8 Whistleblowing: National Report for Ireland

whistle externally from the outset, if there is a legal duty to report, if serious offences are in question, if the employer has committed the crimes himself, or if there is no reasonable expectation that an internal complaint will be suffi cient in bringing wrongdoings to a halt. 85 This conception means on the one hand that a dismissal is not automatically valid if the whistleblower has failed to keep the information on illegal or unethical practices inside the organisation as the fi rst step. On the other hand, informing public authorities or even the media as the fi rst step can constitute a reason for the termination of an employment contract though the whistleblower has not knowingly or frivolously raised false accusations. So the approach of the Federal Labour Court oscillates between a conception of whistleblowing as tool to improve the ability of organisations to deal with wrongdoings autonomously and a conception in which whistleblowing is a tool to enhance the transparency of organisations. 86 Whether the passing of information to the trade union is a case of external whistleblowing is not yet clear. 87 The same rules apply when the employee has not lodged a complaint but only threated to do so, in particular with the goal to achieve advantages for himself, 88 or if he has accused colleagues. 89

Level of Protection

Several regulations prohibit expressly any reprisal by the employer in the case of whistleblowing or exercising a right to complaint. This is true of Sec. 16 (1) 1 AGG, Sec. 4f (3) S. 2 BDSG, and Sec. 17 (2) S. 2 ArbSchG. These provisions are amended by the general rule in Sec. 612a BGB that the employer may not discriminate against an employee who only has exercised his rights. So in theory there is a

85 BAG 3.7.2003 – 2 AZR 235/02, BAGE 107, 36 (at 45–46); affi rmative BAG 31.7.2014 – 2 AZR 505/13, BAGE 149, 1 (at 15–16). See also LAG Hamm 12.11.1990 – 19 (16) Sa 9/90, LAGE BGB § 626 No 54: no need for previous information to the employer if the accusations are true and the immediate report to external public bodies is the only way for the employee to avoid prosecution for tax fraud. In the case of informing external public authorities by works councils BAG 3.6.2003 - 1 ABR 19/02, BAGE 106, 188 (at 196) tends to favour internal whistleblowing as a rule. 86 As to this aspect in detail G Forst, ‘Whistleblowing im internationalen Vergleich – Was kann Deutschland von seinen Nachbarn lernen?’ (2013) EuZA 37–82 (see 73–74). 87 In this direction LAG Baden-Württemberg 20.10.1976 – 6 Sa 51/76, EzA KSchG § 1 Verhaltensbedingte Kündigung No. 8 with critical comment of M Weiss. 88 cf. BAG 14.11.1984 – 7 AZR 133/83, AP BGB § 629 No. 89 (at II 3); BAG 11.3.1999 – 2 AZR 507/98, AP BGB § 626 No. 149 (at II 1); LAG Rheinland-Pfalz 17.11.2004 – 10 Sa 1329/03, Juris; LAG Brandenburg 21.12.2009 – 10 Sa 2193/09 u. a., Juris; LAG Sachsen 21.1.2011 – 3 Sa 181/10, NZA-RR 2011, 290; LAG Schleswig-Holstein 17.8.2011 – 3 Sa 196/11, LAGE BGB § 626 No. 35; LAG Hessen 26.10.2011 – 8 Sa 1554/10, Juris; LAG Hessen 5.4.2012 – 5 Sa 1117/11, Juris; LAG Hamm 13.11.2012 – 14 Sa 1178/12, LAGE BGB § 626 No. 38a; LAG Rheinland-Pfalz 15.5.2014 – 5 Sa 60/14, Juris. 89 LAG Frankfurt a. M. 14.2.1991 – 12 Sa 846/90, LAGE KSchG § 1 Verhaltensbedingte Kündigung No. 31; LAG Nürnberg 16.9.2011 – 4 Sa 297/10, Juris; BAG 11.7.2013 – 2 AZR 994/12, AP KSchG § 1 Verhaltensbedingte Kündigung No. 69.

comprehensive protection against any kind of detriment like suspension, demotion, loss of promotion opportunities, punitive displacements, reduction in wages or harassment. However, the problem is often to prove that any measure taken by the employer is a direct reaction to justifi ed whistleblowing. In certain situations a prima facie evidence is possible. 90 Furthermore, in antidiscrimination cases Sec. 22 AGG facilitates the burden of proof because the employee must only provide evidence for the assertion that he or she has been placed at a disadvantage based on forbidden grounds. If the employee is successful the employer must prove that antidiscrimination law was not violated. But this favorable regulation applies only to whistleblower cases with an antidiscrimination background and cannot be implemented in other whistleblower cases. Hence, the focus is mainly on the protection against a termination of the employment contract. Insofar dismissals can be declared void if the courts fi nd that there is no compelling reason or at least a suffi cient reason for the termination of the contract. However, if a dismissal is declared with notice and the employer fails to show a suffi cient reason it is in principle possible to avoid the consequence of the nullity of the dismissal since the labour court can rescind the employment contract if due to tensions between the employer and the employee a further collaboration seems not reasonable (Sec. 9 KSchG). In this case the employer has to pay an indemnity to the employee (Sec. 10 KSchG). Normally this regulation applies in cases in which the employee has “poured oil on the fi re” during the litigation on the dismissal. 91 Nevertheless, one regional labour court has used this option in a whistleblower case, 92 whereas another regional labour court has strictly denied the possibility of applying that regulation in order to avoid diminishing of the protection of the whistleblower. 93 So there is legal uncertainty on that question and employees who have blown the whistle are at least exposed to the risk of losing their job even if the dismissal is void. One particular dimension of protection concerns the question whether whistleblowers have a right to stay anonymous 94 or that confi dentiality will be preserved. This issue concerns the protection of personal data of the whistleblower. 95 There are

90 BAG 21.11.2000 – 9 AZR 665/99, BAGE 96, 274 (at 280). 91 cf. LAG Düsseldorf 8.9.1978 – 6 Sa 927/78, DB 1979, 556 (employee has turned to the media in order to put pressure on the employer); LAG Bremen 12.4.2011 – 1 Sa 36/09, Juris (at A II 2) (criminal complaint against the employer during the court trial). 92 LAG Schleswig-Holstein 20.3.2012 – 2 Sa 331/13, LAGE KSchG § 9 No. 44. 93 LAG Hessen 27.11.2001 – 15 Sa 411/01, LAGE KSchG § 1 Verhaltensbedingte Kündigung No. 79. 94 Anonymous whistleblowing causes other problems as well which shall not be tackled here. As to this topic see the so-called “Article 29 Data Protection Working Party” (an independent European advisory body on data protection and privacy set up under Art. 29 of Directive 95/46/EC), Opinion 1/2006 on the application of EU data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the fi elds of accounting, internal accounting controls, auditing matters, fi ght against bribery, banking and fi nancial crime (at 10–11). Available via www.c.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/ wpdocs/2006/wp117_en.pdf . Accessed 1 May 2015. Further G Wisskirchen, A Körber, A Bissels, ‘“Whistleblowing” und “Ethikhotlines”. Probleme des deutschen Arbeits- und Datenschutzrechts’ (2006) BB 1567–1572 (see 1569). 95 Whistleblowing raises a huge number of further data protection problems which are depicted in detail by A Breinlinger and G Krader, ‘Whistleblowing – Chancen und Risiken bei der Umsetzung

some provisions which expressly address this problem (Sec. 81a (3a) and 197a (3a) SGB V, Sec. 47a (2) SGB XI) but mostly general rules apply. In the case of internal whistleblowing the employee is protected by the Federal Data Protection Act. This Act stipulates that the employer must not transfer data to others, in particular to colleagues who are accused, unless this is necessary for carrying out the employment contract (Sec. 32 (1) BDSG) or at least insofar as this is necessary to safeguard justifi ed interests of the employer and there is no reason to assume that the employee has an overriding legitimate interest in his data being excluded from transfer (Sec. 28 (1) S. 1 No. 2 BDSG). As regards the personal data of the accused employee a notifi cation of the data subject is not required if the data must be kept secret on account of an overriding legal interest of a third party (Sec. 33 (2) S. 1 No. 3 BDSG). In such a situation there is also no obligation to provide information on the source of the data (Sec. 34 (7) BDSG). In the case of external whistleblowing to public authorities the Freedom of Information Act (Informationsfreiheitsgesetz – IFG) applies. In general the Act stipulates that everyone is entitled to offi cial information from the authorities of the Federal Government (Sec. 1 (1) S. 1 IFG). However, in order to protect special public interests the entitlement to access to information shall not apply inter alia in the case of information obtained or transferred in confi dence, where the third party’s interest in confi dential treatment still applies at the time of the application for access to the information (Sec. 3 No. 7 IFG). 96 The reason for that regulation is clear: Citizens (including employees) will only give anonymous information to public bodies if they can be trusted to maintain the confi dentiality of the information 97 and at the very least to prevent any retaliation. The same applies to the duty of banks to establish a scheme for internal confi dential whistleblowing of employees according to Sec. 25a (1) S. 6 No. 3 KWG. 98 The employer is not only required to refrain from any reprisal of his own but also to protect the whistleblower from any harassment by colleagues. 99 This duty is derived from the general duty of the employer to defend employees who are victims of a hostile attitude of other employees. For instance, the employer has to prompt the harassers to stop their conduct, to displace or even to dismiss them. Regulations on the support of whistleblowers by collective organisations or specialized bodies do not exist. There is only a provision in the General Equal Treatment Act according to which antidiscrimination organisations are allowed to

von anonym nutzbaren Hinweisgebersystemen im Rahmen des Compliance-Managements von Unternehmen’ (2006) RDV 60–70 (see 64–69); G Forst, ‘Whistleblowing und Datenschutz – Brauchen wir eine spezielle Regelung?’ (2013) RDV 122–131 (see 127–131); T Grau, ‘Arbeits- und datenschutzrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für Systeme zur Meldung von Missständen und Regelverstößen durch Arbeitnehmer’ (2012) KSzW 66–76 (see 70–76); G von Zimmermann, ‘Whistleblowing und Datenschutz’ (2006) RDV 242–249 (see 243–248). 96 Depicted in detail by H Greve, ‘Korruptionsbekämpfung und Whistleblowing’ (2014) ZD 346–342 (see 340). 97 cf. Bundestags-Drucksache 15/4493 of 14 Dec 2004 (see p. 11). 98 See above sub II 1. 99 G Forst, ‘Whistleblowing im internationalen Vergleich – Was kann Deutschland von seinen Nachbarn lernen?’ (2013) EuZA 37–82 (see 76).

aid employees in court trials (Sec. 23 (2) S. 1 AGG). The same is true of trade unions for trade union members. Within the enterprise the whistleblower can gain support by the works council. Financial incentives for whistleblowers do not yet exist. 100 However, in antitrust law the Federal Cartel Offi ce (Bundeskartellamt) can reduce fi nes if a member of a cartel blows the whistle and acts in a cooperative manner. 101

Conclusion

The image of whistleblowing in Germany is still ambiguous. According to a survey in 2010, a majority of large enterprises do not intend to implement an internal mechanism for whistleblowing because they fear to stimulate a culture of distrust and spying. 102 Indeed, the promotion of whistleblowing has to sail between Scylla and Charybdis: On the one side a “culture of keeping silence and looking away” has to be avoided and on the other a “culture of denouncing and sneaking”. 103 Instead, a “culture of witnessing and intervening” should be introduced. As regards employment law the legal framework is dominated by anti-retaliation protection. Other measures to provide a whistleblower-friendly environment play only a minor role. The protection of whistleblowers against reprisal is to some extent provided by special legislation. However, there is no system behind the rules which have only a fragmented character. Thus, the protection on the grounds of fundamental rights is much more important. On the one hand, this approach and particularly the reference to the right of freedom of expression has the advantage of embracing all situations in comparison to special provisions, which cover only particular situations and in doing so inevitably leave gaps. On the other hand, this approach means that the major burden to protect whistleblowers in particular against dismissals rests on the courts.

100 A proposal from the 1990s to introduce fi nancial incentives for whistleblowers on tax fraud failed; cf. M Müller, ‘Whistleblowing – Ein Kündigungsgrund?’ (2002) NZA 424–437 (see 425). Now Art. 32 (4) Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014, which has to be implemented by July 3, 2016, stipulates that Member States may provide for fi nancial incentives to persons who offer relevant information about potential infringements of the Regulation. The proposal (Com (2011) 651 fi nal of 20 Oct 2011) is discussed by H Fleischer and K U Schmolke, ‘Finanzielle Anreize für Whistleblower im Europäischen Kapitalmarktrecht?’ (2012) NZG 361–368; very critical C Buchert, ‘Der Irrweg der EU-Kommission – Zu den Überlegungen über die Einführung einer staatlichen Whistleblower-Prämie’ (2013) CCZ 144–149. 101 cf. available via www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Bekanntmachungen/ Bekanntmachung%20-%20Bonusregelung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7 . Accessed 1 May 2015. 102 PwC/Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg (Ed.), Compliance und Unternehmenskultur. Zur aktuellen Situation in deutschen Großunternehmen (2010) 32–33. 103 The problem is nicely described by B Rohde-Liebenau, Whistleblowing (Düsseldorf, HansBöckler-Stiftung No. 159, 2005) 37–40. Available via www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_edition_hbs_159. pdf . Accessed 1 May 2015.

The existence of a high standard of protection against wrongful termination of the employment contract and the indirect third party effect of fundamental rights within the employment relationship deliver in principle the instruments for the courts to establish an appropriate level of protection. Insofar a particular normative framework for the protection of whistleblowers is less of a necessity than within an employment-at-will-system which regularly renders employees without protection against arbitrary dismissals by the employer. 104 All in all, the labour courts have used these tools at least since the 2000s mostly in a proper manner. There are only a few decisions that appear too rigid. Nevertheless, as the outcomes are not clear and certain the system of case law induces the danger to discourage potential whistleblowers. 105 For this reason, German law is far from having a comprehensive and coherent approach to facilitating public interest reports and disclosures as was recently recommended by the Committee of Ministers of the European Council. 106 Moreover, the incorporation of the protection of whistleblowers into the “logic” of termination protection law with its focus on the balancing of the rights and interests of the parties to the employment contract has contributed to the traditional negligence of public policy considerations. 107 In principle, the regulatory framework is fl exible enough to integrate the “logic” of whistleblowing, i.e. public policy arguments 108 which are stressed by the ECtHR in the Heinisch-case 109 and in some further decisions. 110 However, this conception sticks inevitably to the axiom that each report of an employee to external bodies is basically a breach of the duty to loyalty. The alternative conception that the whistleblower acts as a monitor in the interest of the public and contributes to effective law enforcement will presumably only enter into German law together with an independent Whistleblower Protection Act.

104 cf . B Fasterling, ‘Whistleblower Protection: A comparative law perspective’, in: A J Brown, D Lewis, R Moberly, W Vandekerckhove (Ed.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 331–347 (at 333); B Fasterling, D Lewis, ‘Leaks, legislation and freedom of speech: How can the law effectively promote public-interest whistleblowing’ (2014), ILR 153 , 71–92 (see 82, 89); C W Summers, ‘Individualism, Collectivism and Autonomy in American Labor Law’, in: D Simon, M Weiss, Liber Amicorum Spiros Simitis (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2000) 413–436 (at 418–421). 105 D Deiseroth, P Derleder, ‘Whistleblower und Denunziatoren’ (2008) ZRP 248–251 (see 249). 106 Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of whistleblowers of 30 Apr 2014. Available via www.wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc. jsp?id=2188855&Site=CM . Accessed 1 May 2015. 107 Critical R Ogorek, ‘Whistleblowing – oder vom Verpfeifen im Arbeitsrecht und anderswo’, in: A Höland, C Hohmann-Dennhardt, M Schmidt, A Seifert, Liber Amicorum für Manfred Weiss (Berlin, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2005), 539–555 (at 552–554); similar S Simitis, ‘Die verordnete Sprachlosigkeit: Das Arbeitsverhältnis als Kommunikationsbarriere’, in: W Brandt, H Gollwitzer, J F Henschel , Festschrift für Helmut Simon (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987), 329–358 (at 346). 108 As early as 1949 advocated by P Dahns, ‘Denunziation und Strafanzeige als Entlassungsgrund’ (1949) BB 39–40 (see 40). 109 See above sub II 2. 110 ECtHR 18.11.2011 – 102474/09 – Sosinowska v Poland ; ECtHR 21.10.2014 – 73571/10 – Matúz v Hungary .

Certainly, one should not ignore that both ways of protecting whistleblowers rest on different approaches: A particular Act would express the approach that the protection of whistleblowers is a means to an end, namely to pursue the public interest in the compliance of organisations with legal and ethical standards. In contrast, protecting whistleblowers because they have exercised fundamental rights is a means in itself. Hence, the solution should not be “either-or” but rather “both” in order to cover all legitimate purposes of whistleblowing law.

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