fig. 4 Consistent payers of bribes the exception

offce a government that abuses its powers by hook and by crook and install a new government in the hope that it will reduce corruption. The results indicate that democratic institutions may have a substantial and signifcant impact on corruption. Net of past legacies, going from undemocratic to fully democratic is associated with an improvement in a country’s rating on the CPI by 22 percentage points. However, in a global context, national governments that fully respect civil liberties and political rights are in the minority; the median group consists of countries that are only partly democratic.

Low-income countries tend to be most favoured as recipients of foreign aid because their economic and social development requires capital-intensive resources that they cannot fnance themselves. The percentage of Gross National Income received as aid ranges from below one-tenth of 1% in countries such as Mexico to above 5% in more than a dozen countries scattered from Cambodia to Togo and Jordan. Although aid contracts normally include clauses imposing bureaucratic procedures intended to prevent corruption, national offcials are much better placed than foreign auditors to get around these procedures to beneft themselves. As hypothesized, foreign aid is signifcantly associated with national corruption, but not in the direction that donors would like. In countries where aid bulks largest in its national economy because domestic economic resources are in short supply, aid may be important for public offcials wanting to beneft from the capital-intensive corruption that it can fnance. The CPI index is likely to be 14 percentage points lower in countries that receive the most aid than in countries that receive no aid.

Natural resources are not distributed evenly within developing countries or globally. The World Bank measure of government income from natural resources as a percentage of GDP reckons dozens of countries have virtually no such income. Since natural resource income has only a low correlation with foreign aid, 0.13, its effect on corruption can be tested without any risk of statistical contamination. Although natural resource revenue increases national income, governments receiving a substantial income from natural resources are not signifcantly more corrupt, after taking other infuences into account. This suggests that oilrich countries such as Russia and Nigeria are high in corruption because of a lack of early bureaucratization and democracy, while Norway and Australia receive large natural resource income without a corrupt impact because they bureaucratized early and are democracies.

The measure of ethnic diversity used is the index of ethnic fragmentation created by Alberto Alesina and colleagues (2003); it calculates the probability that two randomly selected people will belong to the same ethnic group. The mean value of 0.46 on a 0 to 1.0 scale emphasizes that ethnic differences are relevant in most countries included in the CPI analysis. There is also a wide range between countries where fragmentation is extremely high, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, and those where it is virtually non-existent, such as the Republic of Korea. Ethnic fragmentation is not signifcantly associated with national corruption (Table 1). This may be due to the fact that where fragmentation is greatest no ethnic group has the political power to exploit the state to its beneft, and where fragmentation is lowest there is no substantial minority forced to rely on corruption to get what it wants.

The Gini Index is a standard social science measure of economic inequality in a society. It assesses national inequality on a scale that ranges from 0, no inequality, to 100, total inequality. Because the calculation of the Index requires good national statistics of income little affected by shadow economy income, it is only available for 99 countries that we analyse. Among the countries covered, the Gini Inequality Index ranges from the most unequal, South Africa 63, to the least, Denmark and Japan, 25. When it is included as an independent variable along with contextual infuences highlighted in Table 1, the result is clear. Contrary to theories of the pervasive infuence of inequality, it fails to have any signifcant association with national corruption (p 0.585).

The combined effect of statistically signifcant infuences is substantial. for the 29 countries, introducing bureaucratic institutions more than a century ago and having governors today accountable through democratic institutions, the CPI rating will be 47 points more favourable than if these conditions are lacking. While these countries provide the paradigm example of good governance today, globally, they are less than one-ffth of the world’s political systems. More numerous are countries where foreign aid is associated with a depressed CPI, thus creating a gap of 61 points between this relatively badly governed group and the best-governed countries (Table 1).

Evidence that political history and institutions have a signifcant impact is consistent with social science theories of capital-intensive corruption at the national level. However, it is not evidence of corruption at the grass roots, where low-level offcials are responsible for the retail delivery of services to masses of ordinary people. Nor can generalizations about national corruption based on the national indexes explain why some citizens of a country pay bribes for some public services while others do not.

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CHAPTER 4

Exploiting People at the Grass Roots

This chapter shifts attention from corruption at the top of government to corruption at the grass roots, where the great mass of citizens deal with public employees face-to-face. Whereas laws and rules are enacted in the national capital, this is a long way from where most people live, including the public employees nominally acting as their agents. Whatever the formal hierarchy linking institutions, at each level offcials have a degree of informal discretion; this is especially true in federal political systems. Local institutions at the bottom of the pyramid of multilevel governance are responsible for the delivery of major public services and within each local authority there are further subdivisions. for example, an education authority has a multiplicity of schools and each school is divided into classrooms in which a teacher deals with children as individuals. Policing is devolved to the street level.

The state’s activities are no longer confned to the provision of a few collective goods such as defence and diplomacy, which involve little frsthand contact with the great mass of the state’s subjects. Contemporary welfare states are now service states, bringing ordinary people into direct contact with public employees who deliver desirable social services (Kumlin 2004). A big majority of households contact at least one public service annually and over a few years virtually every household has a number of contacts. While the cost of social services for a single individual is far less than the cost of building a dam or buying a fghter aircraft, collectively public expenditure on social services such as health

© The Author(s) 2019 R. Rose and C. Peiffer, Bad Governance and Corruption, Political Corruption and Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92846-3_4 61

and education is greater than the amount spent on capital-intensive contracts. The scale and variety of public services gives special relevance to Max Weber’s (1948) dictum, ‘Power is in the administration of everyday things’.

In a political system in which there is a risk of corruption, national policymakers face a challenge: How do you make sure that the services for which you are nominally responsible are delivered as intended at the grass roots? In many parts of the world the delivery of public services by the book cannot be taken for granted. Examining how services are actually delivered avoids the fawed assumption of national indexes of governance, which imply that governance is the same regardless of service. Our evidence shows that the outcome of encounters between ordinary citizens and public offcials is variable. The extent of contact and bribery not only differs between countries but also between services within a country. Sometimes services are delivered in keeping with bureaucratic standards and sometimes they are not. Since most of the world’s population live in countries where corruption is relatively widespread, it directly affects an estimated 1.8 billion people each year.

1 hoW PeoPLe see PuBLic insTiTuTions

In principle the payment of a bribe to a low-level public offcial is an observable act. Likewise, the electronic transfer of a large bribe paid to a high-level policymaker’s secret offshore bank account is a matter of record. Because bribery is illegal, there are no offcial statistics about bribery. When Transparency International launched its Corruption Perceptions Index, it pooled indirect forms of evidence, including the views of lawyers, consultants, lobbyists and business people whose status as experts could be gained by frst-hand involvement as brokers or payers of big-bucks bribes to policymakers. To get around the expected reluctance of people whose work involved paying or receiving bribes, it frst of all asked informants to report their perceptions of corruption. This strategy was followed in Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) survey. It began by asking people about their perceptions of corruption in a variety of political and social institutions. Its pioneering use of questions about popular perceptions of corruption has since been incorporated in a big majority of surveys about corruption (see Rose and Peiffer 2015: 51ff).

Social psychological theories postulate that even though perceptions are subjective judgements, these views are real if people think they are real, since how people perceive others act can condition how they relate to others. for example, if an individuals perceive a public service as corrupt this may predispose them not to use it. However, not paying a bribe means the loss of health care or education or making a substantial payment to a private-sector hospital or school. When there is contact, a person who sees public offcials as corrupt will be alert to signals from an offcial that a bribe would expedite action. The perception that ‘everybody is doing it’ provides a reason for people to engage in corruption as they assume others do and pay a bribe, even if doing so is regarded as wrong. The result of a widely shared perception of corruption can create a low-level equilibrium trap making it accepted as an unwelcome fact of life even if it is thought wrong.

Popular perceptions of political institutions. The 2016 GCB measured popular perceptions of corruption by asking: How many of the following do you think are involved in corruption or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? The nine groups covered range from the leaders of the national government to local government offcials and non-political fgures such as heads of businesses and religious leaders. The extent of perceived corruption is rated on a scale ranging from none is corrupt to all are corrupt.

The key representatives in a political system—Members of Parliament and the president or prime minister—are seen as among the most corrupt (fig. 1). These responses cannot be explained away as a consequence of the GCB survey including a large number of partly democratic and undemocratic states. A Eurobarometer survey (2014: 26) in member states found that 55% thought most or all of their national politicians were corrupt and 59% held the same view of political parties. Although international experts regard Denmark and Sweden as being the world leaders in good governance, about one-third of Danes and the same proportion of Swedes thought most of their politicians and parties were corrupt (Eurobarometer 2014: 26). for each group, the median view was discriminating: some of their leaders are corrupt.

The extent of perceived corruption among religious leaders is low: 25% think none is corrupt compared to 19% thinking most or all are corrupt. Previous GCB surveys have found that the military is less likely to be perceived as corrupt. Although the police also provide security

Police

MPs

Gov't officials

Business 38%

37%

36%

35%

Local govt

Tax 34%

34%

Executive 32%

Judges

Religious 19% 31%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Fig. 1 Perceptions of corruption in institutions (Source Global Corruption Barometer 2016)

services for a community as a whole, they also deliver such private benefts as an exemption from a fne or arrest in exchange for a bribe (Rose and Peiffer 2015: 53).

Asking about perceptions of many institutions assumes that people differentiate the extent to which corruption is specifc to a particular institution. Alternatively, people may make diffuse judgements about the integrity of government and project their general opinion onto specifc institutions. This perspective is implicit in governance indexes that generalize about corruption in government as pervasive. factor analysis can test statistically whether the perceptions of the nine different groups reported in fig. 1 refect a single generalized attitude towards the prevalence of political corruption among national leaders. This is the case. A single factor with an eigenvalue of 5.12 accounts for 57% of the variance between institutions. The three groups most closely linked in government—MPs, national and local offcials—are of most importance for general perceptions of corruption.

The cross-national variation in popular perceptions of corruption is much less than the popular experience of paying a bribe. The GCB survey reports that on the four-point scale for measuring perceptions, the Russian mean rating is 1.6, double the rating that Germans give their institutions. While this is a signifcant difference, it is much less than the difference in the experience of bribery in the two countries. Russians are 13 times more likely to report that they have paid a bribe than are Germans (see Appendix fig. A.1). One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that in countries in which bribery is relatively low, stories about politicians behaving badly are especially likely to colour popular perceptions of corruption. By contrast, where corruption is high, single events are not news and the government’s undemocratic control of the press limits the amount of media publicity given to capital-intensive corruption.

The correlation between a country’s national CPI rating for capital-intensive corruption and the mean score for individual perceptions of corruption is statistically signifcant but weak, 0.30. One explanation for this is that individuals make assessments by mixing perceptions based on direct experience, such as dealings with local government offcials and those with whom they have no contact, such as the national president.

2 hoW PuBLic services Differ

The heterogeneous activities of the contemporary state differ greatly in the likelihood of ordinary people having contact with public offcials. Collective goods and services such as military defence and the rate of infation affect everyone in society without ordinary people having any direct contact with policymakers at the top of government. Since this is the case, the offcials making collective goods decisions cannot make the payment of a bribe a condition of being affected or not. Since every citizen shares in the risks of modern war, the only way in which a person can avoid this is to leave the country. In the language of economics, collective goods are non-excludable, because everyone in the population is included in their impact (Samuelson 1954).

Excludable goods and services differ between those that are capital-intensive, because they cost many millions to produce, and services that are retail in scale because they are relatively cheap to provide, such as birth certifcates. Services also differ in who is involved. Capitalintensive activities such as building bridges or producing military aircraft

involve a relatively small number of corporations that have the resources needed to produce such expensive high-tech goods. In countries where bureaucratic standards are weak, the prospect of big profts is an incentive for enterprises to offer big bribes for contracts and for groups of high-ranking politicians to accept them. Government negotiations of contracts for capital-intensive goods are handled over the heads of ordinary people.

Ordinary people are directly involved in retail services delivered by public employees based in schools, clinics and other public agencies in their community. These services are excludable when public offcials have the power to decide whether or not a person is entitled to receive a desired service or excused from meeting an obligation. Bureaucratic laws and regulations set out in detail the procedures that public offcials ought to follow when deciding whether a person is entitled or obligated to receive a service. for example, the determination of entitlement for maternity-related benefts starts with a positive fnding in a pregnancy test. It is followed up with a series of standard actions to which a pregnant woman is entitled until a specifed point in the post-maternity process is reached. A decision about whether a patient has a mental illness that entitles a person to receive disability benefts in cash or kind cannot rely to the same extent on clinical evidence available for maternity care, and thus leaves offcials with substantial discretion.

To describe the people who deliver public services as bureaucrats is misleading. It reduces millions of people with all kinds of skills and roles to robots whose behaviour is determined by algorithms derived from laws and regulations. In fact, the great majority of public employees do not spend their working day sitting at a desk inputting data to a computer that controls the delivery of public services. Nor do they think of themselves as cogs in the machinery of public administration. Instead, they are people who spend their working day applying specifc occupational skills necessary for the delivery of a particular public service, whether it is looking after patients in a hospital or maintaining its electrical services. If asked to describe their occupation, they will say they are a nurse or an electrician. To obtain their job, they have to learn skills through vocational education leading to a formal qualifcation. The fact that public employees must respect bureaucratic regulations no more makes them bureaucrats than being subject to university rules makes a professor see herself as a bureaucrat rather than an economist or engineer.

In countries with good governance, the people who deliver grass-roots services see themselves as agents of their profession rather than as agents of a politician or political party. That is why this study refers to the people delivering services as public offcials or employees rather than as bureaucrats. Offcials may rely on bureaucratic rules to protect them from corrupt politicians who want to see their friends looked after favourably or in violation of rules. The majority of recruits to jobs in the public sector do not seek posts where the opportunity to collect bribes are greatest. If that were the case, no one would take a job where the opportunities for collecting a bribe are low, such as working in the back room of an offce without any contact with people who seek services. People out for bribes would rather be a customs offcial, where there are many opportunities for collecting bribes from businesses wanting to speed up the delivery of perishable goods or smuggle high-tariff or illegal goods.

Particular circumstances of a claimant for a service may create a confict between the literal application of bureaucratic rules and what a qualifed professional considers ought to be done. The logic of appropriateness takes into account the fact that formal rules meant to be applied equally to everybody are not necessarily suitable in all situations. for example, if a judge suspends a jail sentence on the grounds of the extenuating circumstances of a guilty person, this is not corrupt as long as the judge is not paid a bribe for doing so. Applying the abstract norm of appropriateness is easier said than done.

Most public employees have a degree of discretion that they can exercise in delivering their service. The less the supervision, the more opportunities for exercising discretion. The need for technical knowledge insulates offcials from having decisions audited by supervisors lacking their knowledge. The diagnosis of an illness requires a doctor to make a judgement about what treatment should be prescribed in the light of a physical examination and clinical data. The attention that a busy nurse pays to a patient experiencing discomfort is immediately determined by the nurse’s choice of priorities between ailing patients. Classroom teachers have substantial discretion in deciding which pupils they will give special assistance to and which are ignored.

Professional standards offer guidance about when and how to exercise discretion rather than adhere strictly to rules. The two may combine in a positive way to deliver a service in keeping with both policy and professional objectives. This was illustrated in a classic study of American forest rangers, who worked in government-owned forests thousands of miles

away from their headquarters in Washington, DC. They exercised discretion in making decisions affecting features of forest management on site and referred problems upward for decision only when they judged the rules required this. However, where standards and supervision are weak, public employees have much more discretion about how they conduct themselves (Wilson 1991). The greater the extent of discretion, the greater the opportunities for a service to be delivered by hook or by crook rather than by the book. Street-level bureaucrats such as the police have a substantial amount of discretion (Lipsky 2010; Goel et al. 2016). As long as police are not under camera surveillance, they can make decisions about how and whether they enforce minor and major laws or take a bribe rather than report that a law has been broken.

In a service in which corruption is widespread, informal norms make receiving bribes and personal favours one of the benefts of a job. Policing has a particular problem, for police operate in small groups with a primary loyalty to their immediate colleagues rather than to an abstract police code or to remote offcials to whom they are notionally accountable. Corruption can take the form of accepting bribes to allow illegal activities such as drug peddling or breaking rules against wiretapping for the ‘noble cause’ of securing evidence to sustain a conviction (Reiner 2010). When corrupt payments are shared between several police offcers, reporting bribery breaks informal obligations to cover up activities of one’s friends and colleagues.

Bureaucratic rules controlling what public offcials should and should not do are intended to put limits on discretion. yet bureaucratic rules can do no more than provide a framework within which public employees do their job with a greater or lesser degree of discretion. The more bureaucratic rules that exist to restrict the exercise of discretion, the greater the potential friction between the makers of rules and publicly employed professionals who are trained to exercise discretion in delivering their services. When rules and informed judgements are in confict, this generates complaints about red tape and efforts to cut the tape by hook or by crook.

3 conTacT varies By service

Whether individuals contact a particular public service depends on characteristics of the service, such as whether it is a desirable good or an undesirable obligation. It also depends on characteristics of the individual, for example, whether they are ageing and in need of health care or young parents with school-age children. No one can be expected to

contact every public service each year nor is it easy for a person to avoid all contact. To capture this variety, surveys should ask about those public services that bring many citizens into face-to-face contact with public employees at least once a year.

Barometer surveys differ in the number of services that they ask about (Rose and Peiffer 2015: 28ff). The latest GCB and the Afrobarometer ask about six services and the EBRD survey of post-Communist countries asks about eight services. Even though bribing for services occurs least often in Europe, the latest Eurobarometer asked questions about contact with 15 different public and private-sector services and politicians. In order to achieve comparability between major surveys, our analysis concentrates on the fve most used public services: health care, education, local offcials issuing permits and documents, the police, and courts.

During the year more citizens have contact with the output side of politics, public services, than with the input side, voting for MPs. On every continent almost three-quarters annually have contact with at least one major service (fig. 2). Notwithstanding big differences in the

100%

80%

Any contact (%)

60%

40%

20% Any contact Mean contacts

Asia Africa Latin W. MENA EBRD America Europe

78% 76% 73% 73% 70% 69%

1.9

1.7

1.2 1.2

1.7

1.2

5

4

3

2 Mean contacts

1

0% 0

Fig. 2 Contact with services high in every continent (Source Global Corruption Barometer 2016. There is no contact data for the police in LAPOP)

economic capacity of governments, the scale of contact differs very little across continents. The average ranges from 78% in Asia to 69% in formerly Communist EBRD countries.

Within every country, individuals vary greatly in the number of different services that they contact. In the population as a whole, the mean number of contacts ranges between 1.2 in Western Europe and EBRD countries and 1.9 contacts in Asia. In three groups—Asia, Africa and the Middle East and North Africa—half or more of the population contacts at least two services annually. Since services such as health care can involve several visits, statistics about the use of different services understate the total number of times that an individual contacts public offcials during a year.

Going without any contact with public offcials during a year is likely to be a phase in the life cycle rather than an aversion to government. for example, a healthy young person without any responsibilities for a family may have, for the moment, no need for health or education services. Another reason is that a person does not want it. Individuals would rather be in good health rather than claim hospital treatment, and couples do not need a marriage license to live together. A third reason for not using a service is having no entitlement; to use schools a person must have a school-age child. In addition, a person can have indirect contact when tasks are shared within a household. for example, only one person need obtain the license for a family automobile.

There are big differences within every country in the percentage of people contacting particular services (Table 1). In each Barometer survey, more than half report seeing a doctor or going to a clinic or hospital during the year. By contrast, less than one-sixth get involved with courts. The gap between the most and least used service is 56 percentage points in Western Europe and 52% in Africa. Contact with education

Table 1 Contact varies by public service

Africa (%) Asia (%) Latin America (%) EBRD (%) W. Europe (%) MENA (%)

Health 62 58 51 57 62 54 Education 42 38 40 21 25 33 Permits 44 47 18 22 6 47 Police 20 35 n.a. 20 18 21 Courts 10 15 10 3 6 15

Source Global Corruption Barometer 2016

services is twice as great in Africa, where birth rates are high, as it is in post-Communist EBRD countries, where birth rates are relatively low. Many public services have less contact with citizens than do some major private-sector institutions. The Eurobarometer found that 50% of citizens contacted banks and related institutions annually, a higher rate than that for four of fve major services provide by their government.

4 exPerience of BriBery varies Too

The 100-point Corruption Perceptions Index implies that in every country corruption is a matter of degree; it avoids dividing countries into two categories, those with good and those with bad governance. Contact with public services is also a matter of degree: some services are used more than others and some people make more use of services. The likelihood of an individual having to pay a bribe for a public service is also a matter of degree. In a representative sample of 1000 citizens, some will have paid a bribe and some will not.

In countries where corruption is higher, the experience of paying a bribe for a grass-roots service is more likely to be the subject of conversations that ordinary people have with family, friends and neighbours. Surveys that ask about bribery are not dealing with a sensitive issue but with a subject that is common knowledge. To broach the subject, the GCB frst asks respondents their opinion of overall corruption in government and then about their perception of corruption in particular public institutions. This is followed by questions about contact with services; for each service where there is contact, it asks whether a bribe was paid (for more discussion about questionnaire design, see Rose and Peiffer 2015: 35ff).

Although questions asked in different languages and different continents cannot be literally the same, as long as they are conceptually comparable they can be good indicators of generic concepts. In multinational surveys the master questionnaire is normally in English and must be translated into a dozen or more languages. The challenge of translation is reduced insofar as corruption surveys concentrate on familiar and visible services such as schools and hospitals rather than asking about abstract ideas such as the market. Most Barometer questionnaires use the word bribe. The EBRD refers to an unoffcial payment or gift, an activity distinct from trying to get services by the use of connections. The Afrobarometer refers to gifts and favours as well as paying money as a bribe; this recognizes that if money is scarce in a household, payments in kind can be given.

100% Percentage paying a bribe

Western Europe EBRD

Latin America Africa Asia MENA

50%

0 MEAN 65% Haiti

56% Liberia

61% India Vietnam

44% Morocco

7% Greece

2%

0.1% Sweden, Finland

27% Tajikistan

14% 14% 17% 21% 23%

2% Slovenia

2% Barbados

1% Botswana 0.2% Japan

3% Jordan

Fig. 3 Bribery varies between and within continents (Source Global Corruption Barometer 2016)

Payment of a bribe. Aggregate indicators of national corruption imply that in countries labelled corrupt everyone who has contact with public services pays a bribe or at the very least a big majority of people do so. However, this is not the case (fig. 3). The payment of bribes is confned to a limited minority of Barometer respondents. In West European countries an average of only 2% reported paying a bribe in the past year. At an average level of 23% paying a bribe annually, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is highest with Asia close behind at 21%. yet even where bribery is high, it is the annual experience of less than half the population. Among the 73 countries surveyed in the continents of Asia, Africa and Lain America, there were only four—Haiti, India, Vietnam and Liberia—where a majority of respondents reported paying a bribe in the past year. On average, the GCB fnds that bribery affects 18% of a country’s population each year.

Conventional geographical categories group together countries with very different levels of grass-roots bribery. The gap is greatest in Asia, a difference of almost 61 percentage points between India and Vietnam and Japan. It is least among the 15 old member states of the European Union, where the range is just under 7% between Greece and two Nordic states, Sweden and finland. In the new EU member states, the legacy of Communism increases bribery, rising to 22% in Lithuania but as low as 2% in Slovenia.

The size of a household increases the likelihood of paying a bribe; but there is no one-to-one relationship between an increase in household size and the payment of bribes. EBRD data shows that in a single-person household, 16% report paying a bribe. When household size doubles, the percentage reporting the payment of a bribe rises by only 5%. With six persons in a household, the proportion paying a bribe is only twice that of a single-person household (Rose and Peiffer 2015: 37ff). In larger households, an individual may be indirectly involved in bribery if another person makes a side-payment to get a service. In a 2010 survey undertaken by the United Nations Offce of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in seven strife-torn states in the Western Balkans,1 73% said they had paid a bribe themselves while 27% reported another household member had done so.

All the Barometer questionnaires restrict the span of time covered to 12 months. Doing so avoids the risk that people will be unable to remember accurately whether they have ever paid a bribe. It also results in replies refecting current conditions in the political system, an important consideration in countries where there have been one or more changes of regimes in the lifetime of most respondents. Moreover, placing responsibility for corruption on the government of the day gives ammunition to advocacy groups that want their government to take action to reduce corruption.

While restricting questions to the past year minimizes the problem of recall, it also underestimates the proportion of people who have paid a bribe in the past. Exceptionally, the 2013 GCB asked people whether they had ever paid a bribe. As expected, measuring lifetime experience increases the proportion exposed to bribery. However, asking the percentage of people ever paying a bribe added only four points to the total

1 A total of 28,066 persons were interviewed in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and the former yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.