Contents
Author’s Note vi Memories vii Acknowledgements viii Introduction ix Chapter 1
The Whirlwind Approaches
1
Chapter 2
The Final Phase Takes Shape
29
Chapter 3
Crushing the Enemy
49
Chapter 4
Oil Plants and Railyards
67
Chapter 5
The Whirlwind Arrives
82
Chapter 6
‘Avenging in the Shadows’
93
Chapter 7
Dresden Destroyed
Chapter 8
‘Goldstadt’ 121
Chapter 9
Courage and Depravity
Chapter 10
Obliterated 153
Chapter 11
Leaving the Cellars
179
Chapter 12
The Morning After
197
Chapter 13
The Bombing Continues
214
Chapter 14
Living in the Ruins
243
Chapter 15
Murder on the Ground
256
Chapter 16
Occupation 276
Chapter 17
The Phoenix
300
Chapter 18
Bombing Germany – Perspectives
317
Chapter 19
Reconciliation and Remembrance
333
Chapter 20
Aftermath 345
102 136
Final Words From Germany 368 Bibliography 369 Glossary 370 Index of Names 375
Author’s Note
B
omber Command made a crucial contribution to the achievement of the Allied victory in Europe in May 1945. Its young volunteers fought a lonely war, each crew confined to the cramped fuselage of a heavy bomber. Having written about the two operational tours of rear gunner Warrant Officer Sidney Knott, DFC (Flying for Freedom, more recently published as Life and Death in Bomber Command), I felt the need to tell the story from the other side, the people in the cities who endured the bombing. This new project began when gunner Don Robson, during an interview for the earlier book, mentioned the murder of aircrew from his squadron at a place called Pforzheim. My original idea was to explore this war crime and tell the story of the victims and the perpetrators. Soon, however, the new book’s scope widened. I discovered that the Pforzheim raid killed over 17,000 people and was, in terms of deaths, the third worst raid on a German city, after Hamburg and Dresden. I was surprised that so little had been written about this cataclysmic raid on Pforzheim. This book focuses on Pforzheim’s destruction and the time of the ‘whirlwind’ – the last seven months of the bombing war, when Germany’s cities were finally overwhelmed. It includes the stories of the British aircrew, particularly the crews of 550 Squadron at North Killingholme, and tells the stories of those on the ground. Their accounts give a vivid impression of total war and the courage and resilience required to survive. Tony Redding Ash, Canterbury, 2014
Memories
O
n Friday, 23 February 1945, Margot Geiger, a 16-year-old pupil at Pforzheim’s Hildagymnasium, went to work milling fuses at a watchmaking factory. Dawn came with a red sky, a strange herald of the city’s fiery destruction later that day. Margot had said goodbye to skilled watchmaker Werner Schultz, deported as a Mischling (half-Jew) for forced labour near Dresden. She had been used to taking ‘messed-up’ fuses to Werner, who would try to salvage them while talking about things which were not to be discussed. Eva Kulp was another friend. She had been ballet mistress at Pforzheim’s Stadttheater but had been conscripted for fuse work at the factory the previous September. Eva was not afraid to voice her opposition to the Nazis and showed no fear of denunciation. At the end of the Friday shift, Margot parted from Eva at the corner of HeinrichWieland Allee and Bayernstrasse. Eva said she was going to a city pub. Suddenly, the pre-alarm sounded. Pforzheim was just minutes from destruction. Werner survived, thanks to the Nazis’ decision to deport him – his train left the doomed city just two hours before the bombs fell. Margot survived the catastrophic raid, but Eva disappeared in the inferno.
Acknowledgements
T
his book is the product of generosity, enthusiasm and support on the part of many people, both in Britain and in Germany. They include veterans of Bomber Command, who shared memories extending back to their youthful years when their lives were on the line. I owe a special debt of thanks to Wing Commander Jack Harris, OBE, DFC, who tolerated my persistent questioning and shared the results of years of research concerning his beloved 550 Squadron. This project enjoyed much support in Germany. Dr Christian Groh, formerly director of Pforzheim’s Stadtarchiv, paved the way. He agreed to an initial interview, suggested contacts for further interviews, gave access to records and provided a base for research and other work. Leo Steinbeis organized and facilitated my visits to Pforzheim and assisted in the research. He also undertook translations and, when required, acted as interpreter during meetings and interviews. He was unswerving in his support and provided valuable advice and suggestions throughout. In the UK, Tony Butter and Tina Lindemann also made important contributions to the substantial task of translation. I owe thanks to everyone in Britain and Germany who agreed to be interviewed. Some sources talked about very difficult and painful issues. Several local researchers and historians made outstanding contributions. Brigitte and Gerhard Brändle opened their extensive files on victims and resisters and, in doing so, provided insights into German society in the time of the National Socialists. Most importantly, they gave a human face to the victims of Nazi oppression and those with the courage to resist an appalling tyranny. Stephan Paetzold was equally generous in sharing his research into the murders of British airmen and, in particular, the killing of five members of RAF pilot Johnny Wynne’s crew. Helmut Schmitt also gave an important overview of the context surrounding the murders following the bombing of Pforzheim. A panel of readers corrected errors and provided much useful guidance during preparation of the text. They included Sidney Knott, Don Robson, Jack Harris, Jeremy Hayes, Dr Alan Russell, Brigitte and Gerhard Brändle, Stephan Paetzold and Dr Christian Groh. Naturally, the responsibility for remaining errors rests with the author. This book represents a considerable workload and its completion is thanks in large measure to the extraordinary efforts of Joy Kemp, who did so much to prepare the text. Mandy Taylor, as always, also gave her time and support. My thanks to all involved. Tony Redding
Introduction
B
ritain stared into a precipice in June 1940. France was lost. The British Expeditionary Force had been rescued but its heavy weapons remained at Dunkirk. Britain stood alone. There were the Navy and Fighter Command, but the battle for Britain – to be contested by fighter squadrons during the Battle of Britain – had yet to be fought. Invasion was expected and when Churchill became prime minister the national mood was caught by his chilling comment on the prospect of a landing: ‘You can always take one with you!’ The so-called ‘Phoney War’ had ended in April 1940 with the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, followed soon after by the main offensive in the West. Until then, Bomber Command’s aircraft were permitted only to sow mines, bomb German naval vessels when not in port (to avoid killing civilians) and engage in leaflet dropping. Now Germany showed the way in city bombing. With France defeated, Churchill faced immense pressures in ensuring Britain’s immediate survival, yet he still found space to look ahead. He sought a way to prosecute the war successfully in the longer term. On 8 July 1940, he sent Minister of Aircraft Production Lord Beaverbrook a perceptive memorandum: ‘When I look round to see how we can win the war, I see that there is only one sure path. We have no continental army which can defeat German military power. The blockade is broken and Hitler has Asia and probably Africa to draw on. Should he be repulsed here or not try invasion, he will probably recoil eastwards and we will have nothing to stop him. But there is one sure way that will bring him back and bring him down and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers against the Nazi homeland.’1 It is a common misconception that Sir Arthur Harris – ‘Bomber Harris’ – instigated the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. Harris was certainly vigorous in his pursuit of strategic bombing objectives, but the rapid development of Bomber Command and its capabilities sprang from Churchill’s recognition of Britain’s lack of other offensive options. In 1941, the year before Harris took over at Bomber Command, the Air Staff had already proposed the creation of a force of 4,000 heavy bombers. This goal proved beyond reach, owing to the high cost of building a new British Army capable of contributing to Europe’s liberation in the final phase of the war. Bomber Command reached its maximum strength of 1,994 operational heavy aircraft in May 1945.1 A July 1941 memorandum from the Chiefs of Staff to Churchill argued for a British bombing offensive on the heaviest possible scale (the only limits being imposed by
x Bombing Germany: The Final Phase operational difficulties in the UK). This paper concluded: ‘As our forces increase, we intend to pass to a planned attack on civilian morale with the intensity and continuity which are essential if a final breakdown is to be produced.’ It added: ‘We have every reason to be confident that if we can expand our forces in accordance with our present programme, and if possible beyond it, that effect will be shattering.’2 During the evening of Sunday 29 December 1940, Arthur Harris was at work at the Air Ministry when German bombers began a huge fire raid on the City of London. He stood on the Air Ministry roof, in the company of Sir Charles ‘Peter’ Portal, then Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command. They looked out over a sea of flames. Harris commented: ‘They are sowing the wind.’ Later, after the war, he wrote that this was the sole occasion when he felt vengeful.3 Harris arrived at Bomber Command headquarters at High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, on 22 February 1942. A week earlier, on 14 February, a new directive had been issued. This stated that Bomber Command’s primary target was now civilian morale, especially that of Germany’s industrial workers. This directive included a list of ‘area targets’ where collateral damage inevitably implied a large loss of civilian lives. Harris’ job was to pursue this directive, and he did so with exceptional energy and determination. Yet this strategy came not from him, but from Churchill, the War Cabinet, the Air Ministry and the Chiefs of Staff.4 There was a dilemma here. Before the war, Bomber Command trained for and expected to raid Germany in daylight. Experience in conflicts such as the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and German participation in the Spanish Civil War had led to the conviction that ‘the bomber will always get through’. It was hoped that RAF day bombers with powered gun turrets would be capable of self-defence. With savage losses of 25 to 50 per cent on the initial daylight raids, it was soon appreciated that if Bomber Command was to operate at all, it would have to operate at night. This made area bombing inevitable. The problem was summed up by Portal: ‘Our original idea at the beginning of the war had been to wreck the German oil industry, but we were not then strong enough. Day bombing was not then practicable and we had not got the radar aids which we needed to enable us to hit small targets at night. We were forced to adopt area bombing as a means of generally weakening the German economy.’5 Later, in 1944, Portal felt that Bomber Command at last had the strength to destroy the German oil industry. By that time, however, Harris was firmly wedded to the conviction that area bombing was the most effective way of undermining Germany’s war-fighting ability. There was nothing new about regarding enemy morale as a legitimate target. A couple of months before Harris watched London burn, Portal had proposed that the BBC should name twenty German cities to be bombed – each to be attacked by over 100 bombers. Later, as Chief of the Air Staff, Portal continued to advocate attacks on German morale, despite the relatively modest size of the British bomber fleet at that time.6
Introduction xi Early assessments of Bomber Command’s achievements were wildly overoptimistic, both in terms of damage done and its effect on German morale. The true situation was exposed in 1941. Drawing on a scientific analysis of bombing photographs, the Butt Report painted a dismal picture of the British bomber as an instrument of war. It was found that only one in three crews claiming to bomb a German target put their bombs within 5 miles of the target.7 The bombers could not operate by day without long-range fighter escort, which would not be available until much later in the war. For the present, many bomber crews had trouble finding a large city, let alone bombing a specific target within that city. The report commented: ‘only about one third of aircraft claiming to reach the target area actually reach it. This figure of one third … relates to the aircraft recorded as having attacked the primary target, not to the total aircraft dispatched. In the raids considered in this analysis 6,130 aircraft were dispatched but 4,065 attacked, i.e. 66 per cent. Thus of the total dispatched not one third but one fifth reached the target area.’8 Clearly, in the wake of this grim report, Harris needed a miracle to restore his new command’s flagging fortunes. He found it in the ‘Thousand Plan’. Cologne was selected as the target for the first of the 1,000 bomber raids, on 30–1 May 1942. Mass raids were also flown against Essen and Bremen in June, but Cologne was the most destructive of the three attacks. It was a public relations coup of tremendous significance, both for the future of Bomber Command and the eventual fate of Germany’s cities. Cologne saved Bomber Command from its many critics. After Cologne, Bomber Command was seen as the way forward.9 As for Cologne, over 15,000 dwellings were destroyed or damaged and refugees flooded out into the surrounding countryside. Factories and businesses suffered badly, with 1,505 premises totally destroyed and 630 severely damaged. Cologne’s main railway station and trams were put out of action. There were 469 dead and just over 5,000 injured. Cologne’s police president commented: ‘The weight of this attack is most significant because, for the first time, more than 1,000 aircraft took part. This is not an estimate but a concrete number and on the German side one could not imagine such striking power.’10 Several milestones in the growth of Bomber Command and its capabilities were reached in rapid succession. The Avro Lancaster – described by Harris as Bomber Command’s ‘shining sword’ – began operations on 3 March 1942. This aircraft, with a wingspan of 102ft and an all-up weight of 67,000lb, carried 15,000lb of bombs with ease. It had a maximum range of 2,530 miles with a 7,000lb bombload.11 The Lancaster was by far the most successful British bomber of the Second World War. The crews worshipped the ‘Lanc’ and it was recognized from the first as a warwinner, given its huge lifting capacity and cavernous bomb-bay. Britain’s Lancaster building programme amounted to a national investment. Britain built 7,377 Lancasters; each cost around £59,000, excluding the electronics. Around 1,150,000 men and women were engaged in building Lancasters at some
xii Bombing Germany: The Final Phase
Bomber Command’s ‘shining sword’: the Lancaster was by far the most effective British bomber of the Second World War. Photo: Trustees of the Imperial War Museum.
point during the war. A total of 156,192 Lancaster sorties were flown on war service; 3,431 Lancasters were written off on operations.11 The ‘Thousand Plan’ raid on Cologne was a convincing demonstration of air power. This created a favourable political environment for the continued expansion of Bomber Command. Harris got his Lancasters and his chance to swamp the German defences with a concentrated ‘bomber stream’, with twenty-five to thirty bombers a minute crossing the target. New initiatives were essential as the German defences grew much stronger in 1942. The airborne interception Lichtenstein radar entered service and the German night fighter force more than doubled, from 152 to 362.12 Nevertheless, the bomber stream offered safety in numbers, with the concentrated mass of aircraft flying a set route at a set speed, with individual aircraft given specific height bands and times to reduce collision risks.13 Bomber Command’s strength continued to grow throughout 1942. By early November, the all-Lancaster 5 Group reached its full strength of ten squadrons (representing two-thirds of total Lancaster strength). By 1 January 1943, Bomber Command had 206 Lancasters (31.7 per cent of heavy bomber strength). Bomber Command’s six groups totalled fifty-three squadrons, with nearly 1,000 frontline aircraft (including 650 four-engined bombers). By early 1944 Lancaster numbers had risen to 586 (53.8 per cent of heavy bomber strength).14 This was of great significance as, in terms of bombs dropped per aircraft failing to return, the Lancaster stood head and shoulders above other ‘heavies’ (Stirling, 41 tons; Halifax, 51 tons; and Lancaster, 132 tons). By May 1943, the strength of each Lancaster squadron had increased to twenty-six aircraft, with two reserves. This expansion of the bomber fleet was accompanied by a massive programme of bomber airfield construction across
Introduction xiii eastern England. Another important development was the arrival of the Americans. On 17 August 1942, USAAF B.17s began to operate, marking the beginning of what would become round-the-clock bombing, with American daylight raids under fighter escort.15 Bomber Command’s effectiveness continued to grow. Electronic devices such as Gee overcame long-standing navigational and target-finding problems at night. Navigators used Gee to fix their position to within 6 miles, even at extreme range (the range was limited by the Earth’s curvature to 350–400 miles). Portal’s vision of a bombing ‘whirlwind’ continued to evolve. On 3 November 1942, the Chief of the Air Staff produced a paper setting out his aims for 1943 and 1944. The objective was to drop 1.25 million tons of bombs on Germany (killing an estimated 900,000 people and seriously injuring a million), destroying the enemy’s industrial and transportation infrastructures and making 25 million people homeless.16 At least one-third of German industry would be laid waste.17 A new phase in the bombing war began in March 1943. This was the Battle of the Ruhr. There were forty-three major raids during this campaign and crews flew 18,506 sorties. Half the attacks were on targets in the Ruhr, known euphemistically to bomber crews as ‘Happy Valley’. In reality, the Ruhr was Bomber Command’s graveyard; the near five-month battle cost 872 aircraft, with another 2,126 damaged.18 The German night fighters were very effective and German flak was deadly, with guns and searchlights under excellent radar control. Nevertheless, Harris was not to be deflected. His striking power expanded: the enlarged Pathfinder Force emerged as 8 Group and target location improved. During the final fortnight of December 1942 the revolutionary Oboe blind-bombing system was trialled in service. Oboe required two ground stations, ‘Cat’ and ‘Mouse’. Cat sent a signal to the Mosquito and the pilot had to stay within a beam just 35yd wide. This was achieved by keeping an ‘equi signal’ – a continuous note, rather than dots to one side and dashes to the other. The aircraft flew an arc of a circle to arrive at the bomb release point. The Mouse station sent ‘milestone’ signals to the Mosquito as it approached release, ending in five dots and a 2.5 second dash, which was the signal to drop. Oboe-equipped Mosquitoes were ideal for pinpoint target-marking. Oboe made accurate, concentrated bombing possible even when targets were obscured. Pathfinder Force Commander Donald Bennett described it as ‘probably the most effective single instrument of warfare in our entire armoury’.19 The technological advances accelerated. On the night of 30/1 January 1943, Pathfinder aircraft used H2S airborne radar for the first time during an attack on Hamburg. Earlier in the month improved Target Indicators (TIs) were dropped to mark Berlin. The intention was to perfect techniques for highly accurate, concentrated bombing. Target finding was by visual means or illumination, using Oboe-equipped Mosquitoes whenever possible. These aircraft were followed by flaredropping illuminators and primary markers dropping TIs. The TIs were topped up
xiv Bombing Germany: The Final Phase
High precision: the Oboe-equipped Mosquito was the key to accurate, concentrated bombing. Photo: Trustees of the Imperial War Museum.
by backers-up. The main force arrived over the target in a dense stream, swamping the defences. The master bomber provided direct VHF control of the attack over the target.19 Bennett described these methods in Pathfinder. The finders dropped flares around the aiming point a few minutes before zero hour. A finder or finders would then drop flares on the exact aiming point. The illuminators dropped more flares, followed by the primary markers (using crews with an established reputation for accuracy). The primary markers dropped TIs on the aiming point and the backers-up added more TIs as required.19 In early 1943 the Casablanca Directive gave fresh instructions to Harris: ‘Your primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.’20 Britain’s investment in heavy bombers paid off. Bomber Command was capable of doing real damage. The entire Ruhr was within Oboe marking range, and this was a system never jammed effectively by the Germans. H2S ground-scanning radar could pick out rivers, lakes and coastlines. Two Pathfinder squadrons received the first H2S sets in January 1943. Within a few months all Pathfinder aircraft had H2S and the entire heavy bomber force was so equipped by early 1944. Oboe and, to some extent, H2S brought Bomber Command’s striking power to an unprecedented level. New devices arrived on the squadrons to warn crews of approaching fighters and further confuse the German defences. Mandrel and Tinsel were introduced in the final quarter of 1942. Mandrel jammed German radars controlling night fighters.
Introduction xv Tinsel was an airborne system broadcasting engine noise on German night fighter frequencies.21 The new TIs reached the Pathfinder squadrons in January 1943. These pyrotechnics were in various colours, typically red, green, yellow and combinations. One TI in common use was the Red Spot Fire, which burst at 3,000ft, producing a vivid crimson glow.21 This was the crucial period in Bomber Command’s evolution. In just eight weeks, during early 1943, Harris’ squadrons received Oboe, H2S, more effective TIs and new radio countermeasures. The new all-Canadian 6 Group became operational on 1 January 1943. The Pathfinder Force became 8 Group one week later. Bomber Command’s striking power was transformed: the all-Lancaster 5 Group could drop a greater weight of bombs in a single night than the entire Bomber Command main force a year earlier.21 The pace of innovation quickened in the closing months of 1943. During October Mosquitoes trialled the new GH blind-bombing aid. Two new radio countermeasures were introduced that month. Corona broadcast false orders to enemy night fighters, using German-speaking RAF personnel. ABC (Airborne Cigar), carried by heavy aircraft, disrupted German voice transmissions. In 1944 the radio-countermeasures available continued to proliferate: • Radar jamming: Window (Würzburg/AI), Mandrel (Freya) and Ground Grocer (AI). • RT jamming: Airborne Cigar (VHF), Ground Cigar (VHF), Special Tinsel (HF), Corona (broadcasting false fighter control reportage) and Dartboard (MF). • W/T jamming: W/T Corona.21 Some electronic aids warned of approaching fighters, such as Fishpond and the Monica tail-warner. There was also Boozer, a passive radar giving cockpit light warnings whenever Würzburg gun-laying radar or Lichtenstein night fighter radar locked on. The German equipment included Flensburg, which homed onto Monica transmissions, and Naxos, which homed onto H2S transmissions. Marking techniques were further refined. Flare-dropping illuminators went in first, followed by primary markers. With the target well lit, the first markers would be laid, followed by fresh markers of another colour dropped by backers-up. Crucially, if things went wrong, markers of a different type and/or colour were now used to cancel earlier markers. Visual ground-marking was codenamed Newhaven. If the target was obscured by cloud or smoke, to a degree ruling out Newhaven, blind ground-marking by H2S radar was used. This was the Parramatta method. Oboe blind-marking was known as Musical Parramatta. If the target was totally obscured, a third technique – Wanganui – was employed. This was blind-marking using parachute-equipped sky markers.21
xvi Bombing Germany: The Final Phase New tactics reduced the so-called ‘creep-back’ problem. Markers and bombs tended to fall short, reflecting the crews’ understandable desire to drop as soon as possible and the poor ballistics of incendiary bombs. The master bomber’s job was to focus attention on accurate markers. ‘Offset marking’ began to be employed. Markers were dropped beyond the target, allowing bombs to ‘creep back’ into the target zone. Offset marking also overcame the problem of markers being obscured by smoke or overwhelmed by fire in the immediate target area.21 It became apparent that the British target of 4,000 heavy bombers was unrealistic, but even bigger numbers could now be attained if Bomber Command and the Americans joined forces and coordinated their attacks on a round-the-clock basis. At this time there was overwhelming public support for intensified bombing (typically on a ‘they started it’ basis), but there were a few prominent critics within Church and Parliament. Dr George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, was a firm opponent of area bombing, which he believed involved too great a loss of life and would bring about a needless destruction of cultural heritage.22 The Labour MP Richard Stokes was also among the critics.23 Harris, meanwhile, had a doughty critic at his very elbow. His chaplain, John Collins, protested after the Hamburg raids of July 1943 and continued as an outspoken opponent of area bombing. Yet he remained in post, possibly on the grounds that free speech was one of the freedoms being fought for. Later, Collins became a founder of CND, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Harris and Collins were two of a kind – strong-willed and unbending in their views. Somehow, they developed an understanding based on mutual respect.24 One famous clash involved Minister of Aircraft Production Sir Stafford Cripps, who gave a lecture at Bomber Command headquarters. He changed the subject of his address at the last moment, moving from ‘The Christian in industry’ to ‘Is God my co-pilot?’ In other words, was God on the side of Bomber Command and its crews? The minister concluded that conscience always has primacy and that it is possible for a man to find himself in a situation where he must follow his conscience, rather than orders.25 It is hard to imagine Albert Speer giving a lecture to senior Luftwaffe officers on the primacy of conscience. Cripps had a good reception, although some senior officers were offended. Harris then ordered everyone attending Cripps’ lecture to attend a second lecture putting the counter-argument. His personal assistant, Harry Weldon – an Oxford don – talked on ‘The ethics of bombing’. Collins was less than impressed. When Weldon had finished, he stood up and suggested an alternative title: ‘The bombing of ethics’.25 Harris was convinced that, with sufficient resources, he could smash Germany from the air. This would make an opposed seaborne invasion of Continental Europe unnecessary. Yet, crushing Germany required more than raw power. As Neillands points out, it also demanded a new degree of ruthlessness.26
Introduction xvii By the third quarter of 1944 Bomber Command was approaching the pinnacle of its power and German defences were in terminal decline. Germany felt the whirlwind’s full destructive power during the final months of bombing, from October 1944 to April 1945.27 There were significant differences of opinion between Harris, Portal, the American commander Spaaz and others on how best to use the bombers. The Air Ministry wanted synthetic oil plants destroyed. Others wanted more rail targets attacked. Harris wanted to continue the area bombing of cities. The bombing entered a new phase in August 1944. City attacks resumed on 16 August with raids on Stettin and Kiel.28 By late August the ability to raid Germany in daylight underlined the success of Allied long-range fighters in suppressing the German day fighter force.29 The point was fast approaching where night operations suited the German night fighters more than the British bombers, as daylight air superiority was won over Germany. The ferocity of the bombing campaign grew to levels unimagined in 1940. During the final quarter of 1944 Bomber Command alone dropped 163,000 tons of bombs.30 In this period, Bomber Command dropped more bombs than in the whole of 1943 and with greater accuracy.31 In the first four months of 1945, Bomber Command dropped another 181,000 tons of bombs (around one-fifth of the aggregate for the entire war).32 The combined total for the last quarter of 1944 and the first four months of 1945 – over 344,000 tons of blast and fire bombs – was the whirlwind delivered. In high explosive terms, this tonnage was the equivalent of around seventeen atomic bombs of Hiroshima size. The few German cities that had so far escaped destruction, notably Dresden, were now to suffer along with the rest. The late targets also included the south German city of Pforzheim, relatively untouched although close to heavily bombed Karlsruhe and Stuttgart. While spared in six years of war, Pforzheim was to share the fate of so many other cities. Disaster overtook it just eleven weeks before the German surrender.
Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
Redding, T. (2008), Flying for Freedom, 259–60. Terraine, J. (1988), The Right of the Line, 291. Probert, H. (2001), Bomber Harris, 110. Ibid., 132. Sweetman, J. (2004), Bomber Crew, 249. Neillands, R. (2001), The Bomber War, 52–3. Ibid., 58. Terraine, J. (1988), The Right of the Line, 293. Redding, T. (2008), Flying for Freedom, 30–1. Neillands, R. (2001), The Bomber War, 122–3. Redding, T. (2008), Flying for Freedom, 34–5. Neillands, R. (2001), The Bomber War, 187–8. Redding, T. (2008), Flying for Freedom, 32.
xviii Bombing Germany: The Final Phase 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.
Ibid., 41–2, 58. Ibid., 181. Terraine, J. (1988), The Right of the Line, 505. Overy, R. (1997), Bomber Command, 1939–1945, 111. Terraine, J. (1988), The Right of the Line, 518–19. Redding, T. (2008), Flying for Freedom, 45–8. Longmate, N. (1988), The Bombers, 232. Redding, T. (2008), Flying for Freedom, 181–5. Neillands, R. (2001), The Bomber War, 279. Ibid., 371. Ibid., 279. Nichol, J. and Rennell, T. (2004),Tail-end Charlies, 202–3. Neillands, R. (2001), The Bomber War, 116–17. Redding, T. (2008), Flying for Freedom, 181. Ibid., 210–11. Ibid., 181. Ibid., 210–11. Ibid., 181. Ibid., 212.