PHR Fall 2014

Penn History Review Journal of Undergraduate Historians Volume 21, Issue 2 Fall 2014

Tomas E. Piedrahita

on Argentine Perspectives on the Spanish Civil War

Matthew Rublin

on Cárdenas Policy towards Spain from 1936-1940

Sarah A. Sadlier

on U.S. Perceptions of Simón Bolívar

Penn History Review Journal of Undergraduate Historians Volume 21, Issue 2 Fall 2014 Editor-in-Chief Gregory Segal 2015, American History

Associate Editors-in-Chief Jackson Kulas 2015, American History Elizabeth Vaziri 2015, European History

Editorial Board Leila Ehsan 2015, Diplomatic History Kate Campbell 2016, Intellectual History Aaron Elkin 2016, Diplomatic History Taylor Evensen 2016, Diplomatic History Aaron Mandelbaum 2017, American History

ABOUT THE REVIEW Founded in 1991, the Penn History Review is a journal for undergraduate historical research. Published twice a year through the Department of History, the journal is a non-profit publication produced by and primarily for undergraduates. The editorial board of the Review is dedicated to publishing the most original and scholarly research submitted for our consideration. For more information about submissions, please contact us at phrsubmissions@gmail.com.

Funding for this magazine provided by the Department of History, University of Pennsylvania.

Cover image: Pedro José Figueroa, Simón Bolívar: Libertador de Colombia. 1819, oil on canvas, 97x 75.5cm. Colección Banco de la República, Bogotá, Colombia.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permissions in writing. The authors and artists who submit their works to Penn History Review retain all rights to their work.

Copyright © 2014

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Penn History Review Volume 21, Issue 2 Fall 2014 Contents: Letter from the Editor........................................................6 In Defense of Our Brothers’ Cause: Argentine Perspectives on the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 Tomas E. Piedrahita.............................................................8 Everything Necessary: An Examination of the Cárdenas Policy toward the Spanish Civil War and the Spanish Refugee Crisis from 1936-1940 Matthew Rublin................................................................32 The Second “Great Experiment”?: U.S. Perceptions of Simón Bolívar the American Revolution’s Legacy in Latin America, 1808-1830 Sarah A. Sadlier, Stanford University..................................52

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Letter from the Editor

One of the most enriching parts of being on the Editorial Board of the Penn History Review is the chance to see the array of submissions we receive. This diversity is striking, from the time periods and regions that students choose to write about to the range of methods that authors use to make their arguments. With this in mind, one may be surprised to see that this issue of the PHR focuses on a single region; all three essays center around Latin America. This is by no means an accident. As we reviewed the many submissions we received this semester, we realized that the strongest essays had Latin American countries and figures as central protagonists. We believe that by publishing them together, each article can build upon the themes presented in the other pieces, and the nuances that make these essays so strong are far more apparent than if they had been published separately. We look forward to seeing future issues of the PHR concentrated on other regions or themes.

The publication begins with In Defense of Our Brothers’ Cause: Argentine Perspectives on the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, by Tomas E. Piedrahita. From the moment one begins to read Piedrahita’s piece, one sees the vivid tapestry he has created of Argentinian reactions to the Spanish Civil War. By interweaving developments on the domestic political stage to the reactions of Argentinian citizens, it is clear how deeply Argentina was tied to events taking place across the Atlantic.

Looking at Mexico in this same period, Matthew Rublin’s Everything Necessary: An Examination of the Cárdenas Policy towards the Spanish Civil War and the Spanish Refugee Crisis from 1936-1940 builds upon similar themes. While Rublin, like Piedrahita, studies how a Latin American country responded to the Spanish Civil War, a reader will be struck by how differently the two pieces read from one another. By focusing on the response of Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas to the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath, Rublin creates a fantastic portrait of this leader and his decision-making in a challenging moment.

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The final essay, The Second “Great Experiment”?: U.S. Perceptions of Simón Bolívar and the American Revolution’s Legacy in Latin America, 1808-1830, is written by Sarah A. Sadlier of Stanford University. In her piece, she offers a fascinating case study of evolving American diplomacy and self-conception in the early decades of U.S. history.

Sadlier uses the manners in which Bolívar was imagined and presented in the American press to study how the United States perceived the influence of the American Revolution on other countries. We are proud to include Sadlier’s work as the second external submission published in the PHR’s history.

This publication would not be what it is today without the advice and guidance of Dr. Thomas Max Safely, the Undergraduate Chair of the History Department, and Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the Undergraduate Advisor of the History Department. We must also thank the History Department as a whole and the University of Pennsylvania for their support of the Penn History Review and their continued commitment to undergraduate research and the study of history. In addition, we would like to note our appreciation for the faculty at other colleges and universities who circulated our call for submissions and helped make our efforts to publish an external submission a reality.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the entire Editorial Board for its hard work this semester. In particular, I must single out Jackson Kulas and Elizabeth Vaziri, who originated the role of Associate Editors-in-Chief this semester, a position that I believe will be expanded into the future due to the invaluable work they did this past semester. It was also a great pleasure to bring on two new members to the Editorial Board, Leila Ehsan and Kate Campbell, who were phenomenal additions to the team. Without a doubt, this publication is a testament to the dedication of each member of our Editorial Board.

Gregory W. Segal Editor-in-Chief

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Immigrants disembarking from a ship at Buenos Aires pier in the early twentieth century.

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Tomas E. Piedrahita

Argentine Perspectives on the Spanish Civil War

In Defense of Our Brothers’ Cause: Argentine Perspectives on the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 Tomas E. Piedrahita

There are few countries that, during the scope of the twentieth century, displayed so strong an affinity for their former colonizer as Argentina. The reasons behind this affinity are, to be sure, layered and complex. The substantial Spanish émigré population residing in the country surely played a role in increasing the frequency of contacts and deepening connections; in fact, by 1936 immigrated Spaniards may have comprised up to fifteen percent of Argentina’s population.1 But this alone does not account for the pervasive Spanish influences in Argentina’s cultural, literary, and artistic traditions, nor does it wholly explain the unending claims and references to Spain during the Spanish Civil War, a time of crisis and reshaping for both.

This paper aims to dissect Argentine writing on the Spanish Civil War. More specifically, it will examine the writings of poets, clergy, politicians, and intellectuals, among others, with an eye toward determining the motives behind comparisons to Spain.

The paper will endeavor to strike a balance between perspectives and capture as broad a range of positions as possible in an attempt to reflect the complexity of the relationship between the two countries. A brief dip into the politics of Argentina during the 1930s will give shape to the climate in which writing was taking place, and will be followed by an evaluation of Argentine claims to a shared cultural heritage. Finally, the paper will analyze the framing of the Spanish Civil war to identify continuities and departures across accounts.

While a number of historians have written on Argentina during the 1930s, there is little coverage of the Spanish Civil War as it was observed and understood through the eyes of

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Argentines. Most scholarship centers either on the ideological parallels between the two or the mobilization of political and cultural forces in Argentina in response to the war. Argentine scholar Ernesto Goldar, for example, explores the galvanizing effect the war had on cultural life in Buenos Aires, tracing in particular the proliferation of poetry. Argentine responses to the 1936 death of famed Spanish poet Federico García Lorca are also featured in Goldar’s work. Yet, both subjects consume only ten pages in the 240-page book, entitled Los Argentinos y La Guerra Civil Española.

Historian Niall Binns also examines Argentina’s responses to the Spanish Civil War, but his research outlines the mobilization of the left and right, consigning his work to realm of political history. Though some space is devoted to the responses of major Argentine newspapers, it is only in service to broader explorations. Likewise, scholar Mark Falcoff delves briefly into the cultural links between Spain and Argentina, laying emphasis on the ideological and political evolution of Argentina during the 1930s. While most scholars agree the HispanoArgentine connection ran peculiarly deep, little has been done to assess the particularities of this connection through the lens of Argentine writing. The question of what the domestic framing of the Spanish Civil War reveals about Argentines and their understanding of conditions within and without their borders is one that has been seldom addressed.

My argument rests on two assertions. First, I will argue Argentines saw the Spanish Civil War as a direct reflection of their own struggles and so put pen to paper to make sense of this reflection. Second, I will argue the framing of the war spoke more to the tensions of Argentina than the actualities of the civil war in Spain. A brief detour into the political climate of Argentina during the time will contextualize my argument and give shape to Argentina’s sociopolitical zeitgeist.

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The Political Climate in Argentina During the 1930s At the start of the Spanish Civil War, Argentina was experiencing strong currents of change. From September 6, 1930, to February 20, 1932, the country had been governed by Jose Felix Benito Uriburu, a heavy-handed Argentine Army General who spearheaded the military coup that in 1930 resulted in the ousting of President Hipólito Yrigoyen, a noted progressive and co-founder of the Radical Civic Union (RCU). In November of 1931, under the aegis of Uriburu’s administration and as a result of voting corruption, Augusto P. Justo was elected President.

Serving from 1932 until 1938, Justo ushered in a wave of conservative policies and positions that marked a sharp departure from the political ethos of preceding years. Thus began the Década Infame, a period between 1930 and 1943 that saw political tumult, widespread corruption, financial instability, and a cultural reshaping that permanently recast Argentina’s identity.

The years before General Uriburu’s coup were marked by remarkable progressivism in Argentina. Prior to the presidency of Yrigoyen, Argentina had seen tremendous economic growth under the tenure of presidents whose administrations took a decidedly conservative bent in later years. President Yrigoyen, branding himself a “man of people,”2 captured the presidency in 1916 and implemented policies that strengthened the immigrant middle class, secured universal male suffrage, increased employment, and more generally projected a sense of “integrity and democracy” that captured the hearts and minds of working Argentines.3 His party, the Radical Civic Union, also gained in power and influence, sparking a consolidation of previously fragmented conservative forces that viewed the rise of a “reformist democracy” with a wary eye.4 Despite Yrigoyen’s broad appeal and popular initiatives, enthusiasm for his administration began to wane in the wake of the 1929 global economic crisis. Argentina’s most prominent newspapers grew highly critical of Yrigoyen, and there was a pervasive sense that the aged President was losing control of his administration.5 Penn History Review

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This, coupled with the coalescing and renewed vigor among rightwing groups, gave rise to exchanges with the army that carried out the 1930 coup.6 Yet the reemergence of conservatism in Argentina was neither swift nor smooth. Conservative groups had exerted considerable influence during the early twentieth century, and opposition to progressivism had been taking root in the years preceding the 1930 coup.7 But much of the right wing still found itself fragmented and amorphous at the start of the 1930s.

After taking office, President Augustin Justo distanced himself from Uriburu on account of the latter’s strong nationalist and corporatist tendencies.8 A new right and an old right also concretized during this time, which temporarily combined to advance their shared agendas. The old right, embodied in the Partido Demócrata Nacional, represented the most prominent landed Argentine families, protecting them with policies and directives that fostered a perverse oligarchical liberalism which had characterized early twentieth century Argentina and resulted in the country’s economic ascendancy. 9 The budding Nacionalistas, by contrast, appealed to urban centers and middle class workers, many of whom were drawn to the party’s calls for renewed patriotism and corporatism.10 However, these two camps encompassed even smaller and more specialized political subgroups, which had a fissiparous effect on the right during the 1930s.

President Justo devised and endorsed policies that were at variance with those the country had seen under Yrigoyen’s tenure. There was, therefore, a general perception among Argentines that conservatives represented the landed elite, whereas members of the RCU incarnated the interests of the burgeoning middle and working classes – a view vindicated by congressional voting records of the 1930s, which indicate consistent conservative opposition to programs impacting the middle and lower classes.11 It was as if the “workers and farmers, small merchants, industrialists and land owners” had been pit 12

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HipĂłlito Yrigoyen

against a regime intent on promoting oligarchies, catering to the rich, and chipping at the influence of the working classes.12 There is, in short, no doubt that class tensions were amplified in the 1930s, with rigged elections, unpopular domestic policies, and a lagging economy fueling discontent in various quarters.

Apart from a changing and increasingly tense political climate, the economic landscape was also dramatically shifted during this time. For much of the 1930s, Argentina was plagued by the scourge of economic contractions, a condition exacerbated by the chilling of relations with Great Britain, its principal trading partner. In 1933, President Justo signed the first of what would be two lopsided accords with the British, both of which embittered Argentines, who resented what they perceived as being “degrading� arrangements.13 Apart from stoking discontent, these pacts also led to an increasing emphasis on import-substitution industrialization,14 which expanded Penn History Review

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domestic industries and diversified product lines.15 Though Argentina rebounded comparatively quickly from the 1929 crisis, Justo’s accords with British reshaped what had historically been an export-led economy and deepened Argentina’s self-image crisis.

The push-and-pull between conservatives and leftists engulfed the whole of the country, making for a particularly fruitful period of writing. Publications of all stripes sprouted across provinces, with the Argentine intelligentsia writing even more prolifically after the start of the Spanish Civil War. Public disaffection with the Justo, and later President Ortiz, grew markedly during the decade, and the sharp political reversals triggered by General Uriburu’s coup jolted both liberals and conservatives into action. The following accounts lend insight into the nature of this mobilization and the decidedly cultural form it assumed.

A Shared Cultural Heritage Though the perspectives of the educational elite may not accurately capture the grievances and sentiments of all societal rungs in Argentina, they still give shape and substance to the era’s zeitgeist, especially given that much of their writing was published in venues with sizable readerships. More important for the purposes of this examination, however, is the recognition that the dire political situation in Argentina temporally aligned with the turmoil in Spain, sparking an intense vicarious investment in the outcome of Spanish Civil War –– a crisis which would, in the eyes of many, carry profound implications for the identity of Argentina.

One open letter, signed by a number of prominent Argentine writers and penned August 1, 1936, was directed to the Spanish ambassador, and it lamented the bloody civil war of a country intimately bound to Argentina. “Their conflicts,” they wrote, “reverberate in Argentina with greater intensity than those of any other country in the world.”16 Describing the 14

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Spanish as “brothers,” the authors – which included Jorge L. Borges, Alberto Gerchunoff, and other luminaries – affirmed their support for the Republican cause “that today defends the government of their homeland.”17 Exhorting the ambassador to side with those fighting for democracy, the authors also stressed the civil war had extended into “homes” of Argentina; that is, it stirred and perturbed the population as if it the battles were taking place within its own borders.18 From the beginning of the war, then, the Argentine intelligentsia was seen couching their message in a language that subtly emphasized the cultural stakes for the country.

A mere thirteen days later, another open letter, published in the same newspaper but signed by twice as many Argentines, articulated more specific grievances. While not explicitly affirming their support for Franco, this letter constituted a direct anti-republican challenge to Argentine intellectuals who had penned the August 1st letter in the same publication. In it, the authors decried the destruction of art and churches and denounced “[the] cruelties … being perpetrated by the parties of the communist republic.”19 The authors also lamented the threats on the life of the Argentine ambassador to Spain20 and made no pretenses of paternalism. Instead, they called for civility in the face of conflict and placed their sympathy with those who “restore the nationality, the religion and the glorious tradition of their homeland.”21 Their emphasis on “glorious” traditions hints at the perceived cultural implications for Argentina, which, if not an equal, at least viewed itself an heir to Spanish culture.

This last notion is evoked explicitly and implicitly in a number of written accounts. Take, for instance, Leonilda Barrancos de Bermann, a spirited political activist in Argentina and wife of famed doctor-turned-intellectual Gregorio Bermann.

In an interview for Crítica, a widely circulated Argentine newspaper,22 Barrancos highlighted the Argentine affinity for Spain: “Those of us who, over the course of several Argentine generations, feel our native blood … know instinctively who Penn History Review

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actually defends the traditions, history, and culture of Spain. We side with those intellectuals who … have made the proletarian cause their own.”23 We see, then, not only an invocation of proletarian solidarity, but an explicit appeal to the understanding that Argentina is an inheritor of the trappings and traditions of Spain. In like manner, Samuel Eichelbaum, a leading Argentine playwright and writer, warned in 1936 that ““the fate of the Hispanic culture”24 was in the hands of those fighting in Spain.

“If they don’t triumph,” he cautioned, “Spain and the Hispanic countries will sink in a retrogradation that will destroy all that which is vital to our culture.”25 Not all appeals to a shared cultural heritage were as explicit. In a 1936 article, Argentine Senator Mario Bravo, a noted orator and progressive within the Senate, spoke of a changed hispanoamericanism, that is, of a warmed relationship between Spain and former colonies –– not just Argentina. According to Bravo, this relationship had called forth “that which is most sacred to the liberty and dignity of man..”26 Archaic notions of Hispanic exceptionalism and of an exalted language had been superseded by an “hispanoamericanism” stressing “the solidarity of class [economic] interests … [and] the liberty of those who are oppressed.”27 Similarly, Rosa Bazán de Cámara, a prominent Argentine professor and feminist, wrote romantically of Spanish Civil War without drawing a direct comparison to Argentina. She described the essence of Spain as having a “purity,” or being impregnable to the coming and passing tides of change28 –– the implication being that perhaps Argentina was subjecting itself to unwanted transformations. Her message was couched in terms of a conscious and enduring Spanish volition: “If other countries have accepted changes that have altered the basis of their essence, Spain has not accepted them … [i]t is Spain, with its history, its tradition, its culture, that is to say, Spain in body and soul, that in these moments is battling between life and death….”29 Catholic intellectuals also invoked Spain’s grandeur in 16

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their formulations. Apart from fostering close ties to Justo’s administration, most clergy openly supported Franco’s regime through a host of publications, penning articles with sharp nationalist and antiliberal overtones.30 Shortly after the start of the civil war, for example, a number of prominent Catholic intellectuals authored a manifesto in which they condemned Spanish Republicans and saluted those fighting “heroically … for their fatherland’s nationality, religion, and glorious traditions.”31 Particularly interesting to note here is that both camps were seen stressing their ties to madre patria, meaning that appeals to Spain’s history and grandeur were able to accommodate disparate messages – that is, to fit the rhetoric of conservative and liberal Argentines alike without posing any direct contradictions.

Francisco Luis Bernádez and Alfonso Durán are two conservative Franco sympathizers who are illustrative of this last point. Bernádez, a noted Argentine poet and reporter, published a review for a book in Crisol, a small newspaper notorious for its biting prose, in December of 1936.32 One passage of the review contained references to “an Argentina founded on the Crucifix and the sword,” terms which figured prominently in the rhetoric of Franquistas.33 The reference to the cross was surely a nod to the Catholic tradition in Spain, and the reference to the sword conjures Spain’s storied medieval incarnation. In response to those claiming the Spanish Civil War was running too long, Durán, a conservative priest and writer, compared the conflict to the American Civil War and then asked in 1938: “Why must one say that this Spanish war has run long, when it attempts to save not two million men, but twenty-five million Spanish men and their glory, their tradition, their religion, their catechism, their art, and their soul and flag?”34 Indeed, the symbolic importance the war carried for Argentines cannot be understated.

The centrality of the Spanish Civil War in Argentina, particularly among the country’s intelligentsia, bespeaks of the narrative-forming capacity the outcome of the war was thought to hold. In other words, Spain’s emergence, either as democracy Penn History Review

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or fascist state, would have a profound impact on Argentina’s self-conception, a country facing its own crises in the 1930s but also long thought to have been the torchbearer of prosperity, modernization, and Spanish culture in South America. Indeed, claims to madre patria abounded, with intellectuals of all persuasions jostling to declare allegiance to Spain. Little, however, was established in these discussions, with the engagements serving more as a sort of exercise for Argentina, one in which intellectuals and politicians could, implicitly, outline the way in which culture was informed by the politics of their own soil.

A War for Civilization

As previously explored, Argentina’s political scene was undergoing its own transformations during the Década Infame.

The ascendancy of conservatism and relegation of progressivism gave way to latent class tensions. In addition, both liberals and conservatives had begun casting Argentina in their own light, evincing profound differences in the values held across parties but also similarities in what each thought would appeal to the public. Spain had experienced comparable political turmoil during the 1920s and early 30s, and so there was a natural inclination on the part of Argentines to draw parallels, which took on distinct cultural, political, and ideological forms. In the process, Argentines sought to determine the significance of the war in the context of their own country. For much of Argentina, the triumph of one party wouldn’t just signal an ideological victory; it would mark a paradigmatic shift in the world’s conception of living and civilization.

Take, for instance, the year 1936, when the Argentine Congress passed a number of reactionary bills, among which was a bill that sought to suppress communist activities. Proposed by the Justo administration, the bill was broadly aimed at curbing free speech and imposing harsh sanctions for those suspected of being affiliated with communism. It sparked heated exchanges between congressional members, some of whom made reference 18

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to the turmoil in Spain as an example of what would happen in Argentina. One such member, conservative Senator Matías Sánchez Sorondo, who was also the bill’s principal spokesperson, pointed to the effect communism had on Spain: “Moscow’s will, never flagging and even reinforced by a global revolution, has carried out in the Spanish example. Those who prefer not to listen or witness should not lament the consequences.”35 Sorondo claimed Spain was combating the presence of “barbarians,” and “saving with the heritage of civilization with blood and pain.”36 His references to “heritage” and “civilization” implied the war concerned more than just ideology; it was about the preservation of a cherished heritage, one that Argentina also bore on its shoulders. Sorondo used the “Spanish example” to draw a direct parallel to Argentina, suggesting present conditions in the latter were not only comparable to those in Spain, but that they would yield same fate if the country did not eradicate communists with the passage of the proposed bill.

The notion that the Spanish Civil War carried ideological implications beyond its own borders is also seen in the accounts of Colonel Carlos Gómez, who at the time was a retired professor of La Escuela Superior de Guerra, a military academy in Argentina.

Of his many articles, most of which focused on evaluating the military strategy of the Spanish Civil War, one in particular, titled “The Spanish War and the State of International Affairs,” discusses the significance of the conflict in the context of global affairs. He writes: It had been a while since the world had last seen a crisis in international relations so acute as the one we are presently witnessing … But the actual Spanish war is about the clashing of two ideologies, fundamentally opposed and irreconcilable, that divide, not just Spain, but the people of many countries, threatening to extend to the entire inhabited world; and we don’t say “civilized” because the ideological battle has been carried, from one Penn History Review

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place, to even those peoples with the most rudimentary cultures..37 Gómez’s perspective is telling in that he thought the Spanish Civil War was of “global interest.”38 Implicit in his account is the assumption that the clashing of two ideologies in Spain would be encompassing or, at the very least, emblematic of the ideological dichotomies elsewhere – Argentina included. To some, then, the universality of the war was clear.

Enrique Dickmann, a Jewish doctor, author, and congressional legislator in Argentina, shared in this view.

At the height of Spanish Civil War, he proposed passing a congressional declaration that expressed Argentine support for the establishment of a democracy in Spain.39 After conservatives emptied from the chamber upon hearing his proposal, he decried neutrality and noted the hypocrisy of those who were “a democrat in his own country and a fascist internationally.”40 A similar but more expansive view is seen in an article Dickmann wrote for Revista Socialista in September of 1937. The article, couched in romanticism, discusses the battle between fascism and democracy, with references to “the free men of the world” and the “universal and eternal transcendence” of the war.41 Dickmann suggests the war’s “consequences are projected in time and space; because in [Spain’s] civil war, two utterly clear conceptions of man in society, of government, of human material and mental progress, of social justice, have been polarized.”42

Argentine newspapers cast the war in even broader terms, that is, as having implications for civilization and humanity.

Crítica, for example, affirmed its support for the Republican cause in a 1936 editorial entitled “Why we are with Spain.” “All that which stands for spiritual, social, and political progress,” the article reads, “has been incorporated into the world’s culture, over these past two centuries, is at jeopardy in Spain.”43 The piece ends by noting socialists were shouldering “the cause of civilization and of justice,”44 an utterance which echoes 20

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Dickmann’s pronouncements. Relatedly, Guillermo Delgado, a medical student and Argentine activist, wrote in Córdoba, a provincial Argentine newspaper: “The potential of youth, the potential of humanity which is now being put into action, today uplift an invincible Spain that presages a new era in the history of civilization.”45

La Fronda, a conservative Argentine newspaper founded and run by a cousin of General Uriburu, took part in the same brand of sensationalism. In an article entitled “Civilization or Barbarism,” the paper discussed the two perspectives taking root in periodicals across the country. On one end, sensationalism characterized the prose of some publications, and on the other, venues were declaring a disingenuous neutrality toward the war.

To the latter, the paper responded: “But that is a great hypocrisy … The battles of Spain transcend its frontiers and affect the future of political civilization in Europe and the Americas.”46 A Social War By way of contrast, El Mundo, a left-leaning Argentine newspaper publishing in Buenos Aires, framed the civil war not as concerning civilization per se, but as relating to the social order.

One article in particular, detailing the arrival of Republican troops in Madrid, discussed the rising tensions coursing through “coffee shops” and “stores” in Argentina.47 “Spain has been – is currently – the site of the first social war in history. The ideas and sociological theories most contemporary and ancient – communism and fascism – the conception of a better world, brandish at this hour the arguments of canons, grenades, tanks, planes….”48 Though the battle between ideologies is still reduced to fascism and democracy, the more expansive references to a social war invoke the notion of class divisions, particularly divisions as emanating from ideological differences. While surely the Spanish Civil War concerned class to a great extent, it was not its principal concern. The newspaper’s characterization, then, reflects more directly on the way in which conditions in Penn History Review

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Argentina were coloring perceptions of the war.

This last point rests on the assumption that the manner in which a subject is discussed can say more those discussing it than of the subject itself –– a phenomenon that can be observed firsthand in the previous article. The article notes, for instance, that the debates “about the moving tragedy of Spain” taking place on the streets of Buenos Aires contained no shortage of individuals “who boasted historical erudition and true comprehension of social theories....”49 There was, then, a perception that Argentines not only understood the war in Spain, but could also make sense of the competing social visions at stake, an observation indicating that this was a topic widely discussed among citizens. In consequence, El Mundo’s framing of the Spanish Civil War as a social war says more of Buenos Aires than Madrid.

Carlos Ibarguren, an eminent Argentine intellectual and politician, believed mainstream discussions of the Spanish Civil War were misplaced. Refraining from lofty references to civilization and humanity, Ibarguren instead commented on the war’s potential to alter the “systems” of countries.50 In particular, he posited the “politico-social” organization would be changed such that collectivism would reign supreme, suffocating individualism and democracy in the process. This perspective stems in part from the author’s thinking that “nationalism” would take the place of “internationalism, [largely] because Spain is a deeply traditional and profoundly religious nation.” He finishes, “a social war is the threat from which Europe now suffers.”51 Ibarguren is thus more specific in his articulation of the stakes and transformations attendant on the war, stressing, as with El Mundo, the social dimensions.

Nicolás Repetto, a medical student and affiliate of the Socialist party,52 took to writing about the significance of the Spanish Civil War in La Vanguardia, a Socialist Argentine newspaper. His elegant articulation of Argentina’s affinity for Spain gives substance to the complexity of the relationship, and 22

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it contrasts from previous accounts in that it outlines Argentina’s own troubles: If one analyzes superficially and extracts hasty conclusions from certain events taking place in our country and the rest of the world, one necessarily arrives at discouraging findings. Within our country we see strength, injustice and fraud ingrained; Outside of our country shocking governmental mechanisms affirm and extend themselves in such way that they stand as the absolute negation of all that which had been heretofore considered essential and irreplaceable in the political life of nations.53 The war, according to Repetto, had resulted in an especially troubling realization for Argentina. It meant, in particular, that virtually all that which the country held dear in “political life” was being put to test abroad, prompting the recognition that whatever happened in Spain would likely presage Argentina’s own fate.

Distancing, Detachment, and Reductionism Not all periodicals subscribed to such reductionism, however. La Nación, one of Argentina’s largest and arguably most influential newspapers, lamented what it saw as passive participation in discussions of ideology. In a biting 1937 editorial, the paper sardonically noted the country’s unending obsession with politics, proceeding then to lambast the ideological reductionism: “the people whom we have considered intelligent as a result our great naiveté – and what is most disconcerting of all, is that they often are intelligent – can’t possibly comprehend that a person chooses not to belong to the left or right, as if there were no alternatives, as if sensibility and intellect were incapable of situating themselves among other latitudes.”54 The act of independent thinking, they wrote, was lost in favor of adopting popular ideological positions, especially and most paradoxically Penn History Review

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among intellectuals.55

La Prensa, another prominent Argentine newspaper, took a similar but differently angled position on the war. Reflecting on the second anniversary of the civil war, the newspaper published an editorial in which it described the conflict as one “difficult to define or classify, because interventions of other countries have complicated and bestowed it with the character of a global war….” It was difficult, therefore, to see the distinctly Spanish character of the war; it concerned, according to the paper, the grandchildren “of those who, over the course of several centuries, gave glory to Spain and made it master of half the world.” Spaniards could not resolve it from the interventions and recommendations of other countries. “Such circumstances,” they wrote “prevent one from clearly seeing the genuinely Spanish character of this war.”56

Some in Argentina more explicitly distanced themselves from the Spanish Civil War, though they were by all means in the minority. Manuel Ugarte, a noted author and Socialist Party adherent, is one such person. In October of 1936, he founded Vida de Hoy, a magazine that sought to foster a “hispanoamericansim”57 independent of Spain and other European countries. On the subject of the Spanish Civil War, he urged detachment: “It is not possible to comprehend, nor to justify within the bounds of logic, those feelings stirred up within us, alongside tinges of colonialism, every time the interests of others are at stake. Unfortunately, such was the case in the war of 1914 and such threatens to be the case now … Let’s think of ourselves now, without having news cables dictate hatred or sympathy; let us discard intellectual bellicosities and the mobilizations of masses that participate instinctively. The real Argentinean, the authentic Argentinean, has no motive to fuel the fire … and has even less motive to carry over to this continent the agitations of a civilization which kills itself.58 24

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Original headquarters of La Nación, Argentina’s most prominent newspaper during the twentieth century.

This call for detachment demonstrates the degree to which Argentines were following developments in Spain, but it also speaks to the emotional investment Argentines were placing in the outcome of the war.

The Argentine newspaper Córdoba also called for detachment, though less explicitly than Ugarte. The Spanish Civil War was, according to an editorial published in 1936, “in the end, the European war.” It concerned the vitality of capitalism in Germany, Italy, England, and France, and was launched by

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those seeking to “europeanize nations.” The editorial thus deemphasized the implications the war would carry for Argentina, which was mostly insulated from the dynamics of European politics. The article finishes with a touch of fatalism: “Let us not delude ourselves. The conflagration is now a given.”59 Conclusion The cultural bridge between Spain and Argentina was inexplicably strong. So much so, in fact, that the pains and passions attendant on the civil war were said to have been felt with special force in the former colony. In spite of these professed ties to madre patria, however, Argentine claims to a shared cultural heritage may have been rooted more in romanticism than reality, with the desire to affirm Argentina’s exceptionalism and Hispanic otherness, especially in the wake of the 1930 coup, driving such claims. There was, moreover, something to be gained from associations with Spain: in drawing links to its former colonizer, organizations could broaden their appeal and legitimize their functions. If we stand as the continuation of something Spanish –– the thinking might have gone –– we can claim to be participating in a historical and identity-shaping movement.

This last point hinges on the assumption that Argentina was experiencing an identity crisis, a lofty but otherwise defensible assertion in light of the foregoing exploration. The variety of references to Spain, coupled with the remarkable diversity of perspectives on the war, indicates that Argentines were trying to make sense of their ties to Spain. Many of the previous accounts emphasized notions of culture, history, and tradition – all elements of national identity – suggesting they were truly at the fore of national consciousness in Argentina during the 30s.

Identity crisis aside, one cannot also understate the degree to which Argentines expressed disaffection with President Justo and later Ortiz, both for their fraudulent political victories but also for their undoing of Yrigoyen’s initiatives. Spaniards 26

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had experienced a similar disaffection in previous years, and so Argentines pointed to the turmoil in Spain to suggest a comparability of conditions. In other words, Argentines articulating the stakes, contingencies, and circumstances of the war in Spain were, implicitly, doing the same for Argentina –– almost as if in anticipation of upheaval. There was, in the eyes of some, no reason why the Spanish Civil War could not spell Argentina’s own future.

This discussion also extends to the disparate framing of the Spanish Civil War, which is unique for two reasons. First, it means reporting on Spain was communicating vastly different conceptions of the war. Second, it suggests the war was being refashioned to suit particular narratives, a task necessitating some degree of distortion and exaggeration. It is precisely for this reason one observes Argentines framing the war as one for humanity, culture, and civilization. And it also for this reason the realities of the war may have been lost in the process, reflecting instead the tensions of Argentina and the ways in which those tensions were shaping collective understandings of wartime conditions in madre patria. Spain was, to be sure, a puppet in the hands of some.

Mark Falcoff, “Argentina,” in The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives, ed. Mark Falcoff and Frederick B. Pike (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 291.

2 Sandra McGee Deutsch, “The Right under Radicalism, 1916 – 1930,” in The Argentine Right: Its History and Intellectual Origins, 1910 to the Present, ed. Sandra McGee Deutsch and Ronald H. Dolkart (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1993), 37.

3 Ibid. 48.

4 Ibid. 37.

5 Jorge A. Nállim, Transformations and Crisis of Liberalism in Argentina, 1930 – 1955 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg 1

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Press, 2012), 33.

6 Ibid.

7 Deutsch, “Radicalism,” 50.

8 Mario Rapoport, Historia económica, política y social de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Primera Clase Impresores, 2006), 198.

9 Ronald H. Dolkart, “The Right in the Década Infame, 1930 – 1943,” The Argentine Right: Its History and Intellectual Origins, 1910 to the Present, ed. Sandra McGee Deutsch and Ronald H. Dolkart (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1993), 65.

10 Ibid.

11 Richard J. Walter, “Politics, Parties, and Elections in Argentina’s Province of Buenos Aires, 1912-42,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 64 (1984): 717.

12 Tulio Hl. Donghi, La Argentina y La Tormenta del Mundo: Ideas e ideologías entre 1930 y 1945 (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores Argentina, 2003), 53.

13 Sandra McGee Deutsch, The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890 – 1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) 205.

14 Ibid.

15 Rapoport, Historia económica, 215.

16 Enrique Amorim et al., “Mensaje de los escritores de la Argentina,” El Mundo, August 1, 1936, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 816.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Carlos Ibarguren et al., “Provoca la protesta de escritores argentinos la situación de España,” El Mundo, August 14, 1936, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp.

Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 817.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Daniel Gutman, “Hace 90 años ‘Critica’ salia a renovar la Prensa argentina,” Clarín, September 15, 2003, accessed April 28

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6, 2014, http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2003/09/15/s-04901. htm.

23 “El drama de España visto desde la Argentina,” Critíca, September 8, 1936, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 133.

24 Samuel Eichelbaum, “Lo que opinan sobre la Guerra civil de España los delegados del Primer Congreso de Escritores,” Galicia, November 22, 1936, in Argentina y la guerra civil española.

La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 265.

25 Ibid.

26 Mario Bravo, “Hoy, y solamente hoy, España ha entrado en nuestro corazón,” Córdoba, October 27, 1936, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 163.

27 Ibid.

28 “Qué piense usted de la situation actual de España,” Vida de Hoy, November 2, 1936, in Argentina y la guerra civil española.

La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 135.

29 Ibid.

30 Jorge A. Nállim, Transformations and Crisis of Liberalism in Argentina, 1930-1955 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 49.

31 Quoted in Jorge A. Nállim, Transformations and Crisis of Liberalism in Argentina, 1930-1955 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 49.

32 Niall Binns, Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 145.

33 Quoted in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 145.

34 Quoted in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., Penn History Review

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2012), 255.

35 Congreso de la Nación Argentina, Represion de Actividades Comunistas, December 4, 1936, 134.

36 Ibid.

37 Carlos A. Gómez, La Guerra de España: Comentarios Publicados en “La Nación” (Buenos Aires: Tomo Primero, 1939), 93.

38 Ibid.

39 Binns, La voz de los intelectuales, 250.

40 Quoted in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 250.

41 “El caso de España. Democracia y dictadura,” Revista Social, September, 1937, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 251.

42 Ibid.

43 “Por qué estamos con España,” Crítica, September 2, 1936, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp.

Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 232.

44 Ibid.

45 “La cultura en el pueblo,” Córdoba, October 12, 1937, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp.

Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 245.

46 “Civilización o barbarie,” La Fronda, August 9, 1936, Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 431.

47 “La emoción de Buenos Aires ante la anunciada caída de Madrid,” El Mundo, November 8, 1936, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 268.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid. 269.

50 Carlos Ibarguren, “La guerra social es la actual amenza que sufre Europa, dice el publicist Carlos Ibarguren,” Los Andes, August 28, 1936, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los 30

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intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 406.

51 Ibid.

52 Nicolás Repetto, “España y la República. No es un esfuerzo estéril la defense heroica,” La Vanguardia, May 1, 1938, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp.

Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 680.

53 Ibid. 681.

54 “El mal del siglo,” La Nación, February 21, 1937, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 347.

55 Ibid.

56 “Dos años de guerra en España,” La Prensa, July 17, 1938 in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp.

Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 440.

57 Binns, La voz de los intelectuales, 775.

58 Quoted in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 776.

59 Ibid.

Image Sources: Page 8: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3b/D%C3% A9barquement_d’immigrants_%C3%A0_la_Darse_Sud._Port_de_Buenos_ Aires.jpg Page 13: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f7/Yrigoyen_ en_ventanilla_del_ferrocarril_viaje_a_Santa_Fe_campa%C3%B1a_ electoral_de_1926..jpg Page 25: http://wander-argentina.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/WAfloridast.-lanacionbuilding.jpg

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President Cรกrdenas and Spanish refugees in June 1937

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Everything Necessary: An Examination of the Cárdenas Policy towards the Spanish Civil War and the Spanish Refugee Crisis from 1936-1940 Matthew Rublin “They come and stand around you and talk; they argue among themselves in front of you: ‘Are we worse off here today than we might be in Spain?’”1 From 1937 to 1942, over five hundred thousand Spaniards left their homes and crossed the border into southern France. The atrocities of the Spanish Civil War and the harsh rhetoric of Francisco Franco against the Second Republic led republicans, those with republican family members, and even those suspected of ties with republicans to seek new lives elsewhere. Yet in escaping the potential dangers looming under Franco’s regime, these refugees found themselves immersed in an entirely new crisis: living for months, or sometimes years, in French concentration camps that lacked basic provisions, medical supplies and more, creating “a tragedy so immense that one hardly [saw] how to tackle it.”2 Nearly six thousand miles away, Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas desired to tackle this humanitarian crisis. A supporter of the Second Republic, Cárdenas kept himself apprised of the situation along the border and allocated tremendous resources towards facilitating the refugees’ emigration out of France and into Mexico.

Although much scholarly literature exists on Spanish emigration to Mexico during and after the Civil War, scholars have focused on these events primarily from the Spanish perspective: the details of how thirty thousand Spaniards arrived

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in Mexico between 1937-1945,3 their assimilation (or lack thereof) into Mexican society and institutions like el Colegio de México. A gap in the historiography emerges around the origins of this movement, specifically regarding the efforts of the Mexican government. Despite widespread opposition from both the Mexican population and other countries, President Cárdenas pledged his administration’s full support to the Spanish republicans. An analysis of his background, speeches, journal entries, and secondary sources reveals the ideological motives that prompted his assertion of a Mexican position independent from international opinion, leading him to be identified as “grand exile benefactor” by Aurelio Velázquez Hernández. 4 While Cárdenas intended for his nonconformist approach to aid the republicans, dissent—both domestic and international—as well as errors committed by his own administration ultimately prevented Mexico from providing adequate help to the Spanish republicans during the Civil War and the subsequent refugee crisis.

Cárdenas’s Ideology An analysis of Cárdenas’s approach towards the Second Republic requires not only context, but also an understanding of his ‘revolutionary’ ideology and its formation prior to his presidency. Born in 1895, Cárdenas’s modest upbringing in the state of Michoacán helped to shape his economic and political views. He experienced the economic struggle of the working class firsthand: his father died in 1911, leaving his mother with eight children to support and forcing the sixteen year-old Cárdenas to enter the labor force to help provide for the family.

Learning about Mexican history from Don Esteban Arteaga, a friend of his father’s, and his grandfather Francisco Cárdenas Pacheco (who had fought against the French imperialists in 1864), Cárdenas could hear how powerful interests had historically impeded the advancement of the working class to which his family belonged.5 Additionally, his teacher Don Hilario de Jesús

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Fajardo taught him about the fight for reform and the wrongs of intervention and imperialism.6 Outraged by the events of ‘La Decena Trágica,’ in which President Francisco Madero and Vice President José María Pino Suárez were both assassinated after a coup, Cárdenas joined the Mexican Revolution in 1913, serving under Venustiano Carranza and later Plutarco Elías Calles.7 He interpreted the Revolution as a “drive to improve” the cultural and economic conditions of ‘el pueblo mexicano’ through collective organization and use of natural resources.8 In his memoirs, Cárdenas wrote nostalgically about the other lessons passed to him by his teacher, Fajardo, about the importance of natural resources: “He allowed us to get to know the environment; he put special effort to talk to us about the trees, of their importance and of the care that we ought to provide them. This is the tree, he would tell us, the best friend of the children, which covers them with its shade, provides health, fruit, and in general enriches countries.”9 Fajardo, accordingly, influenced the young Cárdenas by providing an outlook that he maintained for the rest of his life.

Along with Fajardo’s lessons, Cárdenas’s nostalgia for his experiences working the land with his grandfather led him to view Mexican natural resources as the keys for the nation’s economic future. While Cárdenas also spoke of the importance of new industries, his writings elevated agricultural needs above everything else. His daily journal observations taken during his tour of Mexican towns and states as a 1934 presidential candidate reveal an overwhelming focus on spotting impediments to agricultural efficiency in these places (such as individualistic work systems and social vices like alcohol, which lowered worker productivity) and declaring possible solutions to them. As a candidate and admirer of agraristas de convicción (agrarians of conviction), he espoused some of these broader solutions in his Penn History Review

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proposed curriculum for Mexican schooling: educate the child to be in contact with the environment, as his own teacher had, and prepare him for collectivized agricultural work. The government, he believed, must take an active role in organizing production and distributing land to those working class individuals who would actually “take advantage of the natural resources and agricultural advantages offered by the country.”10 Although factories and new industries would surely help the country, Cárdenas believed that the primary solution to Mexican ‘problems’ (and a goal of the Revolution) rested with collectivized farming, which would maximize the usage of Mexican natural resources.

Yet in 1933 and 1934, Cárdenas grew frustrated with those in power as problems and revolutionary purposes continued to be ignored. The Constitution of 1917 had provided the foundation for future governments to reinforce state power over public life and avoid the corruption and foreign meddling that had characterized General Porfirio Díaz’s rule and led to his ultimate overthrow.11 However, according to T.G. Powell, many of the same issues merely remained unaddressed by subsequent presidents including Calles.12 Originally on good terms with Calles as a revolutionary comrade, Cárdenas believed that the Maximato13 constituted a retrocession as the government had not responded to what Cárdenas believed were the social needs of the workers and peasants.14 To Cárdenas, Calles and his supporters had violated the revolutionary cause: “The abandonment in which many towns live; the criminal apathy of many authorities and their lack of interest in resolving the fundamental problems that initiated the Revolution; the attitude of elements that call themselves revolutionaries yet sustain a conservative criteria…make me understand that my work will be difficult….But I have faith that I can resolve all of this in the support of the town and the confidence that I know inspires the country with my own actions.”15 36

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President Cárdenas wanted to revitalize the Mexican Revolution.

After winning the presidential election in 1934, Cárdenas sought to separate himself from the regression that he believed had occurred under his predecessors. By promising to inspire the nation with his “propios actos” (own actions), he portrayed himself as a savior-like figure, one who would redeem the Mexican working class and peasants by finally bringing the prosperity they had long desired during the Revolution. During his presidency, Cárdenas would extend this vision of himself beyond Mexico and to the Spanish republicans, many of whom shared attributes and ideals with the Mexican socioeconomic classes that Cárdenas had pledged to support.

Mexican Help to Republicans in the Spanish Civil War With the advent of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, Cárdenas was dismayed to see the Second Republic, which had echoed the themes of the Mexican Revolution, challenged by violent rebellion. Even before the outbreak of the Civil War,

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Spanish republicans and the Mexican Left had sympathized with each other. The establishment of the Second Republic in 1931 had prompted a new phase in diplomacy between the two countries with heightened bilateral relations, leading some historians to deem it a “honeymoon.”16 Much of this new diplomatic closeness can be attributed to similar domestic policy goals held by the Cárdenas administration and the Spanish Republic. On an individual level, Cárdenas, according to Margarita Carbó, believed that his working class interests coincided with those of Spanish republicans.17 Each promoted policies such as agrarian reform and secular education despite the objections of a powerful elite. Speaking one month after the Civil War’s start, Cárdenas proclaimed that the Spanish republicans faced “oppression by the privileged classes” for their policies, rhetoric that Cárdenas would likely have used for opponents of the Mexican Revolution as well.18 Accordingly, responding to a self-imposed rhetorical question about why Mexico was aiding the Second Republic, Cárdenas simply answered “solidaridad a su ideología” (solidarity with their ideology).19 Cárdenas likely related to the violent challenge that confronted the Second Republic, as he himself had joined the Mexican Revolution after witnessing the overthrow of the Madero government. In a letter he wrote after his presidency, Cárdenas described how aiding the Spanish republicans acted as a mechanism to show his solidarity with the democratic ideals they espoused.20 This sentiment also hints at the personal implications of the Mexican policy for Cárdenas: he may have felt personally attached to the Spanish republicans. Using his experiences with President Calles as a guide, anything other than full support for them and the working-class policies they represented would have constituted an immoral violation of loyalty to the cause they strived to realize.

In a similar manner, Cárdenas experienced a special kinship with the republicans due to a shared Hispanism. During and after his presidency, Cárdenas repeatedly invoked the 38

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responsibility that Mexicans held to fellow members of “la raza hispánica” (the Hispanic race). One month after the start of the Civil War, Cárdenas described Mexican help to the republicans as the nation’s “moral obligation” to those with both similar ideology and ‘blood.’21 References to ‘la raza’ (the race) as justification for republican aid crossed political lines in Mexico, providing Cárdenas and some of his conservative opponents a rare opportunity for agreement. These Mexican conservatives viewed the republicans as holding a Hispanism that united Spain and its former colonies. Through this unity, they believed, Spanish culture in Latin America would be revived, providing a bulwark against North American imperialism.22 Prompted by this strong bond, Cárdenas displayed a willingness to go to extreme lengths, both domestically and internationally, on behalf of the Spanish republican cause. While the overwhelming majority of countries publically declared neutrality (very few publically favored the Nationalists), the Mexican government became one of the only state-actors (and the only one in Latin America) to demonstrate public, enthusiastic support for the republicans. As Mexico facilitated arm shipments to republican forces as early as August 1936, foreign powers, according to Powell, “took a dim view of Cárdenas’s military assistance to the Republic and pressured [him] to keep this help to a minimum or to discontinue it altogether,” as it did not abide by the neutral stance held by much of the international community.23 From September 1936 to September 1937, however, Cárdenas continued to sell rifles, ammunition, mortars, and other pieces of military equipment to the republicans for a total of eight million pesos ($2.2 million).24 Cárdenas’s defiance of international pressure exacerbated existing perceptions of the Mexican government as overeager and somewhat immature to geopolitical powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom.25 Cárdenas proudly aggravated these governments on repeat occasions, framing himself in his writings as the one who would fight against imperial capitalism Penn History Review

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and protect the equality of nations.26 Already seething with resentment from Mexican economic nationalization, which had impeded the operations of private corporate enterprises based in their nations, foreign powers lacked incentive to work with a nation like Mexico on finding possible areas for agreement on the Civil War and the later refugee crisis.

Cárdenas’s administration further isolated itself diplomatically during the Spanish Civil War with its actions in the League of Nations. The nation formally entered a note on the Civil War to the organization in March 1937. In it, Cárdenas publically bashes the Non-Intervention Committee of the League of Nations for not punishing German and Italian aid to the Spanish Nationalists.27 The lack of punishment by the League, Cárdenas said, was “cruelly prolonging a fratricidal struggle” that threatened world peace.28 With this note, the Mexicans not only tried to defend their Spanish republican allies but also attempted to push members of the League towards noninterventionist promises that would protect nations like Mexico in the future from ‘capitalist imperialism.’

According to Powell, “The responses to Cárdenas’s appeal, when governments even bothered to give them, showed that Mexico remained thoroughly isolated in its Spanish policy.”29 England and France began refusing to discuss matters about Spain with the Mexicans. The Polish Under-Secretary of Foreign Relations, Count Schoenbeck, portrayed the Mexicans as hypocritical. In his view, the Mexicans criticized the German and Italian help to the Nationalists (and, subsequently, the League for not punishing such actions) while it provided monetary, military, and other war supplies to the republicans. Latin American nations, the majority of which had declared neutrality, simply rejected Mexico’s position without providing extensive justification. In the opinion of many League nations, Mexico’s public criticism of the organization overstepped its bounds and showed a lack of self-awareness on the part of the Cárdenas administration.

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even selfish would create a large gap between Mexico and the international community, one that would impede Cárdenas’s efforts later to garner help on behalf of the republican refugees.

Mexican Response to the Spanish Refugee Crisis With the Nationalists gaining territory and control in Spain during the latter half of the Civil War, those who aligned with the republican cause confronted an increasingly hopeless outcome.

As they crowded into the dwindling number of republican strongholds such as Catalonia, many realized that a Franco regime would simply present a new threat to their livelihoods, as he had publically pledged to extinguish any memories of the Republic. Moving north, hundreds of thousands of Spanish refugees clustered around the Spanish border with France. After enduring bitter conditions as they awaited French permission to enter, 514,337 Spanish republicans crossed the border.30 The majority of these refugees lived in camps with little access to adequate food, shelter, and medical provisions. Nancy Cunard, a British observer, reported that “some of the camps to which the Spanish refugees are going are not fit to receive human beings:” 1,500 wounded soldiers without any sanitary supplies, people lying in ditches without any protection from the rain, maltreatment from French guards.31 The republicans’ suffering continued with no end in sight, now in a new land.

Hearing of the crisis from Mexican Foreign Ministry officials in Europe, Cárdenas promised to provide everything necessary to ensure the safe evacuation of Spanish refugees out of France, in a manner similar to his treatment of the republican side during the Spanish Civil War. While the war may have looked increasingly dim, he refused to violate his sense of commitment to the republican cause. As a result, he sought the provision of substantial assistance in the form of economic support, supplies, and transportation to the displaced republicans, either directly or through independent aid organizations such as Service of Evacuation for Spanish Refugees (SERE) and its successor, the Penn History Review

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Spanish refugees in France (1939)

Aid Committee for Spanish Republicans (JARE).

Despite the strain of nationalization on the Mexican treasury, the president still authorized “substantial payments… to care for the needy exiles who probably would never leave [France].”32 In Marseilles alone, Mexican money supported nineteen welfare centers.33 This substantial financial help carried political risk, as many working class Mexicans reading about these measures in the newspapers may have wondered where Cárdenas’s priorities actually rested: with the Revolution or the status of people on a different continent whom they could not witness firsthand.

Cárdenas tried to calm Spanish socialist politician Indalecio Prieto about the crisis of refugee evacuation. He assured Prieto, “I have given instructions to the Secretary of [Foreign] Relations to process whatever necessary with urgency so that the authorization can be done for the contingent, whatever the size it may be, to move to Mexico.”34 On a different occasion, Cárdenas offered to accept over fifty thousand Spanish refugees, 42

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approximately fifteen thousand more than actually arrived.35 When compared to his justification for Mexican help during the Spanish Civil War, Cárdenas maintains some ideological consistency in his approach to Spanish refugee assistance. While his actions during the Spanish Civil War and the Spanish refugee crisis both relied on Hispanism, financial motivations replaced democratic solidarity as part of his rationale.

Although the tide of the war may have shifted in favor of the Nationalists, it could not diminish the ties between the Mexican and Spanish members of “la raza.” In fact, it may have increased the concept’s importance in Cárdenas’s view, as his “brothers” faced increased despair in France. In a September 1937 speech, Cárdenas proclaims: “The gates of México were opened for the republicans… who are a contribution of human force and race like ours in spirit and in blood, which at its origins contributed to the formation of our nationality.”36 Interestingly, Cárdenas here emphasized shared colonial history to validate a future in which the power relationship between the motherland and the former colony would be reversed: this time, the Mexicans would transform into the overseers and protectors of the Spaniards. He also hints at this future, which prioritizes Latin American success and associates Spain with the past, in his letter to Latin American nations one month later on “Día de la Raza:” “Each time progress and peace in the lands discovered by the illustrious navigator Christopher Columbus….and of the deserved homage to the discoverer of the New World, who without doubt will contribute to secure the continental fraternity and the tall historic destinies of America.”37 The republicans’ forced removal from political power signified to Cárdenas that using shared democratic ideals as justification would have little to no practical purpose, with economic motivation emerging as a stronger option. These motives were not important before in prompting Mexican assistance to the republican war effort, as Mexico would have received nothing financially meaningful in return from the Penn History Review

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struggling republicans. The refugee crisis, however, left hundreds of thousands of people looking for new opportunities abroad and a new potential labor source for unfarmed Mexican land.

Sensing an opportunity to once again portray himself as reviving Mexico’s revolutionary legacy, Cárdenas employed economic dialogue in his rhetoric and policies to justify the immigration of Spanish republicans to Mexico. Coming to power in the midst of the Depression, Cárdenas had professed that his administration would “intervene in all aspects of production and consumption, culture, and education,” thereby echoing the theme of state direction inscribed in the 1917 constitution.38 In addition to nationalizing industries like oil, Cárdenas viewed his administration’s efforts to move Spanish refugees to Mexico as part of the overall strategy of leveraging greater state control over the economy. In a speech to the Mexican Congress on September 1, 1939, Cárdenas said that, with the arrival of Spanish refugees, Mexico would receive the “benefits of these human energies that come to contribute their capacity and effort to the development and progress of the nation.”39 With this type of oratory, Cárdenas attempted to portray to the public the administration’s active involvement in the refugee issue as advantageous to domestic economic goals.

According to Haim Avni, Cárdenas envisioned the refugees as useful manpower that would be critical to the development of both new industries and agriculture in areas that lacked population.40 To achieve these objectives, he had asked his administration to draw up a plan to effectively distribute the Spanish refugees between five states based on their respective agricultural and industrial needs. Cárdenas envisioned agricultural ‘colonies’ in places like Veracruz that would act as national models for highly innovative and technological farming, as he assumed that the Spanish refugees would be more advanced in certain farming techniques. With the presence of Spanish teachers, medics and other professionals, these ‘colonies’ would further mimic the collectivist farming “program” that constituted 44

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a strong component of Cárdenas’s ‘revolutionary’ ideology.

Likewise, when a group of Spanish intellectuals arrived at the end of 1937, the Cárdenas administration constructed la Casa de España (House of Spain), the predecessor to today’s Colegio de México. The Mexicans hoped that by continuing their studies and research in Mexico, the Spaniards would contribute their ideas to the nation’s economic advancement.

Similar to his administration’s actions earlier in the Civil War, Cárdenas continued to isolate Mexico diplomatically during the Spanish refugee crisis. With much of the world increasingly preoccupied by the events involving Germany and Italy, Cárdenas found himself interacting with a smaller body of nations on the issue of Spain, many of these nations being from Latin America.

Cárdenas refused to take any action that would even imply Mexican recognition of the Nationalist regime in Burgos or the Franco government,41 distrusting an administration that had “gained power through violent acts.”42 He thus declined offers of collective Latin American participation: efforts to negotiate a settlement to the war, organized appeals to free imprisoned Latin American brigade fighters, and “certain humanitarian actions that might have been beneficial to republicans.”43 His steadfast position depicted Mexico as an overly demanding nation unfit for any sort of alliance. Already confronted by suspicions held by much of conservative Latin America of leading a communist conspiracy, Cárdenas’s shortsightedness here, when presented with opportunities for cooperation on Spain, “provided additional evidence that the PNR regime could not be trusted.” Only Ecuador responded favorably, without any preconditions, to Cárdenas’s June 1940 public appeal to all Latin American nations for the acceptance of Spanish exiles. Other nations declined without providing any reasoning or even put forth various ‘excuses,’ ranging from a coffee crisis (El Salvador) to being too poor to help (Bolivia).

In addition to scarce collaboration with Latin American nations, extensive opposition among the Mexican population to Penn History Review

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Cárdenas’s all-in efforts for the republicans unavoidably weakened the Mexican humanitarian response to the refugee crisis. This resistance crossed socioeconomic, political, regional boundaries and even entered his own administration, as Secretary of Foreign Relations Eduardo Hay displayed “scant enthusiasm for the Republic,” despite his boss’s heightened interest. Teachers, who usually supported PRM policy, strongly opposed the migration of Spanish republicans. Xenophobia, already rampant in Mexico at the time, fueled intense reactions against Cárdenas’s plans. From a more ideological perspective, Mexican Catholics voiced their disapproval, as the Second Republic promoted secularization and an ‘attack on religion.’ As economic policy became a central component in justifying the migration of Spaniards, many Mexicans worried about the potential loss of their jobs or land.

Members of the working class believed that Spaniards would entice employers like railroad companies by offering to work for lower wages.44 Furthermore, many rural workers grew resentful of the Mexican government’s funding and allocation of other resources to small farming ‘colonies’ created for the Spaniards, many of which actually lacked much experience in agriculture.45 Through a different socioeconomic lens, the middle and upper classes, already frightened by Cárdenas’s populist rhetoric in support of the republicans during the Civil War, interpreted the migration of Spaniards as another measure taken by Cárdenas against their financial interest.46 Taken together, this domestic opposition created a tense situation for the Cárdenas government: The nation generally seethed with discontent, organized movements opposed to the PRM steadily increased in number, many sectors of the population remained alienated from the Revolution, and civil war still seemed possible. Cárdenas nevertheless refused to renege on his promise and admitted the refugees despite the almost universal unpopularity of his 46

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action.47 In fact, he further antagonized the opposition by approving violent intimidation tactics against conservative newspapers like El Universal, Excelsior, and Novedades. This strategy, however, motivated the journalists to ramp up their attacks. Columnist Rubén Salazar Mallén blasted Cárdenas for “killing the principle of legitimate authority” and preparing “the destruction of Mexico.” By “stoking the fire,” Cárdenas actually intensified the domestic opposition, which culminated with violent protests that not only derailed his plan to save members of the International Brigades, but also forced him to delay the emigration of Spaniards to Mexico in January 1939. These demonstrations, according to Powell, serve as a “good index of the limits that widespread opposition imposed on even so powerful a figure as Mexico’s president.” By not attempting to listen to or reach a compromise with opponents to his Spanish policy earlier in his presidency, Cárdenas inadvertently pushed them towards a higher level of opposition that would ultimately impede his humanitarian efforts not only in 1939, but also through the end of his presidency in 1940.

Conclusion Despite Cárdenas’s strong motivations and steadfast rhetoric in support of the Spanish republicans, obstacles such as distrust in the international community, dissent in the population, and poor decision-making hampered his government’s efforts to aid the republicans both during the Civil War and the ensuing refugee crisis. Undoubtedly, compared to the rest of the world, Cárdenas presided over a nation that contributed the most help to the Spanish republicans. In accomplishing this, however, Cárdenas and his administration committed unnecessary diplomatic missteps. From his refusal to compromise on his position on Franco to his public criticism of the League of Nations, Cárdenas lacked any sort of proper acumen or tactical Penn History Review

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skills critical for effective foreign policy leaders.

This inability to properly control and express advocacy for the Spanish republicans shows future world leaders the pitfalls of unrestrained diplomacy. By trying to resolve international issues alone instead of working with an intergovernmental organization, like the League of Nations, or a group of state actors, such as Latin American nations, Cárdenas pushed away sources of help and cooperation for both the Civil War and the refugee crisis. His failures in the foreign policy sphere therefore reflect the necessity for world leaders to choose practicality over idealistic aspirations or legacies in crisis resolution.

Jim Fyrth and Sally Alexander, Women’s Voices from the Spanish Civil War (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991), 331.

2 Ibid. 328.

3 Patricia Weiss Fagen, Exiles and Citizens; Spanish Republicans in Mexico, Latin American Monographs, no. 29 (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies by the University of Texas Press, 1973), 38-39.

4 Aurelio Velázquez Hernández, “La diplomacia mexicana: ¿Agente al servicio del exilio español? Las relaciones entre diplomáticos mexicanos y los organismos de ayuda a los republicanos españoles,” Historia Actual Online, 2010, 12.

5 Lázaro Cárdenas, Apuntes: 1913-1940 (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Dirección General de Publicaciones, 1986), 6.

6 Ibid. XII. 7 “Lázaro Cárdenas,” The Storm That Swept Mexico, http://www. pbs.org/itvs/storm-that-swept-mexico/the-revolution/facesrevolution/lazaro-Cárdenas/.

8 Lázaro Cárdenas, Cárdenas habla! (Mexico: Turanzas del Valle, 1940), 17.

9 Original Text: “Nos hacía conocer la obra de la naturaleza; ponía 1

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especial empeño en hablarnos de los árboles, de su importancia y del cariño que debíamos guardarles. Es el árbol, nos decía, el mejor amigo de los niños, los cobija con su sombra, da salud, y frutos y en general enriquece a los países.” Cárdenas, Apuntes: 1913-1940, 5. References for next three paragraphs from this source: 6; 283-292; 307; 298; 247; 298.

10 Original Text: “aprovechar las riquezas naturales y las ventajas agrícolas…que ofrece el país.”

11 T. G. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 1st edition (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981), 2-3.

12 Ibid.

13 During the Maximato, Calles, even after officially leaving the presidency in 1928, still unofficially led the government for the next six years.

14 Cárdenas, Apuntes: 1913-1940, 229.

15 Original Text: “El abandono en que viven numerosos pueblos; la criminal apatía de muchas autoridades y su falta de interés por resolver los problemas fundamentales que planteó la Revolución; la actitud de elementos que diciéndose revolucionarios sostienen un criterio conservador…me hacen comprender que mi labor será ardua….Pero tengo fe en que podré resolver todo esto apoyado en el pueblo y en la confianza que sepa inspirar al país con mis propios actos.” Ibid., 308.

16 Velázquez Hernández, “La diplomacia mexicana,” 8.

17 Margarita Carbó, “Alrededor del 10 de junio llegará a Veracruz el vapor Sinaia,” Scripta Nova: Revista Electrónica de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales, no. 5 (2001): 36.

18 Cárdenas, Apuntes: 1913-1940, 355.

19 Ibid. 370.

20 Lázaro Cárdenas, Apuntes: 1941-1956 (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Dirección General de Publicaciones, 1973), 3.

21 Cárdenas, Apuntes: 1913-1940, 355.

22 Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 41.

23 Carbó, “Alrededor del 10 de junio llegará a Veracruz el vapor Penn History Review

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Sinaia,” 38; Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 58.

24 Ibid. 74.

25 Ibid. 77.

26 Cárdenas, Apuntes: 1913-1940, 397. Cárdenas, Cárdenas habla!, 83.

27 Velázquez Hernández, “La diplomacia mexicana,” 8.

28 Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 92-93.

29 Ibid. References for this paragraph from this source.

30 Tara Zahra, The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe’s Families after World War II (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), 47.

31 Fyrth and Alexander, Women’s Voices, 331.

32 Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 152.

33 Ibid.

34 Original Text: “He dado instrucciones al señor Secretario de Relaciones para que tramite lo necesario con carácter urgente a fin de que haga conocer la autorización para que se traslade a México el contingente que sea.” Velázquez Hernández, “La diplomacia mexicana,” 11.

35 Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 158.

36 Original Text: “Se abrieron las puertas de México a los elementos republicanos… que se trata de una aportación de fuerza humana y de raza afín a la nuestra en espíritu y en sangre, que fundida con los orígenes contribuyó a la formación de nuestra nacionalidad.”

Lázaro Cárdenas, “Al abrir el congreso sus sesiones ordinarias” (México, September 1, 1939), http://lanic.utexas.edu/larrp/ pm/sample2/mexican/history/4/6603229.html.

37 Original Text: “Cada vez más el progreso y la paz en las tierras que descubriera el ilustre navegante Cristóbal Colon….y de merecido homenaje al descubridor del Nuevo Mundo, que sin duda contribuirá a afianzar la fraternidad continental y los altos destinos históricos de América.” Cárdenas, Cárdenas habla!, 129.

38 Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 13.

39 Cárdenas, “Al abrir el congreso sus sesiones ordinarias.”

40 Haim Avni, “Cárdenas, México y los refugiados: 1938-1940” 50

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(Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén, n.d.). References for this entire paragraph from this source.

41 Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 77.

42 Cárdenas, Apuntes: 1941-1956, 8.

43 Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 152; 77. References for next two paragraphs from this source: 88; 59; 153; 63; 157; 58.

44 Albert L. Michaels, “The Crisis of Cardenismo,” Journal of Latin American Studies 2, no. 01 (1970): 76.

45 Avni, “Cárdenas, México y los refugiados: 1938-1940.”

46 Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 58.

47 Ibid. 154. References for next three paragraphs from this source: 147; 148; 155-156.

Image Sources: Page 32: http://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Biografias/CRL95.html (Memoria Política de México) Page 37: http://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Biografias/CRL95.html (Memoria Política de México) Page 42: http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/exiliados-yemigrados-19391999--0/html/ffdf03e4-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_7. html (Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes)

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U.S. Perceptions of Sim贸n Bol铆var

Sim贸n Bol铆var

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U.S. Perceptions of Simón Bolívar

The Second “Great Experiment”?:

U.S. Perceptions of Simón Bolívar and the American Revolution’s Legacy in Latin America, 1808-1830

Sarah A. Sadlier Stanford University

“With the newborn Nations on the same Hemisphere with ourselves, and embarked in the same great experiment of SelfGovernment; and who are alive to what they owe to our example, as well in the origin of their career, as in the forms of their Institutions, our sympathies must be peculiarly strong & anxious; the more so, as their destiny must not only affect deeply the general cause of liberty, but may be felt even by our own.”

–James Madison, December 9th, 18271

By 1827, the South American revolutions had captured the attention of the United States public. Periodicals across the young country carried news of the recently-installed free governments in the Southern Hemisphere. The widespread fascination with these “newborn Nations” and their hero, Simón Bolívar, spanned from the northernmost to the southernmost state.2 U.S. citizens felt a particular bond with their neighbors on the southern continent because they saw the Spanish American wars of independence as the global expansion of the American Revolution. At the time, this connection was seemingly selfevident, as former President and “Father of the Constitution,” James Madison, noted that even South Americans were aware of “what they owe our example.”3 Yet, the perceived exportation of the American Revolution to South America signified more than merely a manifestation of republican principles: it reinforced U.S. confidence in the durability of their own “great experiment of Self-Government.”4 Still, the terms “exportation” and Penn History Review

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“globalization” of the American Revolution do not indicate an active U.S. involvement in revolutionary activity abroad; rather, these expressions encapsulate the perception in the United States that South American revolutions—although they transpired largely independent of U.S. influence—were the direct result and perhaps, even the continuation of the American Revolution.

In 1827 U.S. public opinion, the “general cause of liberty” on one continent was contingent upon the successful and continued implementation of revolutionary doctrine and republican principles in the other, regardless of whether or not this was historically true.

Analyzing U.S. interpretations of the South American freedom fighter and “Liberator,” Simón Bolívar, is an effective method of studying contemporary U.S. understandings of the globalization of the American Revolution, a phrase that refers to U.S. perceptions that revolutions in Latin America took up the mantle of the American Revolution by adopting its principles of republicanism. At issue is whether the U.S. press—and populace more generally—viewed these revolutions in that light. In many ways, North Americans considered Bolívar to be a symbol of the South American revolutions of the early nineteenth century.

Consequently, U.S. articles written about Bolívar during his lifetime offer a microcosmic look into perceptions of the Spanish American wars of independence, particularly in the Bolivarian countries of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, as well as the incipient South American governments more generally. This study reviews twenty newspapers representing most regions of the United States between 1808, which marks the initiation of the wars of independence, and 1830, which was the year of Bolívar’s death.5 Despite the diverse locations of each publisher, these newspapers most often reflected similar rather than divergent opinions of Simón Bolívar and United States relations with South America. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the average U.S. citizen likely would have formulated their impression of this Latin American leader 54

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from reading newspapers.6 Thus, the methodological approach of examining Bolívar’s representation via these primary source documents allows for a reasonably comprehensive study of the U.S. population’s perspicacity of their revolution’s legacy worldwide. While the U.S. press’s subjective interpretation of the Revolution’s heritage through the figure of Simón Bolívar does not reflect what modern historians would view as the legacy of the Revolution, it informs historians as to how the U.S. vision of the American Revolution’s globalization drastically transformed in the first three decades of the nineteenth century.

Initially, in the 1810s and early 1820s, the U.S. press portrayed Bolívar as the “George Washington” of Latin America—the heir to the American Revolution. The comparison to Washington, who the U.S. Press presented as emblematic of the American Revolution’s republicanism in their simplified historical narrative, illustrated to U.S. citizens both the republican virtue of Bolívar himself and also that of the independence movements in which he participated. Moreover, such parallels suggested to the U.S. population that the South American independence movements would not have been possible were it not for the exemplary models of Washington and the American Revolution. By 1828, however, when the fledgling South American republics reverted to a state of instability and when Bolívar limited democratic freedoms in Gran Colombia, the U.S. press revoked his title as the “George Washington of Latin America.”7 Subsequently, various newspapers portrayed Bolívar as a tyrant and depicted the South American revolutions as fundamentally different from the American Revolution. Nonetheless, the U.S. press’s description of Bolívar’s final Washingtonian acts helped to restore his image in the United States. Indeed, at the hour of his demise, the U.S. press had thoroughly divorced the American Revolution from any connection to the South American revolutions; hence, the U.S. press was finally able to evaluate Bolívar as a man instead of a symbol of the American Revolution’s enduring legacy in South America. The evolution of the depiction of Bolívar in Penn History Review

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U.S. newspapers informs historians as to how the U.S. public changed its perceptions of its own revolutionary origins during the period between 1808 and 1830. At first, U.S. citizens viewed the American Revolution as exportable, meaning it could be emulated in a global context. In this international model, South Americans in conjunction with U.S. citizens preserved the Revolution’s victorious legacy. Yet, the U.S. press believed that the American Revolution could be adopted in global context only if other nations’ revolutions proved similarly successful.

When Bolívar became more authoritarian and imperiled the democratic ideal in Latin America, the U.S. press discounted the notion of South Americans globalizing the American Revolution.

Newspaper contributors increasingly adopted an attitude of “American exceptionalism,” in which the U.S. press held that only the people of the United States were capable of selfgovernance and embodying revolutionary principles. In doing so, newspapers implied that the American Revolution was purely a U.S. phenomenon, and that its principles were unavailable for adoption in anything other than a U.S. context.

The influence of the latter narrative on the historiography of the American Revolution’s global implications was profound.

There is myriad literature on the American Revolution, and there is a significant amount of secondary source literature devoted to the Spanish American wars of independence. Nevertheless, very little scholarship has drawn historical connections between these movements. Those historians who acknowledge the relationship between the American Revolution and the Spanish American revolutionary movements often do so in passing. For instance, in The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492-1867, historian D.A. Brading mentions the ideological influences of the American Revolution on Spanish American wars of independence only once in 761 pages of text.8 Although a minority of Latin American historians has attempted to measure the effect of the American Revolution on South American revolutions, understanding the U.S. perception of this 56

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impact is equally informative because it reveals how the newlyformed United States conceived of its place on the world stage and placed its Revolution in a global context during the early nineteenth century.9 Only recently have historians begun to examine the contemporary U.S. perception of Bolívar and the Latin American revolutions. In his 2004 study, David Sowell investigates how Bolívar was a mirror for public opinion of republicanism in the United States. According to Sowell, Bolívar’s transformation in the U.S. press can be situated within the context of “republicanism, domestic political differences, and international rivalries.”10 Sowell claims that the new generation of Americans that emerged after the deaths of Adams and Jefferson, and the domestic rivalries of Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and John Quincy Adams, shaped American opinions of Bolivar. While Sowell’s argument has merit, he does not discuss the implications of Bolívar’s evolution in the U.S. press for the historiography of the American Revolution. Thus, the purpose of this study is to narrow this lacuna in our historical understanding by analyzing the evolving narrative of the Revolution’s global legacy via representations of Bolívar in U.S. newspapers during his years of political activity.

The U.S. story of Bolívar began in 1808, the year in which the Spanish American wars of independence commenced. Initially, these movements garnered very little attention from the U.S. press because of the improbability of their success. Prior to the late 1810s, mention of Bolívar and the South American revolutions was virtually absent from North American newspapers. The rebellious Spanish colonies were not of paramount concern to the legislative or executive branch of the U.S. government, and the question of South American revolutions and their relationship to the American Revolution was not discussed in the House or the Senate between 1808 and 1817.11 While some U.S. pamphlets referred to individual Americans promoting freedom and democracy in Penn History Review

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Spanish America, they did not cite the American Revolution as an example for South Americans.12 Although some North Americans at this time did “view the wars for independence in South America as logical extensions of the American Revolution and urged an active support of these policies,” most doubted the applicability of the tenets of the American Revolution to Latin America.13 John Quincy Adams was of the latter category, as he observed that there was “no community of interests or of principles between North and South America.”14 However, the best explanation for the U.S. public’s lack of interest and unwillingness to tie the American Revolution to events in the Southern Hemisphere during this era was the scant success achieved by the South American revolutionaries. The losses of the rebels discouraged the U.S. press from supporting what they viewed to be an untenable, floundering movement.

The U.S. press became interested in Bolívar after 1816, a time that corresponded to the period in which South Americans made tangible military gains against Spanish forces, suggesting that the U.S. press only saw the American Revolution’s legacy in successful revolutionary contexts. For instance, one newspaper contributor requested that an announcement be placed in the “patriotic newspaper of Mr. Binns,” so as to broadcast the “astonishly [sic] successful operations of the Revolutionary Army of Simon Bolivar.”15 During this period, Bolívar’s proclamations became prominent features in various newspapers across the country.16 Multiple newspapers reprinted his famed “July 6th, 1816 Address,” in which he employed language similar to that utilized by the U.S. patriots. In this speech, he spoke of restoring natural rights to all, setting all men free from the yoke of slavery, and educating them to become virtuous citizens. Moreover, he called for the convocation of “the representatives of the people to a general Congress, in order to re-establish the government of the republic.”17 This democratic gesture hearkened back to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, showing the U.S. press that Bolívar was a leader worthy of promoting republican ideals, and 58

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that he was in fact operating under such principles. Beyond these printed interpretations of Bolivar, Speaker of the House Henry Clay starkly stated the parallels between the American Revolution and the South American revolutions. Even John Quincy Adams reversed his previously asserted opinions on South America. Still, a “substantial majority of Americans saw no reason to compare the anarchic violence of the Latin American fight for self-rule with what they deemed the principled and orderly sobriety of their own revolution.”18 The comparisons between the American Revolution and the South American revolutionary movements in U.S. newspapers increased during the early 1820s because the success of Bolívar and his independence movements seemed assured.

The U.S. press credited these accomplishments to Bolívar’s emulation of George Washington and the American Revolution.

In a characteristic sketch of Bolívar, one writer illuminated the indisputable connections between this Latin American “Liberator” and his revolutionary predecessor: An indefatigable promoter of the liberties of his country for 15 years past—he takes, at present, the attitude of another Washington. Descended from a noble family, he enjoys a patrimony of 200,000 francks (about 40,000 dollars) annual income; part of this estates is now expanded upon, the success of an enterprize [sic], the first idea of which entered his mind, amid the pleasures of Paris, where he had came for completion of his education.19 Like the Founding Fathers in the United States, Bolívar was a man of means. He was affluent, well-educated, and worldly like Washington or Jefferson. He was also willing to sacrifice all of his privilege for the furtherance of democratic principles.20 The resemblance of Bolívar to Washington enabled North Americans to recognize Bolívar as an actor worthy of bringing Penn History Review

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their revolution to South America. For an American audience, the publication of one of Bolívar’s letters in the Niles’ Weekly Register augmented the perceived likelihood that the South American revolutions would maintain the legacy of the America Revolution, as it verified “the establishment of a government… based on principles similar to that of the United States.”21 Moreover, the same journalist asserted, “Bolívar emulates the example of Washington and gives up his command!”22 This emphatic statement of the Niles’ Weekly Register implied that the example of the American Revolution and Washington shaped the actions of Bolívar and his contemporaries. The U.S. press construed the victorious conclusion to the South American independence movements as a sign of the American Revolution’s continuation in South America and the vindication of republican principles emanating from the American Revolution. According to Sowell, there was very little differentiation in this projected image among these various publications, as the editors of often “shared a common set of cultural and political values through which they perceived the Liberator.”23 Nevertheless, a minority of U.S. citizens did not believe that the legacy of the American Revolution had global implications, especially with regards to South America, because of their adherence to an inchoate form of U.S. exceptionalism.

These early proponents of an exceptional, inimitable American Revolution cited their racial differences with South Americans as sufficient reason to bar them from perpetuating the American Revolution’s ‘noble’ republican experiment: We have no concern with South America: we have no sympathy, we can have no well-founded political sympathy with them. We are sprung from different stock, we speak different languages, we have been brought up in different and moral schools, we have been governed by different codes of law. We profess radically different forms of religion….But they would not act in our spirit, 60

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This work was commissioned for the festivities honoring Bolívar in September of 1819, and it was presented to him in the Plaza Mayor of Bogotá. In this paintng, Bolívar, dressed in military attire, embraces a female figure representing America.

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they would not follow our advice, they would not imitate our example. Not all the treaties we make, nor the commissioners we could send out, nor the money we could lend them, would transform their Pueyrredons and their Artigases, into Adamses or Franklins or their Bolivars into Washingtons.24 This excerpt suggested that U.S. citizens possessed unique political and social traditions, which, in addition to racial difference, inhibited the South Americans from emulating the ideals of the American Revolution. The disparity between the North American and South American “stock” portended the rising beliefs among some North Americans of an AngloSaxon superiority.25 This philosophy was uncommon in the early 1820s, but it would gain traction by 1828, when the U.S. press attempted to distance the American Revolution from events in South America.

Despite these early exceptions to the dominant BolívarWashington paradigm in the U.S. press, the most frequently expressed view of the South American revolutions during the early 1820s was that they were a fortunate consequence of the dissemination of the American Revolution’s republican principles.

In a speech given to the House of Representatives in 1822, James Monroe reiterated that the revolutionary movements in Spanish colonies “attracted the attention and the excited the sympathy of our fellow-citizens from its commencement.”26 Moreover, he broadly assumed that the feelings among North Americans and the moral support for these South American groups were “natural and honorable” given the latter’s democratic purpose.27 By the mid-1820s, the success of Bolívar and his contemporaries in organizing democratic institutions based on ideology similar to the republicanism emerging from the American Revolution deepened the North American’s affinity for South Americans. As a result, the U.S. public honored Bolívar as an equal to its most admired patriots. For instance, 62

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a portrait of Bolívar was the first South American painting to hang in the Academy of Arts, along with the paintings of the American Founding Fathers.28 On Patriot Thomas Paine’s birthday, the seventh toast of a Mr. J. Hobson was to “Simon Bolívar and the patriots of South America,” followed by “May those Scourges of Mankind, commonly called Kings, soon be taught that all true sovereignty emanates from the people.”29 A year later, on yet another anniversary of Paine’s birthday, a toast in honor of “Simon Bolívar, and Thomas Cochrane,” hoped that, “the great bulwark of Republican principles which they have erected in South America never be erased, but continue to be imitated by every nation upon the habitable globe.”30 The emphasis on the idea that Bolivar’s work emulated that of U.S. revolutionaries demonstrated that North Americans believed that their revolution’s republican legacy was visible in South American events and unrestricted to the United States.

The U.S. press portrayed Bolívar, as the purveyor of the Revolution’s ideals, not only as “the worthiest and best qualified among them to be placed at the helm” but also as someone who had the potential to improve upon the American Revolution’s legacy.31 In a pamphlet issued on the “genius of universal emancipation,” the author suggested that had it not been for Bolívar, slavery “would not have been extinguished in our sister republic of Colombia, perhaps for centuries to come.” 32 The author went so far to suggest that “had a Simon Bolivar presided in the executive branch of our government, twenty years ago,” when Washington was president, slavery would have been abolished in the United States.33 At this time, the U.S. press was almost wholly positive in their perception of the South American revolutions, noting that “the brave and patriotic Bolivar, to whom his country is indebted for the inestimable privileges of Civil liberty” had a “holy lustre that surround[ed] his name,” which was “a name that need no title to render it conspicuous” and merited “admiration, with all our countrymen who are capable of reflection.”34 Just as it revered Washington as the symbol of Penn History Review

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In 1826, General Lafayette honored Bolívar by giving him a portrait of George Washington.

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the American Revolution, the U.S. press elevated Bolívar’s name to a higher plane of veneration because he was the embodiment of the American Revolution’s extension to South America.

This honeymoon period of the “good and the great” Bolívar came to an abrupt end in 1827 as a result of the U.S. press’s perception of the failure of republicanism in South America.35 Between 1827 and 1829, the South American republics experienced the “most serious threats to the stability of the new international order during the decade of the 1820s” because of the Argentine-Brazilian and Peruvian-Colombian conflicts occurring during this time.36 Although Bolívar was still called the “Liberator” in publications from Vermont to Raleigh, the U.S. press broadly began to accuse him of authoritarianism in his efforts to bring order to the crumbling South American republics.37 Following Bolívar’s implementation of dictatorial measures to stabilize Colombia and Venezuela, he begged his congress to “confer on me the title of a private Citizen.”

Nevertheless, there was an almost universal skepticism in the U.S. press as to his motives. No longer was he the George Washington who relinquished power: he was an unfit imitator who could tarnish the legacy of the American Revolution for which he had previously served as a protector.38 By 1828, the U.S. press had become critical of Bolívar and the revolutions in South America, so much so that columnists sought to sever the connection they had previously made between Bolívar, his South American Revolutions, and the American Revolution. In an article written for the New York Spectator, the Colombian ambassador vilified the former hero, proposing that “personal aggrandizement” was the “sole object [Bolívar had] at heart; and though he might obtain that object by a conduct like that of the illustrious Washington,” but “his haughty, impetuous and despotic character [would] not permit him to resemble the Liberator of the North.”39 In this way, the press began to distance itself from its previous assertions of Bolívar’s similarities to Washington. By revoking their previous Penn History Review

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analogies to Washington, the U.S. press also demonstrated a reversal of North American confidence in the ability of their Colombian neighbors to self-govern. Now, newspaper articles chronicled South America’s wandering from the “path of true glory,” which would have led to the establishment of “the two most splendid models of republican virtue” in the world.40 The editors of the same paper in which this was featured observed, “Bolivar’s military reputation [was] not more to be compared to that of Washington, than the tactics of savages are to those of scientific and civilized armies.”41 This abrupt, racialized depiction of South Americans as “savages” as opposed to the “civilized” North Americans highlighted the U.S. press’s desire to create difference rather than sameness between the political traditions of the two continents. Again, from this perspective found in U.S. newspapers, not only were South Americans unworthy of embodying the legacy of the American Revolution but they were also seen as inferior in the context of their racial background.

At this time, segments of the U.S. population were beginning to adhere to the notion that Anglo-Saxons possessed the “strength and status of a distinguished racial heritage.”42 These arguments effectively terminated any hope U.S. citizens held of the emulation of the American Revolution in South America.

By 1830, the U.S. press had thoroughly divested itself of any connection between their revolutionary legacy and those of South American nations. Since Bolivar no longer served as a symbol of the Revolution in U.S. newspapers, the U.S. public was free to celebrate the man rather than the cause, as they had done previously. In death, Bolívar was elevated once again to a heroic status in the United States. Perhaps, this is because his final acts, such as his abnegation and peaceful transfer of presidential power, were reminiscent of the Founding Fathers, and this enabled him to once again attain the admiration of the American people. The Carolina Observer noted that his 1830 retirement plan seemed “to be noble and disinterested, and if pursued to the end w[ould] secure to him glory unfading.” 43 Moreover, Bolívar, like 66

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Simón Bolívar at age 47, just before his death

Washington in his “Farewell Address,” urged the disappearance of faction and party politics.44 He spoke of sacrificing his own tranquility of living for supplanting liberty with tyranny, ideas associated with the historical aim of the U.S. patriots. The editors of the Daily National Intelligencer lamented afterwards that next news from South America would likely “bring tidings of the death of the great South American Liberator.”45 When that day did arrive, the U.S. press carried the news of his demise all over the United States.46 The papers called his death a most “melancholy event,” illustrating the newfound U.S. sympathy for the individual revolutionary leader rather than his revolutions.47 When the U.S. press had begun to draw parallels between their revolution and those of South America in the later 1810s, it Penn History Review

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had envisioned Simón Bolívar as the new “George Washington.”

This timing coincided with an improved prospect of success for the South American revolutionaries, suggesting that North Americans would only attach the legacy the American Revolution to South American uprisings if it served to widen their influence in the Southern Hemisphere and preserve the untarnished memory of their victorious republican experiment. Madison’s optimistic appraisal of the situation in South America marked the end of this globalizing tendency. By 1828, the U.S. press’s positive representations of the Liberator and the “newborn Nations” of the Southern Hemisphere were vanishing. Publishers wanted to have heirs to their republican tradition, with the caveat that these heirs would successfully replicate the U.S.’s “Great Experiment.”

When the revolutions of Latin American countries appeared as though they were failing to establish stable democracies, the U.S. press stripped Bolívar of his title as the “Latin American George Washington.” No longer was there the hemispheric brotherhood advocated by Madison nor were U.S. sympathies towards South Americans “peculiarly strong & anxious.”48 What is more, the U.S. populace no longer saw the movements in South America as affecting their own destiny or general cause of liberty. In asserting their own uniqueness, the U.S. press rewrote the story of their revolution as an isolated incident without global repercussions: in this version, there was no second “Great Experiment.” As a result, the U.S. press preserved the successful history of the American Revolution by creating a tale of American exceptionalism—of which only Anglo-Saxons could take part—that has endured for centuries.

James Madison to James Monroe, “Letter,” (December 9, 1827), in the Retirement Papers of James Madison (VA: The University of Virginia Press, 2010), The Papers of James Madison Digital Edition, accessed February 26, 2014, http://rotunda.upress.

1

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virginia.edu/founders/JSMN.html.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Sadlier’s selection covers a wide geographic range, including papers published in Fayetteville, NC (Carolina Observer), Raleigh, NC (Raleigh Register, and North-Carolina Gazette), Charlestown, WV (Virginia Free Press & Farmers’ Repository), Annapolis, MD (Maryland Gazette), Baltimore, MD (Niles Weekly Register), Washington, D.C. (Daily National Intelligencer; Daily National Journal; The National Register), Philadelphia, PA (Mechanics’ Free Press), New York, NY (New-York Spectator; The Atlantic Magazine), Boston, MA (The Liberator), Bellows Falls, VT (Vermont Chronicle), Dover, NH (Dover Gazette & Strafford Advertise), Little Rock, AR (The Arkansas Gazette), New Orleans, LA (Orleans Gazette, and Commercial Advertiser), St. Louis, MO (Missouri Republican), Chillicothe, OH (The Scioto Gazette); Tallahassee, FL (Pensacola Gazette and West Florida Advertiser), and Indianapolis, IN (Indian Journal). Despite the diverse locations of each publisher, these newspapers most often reflected similar rather than divergent opinions of Simon Bolivar and United States relations with South American.

6 Sowell, “The Mirror of Public Opinion,” 166.

7 Marie Arana, Bolivar: American Liberator, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 6.

8 David A. Brading, The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492-1867 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 649.

9 In the externalist camp, Víctor Andrés Belaúnde’s Bolivar and the Political Thought of the Spanish American Revolution claims that the world created by the American Revolution and French Revolutions was one of the factors in influencing Spanish American political thought, in conjunction with Spanish tradition, economic necessities, a spirit of reform, and religious sentiment (xviii). However, internalist interpretations have not disappeared Penn History Review

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from this historical record. In 1958, Mexican philosopher Francisco Larroyo and Bolivian philosopher Manfredo Kempf Mercado discovered that Latin American thought, though originating from the American experience during the Colonial period, rapidly evolved in a different direction from the thought of their American neighbors (Davis, 26). Likewise, historian Richard Morse asserted that Latin Americans cultivated their own ideology rather than appropriating it from North America’s Revolution (New World Soundings: Culture and Ideology in the Americas). The connections between North America, Spain, and South America remain even more nebulous. According to historian Harry Bernstein, the “three-way kinship of the Latin American, Iberian, and Northern Segments of the Atlantic world is a permanent part of the intellectual history of the Western Hemisphere”(Making an Inter-American Mind, v). In pursuing this project, Sadlier will enter this centuries-old debate and add her modern interpretation, though her focus will be primarily in North America and Latin America.

10 David Sowell, “The Mirror of Public Opinion: Bolívar, Republicanism and the United States Press, 1821-1831,” Revista de Historia de América, no. 134 (January-June, 2004): 165, Pan American Institute of Geography and History, accessed February 14, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20140139.

11 U.S. Congress, Journals of the House and Senate from 1789-1817 (November 4, 1811), 92, Newsbank, November 2005, accessed February 16, 2014, http://infoweb.newsbank.com. In my review all of the Senate and House Journals from 1789-1817, there was no mention of any revolutions in the Spanish colonies.

Furthermore, the phrase “South America” appeared only once, and “Bolivar” never appeared.

12 James Biggs, The History of Don Francisco de Miranda’s attempt to effect a revolution in South America, in a series of letters. By a gentleman who was an officer under that general, to his friend in the United States.

To which are annexed, sketches of the life of Miranda, and geographical notices of Caraccas (Boston: Oliver and Munro, 1800), American 70

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Antiquarian Society and News, 2013, accessed February 26, 2014, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.

13 Robert Freeman Smith, “The American Revolution and Latin America: An Essay in Imagery, Perceptions, and Ideological Influence.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 20, no. 4 (November, 1978): 430, Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami, accessed February 14, 2014, http://www. jstor.org/stable/165444.

14 Quoted in Arthur Preston Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830, (New York: 1964), 148.

15 Partholan, “South American Affairs,” The National Advocate (August 20, 1816), accessed February 26, 2014, infotrac. galegroup.com.

16 Sowell, “The Mirror of Public Opinion,” 166.

17 Simon Bolivar, “Simon Bolivar, supreme chief of the Republic, and captain general of the armies of Venezuela & New Grenada, &c. To the Inhabitants of the Province of Carraccas,” Daily National Intelligencer, no. 1128 (August 20, 1816), accessed February 15, 2014, infotrac.galegroup.com.

18 Smith, “The American Revolution and Latin America,” 431; Fredrick Pike, United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992), 67.

19 “Gen. Bolivar, a Characteristic Sketch: Extract of a letter from a Paris paper of June 20th,” The National Register, a Weekly Paper, Containing a Series of the Important Public Documents, and the Proceedings of Congress; Statistical Tables, Reports and Essays, Original and Selected, Upon Agriculture, Manufactures, Commerce, and Finance; Science, Literature and the Arts; and Biographical Sketches; with summary Statements of the Current News and Political Events; Making Two Volumes Yearly (1816-1820), (September 4, 1819): 157. “Foreign Articles.: GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND. From London papers to the 5th September. TURKEY. From the Boston Daily Advertiser. Citizens of the United States of America. PERU. COLOMBIA. From the Correo National of Maracaibo, of the Penn History Review

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21st July, 1821--11th. Head quarters, Guanare, 25th May, 1821.

POSTSCRIPT,” Niles’ Weekly Register (1814-1837)21, no. 529 (Oct 27, 1821): 140, American Periodical Series, accessed February 15, 2014, http://www.proquest.com.

20 Arana, Bolivar: American Liberator, 4.

21 “Foreign Articles,”140.

22 Ibid. 140.

23 Sowell, “The Mirror of Public Opinion,” 166.

24 “ART. XIII.—Ensayo de la historia Civil de Paraguay,” The North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal (1815-1821) II, (April 1821): 432-433.

25 See Reginald Horsman’s Race and Manifest Destiny: Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism for an in-depth story of the rise of Anglo-Saxon exclusionary thought in the nineteenth century.

26 U.S. Congress, “Political condition of the Spanish provinces of South America. Communicated to Congress, March 8 and April 26, 1822,” American State Papers 4, no. 327 (March 8, 1822): 818.

27 Ibid. 818.

28 Pausan Arcad, “Letter 1—No Title,” The Atlantic Magazine (1824-1825) 1, no. 2 (June 1, 1824): 155.

29 Richard Carlile, “Celebration of the 29th of January, 1822,” The Republican, 1819-1826 5, no. 10 (March 8, 1822): 307.

30 Richard Carlile, “Paine’s Birth Day,” The Republican 7, no. 10 (March 7, 1823): 296.

31 “Sketch of the Political Career of Simon Bolivar: President of the Republic of Columbia,” Mirror of Literature, Amusement and Instruction (1823-1825)5, no. 25 (Jan 1, 1823): 4-9.

32 “Presidential Election,” Genius of Universal Emancipation (18211839) 3, no. 11 (March 1824): 129-130.

33 Ibid. 129-130.

34 “Simon Bolivar,” Daily National Journal 200 (April 1, 1825).

35 “Peru—Bolivar,” Niles Weekly Register (1814-1827) (July 2, 1825): 28.

36 Ron L. Seckinger, “South American Power Politics during 72

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the 1820s,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 56, no. 2 (May, 1976): 242, Duke University Press, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/2514326.

37 “Important from Colombia,” Raleigh Register, and North-Carolina Gazette, no. 1478 (April 6, 1827); “Laws of Maryland, An Act Relating to the Removal of Causes for Trial to the Third Judicial District, Simon Bolivar,” Maryland Gazette, no. 14 (April 5, 1827); “The following official document, extracted from a Caracas paper of the 8d ult. will show that BOLIVAR has again resigned the Presidency of the Columbian Republic.” Vermont Chronicle, no. 52 (April 6, 1827): 207; “Latest from Europe,” The Scioto Gazette, no. 7 (April 12, 1827); Pensacola Gazette and West Florida Advertiser, no. 7 (April 20, 1827).

38 Ibid.

39 “Untitled,” New-York Spectator (March 4, 1828).

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 5.

43 “Foreign Late and Important from Columbia Vincente Borrezo; Simon Bolivar, Liberator President,” Carolina Observer 682 (July 1, 1830).

44 “Tennessee Conference,” The Arkansas Gazette, no. 10 (March 2, 1831); “Bolivar,” Mechanics’ Free Press, no. 160 (January 29, 1831); “Bolivar,” Daily National Intelligencer, no. 5609 (January 27, 1831); “Bolivar,” Mechanics’ Free Press, no. 160 (January 29, 1831).

“Bolivar,” The Liberator, no. 5 (January 29, 1831):19; “Bolivar,” Dover Gazette & Strafford Advertiser, no. 9 (February 1, 1831); “Latest, and probably, last act of Bolivar,” Carolina Observer, no. 713 (February 03, 1831); “Bolivar,” Virginia Free Press & Farmers’ Repository, no. 49 (February 3, 1831); “The following proclamation was issued at Santa Martha just before the Pomana sailed, which has arrived here in 88 days, having left there on the 18th December,” Raleigh Register, and North-Carolina Gazette, no.

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12 (February 3, 1831).

45 “Bolivar,” Daily National Intelligencer, no. 5609 (January 27, 1831).

46 “Tennessee Conference,” The Arkansas Gazette, no. 10 (March 2, 1831); Mechanics’ Free Press, no. 160 (January 29, 1831); “Simon Bolivar,” Daily National Intelligencer, no. 5609 (January 27, 1831); “Bolivar,” The Liberator, no. 5 (January 29, 1831): 19; Bolivar, Dover Gazette & Strafford Advertiser, no. 9 (February 1, 1831); “Latest, and probably, last act of Bolivar,” Carolina Observer, no. 713 (February 3, 1831); “Bolivar,” Virginia Free Press & Farmers’ Repository, no. 49 (February 3, 1831).

47 “The following proclamation was issued at Santa Martha just before the Pomana sailed, which has arrived here in 88 days, having left there on the 18th December,” Raleigh Register, and North-Carolina Gazette, no. 12 (February 3, 1831).

48 James Madison to James Monroe, “Letter,” (December 9, 1827).

Image Sources: Page 52: Arturo Michelena, El Libertador en traje de campana. 1895, Oil on Canvas, 240x126.5cm. Galería de Arte Nacional.

Page 61: Pedro José Figueroa, Simón Bolívar: Libertador de Colombia.

1819, oil on canvas, 97x 75.5cm. Colección Banco de la República, Bogotá, Colombia.

Page 64: “It will be recollected, that when a General Lafayette was in this country, a present was prepared for the Liberator BOLIVAR.” Raleigh Register, and North-Carolina Gazette 1403 (September 22, 1826).

Page 67: José María Espinosa, Simón Bolívar. 1830, pencil, 28x20cm. National Magazine of Culture, Santa Marta Colombia.

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