Chapter 2
Mobilization and Deployment
U
nlike Thatcher’s government, which seemed paralyzed in their slow appreciation of the situation and decision-making during March, the British military had been leaning forward. Getting logistics pieces in place would be key to sustaining any task force. Admiral Leach might have been waiting for a green light to mobilize troops, but he and some of his colleagues had not waited to make the first moves in what would become an important logistics backbone for the war. Discussions had already started about what to do. Then, when the invasion happened and Parliament backed Thatcher’s decision to launch a task force, a series of simultaneous activities commenced immediately that remains without parallel in modern force projection. Britain’s response was swift, decisive and, although surely confusing at times, very effective. It was also noticeable immediately in cities and towns. People no sooner had read newspaper headlines on the morning of 2 April about an imminent invasion than they started witnessing hubs of activity in many places. That mobilization remains one of the greatest strategic achievements of the war because it enabled everything that followed. It all started rather discretely and involved many organizations working quickly and together. At the time, Britain’s lone ship in the South Atlantic, Endurance, only had provisions to last another three weeks. On 27 March, the RFA tanker Appleleaf, then bound from Curaçao to the United Kingdom with a full load of fuel, received orders to divert to Gibraltar, to embark general stores and then to head south. Two days later, the RFA stores ship Fort Austin received similar orders. Both ships sailed packed with supplies not just for Endurance but also as contingency for other ships that might follow and need support. Appleleaf and Fort Austin became the first pieces in a logistics backbone at sea between the United Kingdom and the Falklands that would strengthen