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Contents List of Maps Key to Maps List of Illustrations Acknowledgements Notes for Readers
Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10 Chapter 11 Chapter 12 Chapter 13 Chapter 14 Chapter 15 Appendix A
7 8 9 11 13
Foreword Introduction The French Invasion of Portugal Soult’s Capture of Badajoz The First British Siege of Badajoz The French Advance to Albuera The French Feint The Spaniards Hold Firm The Annihilation of Colborne’s Brigade Stalemate The Charge of the Fusiliers The Aftermath of Battle The Second British Siege of Badajoz The Wounded of Albuera The Prisoners of Albuera The Dead of Albuera Controversy and Conclusions
15 19 23 35 51 72 91 113 125 143 177 199 211 222 232 239 245
Orders of Battle
261
Part 1: Anglo-Portuguese Army 261; Part 2: Combined Spanish Armies 264; Part 3: French Expeditionary Force 266
Appendix B
Unit Strengths and Casualties Part 1: Anglo-Portuguese Forces 272; Part 2: Spanish Forces 277; Part 3: French Forces 281; Part 4: Strength and Casualty Totals 285
272
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Contents Albuera Uniforms
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Part 1: British and Portuguese Uniforms 286; Part 2: Spanish Uniforms 288; Part 3: French Uniforms 290
Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G
How the ‘Die Hards’ Got Their Name British Colours Captured at Albuera After Albuera The Napier–Beresford Pamphlet Wars Bibliography Index
291 296 300 314 318 330
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Maps 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Spain and Portugal 1811 Southern Portugal/South-Eastern Spain February 1811 Extremadura and Adjoining Regions May 1811 The Initial French Advance 8:00 a.m. The French Flank Attack 10:00 a.m. Girard’s Attack against Zayas 11:00 a.m. Colborne’s Attack against Girard 11:30 a.m./Colborne’s Defeat 12:00 noon The Musketry Duel Between Hoghton and Maransin 12:30 p.m. The Advance of the 4th Division 2:00 p.m. The Fight for the Village 2:00 p.m.
22 26 34 92 104 114 126 144 186 196
Cartographic Note The maps in this book are based on the terrain depicted in Spanish National Topographical Map No. 802-III. All unit placements and movement timings represent reasoned conclusions based on analysis of primary source information.
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Chapter 2
Soult’s Capture of Badajoz The long-awaited French offensive into Extremadura left Seville on 2 January 1811. Soult’s oddly proportioned force (consisting of 14,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, 2,000 engineers and gunners and 34 guns) was formed by combining Marshal Mortier’s V Corps with cavalry and support troops detached from other commands within Andalucia. Travelling in two parallel columns using the two primary passes over the Sierra Moreno mountains, the French ran into delays almost immediately after setting out.1 First, they encountered heavy rain. The right-hand column, moving by way of Guadalcanal, Llerena and Usagre, was not greatly affected, but the left-hand column, which included the siege train of over 300 wagons and which was advancing via Ronquillo to Santa Ollala and Monesterio, became strung out as draught animals struggled in the muddy conditions.2 Next, cavalry patrols from the left column discovered a force of 5,000 Spanish infantry under Teniente General Francisco Ballasteros, who was coincidentally moving south from Extremadura on a parallel route with orders to threaten Seville. On 4 January 1811, Soult detached the infantry division of Division General Honoré-Théodore-Maxime Gazan to drive Ballasteros away from both the main invasion route and from Seville. When Ballasteros continued to head south and west, Gazan made the mistake of allowing himself to be drawn away from the decisive theatre of action in an over-zealous pursuit which ultimately lasted three weeks. When Gazan finally caught up with his foe on 25 January, the clash was inconclusive and Ballasteros was able to ferry the bulk of his force safely across the lower Guadiana River into the Algarve province of Portugal.3 The rest of Soult’s force meanwhile pressed on into Extremadura. The Spanish defenders, weakened by the recall of Ballasteros to the south, retired before him, intending to make Badajoz, the provincial capital, the focal point of resistance. However, the local Spanish commander, General Gabriel Mendizabal, took two questionable actions in carrying out his withdrawal. First, he threw a large garrison into the second-rate fortress of Olivenza. Second, on 8 January, he hurriedly evacuated the town of Mérida and allowed its bridge over the Guadiana to fall intact into French hands despite orders to destroy all crossings. This latter development was particularly problematic for Wellington because it opened up so many strategic alternatives for the 1. Lapène, Conquête, pp. 70–1. 2. Lamare, Relation, p. 3. 3. The details of Gazan’s detour are given in Lamare, Relation, pp. 5–9.
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Albuera 1811
French that it became difficult for him to guess what they might do next. At first Wellington was sure that the French would take advantage of the capture of the intact bridge to advance into the Alentejo towards Lisbon even if that meant cutting loose from their communications with Andalucia.4 Shortly thereafter, however, he received reports which suggested that the French were moving north from Mérida to link up with Masséna via the French-controlled bridge over the Tagus at Almaraz.5 Wellington thought this move might well lead to a general action in front of Lisbon: I reckon that Mortier, supposing him to march by Almaraz, can be [with Masséna] on the Zezere in the first days of February, and I think it probable that the battle for the possession of this country, and probably the fate of the Peninsula, will be fought in less than a month from this time.6
Further information soon proved that both his conclusions were wrong and that the French were, in fact, remaining on the left bank of the Guadiana. This meant that the Alentejo was safe for the moment, but that Olivenza, a town of some 5,000 inhabitants situated four leagues (approximately twelve miles) to the south and west of Badajoz, was not.7 Olivenza had been ceded by the Portuguese to the Spanish following the short war between those two countries which took place in 1801, and had never been properly repaired or maintained by its new owners. There was so little prospect for a successful defence that la Romana specifically ordered his deputy to abandon the position in the face of any French advance.8 Mendizabal’s contrary decision to reinforce that garrison inspired Wellington to exasperated sarcasm in a letter to his brother, Henry Wellesley, the British ambassador to the Spanish government in Cadiz: . . . no arrangement was ever more completely Spanish than to have sent between 3000 and 4000 of their best men into Olivenza, a place without artillery, ammunition, or provisions, under circumstances in which it was impossible, if they should be attacked, that they could be relieved! 9
An attack was not long in coming. With his siege train delayed by adverse weather conditions and Gazan’s division chasing after Ballasteros, Soult decided it would be rash to attack Badajoz without first having established a base in the province, so Olivenza immediately became the interim objective of the French.10 The first trenches for the siege of Olivenza were opened on 13 January, and there was so little interference from the defenders that work proceeded very swiftly. Within ten days a practicable breach had been achieved and, rather than face an assault, General Manuel Herck unconditionally surrendered his garrison on 23 January.11 Probably the only uncomfortable moment for Soult during the entire siege was provided by the 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
W. to B., 12 January 1811, Dispatches, Vol. 7, pp. 124–6, at 124. W. to B., 15 January 1811, Dispatches, Vol. 7, p. 139. W. to Stuart, 16 January 1811, Dispatches, Vol. 7, pp. 141–2, at 142. Lamare, Relation, pp. 23–4. W. to Liverpool, 2 February 1811, Dispatches, Vol. 7, pp. 221–4, at 222. W. to Henry Wellesley, 20 January 1811, Dispatches, Vol. 7, pp. 158–9, at 158. Soult, Mémoires, p. 210. For some, surrender to the French was far from a novelty. One Spanish soldier filing out of the fortress was heard to say: ‘This is the seventh time I have been made prisoner by the French. I am confident that I will find a way to escape again.’ Petiet, Souvenirs Historiques, p. 336.
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belated arrival on 20 January of three separate dispatches from Berthier (dated 28 November, 4 and 10 December) reiterating Napoleon’s desire to have V Corps sent to support Masséna.12 That of 4 December in particular was couched in terms which must have reminded Soult that his Badajoz plan constituted direct disobedience of an imperial order: His Majesty is unhappy that, when it comes to dispositions as important as those relating to the safety of his army in Portugal, you have let General La Romana slip away to the Tagus without pursuing him. If the army of the Prince of Essling is defeated, you, duke, will have occasion to find out how important that will be for the emperor’s armies in Andalucia and how much they will be compromised thereby. The movement of La Romana proves that the situation in Portugal is the most important thing for the affairs of Spain. . . . It is indispensable for a corps of ten thousand men, taken from the Army of Andalucia . . . to make contact with the Prince of Essling and General Drouet [d’Erlon]. . . . By my letters of 30 September, 26 October and 14, 21 and 28 November, I have reiterated to you the wishes of the Emperor in this regard, and His Majesty has no doubt that a corps of all arms of the Army of Andalucia, equal in force to that of La Romana, is at this moment already on the Tagus and in communication with the Prince of Essling because, as I have said before, no movement in Andalucia can have any result if the Prince of Essling does not succeed, a point which has been well understood by La Romana. His Majesty therefore orders you to send a corps to the Tagus to join in the principal operation, which is the destruction of the English.13
As if these words were not emphatic enough, the order also specified that ‘All other considerations must give way before the movement prescribed.’ Astonishingly, despite the pressure exerted by this communication, Soult never wavered from his chosen course of action. The new order was certainly clearer and more emphatic than the emperor’s earlier instructions, but, as Soult saw the matter, it was still unrealistic in terms of its stated objectives and the force assigned to achieve them. In the first place, he felt he did not have 10,000 men to spare for Masséna if he was simultaneously responsible for maintaining control over Andalucia – there were simply not enough troops to go around.14 Second, even if the troops were available, Soult still had grave doubts that an expedition to the Tagus was anything other than an invitation to another disastrous defeat like Bailén, doubts he expressed in the reply he immediately sent back to Paris while reminding the emperor that control of the border fortresses was an acceptable alternate course of action: It is clear to me that if I were to thrust a corps of 10,000 men forward to the Tagus, as was His Majesty’s intention before Your Highness [Berthier] wrote me on 10 December, it would never reach its destination and would be cut off and surrounded before I could go to its aid. It thus seems to me that, under the 12. The date of arrival of these orders is specified in Soult, Mémoires, p. 208. 13. Berthier to Soult, 4 December 1810, in Jones, Journals of Sieges, Vol. 3, Appendix A, pp. 193–4. This order is summarised with a short quote in Masséna, Mémoires, Vol. 7, p. 302. 14. Soult, Mémoires, p. 208.
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Albuera 1811 prevailing circumstances, I can best fulfill the intentions of His Majesty, and be of use to the Army of Portugal, by taking Olivenza, Badajoz and Campo-Mayor, from where I should be able to communicate with Marshal the Prince of Essling.15
A mere two days after this reply had been dispatched to Paris, yet another letter arrived from Berthier, this one dated 22 December 1810, reiterating the same orders. Soult was forced once again to write to the emperor and dig an even deeper potential hole for his career: ‘This order is impossible to execute – it will cause us to lose V Corps and ruin the Emperor’s affairs in Andalucia without being any help to the imperial Army of Portugal.’16 The marshal also reiterated his view that the attack he was about to make on Badajoz was the only reasonable course of action under the then prevailing circumstances: ‘I declare on my honour . . . that I do not think it is possible to do more without compromising the fate of the imperial troops that I left behind in Andalucia.’17 This last caveat is especially telling because, particularly with the benefit of hindsight, one can recognise that it was concern for the retention of Andalucia that deprived the French of whatever small chance they might have had to defeat Wellington. Napoleon should have ordered Soult to support Masséna not just with 10,000 men, but with the whole of his army, thus subordinating all other objectives to the greater purpose of defeating the British. The value of such a radical move can be judged by the fact that its mere possibility was cited by Wellington as grounds for keeping a full complement of transport vessels on station at Lisbon after Masséna’s withdrawal to Santarem: I am also certain that, if the British army should not be obliged to evacuate Portugal, the French army must withdraw from Andalusia. I think it not improbable, therefore, that a large part of it, if not the whole of the French army in Andalusia will be introduced into the southern parts of this kingdom. I do not despair of holding my ground against this accumulation of force, and I have taken measures to prevent the only inconvenience which it can produce, viz., a deficiency of supplies. But as these troops are all within a few marches of me, and an order from Paris would not only put them in motion, but they could be in this country almost before the transports could arrive in England, I cannot think it advisable, in the existing situation of affairs, to send them out of my reach.18
Such a concentration of manpower by the French would, however, have entailed abandoning the siege of Cadiz and all but the largest towns in Andalucia, and Napoleon, the greatest practitioner in history of concentration of force in military operations, apparently could not bring himself to abandon the gains which had been made in that province. As a result, the type of order Wellington feared was never given and Soult was left in practice with discretionary authority to determine just what assistance the Army of Portugal would receive from him. 15. 16. 17. 18.
Soult to Berthier, 22 January 1811, in Belmas, Journaux, Vol. 1, pp. 470–3, at 472. Soult to Berthier, 25 January 1811, Ibid., p. 474–5. Ibid. W. to Liverpool, 21 December 1810, Dispatches, Vol. 7, pp. 51–5, at 52.
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‘Lancer of the Vistula Legion’, print by Carle Vernet. (Anne Brown Military Collection)
‘General Konopka’, engraving by Hulk after Pierre Martinet, from F. Ternisien d’Haudricourt, Fastes de la Nation Française (Paris, 1821). (Anne Brown Military Collection)
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‘Marshal Beresford with the Allied Forces under his command gained a Glorious victory . . . near Albuera’, woodcut published by G. Thompson (London, 4 July 1811). This is the earliest depiction of the battle. (Author’s Collection)
‘British Artillery in Action’, print by George Jones. (Author’s Collection) ‘Drummers, 57th Foot’, print after watercolour. The shakos and overalls of these drummers are probably more accurate than the bearskins and gaiters depicted in Lady Butler’s famous painting of the 57th at Albuera. (Author’s Collection)