6. Conclusions

(b) Efficiency audit

Part 3. Efficiency audit Section 57 1. The Court of Audit shall devote attention to the efficiency of the management, organisation and policies of central government. 2. Our Ministers shall inform the Court of Audit in good time of efficiency audits instituted by them and of the results thereof. 3. Sections 53 (1) and 54 above shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(c) Other acts

Part 4. Other duties and powers Section 58 The Court of Audit may institute certain audits at the request of either House of the States General.

6. Conclusions

For our conclusions, we follow Bovens’ line of thought in his publications. The step from purely financial accounting to public accountability offers audit offices a chance to emancipate themselves from their somewhat dull bookkeeping background. They can enhance their public legitimacy by taking up new roles, for example, the vigilant public accountant who watches over the efficiency and effectiveness of public programmes. We see such developments at the national level as well as at the EU level.

These new roles require new skills, however. Establishing the effectiveness of policies and programmes often requires a variety of sophisticated evaluation techniques that may also vary within the sector that is being evaluated. Old-fashioned financial accounting or legal scrutiny will not suffice. Audit offices have to establish multidisciplinary teams and interdisciplinary understanding becomes more important.

Some of these new roles may also create new dilemmas. Auditors may find it difficult to combine both the traditional accounting role and the new role, where they have to apply the principle of accountability in the context of the principles of good governance. Establishing the effectiveness and the accountability of public policies and programmes also moves audit offices into the realm of policy evaluation. Nevertheless, it will be important to evaluate based on objective criteria, such as the principles of good governance.

The step from financial accounting to public accountability therefore puts audit offices in the political spotlight. They have to account for themselves as well, for the standards they apply—the principles of good governance—and for the sophistication and independence of their judgement at the risk of decreased government legitimacy.