Bravehearts of the 1965 war
the colours of COurage
the colours of courage
Bravehearts of the 1965 war
Bravehearts of the 1965 war
The colours of courage
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Bravehearts of the 1965 war
The colours of courage
contents
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri flanked by Lt Gen PO Dunn (right) and Lt Gen Sparrow on a tank in the Sialkot sector
Indian troops hoisting the tricolour at Haji Pir DPR/MOD
DPR/MOD
prelude to war VI-VII INDIA’S HIGHEST MILITARY AWARD
The Param Vir Chakra is a military decoration that is very rarely awarded. The majority of the recipients were awarded posthumously VIII-XI
Unsurpassed Courage
Only two Companies of the 2nd Battalion CRPF repulsed the attack of a full Pakistani Brigade in the Rann of Kutch 014-026
OPERATION GIBRALTAR
Pakistan sent infiltrators into India to scatter Indian forces along the frontier with a plan to eventually annex Kashmir 028-040
OPERATION GRAND SLAM
Pakistan launched “Operation Grand Slam” thinking its hold on PoK may slip when India advanced on Haji Pir once more 044-052
CALL FOR HELP
The Indian Air Force conducted several successful counter air-strikes against the Pakistani Air Force and its bases 056-066
Indian artillery men in Kashmir during the conflict AP
THE INDIAN RESPONSE
Indian armed forces realised that the best counter-action was to strike at the root of the invading forces 068-080
operation riddle
Surprise and strategy were to be key elements of the Indian operation codenamed “Operation Riddle” 082-094
COURAGE UNDER FIRE
The exemplary grit and courage shown by the Indian armed forces was incredible even during the most bloody battles 096-110
HARD-FOUGHT BATTLES
The 1965 war saw several battles, many of them being fought on difficult hilly and inhospitable terrain 112-123
WINNING TACTICS
Fought from September 8 to September 10, the battle of Asal Uttar resulted in a decisive win for India 124-135
I CORPS OPERATIONS
An offensive by I Corps was launched to undertake operations in the vital Samba-Jammu-Sialkot sector 136-147
ALL QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT
A cease-fire brought an end to the war with a strange silence enveloping the mountains and plains 148-156
Of grit and valour
The Maha Vir Chakra, the second highest military decoration in India, is awarded for acts of gallantry in the presence of the enemy 158-159
VI
Prelude To War
I
n 1947, after a reign of nearly two centuries, British rule over India came to an end, and the reins of power were transferred into Indian hands. But freedom came at a price, and in this case, the price was blood. The Partition of the country into the two dominions of India and Pakistan left a wound that still festers two decades later. Matters were not helped by Pakistan’s abortive attempt to annex the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, through an armed insurrection in 1948. Indeed, it was this that sowed the seeds of military mistrust between the two nations. Post independence, the new Indian government, under the aegis of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, committed itself to principles of peace, non-interference and (more famously) non-alignment. Nevertheless, the brief but shocking defeat in the1962 border war with China crippled the morale of a proud country. Meanwhile, Pakistan was lapsing in and out of spells of military rule. On the international stage, it aligned itself with two prominent
India’s 1965 war with Pakistan featured one of the largest tank battles fought DPR/MOD
regional security groupings – the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). In India’s neighbourhood, however, its moves were potentially dangerous. In 1963, one year after Chinese armed forces had devastated India’s armies in the snowy passes of the Himalayas, Pakistan ceded considerable swathes of territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to China. The land agreement tightened the bond between Islamabad and Beijing, resulting in further agreements in trade, air-travel and military aid. This was, at the time, a heady achievement for Pakistan and its leader, Field Marshal Ayub Khan. Pakistan now was in possession of the latest Patton tanks and Sabre aircraft (given to it by the United States), in addition to its already existing armoured divisions. Small wonder, then, that confidence was high in the Pakistani military establishment. India, on the other hand, was facing the effects of a bad annual harvest and was still shaken from the debacle of the 1962 war with China. Its armed forces were in a state of flux in the aftermath of the war, and the indigenous route to source its own military hardware requirements was yet to mature. It was, for Pakistan, the perfect moment to launch its fresh operation to annex Jammu and Kashmir. n
VII
A Rare Honour The Param Vir Chakra (PVC) is India’s highest military decoration awarded for most conspicuous bravery and valour or self-sacrifice in the presence of the enemy. The award is very rarely conferred VIII
Company Quartermaster
Havildar Abdul Hamid
Q
uartermaster Havildar Abdul Hamid was a soldier in the 4th Battalion of The Grenadiers, who lost his life in the Khem Karan sector during the Battle of Asal Uttar, and was the posthumous recipient of the highest Indian military decoration, the Param Vir Chakra. After five years of service in the anti-tank section, Abdul Hamid had recently been promoted and given charge of the Quartermaster stores of his Company. As he was the best 106 mm recoilless rifle (RCL) shot in the Battalion, he was reverted to his former charge as Non-commissioned Officer commanding the Battalion’s recoilless rifle Platoon. In the Lahore sector of operations, 4 Mountain Division, having been rebuffed in its advance to Ichhogil by the Pakistani counter-offensive, fell back to the Khem Kharan area.1 On a moonlit night, at 0200 hours on 9 September, an enemy contingent 1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Hamid_(soldier)
of Pattons, equipped with infrared, attacked the 18 Rajputana Rifles. The enemy tanks had a clear run, but the Indian forces held their ground and the assault came to naught. The final enemy attack came at 0700 hours on 10 September. A formidable Combat Group consisting of Armoured Regiments, a Motor Battalion and a Squadron of Chaffee tanks swung toward the northern flank of the Indian defence, while, a strong detachment from the same Group branched off towards 4 Grenadiers. But lying in wait for them was a Squadron of 3 Cavalry. Once the line of Pattons exposed their broad-sides, while negotiating their way through a sugarcane field, the Indian tank Illustration: Malay Karmakar
gunners fired with deadly accuracy. However, Pakistani forces struck out in a widening outflanking manoeuvre aimed at the Indian guns. Again, the move was stymied by 3 Cavalry. The Pakistani forces then made their way towards the Mahmudpura-Dibbipura area when they were caught in the crossfire of tank-guns, blazing at them from three different directions. In a frantic endeavour to extricate themselves, the Patton tanks sank deep into the boggy terrain. It was here that Company Quartermaster Havildar Hamid displayed such exemplary courage while laying down his life for the country that his name has gone down forever in the annals of Indian military history. For his immensely brave action he was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra. His citation reads: At 0800 hours on 10 September 1965 Pakistan forces launched an attack with a Regiment of Patton tanks on a vital area ahead of village Cheema on the Bhikkiwind road in the Khem Karan Sector. Intense
artillery shelling preceded the attack. The enemy tanks penetrated the forward position by 0900 hours. Realising the grave situation, Company Quartermaster Havildar Hamid who was Commander of a RCL gun detachment moved out to a flanking position with his gun mounted on a jeep, under intense enemy shelling and tank fire. Taking an advantageous position, he knocked out the leading enemy tank and then swiftly changing his position, he sent another tank up in flames. By this time the enemy tanks in the area spotted him and brought his jeep under concentrated machine-gun and high explosive fire. Undeterred, Company Quartermaster Havildar Hamid kept on firing on yet another enemy tank with his recoilless gun. While doing so, he was mortally wounded by an enemy high explosive shell. Havildar Hamid’s brave action inspired his comrades to put up a gallant fight and to beat back the heavy tank assault by the enemy. His complete disregard for his personal safety during the operation and his sustained acts of bravery in the face of constant enemy fire were a shining example not only to his Unit but also to the whole Division and were in the highest traditions of the Indian Army.2 n
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Hamid_(soldier)
IX
X
Burzarji Tarapore was assigned the task of delivering the main armoured thrust for capturing Phillora in the Sialkot sector in Pakistan. As a preliminary to making a surprise attack on Phillora from the rear, the Regiment was thrusting between Phillora and Chawinda when it was counter-attacked by the enemy’s heavy armour from Wazirali. Lieutenant Colonel AB Tarapore who was then at the head of his Regiment, defied the enemy’s charge, held his ground and attacked Phillora with one of his Squadrons supported by an Infantry Battalion. Though under continuous enemy fire, he remained unperturbed and when wounded refused to be evacuated. On 14 September 1965, though still wounded he again led his Regiment to capture Wazirali. Such was his determination that unmindful of his injury, he again bravely led his Regiment and captured Jassoran and Butur-Dograndi on 16 September. His own tank was hit many times, but despite the odds he maintained his pivots in both these places and thereby allowed the supporting Infantry to attack Chawinda from the rear. Inspired by his leadership, the Regiment fiercely attacked the enemy heavy armour destroying approximately 60 enemy tanks at a cost of only 9 tank casualties, and when Lieutenant Colonel Tarapore was mortally wounded the Regiment continued to defy the enemy. The valour displayed by Lieutenant Colonel Tarapore in this heroic action, which lasted 6 days, was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Indian Army.2 n
Lieutenant Colonel
Ardeshir Burzarji Tarapore
P
opularly known as Adi, Lieutenant Colonel Ardeshir Tarapore was not very happy at joining the Infantry, as he wanted to join an Armoured Regiment. One day his Battalion was inspected by Major General El Edroos, who was the Commander-inChief of the Hyderabad State forces in 1948. It so happened that at the grenade throwing range, a grenade accidentally fell into the bay area. Adi was quick to pick it up in order to toss it out of range. However, the grenade exploded and Tarapore was hurt by the flying shrapnel. Major General Edroos, who was witness to this event, was so impressed by the exemplary courage displayed by Tarapore that he summoned the young man to his office and congratulated him. This was when Tarapore took the opportunity to request a transfer to an Armoured Regiment. The General readily agreed, and Tarapore was transferred to the 1st Hyderabad Imperial Service Lancers.
Much later he shifted to the Poona Horse and was commissioned in Poona Horse on 1 April 1951. He rose to become Commanding Officer (CO) and commanded his very own Regiment in the Poona Horse in the 1965 war against Pakistan.1 On 11 September 1965, the 17 Horse (Poona Horse) Regiment launched an attack on Phillora in the Sialkot sector. The southern thrust of the attack, Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tarapore advanced on the right flank. Between Phillora and Chawinda, the attack met with the Pakistani Army’s heavy armour charge from Wazirali. Lieutenant Colonel Tarapore held his ground and attacked Phillora under continuous enemy tank and artillery fire. For his tremendous bravery he was awarded the Param Vir Chakra (PVC). His citation reads: On 11 September 1965, the Poona Horse Regiment under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Ardeshir 1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ardeshir_Tarapore
Illustration: Malay Karmakar
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ardeshir_Tarapore
XI
Unsurpassed Courage
The Rann of Kutch
The battle at Sardar Post was penned by the bravehearts of the Central Reserve Police Force when only two Companies of the 2nd Battalion CRPF repulsed the attack of a full Pakistani Brigade
F
016
International Border
PAKISTAN Kutch
Sardar Post Bair Bet Kanjarkot
Mandvi
India
From the head of the Gulf of Kutch stretches a dry bed of the sea that once surrounded Kutch. The Rann of Kutch is a salt waste, separating Sind from Kutch in the north, and Radhanpur and Kathiawar from the east and the south. A broad, bare expanse of land, the Rann of Kutch forms the southern boundary of Sind from the south-western border of Rajasthan to the sea. During the monsoons, the swelling waters of the sea invade the Rann, turning it into a wide, salty lake stretching to the borders of Rajasthan. It is this large salt desert with which this history is concerned. Geopolitically speaking, the area had always been a sore point between Sind and Kutch, even before Partition. Like most political bones of contention, this was a problem to which no real solution could be found. As a result, after Partition, the area was divided based on religion. Sind, by virtue of its Muslim majority, was handed to Pakistan, while the dominantly Hindu Kutch region remained with India. However, diplomatic haggling over the Rann of Kutch continued.
8 Frontier Force was moved to Khadan on 6 March, to reinforce the posts at Rahim-ki-Bazar and
Kanjarkot
017
I
3,500
men of the 51st Infantry Brigade of the Pakistan Army launched a simultaneous assault on the Sardar and Tak Posts
MAP NOT TO SCALE
Indian troops during a period of armed conflict with Pakistan Getty Images
n 1964, the first signs of trouble surfaced at Kanjarkot, where the Pakistanis had frequently been trespassing into Indian territory. Kanjarkot essentially comprised a fort in ruins, close to the Pakistani border. It was surrounded by a flat plain to the south and an undulating bank of sand dunes to the north. The dunes dominated the area immediately surrounding the fort, and provided the Pakistanis a clear view of Indian territory. What was more, communications in the area also favoured the Pakistanis more than the Indians.1 The Indian administrative base at Bhuj was 177 kms south of the border while the advance maintenance area being established at Khavda was about 104 kms from the border and 119 kms from Vigokot. The Bhuj-Khavda road was susceptible to breaches during the monsoon, and though there was a fair-weather landing-strip at Khavda 1 B.C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War 1965, published by the History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 19
018
and a civil landing ground at Bhuj, the only sizeable airstrip for Air Force operations was at Jamnagar.2 On the Pakistani side, however, things were different. Badin, a sizeable town, was only about 30 kms from the border. It was well equipped with a large airfield with radar, which was capable of handling all kinds of transport and fighter aircraft, and located close to Hyderabad (Sind) and Khairpur. There was also a road connecting Badin to Maro, and further east to Nagar Parkar. On 13 May 1964, three Pakistani intruders were arrested and subsequently released by the State Reserve Police. No further incidents occurred to mar bilateral relations for the rest of that year, but early in 1965, the dice rolled again. In February 1965, Indian troops patrolling the border reported a buildup of Pakistani troops on the opposite side of the border at Kanjarkot. It was discovered that the Pakistanis had established a vehicle track, running from Surai to Ding, through Indian territory, south of Kanjarkot. The Indian Border Police increased their nightly patrols, but this measure was met with a standing patrol by the Pakistanis. With its hand forced in this manner, India had no option but to take suitable measures to evict Pakistan from the area. On 21 February 1965, the Indians launched “Operation Kabadi”. The Maharashtra and Gujarat Area Commander, Major General PC Gupta, MC, issued Operation Instruction No. 1 to Brigadier SSM Pahaljani, Commander, 31 Infantry Brigade Group, to capture Kanjarkot. The 2 B.C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War 1965, published by the History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 19
As skirmishes continued, the Indian armed forces were on high alert DPR/MOD
15
INDIA
Indian Soldiers Killed
40
Wounded Including 2 Officers
2
pakistan
casualty assessment
150 5
Three thousand five hundred men of Pakistan’s 51st Infantry Brigade comprising 18 Punjab Battalion, 8 Frontier Rifles and 6 Baluch Battalion launched a simultaneous assault on the Sardar and Tak Posts
Missing/PoW Both Officers
34
Pakistani Soldiers Killed at Sarder Post
Wounded at Biar Bet
Ratio:
= 2 Soldiers
Missing/PoW Includes 1 Officer
Source: B.C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War 1965, published by the History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi
Arms captured from the Pakistan army being layed out for inspection by Indian troops during the IndiaPakistan conflict. Keystone/Getty Images
Brigadier was authorised to cross the border to complete his mission. The Headquarters 31 Infantry Brigade Group, 11 Field Regiment, 226 Independent Workshop Company, 373 Field Company Engineers, 31 Infantry Brigade Signal Company, Army Service Corps and 407 Medical Company reached Bhuj on 27 February, to join the troops of the 17 Rajputana Rifles which were already stationed there. On 26 February, the Army Headquarters arranged to send 7 Companies of police to Ahmedabad. A Parachute Battalion was also placed on 24-hours notice to move to the area, should their help be required.3 Learning of India’s counter-moves, Pakistan lost no time in retaliating. Its 8 Division Commander, Major General Tikka Khan, was ordered to assume operational command of the Indus Ranger, and to take effective measures for retaliation. The 8 Frontier Force was moved to Khadan on 6 March 1965, to reinforce the posts at Rahim-ki-Bazar and Kanjarkot. Mortars and machine guns were deployed around the fort. The sudden and intense build-up
Jawans relax of Pakistani military for a while troops and hardware during a routine day at Kanjarkot was patrol in the alarming enough for Rann of Kutch saw an the Indian armed forces which attack by Pakistan’s to work extra hard to armed forces turn the prevailing DPR/MOD natural conditions on their side of the border to their advantage as best they could. According to a Pakistani Officer, steel planks were laid down to cover the marshy and sandy sections of the roads in the Rann, while overhead covers were constructed over the dugouts in and around Vigokot, Gullu Talao, Kanjarkot, and Vingi.4 Within days, India had constructed positions which Pakistani forces would ultimately be unable to recover due to inadequate weapons and number of troops.5 On 13 March, the Central Reserve Police constructed Sardar Post, 4,600 metres to the southwest of Kanjarkot. Sardar Post was a flat mud-terrace, with sparse foliage or tree-cover. This
3 B.C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War 1965, published by the History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 20-21
5 B.C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War 1965, published by the History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 21
4 B.C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War 1965, published by the History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 21
...our Army will defend the country and it will decide its own strategy... Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri HT Photo
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020
was a move that would effectively block the influx of any incoming Pakistani troops. But Pakistan soon decided that it would show India that it meant business. In his book, Major Ahmad writes that Islamabad had seen an Indian attack on Kanjarkot coming, and so it launched a pre-emptive strike.6 On the morning of 7 April, 1965, Pakistani forces tried to storm Indian posts in Kutch in a series of operations nicknamed “Operation Desert Hawk”. However, the Indian forces, though they were numerically inferior, managed to beat back the repeated attacks, inflicting casualties by the hundreds on their enemy. Indeed, the battle at Sardar Post is
one of the most glorious chapters in the military history of the nation. It was penned by the brave hearts of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) on 9 April 1965 when only two Companies of the 2nd Battalion CRPF stood their ground and repulsed the 6 B.C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War 1965, published by the History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 23
On 13 March, the CRPF constructed Sardar Post, 4,600 m southwest of Kanjarkot
A foot patrol in the Rann of Kutch, somewhere near the IndoPakistan border
All I had was a lathi in hand and a hat on the head to patrol the border. The rest is history
DPR/MOD
AFP
Major Rajinder Kumar Bali HT Photo
021
A camel border patrol in Kutch DPR/MOD
attack of a full Pakistani Brigade. As Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda said, “This battle will go down in the history of Indian Police, nay in the history of military battle.” During the dark hours of the night of 8 April and the early hours of 9 April, 3,500 men of the 51st Infantry Brigade of the Pakistan Army comprising 18 Punjab Battalion, 8 Frontier Rifles and 6 Baluch Battalion stealthily launched a simultaneous assault on the Sardar and Tak Posts as part of Operation “Desert Hawk”. Head Constable Ranjit Singh was on duty at Sardar Post at the time, manning a machine gun. Sensing some movement about 50 to 100
yards to his north, he realised, with a soldier’s innate instinct for danger, that it was enemy movement. He challenged the intruders, and his action was met with a rain of bullets from the opposite direction. This was rapidly followed by artillery fire from 25 pounder guns. Rushing to his aid, Singh’s fellow soldiers took up their positions, and retaliated bravely.Soon all the personnel deployed at the Post realised that it was the attack of a full Pakistani Brigade. Prior to the attack a patrolling party under the Command of Subedar Kabirman Subba was sent to patrol the area on that fateful night. This party was trapped between firing on both sides. Despite these
difficult circumstances the party slowly advanced towards their camp through a nala and sent a signal to Tak Post. The Tak Post Commander however, asked Head Constable Mahadev Nilgunde to investigate, as he felt that it might be a move of the enemy to infiltrate the Post in the guise of CRPF personnel. Despite concentrated enemy fire in the area, Head Constable Nilgunde left the Post, and only after Jamadar Jainarayan Singh of the night patrol was identified, was the patrol allowed to move in. But the biggest odds were the limited availability of ammunition in the Post which was insufficient
25 Pounder GUN The Ordnance QF 25 pounder was the major British field gun and howitzer during World War II. It was introduced into service just before the war started, combining high-angle and direct-fire and a reasonably lethal shell in a highly mobile piece. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordnance_QF_25-pounder
20 April
saw shelling from the enemy at Sardar Post with the rain of fire at its heaviest between 0700 to 0900 hours Illustration: Abhimanyu Sinha
7 April
022
for the duration of the battle. As part of a well-thought out strategy, the Post Commander ordered saw Pakistani forces trying to storm Indian posts his men to hold their fire after in Kutch in a series of some amount of firing in order operations called “Operation Desert to conserve the ammunition. Hawk” This decision proved to be a gamechanger for the ensuing battle. The sudden, deafening silence from the Indian side even as the mists of the night drifted towards dawn, led the Pakistanis to believe that all the personnel manning the Post had been killed or wounded. Nevertheless, the incoming Pakistani Columns fanned Top: The out, surrounding Sardar Post. There inhospitable, large salt desert was still not a ‘sign of life’ from the that is the Rann 7 of Kutch Indian forces. All was quiet. Twenty of the attacking Columns Below: Indian soldiers hit back then crept even closer. Immediately, a at enemy hail of bullets rang out, and flattened positions DPR/MOD
7 Sardar Post Kiosk Release, courtesy CRPF archives
the unsuspecting enemy. Another wave of enemy attackers, coming in from the rear, met with the same fate as their predecessors who had fallen in front. Fourteen of them were injured and 4 were captured. In retrospect, it is to the credit of Commandant Shiv Ram of Sardar Post that he detected enemy movement 600 yards away, despite the grave risk from intermittent
shelling, he ran to Tak Post to inform Subedar Balbir Singh, who was in charge of the 3 inch mortar, about this. Subedar Balbir Singh was quick enough to direct Indian mortar fire to destroy the enemy Observation Post (OP). Constable Shiv Ram then returned to Sardar Post. Later in the day, he noticed enemy vehicles moving in from the north east. Again at personal risk he went to Tak, gave the information to Subedar Balbir Singh and as a result the vehicles were either put out of action or forced to withdraw. One Observation Post which was inside the Tak Post, was then destroyed by Head Constable Mahadev Nilgunde as it posed a potential danger should it be captured by the enemy. Meanwhile a message was conveyed to Tak Post to send extra ammunition to Sardar Post for the MMGs (medium machine guns). Despite heavy shelling CT/DVR (Constable/Driver) Kishan Singh volunteered to supply the ammunition in a Jeep, which to his credit and immense bravery, he did three times.8 There was a brief moment when the Pakistanis achieved slight success, when one of the machine guns on the north-eastern corners of the Post got jammed. Nevertheless, the CRPF
men rallied swiftly, continuing their defence of the Sardar Post to the last man. As the Pakistanis moved in closer, Head Constable Bhawana Ram, deployed on the eastern parameter of Sardar Post, displayed commendable vision and when the MMG in his area was silenced he collected all the grenades at his Post and kept throwing them at the incoming Pakistani troops. Indeed, his gallantry was to a great extent instrumental in demoralising the intruders and forcing them to retreat from the Post. The exchange of fire lasted over 12 hours during which the enemy made three attempts – all in vain – to overrun the Post. The Pakistanis were eventually beaten back, but they succeeded in taking 19 CRPF men captive including the Post Commander, Major Sardar Karnail Singh. The retaliation by the CRPF men was so fierce and unexpected that despite their numerical and armament superiority, the enemy was compelled to flee. The fleeing Pakistan Army left behind 34 dead soldiers including two Officers. Four Pakistani soldiers were captured. That 6 CRPF men made the supreme sacrifice for the cause of the nation is a unique and unparalleled feat in military history, where a heavily outnumbered contingent of Paramilitary personnel forced the withdrawal of a regular army Infantry Brigade and, what is more, held them at bay for over 12 hours.9 Skirmishes continued throughout April 1965. The Indian armed forces were on high alert, not just in Kutch, but all along the length and breadth of the Indo-Pak frontier. Eightyyear-old Major Rajinder Kumar Bali
8 Sardar Post Kiosk Release, courtesy CRPF archives
9 Sardar Post Kiosk Release, courtesy CRPF archives
023
(retd), remembers it all like it were yesterday. “In April 1965 I was asked to rush to the Gujarat border in the guise of a Punjab Armed Police personnel. All I had was a lathi in hand and a hat on the head to patrol the border. The rest is history.” Major Bali, 2 Sikh Light Infantry, was rushed to the Kutch area after the Pakistani intrusion and attack on Sardar Post on 9 April. He helped re-organise defences in the Vigakot area and motivated the State Reserve Police Force personnel there. After two police patrols failed to reach the
Destroyed Pakistani tanks in the Kutch area DPR/MOD
Post due to shelling by the intruders, he volunteered to take a patrol out. With just three riflemen, Major Bali ventured through a minefield to capture four Pakistani intruders and a loaded light machine gun. Major Bali was awarded a Vir Chakra for his valorous act.10 As the Indian forces moved into battle positions along the West Pakistan frontier, General Mohammed Musa, Commander-inChief of the Pakistan Army, placed 10 Interview published in Hindustan Times in August 2015
OUR MARTYRS OF 1965 SHAHEED CT KISHAN SINGH
14 May
1965 saw an attack in Kargil being ordered to counteract the Kutch offensive
medium machine gun 024
SHAHEED L/NAIK GANPATH RAM
A medium machine gun (MMG), in modern terms, usually refers to a belt-fed automatic firearm firing a full-power rifle cartridge. The medium designs offered greater flexibility, either using a bipod and being used like lighter designs, or being put on a tripod, or on heavier mounts.
Illustration: Abhimanyu Sinha
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medium_machine_gun
all his Army formations on 12-hours notice to move into battle positions as soon as possible. Pakistani railways were put on high alert to meet military requirements as a matter of top priority, and the Pakistani Air Force and Navy were put on standby to meet the looming threat of war. But it was not to be at this moment in time. Cease-fire negotiations had begun at the diplomatic level. On 28 April, Harold Wilson, the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, wrote to Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, expressing his concern over the ramifications of the Kutch conflict. He suggested a cease-fire, followed by a withdrawal of troops, and subsequently a restoration of the bilateral status quo and talks between the two governments.11 On 14 May 1965, an attack in Kargil was ordered to counteract 11 B.C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War 1965, published by the History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 35
Born on April 1, 1928 in Kangda, Himachal Pradesh, Constable Kishan Singh was recruited in CRPF on May 1, 1948.
Indian soldiers manning a trench DPR/MOD
the Kutch offensive. Company Commander of 4 Rajput, Major Baljit Singh Randhawa and Ranbir Singh Kang (retired as Colonel, now 75) launched the attack on 17 May. Heavy fighting ensued but the Indians reached up to 150 metres from the perimeter wall of the enemy, despite coming under constant fire. Undeterred, the Indians kept moving forward regardless of the fierce handto-hand battle that followed. At this time a bullet grazed Ranbir Singh
Kang’s head and he fell to the ground, unconscious. When he came to, Major Randhawa asked him to return but he refused. Shortly thereafter, Major Randhawa was felled. This put Ranbir Singh Kang in command and he led the Company bravely forward hurling grenades on enemy bunkers. The enemy by now was in full retreat and the Indians were able to hoist the Tricolour here. For their courage under fire, Major Randhawa got an MVC (Maha Vir Chakra) and three Vir Chakras were awarded to their Company which included one given to Ranbir Singh Kang.12 Havildar Budh Singh, also of 4 Rajput, who dreamt of fighting for his country, was just 18 when he joined the Army. He was posted in Kargil when Pakistani intruders attacked one of the Posts on 16 May. Havildar Budh Singh’s Battalion fought bravely to frustrate the enemy’s attempt. They were ordered to push the intruders back and capture a point, a dominating feature. As part of the leading section of his Company, Havildar Budh Singh charged ahead with grenades and continued hurling them on the enemy till he captured 12 Published in Hindustan Times in August 2015
Born on May 12, 1919 in Gurgaon, Haryana, Lance Naik Ganpath Ram was recruited in CRPF on May 9, 1948.
SHAHEED NAIK KISHORE SINGH Born on October 15, 1937 in Sikar, Rajasthan, Naik Kishore Singh was recruited in CRPF on December 20, 1963.
SHAHEED CT JAIN SINGH Born on April 9, 1930 in Kangda, Himachal Pradesh, Constable Jain Singh was recruited in CRPF on April 9, 1949.
SHAHEED CT SHAMSHER SINGH Born on April 22, 1936 in Kangda, Himachal Pradesh, Constable Shamsher Singh was recruited in CRPF on May 12, 1960.
“This battle will go down in the history of Indian Police, nay in the history of military battle”. - Shri Gulzari Lal Nanda
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the target. For this gallant act he was awarded a Vir Chakra.13 Meanwhile, negotiations were, as diplomatic efforts usually are, protracted and continued throughout May and June of 1965. While both governments agreed with the British Prime Minister’s suggestions, Shastri was clear in his warning to Pakistan. “If Pakistan continues to discard reason,” he stated, “and persists in its aggressive activities, our Army will defend the country and it will decide its own strategy and employment of its manpower and equipment in a manner which it deems best.”14 13 Interview published in Hindustan Times in August 2015 14 B.C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War 1965, published by the History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 35
Jawans cleaning their weapons during a lull in fighting at the Kutch border Getty Images
As if to demonstrate the conviction behind Shastri’s statement, all Indian Army formations earmarked for Punjab went on red alert along the IndoPak border. This was code-named “Operation Ablaze”. Under XI Corps, the 15 Infantry Division was concentrated in Amritsar and its units were moved to their battle positions, while the 4 and 7 Infantry Divisions were given other sectors, with headquarters at Fizilka and Bhikkiwind respectively. On 6 May, even as diplomatic negotiations continued for a ceasefire, these Divisions were ordered to complete all defence preparations, including the laying of tactical minefields. This unprecedented step speaks volumes of the danger that the Indian forces
thought Pakistan represented. The minefields, which were laid in the intensely cultivated fields of Punjab, were buried deep in an expanse of rolling acres of farmland – something which had never been done before. Meanwhile, Armed Divisions were ordered to fan out and secure the Ichhogil Canal from Malakapur to Ganda Singhwala, and to open the Grand Trunk Road axis from Wagah to Dograi. But by early June, it had become clear to the Commanding Officers that intensive action was, for the moment, out of the question. Wilson’s labours bore fruit and a cease-fire was brokered between India and Pakistan on 30 June 1965, to take effect from 0600 hours IST on 1 July 1965. A tribunal was set up to put an official end to the dispute, which saw Pakistan getting only 10 per cent of the territory it claimed, while the balance went to India. “Operation Ablaze” had, thus, turned out to be rather a damp squib! It is said that Pakistan’s intentions in Kutch were deliberate, to test the mettle of India’s military capabilities and political will.15 It was a gamble, it was whispered and based on the success of the way the dice rolled, Pakistan could follow up on its actions in Kashmir – which was its real goal. For India, the Kutch war was the “wrong war with the right enemy, in the wrong place.”16 For Pakistan, it created the mirage of a victory which led to the mistaken (as it would later discover) notion that it could succeed once more, this time in Kashmir. n 15 B.C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War 1965, published by the History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 38 16 Saga of Valour and Sacrifice of the Indian Armed Forces: Golden Jubilee of the 1965 War, curated by Major Gen AK Sapra, Brig. Ajay Sharma, Col. Shiv Yadav & Major Viraaj Gulati, 2015, p. 6