encountered in their respective peace operations. Another challenge is how to deal with the legion of sub-state entities that recently have emerged as important players in monitoring and resolving land conflict. Perhaps more daunting still is the struggle international actors have in elevating land governance to a key pillar of peacebuilding in an era of diminished resources. In part two (Chapters Three, Four, and Five), I describe new tools that can help peacebuilders incorporate land governance into their work. Chapter Three examines a new substate entity, Customary Land Secretariats in Ghana, and a nascent technology based on the Land Administration Domain Model (LADM), which enhances human security and economic development. Chapter Four explains how crowdsourcing and participatory mapping betoken untapped promise for international actors, host nation governments, and legitimate customary and civil society institutions to exercise effective land governance. Lastly, restoring human security often takes decades and so requires 4Â Â

metrics to gauge incremental progress. Thus, Chapter Five suggests how civil/military peacebuilders can monitor and measure progress in building local level institutional land governance capacity in post-disaster and post-conflict areas.

Figure I.1: UN Peace Operations: Pakistan is a frequent Troop Contributing Country (TCC), Photo courtesy of PKSOI.

Chapter One: Peacebuilders Running Head-long into Land Governance After the guns fall silent and peace operations begin, seething problems over land rights inevitably emerge. Many of these land disputes are spatial in nature and serious enough to impede reaching end state goals. Population displacements brought about by unexploded ordnance, territorial conquests, and, as in the following example, ethnic cleansing, have grave post-conflict repercussions. In Iraq in 2003, collective action over land disputes rooted in the previous regime’s Arabization policy in traditionally Kurdish areas saw hundreds of armed men battling in the streets. The U.S. Army Stability Operations commander exclaimed, “Kirkuk is a place that could unravel Iraq. This is a place that could begin a spiral, a downward spiral. Civil unrest is right here.”7

U.S. military commanders in

Afghanistan, too, have been vexed by competing claims over land. They have not attempted to settle them for a number of reasons. The myriad of unwritten Afghan customary rules and invisible social power structures surrounding land are cultural nuances few outsiders understand. Add to that the scores of fraudulent documents to compare against a string of legitimate documents from now-defunct regimes. Sorting out land tenure and property rights (LTPR) quickly becomes a nightmarish, politically-charged 6

task. But avoidance comes at a price.

“The Taliban has used

land disputes adroitly, sometimes settling them justly to further their influence, and at other times exacerbating them to gain the allegiance of one side.”8 These U.S. military commanders have run head-long into the significance of land governance, a subject that very few have had any exposure to: Fundamentally, land governance is about power and the political economy of land. Land tenure is the relationship among people with respect to land and its resources. The rules of tenure define how access is granted to rights to use, control, and transfer land….they develop in a manner that entrenches the power relations between and among individuals and social groups”9 With a sigh of relief, commanders of already complex operations have quipped, “land issues belong to GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).” While this is true in theory, it offers no escape from seething societal problems when the host nation government is not up to the task. In a vacuum, non-state actors, not all of whom are nefarious, exercise de facto land governance. As a result, many sincere and altruistic peacebuilders have been insufficiently informed about what customary institutions already exist “and so have tended to reinvent the wheel (or worse, invent an extra wheel) based on the assumption of terra nullius10 rather than build on preexisting institutional architecture.”11

Further, not all local actors are allies in building human security. Many host nation officials lack the political will for increased transparency and accountability in land matters. They prefer the status quo, through which social power, prestige, and profit come directly to them and indirectly to their well-placed relatives.

Whether in rural Afghanistan or the informal

settlements surrounding African megacities, an individual or group secures raw power by obtaining control over land.

When

rule of law fails to protect peoples’ LTPR, sub-state entities rush in to provide these “services.” This dynamic is aptly explained in Where There Is No Government, Wheaton College professor Sandra Joireman’s research on property rights enforcement mechanisms in a Nairobi slum. Joireman identified three sub-state entities in Kibera, “a pocket of statelessness located directly in the geographic center of power in Kenya,”12 that have emerged to fill the void left by a state that lacks the political will to resolve land disputes. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the first type of non-state entity, conduct alternative dispute resolution because the government is perceived as aloof (offering bureaucratic forms to fill out at unaffordable costs), ethnically biased, or corrupt (demanding bribes). The second alternative is government officials who, outside their formal 8

authorities, misuse their positions to resolve disputes for personal enrichment. The notorious, third option is ethnic gangs who run protection rackets and use violence and intimidation on behalf of clients seeking redress. While the last two mechanisms often achieve results faster than the NGO route, and at less cost than the convoluted government judiciary, their ill-gotten gains ultimately weaken the state and invite larger-scale conflict.13

Figure 1.1: Dusk Settles on an Informal Settlement in Ghana Source: Thomson Reuters Decades of rural-to-urban migration have resulted in 1.1 billion14 people now eking out a living in peri-urban informal 9Â Â

settlements (slums), without infrastructure or land rights. Another billion are expected to join that number by 2030.15 Add to that a 21st century phenomenon which just may answer the philosophical question, “if a tree falls in a forest and there is no one there to hear it, does it make a sound?”

The UN

Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD), backed by the World Bank, aims to compensate countries commensurate to their commitments to mitigate carbon emissions by sustaining forests.16 It goes without saying that there is always someone “there” to hear the sound of clinking coins falling into a money box. For indigenous peoples whose ancient livelihoods depend on forests, this new “REDD scare” is a very real, even insidious threat. Even when armed with some knowledge of their land rights and interests, forest dwellers, due to their lack of access to land institutions, and cash to pay associated fees, are hardpressed to realize those rights. They become more vulnerable to exploitation and forced eviction when, unbeknownst to them, REDD has dramatically increased their land’s value.

To ensure that

payments for reduced carbon emissions continue to flow into the pockets of unconscionable national elites, it is not unimaginable that today’s forest dwellers end up as tomorrow’s slum dwellers. The twin avarices of large-scale land grabs by 10

resource-hungry rich countries and now cash payments, based on calculations of invisible greenhouse gases over areas of chiefly customary land tenures, represent knotty new threats to human security. It is no coincidence that these novel perils are chiefly about LTPR.

Chapter Two: Retooling the International Peacebuilding Machinery Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces should be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces. DoD Directive 3000.05 While the United States has been fighting simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, all has not been quiet elsewhere in the world. At least eight complex UN peace operations have been conducted since 2003.17 As the United States examines the lessons learned from intervening in Iraq (a rogue state18) and Afghanistan (a failed state19) it also must acknowledge that peace operations in under- or ungoverned areas of the world remain essential to U.S. national security interests. Accordingly, U.S. President Barack Obama's 2010 National Security Strategy included a commitment to "strengthen the UN's leadership and operational capacity in peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, post-disaster recovery, development assistance, and the promotion of human rights.”20

However, a

decade of war has limited the United State’s direct support to UN peace operations. As a result, few U.S. civilian and military operators are aware of the titanic transformation in

UN peace operations, from military-patrolled, buffer-zone peacekeepers to civilian-led, multi-partner peacebuilders.

United States Military Services Because it faces major budget cuts, the Pentagon views UN peace operations “as an essential and high priority area for needed investment.”21 The U.S. 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) champions robust global peacekeeping, namely, Special Operations Forces (SoF) to "train, advise, and assist partnernation security forces and contribute to coalition and peacekeeping operations."22 In the years 2012-2015, the Pentagon plans to increase SoF by 10%, from 63,750 to 70,000. Many Obama administration officials see the 2011 international military intervention in Libya as a model for future conflicts, with the United States using air power in theatre while relying on its allies and on local forces to fight on the ground.23 Thus, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are experiencing a combined reduction in conventional ground forces of 100,000 active duty troops. The military services have been through downsizing before. As a National Certified Career Counselor, I provided the initial Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) transition services during the 1991-93 drawdown of the U.S. Army Europe.

Voluntary separation incentives were offered to 13

Russian and other Slavic linguists, and to soldiers in other military occupational specialties (MOS), no longer needed with the abrupt end of the Cold War. Soldiers who possessed those skills could have been retained and developed into area experts for crises that soon afterwards occurred in the Balkans and Caucasus.

By recalling numerous examples from military

history, Professor William Flavin of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute warns that: the consequences of retaining legacy structures and inadequate broad-based capacity are the current ad-hoc arrangements that may or may not have institutional staying power. Key examples of ad hoc responses are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Military and Police Training and Advisory Teams, Agribusiness Development Teams from the National Guard, Human Terrain Teams…Female Engagement Teams, and the use of Artillery officers and NCOs in civil affairs (CA) missions. In 2005, the Marines gave its four Artillery Regiments the secondary mission to serve as Civil Affairs.24 If hindsight is foresight, the Pentagon would do well in the drawdown of 2012 and beyond to retain the state-building knowledge and experience honed by soldiers’ multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. In short, exponentially more military personnel possess critical peacebuilding skills. In order to avoid the ad hoc approach and retain the intellectual and operational ability to conduct these tasks post-Iraq and Afghanistan, new functional areas, Warrant 14

Officer MOSs, enlisted member Additional Skill Identifiers, and perhaps new breeds of units might be institutionalized. For example, in June 2012 the U.S. Marine Corps created three new law enforcement battalions. Lessons learned are built “off the work of the military police, adding new capacities in criminal investigations and noncombat duties such as training foreign military forces,” and “the new battalions are expected to conduct intelligence, forensic and biometric work, and civil peace maintenance.”25

Training and advising of foreign

officials were, until recently, solely in the domain of SoF. Only due to the pressing needs in Iraq and Afghanistan did conventional forces venture into this realm. Without intentional attempts to preserve this capability through such institutionalization it stands to be quickly lost. In announcing that U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams will be deployed to the Africa Command in 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta concurred, “I want to see the military retain the hardwon capability to train and advise foreign security forces in support of stability operations.”26 With no new weapons systems in the Army modernization queue, retired Lieutenant General James Dubik opines, “given the financial situation the country is in right now…modernization should wait and we should spend the money on personnel costs and readiness.”27 This aim might be 15

realized, for example, by new U.S. Army units staffed with governance specialists of varying stripes. Select soldiers within Civil Affairs, Geospatial Engineer, and Judge Adjutant General (JAG) career management fields would mentor foreign nationals in agriculture, public works, rule-of-law, information operations, and institution building. Because the Taliban takes advantage of land disputes in Afghanistan, Australian Counter-insurgency (COIN) expert David Kilcullen noted that “the higher the percentage of secure [land] titles in a given area, the less chance [there is] for the Taliban to step in and exploit the situation.” 28 Foreign policy pundit Tom Ricks reacts to Kilcullen’s latest direction for mission creep, “Can you imagine being a new battalion commander in the area trying to keep up with this stuff? Tribes, women, [blood] feuds, land disputes…it is just too hillbilly for me.”29 Land disputes are inherently uncivil. They are politically messy and socially nasty, creating gloating winners and very sore losers. They hearken back to a time in not-too-distant American history when the reach of governance institutions was not ubiquitous. Yet such is often the situation that stability operations commanders are thrown into with the mandate to keep peace and order. For that reason the U.S. military, with Army Field Manual 16

3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, both titled Counterinsurgency, and A Guide to Rebuilding Public Sector Services in Stability Operations: a Role for the Military30 has created new doctrine with civil considerations. More recently, the Final Approved Draft of Army Technical Publication Stability Techniques (ATP 3-07.5) anticipates the war-to-peace transformation with phases and mechanisms for resolving postconflict land and property disputes.

It will provide doctrine

to ensure that conflict resolution is consistent and fair, but flexible enough to achieve justice in a wide variety of situations, and most importantly, to avoid making any decisions about land tenure claims or disposition of properties. For example, when the host nation government lacks presence, legitimacy, or capacity, land disputes might still be addressed via sub-state entities. Such conflicts include disputes over possession of livestock, water distribution rights, land ownership for farming or grazing, or ownership of homes abandoned by their owners and resettled by squatters. Transitional authorities implementing dispute resolution mechanisms early helps prevent escalating violence that often occurs when people seek to enforce resolution on their own terms.31 In preparation to hand-off their findings to host nation authorities, U.S. personnel might be tasked with compiling a roster of contested properties for legal adjudication, an assignment that might be facilitated by involvement of local 17

leaders. “Especially in the absence or incompleteness of written records, local leaders know the locations of contested properties and often can identify people involved in ongoing property disputes.”32

To date the Pentagon has provided the bulk of the muscle and money for both U.S. reconstruction and stability operations and USG support to UN peace operations. However, the largely civilian tasks associated with peacebuilding are best nested in a civilian agency, one capable of taking into account the concerns and perspectives not only of host nation officials, but also of civil society organizations and marginalized populations. According to James Cricks, professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, non-state personae include “pillars of social power in the affected nations, including religious groups and tribal leaders.”33

Cricks then

asks, “Who could possibly be (or become) better equipped within the interagency community to provide such information than the Department of State and its affiliate USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development)?”34

United States Civilian Agencies Cricks was likely aware that in 2008 Congress authorized the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) within the Department of State to provide deployable civilian expertise in international conflict prevention.

In November 2011 the CRC was placed

within the new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) led by Ambassador Rick Barton. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton aims for CSO to accomplish what its aptly-named predecessor, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, could not fully achieve, to serve the whole USG as the locus for policy and operational solutions for crisis, conflict, and stability. Clinton explains how the CSO will harness civilian peacebuilding expertise from the whole of USG: With the right tools, training, and leadership, our diplomats and development experts can defuse crises before they explode. Creating new opportunities for advancing democracy, promoting sustainable economic growth, and strengthening the rule of law in fragile states are all overlapping and mutually reinforcing endeavors. They cut across bureaus and offices and agencies. They demand not just the skills of our State Department diplomats and USAID development experts, but also the expertise of civilian specialists across the U.S. Government.35

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Figure 2.1: The U.S. Civilian Response Corps in South Sudan CRC members have lived up to their billing by supporting the successful South Sudanese independence referendum in January 2011.

Their ongoing collaboration with local and UN officials, 20Â

civil society, and aid agencies assists the U.S. Embassy in Juba and the USG in Washington DC to better understand conflict dynamics in the world’s newest country.

Disputes over ownership

and control of land and property are, not surprisingly, among the concerns reported by a CRC member deployed in the South Sudanese Central Equatoria State (CES): In CES there exists a strong tradition of managing internal disputes in a non-violent manner, relying on cultural traditions and customary law or, more recently, the formal justice system. Overall, the state remains fairly peaceful. Nonetheless, two key challenges threaten stability in CES: land issues and perceived Dinka (ethnic) dominance. The land issues--including access, claims, and disputes---serve as the primary source of conflict drivers in CES. In a predominantly agrarian society, land tenure determines not only wealth and status, but also survival. With increasing numbers of people returning home after decades of war, disputes over land are increasing. These disputes are exacerbated by a weak system of land ownership and poor records. A large number of Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Dinka currently occupy indigenous (mainly Bari but also Kuku and Kakwa) lands, breeding local resentment. Key areas to monitor include Yei town and between the borders of CES and Western Equatoria at Baka and Maradu.36

Such conflict is rarely about individual property ownership rights.

The land disputes in South Sudan, while culturally

nuanced, are of the garden variety, differing little from their antediluvian antecedents, revolving over competing communal interests in rural land: sharecrop farming, water resources, timber harvesting, livestock grazing, etc. Assessing these 21

drivers of conflict is child’s play compared to the dizzyingly complex human landscape that the fledgling CSO will encounter in densely populated urban slums and REDD-affected forest zones. The CRC Active Corps originally was to manifest 500 deployable civilians, including three Property Law/Cadastre experts.37 Global land administration is not an academic degree-producing discipline in the United States as it is elsewhere in the Western world, thus, three such experts would have been adequate. However, Assistant Secretary of State Barton, given budgetary constraints and his desire to see CSO make tangible impacts within 12 months, will have the Bureau dedicate its effort to four major engagements:38 

 



In Syria, a non-traditional surge [of resources] to empower and reunite a fractured non-violent opposition, that includes providing non-lethal assistance. In Kenya, to develop plans to ensure peaceful and credible elections, a year before the vote. In Northern Central America, to bring a new urgency to address the violence on a regional basis, specifically to Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Belize. In Burma, to support analysis and ways to connect with ethnic minorities at the sub-national level.

This change in focus limits the CRC Active Corps to fewer than 100 personnel, none in the crucial LTPR specialty. The reduction of CRC “to a proven leadership cadre who can lead our engagements,” says Barton, allows the CSO to expand: 22

…our reach to deploy experts from inside and outside the government on a “pay as you use” basis. So instead of keeping a large standing staff, just in case of any eventuality, we are moving to the ability to deploy the right person to the right place, just in time, while expanding our partnerships.39 Even without LTPR experts in the CRC Active Corps, the nascent CSO remains the nesting place of choice for LTPR Community of Practice (CoP).

A LTPR CoP would be a

comparatively low-cost pillar of peacebuilding that, with a few dozen experts, perhaps represented in the CRC’s Standby and Reserve components, which was originally envisaged to be staffed with 2000 deployable members each.40

And, in Washington

DC, two USG agencies already offer 3- to 4-day introductory courses in this topic: 



The United States Institute of Peace. Land, Property, and Conflict draws on case studies from peace operations; participants explore the range of entry points (humanitarian, human rights, state building, development, etc.) and options for dispute resolution and structural reform.41 USAID. Property Rights, Resource Governance Issues and Best Practices explores how natural resources and land tenure impact economic growth, agricultural productivity, food and energy security, political stability, Humanitarian Response and Disaster Assistance, and Resource Management and Climate Change Mitigation (REDD).42

The United Nations With the United States focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, the UN, too, has learned lessons from its 21st century peace operations. Peacebuilding means multi-year institution building. It is arduous work, trying the patience of everyone, from the local people with high expectations for rapid change, to fatigued donor nations and philanthropic organizations that have too few tangible results with which to encourage their constituents. To measure its own progress in fostering development, the UN in 2000 established the Millennium Development Goal (MDG)—eight bold goals to free people from extreme poverty and deprivations by 2015.43

Sadly, no low-income,

fragile or conflict-affected country has yet to achieve a single MDG. 44 Moreover, human security, the goal of UN peacebuilding, is not included among the MDG. Perhaps that fact, at times, is related to the counterintuitive truth that rebuilding a shattered nation can be at odds with peacebuilding! Statebuilding can undermine peace in at least two ways. The first way is seen in the results of an outdated approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR). Enhancing the power and institutional reach of the nation-state, a consequence of SSR, may reinforce insecurity or exclusion perceived by marginalized groups.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo 24

(DRC), for example, SSR aims to suppress violent opposition to the state. The United States and other UN member states have consistently linked progress on SSR to the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)’s withdrawal. SSR reforms directly benefit the Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and the Police nationale congolaise (PNC). But continued predations by elements of both groups alienate, if not provoke to retaliatory violence, the populations they ostensibly protect.45

Part of the

disconnect between policy and reality resides in the “train and equip” approach to Congolese SSR that is drawn from, and best left behind with, the Cold War legacy. In the DRC and elsewhere, the USG has done little to increase engagement with local stakeholders and civil society. This is due to its own minimal civilian capacity to craft new strategies from assessments based on a comprehensive assessment of local level needs, capacity, and the political situation.

Figure 2.2: UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

A second area of caution is the rush by external actors to cultivate democracy via elections in post-conflict or fragile states. A badly executed election can be counterproductive. The unexpected electoral violence in Kenya, which had been thought to be a perdurable African state, pointed to invisible sociopolitical fault lines. “Elections are an essential part of democratization, but they can also be conflict-inducing if they are held too soon, are blatantly manipulated, lack transparency, or are marred by violence. Moreover, even if 26

conducted efficiently, they may result in power shifts that not only marginalize powerful elites, but entire communities, creating sectarian or ethnic conflict. The Kenyan elections in 2007 did both.”46 In championing a prospectus for economic recovery and development, UN Mission in Nepal Chief of Staff Elizabeth M. Cousens and American University professor Charles Call tout peacebuilding with a very different agenda. That is the “establishment of institutions with the capacity to prevent, manage, or otherwise adjudicate disputes between groups through political process instead of violence.”47

Call continues:

Institutions include social norms and behaviors---such as the ability of leaders to transcend sectarian and political differences and develop bargains, and of civil society to advocate for greater national and political cohesion---as well as rules, laws and organizations. Where states, markets, and social institutions fail to provide basic security, justice, and economic opportunities for citizens, conflict can escalate. In short, countries and sub-national areas with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability and the least able to respond to internal and external stresses.48 Confidence in a “fragile state” erodes with the very mention of the term, and a failed state cannot secure confidence by itself. Attempts to solve human insecurity problems via military-only, justice-only, or development-only solutions will falter. Building confidence in justice and land institutions 27

takes at least one generation,49 even longer in post-conflict zones. Although pillars of stability take considerable time to nurture, state-community, state-NGO, state-international, and state-private sector partnerships can ultimately extend the state’s capacity to deliver much-needed services. Some serious retooling lies ahead for international actors to address the 21st century challenges of building both state and non-state institutions that deter criminal and political violence. An example of this kind of retooling is being demonstrated by the UN Human Settlement Programme (known as UN-HABITAT) project in Kandahar, a most problematic area for peacebuilders due to its insecure environment. The “post-conflict” era in Afghanistan has stretched over a decade and the country remains fraught with LTPR insecurities. Not the least of these conflict drivers is the doubling of Kandahar city’s population. Spontaneous and uncontrolled urban growth was never accounted for by international actors. Notoriously, the squalid labyrinths with no formal street names or addresses, and home to 70 percent of urban Afghans, play into the hands of the insurgents. In the absence of institutionalized governance systems before 2002, and minimal state capacity now, UN-HABITAT has developed an exemplary approach for building sustained human security based on communal cooperation, resource sharing, and dispute 28

resolution—traditional parts of Afghan culture that are still shared among rural-to-urban migrants, repatriated refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and demobilized fighters. The Governance and Development Support Programme (GDSP) is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and implemented by UN-HABITAT.50 Locally called the People’s Process, the work is based on the human potential to strengthen communities through a sense of ownership in development projects, interaction with municipal officials, vocational training, conflict resolution skills, and settlement upgrading. For the latter, the community’s financial and in-kind contributions have improved municipal service delivery and infrastructure upgrades such as drainage culverts and footpaths in areas prioritized by community members. By working in Afghanistan for over 20 years, UN HABITAT has gained an unsurpassed level of legitimacy among diverse groups in that country. This type of bottom-up state-building does little to meet the expectations of donor nations and philanthropic organizations, however. Those organizations, idealizing programs they think will resonate with their constituents, emphasize elections, anti-corruption measures, and human rights. These interventions are far less risky than the slow grind of institution-building, where failure is more 29

apparent and criticism more easily leveled.

The rewards of the

alternative strategy, however, are worth the wait. The People’s Process city-community partnership, in addition to upgrading living conditions for 100,000 people with incremental housing regularization, also defused violence by slowly building local institutional capacity that enhanced human security. The 2011 Kabul Solidarity Programme, modeled in part after The People’s Process, has already improved relations between Local Development Councils and municipal governments in the Afghan capital.51

Figure 2.3: Surveyed Properties in Kandahar. Image courtesy of UN HABITAT. 30

Human security requires systemic changes if it is to surface on the UN agenda as a MDG. The preamble of the 1945 UN Charter concludes with the aim, “to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.” Although peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned in the Charter, the UN quickly adapted to unanticipated geo-political changes. For over 40 years, “blue helmet” UN troops deployed as “international machinery” along ceasefire lines and kept the peace.

Today, deployed

“blue beret” civilian governance specialists, armed with laptop computers and digital cameras, represent the deeper capacity of 21st century international machinery to bring economic and social advancement to people struggling in poverty and beset by internal violence. In an austere fiscal climate it is prudent for leaders of the International Community to recognize and leverage alternatives to very expensive UN peace operations---the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ 2011-12 budget accounted for a whopping $7.84 billion USD.52

In response to some crises,

regional organizations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU), and the Organization of American States (OAS), have provided the UN non-reimbursable logistical support and rapid reaction forces—above and beyond their 31

assessed share of peacekeeping costs. At times, they have modeled the idealized “integrated mission” by aiding nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and national actors to prevent conflict and strengthen civil society. The costs for UN peace operations need not be so onerous; their approach to LTPR not so gangling. Scott Leckie, Director of the NGO Displaced Solutions, agrees that national actors are instrumental in determining how seriously LTPR are addressed in a given country. Nevertheless, he argues, the role of the international community in influencing these decisions should not be underestimated and he offers an unvarnished opinion about which UN agency should have the lead. Although a comparatively small UN agency, lacking the clout or stature of some of the larger and more influential actors, UN Habitat has led the way in advancing [LPTR] concerns within a growing number of UN peace operations (Iraq, Kosovo, Timor Leste, Sudan, Crimea, DRC, etc.), and its mandate as the UN Housing Agency and UN City Agency places it in perhaps a better position than many other agencies in this respect... This does not mean that UN Habitat should be the only agency involved; far from it. As the lead agency, it will be UN Habitat’s crucial role to coordinate the multi-armed efforts of all the agencies that are, and in most senses should be, engaged in the [LPTR] sector in post-conflict settings. There is a place for all types of expertise and assistance, but what remains missing is the agency to design, establish, implement and coordinate a full [LPTR] spectrum approach which ensures that all [LPTR] rights issues are addressed, that a Housing, Land and Property Rights Directorate is established in all relevant settings and that everyone dealing with [LPTR] rights within a post-conflict society has 32

somewhere to turn in the hopes of finding support and relief. In this way, [LPTR] rights will finally get the attention they clearly deserve.53 Leckie is adamant that the traditional “tarps and tents” shelter-centric response to LPTR concerns is woefully insufficient. One UN peace operation downplays LPTR rights issues, and another, once pressured to act, grapples with perhaps one LPTR concern, on an ad hoc basis, while overlooking others. “Arguably, no post-conflict operation implemented by the international community has tackled [LPTR] rights issues in an integral, comprehensive manner.”54 And concerning recent UN peace operations, Leckie fumes, “leaving a ‘light footprint’ as the UN Mission in Afghanistan has sought, or leaving no footprint at all, as far too many UN and related missions have done when their impact is viewed through an [LPTR] lens, is no longer good enough. Every conflict involves stresses within the [LPTR] sector!”55 Because post-conflict environments foment deep, structural LPTR challenges, Leckie believes that competencies to address them consistently must reside in a future UN Housing, Land and Property Rights Directorate within UN-HABITAT.

Within such a

notional Directorate, seven departments encompassing policy, legal, housing, land, construction, claims, and records “would assist in providing greater political stability; enhance the 33

prospects for economic development; and expedite the reestablishment of national capacities to restore peace, justice, governance and rule of law.”56

Three of the proposed departments

are described below because they represent arenas in which the broadest section of a shattered society could receive tangible LTPR assistance from the UN.57 

The Land Department would maintain institutional competence on all matters relating to residential, agricultural and commercial land, focusing in particular on issues of land administration, dispute resolution and broader land policy, including possible measures of land reform and land demarcation... Issues relating to customary land allocation and control in areas governed by custom would also be overseen by the Land Department.



The Claims Department would be entrusted with collecting and processing [LPTR] restitution claims, resolving [LPTR] disputes linked to restitution claims, the enforcement of successful claims in coordination with other bodies and backstopping traditional forms of mediation and dispute resolution when these proved inequitable or otherwise unable to resolve longstanding disputes.



The Records Department would be entrusted with (re)establishing the housing, land and property registration system, updating the national land cadastre, carrying out GIS surveys of the country or territory and all other matters concerning the administration of the housing, land and property arrangements.

Planning for the Future Both the United States and the UN exhibit signs of being fiscally and politically drained from a decade of intense peace operations. New human security challenges, many with roots in 34

LTPR disputes, offer no respite for the exhausted largest international actors. The impetus behind North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Comprehensive Approach is this same realization, borne out from its operations in Afghanistan, that no single instrument of power can solve the population-centric challenges faced by intervening actors.

A common consensus

points to a need to expand unity of effort in detail to feature proactive engagement between actors, shared understanding between all parties, practical outcome-based thinking and collaborative working, operating under shared doctrine as epitomized in NATO’s Comprehensive Approach.58 Only then can the deeper human security issues be addressed. At the forefront are the LTPR, which require the long-term institution-building that most donors have shied away from. The establishment of the U.S. Civilian Response Corps is a concrete step in that direction. However, CRC’s funding limitations and refocus on a fixed set of present problems means that a U.S. civilian venture into a new peacebuilding discipline like land governance is unlikely to occur. By 2030, sixty per cent of the world’s population will live in cities, with the most explosive growth occurring in developing countries.59 Conflicts on and over land will inevitably occur and they will be increasing ugly. Land warfare, 35

the Army’s forte, will feature multiple actors in dense, urban environments where shaping and winning the information domain invariably will include a robust knowledge of how persons are tied to places. A U.S. strategic pivot away from land warfare toward air and sea dominance only creates more disparity between the military capabilities of the United States and those of its allies. In Iraq and Afghanistan, coalition forces, unable to complement U.S. forces in unified land operations, were often relegated to niche roles. Fortunately, land governance can be an important niche role for the U.S.’s European allies, and potentially for rising powers such as Brazil, India, and Indonesia.

Several academic programs in allied countries, at

reasonable tuition rates and with English as the language of instruction, offer graduate-level training and education in land administration disciplines with field work conducted in developing countries. 

The International Institute for Geo-information Science and Earth Observation (ITC) is part of the Dutch University of Twente and also a UN University. The Enschede campus offers 3-week to 18-month certificate, diploma, and Master of Science degree programs in Land Administration.60



The Technical University of Munich, Germany, offers an International Master's Program Land Management and Land Tenure as well as short-term training. Three semesters are spent on campus and conducting field research. The thesis can then be written from the student’s home country.61 36



The University of Melbourne, Australia, Centre for Spatial Data Infrastructures (SDIs) and Land Administration has, as its research agenda, the legal, institutional and technical issues of establishing and accessing information about land faced by land managers and administrators, in both developed and developing countries. Full-time researchers focus on problems at local, state, national and multinational levels, creating new links through national and international collaboration.62



KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden, offers a Master of Science degree in Real Estate Development and Financial Services is offered by the Department of Real Estate and Construction Management. The program prepares graduates for different occupations related to the real estate, financial services, government, and construction management sectors, both nationally and internationally.63



The University of Calgary, in Canada, offers graduate degrees in Geomatics Engineering with a specialization in GIS and Land Tenure. Development of advanced geospatial database management techniques for resource evaluation and spatial models for environmental resource management; Land tenure studies: land tenure reform, analysis and modeling of cross-cultural tenure systems, use of traditional ecological knowledge for aboriginal land claims; survey law, cadastral surveying issues, international boundaries, women's rights in land, implications of legal pluralism for land tenure and land administration, public participation and its role in resolving land conflicts.64

At long last in the United States, a distance education course in this discipline, SU5480 Cadastre, is now offered by Michigan Technological University.65 This graduate course surveys global and multi-purpose cadastres; land rights: land ownership, 37

leases, access; traditional rights; mortgages; descriptions of boundaries; Cadastre 2014 and other modern technical approaches. Previously, the only such course had been SUR 6427 Land Tenure and Administration, a resident course periodically offered at the University of Florida.66 In order to gain a fuller understanding of ground truth in building human security, the USG might leverage its allies’ training capacity and send select military members and civilians to foreign academic institutions for graduate education in land administration. This approach would be a cost-effective vehicle to groom small cadres of deployable LTPR experts who, in turn, could train regional organization and host nation personnel in land governance skills. The following fictitious example attests to LTPR’s complexity and the need for new tools. When a U.S. or UN mission advance party member arrives in the capital city of a postconflict or disaster area, he will likely ask about the area of interest, “Who owns the land?” A host nation official, perhaps citing an obscure statute, replies, “it is all government land.” Satisfied, the member reports this “fact” back to headquarters and extensive plans are made based on it, often for ill. This debilitation occurs because overlapping and competing land rights and interests, many of them customary and informal 38

systems of land governance, operate outside of host nation government purview, as depicted below. Imagine a well-watered valley in a post-conflict country (Figure X). Every year herders do what their ancestors have done for centuries---bring their flocks to pasture in the valley every spring (Layer A).

In that same valley there are farmers

practicing their ancestral livelihood (Layer B), who, honoring a longstanding verbal agreement, allow the herders water rights every spring.

Recently, a major drought forced a related ethnic

group from a neighboring country to migrate to the valley.

The

government does not enjoy friendly relations with the neighboring country and considers these new arrivals to be illegal squatters.

Decades ago, unbeknownst to either the

herders or the farmers, the newly emergent government laid claim to the entire valley as State domain (Layer D). This law remained obscure until recently. The government had never attempted to develop the area until a foreign mineral company notified it of a valuable natural resource in part of the valley, and negotiated a lease (Layer C) for the entire valley. For each of these four layers, and the squatters as a quasi fifth layer, a different land right is at work.

Now imagine

deployed peacebuilders, under the assumption that given this is state-owned land, all land-related decisions reside solely with 39Â Â

government officials.

With every well-intended peacebuilding

intervention that affects land, the human terrain suddenly becomes very complex, and potentially violent, with an everincreasing number of stakeholders unexpectedly stepping forward.

Figure 2.4: Overlapping Land Rights, Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

40Â Â

The notional peacebuilders here require in-depth human geography knowledge, the ability to graphically depict a population’s numbers, spatial extents, and the socio-culture power exerted by five parties: two extralegal (Layers A–B), two legal (Layers C–D), and the illegal squatters.67 The next chapter elucidates new tools to improve peacebuilding interventions for such complex human landscapes.

Chapter Three:

A Common Operating Picture for Land Governance

Land Administration is the process of determining, registering, and disseminating information about the relationship between people and land.68 Beyond the formal definition, former International Federation of Surveyors (FIG) president Stig Enemark heralds land administration as a “backbone of society,” supporting social justice, economic growth, and environmental sustainability, all key components facing the global agenda.69 Until a decade ago the preferred way to confer land rights upon individuals and groups across the globe had been through formal land titling administered by the state. A new paradigm has recently emerged, recognizing a continuum of rights and interests in land, one inclusive of individuals and groups who live in areas where formal titles are not the norm, or not accessible or affordable.

Registered title

(or deed) ownership of land, common in only 5070 developed countries, account for 1.5 billion land parcels.

The remaining

4.5 billion of the world’s estimated six billion land parcels are held informally and are thus susceptible to disputes, land grabs, environmental degradation, food insecurity, and social unrest.71

Figure 3.1: Continuum of Land Rights. Courtesy of UN HABITAT

Thus, the continuum, from left to right, begins with informal land rights, which are usually oral agreements, and then customary tenures, both relied upon by poor and marginalized populations.72 Certificates of occupancy, while not enabling the holder to sell or lease, do provide a measure of tenure security against predatory slum lords and unscrupulous customary or government authorities bent on eviction. Adverse possession gives formal tenure to one who produces evidence of having lived on or worked land for a given time period. Group tenure is much easier to secure than individual tenure. Efforts to formalize group tenures in land administration systems (LAS) 43Â Â

have also done much to improve the livelihoods of people at risk of losing their communal land rights in land grabs and other nefarious schemes. Pursuant to such efforts, the authors of Land Administration for Sustainable Development contend: Fundamentally, LAS are about formalizing tenure, irrespective of its local form and content, whether it’s short-term occupation rights or full ownership. Simply, land administration is about formal systems. We don’t apologize for this. We accept that informal systems are essential parts of any system of society, but without organizing a coherent, formal system for administering land...a country or society will be doomed to poverty. This does not mean that that the formal system needs to be complicated, national in scale, or expensive.73

For decades, the question among land professionals has been whether or not informal rights could be included in LAS alongside formal titles and deeds. To accommodate the variety of informal land rights found in the continuum, innovative ways of describing and recording this information, heretofore unsuitable for formal property regimes, have been developed.

This chapter

examines two low-cost, people-centric innovations honed in the West African nation of Ghana:

Customary Land Secretariats and

land registration inclusive of customary land tenures. The latter topic begins with the conceptual framework of the Land Administration Domain Model (LADM) and concludes with an on-theground application via a USAID-funded project implemented with 44

OpenTitleÂŽ cadastral software developed by Thomson Reuters (formerly International Land Systems, Inc.).74 Customary Land Secretariats According to Mr. Collins Dauda, Ghanaian Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, his country is beset by an incomprehensive land policy and a weak land administration system.

The resulting problems are manifold:

conflicting

claims to ownership, encroachments on lands, multiple sales of the same land parcel, unapproved development schemes, and indeterminate boundaries of customary-owned lands.

In sum, the

land market is investment unfriendly and unconducive to development.

It is marked by high transaction costs, high

incidences of poverty, and tension born of tenure insecurity.75 Even in the Greater Accra Region land disputes can turn violent. Chiefs enlist armed gangs of land guards to protect some land users, while forcing others to pay again for land they have already bought, or blocking efforts to develop purchased land and thereby triggering development covenants that allow the land to be repossessed. In some cases, these groups physically assault developers or burn down partially-completed buildings.76

Months after my 2011 visit there, a mysterious fire engulfed the Ghanaian Lands Commission building.77 Accusations abound that the fire which destroyed the land records was deliberately set in order to delay release of land to a certain 45Â Â

ethnic group. Increased ethnic tensions and hints of more violence to come are reflected in the on-line comments posted about the incident.78 A Customary Land Secretariat (CLS) can help defuse such tensions. CLS is an arm of civil society striving for an accountable, harmonious, and transparent customary land administration system that utilizes simple and cost-effective land rights documentation practices attuned to local interests.79 Furthermore, CLS bring “greater clarity and transparency to the customary land governance system, as similar institutions have played an important role in this regard in other African countries (for example, the Communal Land Boards in Namibia and Botswana).”80 Ghana, a comparatively stable and progressive African state, is one of four pilot countries in the Obama Administration’s new Partnership for Growth Initiative. Yet without a clear, written understanding of peoples’ rights, restrictions, and responsibilities (RRR), chiefs who unilaterally sell or lease communal lands provoke conflict where trust born of shared lineage had existed. The USAID, the USG executive agent for the Initiative, has among its developmental aims for Ghana to see customary land tenure and property rights (LTPR) rules put in writing in order for all parties to understand RRR pertaining to customary lands. CLS are a 46

promising sub-state organ to carry out these and other LTPRstrengthening measures because the majority of Ghanaian lands are managed by customary as opposed to statutory authorities: All land in Ghana falls under one of four distinct property rights regimes. The most prevalent is stool lands (termed skin lands in the North), under which property rights are vested in a traditional chief called an overlord, in the form of an allodial title81...The chief administers the land on behalf of the community ...stool lands and family lands comprise approximately 80% of the land in Ghanaâ&#x20AC;Śand the law allows for a number of secondary property rights or arrangements. One such arrangement on stool and family lands is referred to as customary freehold, which is a right in perpetuity that can be transferred, bequeathed, and held in private. Another, similar form of landholding on stool and family lands is called stranger usufruct rights. These rights are granted to migrant households, as well as to descendants of migrant households. There also exist sharecropping arrangements which are referred to as abunu or abusa depending on the percentage of land or production that is divided between the original rights holder and the temporary land user.82

47Â Â

Figure 3.2: Land lease from an allodial title-holding Ghanaian chief Source: Thomson Reuters

Thus, there are parties and leaseholders similar to Layers A-D in Figure 2.4. The allodial title-holding chief is comparable to Layer D; his subjects with customary land tenure to Layers A and B; the leaseholders to Layer C. However, customary authorities, who are responsible for protecting and managing land rights to benefit their people, increasingly succumb to temptation for private gain and sell or lease 48Â Â

communal lands without consulting their constituencies. Convoluted statutory law and fluid customary law have been exploited by some Ghanaian chiefs who maintain that land sales and leases to outsiders (compare to the illegal squatters in Figure 2.4) are within their purview as trustees of the land.83 Historically, unwritten customary land rules are subject to abuse. In Ghana, one source of definitive, customary land knowledge currently beyond the ambit of international actors and the host nation government lies with CLS. Community perception of impartiality is important for stability, and the sub-state CLS have shown promise as a vehicle for dispute resolution. When they operate within the jurisdiction of customary leaders and responsibly manage and record land allocations and transactions made by customary authorities, CLSs not only deter violence with improved tenure security, but also improve economic well-being via increased investment, appreciation of land values, and revenue generation. However, implementing the 37 CLS in Ghana since 2004 has been uneven. Some CLS are fully operational and others are barely functional. The initial effectiveness of CLS depends on the amount of foreign donor support, the local chiefs’ willingness and ability to pay staff, and the staff’s level of training.84 Once Ghanaian CLS become sustainable through self-financing and community demand, 49

increasing their capacity is an avenue through which the United States and UN can not only improve human security in that country, but also develop the skills of their respective peacebuilding cadres to effectively identify and engage with customary authorities on LTPR matters for work in more conflictprone environments.

Figure 3.3: Author with Thomas Reuters Team Lead and COLANDEF representative on a public information campaign, near Savelugu, Ghana, March 2011. Source: author.

50Â Â

While visiting Ghana, I had the opportunity to observe an indigenous organization providing land governance training of benefit to CLS and international actors. Ms. Nana Ama Yirrah, The Community, Land, and Development Foundationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (COLANDEF) chief executive officer, described what is involved for CLS personnel: They must first become familiar with the customary and national frameworks guiding land governance in Ghana in order to conduct public information campaigns, and to create mechanisms for improving governance and protecting land rights for a vast number of stakeholders. The work of CLS is challenged by mistrust among actors and ubiquitous male domination in the land and property sectors.85 Customary land authorities have long acted autonomously in administering their lands and are themselves challenged when dealing with state land agencies. They often view the expansion of government as interference in their affairs.

The community-

based LAS used by CLS to record customary land holdings and transactions reflects the buy-in and trust of stakeholders and thus facilitates CLS institutionalization.

51Â Â

Figure 3.4: Customary Land Secretariat Office Sign in Ghana, Courtesy of COLANDEF Lastly, Jolyne Sanjak, formerly chief program officer at Landesa, a land rights consultant group, notes another benefit of CLS.

Their unsung work increases pressure on host nations

governments to take concrete steps to improve human security. “Political will is malleable,” she says. “The collective push from civil society organizations, private sector businesses, and investors can positively influence developing nations to elevate LTPR on their domestic agendas.”86

The Land Administration Domain Model Western governments have developed their own LAS based on either a deeds or titles registration system.

LAS have been

initiated for different purposes, for example, fiscal versus legal. And with varying levels of records centralization and precision of surveyed boundaries, communication of land information across LAS, even within developed countries, has been precarious. Further land data miscues occur when vast tracts of land under state domain are not recorded in cadastres. Even more disappointing have been peoples’ expectations for immediate economic growth in a country with customary land tenures following importation of a LAS based on freehold ownership of private land.

The Land Administration Domain Model

(LADM) spans the discipline of land administration with administrative (to include legal) and spatial components. The LADM is a basis for combining data from different LAS, providing a common language to describe similarities and differences between them. The LADM is not a data product but a conceptual schema that ties people to places via RRR. It is organized into three packages:87   

Parties (people and organizations) Rights, Restrictions and Responsibilities (ownership and land use rights) Spatial Units (land parcels, buildings and utility networks) with a Surveying and Representation subpackage 53

The LADM has undergone a decade-long comprehensive design process and fostered creative approaches to find common denominators in LAS, and to uniquely capture evidences for layered, overlapping, group, and secondary land rights. The LADM covers basic information related to components of land administration, including water and subsurface elements. It also includes agreements on data about administrative and spatial units, land rights in a broad sense and source documents, e.g., deeds or surveys. The LADM-recorded rights may be statutory or customary, informal, or any such mixture. All types of RRR can be represented to include overlapping claims to land. The model can be the basis for combining data from other LAS, linked to other databases, e.g., street addresses, and adapted to local situations.88

In this way all people-land relationships may be

represented and human security measurably improved.

Increased

protection of LTPR in slum or customary areas relies on forms of tenure far different from individual freehold or other formal land rights. Many of the customary rights included on the UN HABITAT continuum of land rights generally cannot be described relative to a land parcel. Therefore, new forms of spatial units not topologically-based (sketch map-, text-, or point-based, or unstructured boundary lines) are, for the first time, with the LADM determinant in a LAS. 54Â Â

Ghanaian customary rights, for example, are based on a hierarchy of Parties (King, Paramount Chief, Village Chief, Family Head, and Household Head), an entire suite of culturallynuanced RRR (i.e., abuna and abusa sharecropping arrangements), and Spatial Units (Kingdom, Region, Village, Family and Household) as in Figure 11 below.89

«featureType» King :LA_Party pID = 1

«featureType» ParamountChief : LA_Party pID = 123

«featureType» VillageChief : LA_Party pID = 999888

«featureType» FamilyFather : LA_Party pID = 56432787

«featureType» HouseholdLeader : LA_Party

«featureType» KingdomBAU : LA_BAUnit

«featureType» KingsRight :LA_Right type = landDecisions

uID = 1

«featureType» RegionBAU : LA_BAUnit

«featureType» ParamountsRight :LA_Right type = paramLandDecisions

uID = 34

«featureType» VillageBAU : LA_BAUnit

«featureType» VillageRight :LA_Right type = allocateResidentialLand

«featureType» FamilyRight :LA_Right type = allocateFarmLand

«featureType» Ashanti :LA_SpatialUnit area = 24389000000

«featureType» Kw abre :LA_SpatialUnit area = 700000000

«featureType» FamiliyBAU : LA_BAUnit

«featureType» FamilyNkrumahSU : LA_SpatialUnit

«featureType» FamilyBAU : LA_BAUnit

type = usefruct

area = 238500000000

uID = 256576

uID = 8765075

«featureType» Usefruct :LA_Right

«featureType» Ghana :LA_SpatialUnit

uID = 54625322

area = 300000

«featureType» HouseholdJohnSU : LA_SpatialUnit area = 2500

Figure 3.5: Customary Rights in Ghana, Derived from: Anthony Arko-Adjei, (2006) Conceptual Approach for Enhancing Customary Land Management: Case from Ghana.

The LADM is a tool for increased action by international actors, host nation governments, and civil society institutions interested in RRR affecting land, or water, and their associated 55

geospatial components. “It is important to note that LAS are not just 'handling geographic information,’ they represent statutorily or customarily lawful relationships amongst people, and between people and land.”90 For that reason the LADM is a prodigious innovation for peacebuilders; it represents the construct of human boundaries.

It is a focusable lens through

which to view socio-cultural dynamics.

Namely, the LADM’s

issuance of a time-stamp to new and superseded entries enables temporal analysis of how people have been related to land over time. The LADM is also expandable, with additional attributes, operators, associations, and even new classes for a specific region or country easily added.

Thus, as a flexible conceptual

model relating people to geographic places, the LADM meets another critical need of peacebuilders---improved communication among various actors.

Firstly, the LADM provides

an extensible basis for the development and refinement of efficient and effective LAS, based on a Model Driven Architecture (MDA), and to enable involved parties, both within one country and between different countries, to communicate, based on the shared vocabulary (ontology), implied by the model. The second goal is relevant for creating standardized information services in a national or international context, where land administration domain semantics have to be shared between regions, or countries, in order to enable necessary translations as it will cover the common aspects of land administration all over the world.91

Tribe : LA_Party

Jack : LA_Party

Access :LA_Restriction

PolygonParcel :LA_Lev el

type = servitude timeSpec = {beginDrySeason, endDrySeason}

Property :LA_Right

Unit :LA_BAUnit

type = ownership

structure = polygon

JacksPlot :LA_SpatialUnit

Figures 3.6: Pastoralists’ Rights modeled in LADM, Derived from:Lengoiboni, M., A.K. Bregt and P. van der Molen, (2010). Pastoralism within land administration in Kenya The missing link. Land Use Policy 27, pp. 579-588.

By recording and codifying customary tenure laws regarding tenure, the LADM mitigates abuses of power by making RRR clear for all stakeholders. The perils of a paper-based system that exposes land records to loss from theft, arson, natural disasters, or war are precluded via a digital repository with electronic back-up capability. Nearly all cadastres implemented in the developing world have been one-offs from each other; expensive to build and maintain. Based on the LADM’s shared vocabulary of land-related concepts, the Government of Finland has recognized substantial cost-savings in LAS implementation in sponsoring the Solutions for Open Land Administration (SOLA) project. Through the development and re-use of open source software, SOLA aims to make computerized cadastre and registration systems more affordable and sustainable in 57

developing countries. Ghana is one of three countries to take part in the pilot project.92 The initial software version was released in June 2012.93 In 2008, the International Federation of Surveyors (FIG) submitted the LADM as a New Work Item Proposal to the International Standards Organization Technical Committee (ISO/TC 211), which is responsible for worldwide geographic information standards.

After intensive review, in 2010 the LADM became

draft international standard (DIS) 19152. The model is not intended to be complete for any particular country, nor is it to replace any existing LAS.

This fact alleviates expressed

concerns about the cost prohibitiveness of conforming 3100 disparate U.S. county-level LAS to a new global standard. At this writing the LADM is in Final Draft International Standard (FDIS) status, on track to become the first international standard for land administration by the end of 2012.

Social Tenure Domain Model I have previously written about the LADM’s activity-based intelligence94, military95, engineering96, and natural resource management97 applications. This section introduces the Social Tenure Domain Model (STDM), a pro-poor specialization of the LADM, as a peacebuilding tool that decreases conflict, limits 58

forced evictions, and motivates the poor to engage with the land industry in undertaking slum upgrades or improvements to rural land.98 Future peace operations will be conducted in areas where the ground truth about people and land is often unknown or ignored in formal land tenure arrangements and statutory legislation. As a result, many people caught up in or fleeing conflict are invisible to host nation governments and international actors because their secondary land rights, such as access to forests and water, are not documented.

The STDM is

an initiative of UN-HABITAT to address these land tenure gaps. Indeed, secondary rights and interests in land are often part of complex customary relationships that protect poor people’s livelihoods, and are a key part of social security for women and other vulnerable groups.99 The STDM describes the relationship between people and land whereby it strives to record all forms of land rights, social tenure relationships and overlapping claims or rights over land. STDM is designed to support land rights recording in areas where regular or formal registration of land rights is not the rule. That is, STDM makes it possible to record rights which are not necessary registered rights, nor registerable, as well as claims that need to be adjudicated both in terms of the ‘who’, the ‘where’ and the ‘what’ type. The focus is on recorded rights (or social tenure relationships) and not only registered rights. This means recording personal land use rights and not only real rights – this implies that real rights are included. STDM handles the impreciseness and possible ambiguity of the description of the rights, both in terms of ‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘where’. STDM, therefore, records not only registered, but also the range of 59

rights in the continuum simultaneously; e.g. there can be, apart from formal rights: non-formal and informal rights, customary types, indigenous rights, tenancy and possession. Financially, STDM records options such as group loan and micro[finance] credit.100 In sum, the STDM identifies relationships between people and land independent of levels of formalization or the legality of those relationships. It signally improves human security by realizing the LADM aim of including every human being in some form of LAS. The STDM can contribute to poverty reduction, as the land rights and claims of the poor are brought into the formal system over time; it opens new land markets, and aids development by equipping communities with land management skills, helping them deal with the future challenges of population pressures and climate change.

60Â Â

Figure 3.7: Author surveys parcel boundaries in Ghana with Thomson Reuters team. Source: author In 2011, equipped with a laptop computer and a digital camera, I accompanied a team implementing the USAID-funded Title Registration and Microfinance Project in Ghana. Thomson Reuters developed the STDM-compliant land registry software, OpenTitle®, to collect and digitize images, record oral testimonies, capture ground photographs and other documents that tie people to geographic places. The project’s goal is in concert with the Global Land Tool Network (GLTN), an initiative of UN HABITAT and other agencies, to develop pro-poor land management tools that assist those who find themselves excluded from formal land 61

registries. OpenTitle® is commercial off-the-shelf, Earth Resources Research Institute (ESRI) geographic information system (GIS)-based registry system that is easy to learn, deployable, and very affordable ($600 USD per site license). The conceptual information from the LADM---how a Party (natural person or organization) is related to Spatial Unit (land parcel) via a Rights, Restrictions, and Responsibilities (RRR) is dutifully recorded in accordance with STDM requirements using simple fields and drop down menus. 

Party details include Identification field, First Name, Last Name, Organizational Name, Chief Officer Name, Date of Birth, Gender, City, Postal Code, Street, Validity Start and End dates.



Spatial Unit (property) details include: Property or Building, Postal Address, Location, City, District, Land Use Region, Tax Amount, and unique parcel identification number (UPIN).



RRR details include Relation Type (e.g. Informal Tenure, Occupation), Property/Building, Share of RRR, Validity Start and End dates, and Mortgage.

All default fields can be modified according to user needs. OpenTitle® offers a secure, scalable, and robust system with which to store, manage, and disseminate LTPR. Version control, for tracking changes in social tenure relationships, makes it ideal for community and participatory land governance, and the work of Ghanaian Customary Land Secretariats. Working with 62

partners Trimble Navigation, Opportunity International, and Sinapi Aba Trust, Thomson Reuters OpenTitle® creates paralegal property folios, a collection of property information that can eventually be used as a land title issued by the Government of Ghana (GoG). By moving occupancy or other informal land rights to the formal sector, poor people take a first step out of poverty. The paralegal property folio establishes a level of tenure security in that people may obtain credit from a microfinance institution (MFI) using their previously unregistered, informal property as collateral. Something as simple as having a mailing address is the basis for the ability to use the land as security or collateral for a microfinance loan, typically $100 to $500 USD for six months, to buy a sewing machine, basket weaving material, or other equipment and supplies for an in-home business.101 The Title Registration and Microfinance Project addresses the dual challenges of conducting land registration system in the developing world. First, peoples’ inherent distrust of government inculcates resistance to any top-down mandate to register their properties, which is why many large-scale land registration projects, despite promises of near-term economic benefits, have failed. People simply abhor an inordinate number of bureaucratic steps, each requiring travel and payment of 63

gratuities or bribes to government gatekeepers. Should one irregularity be detected, they perceive that they will face fines, penalties, or government expropriation of their land. Even if a taxation schedule is perceived to be fair, there is little faith that they will witness improved local services or infrastructure as a result.

Challenges also exist for the host

nation government to formally register land in customary areas beyond the cost and time of surveys. Government officials fear that they might create unsolvable problems by issuing deeds or titles in areas where no property mapping has ever been undertaken, or where a previous government had granted land concessions in return for patronage, or where fluid, unwritten, and sometimes contradictory customary rules are voiced by numerous parties. Concerned that the requirement for high accuracy field surveys would be both overly costly and time consuming, Thomson Reuters gained agreement from the Ghanaian Surveyor General for lower accuracy surveys based on Global Positioning Systems (GPS) readings. This pro-poor flexibility provided a framework to ensure the GoGâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s consent to less formal, though no less rigorous, procedures for recording of land rights for as low as $90 USD per parcel.102 Other research cites land title issuance in Africa for as low as $25 USD per parcel.103

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In addition to GPS-based surveys, a Provisional Real Property Questionnaire was used to record land occupancy details, neighbor testimonials, and other documentary evidence in support of land rights. The questionnaire language, by using that of the prevailing land law, is easily understandable, legally valid, and sufficient to gather field evidence. The form could also be extended to capture other information such as construction materials, owner/occupant’s health and education attainment, in order to build a comprehensive database of communities being mapped.104

The field interviews prompted the

divulgence of various types of property rights evidence:

leases

such as in Figure 8; receipts for utilities or rent payments; testimonies of neighbors; attestations by community leaders (customary or religious leaders, mayors, traditional councils,); video and voice recordings; and ground photographs. Relying on “best evidence,” property folios were prepared in a form analogous to the land certificates currently issued by the Ghanaian land registry and kept in a private database maintained by the MFI. The MFI provides the GoG with an alternative service arm by which title can be delivered to the poor at reduced cost to the government. The term “trusted broker” indicates that the MFI conducts due diligence ahead of the loan offering, in terms of affordability and risk, and 65

enables the GoG to receive titles for inclusion in the formal registry. Other trusted brokers may include bio-fuel or mining companies in a cropland or mining area who would assist residents to formalize their land rights. An important legal impact of formal title creation is that third parties will recognize the heretofore informal LTPR, creating value for the owner. Although no direct government action is required prior to incorporation into the formal registry, the MFI acts as facilitator and consolidator for collections of property folios which can be delivered to the government in accordance with a predetermined plan. This reliance by the MFI on the evidence presented demonstrates the commercial trustworthiness of the land information and becomes another form of “de facto” title. The MFI, now vested with its own financial interests in seeing the title formalized and acting on behalf of the borrower, can assist in streamlining formal registration.105 A detailed description how Open Title® software registers overlapping property rights and creates property folios, using Figure 2.4 as an example, is in Appendix II. Without a low-cost means to record, compare, and analyze locally-determined LTPR arrangements across political, cultural, and juridical boundaries, the proposed U.S. and UN mainstays for housing LTPR capacities within peacebuilding auspices cannot be realized. 66

“grass roots,” bottom-up compilation of STDM-enabled participatory and community mapping, that demarcates property boundaries and brings peoples’ secondary land rights and even their land disputes to the fore, fills that void.

importantly, the STDM, as demonstrated by the viability of the Title Registration and Microfinance Project using OpenTitle® to register informal LTPR in Ghana and elsewhere, provides to the world’s poor and marginalized populations not only improved livelihoods, but the hope of shaping their political and economic futures away from violent conflict.

Chapter Four: Socializing Social Media and Human Geography Data Chapter Three introduced innovations that build institutional capacity and competencies in land administration. Once viewed as a narrow, technical field, land administration is now becoming instrumental in solving human security problems. This chapter highlights several social media tools that have suddenly empowered millions of people to report threats to, and provided a means to secure, their land rights. Social media tools increase opportunities for public engagement and are already replacing static maps with more accurate depictions of the human terrain. Furthermore, they prompt individual and collective actions that can increase economic development and improve environmental management, social justice, and even land governance. Because these tools produce a colossal cumulus of data, this chapter also introduces two data-centric professional networks as potential repositories for global socio-cultural data so that it can be analyzed and acted upon. Retired Army Special Forces Colonel, Robert C. Jones, now a strategist with the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) identifies twin dynamics that, when combined with well-organized and comprehensive socio-cultural data, might shape post-Iraq and Afghanistan era U.S. foreign policy.

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Globalization is giving rise to two powerful new dynamics: the rise of non-state actors, and the general empowerment of populaces everywhere. Combined, these dynamics are eroding the Westphalian construct of sovereignty as vested solely in the state. In this new competition for sovereignty, it is ever more important to both understand and address the concerns of the people of other nations in the design and implementation of foreign policy. Taking the will of the people into account is not simply more important than it used to be, the will of the people is now the most important factor in formulating foreign policy.106 Geospatial innovators Robert Tomes and Christopher K. Tucker make a number of salient observations about sociocultural data needed to inform U.S. foreign policy and national security interests:107 

a decade of tortuous attempts to comprehend the human terrain in Afghanistan and Iraq yielded countless cases where fine-grained, time-series, real-world geographies would have enabled a much higher level of operational success in military operations...as well as in diplomatic efforts and development planning.



the lion’s share of global socio-cultural knowledge is held by people outside the U.S. national security community, who possess sophisticated understandings of the human dynamics within specific geographies. [They] have time-series data that demonstrate change over time and ... models based on trend information allowing them to make predictions.



[U.S.] policymakers and operators increasingly demand data on how others perceive or view the local “map,” able to represent cultural features, historic grievances, and relevant ethnic, tribal and other demographic data. 69

Tomes and Tucker acknowledge some yeoman’s work on the part of the U.S. military to map the human terrain in conflict regions, particularly in South Asia, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa, but the resulting data systems have not been integrated. They also realize that much of the population-centric data needed by U.S. national security planners remains inaccessible. NGOs, for example, collect data to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, but have no outlet for the data when the funding dries up. Academics collect and analyze data for research and publication purposes, but often lack storage or the capacity to geospatially enable their work.108

To fill that

void, a flurry of networking and partnership-building is underway to integrate data collected by a vast, disparate community of global practitioners, social media mavens, and nongovernmental organizations. With the establishment of two expansive networks, not since WWII has human geography been so well-poised to inform U.S. defense, diplomacy, and development. Habitats for Humanity’s Ground Truth The first of two nascent human geography networks is the the Cultural Knowledge Consortium (CKC), an interagency effort of the USG to enhance collaboration among the broader sociocultural research community. Formed in 2011, CKC supports civilian and military Combatant Commanders’ (COCOM)109 70

planning

and decision-making processes by providing a socio-cultural knowledge infrastructure to facilitate access to multidisciplinary, worldwide, social science knowledge. The CKC web portal is free to users and requires registration to access to several tools. The portal’s rudimentary Document Library is currently operational and is facilitating information sharing between registered users. The library has been tested successfully for remote access via hand-held devices (android, Iphone, etc.) and is undergoing adjustments to improve its easeof-access by field data-users to a wider subject matter expert (SME) network.

The CKC web portal also plans to serve as a

geospatial data repository, probably one among several, to compile and hold voluntary geospatial information (VGI) originated and reported from numerous, diverse, and remote resources (crowd-sourced, surveyors, field researchers, participatory mapping consortiums, etc.). This particular feature is not yet operable, but will endeavor to integrate the human geography data and analysis-sharing efforts of various organizations. The CKC web portal is also connecting with National Defense University’s (NDU) data wiki, called DataCards,110 to allow users to search links of known sources of data, rate them for reliability, and add their own geospatial and other data links.

NDU created DataCards in response to 71

professional requests for a data catalog of sorts, to provide a tool for finding, in a non-federated fashion, useful data to enhance analysis.

Lastly, the CKC portal will offer the

Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) Standard Cloud widgets built on the Ozone Widget Framework, to enhance data analysis capabilities for users. The other aspect of CKC’s dual facilitative approach to enhancing socio-cultural analysis resides in the form of an established Regional and Functional Scholar (RFS) network. The current seven RFS are responsible to particular COCOMs, but also are connected extensively to the wider public, private, and academic socio-cultural research communities. RFS endeavor to build collaborative networks among the latter, both in the United States and abroad.

In all cases, RFS are engaged in

adding to their already extensive, pre-existing networks of research professionals among different disciplines and communities: anthropology, geography, political science, government agencies, history, environmental history, and cartography are represented, for example. RFS are also facilitators for CKC web portal access and building relationships between the many providers of tools that this portal features. RFS also are responsible to initiate and facilitate dialogue across a full spectrum of researchers and 72

analysts with something to contribute to better understand the socio-cultural world. RFS manage this dialogue in at least five different ways:111 

Weekly speaker series accessible via Defense Connect Online (DCO)



Blogs and Forums accessible via CKC web portal for registered users



CKC sponsored and co-sponsored workshops and working groups to be held at various sites of convenience for participants



CKC assistance and contributions to Global Futures Forums112 to feature human geography and SCA issues



Brokering data and analysis provided online and by public, private, academic research communities for COCOM SCA use.

RFS are scheduling speakers with socio-cultural knowledge and experience to present the results of their work in short presentations accessible from any online laptop computer.

The

presentations are designed for listening over breaks or lunches or as part of any planning session or meeting, and DCO webinar allows for questions and answers via audio and chat. RFS and COCOM analysts are writing blog entries to introduce portions of their work in need of professional scrutiny to improve its applicability to enhancing their analytical work, or about their professional perspective on issues of socio-cultural importance. 73

Professionals of all sorts are invited to participate in forum discussions associated with these entries.

Political Stability Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief

Nation Recovery and Reconstitution

Emerging Infections

Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery

Education

Disaster Risk Reduction

Human Security

Cultural Property Communications Security Public Health

Economics Ecosystem Services

Infrastructure Security

Transportation Security Food Security

Water Security Energy Security

Many Missions Enable Human Security and All Require Foundation Human Geography Data

Figure 4.1: Human security touches upon many missions, Source: WWHGD. Also created in 2011 to focus on understanding “why people do what they do where they do it,” is the World-Wide Human Geography Data Working Group (WWHGD WG). Practitioners from industry, government, and academia, convinced that human geography data deepens understanding of cultures, activities, 74

and attitudes, now desire to also see it applied to analysis. More than any other social science discipline, human geography aids in anticipating societal behaviors over space and time, and thus informs decision-making that supports human security. WWHGD WG is a voluntary approach to create a transparent human geography data framework that leverages world-wide efforts to identify, capture, build, share, and disseminate the best available structured and unstructured foundation data on 10 human geography themes, to include, happily, land use---meaning land cover and ownership: Climate Demographics Education Groups Language Religion Transportation

Communication Economy Ethnicity Land Use Medical/Health Significant Events

In March 2012, under the rubric of Collaboration and Partnerships for Data Preparedness, WWHGD WG’s first session brought together over 230 professionals from over 100 organizations. Subsequent sessions are scheduled to document data requirements, identify priorities and gaps, and discover and catalog human geography data sources and mapping efforts for each of the thematic areas.113 Of special interest to first responders is the Human Security Taxonomy crafted by WWHGD. The list of data elements to be collected in preparation for a 75

disaster enables them to work faster and more effectively to save lives. The two start-up collaborative groups, CKC and WWHGD, have no doubt been influenced by Ms. Letitia Long, who, in 2010 became the first woman to head a U.S. intelligence agency. She is a catalyst for catapulting the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA) as the lead agency for human geography among the 16-member U.S. Intelligence Community. In an interview with NextGov magazine, Ms. Long revealed what is behind NGA’s titanic transformation toward predictive analysis. NGA’s imagery analysis has provided information about the physical features of a particular location. While physical geography information remains valuable, the key to predicting the future, according to Ms. Long, is the human geography of the same place. And Ms. Long is looking to fine-grain socio-cultural data beyond tribal boundaries, political ideology, ethnicity, and languages---birth and death rates, education levels, access to media, principal market commodities, and proximity to health care facilities. "We can create new value for the policymakers, the warfighters, the intelligence community, and first responders" she said. Geospatial intelligence "is the examination of all this data viewed through a spatial and temporal lens" and human geography

"can yield new insight" that would help answer such questions as:114

    

Where are conditions right for weapons of mass destruction proliferation? Where will the next pandemic outbreak occur? Where will transnational criminal activity spread? Where will the next mass migration event occur? Where are the populations most susceptible to extremist ideology?

Unlocking Local Knowledge That these intelligence questions, ostensibly for U.S. national security interests, are indistinguishable from questions about global human security is reflective of the twin 21st century dynamics that Jones described. And the grist needed to grasp the facets of global human dynamics will not come via vaunted intelligence collections, but from open source, grass roots networks. One such network is The Fund for Peace’s (FFP) Universal Network of Local Knowledge (UNLocK), an early warning project that cultivates networks of civil society organizations in conflict-affected countries to improve human security. Participants collect data at the community level for use in a common conflict analytical framework and send it to a hub where it is formatted and organized in order to make the information 77

meaningful. Once aggregated at the district or national level, the data yields trend lines and patterns. The FFP has developed networks of civil society organizations and trained its members in Nigeria, Liberia, and Uganda. But the program is locally owned, in that civil society participants have full access to and control of the framework, data, and analysis. Through a series of workshops, these individuals are trained in a conflict assessment framework (CAST) that consists of 12 social, political and economic indicators. Each indicator is made up of more specific issuesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;for instance, land conflict is included within the indictor for Demographic Pressures, as are other issues such as food scarcity, population growth, etc. Participants report incidents to a local coordinating NGO and also to the FFP by a variety of means, including phone, SMS [short message service], email, an online form, and in-person meetings. Incident reports are compiled into a database and displayed on a web-based map. The full text of the incident reports as initially submitted, including the detailed description of the incident, is kept password protected for participants only due to potential security concerns. More general findings are made public through the web maps and through regular summary reports.115

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Figure 4.2: UNLocK Conflict Assessment Framework (CAST) 12indicator bar chart Courtesy of UNLocK

Figure 4.3: The 12 CAST indictors in their respective social, economic, and political/military groupings. Courtesy of UNLocK

The bar chart above shows the distribution of Uganda incident reports by CAST indicator comparing two four-month periods in 2011. Using the months of January to April as a baseline, in the second time period, as a percentage of the total number of reports by indicator, there was a spike in risk factors reported within the Demographic Pressures, Group Grievance, and Public Services indicators.

Incidence and issues

reported within those indicators related mainly to drought, disease, land competition, and pastoral conflicts.

During this

same time period, other indicators became less salient as there had been an election with associated pressures and risk factors reported during the baseline period. Self-reported data, while potentially useful to external actors’ strategic and operational aims, more importantly empowers civil society and community-based organizations to monitor their own environments and take action to mitigate potential threats to peace. For example, in 2010-2011, UNLocK Liberia generated 44 reports of land conflict in 12 of that troubled West African nation’s 15 counties.116

Figure 4.4: Land Conflict in Liberia 2010-2011, Courtesy of UNLocK, webmap created by The Gadfly Project Land Competition and Related Violence 2010-2011. Incidents were reported in 11 out of 15 counties: Nimba (9 reports), Bomi (9 reports), Gbarpolu (5 reports), Montserrado (5 reports), Lofa (4 reports), Margibi (3 reports), Bong (3 reports), River Cess (2 reports), Grand Cape Mount (2 report), Grand Bassa (1 report), and River Gee (1 report). The development of the Sime Darby palm oil plantation led to a disputes and tension in the Grand Cape Mount and Gbarpolu counties in December 2011, as residents contested the plantation’s alleged incursions onto privately-owned farmland. As a result of these disputes, the Liberian government requested that the plantation halt its operations until the problem was resolved. In Margibi county, several people were reportedly injured in March 2010 when conflict erupted between two towns over ownership a plot of land. Also in March 2010, land disputes reportedly resulted in a number of deaths in the Margibi-Grand Bassa border area. A possible contributing factor for these incidents may have been the recent discovery of iron ore deposits in the area. In June 2010 it was reported that about 125 people were evicted from their homes in Grand Bassa county (District #3) in a land dispute between two 81

families. In 2011, there were reportedly a number of ethnically-based land disputes in Nimba County. Conclusion: In Liberia during the period of 2010 to 2011, land conflict mainly comprised incidents of competition between various towns and families over border demarcation and control over resources. The emphasis on ethnic and clan linkages highlights the continued importance of group grievance in determining potential onset threats. Control over natural resources constitutes another significant pressure that could increase the severity of these disputes. Expansion efforts of multinational corporations interested in exploiting these resources also threaten stability, as local populations often claim that these companies are encroaching on their land and disrupting their farming. These conflicts underscore the need for effective dialogue between community members and investors as a way of avoiding potential violence. Land conflict has also been prominent in the Acholi subregion of northern Uganda.117 Coupled with the geospatial depiction, textual descriptions enable UNLocK to conduct a plausible analysis of the conflict drivers.

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Figure 4.5: Land Conflict in Uganda 2009-2011, Courtesy of UNLock, webmap created by The Gadfly Project. The locations marked with a red dot had incident reports associated with them during the period. Land Competition and Related Violence (May-August 2011): Incidents were reported in 5 Districts: Agago (5 reports), Pader (3 reports), Lamwo (2 reports), and Gulu (1 report). In Agago District, in Parabongo (subcounty 45), arson crimes resulted in the destruction of several homes and claimed the lives of at least 6 people. A contributing factor in the violence in Agago is the conflict between the local community and the refugees/IDPs resettling in the area. In Gulu District, in Lalogi (sub-county 19) several people were injured in a land dispute between two clans. In Pader District a couple was reportedly murdered in Omot (sub-county 55), in the course of a land dispute. In Lamwo District, land wrangles were reportedly behind a case of arson in Palabek-Ogili (sub-county 22) in which five houses were torched. In Padibe (subcounty 27), it was reported that several [people] were injured in a similar attack. 22 83Â Â

Conclusion: Conflict risk in Uganda is mainly at the local level, particularly with respect to land competition and pastoral conflicts in the North that are aggravated by underdevelopment, arms proliferation, a legacy of group grievance, and the resettling of formerly displaced people. However, there are exogenous pressures that can also contribute to the severity of those local disputes. Current pressures include drought in the region and instability in neighboring South Sudan...In September 2011 there were reports that a dispute along the border between Ugandans and [South] Sudanese over land ownership in Moyo District flared up, suggesting that the area may be becoming more insecure.118 An African Instance Young political activists have leveraged internet tools to promote social change. The social media revolution they have brought is illuminated by following interview with Kenyan attorney, Ory Okolloh, co-founder of the NGO Ushahidi (Swahili for “witness.”)119 What is Ushahidi? It is a non-profit technology company that specializes in developing free and opensource software for crowdsourcing and interactive mapping. We build tools for democratizing information and increasing transparency – we're lowering the barriers for individuals to share their stories. It started out as an ad hoc group of technologists and bloggers hammering out software in a couple of days, trying to figure out a way to gather more and better information about the post-election violence in Kenya in January 2008. Since then, the platform has gone open-source, and it's free so it's now being used by organizations big and small all over the world. How did digital technologies best meet your needs, rather than the traditional avenues of publication and dissemination? Digital technologies offer the ability 84

to get up and running in a low-cost way, and the possibility of reaching a much wider audience. What is it about the web that makes it such an effective platform? Its accessibility and the low barriers to publication of information – plus the ability to be who you are. What can't the web do to change our attitudes and behavior? The web can't change our behavior – it can influence us, but its individuals who change. Where will the web have its greatest effect over the next 10 years? No question: Africa. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) began to partner with Ushahidi during Liberia’s 2011 General Elections, when Ushahidi Liberia created an “instance” (customized version) for UN fieldbased operations that U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel David Foster, serving as UNMIL Plans and Operations Officer, began the Situational Awareness Visualization Environment (USAVE) Initiative. The genesis of the USAVE idea is clearly social media. With this geospatially-enabled data repository, UNMIL staff sees trends that had been impossible to identify from textual reports alone. The USAVE instance not only contains UNgathered data, but also links to other Ushahidi deployments such as Liberia’s Early-Warning and Response Network (LERN). Foster states, “the value of linking to other instances cannot be understated.

The eyes and ears of our teammates improve UNMIL’s

ability to truly understand the environment in which we are providing humanitarian services... USAVE is not a thing or a 85

single website,” says Foster, “it is a change of organizational culture and processes, powered by existing technologies like Ushahidi. Using existing tools and a streamlined approach will allow UNMIL personnel to rapidly share, view, and understand relationships between operational datasets and the environment.”120 But movements fueled by social media can be highly problematic in Sub-Saharan African nations with very limited infrastructure. Ushahidi Liberia’s coverage of the October 2011 elections left Timo Lüge, a German journalist and owner of Social Media 4 Good, totally unimpressed. Lüge lamented Liberia’s lack of basic mapping and of a gazetteer of consistently-spelled place names, and doubted that many Liberians were even aware of Ushahidi’s election monitoring. As for the medium of mobile telephones, he noted that many Liberians lack electricity with which to charge them. While Lüge agrees that crowdsourcing can potentially fortify civil society, in this case the “crowd” was limited …almost exclusively to the nine partner organizations that were supposed to feed information to the platform. Some of these organizations, like UNMIL, would certainly have been able to contribute something of value. But in the end they didn’t – UNMIL, for example, did contribute a [one] single report.121

Limited connectivity which undermines the viability of crowdsourcing in countries like Liberia requires a different approach.

LERN, for instance, works with trusted networks to

aggregate data, instead of the “crowd.”

This also helps with

the problem of validation and verification of the information being collected.

The four participating programs in LERN are

the Liberia Armed Violence Observatory, the Early Warning Early Response Working Group, UNLocK Liberia, and the Liberia Peacebuilding Office.

The data collected by these programs and

organizations, whether from police, hospitals, media sources; or through workshops with hundreds of local stakeholders (as UNLocK does), is regularly uploaded to the LERN site. Following his deployment, Foster reflected on the second phase of the USAVE campaign, which began in April 2012 to …establish joint information collection standards and processes for military observers deployed throughout the country. The primary objective is to test and evaluate smart phone technology in remote regions of the country and to incorporate field data from all UN agencies into a networked capability. The ongoing USAVE efforts are defining information collection priorities to focus and eliminate "data noise" of disparate reports, thereby increasing the speed and quality of mission leadership decisions.122 Crowdsourcing Land Administration If the use of social media has limitations as identified by Lüge, land administration systems (LAS) technical expert Robin 87

McLaren is more optimistic. He believes that if social media can topple governments, crowdsourcing must be able to improve land administration. McLaren encourages land professionals to rethink how land administration services are designed and delivered in order to be more inclusive, and lists the following benefits of a citizen-institution collaboration model.123

Citizens • Access to affordable land administration services, especially for the poor and vulnerable • Direct involvement in the land registration process that strengthens the relationship between the citizen and the land, leading to greater trust and legitimacy in the land administration process • Recognition of a level of land rights that at worst would lead to fewer evictions and at best would lead to formal land rights • Fully open and transparent access to land information services that will help to reduce levels of corruption associated with public and private land. Citizens could crowdsource the extents of public land to publicize and safeguard these public assets • Sufficient security of tenure for citizens to start investing in their land and property. Land Administration Agencies • More inclusive set of land administration services, directly involving the citizens that lead to a strong and more trusting relationship with citizens • Potential outreach of services to remote rural regions and slums within urban environments • More comprehensive coverage of land rights with fewer professional resources 88

• Greater number of transactions in the formal land market that leads to higher revenues to increase the sustainability of land administration service and lower the cost of transactions Land Professionals • Land professionals would continue to deliver current services in engineering surveying applications and cadastral surveys in high value urban areas • New opportunities to provide guidance and services to local community experts and citizens • New and enhanced role of land professionals in partnership with citizens that will strengthen the profession

Figure 4.6: Where and how Social Media can improve LTPR in the Continuum of land Rights. Courtesy of Know Edge, Ltd. 90

Figure 4.7: Benefits of Modern Land Administration Systems, Courtesy of Know Edge, Ltd.

McLaren wants to extend the benefits of land administration via low-cost mobile telephone technology to aid the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s poor. For example, the Mbendjele people of Congo-Brazzaville are using the simplified satellite mapping technology to register their property rights in a rainforest. They take hand-held satellite technology devices into the forest and create maps showing places of community importance such as hunting grounds and cemeteries. A touch-screen allows them to easily record the locations of significant cultural and physical features and how they use the land. For the first time, the Mbendjele can intelligently discuss their land rights with private companies and government officials.124 Ghanaian Customary Land Secretariats, along with other African sub-state actors, Ugandan Community Knowledge Workers125, and barefoot land officers,126 for example, function as trusted and neutral go-betweens who explain procedures, data uploads, fees, etc., to populations that have not previously interfaced with customary or government land institutions. The accuracy and authenticity of the captured information, textual and verbal descriptions, geo-tagged digital photographs and videos, positions and coordinates of boundary points, are exponentially strengthened by a timestamp at time of capture, which very few (99.9%) other users can tamper with.127 McLaren explains: 92Â Â

Figure 4.8: Smart Mobile Phone Cyborg Functionality. Courtesy of Know Edge, Ltd. When the captured land rights are submitted to the property register a variety of quality checks could be applied to the submitted information, including: random checks in the field; comparisons with other applications submitted in the same proximity; checks on ownership of the mobile phone; review evidence for the location of its owner through the log showing that the phone is frequently used within a location; network time stamping of captured information; societal evidence from the community; discussions on 93Â Â

social media; and contact the client and their neighbors on their mobile phones to ask for clarification.128 As is the case with the Thomson Reuters Title Registration and Microfinance Project in Ghana, the acceptance of paralegal property folios, such as those produced by Open Title® software, is greatly enhanced when financial institutions use the documents to assess risk. Similarly, concludes McLaren, acceptance of crowdsourced information “may progress over time as quality and trust evolve...Ultimately, it may either replace the government land administration service, reinforcing the informal land market, or be adopted by government once it has reached a critical mass and quality.”129

Chapter Five:

Land Governance Metrics

In Chapter Two, I introduced the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), set in 2000 to free people from extreme poverty and deprivations in 15 years. Not surprisingly, to track progress over this time period, the UN developed a gigantic framework comprised of 18 targets and 48 indicators for monitoring projects’ annual progress.130 But because not one MDG has been realized in poor or fragile states, deep contemplation is afoot at the UN to reinvigorate global partnerships for development beyond 2015. Economists Daron Acemoğlu and James A. Robinson scoured centuries of emphatic historical examples that demonstrate a singular reason for the perpetuation of human insecurity. It is not a curse of unfavorable physical geography, nor frailties of certain human cultural patterns, nor a lack of education or ability among a nation’s leadership that engenders widespread abject poverty and despair which can result in state failure. It is the nature of a country’s political and economic institutions. Namely, whether the institutions are extractive, rapaciously bent on gaining wealth from human and natural resources to benefit an elite few, or inclusive, fostering a literal “commonwealth” with participatory governance that protects peoples’ rights and encourages productivity and 95

innovation.

“No two societies create the same institutions;

they will have distinct customs and different systems of property rights...and degrees of political centralization.”131 These differences become pivotal at what Acemoğlu and Robinson call critical junctures “because they influence how society reacts to changes in economic or political circumstances.”132 For example, the social media employed in collective action against extractive dictators’ economic and political oppression emblematized a critical juncture during the Arab Spring. A poor person without formal tenure security who posts a spatiallyenabled document to a web page to stake his land claim via a mobile telephone betokens another such critical juncture. With the new tools and technologies explained in Chapters Three and Four, even in an austere budget climate, the time is right for the United States and the UN to make the building of land governance institutions a pillar of their respective peacebuilding efforts. USAID land tenure specialist Karol C. Boudreaux summarizes the ineffectual attempts of donor agencies to build formal institutions in Sub-Sahara Africa, and the possible harm that extractive institutions might exact on an unsuspecting populace: Over the past decade numerous donors including, but not limited to, the World Bank, USAID, UN HABITAT, the FAO, the Inter-American Development Bank, DFID 96

(Department for International Development, the U.K. aid agency) and SIDA (the Swedish aid agency) have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to help African countries build land administration institutions, to train officials, to provide equipment to map and survey lands, and to craft land policies, and revise land laws and implementing regulations. Less attention has been paid to supporting or strengthening customary land institutions as it was thought that these institutions needed to be replaced by more modern formal systems designed to identify, value, and record land rights and resolve land disputes. However, building formal land administration systems has proved to be a contentious, time consuming, and costly process... And finally, in the wrong hands, this kind of data can be used for predatory purposes. Aggregating data in the hands of a corrupt or predatory centralized authority can make it easier for that authority to use information to harm political, economic, or other enemies.133

Boudreaux is mindful that such concerns are prevalent where the rule of law and good governance are wanting. Both remain deficient because of three misdirected priorities of international actors. The first foible is the paltry amount of attention, in the form of human and fiscal resources, paid to rule of law and governance as development arenas. In the case of U.S. foreign aid budget in Fiscal Year 2009, only eight percent was directed toward the rule of law and governance. Moreover, when the two budgetary and foreign assistance anomalies of Iraq and Afghanistan are removed from the equation, only four percent of the foreign assistance budget is allocated for governance programs.134 97Â Â

A second defect is the agenda with which international actors approach the task once some modicum of resources are allocated. With deep introspection of her legal profession, the Senior Counsel to the World Bank’s Justice Reform Practice Group, Deborah Isser, challenges the Western assumption that justice must emanate solely from the state. She champions legal pluralism in post-conflict situations where “more nuanced relations between the different legal orders…can then be more responsive to social and political imperatives in ways that support sustainable peace.”135

Her insight is most valuable in

indentifying three constraints that hinder rule of law professionals from engaging customary justice systems, which, are often perceived by aggrieved populaces to be more accessible and just than ineffective or biased formal institutions:136 

The widely held tendency to see justice reform as a technical exercise of drafting laws and building institutions to be done by international legal professionals. But lawyers schooled in Western formal law rarely have the background, skills, or access needed to account for the contextual complexities of customary justice systems.



A built-in normative bias concerning standards. The UN Definition of “rule of law” explicitly calls for consistency with international human rights norms and standards. This normative bias poses an obvious challenge to customary justice systems, which fall short of international norms. To many rule-of-law practitioners, the choice is, either eradicate the deviant customary justice system or intervene to “fix” it. 98



The objective of state building that calls for the (re-)establishment or expansion of state sovereignty, which is generally seen as entailing a state monopoly on delivery of justice. Rule-oflaw practitioners thus tend to regard customary systems as a distraction from their main task or even as an obstacle that undermines the sovereign authority of the state.

Here also the notion of a critical juncture looms large in the minds of international actors because “the immediate postconflict period is often hailed as a ‘window of opportunity’ for the international community to step in and “get it right.”137 The third misdirected priority is the clash of the counterbureaucracy138 and development. Even if sufficient human and fiscal resources were allocated, and international actors acknowledged customary land tenures and worked to include and improve these in institution building, former USAID Administrator and distinguished professor at Georgetown University, Anthony Natsios opines that: One of the little understood, but most powerful and disruptive tensions in established aid agencies lies in the clash between the compliance side of aid programs—the counter-bureaucracy—and the technical, programmatic side. The essential balance between these two in development programs has now been skewed to such a degree in the U.S. aid system (and in the World Bank as well) that the imbalance threatens program integrity. The counter-bureaucracy ignores a central principle of development theory—that those development programs that are most precisely and easily measured 99

are the least transformational, and those programs that are most transformational are the least measurable.139 Natsios views development as the building of public, private, and non-profit institutions in poor and fragile states. The ultimate goal of which is: Developing a capable state, market economy, and civil society that can manage public services, design good policies, create jobs, and protect human rights and the rule of law on a reliable, sustainable basis after the aid program is over and funding ends. All construction or service delivery projects should be subordinate to the larger institution-building task.140 Natsios laments that the demands of the counter-bureaucracy are now so intrusive that they have “distorted USAID‘s development practices to such a degree that it is compromising U.S. national security objectives and challenging established principles of good development practice.”141 In sum, he exposes the counter-bureaucracy’s cop out to apply metrics to things which can be easily measured. Input metrics, such as how many children in a given country received immunizations, are temptingly easier to measure than the societal outcomes of an inoculation or other programs. This practice generates more funding for preventive medicine and other hard sciences, and accounts for the measly amounts allocated to soft science governance programs. Governance improvements are significantly 100

less visible, harder to measure, and much slower to demonstrate success.

It is also the case that effective democracy,

governance, and economic institutions threaten powerful elite interests and thus face opposition whereas the delivery of health services generally does not.142

Metrics That Matter To make an initial assessment about the state of land governance (land tenure, records, and use), land professionals Jaap Zevenbergen and Tony Burns compiled a useful list of postconflict land issues to assess.143 Perhaps wary of labyrinthine indicators of performance, they suggest limiting the number of goals in the first place and pursuing a phased approach that focuses on what is most urgent in the specific circumstances. This limited, step-by-step approach reduces the temptation to measure inputs and measures the societal effects of an intervention (outputs). Simplicity is golden, but a bureaucracy abhors simplicity. Politically-charged, post-conflict environments inevitably attract a parade of Ph.D.s, economists, surveyors, and attorneys. With each new expert brought in as an advisor to higher headquarters, the more esoteric and Orphic the metrics become for the non-experts assigned at the local level. In Iraq and Afghanistan, that local level officer-in-charge 101Â Â

typically has been the 28-year-old company grade officer, who, as Tom Ricks suggested, might already be overwhelmed supervising a plethora of non-military tasks in a “hillbilly” landscape abounding in land disputes. Observations of ground truth over time are key metrics for building human security, but far too often local level observations fail to factor into decision-making in the larger, grandiose schemas used by many international actors (a number of LTPR assessments, guides, and metrics frameworks are listed in Appendix I). Peacebuilders at the local level value simplicity. It is of paramount importance not only that metrics reflect observable realities on the ground, but that they are understood and clearly communicated horizontally. Members of a national or coalition team will likely possess different levels of education, technological sophistication, and English language proficiency than the officer-in-charge. Vertical communications, too, tend to be clouded by the “provide input to my chart” expectations of higher headquarters. The use of arcane language such as “negative externalities”144 that only a Ph.D. or highlytrained specialist comprehends leads to one being marginalized or ignored. Moreover, the definitions of “freedom of movement,” ”expanded economic opportunity,” “improved governance,” and other imprecise terms frequently change. Remote site personnel 102

must guess at the meaning of the shifting terminology used at headquarters. The resulting Power Point chart, while satisfying reporting requirements, will reflect less and less ground truth. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Senior Fellow Robert D. Lamb noted that “governance in Afghanistan does not have to become ‘good’ in American terms, just ‘good enough’ in Afghan terms---and incrementally better over time” and that “accepting and supporting formal and informal systems already in place is an approach consistent with the coming decline in international resources.”145 For those very reasons, I now introduce a methodology developed by Michael Woodgerd for realizing improved governance from peacebuilding efforts with finite resources. Exasperated by untenable, lumbering metrics frameworks, he created a simple methodology that makes governance metrics truly useful at the local level. From 2008-2010, Woodgerd was embedded in three successive U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team/Interagency Partner (DoS, USDA, USAID) staffs in the P2K (Paktya, Paktika, Khost), an austere region of eastern Afghanistan. His eclectic background includes several years of operations research and systems analysis. And, as a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel, he could anticipate and understand the needs of senior officers and civilian decision makers. After 18 months of observing their repeated struggles 103

over synchronizing kinetic (security) with non-kinetic (governance, agriculture, and development) efforts, Woodgerd conceived the Comprehensive Assessment Prioritization Resourcing Synchronization (CAPRS)TM methodology as a basis for allocating resources, measuring Lines of Efforts (LOE), and (re-)directing them within a geographic region toward a precise and predetermined end state. Upon seeing an example of CAPRS

for other

governance components, I sought out Woodgerd and collaborated with him to expand his methodology to the needed land institution-building work described in this monograph. My contribution to the knowledge corpus is a facile, 2-page measure of indicators that can be replicated globally for all actors, civilian or military, international or host nation. CAPRSTM, pronounced “capers,” is an acronym chosen to both uniquely identify this comprehensive planning and assessment methodology and to mnemonically reinforce that the four components---Assessment, Prioritization, Resourcing, and Synchronization---are equally important, sequential, and interrelated. The assessment component, which is the focus in this writing, is limited to the bare bones of what is essential to achieve a desired end state. The assessment is not designed with experts in mind, but rather for commonality of understanding. Realizing that many peacebuilding leaders are 104

young Army captains, Foreign Service Officers, or USAID officials without specific training in agriculture, public works, rule of law, land administration, etc., the methodology is designed for a college graduate to understand and use in the field. The CAPRS

assessment defines a fixed end state that is

neither today’s ground truth nor malleable to a visiting expert’s assertion that yet another facet of the Gordian knot be examined. The end state is defined by local level actors, at the same level where decisions are made and resources allocated, not by working groups at higher headquarters. Without CAPRS

international actors tasked with a generic aim to “improve land governance” are not likely to craft a concrete vision of what can (or cannot) be achieved in a given time frame with finite resources.

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WTS Group, LLC

CAPRS Methodology – Afghan Usage P2K Assessment Average of Category Ratings (G, A, I, S, D)

Governance

Agriculture

Information Engagement

Security

Development

This shows the overall composition of CAPRS by Category. Actual colors of the circles would change when assessments are made. Institution Basic Services Self-Supporting Rule of Law Perception

8/17/2012

Ag Production/Productivity Watershed & Natural Resources Agribusiness GIRoA Perception

CP Define Environment AAF Influence Afghan Communication Free Media Perception

WTS Group, LLC Proprietary Material

Operations/Activity AAF Itself ANSF Construction/ANSF Facilities Perception

Healthcare Education Infrastructure Economic Growth Perception

Figure 5.1: Five CAPRS TM Lines of Effort are further divided into categories. Rule of Law is one such category under Governance. Source: WTS Group used with permission

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WTS Group, LLC

WTS Group, LLC Proprietary Material

CAPRS Governance Focus Areas

Weighted Average of Categories

Institution

Weighted Average of Categories Infrastructure/Publi cAdmin PDC Process PEO/IEC CDCs/DDAs

Basic Services Self-Supporting

Weighted Average of Categories PSAs/Connect Public Works Projects GO Missions District SG Outreach District SG Shuras

Weighted Average of Categories Access Ntl GIRoA Programs Conducts Budgeting Provides District Funds Municipalities Generate $

Rule of Law

Perception

Weighted Average of Categories

Weighted Average o Categories

Functioning Formal System Formal & Traditional System Corruption Land Governance

Opinion Poll Input TCAPF Input Outside Reporting / Open Press

WTS Group, LLC Proprietary Material

Figure 5.2: Rule of Law is one Governance Focus Area under which Land Governance is nested. Source: WTS Group used with permission

CAPRSTM limits LOE to the five categories in Figure 22, and, for simplicity’s sake, drills down just two levels: first to Focus Areas (Figure 23) and then to Components (Figure 24), each also limited in number to what is essential. Ground truth is assessed at one of four (Component) levels: Red, Orange, Amber or Green, using plain language English definitions of each that can be determined by inspection. “Red” signifies non-existent or non-functioning. “Green” does not mean “good to go” by U.S. standards but is situational---as good as it can get here--107

i.e., Afghan good enough. CAPRSTM clearly identifies what incremental improvements are needed to reach an attainable goal, such as a Component’s status changing from orange to amber, and how long that effort would likely take. This honest and measured time estimate for interventions to take hold is in concert with Assistant Secretary Barton’s stated 12-month time frame for CSO impacts to be realized. According to Woodgerd: This methodology allows each leader to produce a clear and justifiable request to higher headquarters for more assets or effort. Perhaps even more important, it allows organizations to decide when to stop because the push just isn’t worth the squeeze. This methodology was not intended to add to the academic literature. It is designed to give decision-makers in austere, even hostile, environments a simple, logical decision aid to make hard, real-world choices.146

Woodgerd relates that when he first briefed CAPRSTM to key peacebuilding actors in the P2K region of Afghanistan, the audience included U.S. State Department members at Provincial and District levels, Army Battalion Commanders at the roughly 10-month mark of their 1-year deployment, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders, and Brigade Combat Team (BCT) J9 (civil-military coordination) staff members. When a colonel on the Division staff scoffed, an infantry battalion commander stood up and stated, “This [CAPRS

methodology] is

exactly what I wish I’d had to prioritize and allocate all of my 108

resources, and then I could have turned to Brigade (higher headquarters) to say and this is what else I need.” An Army Human Terrain Team leader, who led sociologists with long experience in eastern Afghanistan, stated that if the entire “Board of Directors” (the BCT Commander, U.S. State Department, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and USAID leads) did such an assessment then, “this alone tells me how to allocate all my efforts for the year.” During his two years in Afghanistan, Woodgerd attended hundreds of briefings and command updates, worked closely with the key leaders across governance LOE, listened to higher level assessment cells and reviewed their products. But to him they missed the salient point, which is “the only reason for any assessment is to lead directly to a precise decision and courses of actions, which in many cases could be to do nothing or delay action.”147 To have a chance for success, the chosen interventions must mesh with other ongoing actions and other LOE. Not only must the assessment process simultaneously factor in each action in each LOE, but he adds this key qualifier, “it must have defined ‘break points’ of clearly discernible differences between levels that would lead to a decision.”148 The five Components of the Land Governance Focus Area mirror the World Bank Land Governance Assessment Framework 109

(LGAF) described in Appendix I.149 I am grateful to LGAF coauthor Tony Burns and Mike Woodgerd, who helped array postconflict land governance issues into this format.

WTS Group, LLC

WTS Group, LLC Proprietary Material

CAPRS Land Governance Assessment Weighted Average of Categories

Tenure and Institution Framework

Land Use, Planning, Markets, and Land Tenure Security Taxation

Public Provision of Land Information

Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management

Enforcement Mechanism Clarity of State or Customary Institutional Roles an d Procedures Land Use Taxation

State Ability to Inventory, Acquire, Allocate, and Divest Land for Public Good

Weighted Average of Sub-elements

Sub-elements to be developed

WTS Group, LLC Proprietary Material

Figure 5.3: CAPRS TM Land Governance Components Source: WTS Group used with permission

Land Governance in CAPRS: A. Tenure and Institutional Framework 1. Land Tenure Security 110

a. Red-No tenure security, land controlled by elites, informal settlements (undocumented slums, shantytowns) are widespread b. Orange-Tenure security for select few with the means to pay, property rules remain ambiguous c. Amber-Tenure security for most people due to clear, documented property rules d. Green-Nearly all people enjoy tenure security, informal settlements are few 2. Enforcement Mechanisms a. Red-None of police, court, or customary authorities enforce property rules b. Orange-Enforcement by one of above authorities for select few who can pay c. Amber-Two of the above authorities enforce most property rules for most people d. Green- Impartial enforcement by all authorities for all members of society 3. Clarity of State or Customary Institutional Roles and Procedures a. Red-Unclear, complex procedures and overlapping institutional roles push most people into informality (undocumented properties and land use rights) b. Orange-Less overlap of roles, but formal registration procedures are costly and time consuming c. Amber- Accessible institutions and efficient procedures encourage most people to make formal property registrations and transactions d. Green- Clear institutional roles; efficient, affordable procedures; very little informality B. Land Use, Planning, Markets, and Taxation 1. Land Use a. Red-No master land use plans; no public participation, no requirements for construction b. Orange-Planning is ineffective, process for permits invites corruption and informality c. Amber-Planning guides most development; efficient permit process encourages formality d. Green-Public participates in planning, corruption is rare, all new construction is formal 2.

Taxation 111Â

a. Red-Tax policy and schedule are unclear, no assessment or collection systems b. Orange-Policy is clear, but systems are inefficient, no information on taxes collected c. Amber-Schedule is equitable, systems efficient, but information on public good from taxes is limited d. Green-Few exemptions to policy and schedule, all systems are efficient and complete C. State Ability to Inventory, Acquire, Allocate, and Divest Land for Public Good 1. Red-No clear definition, classification, or inventory of public lands 2. Orange-The above exist but are incomplete, expropriations (government taking of private land) are inexplicable 3. Amber-The above exist, and are mostly complete, expropriations are explicable 4. Green-The above are well-managed, allocation and divestiture (government land awarded to private parties) of land is transparent and accountable D. Public Provision of Land Information 1. Red- Land registry is grossly incomplete, land records unreliable, elites benefit 2. Orange-Land Registry is incomplete, land recording process is not generally understood 3. Amber-Land Registry is largely complete, recording process is understood & affordable 4. Green-Land Registry is complete, land records are up-to-date and publically available E. Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management 1. Red-Rampant conflict over land has negative social and economic consequences 2. Orange-Courts settle few disputes, “forum shopping” for alternative resolution is widespread 3. Amber-Courts settle most disputes but costs remain high, customary resolution, when used, is fair and equitable, instances of land conflict are decreasing 4. Green-Land disputes do not drive conflict; courts settle nearly all disputes equitably

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Figure 5.4: CAPRS provinces

land governance assessment for two Ghanaian

Ground Truth Aids in Decision-making Figure 25 depicts a CAPRSTM land governance assessment for two Ghanaian provinces. A cursory look at the overall provincial assessment scores, 2.59 and 2.62, respectively, based on averages, reveals that they are roughly equal in land governance capacity, albeit their respective districts exhibit different strengths and weaknesses. Both provinces, even with massive inputs of human and fiscal resources, are unlikely to attain a green status in the near-term—--in other words---an “as good as it gets here” determination. With substantive overall gains ruled out, one still must guard against regression into weak 113

governance that may stoke violence. For example, Province 1 District A’s overall assessment rates a mere .02 percentage points above the break point from red to orange; its lowest scores are in elements A (Legal and Institutional Framework)and D (Provision of Public Land Information). Element A has the advantage of having been broken down into three sub-elements, which allows for more fine-tuned decision-making against what LOE resources might be applied. An overarching CAPRSTM “big picture” matrix is an impressive decision aid that allows all actors to see what other actors are doing where. Assuming, notionally, that staffing and training of Customary Land Secretariats have been responsible for two districts advancing from orange to green, and one from orange to amber status for element D, then a possible course of action is to replicate this effort in Province 1 District A. Guiding metrics might include “To what degree is the land registry complete?,” “To what degree is the land registration process understood?” and then “To what degree is the land registration process actually utilized?” If the land registry is underutilized, then determine whether the hindrance is a lack of trust in the registry as an institution, inordinately high registration costs, or a registry’s location is too distant for most people to walk to, or something else, and design the intervention 114

accordingly. CAPRS

also boasts a prioritization matrix, with

weighted criteria for a geographic region’s value to overall policy aims, which aids in decision-making where to best allocate resources when, as in this example, two geographic regions are fairly equal in their respective governance capacity. Prioritization factors to consider include:



adjacency to a green(er)-status region



adjacency to a critical border area



a greater population density



possessing development corridors



possessing key land or sea transportation hubs



possessing political significance for the host nation

Admittedly, this writing has focused only on the assessment component of CAPRSTM (CAPRSTM is fully described in Appendix III) because all LOE are included in one structured approach using a common assessment methodology and language. This enables the simultaneous visibility that is required to make peacebuilding resource and timing decisions. CAPRSTM is comprehensive because it ensures the commander’s intent is uniformly applied across a geographic region and can be used to plan, brief (all on one slide), and mentor. In sum, most of the LTPR assessments, 115

guides, and metrics frameworks listed in Appendix I, created by Ph.D.s, economists, and lawyers, are too academic for field use. Of course, these instruments are very useful for designing detailed, long-term interventions, based on thorough analyses, to affect needed societal changes that CAPRSTM can then measure incrementally at the local level. As Woodgerd aptly states, “CAPRSTM is for the rest of us.” Burma and the Peacebuilding Agenda Reconstruction and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, their huge scales each requiring over 100,000 U.S. troops to provide basic security for years, are not synonymous with peacebuilding. They are anomalies that few expect, or wish, to be repeated. Twenty-first century peacebuilding need look no further than the beleaguered nation of Burma, with its suddenlypermissive environment, as a proving ground for its merits. Attorney and visiting scholar at the Environmental Law Institute, Kirk Talbott, believes that peacebuilding via natural resources management has a real chance to succeed in Burma. Namely, interventions there must include social and environmental impact assessments and active engagements of local communities in mapping, planning, and sharing equitably in the benefits of resource use. Talbott explains further:

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After a half century of authoritarian rule, armed conflict against millions of ethnic minorities, and natural resource plunder, Burma now stands at a crossroads. The nation of 55 million people represents as vividly as any, the urgent need to address natural resource governance in civil society and peace-building. Only through accountability, transparency and equitable benefit sharing in of natural resources management can a country like Burma turn the corner. Now, with sanctions being lifted and the flood gates for corporations, aid agencies, and NGOs pouring into that country, a rare opportunity has emerged to strengthen Burma’s natural resource laws and governance. Indeed, Burma’s prospects for peace and development hinge largely on its capacity to transparently manage its vast wealth in timber, minerals, natural gas, and other natural resources for the benefit of the country and not just an elite few.150

For peacebuilding to transform Burma from an oppressive pariah-state of half a century into a benign and functioning one, its institutions must be built to achieve and sustain some level of land governance. With a growing kaleidoscope of international actors with disparate agendas pouring into Burma, peacebuilding efforts there stand to benefit from the CAPRSTM methodology to measure natural resource management in what is a critical juncture for that nation’s future.

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Conclusion Land issues contribute not only to conflict, but also to peace. By addressing land issues, peacebuilding can work to safeguard 1.5 billion people from escalating criminal and political violence rooted in a lack of formalized land tenure and property rights. Attorney and former U.S. Defense Attaché Officer Geoffrey Demarest recalls an unheralded pillar of Western Civilization: “The original reason of property was and remains conflict resolution.”151 He suggests to the U.S. and UN, not to continue to place property formalization on a secondary plane of goals.152

Land administration underpins development and

forms a societal backbone that supports social justice, economic growth, and environmental sustainability, all elements of human security. Thus, the UN should include land administration with its next generation of Millennium Development Goals beyond 2015, just in time to assist Burma. It should also heed Scott Leckie’s suggestions and establish a lead agency within its large and sometimes unwieldy system to consolidate land administration functions. Both the United States and the UN should invest in comparatively low-cost standby personnel for a range of governance lines of effort, including, for the first time, land administration. They must be equipped with critical 118

peacebuilding tools such as the Social Tenure Domain Model (STDM), a pro-poor version of the Land Administration Domain Model (LADM), now in Final Draft International Standard (FDIS 19152) status, and engage host nation stakeholders in land matters beyond government officials. Based on my observations in Afghanistan and Ghana, the STDM can cost-effectively improve tenure security, decrease conflict, limit forced evictions, and motivate the poor to engage with the land industry. That industry increasingly includes non-state actors, who succeed where government could not, for example, in upgrading peri-urban slums and managing natural resources. The conduct of ad hoc peace operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has been costly in blood and treasure and shown very modest results. Donor fatigue has set in and resources are too scarce to build developing world institutions to Western standards. In localities outside the state’s capacity to provide services, it is time for “Afghan good enough.” Foreign nationals have to own the process of institution building, and many of the most capable national actors are outside government. A very diffuse and particularized set of power brokers operates in the non-Western world. Most notably, a rapidly-expanding, empowered, and educated middle class, demanding a share in governance, material development, and economic well-being, has come to the 119

fore. Additionally, new social media and crowdsourcing tools give a voice to the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s poor and marginalized peoples, and they are being heard. As in the case of Ghanaian Customary Land Secretariats, peacebuilders must nurture and then leverage the good work of sub-state entities. Peacebuilding in the 21st century has yet to lift one fragile state out of poverty and want. A lack of attention paid to land issues is one cause of the failures---and that is ground truth.

Starting now with Burma, its vast natural resources

coveted by resource-hungry and powerful neighbors, land governance is the cornerstone in building human security.

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Appendix I A selected list of Land Tenure and Property Rights (LTPR) assessments, guides, and metrics frameworks. 1. The USAID LTPR basic matrix is designed to visualize the categories of possible constraints and interventions associated with land tenure and property rights. In a word, it functions as a menu of six constraints and seven interventions that need to be considered within the realm of land tenure and property rights. Within each heading of the LTPR constraints categories are sub-issues that include historical, cultural, political, economic, and social nuance. This nuance provides depth and complexity to the issues. For example, “Resource Conflict and Displacement” in itself is generic, but when the focus is an issue dealing with displaced persons or the restoration of rule of law in a conflict or post-conflict situation, this category takes on practical dimensions for LTPR policy and program development.153

Figure A.I.1: USAID Land Tenure and Property Rights Base Matrix, Source: USAID 121

2. Logframe Analysis for Titling Projects, by Land Equity International PT, LTD.154 A Logframe is a tool for planning (goals and objectives) and managing (inputs, processes, and outputs) development projects. That the Logframe is included in a broader discussion of project management and evaluation in Chapter 13 of Land Administration for Sustainable Development is especially useful, as is the Logframe’s listing a hierarchy of objectives, indicators of success, along with major risks and assumptions. 3. Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict,155 prepared by UN-HABITAT on behalf of the UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action. The Framework Team is an internal UN support system that promotes

interagency collaboration on early preventive action and assists UN Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams to proactively work with national partners to strengthen their capacities to mediate and manage potentially divisive issues.156 Chapter 7 of this publication lists no fewer than 40 existing toolkits and guidance documents in its Table 6. 4. Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).157 These valuable Voluntary Guidelines are the result of intense negotiations amongst 96 countries along with civil society organizations, UN agencies, and other international organizations, farmers associations, and private sector representatives. The Voluntary Guidelines are organized in 7 parts (I – Preliminary, II – General matters, III – Legal recognition and allocation of tenure rights and duties, IV – Transfers and other changes to tenure rights and duties, V – Administration of tenure, VI – Responses to climate change and emergencies and VII – Promotion, implementation, monitoring and evaluation) and within those parts are 25 sections. Virtually all parts and sections of the Voluntary Guidelines rely on systems to record tenure rights, restrictions, and responsibilities.158 122

5. The Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) by Klaus Deininger, Harris Selod, and Tony Burns maintains the allimportant view to institution-building. Before trying to assess or measure land governance, one has to clearly understand the roles to be fulfilled by public institutions in the land sector. Based on the literature, these are essentially three-fold: First, there is need for a legal and institutional framework that clearly defines the rules for allocation of property rights to land and, by allowing their enforcement in a cost-effective way, encourage land-related investment. Second, reliable and complete information on land rights needs to be made available freely to interested parties so as to allow low-cost verification of land ownership status, which in turn forms the basis for low-cost land transfers to more productive use(rs) and the use of land as collateral in financial markets. Finally, there is need to perform a regulatory function to avoid negative externalities that may arise from uncoordinated action by private parties…The above functions led us to identify five key areas of good land governance, namely:159 

A legal, institutional, and policy framework that recognizes existing rights, enforces them at low cost, and allows users to exercise them in line with their aspirations and in a way that promotes the benefit of society as a whole.



Arrangements for land use planning and taxation conducive to avoiding negative externalities and supporting effective decentralization.



Clear identification of state land and its management in a way that provides public goods costeffectively; use of expropriation as a last resort only to establish public infrastructure with quick payment of fair compensation and effective mechanisms for appeal; and mechanisms for divestiture of state lands that are transparent and maximize public revenue.

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

Public provision of land information in a way that is broadly accessible, comprehensive, reliable, current, and cost-effective in the long run.



Accessible mechanisms to authoritatively resolve dispute and manage conflict with clearly defined mandates, and low cost of operation.

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Appendix II Thomson Reuters Open Title® software registers overlapping property rights and creates property folios160 With Thomson Reuters OpenTitle® (OT) software one can represent legal and extra-legal rights recorded via the Social Tenure Domain Model (STDM). The software integrates parties, social tenure relationships between people and land, and spatial units. The model has been specifically developed for communities where informal land rights may overlap with or are interconnected by familial or clan relations. A notional expansion of the overlapping rights depicted in Figure 2.4 follows: ‐

‐

Legal Rights: o Owner’s property (Aklilu Wube) o Lessee’s property (Adom Adika) o State Land (Nasarawa Region) Extra Legal Rights: o Customary Grazing (Awe Community) o Customary Agricultural (Tiv Ethnic group)

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OpenTitle® Solution: 1. Use the Indexing Tab in OT to fill in STDM fields (Property, Natural Person, Non Natural Person, RightRestrictions-Responsibility, Mortgage). 2. Introduce Property Data: Location of the Property, Land Use, Property Use, Tax Amount and the UPIN (Unique Property Identification Number) data from the map. This latter information will be useful to link the map representation of the property with the parties’ registered data.

3. Introduce Natural Person Data: For this example, it is necessary to introduce property owner data and the lessee of the property. 126

a. Data for the owner of the property with the 100% of rights over the land parcel.

127Â Â

b. Data for the lessee of the property with 100% tenant rights over the land parcel.

128Â Â

4. Introduce Non Natural Person Data: In this example, it is necessary to introduce the data for Nasarawa Government, Tiv ethnic group, and Awe community’s rights over the land parcel. a. Data for the property of Nasarawa Administrative Region with the 100% of government rights over the land parcel (taxation).

129

b. Data for the property of Awe community with 24% of rights over the land parcel (customary grazing).

130Â Â

c. Data for the property of the Tiv ethnic group with 92% of the rights over the land parcel (customary agriculture).

131Â Â

5. At the end of the process all the legal and extra-legal rights over the land parcel are documented.

132Â Â

6. In a final report, with the information indexed, OT compiles a report that shows all the aforementioned property rights over the land parcel.

Figures A.II.1: Software161

Screenshots of Thomson Rueters Open Title®

133

134

135

Appendix III Each component of CAPRS TM, Assessment, Prioritization, Resources, and Synchronization is described below.162 Comprehensive: All Lines of Effort (LOE) are included in one structured approach using a common assessment methodology. Only in this manner can the simultaneous visibility occur that is required to make resource and timing decisions. It ensures commanders’ intent is uniformly applied across entire Area of Operations (AO), and can be used to plan, brief, and mentor. Assessment: Military and civilian agency leaders new to CAPRS TM at first thought the Assessment to be the hardest part of the methodology. This is often the case when multiple, higher echelon groups or outside advisors, who try to cover everything, are involved. This step actually proves to be the easiest when working with the true “doers/experts” at the local level. The greatest error in conducting an assessment is starting with “these are the numbers we can measure,” “this is what we are doing,” or “higher headquarters tasking is” rather than:  

  

A tabula rasa or blank slate definition of each LOE. A process that first literally asks “What is development or governance,” and defines the end state (what success looks like). Simple, actionable, metrics that are commonly understood and agreed upon. Observations (snapshots) taken from the same spot over time is the only way to measure change. Ground truth assessments at one of four levels: Red, Orange, Amber, or Green, with clearly defined break points between them, and make simple definitions of each that can be determined by observation.

This type of assessment provides much needed continuity to LOEs, and is the first step (with Synchronization as the last) of making an honest and measured time estimate of “how long will this take?” It lends itself to a 1-slide chart for leaders to monitor all LOEs. It guides reporting and makes routine updates 136

easy to enter. It also guides planning, and is simple enough for each leader to sit down with a host or partner nation counterpart and communicate the “big picture” across language or cultural barriers. Prioritization: Asking questions such as “What matters most?” and then “What would make one area more important than another?” must be done in a vacuum and separately from developing the assessment. Prioritization must be done across the entire AO, by district, so that actions take place within defined space and time, then peacebuilding actors’ organization and budget are to be likewise structured. This allows for the creation of one master matrix where the assessment results are collected for each AO and then weighted. Assessments should not influence or change the prioritization of an area because an assessment is only a snapshot in time of ground truth. An area’s priority is driven by such factors as its population density, location along a border, or in a key tribal area, etc. Resourcing: With the prioritization matrix and local level assessments, leaders allocate available resources in priority order. Think of resources as poker chips. Every commander or agency lead has a finite amount of resources: people, money, time, expertise. When resources are inadequate for the task at hand, leaders can now quantify what is needed to make progress in a request to higher headquarters, enabling informed decisionmaking. After it becomes clear that further progress is not achievable without a huge influx of often unavailable resources, a sound decision to stop work should be praised, not punished. Synchronization: All actions take place in space and time. After prioritization and resourcing decisions are made, they are reflected on a synch matrix that guides the team’s efforts and serves as a feedback loop to the resourcing step. If an action in one LOE is significantly influenced by another LOE, then an action may be delayed or changed so resources might be allocated differently. The Prioritization Effort, followed by the Resourcing Effort, and now the actual Synch Matrix, together provide the Synchronization of Effort and show when to ramp-up an effort because improvement at the break point from Orange to 137

Amber, for example, is feasible near-term, or to stop efforts should resources be needed elsewhere or timing dictates a shift.

Each District Assessed Five (5) Ways: •Governance •Agriculture •Information Engagement •Security •Development

CAPRS Methodology This Comprehensive Assessment methodology takes a comprehensive snapshot of a district to give ground truth. Take the exact same Picture later and you can see/measure Change. Everyone looks at each district the same way each time.

District Assessments evaluated against prioritization criteria

District, Provincial & Regional Assessments Assessed Exactly the Same Ways

Report Integrates Multiple Key Personnel Assessments

•Each Line of Operations assessed across multiple Categories & Focus Areas •Qualitative and quantitative criteria •Defined RED-ORANGEAMBER-GREEN standards •Ratings are “rolled up” into a single assessment for each Category in each District/ Province/Region

•CF, DOS, USAID, USDA, Afghan Partners •Simple, easy reporting methods 8/17/2012 •Consistent & Defined rating standards

Figure A.III.1 CAPRS

OUTPUT = PRIORITIZED DISTRICT LIST = TOOL TO FOCUS RESOURCES & EFFORT AND SIMPLIFY STAFF WORK (BY STANDARDIZING ROUTINE REPORTING USING MORE SIMPLE TOOLS)

WTS Group, LLC Proprietary Material

Methodology

138

Synch Matrix Targeting Campaign Plan

Definition: a range of actions that reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict. 2

The World Bank, “World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development,” Washington DC, 2011, p. 2. 3

Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell, “Syria: Climate Change, Drought and Social Unrest,” The Center for Climate and Security, February 29, 2012, available from http://climateandsecurity.org/2012/02/29/syria-climate-changedrought-and-social-unrest/, accessed June 13, 2012. 4

Bassem Mroue, “Activists: Syrian Death Toll Tops 19000,” The Seattle Times, July 23, 2012, available from http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2018737744_apm lsyria.html, accessed July 23, 2012.

139

Robert F. Worth, ”Earth is Parched Where Syrian Farms Thrived,” The New York Times, October 13, 2010, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/world/middleeast/14syria.html? _r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1330449407yAiPXrD1kQsKbG2Bb5A61A&pagewanted=1, accessed July 23, 2012. 6

Definition: human security focuses on the protection of individuals, rather than defending the physical and political integrity of states from external military threats - the traditional goal of national security, available from www.humansecuritygateway.com/aboutUs.php , accessed June 13, 2012. 7

Frontline, The Public Broadcasting System. December 1, 2003, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/beyond/interviews/mayvill e.html, accessed June 13, 2012. 8

Thomas E. Ricks, Foreign Policy (on-line blog), February 9, 2010, available from http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/09/kilcullen_ii_how _to_tell_the_effect_of_your_operations_on_the_population, accessed June 13, 2012. 9

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Towards Improved Land Governance” Land Tenure Working Paper No. 11, September 2009, pp. 1-2, available from ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/ak999e/ak999e00.pdf, accessed June 13, 2012. 10

Definition: a legal term meaning land that belongs to no one.

Sarah Cliffe and Nick Manning, “Practical Approaches to Building State Institutions,” Chapter 8 in Building States to Build Peace, Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth, Editors, International Peace Institute, 2008, pp. 164-5. 12

Sandra F. Joireman, Where There is No Government: Enforcing Property Rights in Common Law Africa, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 151. 13

Ibid.

United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), World Habitat Day Feature, October 3, 2005, available from 140

www.unhabitat.org/documents/media_centre/whd2005/boxes.pdf, accessed June 13, 2012. 15

The Boston Globe, “One Billion Slum Dwellers,” February 24, 2012, available from www.boston.com/bigpicture/2012/02/slum_life.html, accessed June 15, 2012. 16

The Bretton Woods Project, “World Bank Ignoring Forest Communities?” April 5, 2011, Update 75, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-567943. 17

Nancy Soderberg, “Enhancing U.S. Support for UN Peacekeeping,” PRISM, National Defense University Press, Vol. 2., No. 2, March 2011, p. 16, available from http://ccoportal.org/sites/ccoportal.org/files/prism2-2.pdf, accessed April 15, 2012. 18

Definition: A nation that disregards international law and threatens world peace. 19

Definition: A nation that that cannot provide basic services, has lost territorial control or the monopoly on the use of force 20

The White House, “2010 National Security Strategy,” Washington DC, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_secur ity_strategy.pdf, accessed April 15, 2012. 21

Soderberg, “Enhancing U.S. Support for UN Peacekeeping,” p. 16. 22

U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” Washington DC, 2010, p. 13, available from www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf, accessed April 15, 2012. 23

Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes, and Siobhan Gorman, “More Drones, Fewer Troops, ”The Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2012, p. 1, available from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204624204577183234 216799116.html, accessed April 15, 2012. 141

William Flavin, “Finding the Balance: U.S. Military and Future Operations,” PKSOI Papers, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 2011, pp. 34-35, available from http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/papers/paperreview.cfm?pa perID=19, accessed April 15, 2012. 25

Kedar Pavgi, “Marine Corps Activates New Law Enforcement Battalions,” Government Executive, July 23, 2012, available from www.govexec.com/defense/2012/07/marine-corps-activates-new-lawenforcement-battalions/56936/?oref=dropdown, accessed July 23, 2012. 26

Jennifer Rizzo, “U.S. Military Seeks to Spread Skills around the World to Ease Burden on Itself,” Cable News Network (CNN), June 28, 2012, available from http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/28/us-military-seeks-tospread-skills-around-the-world-to-ease-burden-on-itself/, accessed July 13, 2012. 27

Rowan Scarborough, “Being 'Army Strong' Gets Weak Backing With Obama's Strategy,” The Washington Times, April 8, 2012, available from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/8/beingarmy-strong-gets-weak-backing-with-obamas-st/, accessed April 15, 2012. 28

Thomas E. Ricks, “Kilcullen (II): How to Tell the Effect of your Operations of the Population,” The Best Defense blog: Ricks’ comments on David Kilcullen’s essay, “What Works in Counterinsurgency, what doesn’t, and how to tell the difference,” February 9, 2010, available from http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/09/kilcullen_ii_how _to_tell_the_effect_of_your_operations_on_the_population, accessed April 15, 2012. 29

Ibid.

Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Ronald W. Johnson, Richard Hill, RTI International, “Guide to Rebuilding Public Sector Services in Stability Operations: a Role for the Military,” PKSOI Papers, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 2009, available

142

from www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a507815.pdf, accessed April 15, 2012. 31

United States Department of the Army, Final Approved Draft of Army Technical Publication Stability Techniques (ATP 307.5), 2012, p. 3-15.

Ibid p. 3-16

James Cricks, “Moving Beyond Force-on-Force Planning,” Interagency Journal Vol. 2, Issue 1, Winter 2011, p. 34, available from http://thesimonscenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/IAJ2-1-Winter-2011.pdf, accessed April 15, 2012. 34

Ibid.

Hillary Rodham Clinton, “A Message from the Secretary.” U.S. Department of State, 2011, available from www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/, accessed April 15, 2012. 36

Personal correspondence with U.S. Embassy contacts, November 12, 2011. Permission to reprint obtained from CSO February, 14, 2012. 37

Douglas E. Batson, Registering the Human Terrain: a Valuation of Cadastre, 2008, National Intelligence University Press, Washington DC, pp. 135-140, available from www.niu.edu/ni_press/pdf/Registering_the_Human_Terrains.pdf, accessed April 15, 2012. 38

U.S. Department of State, Ambassador Rick Barton’s Remarks at the 2012 Alliance for Peacebuilding Annual Conference, 11 May 2012, available from www.state.gov/j/cso/releases/remarks/2012/189975.htm, accessed May 15, 2012. 39

Ibid.

Samuel S. Farr, “From Idea to Implementation: Standing up the Civilian Response Corps,” PRISM, Vol. 2 No. 1, December 2010, available from www.ndu.edu/press/civilian-response-corps.html, accessed April 15, 2012. 143

United States Institute of Peace, 2012, available from www.usip.org/education-training/courses/land-property-andconflict, accessed April 15, 2012. 42

United States Agency for International Development, 2012, available from http://usaidlandtenure.net/usaidltprproducts/trainingdocuments/property-rights-and-resource-governance-issues-andbest-practices-oct-20-22-2010-washington-dc, accessed April 15, 2012. 43

United Nations Development Programme, 2012, available from www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview.html, accessed April 15, 2012. 44

International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2012, available from www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_21571361_43407692_46008211_1_ 1_1_1,00.html, accessed April 15, 2012. 45

Oxfam America, “No will, no way: U.S-funded Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” November 19, 2010, available from www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/no-will-no-way, accessed April 15, 2012. 46

Pauline H. Baker, “The Dilemma of Democratization in Fragile States,” UN Chronicle, 2010, available from www.un.org/wcm/content/site/chronicle/home/7billionpeople1united nations/dilemmaofdemcratizationinfragilestates, accessed April 15, 2012. 47

Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies,” in International Studies Perspectives, Volume 9, February 2008, p. 9, available from http://nw08.american.edu/~call/Publications/Ending%20Wars%20Buil ding%20Peace.pdf, accessed April 15, 2012. 48

Ibid, p.7.

The World Bank, “World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development,” p. 147. 144

Abdul Baqi Popal and Jan Turkstra, “Peace Building in Afghanistan through Settlement Regularization,” a paper presented at the 46th International Society of City and Regional Planners (ISOCARP) Congress in Nairobi, Kenya, 19-23 September 2010, p. 1, available from www.isocarp.net/Data/case_studies/1639.pdf, accessed April 15, 2012. 51

UN HABITAT, “First Initiative Inaugurated: Kabul Solidarity Programme,” 2001, available from www.fukuoka.unhabitat.org/projects/voices/afghanistan/pdf/First_ KSP_Community_Initiative_FINAL.pdf 52

The United Nations, “Financing Peacekeeping,” 2012, available from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml, accessed June 5, 2012. 53

Scott Leckie, “Leader of the Pack: Who Will Take the Lead on Post-Conflict HLP Issues?” in Uncharted territory: Land, Conflict and Humanitarian Action, Sara Pantuliano, Ed. Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2009, available from www.displacementsolutions.org/files/documents/ODI_article.pdf, accessed June 5, 2012, with limited correction: Leckie’s preferred term for LPTR is HLP (housing, land, and property rights). 54

Ibid p. 5

Ibid. p. 13

Ibid. p. 6

Ibid. pp. 8-9

Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, Eds., “Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach,” 2011, p. 15. 59

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision,” 2011, p. 4.

145

Faculty of Geo-information Science and Earth Observation (ITC), University of Twente, the Netherlands, 2012, available from www.itc.nl/Pub/study/Course-domains/Land-administration, accessed June 5, 2012. 61

Technical University of Munich, Germany, Masters Programme in Land Management and Land Tenure, 2012, available from www.landentwicklung-muenchen.de/master/index.html, accessed June 5, 2012. 62

The University of Melbourne, Australia, Centre for Spatial Data Infrastructures and Land Administration, 2012, available from www.csdila.unimelb.edu.au/, accessed June 5, 2012. 63

KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden, Master of Science degree in Real Estate Development and Financial Services, 2012, available from www.kth.se/en/studies/programmes/master/programmes/be/realestate /master-s-programme-in-real-estate-development-and-financialservices-1.48568, accessed June 5, 2012. 64

The University of Calgary, Canada, Geomatics Engineering with a specialization in GIS and Land Tenure, available from www.geomatics.ucalgary.ca/specializations, accessed June 5, 2012. 65

Michigan Technological University’s Master of Science degree in Integrated Geospatial Technology, available from www.mtu.edu/technology/graduate/igt/, accessed June 5, 2012. 66

The University of Florida course syllabus for SUR 6427 Land Tenure and Administration appears in Batson, “Registering the Human Terrain: a Valuation of Cadastre,” pp. 141-42. 67

This illustration was first used in Batson, Registering the Human Terrain: a Valuation of Cadastre, pp. 55-56. 68

Geographic Information — Land Administration Domain Model (LADM) as a Draft International Standard, International Standards Organization ISO TC 211/SC, Geneva, Switzerland, available from 146

www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm? csnumber=51206, accessed 13 June 2012. 69

Stig Enemark, “Facing the Global Agenda – Focus on Land Governance,” International Federation of Surveyors (FIG), July 2009, available from www.fig.net/pub/monthly_articles/july_2009/july_2009_enemark.htm l, accessed 13 June 2012. 70

42 countries’ cadastral systems are compared at www.cadastraltemplate.com. 71

Robin McLaren, 2011, “Crowdsourcing Support of Land Administration: a new, collaborative partnership between citizens and land professionals,” Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) Report November 2011, available from www.rics.org/site/scripts/download_info.aspx?fileID=10844&catego ryID=545, accessed May 15, 2012. 72

Klaus W. Deininger, Clarrisa Augustinus, Stig Enemark, Paul Munro-Faure, “Land Governance for Rapid Urbanization,” Chapter 5 in Innovations in Land Rights Recognition, Administration, and Governance, 2011, The World Bank, Washington, DC, p. 178. 73

Ian Williamson, Stig Enemark, Jude Wallace, and Abbas Rajabifard, Land Administration for Sustainable Development, ESRI Press: Redlands, California, 2010, p. 438. 74

The work described was performed by International Land Systems (ILS), Inc. The Thomson Reuters acquisition of ILS in July 2011 established the Government segment within that company. http://grm.thomsonreuters.com/news/july-2011/thomson-reuterscompletes-acquisition-of-manatron/ 75

Klaus W. Deininger, Clarrisa Augustinus, Stig Enemark, Paul Munro-Faure, “Improving Land Administration in Ghana: Lessons and Challenges in Moving Ahead,” Chapter 1.3 in Innovations in Land Rights Recognition, Administration, and Governance, 2011, The World Bank, Washington, DC, pp. 20-21. 76

Ato K. Onoma, The Politics of Property Rights Institutions in Africa, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 147

Ghanaweb News, “Ga-Damgbe Youth Suspect Foul Play in Lands Commission Fire,” March 1, 2012, available from www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=230958 , accessed May 22, 2012. 78

Comments on the fire at the Ghanaian Lands Commission, March 30, 2012, available from www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=230958 &comment=0#com, accessed April 22, 2012. 79

United States Agency for International Development(USAID), “Report on Ghana by the Partnership for Growth Interagency Land Tenure Working Group: Analysis and Recommendations on Constraints Analysis,” 2011, p. 9. 80

Ibid, p. 4.

Definition: characterized by or relating to the system of holding land in absolute ownership: the allodial system

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Report on Ghana by the Partnership for Growth Interagency Land Tenure Working Group: Analysis and Recommendations on Constraints Analysis,” pp. 2-3. 83

Ailey Kaiser Hughes, Anna Knox, and Kelsey Jones-Casey, “Lesson 1: Chiefs Behaving Badly: How Greed and Rising Demand for Land are Fueling Tenure Insecurity in Ghana,” Focus on Africa Brief, World Resources Institute and Landesa, January 2011, available from http://landportal.info/sites/default/files/ghana_brief1_landesa. pdf, accessed May 22, 2012. 84

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Report on Ghana by the Partnership for Growth Interagency Land Tenure Working Group: Analysis and Recommendations on Constraints Analysis,” p. 4. 85

Nana Ama Yirrah, Chief Executive Officer of The Community, Land, and Development Foundation (www.colandef.com), interview by author, Accra, Ghana, April 1, 2011. 86

Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Land Tenure & Development: Innovations and Progress Titling Systems Forum,” 148

December 12, 2011, available from http://csis.org/event/landtenure-and-development-innovations-and-progress-titlingsystems, accessed May 22, 2012. 87

P.J.M. van Oosterom, C.H.J. Lemmen, H.T. Uitermark, G. Boekelo, G. Verkuijl, “Land Administration Standardization with focus on Surveying and Spatial Representations,” 2011, available from http://proceedings.esri.com/library/userconf/survey11/papers/pap _3834.pdf, p.4., accessed May 14, 2012. 88

Christiaan Lemmen, Harry Uitermark, Peter van Oosterom, Jaap Zevenbergen, Iain Greenway, “The Road to a Standard Land Administration Domain Model, and Beyond,” paper presented at the FIG Working Week, Marrakech, Morocco, May 18-22, 2011, available from www.gdmc.nl/publications/2011/Road_to_Standard_LADM.pdf, accessed May 22, 2012. 89

Ibid.

Christian Lemmen, “The Social Tenure Domain Model: a Pro-poor Land Tool,” International Federation of Surveyors (FIG), Global Land Tool Network (GLTN), and UN-HABITAT, 2010, available from http://fig.net/pub/figpub/pub52/figpub52.htm, accessed May 22, 2012. 91

Geographic Information — Land Administration Domain Model (LADM) as a Draft International Standard. 92

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2011, available from www.fao.org/nr/tenure/sola/en/, accessed May 22, 2012. 93

The SOLA web site is www.flossola.org.

Douglas E. Batson, Registering the Human Terrain: a Valuation of Cadastre. 95

Douglas E. Batson, “Napoleonic Know-how for Stability Operations,” in Modern Military Geography, Francis Galgano and Eugene Palka, Eds., 2010, Routledge, New York.

149

Douglas E. Batson, “Reconstructing Post-Conflict Human Landscapes: The Land Administration Domain Model,” in Engineering Earth, Stanley D. Brunn, Ed., 2011, Springer, New York. 97

Douglas E. Batson, “Snow Leopards and Cadastres: Rare Sightings in Afghanistan,” in Land and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Jon Unruh and Rhodri Williams, Eds., forthcoming 2012, Earthscan-Routledge, New York. 98

Jaap Zevenbergen and Clarissa Augustinus, “Designing a Pro Poor Land Recordation System,” paper 5028 presented at the International Federation of Surveyors (FIG) Working Week, Marrakech, Morocco, May 18-22, 2011, available from www.fig.net/pub/fig2011/papers/ts07g/ts07g_zevenbergen_augustinu s_5028.pdf, accessed May 22, 2012. 100

Jaap Zevenbergen and Tony Burns, “Land Administration in Post-Conflict Areas: A Key Land and Conflict Issue,” paper presented at the International Federation of Surveyors (FIG) Congress, Sydney, Australia, April 11-16, 2010, p. 17, available from www.fig.net/pub/fig2010/papers/ts07a%5Cts07a_zevenbergen_burns_4 011.pdf, accessed May 22, 2012. 101

Nigel Edmead, “OpenTitle®: A Model for Low-Cost, Customizable Land Administration Technology,” paper presented at the World Bank Land and Poverty Conference, 18-20 April 2011. 102

Ibid.

103

Douglas M. Black, “An Innovative Approach to Land Governance,” paper presented at the International Federation of Surveyors (FIG) Working Week, Rome, Italy, May 6-10, 2012, p. 7, available from 150

www.fig.net/pub/fig2012/ppt/ts01g/TS01G_black_5532_ppt.pdf, accessed July 26, 2012. 104

Nigel Edmead, “OpenTitle®: A Model for Low-Cost, Customizable Land Administration Technology.” 105

Ibid.

106

Robert C. Jones, “A populace-Centric Foreign Policy,” World Politics Review, 16 February 2009, available from www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/3296/a-populace-centricforeign-policy, accessed June 4, 2012. 107

Robert Tomes and Christopher K. Tucker, “Rethinking Human Dynamics: Crowd Sourcing Can Play a Key Role in Planning for the Post-war Transition of Human Terrain Mapping.” Geospatial Intelligence Forum, Volume 8 Issue 3, April 2010, available from www.kmimediagroup.com/mgt-home/239-gif-2010-volume-8-issue-3april/2756-rethinking-humandynamics.html?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page, accessed June 4, 2012. 108

Ibid.

109

Definition: For the U.S. military, the world is divided into Combatant Commands, abbreviated COCOMs, with regional Areas of Responsibility (AOR). 110

The DataCards website is www.datacards.org.

111

The Cultural Knowledge Consortium (CKC) website is www.culturalknowledge.org. 112

The Global Futures Forum (GFF) website is www.thegff.com.

113

World Wide Human Geography Data Working Group (WWHGD) website is https://wwhgd.org. 114

William Mathews, “Mapping Human Terrain,” Nextgov, 14 July 2011, available from www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20110714_6446.php, accessed June 4, 2012 115

Nate Haken, Ed., “Uganda: Building a Sustainable Peace,” The Fund for Peace Conflict Early Warning and Assessment, UNLocK 151

Report 13, May-August 2011, available from www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cuugr1125-unlockuganda11g.pdf , accessed June 4, 2012. 116

Personal Interview with Nate Haken, June 5, 2012.

117

Ibid.

118

Haken, “Uganda: Building a Sustainable Peace.”

119

Aleks Krotoski, “The Internet’s Cyber Radicals: Heroes of the web changing the world,” The Guardian/The Observer, November 27, 2010, available from www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/nov/28/internet-radicalsworld-wide-web, accessed June 4, 2012. 120

John Etherton and David A. Foster, “Mapping the Mission: Ushahidi + Liberia’s UN Mission team up,” May 15, 2012, available from http://blog.ushahidi.com/index.php/2012/05/15/mapping-themission-ushahidi-liberias-un-mission-team-up/ accessed June 4, 2012. 121

Timo Lüge, “Web-based Election Monitoring in Liberia: a Failure,” October 11, 2011, available from http://sm4good.com/2011/10/13/web-based-election-monitoringliberia-failure/, accessed June 4, 2012. 122

David A. Foster, “Empowering the Edge: Information Sharing in Post Civil War Liberia,” Unpublished Paper, June 26, 2012, p. 5. 123

Robin McLaren, “Crowdsourcing Support of Land Administration: A New, Collaborative Partnership between Citizens and Land Professionals,” p. 19. 124

John James, “Logging with Care in Congo,” BBC News, October 7, 2007, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent /7028445.stm, accessed June 4, 2012. 125

Killian Fox, “Africa’s Mobile Economic Revolution,” The Guardian/The Observer, July 23, 2011, available from 152

www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jul/24/mobile-phones-africamicrofinance-farming, accessed June 4, 2012. 126

Jaap Zevenbergen and Clarissa Augustinus, “Innovative and Pro-poor Land Records and Information Systems,” paper presented at the FIG Working Week, Marrakech, Morocco, May 18-21 2011, p. 4. 127

Robin McLaren, “Crowdsourcing Support of Land Administration: A New, Collaborative Partnership between Citizens and Land Professionals,” p. 14. 128

Ibid. p. 15

129

Ibid. p. 18

130

United Nations, “United Nations Millennium Declaration,” Millennium Summit, New York, 6‐8 September 2000, available from www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf, accessed May 10, 2012. 131

Daron Acemoğlu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, 2012, Crown Business, New York, p. 108. 132

Ibid, p. 109.

133

Karol C. Boudreaux, “The Two-edged Sword of Administratively Derived Data in Sub-Shara Africa,” in Challenges of SocioCultural Dynamics for Global Security, forthcoming 2012, United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation Press. 134

Andrew Natsios, “The Clash of the Counter-bureaucracy and Development,” The Center for Global Development, 2010, p. 8, in revised abstract available from www.cgdev.org/files/1424271_file_Natsios_Counterbureaucracy.pdf, accessed June 13, 2012. 135

Deborah H. Isser, Ed., “Customary Justice and Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies,” United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington DC, 2011, p. 5. 136

Ibid, pp. 3-5. 153

137

Ibid, p. 5.

138

Definition: a bureaucracy so removed from field operations that it actually counters the program’s stated (in this case) development aims. 139

Andrew Natsios, “The Clash of the Counter-bureaucracy and Development.”

140

Ibid, p. 14

141

Ibid, p. 5

142

Ibid, p. 7

143

Jaap Zevenbergen and Tony Burns, “Land Administration in Post-Conflict Areas: a Key Land and Conflict Issues,” paper presented at the International Federation of Surveyors (FIG) Congress, Sydney, Australia, 11-16 April 2010, pp. 8-9. 144

Definition: a negative consequence of an economic activity experienced by unrelated third parties. 145

Robert D. Lamb and Brooke Shawn, “Political Governance and Strategy in Afghanistan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012, p. 45. 146

Michael Woodgerd, “CAPRS: A Simple and Measurable Methodology to Effectively Synchronize Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Efforts,” Unpublished Paper, 2012, p. 1. 147

Ibid, p. 2.

148

Ibid.

149

Klaus Deininger, Harris Selod, and Tony Burns, “The Land Governance Framework: Methodology and Early Lessons from Country Pilots.” 150

Kirk Talbott, “Light on Myanmar: Burma’s Crossroads for Peace-Building and Natural Resource Governance.” Adapted from his 26 April 2012 blog and used with permission. The views expressed in this comment are those of the author alone and do not reflect those of the Environmental Law Institute (ELI). 154

151

Geoffrey Demarest, Property and Peace: Insurgency, Strategy, and the Statute of Frauds, 2010, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 331.

152

Ibid. p. 335

153

The USAID Land Tenure and Property Rights Base Matrix, available from http://usaidlandtenure.net/usaidltprproducts/matrix, accessed June 5, 2012. 154

Ian Williamson, Stig Enemark, Jude Wallace, and Abbas Rajabifard, Land Administration for Sustainable Development, Table 13.1, pp. 417-420. 155

The UN Framework Team for Preventative Action with funding and Support of the European Union, “Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict,” 2010, UN: New York. 156

The UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, 2011, available from www.unep.org/conflictsanddisasters/Portals/6/documents/FRAMEWORK _TEAM_FLYER-1Oct10.pdf, accessed June 13, 2012. 157

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security,” 2012, available from www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/newsroom/docs/VG_en_Final_Marc h_2012.pdf, accessed June 13, 2012. 158

Neil Pullar, Andrew McDowell, Alexander Solovov, Elton Manoku, and Maria Paola Rizzo, “Solutions for Open Land Administration (SOLA) Software – Customising Open Source Software to Support Land Administration Services and Responsible Land Governance,” paper presented at the Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, 23-16 April 2012, Washington DC. 159

Klaus Deininger, Harris Selod, and Tony Burns, “The Land Governance Framework: Methodology and Early Lessons from Country Pilots,” in Chapter 7 Making Land Governance Real, in Innovations in Land Rights Recognition, Administration and 155

Governance, a joint organizational discussion paper ---issue 2 of the World Bank, Global Land Tenure Network, FIG and FAO, 2011, p. 191. 160

The following diagrams were made by a Thomson Reuters Government Revenue Management staff member in concert with a news article, “Addressing Political and Economic Stability through Land Administration,” June 6, 2011, available from http://grm.thomsonreuters.com/news/june-2011/addressingpolitical-and-economic-stability-through-land-administration/, accessed July 31, 2012. 161 The

following diagrams were made by a Thomson Reuters Government Revenue Management staff member in concert with a news article, “Addressing Political and Economic Stability through Land Administration,” June 6, 2011, available from http://grm.thomsonreuters.com/news/june-2011/addressingpolitical-and-economic-stability-through-land-administration/, accessed July 31, 2012. 162

Michael Woodgerd, “CAPRS: A Simple and Measurable Methodology to Effectively Synchronize Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Efforts,” Unpublished Paper, 2012.

156