Meanwhile, the process of devolution in Wales was strikingly different. For starters, the Government of Wales Act 1998 implemented a scheme of “executive devolution”, where powers over primary legislation and taxation were not awarded (Tomkins and Turpin).105 The elected Welsh Assembly was only permitted to make delegated or secondary legislation until 2007, when a primary law-making power was granted on a limited basis. It was only after the 2011 referendum that this power was conferred completely. Lastly, the aim of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 was to give legal effect to the provisions of the Belfast Agreement. The arrangement of the Northern Ireland Executive merits particular attention. In order to gain universal support from both sides of the political spectrum, the First Minister is to be nominated by the largest political party while the Deputy First Minister is nominated by the second largest political party. This same model does not apply to Wales or Scotland. In addition, England’s precarious position in relation to devolution must be considered because of the absence of devolution in England. This is animated by the West Lothian question, where MPs of the devolved nations can decide on laws affecting English matters in the UK Parliament while the same scope of intervention is unavailable to MPs of English constituencies on devolved matters. This imbalance of power is a further illustration that the UK is not a federal state. Although the government has introduced ‘English Votes for English Laws (EVEL)’ as a potential solution, concerns have been raised over the dual function of Westminster as both the UK Parliament and a de facto English legislature. Conclusion In sum, the devolved arrangements of the UK means that it cannot be considered a federal state. Indeed, the fact that devolution is a “process, not an event” (Davies) raises questions over the end of devolution (Tierney), with some even arguing that it is “a road with no logical stopping point short of independence”. However, the current arrangements of the UK are entirely irreconcilable with the general features of federalism. 105
Young, A., n.d. Turpin & Tomkins' British government and the constitution.
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