The new right’s think-tanks

American conservatives Trumpism’s new Washington army

WASHINGTO N, DC In preparation for power, the new right builds new institutions

Agilded conference room stocked with coffee and lanyardwearing men ing a new conservative elite and agenda. Likeminded wonks and former Trumpin dark suits is a common enough sight in Washington. Only a sign at the door reading “The Lies of the Ruling Class”, hosted by the Claremont Institute’s yearold Centre for the American Way of Life, marks this event at the Mayflower Hotel as something more unusual. “America’s elites are not bright, not competent and not qualified,” says Michael Anton, a former nationalsecurity aide to Donald Trump, in the day’s first session. United in favour of economic nationalism, a restrained foreign policy and restricted immigration, many of the room’s selfdescribed national conservatives see the “threat” to America from the left in existential terms. Yet they are brimming with confidence.

Come November, when Republicans expect to retake one if not both chambers of Congress, the national conservatives hope to translate their budding movement’s energy into a share of that power. Thrilled by Mr Trump’s election but disappointed by his inability to convert unorthodox instincts into action, they are intent on shapadministration officials are busy building thinktanks and advocacy organisations, to provide the policies and, crucially, the personnel for a new Republican right. Conservatives have long relied on such places to “formulate concepts, strategies and policies that elected officials can implement when in positions of authority”, says Matthew Continetti, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (aei), a conservative thinktank, and author of a history of the American right. Years before Ronald Reagan became president, thinktanks including the Heritage Foundation and magazines such as National Review promoted a generation of Republicans that embraced free markets, social conservatism and an assertive foreign policy. They provided a career for young conservatives—and cadres for White House personnel directors and congressional chiefs of staff seeking to hire ideological allies.

But Mr Trump’s unexpected election was not preceded by institutionbuilding to match his America First instincts. To staff the government, Mr Trump instead depended on outfits like the Heritage Foundation, stocked with many experts who had opposed him. The Republican majority in Congress busied itself with older priorities, such as tax cuts. It was the handful of dissident Republicans with experience and networks in Washington, like Robert Lighthizer, a lawyer appointed as us trade representative, who proved to be the most effective policymakers in the administration, reckons Mr Continetti.

Among the first to act was the Claremont Institute, based in southern California. It shot to prominence for its affiliates’ defence of Mr Trump. One of these was Mr Anton. Another, John Eastman, was the legal theorist behind Mr Trump’s bid to cling to power after the 2020 election. The institute has a highbrow journal, the Claremont Review of Books, and a centre on Capitol Hill near other newright institutions. A few blocks away is the Washington outpost of the conservative Hillsdale College, where Mr Anton is a lecturer. Nearby is the townhouse of a former Trump adviser,

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