Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 3
DAY FIGHTERS
IN DEFENCE OF THE REICH A War Diary, 1942– 45 Donald Caldwell
FRONTLINE BOOKS
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 5
CONTENTS
Introduction and acknowledgements
6
Chapter 1 August–December 1942
10
Chapter 2 January–June 1943
30
Chapter 3 July–September 1943
77
Chapter 4 October–December 1943
123
Chapter 5 January–March 1944
173
Chapter 6 April–June 1944
248
Chapter 7 July–September 1944
323
Chapter 8 October–December 1944
377
Chapter 9 January–May 1945
411
Chapter 10 Summary and conclusions
448
Table of equivalent ranks
458
Glossaries
459
Notes on sources
462
Bibliography
465
Index
470
––––––––5––––––––
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 6
INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book is intended to be a detailed, comprehensive daily reference to the air operations flown by the Luftwaffe in response to daylight strategic missions by the United States Army Air Force against the German Reich and the western zone occupied by Germany. It is a natural complement to The Luftwaffe over Germany: Defense of the Reich, a narrative history of the day Reichsluftverteidigung (Air Defence of the Reich) by myself and Dr Richard Muller. The present book contains a brief narrative and a table of statistics detailing every mission of every Luftwaffe unit defending the prescribed area against daylight strategic raids by the USAAF and RAF, and a summary of every 8th and 15th US Army Air Force strategic mission over this area in which the Luftwaffe was encountered, beginning with the first numbered 8th Air Force raid in August 1942 and ending in May 1945. Many specially prepared mission maps are included, as well as tables summarising strengths, victory claims and losses of the Luftwaffe and the Allies in this campaign. I have called it a ‘War Diary’ because its contents are as close as possible to those of a conventional, official unit war diary. Most people picking up this book will understand the challenges facing any serious Luftwaffe historian owing to the lack of primary documentation. I accumulated the data needed from more than 1,000 sources over a period of 25 years. The tables are inevitably incomplete; I found the lack of some important official data, especially unit mission strengths prior to 1944, especially galling. Since each table in this book might contain data from 100 sources, conventional footnotes for the tables have been passed up in favour of a general discussion of sources and an extensive bibliography. Direct quotes are, however, referenced as they appear. I first solicited the help of Luftwaffe veterans when I began serious research in 1985, and their generous
assistance proved invaluable. Their numbers are unfortunately but inevitably growing fewer by the year, but here are all of the men who provided material that I eventually used in this book: Willi Andiel, Hans Berger, Karl Boehm-Tettelbach, HansEkkehard Bob, Walter Bohatsch, Oskar Bösch, Hans Bott, Hermann Buchner, Eberhard Burath, J. E. Clade, Peter Crump, Martin Drewes, Georg-Peter Eder, Günther Ehrlich, Fritz Engau, Wolf Falck, Richard Franz, Adolf Galland, Georg Genth, Adolf Glunz, Heinz Gomann, Alfred Grislawski, Klaus Hahn, Alois Höhn, Hans-Joachim Jabs, Robert Jung, Jörg Kiefner, Otto Kleinert, Gerhard Kroll, Ottomar Kruse, Heinz-Günter Kuring, Erwin Leykauf, Fritz Marktscheffel, Wilhelm Mittag, Werner Molge, Theo Nau, Johannes Naumann, Karl-Heinz Ossenkop, Dietrich Peltz, Horst Petzschler, Douglas Pitcairn, Günther Rall, Willi Reschke, Arno Rose, Wolfgang Schenck, Ernst Scheufele, Jan Schild, Dieter Schmidt–Barbo, Gerhard Schöpfel, Ernst Schröder, Erich Schwarz, Günther Sinnecker, Georg Spies, Peter Spoden, Otto Stammberger, Heinrich Staniwoga, Karl-Heinz von den Steinen, Fritz Ungar, Willi Unger, Hans Weik, Berthold Wendler, Gerd Wiegand, Günther Wolf, Helmut Zittier and Paul Zorner. Next, special thanks are owed to Les Butler for the maps and to Rich Muller for his frequent encouraging words, many helpful suggestions, editing of the text and tracking down of references, many at very short notice. Luftwaffe memorabilia are considered collectibles, which presents another challenge to the serious researcher. Photo albums and documents that were shared freely in the 1980s and 1990s now appear on eBay® to be sold to wealthy collectors, frequently never to be seen again by the general public. The small band of serious air war historians and enthusiasts has fought this pernicious trend by freely sharing their
––––––––6––––––––
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 7
INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
material, aided by Internet discussion boards such as 12 O’Clock High (http://forum.12oclockhigh.net). I wish to acknowledge the following men and women for their generous gifts of time, information, leads, photographs, documents and/or photographic assistance: Arno Abendroth, Remi Badru, E. J. Bakker, Bernd Barbas, Nick Beale, John Beaman, Csaba Becze, Paul Berg, Dénes Bernád, Christer Bergström, Steve Blake, Jan Bobek, Winfried Bock, Manfred Boehme, Theo Boiten, Andreas Brekken, Jerry Brewer, David Brown, Eric Brown, Edwina Campbell, Sven Carlsen, Carl Charles, Steven Coates, Jerry Crandall, A. J. Cranston, Jim Crow, Ferdinando D’Amico, Curt Deatrick, Arie De Jong, Ivo De Jong, Wim de Meester, Linda Dewey, Larry deZeng, C. J. Ehrengardt, Russ Fahey, Bob Fletcher, Stephen Fochuk, John Foreman, Jim Forsyth, Robert Forsyth, Norman Franks, Garry Fry, Carl Geust, Bob Gill, Chris Goss, Steve Gotts, Richard Goyat, Timothy Gravelle, John Gray, Lewis Griffith, Russell Guest, Tomislav Haramincic, Ian Hawkins, Bill Hess, Larry Hickey, Michael Holm, Kevin Holzimmer, George Hopp, Bertrand Hugot, Budd Jones, Peter Kassak, Jim Kitchens, Werner Kock, Bob Korkuc, Harold Lake, Malcolm Laing, Bruce Lander, Gerd Lanio, Eric Larger, Joss LeClerq, Jean-Yves Lorant, Rod MacKenzie, John Manrho, Bill Marshall, Lex McAulay, Ian McLachlan, Michael Meyer, Robert Michulec, Kenneth Minor, Kees Mol, Eric Mombeek, George Morrison, Williamson Murray, Wesley Newton, Frank Olynyk, Neil Page, Mack Palmer, Evgeniy Pavlenko, Don Pearson, Robert Peczkowski, Doug Peifer, Gordon Permann, Jim Perry, Toni Petito, Peter Petrick, Gert Poelchau, Dick Powers, Dr Alfred
Price, Dr Jochen Prien, Ron Putz, Lorenz Rasse, JeanLouis Roba, Peter Rodeike, Barry Rosch, Brown Ryle, Tom Semenza, Chris Shores, Barry Smith, Evelyn Smith, Sam Sox, Christian Stopsack, Klaes Sundin, Günter Sundermann, Lothair Vanoverbeke, John Vasco, Leon Venter, Luc Vervoort, Dave Wadman, Walter Waiss, Edward Westermann, Dan Williams, Tony Wood and Ad van Zantvoort. I apologise for any inadvertent omissions; however, anyone who posts to Internet discussion boards using pseudonyms has chosen not to be acknowledged. The Bundesarchiv–Bildarchiv (Koblenz) has granted permission to reprint photographs from its collection. Permission has been received from Motorbuch Verlag, Helios Verlags- und Buchvertriebsgesellschaft, the Gemeinschaft der Flieger Deutsche Streitkräfte e.V. and the Kassel Mission Memorial Association, Inc., to reproduce pilot’s accounts from published works. I wish to acknowledge the help received from the professional staffs of the British National Archives (Public Record Office), the Bundesarchiv–Militärarchiv (Freiburg), the Military Archives Division of the National Archives and the United States Air Force Historical Research Agency. I take responsibility for the book’s inevitable errors of omission and commission. I wish to state further that I translated all quotations in the book that were originally written in the German language. The responsibility for any consequent errors in fact or tone is my own.
––––––––7––––––––
Donald Caldwell Lake Jackson, Texas June 2010
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 10
CHAPTER 1
AUGUST – DECEMBER 1942
August 1942 Eight months after Germany declared war on the USA, American heavy bombers were arriving in the United Kingdom. The Luftwaffe leaders knew this, and that United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) doctrine called for high-altitude daylight strategic bombing, but the mere threat of an American bombing campaign did not warrant the reinforcement or centralisation of Germany’s day fighter defences. The Luftwaffe itself had failed to defeat the United Kingdom with daylight bombing in 1940, and the Royal Air Force’s small day attacks on German targets since the beginning of the war had failed likewise, at
high cost. Confidence that the forces on hand could meet the American threat was high. For more than a year, the day fighter defences had comprised three Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Wings), spread thinly near the coast from Cherbourg along the English Channel and the North Sea coast to Denmark and southern Norway. The authorised strength of these three Geschwader was 442 fighters; their operational strength on 27 July was 333. Almost all were FockeWulf Fw 190s, the nimble radial-engine fighter whose performance had shocked the RAF when it entered service on the Kanalfront (English Channel front) in 1941. Bombers penetrating the coastal crust would be
Four Fw 190As of 11./JG 1, photographed in their netcovered boxes at Deelen in the summer of 1942. (Burath)
––––––––10––––––––
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 11
AUGUST – DECEMBER 1942
taken care of by Flak, aircraft factory defence flights, and the operational flights maintained by each advanced flight training school. The wing defending the most territory was Major Erich von Selle’s Jagdgeschwader 1 (JG 1), whose four Gruppen, or groups, were stationed along the North Sea coast from Norway to the Netherlands. It was part of the air defence command responsible for the Reich proper, Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte (Central Air Command; Lw Bfh Mitte), which was commanded by a Flak officer and contained only a single Fliegerkorps (Flying Corps) led by a night fighter specialist. Operational control of the day fighters rested with two Jagdfliegerführer (Fighter Commands; Jafü) who were part of two Jagddivisionen (Fighter Divisions). This complex command structure was not tested by day in 1942. The Americans did not cross the German border, and JG 1 encountered the American 8th Air Force over the Netherlands on only a few occasions. It did counter a few raids by RAF tactical forces, but most of its operational flights were routine coastal patrols and convoy escorts. The two Jagdgeschwader based nearest to the English Channel and nicknamed the Kanalgeschwader
Mechanics sit on the cowling of a 12./JG 1 Fw 190A-4 at Deelen in the autumn of 1942. Note the presence of both Geschwader and Gruppe emblems and the dark colour of the lower cowl panel. (Burath)
were thus the first to face the Americans. They belonged to a front-line air force, Luftflotte 3 (3rd Air Fleet). This force had been left in the western occupied zone (France and the Low Countries) in mid1941 when most of the Luftwaffe was transferred east to support the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Its bombers had conducted the night Blitz on England, and the task of its fighters was to maintain air superiority above the region against the fighters and light bombers of the RAF. They had performed this task with great success; they were now to face a different challenge. In August 1942, the Fw 190s of Major Walter Oesau’s JG 2 ‘Richthofen’ were based in northwestern France, under the command and control of Jafü 3. The Stab and I./JG 2 were at Triqueville, II./JG 2 was at Beaumont–le–Roger, and III./JG 2 was at Théville, less one Staffel which was guarding the U-boat bases in Brittany. Major Gerhard Schöpfel’s JG 26 ‘Schlageter’ was under Jafü 2 and deployed as follows: the Stab and I./JG 26 at St. Omer in the Pas de Calais; II./JG 26, the ‘Abbéville Boys’, at Abbéville-Drucat on the lower Somme, and III./JG 26 at Wevelghem, in western Belgium. In addition to these Fw 190 units,
Major Walter Oesau, JG 2 Kommodore (left), with Hptm. Siegfried Schnell, one of his successful Staffelkapitäne, on the Kanalfront in 1942. Oesau was killed on 11 May 1944 as JG 1 Kommodore. Schnell became Kommandeur of III./JG 54 in the RLV force on 1 May 1943 and transferred to IV./JG 54 on the Eastern Front in February 1944. He was killed in combat that same month. (Author’s collection)
––––––––11––––––––
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 12
DAY FIGHTERS IN DEFENCE OF THE REICH
17 August 8th Air Force VIII BC (VIII BC) Mission #1: 12 97th Bomb Group (97th BG) B 17s bomb Rouen–Sotteville rail yards, TOT 1839-1846 – lose 0-0-2 [lost-cat E (scrapped)damaged], claim 0-0-1 [downed-probable-damaged]. Close escort of 4 sqds RAF Spitfire IX claims 1-5-4, loses 3-0-1.
The VIII BC’s first heavy bomber mission sent a mere dozen Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses to Rouen in late afternoon. Supermarine Spitfires of RAF Fighter Command provided the escort. Most were Spitfire Vs, which were markedly inferior to the Fw 190A. The new Spitfire IX, which equipped one fighter wing, would prove to be the Focke-Wulf fighter’s equal. After patrolling the Channel coast in the morning, at least one JG 2 Gruppe and all three JG 26 Gruppen were scrambled against a late raid that proved to contain the B-17s. Hptm. Erich Leie’s I./JG 2 and Hptm. Conny Meyer’s II./JG 26 reached the Allied formation, but not until it had already dropped its bombs and turned for England. The Focke-Wulfs did not attack the bombers, but did draw their fire. Instead, they tangled with the RAF escort and claimed four Spitfires for the loss of one I./JG 2 Fw 190 and pilot. Three Spitfire IXs were, in fact, shot down, and a fourth was seriously damaged. The German pilots identified the bombers as RAF Short Stirlings and Handley-Page Halifaxes and were reportedly impressed by their close formation and heavy defensive fire.
Major Gerhard Schöpfel. A pre-war JG 26 pilot and Staffelkapitän, Schöpfel was Kommodore of JG 26 for all of 1942. He was replaced by Hptm. Josef Priller in January 1943 and spent the rest of the war in various mid-level staff and combat leadership positions. (Schöpfel)
there were two independent Staffeln, 11.(Höhen)/JG 2 and 11.(Höhen)/JG 26, which were equipped with the high-altitude Bf 109G-1. These were based at Ligescourt and Norrent–Fontes, nominally under JG 26. The two Jafü reported directly to Luftflotte 3. Its command structure was thus quite flat, not typical for the Luftwaffe, but the overlapping territories of the two controllers did lead to occasional problems, and the quick reaction times necessitated by the closeness of the American bases prevented the assembly of the large combat formations that later became common over the Reich. The standard interception unit in Luftflotte 3 would remain the Gruppe, nothing larger.
The Fw 190A-3 of Oblt. Wilhelm-Ferdinand ‘Wutz’ Galland, Kapitän of the 5. Staffel of II.//JG 26, at Abbéville in 1942. Galland was killed by P-47s on 17 August 1943, the second brother of Adolf Galland to die in JG 26. (Crump)
––––––––12––––––––
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 13
AUGUST – DECEMBER 1942
This II./JG 26 Fw 190A-3 is a typical example of the aircraft equipping the three air defence Jagdgeschwader in late 1942 and early 1943. Obfw. Werner Gerhardt was killed in it off Dieppe on 19 August. (Crump)
21 August
19 August
The Americans’ second raid was an attack on the II./JG 26 base at Abbéville–Drucat, which was ignored by the Luftwaffe. The Kanalgeschwader were fully occupied elsewhere; this was the day of Operation JUBILEE, the ill-fated Allied raid on Dieppe.
The VIII BC ordered its first raid on a target outside France. The RAF’s diversionary raids on the Pas de Calais occupied JG 26, leaving the defence to Oblt. Detlev Rohwer’s Woensdrecht-based II./JG 1. The bombers were recalled after missing rendezvous with their escort (1 squadron of USAAF and 8 squadrons of RAF Spitfires) and were attacked on withdrawal by nine II./JG 1 Fw 190s. These damaged one B-17 severely, costing the VIII BC its first fatality. One Axis fighter force-landed with combat damage.
20 August
24 August
8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #3: 11 of 12 B-17s bomb Amiens–Longeau rail yards, TOT 1901 – lose 0, claim 0. Close escort of 4 sqds RAF Spitfire IX claims 1-1-1, loses 0-0-1.
8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #5: 12 B-17s bomb LeTrait shipyard, TOT 1716-1723 – lose 0-0-5 (to Flak), claim 0-0-0. Escort of 10 sqds RAF Spitfires claims 3-1-4 Fw 190s, loses 2-0-3.
8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #2: 22 of 24 B-17s bomb Abbéville–Drucat airfield, TOT 1132-1140 – lose 0-0-3, claim 0-0-0.
The VIII BC sent 12 B-17s to Amiens. One JG 2 Gruppe and the three JG 26 Gruppen were scrambled against this raid, but the Spitfire escort kept all formations away from the bombers.
8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #4: 12 B-17s target Rotterdam shipyard (recalled) – lose 0-0-1, claim 2-5-6. Close escort of 8 sqds RAF Spitfires claims 0, loses 0.
The VIII BC sent a dozen B-17s to Le Trait. II./JG 26 and I./JG 2 were scrambled, but only II./JG 26 made contact and was kept from the bombers by the escort. The Gruppe claimed five Spitfires without loss. Two Spitfire IXs were shot down; two more force-landed in England with wounded pilots.
––––––––13––––––––
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 14
DAY FIGHTERS IN DEFENCE OF THE REICH
Luftwaffe defensive activity – 17 August 1942 Unit
Type
Gruppe up Base
Gruppe down No
Time
Base
Claims Time
Losses Dest
Dam
KIA
MIA
WIA
Luftflotte 3 Jafü 2: I./JG 26
Fw 190A
St. Omer–Arques
1820
St. Omer–Arques
1853
0
0
0
0
0
0
II./JG 26
Fw 190A
Abbéville
1837
Abbéville
1920
4 Spitfire
0
0
0
0
0
III./JG 26
Fw 190A
Wevelghem
1827
Wevelghem
1902
0
0
0
0
0
0
Fw 190A
Triqueville
1831
Triqueville
1903
0
1
0
1
0
0
Claims
Losses Dam
KIA
MIA
WIA
Jafü 3: I./JG 2
Luftwaffe defensive activity – 20 August 1942 Unit
Type
Gruppe up Base
Gruppe down No
Time
Base
Time
Dest
Luftflotte 3 Jafü 2: I./JG 26
Fw 190A
St. Omer–Arques
1802
St. Omer–Arques
1836
0
0
0
0
0
0
II./JG 26
Fw 190A
Abbéville
1756
Abbéville
1838
0
0
0
0
0
0
III./JG 26
Fw 190A
Wevelghem
1844
Wevelghem
1948
0
0
0
0
0
0
Fw 190A
Triqueville
1837
Triqueville
1928
2 Spitfire
0
0
0
0
0
Dest
Dam
KIA
MIA
WIA
0
1
0
0
0
Dest
Dam
KIA
MIA
WIA
Jafü 3: I./JG 2
Luftwaffe defensive activity – 21 August 1942 Unit
Type
Gruppe up
Gruppe down
Claims
Base
No
Time
Base
Time
Woensdrecht
9
?
Woensdrecht
?
Losses
Lw Bfh Mitte XII. Fliegerkorps Jagddivision 1 Jafü Holland-Ruhr: II./JG 1
Fw 190A
0
Luftwaffe defensive activity – 24 August 1942 Unit
Type
Gruppe up Base
Gruppe down No
Claims
Time
Base
Time
Losses
Luftflotte 3 Jafü 2: II./JG 26
Fw 190A
Abbéville
1710
Abbéville
1800
5 Spitfire
0
0
0
0
0
Fw 190A
Triqueville
1706
Triqueville
1759
0
1
0
0
0
1
Jafü 3: I./JG 2
––––––––14––––––––
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 15
AUGUST – DECEMBER 1942
27 August 8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #6: 7 of 9 97th Bomb Group B-17s bomb Rotterdam shipyard, TOT 1840 – sight no e/a, lose 0-0-3 (to Flak). Escort of 7 sqds RAF + 12 US Spitfires claims 0, loses 0.
German fighters away from the bombers, shooting down one 11.(Höhen)/JG 2 Bf 109G 1 for the loss of one Spitfire IX shot down and a second seriously damaged. II./JG 26 was credited with two Spitfires. 29 August
The VIII BC sent a small force to Rotterdam in late afternoon. The Channel units had spent the early afternoon battling RAF Spitfires escorting a raid by Bostons on Abbéville-Drucat airfield. They had landed for the day when the heavy bombers were detected, and the Luftwaffe fighters were not scrambled again to oppose them.
8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #8: 12 of 13 97th BG B-17s bomb Courtrai–Wevelghem airfield, TOT 1231-36 – lose 0-0-3, claim 1-2-0. B-17 escort of 4 sqds RAF Spitfire IX and escorts of RAF raids claim 2-2-4 e/a, lose 3 fighters and 2 pilots.
8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #7: 11 of 14 97th BG B-17s bomb Méaulte–Potez aircraft factory, TOT 1437-44 – sight no e/a, lose 0-0-3, one KIA (to Flak). Escort of 8 sqds RAF Spitfires claims 1 Bf 109, 0-3-3 Fw 190s, loses 1-0-2.
The VIII BC bombed the III./JG 26 base at Wevelghem. Much of Hptm. Josef ‘Pips’ Priller’s Gruppe was already airborne against another raid, but the field itself sustained considerable damage. One German unit apparently succeeded in reaching the bombers, as evidenced by the Allied claims; its identity, however, is unknown.
The VIII BC B-17s bombed Méaulte in midafternoon. The Channel units had spent the early afternoon chasing RAF feints and diversions, and only II./JG 26 and one or both of the two Luftflotte 3 highaltitude Staffeln were scrambled against what proved to be the day’s true raid. The RAF close escort kept the
Fw 190A-2s of the III./JG 26 Stabsschwarm stand ready for takeoff from Wevelghem, Belgium, in 1942. The nearest aircraft is that of Fw. Grünlinger, wingman to the Gruppenkommandeur, Hptm. Priller; in the middle, a Gruppe staff aircraft; behind, a wingman’s aircraft from the 7th Staffel. (Cranston)
28 August
––––––––15––––––––
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 16
DAY FIGHTERS IN DEFENCE OF THE REICH
September 1942 5 September 8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #9: 31 of 37 B-17s bomb Rouen–Sotteville rail yard, TOT 1130-35 – sight no e/a, lose 0-0-0. B-17 escort of 4 sqds RAF Spitfire IX claims 21-3, loses 6.
The VIII BC bombed a frequent target, the Rouen rail yard. Interception in the target area by JG 2 Fw 190 formations was ineffective. I./JG 2, 11.(Höhen)/JG 2 and II./JG 26 reached the withdrawing bombers, but were kept away from the B-17s by Spitfires, which were then punished severely for their success. Six Spitfires were shot down, for the loss of one I./JG 2 Fw 190A-3 and damage to one 11.(Höhen)/JG 2 Bf 109G-1. 6 September 8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #10: 43 of 64 B-17s bomb St. Omer airfields, Méaulte–Potez aircraft factory, TOT 1840-48 – lose 2-0-7, claim 4-19-20. Escort of 7 sqds RAF and 3 sqds US Spitfires claims 1-1-7 e/a, loses 3-0-0.
The VIII BC lost its first two B-17s today, on its tenth mission. The German intercept force was the largest to date – three Gruppen – and the efficient Spitfire IX wing, which had provided close escort to previous missions, missed rendezvous and was late reaching the battle. The Spitfire high cover was bounced from above and behind and dispersed by Hptm. Conny Meyer’s II./JG 26, which then joined Hptm. Helmut-Felix Bolz’s II./JG 2 in attacking the bombers from the French coast to the target. After numerous passes from all directions, two B-17s ultimately went down; each Jagdgruppe was credited with two Fortresses. Their claims for three Spitfires did match the true RAF losses. The II./JG 2 lost one Focke-Wulf and pilot; a I./JG 2 Focke-Wulf was damaged seriously enough to write it off. Hptm. Meyer’s II./JG 26 continued its string of loss-free intercept missions. 7 September 8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #11: 9 of 29 B-17s bomb Rotterdam, Utrecht shipyards, TOT 1011-30 – lose 0-0-5 (to Flak), claim 12-10-12. Escort of 5 sqds RAF Spitfires claims 1-0-5 e/a, loses 1-1-1.
The VIII BC sent its small force to two Dutch shipyards. Two JG 1 Gruppen intercepted the bombers and were met by the Spitfire IX escort wing, which shot down two Focke-Wulfs without loss to itself or the bombers. III./JG26, the easternmost JG 26 Gruppe, was the only Luftflotte 3 unit to see combat. This Gruppe took off intending to catch the bombers on their return flight, but was quickly engaged by Spitfires sweeping the coast. One Spitfire was claimed. In fact, one crashed in Belgium, a second was abandoned over the sea, and a third crash-landed on Manston.
October 1942 2 October 8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #13: 36 of 49 B-17s bomb St. Omer–Wizernes airfield and Méaulte-Potez aircraft factory, TOT 1617-18 – lose 0-0-6, claim 9-9-5. Escort of 13 sqds RAF Spitfires claims 2-5-1 e/a, loses 5. 31 1st Fighter Group (1st FG) P-38s claims 0, loses 1; 23 4th FG Spitfires claim 4-0-2, lose 0.
The VIII BC attacked two targets, a St. Omer airfield and the Méaulte–Potez aircraft factory. Several diversionary raids and sweeps were ignored by the German controllers, but the principal diversion, a sweep of the Pas de Calais by three fighter wings, was met near Calais by Hptm. Johannes Seifert’s I./JG 26, which lost two Fw 190s to the US 4th FG, flying its first mission as an American unit after its formation from the three RAF Eagle squadrons. III./JG 26 met the withdrawing Spitfires over the Channel and accounted for the sweep’s two losses, while losing one Fw 190. The St. Omer raiders faced only scattered attacks. These B-17s were escorted by the P-38s of the 1st FG, flying its first mission as a unit; one P-38 failed to return. The Spitfire IX wing escorted the Méaulte force. Hptm. Hans ‘Assi’ Hahn’s III./JG 2, Hptm. Meyer’s II./JG 26 and the two Höhenstaffeln all reached these bombers as they were coming off their bomb run, splitting the escort and making quick passes at the B-17s from all directions, damaging several but downing none. Three III./JG 2 Focke-Wulfs went down, killing two pilots. The escorts shot down one 11.(Höhen)/JG 26 Bf 109G-1, while losing one Spitfire to II./JG 26.
––––––––16––––––––
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 17
AUGUST – DECEMBER 1942
Luftwaffe defensive activity – 28 August 1942 Unit
Type
Gruppe up Base
Gruppe down No
Time
Base
Claims Time
Losses Dest
Dam
KIA
MIA
WIA
Luftflotte 3 Jafü 2: 11.(H)/JG 2
Bf 109G
Ligescourt
~1410 Ligescourt
1450
0
1
0
0
0
1
II./JG 26
Fw 190A
Abbéville
1405
Abbéville
1510
2 Spitfire
0
0
0
0
0
Fw 190A
Triqueville
1412
Triqueville
1453
0
0
0
0
0
0
Claims
Losses Dam
KIA
MIA
WIA
Jafü 3: I./JG 2
Luftwaffe defensive activity – 5 September 1942 Unit
Type
Gruppe up Base
Gruppe down No
Time
Base
Time
Dest
Luftflotte 3 Jafü 2: 11.(H)/JG 2
Bf 109G
Ligescourt
~1110 Ligescourt
~1210
1 Spitfire
0
1
0
0
0
II./JG 26
Fw 190A
Abbéville
1110
Abbéville
1210
6 Spitfire
0
0
0
0
0
Fw 190A
Triqueville
1123
Triqueville
1135
0
1
0
0
0
1
Dest
Dam
KIA
MIA
WIA
0
0
0
0
0
Jafü 3: I./JG 2
Luftwaffe defensive activity – 6 September 1942 Unit
Type
Gruppe up Base
Gruppe down No
Claims
Time
Base
Time
1805
Abbéville
1905
Triqueville
1917
Losses
Luftflotte 3 Jafü 2: II./JG 26
Fw 190A
Abbéville
2 B-17, 1 Spitfire
Jafü 3: I./JG 2
Fw 190A
Triqueville
1803
II./JG 2
Fw 190A
Beaumont–le–Roger
~1800 Beaumont–le–Roger ~1915
0
1
0
0
0
0
2 B-17, 2 Spitfire
1
0
1
0
0
Claims
Losses Dam
KIA
MIA
WIA
Luftwaffe defensive activity – 7 September 1942 Unit
Type
Gruppe down
Gruppe up Base
No
Time
Base
Time
Dest
XII. Fliegerkorps Jagddivision 1 Jafü Holland-Ruhr: II./JG 1
Fw 190A
Woensdrecht
~0945 Woensdrecht
~1045 0
1
0
1
0
0
IV./JG 1
Fw 190A
München–Gladbach
0945
München–Gladbach
1045
0
1
0
1
0
0
Fw 190A
Wevelghem
1040
Wevelghem
1130
1 Spitfire
0
0
0
0
0
Luftflotte 3 Jafü 2: III./JG 26
––––––––17––––––––
Dayfighters book 001-029 revise
6/7/11
18:31
Page 18
DAY FIGHTERS IN DEFENCE OF THE REICH
Oblt. Kurt Kranefeld (III./JG 26) cruises over the Belgian countryside in his ‘Black 11’ in late 1942 or early 1943. The Kanalgeschwader had many tasks in addition to bomber interceptions, including routine patrols. (Meyer)
9 October – Lille (see map) 8th Air Force VIII BC Mission #14: 79 of 108 B-17s and B24s bomb Lille industrial area, TOT 1025-31 – lose 4-246, claim 25-38-44. 30 sqds of RAF Spitfires claim 5-1-3, lose 1. 3 sqds US P-38s claim 0, lose 0-0-1; 3 sqds US Spitfires claim 0, lose 0.
The VIII BC sortied more than 100 bombers for the first time. Their target was the Lille industrial area. The escort plan dispensed with close escort in favour of a complex scheme of sweeps and diversions, utilising 36 squadrons of Allied fighters. Hptm. Priller’s III./JG 26, which led the defensive effort, encountered none of the Allied fighters and was able to attack the bombers repeatedly. The Gruppe claimed five B-17s and one B-24, matching the number of bombers lost over France or scrapped on their return to England. This was the greatest success yet against the American heavy bombers. One III./JG 26 pilot was lost to bomber fire; one III./JG 2 pilot was lost at sea under unknown circumstances.
COMBAT REPORT1 9 October 1942 One B-17 Fortress shot down at 1045 hours, E of Lille–Vendeville airfield [Stammberger’s victim was Capt. Olson’s 306th Bomb Group B-17: DC] This was the period in which we dispersed to small fields every evening from our operational bases because British commando attacks were expected. My Staffel had not returned from Moorsele to Wevelghem when I was ordered to lead a scramble. We were to climb in the direction of St. Omer. We were not able to assemble as planned, because we sighted a large swarm of bumblebees [heavy bombers] only three or four kilometres from St. Omer. There was no sign of a proper formation; they were at three levels up to 6,000 metres, but the individual vees were scattered. Above them were fighter condensation trails. The bombers flew just west of Lille and made a sharp left turn before we could get there. I finally reached height and position. We approached the individual vees in pairs and attacked like wild men: approach from behind, full throttle and dive away. The bombers grew larger and larger, and all our
––––––––18––––––––