1988 malajacan thesis

T'

IN

THE

PHILIPPINES

of

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by MARCELINO Q. MALAJACAN, JR., LT. COL., PHILIPPINES B.S. Philippine Military Academy, 1971

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1988

DTIC D

I

ELECTEO

Approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

UNCLASSIFIED 1

SECUR TY CLASSIFICATION OF THiS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Ia. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

lb. RESTRICTIVE

MARKINGS

Unclassified 2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

3

2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNJGRADING SCHEDULE

is unlimited.

4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT

Approved for public release; distribution S. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

6b. OFFICE SYMBOL

U.S. Army Command and General

7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION

(If applicable)

Staff College

ATZL-SWD-GD

6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

Attn: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS

7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

66027-6900

8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

18b. OFFICE SYMBOL (I applicable)

9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.

I'

PROJECT NO.

TASK NO.

WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

TITLE (Include Security Classification)

Anti-Communist Vigilantes in the Philippines 12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Lieutenant Colonel 13a. TYPE OF REPORT

t'aster's Thesis

Iarcelino 0. 11al-jcan. 113b. TIME COVERED I FROM8-.J7TOj_.

jr,

114.

DATE OF R PORT (Year, Montfl, Day)

1988 June 3

S. PAGE COUNT

100

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17

COSATI CODES

FIELD

GROUP

SUB-GROUP

18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block num)

Anti-Communist Vigilantes, Philippines, Counterinsurgency

Insurgent flovement '9 ABSTRACT (Corrtinue on reverse if necessery and identify by block number)

See reverse side.

20. DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY IUNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED [3

OF ABSTRACT 0] SAME AS RPT. 22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIIDUAL

DD FORM 1473.84 MAR I

!21. 0

OTIC USERS

I

ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Unclassified

|27b TELEP 'ONF (Include Ai jj Czjt; ',;OFFICE.Y MbQL

83 APR edition may be used until exhausted.

All other editions are obsolete.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

UNCLASSIFIEJ

UNCLASSIFIED CURtTY CLAUSVICATtON OF ?KWt PAo9

19.

ABSTRACT (Continued)

This study examined the conditions which brought about the organization

and

growth of

anti-communist

vigilantes,

and

their Impact on the counterinsurgency effort and society in the Philippines. The analysis aimed at determining a suitable role for anti-communist vigilantes In a comprehensive counterinsurgency program and their future role in a post-insurgency Philippine society. Moreover, the research was also directed at defining the role of government or any of Its agencies in the anti-communist vigilante movements in the Philippines. This study used the historical method to collect, analyze, and integrate evidence. This was reinforced by a survey administered to all Armed Forces of the Philippines officers and enlisted personnel attending training in the Continental U.S. serice schools.

The study concluded that the spectre of CPP/NPA political violence, the resulting economic strain of "progressive taxes" exacted on the masses and businesses, and the inspiring motivation of the 1986 "People Power Revolution" are the conditions that bred courage to the people to spontaneously reject and openly confront, "vigilante style," the communist movement. The study also found that the Philippine qovernment, particularly President Corazon C. Aquino, should provide the lead in harnessing the ground swell against communism. President Aquino's enormous popularity Is the single unifying element, which can equal If not better the charisma and success of the late President Magsaysay in

fighting the HUrs in the 50's. Finally, the study finds that the politico-psychological impacts, void of an ideology, of vigilantism to a nation menaced by a violence prone insurgent movement more than outweighs the portent of anarchy that may result from the existence of popular militias, un-regulated by government

UfCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS

PAGE

ANTI

-COMMUNI THE IN

ST VIGILANTES PHILIPPINES

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

/

4

by MARCELINO Q. MALAJACAN, JR., LT. COL., PHILIPPINES B.S. Philippine Military Academy, 1971 Aoeesston For F- -

DTIC TAB U ri riounced JutlflatioJ

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1988

By Distribution/ Avalinbilty Codes i Dlst

AvaI and/or eca

I Approved for public release;

88-3238

distribution is unlimited.

_

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate

Lt. Col. Marcelino 0.

Title of thesis

Anti-Communist Vigilantes in the Philippines

Malajacan.jr.

Approved by:

4 0, Ma 0r Robert C. Leicht, M.S.A.

Thesis

I

Lt

CL

Committee

Chairman

Member, Graduate Faculty

Col. Ross D. Millican, P.S.C., P.S.C.

aMember,

(U.S.)

Consulting

Faculty

Colonek James L. Morrison, Ph.D.

Accepted this 3rd day of June 1988 by:

I~9 ~/

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

,Director.

Graduate Degree

Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the autnor and CArono nti.ssarhiy e zcj-eZet te .iewot the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (Reference to this study should include the forgoing statement.)

AS

STRACT

ANTI-COMMUNIST VIGILANTES IN THE PHILIPPINES, Lt. Col. Marcelino 0. Malajacan, Jr., Philippine Army, 100 pages This study examined the conditions which brought about the organization and growth of anti-communist vigilantes, and their impact on the counterinsurgency effort and society in aimed at determining a The analysis the Philippines. a in vigilantes for anti-communist role suitable comprehensive counterinsurgency program and their future Moreover, in a post-insurgency Philippine society. role the research was also directed at defining the role of government or any of its agencies in the anti-communist vigilante movements in the Philippines.) This study used the historical method to collect,-aaa-ryze, and integrate evidence. AThis was reinforced by a survey administered to all Armed Forces of the Philippines officers and enlisted personnel attending training in the Continental U.S. service schools.N The study concl~ded that the spectre of CPP/NPA political violence, the resulting economic strain of "progressive and the masses and businesses, taxes" exacted on the inspiring motivation of the 1986 "People Power Revolution" are the conditions that bred courage to the people to "vigilante and openly confront, spontaneously reject style," the communist movement. government, The study also found that the Philippine particularly President Corazon C. Aquino, should provide the lead in harnessing the ground swell against communism. Aquino's enormous popularity is the single President unifying element, which can equal if not better the charisma and success of the late President Magsaysay in fighting the HUKs in the 50's. F 4 the study finds that the politico-psychological impacts, vold of an ideology, of vigilantism to a nation menaced by a violence prone insurgent movement more than outweighs the portent of anarchy that may result from the existence of popular militias, un-regulated by government.

ii

ACKNOWLED(..M..NT

This study -

Phtlippines movements. of

Lt.

It

Col.

dedication Millican Without

examines a contempory phenomena

the was

Kalowski

and

Colonel

could

these

fine

anti-communist

vigilante

in

response

challenge

and

steered

not

have

of

Morrison,

my

guidance

and

unrelenting

progressed.

gentlemen

of

in the

of

professionalism

and

study

rise

initiated

Paul

their

.

the

Us

to by

the

Bob

infectious

Leicht,

thesis

Ross

committee.

encouragement, The

and

the

this

researcher

Australian

owes

armies

a

debt of gratitude I wish also to thank my wife Perla and our children Jay Paul, support

Tricia,

and

gratitude

to

my

Major

friendship

they

not

man

friday

and

John

have

Alejandrino

Jason,

understanding.

instructor

would

Patrick,

ACE, Al

so

I

Major

Albert

Pigason

Pienkowski. and

his

would

for

and

And, family

if

not

for

like

the

to

Nolan

the

conveyed.

been completed

Lala

Henry

Fehlauer

warmly

and

extend

and

The

effort,

who's

support

and

however,

for assistance

special

my

Tactics

encouragement

great classmates a

moral

of

my

Tim McNeil

thanks

to

Sonny

exemplifies

the

true meaning to the word "friendship." Finally, the

countless

I

would

Filipinos

to a very special

like who

to

dedicate

stand

friend - Ate Baby. lii

bravely

this for

effort

to

freedom and

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ................................

i

ABSTRACT ............................................

11

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................

iv

LIST OF TABLES ..........................................

vi

Chapter I.

INTRODUCTION Introduction .................................. 1 Background of the Problem ................... .3 Significance of the Study ................... 8 Scope of the Study ........................... 8 Research Questions ....................... 8 Assumptions .............................. 9 Limitations ............................... 9 10 Delimitations .......................... Methods and Procedures ...................... 10 10 Definition of Terms ........................ Vigilantism ............................ 10 Insurgency ............................. 11 Counterinsurgency ....................... 12 Political Terrorism ...................... 12 Alsa Masa ............................... 13 Nakasaka ................................ 13 National Democratic Front .............. 14 Moro National Liberation Front ...... 15 16 Summary ...................................... 17 Notes .......................................

2.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE Introduction ............................ Theory and Typology of Vigilantism ...... Theory and Tactics of Political Terrorism ............................... Strategies and Tactics to Combat Political Terrorism ....................... Summary...................................... Notes ....................................... iv

20 20 24 26 29 30

3.

METHODOLOGY Introduction................................ The Data.............................. ... The Procedures of Collecting Data .... The Survey.................................. The Treatment of Data....................... Summary..................................... Notes.......................................

4.

FINDINGS Introduction ....................... CPP/NPA Political Terrorism ................. Growth and Effectiveness of Anti-Communist Vigilantes in the Philippines.......................... The Survey ......................... ........... Origin and Growth of vigilantism ..... Role of the Philippine Government in Anti-Communist Vigilante Movements................................ Role of Anti-Communist Vigilante Movements................................ In COIN Programs......................... in other Government Programs........... In Post-Insurgency Philippine Society.............................. General Comments............................ Summary..................................... Notes.......................................

5.

32 33 33 34 35 36 37

38 40 47 51 53 55 58 58 59 61 62 63 64

CONCLUSIONS Introduction................................ The Research Questions...................... Recommendation.............................. Conclusion.................................. Notes.......................................

66 67 77 77 79

APPENDICES A: chronological history of the communist movement In the Philippines, (1922-1984) .... B: Chronological history of Goverment responses to the communist movement In the Philippines..................... C: Letter to Respondent............................ D: Survey Questionnaire Form.......................

86 90 91

BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................

94

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST...............................

98

V

9

*-Is-

Table

I

of

.--

le

4-1

Survey Population and Response............... 52

Table 4-2

origin of Alsa Hasa......................... 54

Table

4-3

Success of Alsa Hasa........................ 55

Table

4-3

Survey Responses............................ 56

Vi

(H-AP

T'I] :

ONE~

I NTR~ODUCT

ION

well-led, a today exists there Moreover, a with insurgency communist disciplined sophisticated political infrastructure and growing The Communist Party of the military capability. (CPP/NPA) bears Army / New People's Philippines little resemblance to. the Hukbalahap insurgency of in its ultimate objective of overthe 1950's excep throwing the goverment by force - by all accounts it is far more efficient and dangerous. Committee on Foreign Relations. Situation in the Philipines. A Staff Report (1984)

Introduction

The communist beginning when

to

the

early

communist of

toppled

Tsarist

political

role

in as

a

in

the

It

resistance

Japanese during World War

II.

to of

in the

Russian

developed

1932

election

a period

attracting

by

regime.

the

-

was

awed

organization

particitated it's

people

in the Philippines traces its

1920's

ideology

imagination the

movement

a

surrender

after

the

interest

revoiution from an

political

1948

movement

largely which

and that

outlawed

party

that

because fought

of the

Angered by the parliamentary

failure of 1948 and encouraged by the weapons not

world history

war,

the

the Party did

communist

developed into an insurgency that challenged the

movement "showcase

of

United

cold

democracy

States

war

of

the

early

during

In Asia"

1950's.

the

decline

Its

as

east-west the

pro-

Soviet Partldo Komunlsta ng P1l1pinas / Rukbong Mapagpalaya nq

Bayang

(CPP/NPA) is

strategy. to 26,

a

it

differentiate by

1968

former

11

chairman Jose

founding

the

movement's

as

the

party called

PKP,

was

founded

young

and communist

leader Bernabe Buscayno, a.k.a. Kumander Dante. Today, threat

to

democracy affects its

at

the

CPP/NPA

on

continues

to

itself

December

including

members

PKP

Sison

Maria

flexible

of

CPP,

from the

Maoist

/ New People's

the Philippines

reflection

The revitalized

the

as

rise

subsequent

Party of

oriented Communist Army

and

(PKP/HMB)

be

the

guerrilla

2

the

greatest

the security of the government and the return of in

the

least

political

Philippines. 80%

and

of

the

The

communist

country's

military presence

is

approximately 45,000 villages.

This

Deputy

Defense

Assistant

Pacific Affairs

Secretary

of

74

insurgency 3 provinces and

felt

in 18%

of

was aptly described by for

East

Asian

on December 1, 1986:

The Communists have undertaken their revolutionary activities with increasing boldness since President Aquino came to power in February. The NPA, the military arm of the CPP, has approximately 23,000 troops, not all of them armed. rhe number of violent incidents is down, but the level of political agitation in both urban and rural areas is up. No one can quantify how effective these increasingly open activities have been, but the combination of economic contraction and increasing radical agitatiYn endangers President Aquino's fragile democracy.

2

the

and

The either of

by

the

government

omission

or

situation

by

a

bewildered

did

capitalize

upon

within

the

file

People

Power

and

reconciliation

by

February

President

Marcos,

arms

come

down

there

was

and

Instead, respite

that

from

conveniently

a 60-day ceasefire.

the

a

an

government

the

amnesty

resurgence

provided

by

of

the

of

promise

to

Jailed

by

to

with

did

hills

the

strategy

communists would the

by the

Instead,

election

the

CPP/NPA. their

materialize.

violence long

who

those

lay down

not

it

confusion

Including communists offering

to

legitimacy

1986.

negotiations

seeking

power

The

rigid

with

complying

former

hopes

a

adopted

advantage

to

of

Aquino,

CPP/NPA 5 generated

of

detainees

Government

level

the

political

and

movement.

high

C.

take

ascension

of

release

surrender,

to

internationally and

Revolution

government

Corazon

failed

its

the

and

Aquino

design,

communist

enjoyed domestically rank

President

following

confront not

of

after

the

negotiations and

6

Background of the Problem

The

mobilization,

social

people to combat

revolutions

throughout world

history.

the

Philippines

period.

For

three

dating

and

quasi-military, of

and insurgencies has

This tactic back

centuries

of

3

to

the

has

the

been used

been applied

Spanish

Spanish rule,

in

colonial

natives

were

integrated

enlisted

or

Into

the

American

war,

the

United

to

track

down

Filipinos

to

resistance the

after

Funston

Colonel

known

natives,

posed

as

General

Emilio

"Macabebe

the

islands under

Scouts",

captured

and

armed

of

the

occupation of

insurgents

as

native

collapse

eventual

States

United

the

of

guerrillas

the

to

led

This

Aguinaldo.

used

successfully

States the

quell

Spanish-

the

following

immediately

years

the

to

7 law and order.

pocket rebellions and to restore In

force

colonial

General

Aguinaldo. World known as spies

War

saw the

ruthless

use

"Makapilis", by the Japanese

and

quasi-military/police

replete with by

II

the

stories

Makapilis

of

to

collaborators,

occupation forces

forces.

brutalities

extract

of

and

The

period

as is

excesses committed

information

from

suspected

resistance fighters and sympathizers. A War

II

new and

States. known ag

as

forces,

confronted

subsequent

was

a

the

Nation

independence

Moscow

oriented

after

from

World

the

communist

United

insurgency

Partido Kumunista ng Pilipinas/ Hukbong Mapaglaya

xyn

the

its

This

civilian of

challenge

(PKP/HMB). forces

Republic while

counterinsurgency

from

This

another

against not

a

strategy

ushered

period

perspective

communist decisive in

4

the

-

in

the

the

insurgency. component

early 1950's,

use

of

protection Civilian of were

the used

locally

by

military commanders

in support

of

the

national

counterinsurgency effort. The of

the

rectification

PKP

resulted

campaign that

followed

the

of

in

creation

a

the

more

lefeat

militant

communist party which set out to correct errors, avoid past and

mistakes

rebuild

Marxist-Leninist

and

the

Adopting

party.

Mao-Tse-Tung

a

thought as

the reestablished communist party

of

mixture

its

ideology,

(CPP/NPA) pursued, in the

1960's, a policy of subversion aimed at the elite and youth in

the

urban

September

areas.

1972

mobilization until

the

triggered

phase

arrest

chairman.

The

The

of in

declaration the

start

their 1976

of

campaign.

of

Jose

of

Martial

the 10

This

Maria

new leadership modified

rural

Law or

in

mass

continued

Sison,

the

the communist

CPP

armed

struggle by giving new impetus to urban guerilla warfare or "sparrow

unit

strategy

of

operations."

armed

As

struggle,

a

supplement

followed 11 "take the enemy's fortress from within". The

what

is

it

Armed city Partisans

now

notoriously

(ACP's),

known

as

to

Sun

the

Tsu's

late

political, corollary

sixties

and

agitation, function

organizations

and

of

the

early

and

"sparrows,"

providing

officials

in

5

the

teams

security

maxim

were

of the

The ACP's of

seventies

propaganda

CPP

forerunner

CPP/NPA urban guerrillas of the early 1970's. the

the

to

were with the

urban centers;

more the party

whereas

the

sparrow

units

practiced

violence and terror.1 Davao,

a

city

laboratory

for

military,

political,

experiments, to

export

in

CPP/NPA

the

extreme

Mindanao

urban and

use

of

terror

Island,

terrorism.

political

became

Motivated

psychological

communist

these

the

2

the

by

impacts

the

of

the

party by the mid-1980's started

tactics

to

other

urban

centers

in

the country. 13 The

period

organization into

of

also

witnessed

religious

anti-communist

fanatics

movements

in

the and

formation

tribal

remote

areas

and

minorities of

Mindanao

14 similar to the Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam experiences.

Today, and

growth of

to

combat

terror

that

movement,

of

the

February 1986 of

leftist

rejection unique

of

Alsa

anti-communist

ex-President

groups the

phenomena

and

the

cities

communist

anti-communist

in

Davao

guerrillas.

This

Masa, and the

groups

trace

City

is

Marcos. 1 5

These

original

other armed

their

People Power Revolution that

groups were dubbed by

original

organized

urban

which was dubbed

the

by

formation

a people's uprising against the violent

CPP/NPA

unarmed

the

in towns

waged

the

spontaneously

and

regime

experiences

campaigns

Significantly,

widely perceived as excesses

Philippines

anti-communist movements

the

insurgents. movement

the

origin

to

toppled the

anti-communist

"vigilantes" to discredit their success and

media.

communist but

This

movement also 6

spontaneous is

not

perceived

and

open

only seen as by

some

a as

I

unprecedented nature

of

in

the

counterinsurgency Filipino

history.

"vigilante"

The

spirit

unique

was

aptly

described by Brian Johnson in his historical account of the February 1986 Revolution:

Word of attack flashed over the Catholic radio station Veritas, and the citizen defenders prepared to make their stand at Ortigas Avenue. Traffic had been nearly normal there, Just minutes before, as an advance group of vigilantes started to fill sandbags and build knee-high barricades. Now the Intersection received an adrenalin rush of pure panic. Thousands made a dash from nearby Camp Crame (pronounced crah-may) rebel base and frantically began to reinforce the pathetic barrier. People surged into the path of oncoming traffic. Cars skidded to a halt as astonished drivers found a crowd dragging trees, buses, and burning tires across the road. Someone who had brought a PA system from Crame, set it atop a red station wagon, and began to direct cars and taxicabs into open spots in the barricades. "Hi", said the vigilantes. "We need your car. The tanks are coming. Please flatten the tires." Amazingly, almost ever-hody leapt out and started tearing off valve caps.

The a

model

order

of

to

hundreds

this the

of

dislocated city.

"Alsa Hasa" movement of Davao City appears to be

city

the

political

of

areas

by

The

brought police

movement peace and

success

of

President

Corazon

Aquino

affected

or

to

infrastructure

organize unarmed

7

the

of

the

the

"Alsa

by

the

law and lives It

CPP

a

of also

in the

Hasa",

launched

vigilantes or

threatened

insurgents. 17

restored

civilians.

the

wide program to in

and

military,

Inspired

government

phenomena.

the

nation

"Nakasaka", communist

Significance of the Study

This about

the

study

examines

organization

vigilantes,

and

their

effort and society at

determining

the

and

conditions growth

impact

on

of

the

suitable

role

brought

anti-communist

counterinsurgency

in the Philippines.

a

which

The analysis aims for

anti-communist

vigilantes in a comprehensive counterinsurgency program and their

future role

Moreover, role

of

the

in a post-insurgency Philippine society.

research

government

or

is

also

any

of

communist vigilante movement it

will

contribute

intensity conflict

to

the

(LIC) and

directed its

at

agencies

defining in

the

in the Philippines. body

of

the

anti-

As such,

knowledge

on

military operations short

low of

war.

Renne of the Rtudv

Research Questions

The

focus of the study is to explore the following

questions and sub-questions: What are the organization vigilantes?

conditions which brought about the and growth of anti-communist

What is the role of anti-communist vigilantes the counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines?

i8

in

Should the Philippine Government organize, control and direct the anti-communist vigilantes as part of a comprehensive counterinsurgency program? What impact do the anti-communist vigilantes have on other government counterinsurgency programs? What should be the future role of vigilantes in Philippine society?

anti-communist

The assumptions of the study are: That communist order

of

insurgency threatens

Philippine

society

the stability and

and

is

fundamentally

detrimental to it. That the people or a group of citizens have the moral and

legal

right

threat to their

to

organize

and

combat

a

perceived

common

community.

Limitations

The Moreover, of

the

Philippines

personnel

not

is

a survey of

population

the

study

of in

Continental include

to

officers and

was

Armed

service

limited

conducted Forces

of

schools and

United

personnel

States

of

currently

Philippines.

9

unclassified men of the

sources.

Armed Forces

only

among

the

Philippines

(AFP)

military academies

across

America on

the

(CONUS),

active

duty

limited

and

did

in

the

Delimitations

The 1987.

study

on

focuses

1984

period

the

October

to

However, an outline of the origin and growth of the

be

will

countermeasures

develop as&t

the

and

insurgency

communist

presented

government

of

in Appendix A and

B to

all

four

provide a cogent background. The elements

study

of

the

focus

Its

dependent

functions

States

will of

be

on

Army

counterinsurgency

of

the

four

Defence

and

Development

one

Internal

detail,

in

address,

United

doctrine.

strategy (IDAD),

not

will

inter-

social mobilization.

Methods and Procedures

This analyze,

study

and

uses

the

integrate

historical

evidence

interpretation of the evidence. a

survey

Philippines

administered officers

to and

method

to

arrive

to

collect,

at

a

new

This will be reinforced by

all

Armed

enlisted

Forces

personnel

of

the

attending

training in the CONUS service schools.

Definition of Terms

vigilantism Vigilantism, as used in this study is more inclusive than

the

Webster

dictionary 10

definition

of

the

term

"vigilance committee"

own

hands."

see

in

The

movies

meaning

or

as

goes

television

"taking the

law

beyond

connotation

wherein

handed down by an angered crowd a

group

of

rowdy

frustrated

cowboys

policeman's

Vigilantism in non-violent reponses or

political

objectives.

refer

of to

as

we is

a

horse

execution

thief;

of

the

or,

a

criminal

18

this

violence

political

Justice

study refers

to

the violent

of a group of people to the

terrorism

type

summary

one's

against criminal elements;

lynching

summary

elements of a community.

the

into

perpetrated In

this

violence

"establishment

by

study,

which

some

violence."

another it

is

or

political group

akin

to

for the

social

scientists

It

a

is

form

of

political violence or terrorism wherein the objective is to reinforce a political and social structure. Moreover, context of

the

19

word vigilantism or vigilante,

in the

its usage in this study, refers to a spontaneous

anti-communist movement

that first sprang up in Davao City,

Philippines.

Insurgency The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 (JCS Pub.l), Department Terms,

of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

defines

insurgency as

"an

orcganized

movement

aimed

at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." 2 0

!11

As

"evolutionary which

in

used

this

protracted the

added

warfare

to

will

theory"

also of

Mao

economic,

political,

dimensions

psychological

it

study,

the

Tse

Tung

social

and

The

term

war.

guerrilla

mean

will

further refer to a communist inspired

insurgency or

what

some

call

"subversive

scientists

political 21

insurgency. .

Counterinsurgency JCS

Pub.

1 defines

counterinsurgency

military, para-military, political,

as

economic, psychological

and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency." definition

in

"subversive" strategy

the

same

before

that

is

publication

insurgency directed

those

"

in

adds

the

to

describe

order

against

a

Another

communist

word a

inspired

22 insurgency or subversive insurgency.

The will

be

counterinsurgency

referred

to

in

this

strategy study will

described by Field Circular 100-20 defense and

and be

doctrine

that

that which

(FC 100-20) as

is

internal

23 development (IDAD).

Political Terrorism Terrorism refers to the deliberate use of terror or "political

violence",

as

a

tactic

by

insurgent

against the government, the military and the people.

12

forces

Alsa Masa Alsa uprising".

Masa,

It

communist

is

a

the

vigilante

Tagalog name

term,

adopted

movement

which

means

by

the

was

"people's

armed

organized

antiby

the

people of the district of Agdao, Davao City in spontaneous and

violent

response

to

the

political

terrorism

of

the

CPP/NPA urban guerrillas known as "sparrows". 24 The unit

Alsa

Hasa

operations

CPP/NPA

in

centers

the

that

political

crippled

City caught

the

interest

the

Philippines

and

similar

The

damage

that

the

the

sparrow

infrastructure

Davao

in

sprouted.

and

movement

movement

of

of

other

groups exacted

the

urban slowly

on

the

CPP/NPA in Davao City and the potential threat it poses to the

communist

leadership

of

discredit media, by

the

the Alsa

According

to

on

in

the

CPP/NPA.

human-rights

focusing

dubbed

movement

Thereafter,

Hasa

using

groups

and

the

General

In

order

elements

of

villa, 2 5

to

campaign

organizations

nature

de

alarmed a

leftist other

violent Renato

"vigilantes"

country

the

the

project

of

the to the

ensued

movement.

movement

was

a negative

and

derogatory character on the anti-communist Alsa Masa.

Nakasaka Nakasaka,

an

Nagkahlusang

Katawhan

for

is the

Peace,"

Identify

a

acronym Alang sa

name

government

for

Kallnaw

adopted

sponsored 13

the

by

or"

Visayan United

President

anti-communist

phrase People

Aquino

to

vigilante

movement.

It is

organized under the national supervision of

the Department of Local

Goverment

by the

insurgents.

direction and control

by the

local executives while the

The

local

is exercized

military commander

supervision

and

training

provides

in communities threatened

of

operational

that

unlike

activities. However,

the

is

Hasa, Nakasaka

Alsa

insists

government

the

of

"unarmed version"

the anti-

the

26

communist

vigilante

Government

is

progressive

elements

oriented

movement.

aimed

groups

at of

which

This

parrying

criticism

Philippines,

attacks

any

position

notably,

government

of

the

from

the

the

cause-

program

that

hurts the communist insurgent movement.

National Democratic Front The the

National

National

Liberation

the protracted war by the CPP CPP/NPA

Democratic Front

24,

to

1973,

"isolate

"imperialists,

feudalists,

and

all

organize

that

carried

in South Vietnam.

on April

cadres

Front

(NDF) is the

similar

to

banner

of

The NDF was organized

to coordinate the efforts of 27 enemy diehards", combat

and

bureaucratic

capitalists,"

anti-government/anti-Marcos

forces

in

strategy,

the

Philippine society. The third

weapon

The

other

and

the

NDF of

two are Army

is

the

CPP's

communist the which

united

insurgency

front in

the

Philippines.

Party, which provides the conducts 14

the

armed

direction, struggle. 2 8

Moro National Liberation Front The umbrella the

Moro

National

Liberation

organization which controls

Muslim

largest

secessionist island

In

chairman

Nur

Sison

in

organizing

1960's

called

Youth".

Nur

both young

the

Misuari

(MNLF)

largest in

radical

founder

youth

and

Joma,

as

study

movement

in

addressed

in the

the

they

are

focuses

on

the

Philippines.

the

The

MNLF

Jose

movement

popularly

the University of

the

faction of

Philippines. CPP

is

Mindanao,

Kabataang Makabayan, which means

professors at

This

movement

assisted the

Front

the

Southern

(MNLF)

Maria of

the

"Nationalist called-,

were

the Philippines.

anti-communist

vigilante

The

questions

specific

study are:

What are the conditions which brought about the organization and growth of anti-communist vigilantes in the Philippines? What is the role of anti-communist vigilantes the counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines? Should the Philippine Government organize, and direct the anti-communist vigilantes as a comprehensive counterinsurgency program?

in

control part of

What impacts do the anti-communist vigilantes have on other government counterinsurgency programs? what

should

vigilantes The better

be

the

future

role

of

anti-communist

in the Philippine society?

researcher

understanding

also of

found the

15

it

important

problem

by

to

ensure

providing

a a

chronological

outline

movement

and

the

form

appendices.

the

of

background

of

the

resulting This

presented

research

is

directed

knowledge

on

insurgency,

at

growth

government

is in

further this

of

communist

responses

aimed

ctiapter.

contributing

the

at

in

the

reinforcing Lastly,

the

to

the

body

counterinsurgency

and

military

operations short of war.

16

of

1. Col. Julius L. Javier, "A Study to Determine the Effectiveness of the Present Counterinsurgency Strategy of the Philippines" (Masteral Thesis, Command and General Staff College, 1985), 1-7. 2. David A. Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines", Problems of Communism, Sept.-Oct. 1984, 34. 3. James C. Clad, "Betting on Violence", Eastern Economic Review, 17 December 1987, 35.

Far.

4. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Implications of Recent Developments in the Philippines", (Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, December 1, 1986), 17. 5. Military",

Virgilio David, "President Aquino Philippine News, 17-23 Feb. 1988, 11.

and

the

6. Leif R. Rosenberger, "Philippine Communism: The Continuing Threat and the Aquino Challenge", Asia Conflict Zones, Lawrence E. Grinter and Young Whan Kihl, Eds. (New York, 1987), 191. 7. Lt. Col. Antonio S. Nale, "Employment of Natives in Counterinsurgency Operations in the Philippines" (Masteral Thesis, Command and General Staff College, 1983), 2. 8.

Ibid.,

2.

9. Makapili, an acronym for "maka pilipino,' means patriot. The Japanese occupation forces organized this paramilitary force t- gather informations on the resistance. These collaborators of WW II, in many instances, took advantage of their new found power and influence not only to gather intelligence and perform semi-police functions but also coerce and intimidate the people for their own personal advantage. Stories of gory abuses committed by the collaborators, which resulted in the death of guerrillas and innocent civilians, became propaganda material of the resistance movement. During the liberation of the Philippines by the Allied Forces under MacArthur, documentary accounts of violent reprisals against these collaborators were seen. Until today, the abuses of the Makapilis" continue to be a favorite theme of war movies.

17

L

_i'~m

imn

10.

Rosenberg, Communism In the Philippines, 35.

The use of urban guerrilla strategy has been 11. an experiment of the CPP/NPA as a complimentary form of The idea appears to have been borrowed armed struggle. from the Latin American experience with modification to There are reports that suit the Philippine environment. the CPP decided in 1987 to give emphasis to urban terrorism in the power leaders prevailed the more radical after 1986 the after Party the confronted that struggle Revolution. "Philippine Communism Gareth Porter, 12. Marcos", Problems of Communism. Sept.-Oct. 1987, 34.

After

No.1Philippines: the in "Insurgency 13. demonstrable", and widespread, marked, Deterioration Pacific Defence Renorter, Sept. 1985, 12. militia:

in the Philippines: 14. "Insurgency help or hindrance?", PDR, 15.

15. James Clad, "Vigilante Power: Far irregulars," anti-communist with Review, 23 April 1987, 32.

No.2-The

Aquino goes along Eastern Economic

16. Bryan Johnson, Four Days of Couraqe (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1987), 14. 17. Clad, Vigilante Power. 32. Rosenbaun Jon H. 18. yigilante Politics (New York: Press, 1976), 4. 19.

Ibid.,

C. Sederberg, and Peter University of Pennsylvania

5.

Dictionary of Pub.1, of Defense JCS 20. Dept. U.S. (Washington D.C.: Associated Terms and Military Government Printing Office 1986), 185. 21. The use of 'subversive' before insurgency is to describe the insurgent movement as communist inspired in The term, to the author's knowledge, has the Philippines. been used also by political scientists, notably Sir Robert Thompson, to define communist inspired zevolutionary war. 22.

JCS Pub. 1, 93.

23. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, FC Low Intensity Conflict (Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: CGSC, 100-20 1986), chap.3.

18

24. Clad, Vigilante Power, 33. 25.-------- , "Can vigilantes stop the rebels?", Manila Standard, 23 November 1987, 1.

communist

26. Nakasaka was organized, by Governor Douglas Cagas of Davao del Sur, as the unarmed version of the Alsa Masa of Davao City. Having a more palatable character, the Nakasaka caught the attention of the Aquino government, notably, the fervent anti-communist Secretary of Local Government Jaime Ferrer. The Government, on Ferrer's initiative expressed support for the movement and undertook a program to organize Nakasaka vigilantes in areas affected by CPP/NPA terrorism. 27.

Rosenberg, Communism in the Philipines, 41.

28. Javier, A Study to Determine the Effecttveness of Counterinsurgencv in the Philippines, 3-9 to 3-21.

19

CHAP

REV

I EW

I

TUR

I

L. I TERATURE

OF

Violence takes much deeper root in Irregular In the warfare than it does in regular warfare. to obedience by counteracted is it latter constituted authority, whereas the former makes a virtue of defying authority and violating rules. It becomes very difficult to rebuild a country, and a stable state, on a foundation undermined by such experience.

Introduction

The review

political literature study

existing

of

will

literature

this

of

objective

literature

chapter

to

related

terrorism and counterinsurgency. will

establish

step

forward.

the Within

foundation the

to

is

survey

a

present

vigilantism,

This

survey

of

from

which

the

conducted,

the

is divided into the following broad categories:

The theory and typology of vigilantism. Theory and tactics of political terrorism. Strategies

and

tactics

of

counterinsurgency

to

combat political terrorism.

Theory and Typologv of Vigilantism

Limited vigilantism.

literature

Rosenbaun

and

exists

on

Sederberg's 20

the

subject

of

Vigilante Politics

is

a

and

collection psychology

of

essays

of

dissecting the

vigilantism

"establishment

violence." 2

"establishment"

as

community's

elite

the

or

or

what

The

they

not

who

typology

refer

editors

people,

government,

nature,

to

described

necessarily

favor

as

the

the status

quo

3 and

look with suspicion on any proposal for change.

the aim

is to preserve the social

Thus,

values to which they are

accustomed. Rosenbaun understanding

and

the

Vigilantism:

An

Sederberg

meaning

Analysis

of

provide

a

vigilantism

of

view

in

towards

their

essay

Establishment Violence.

The

authors discuss the conditions that may result in vigilante action,

the types

socio-political

of vigilantism, and

political

order.

violence

The

as

by motivation or

maintain

(vigilantism),

values.

In

authors

this

define

violence

authors

acts

affected

of

or

describe

sociopolitical

coercion

restore of

vigilantism at

further

intent to create

continuum

directed

its relationship with

as

(revolutionary),

(reactionary)

social

political

violence,

the

of

deterring

form

the

the

political

revolutionary

or

reactionary change of social values. The emergence City

fits,

Rosenbaun

in

and

a

of anti-communist vigilantes

large

Sederberg.

sense,

the

Purists

definition

will

indeed

in Davao given

claim

by

that

the spontaneous response of the people of Davao City to the political

violence

violence

which

of

the

the

CPP/NPA

authors 21

is

a

classify

form as

of

political

vigilantism.

In

the

attention is control

discussion of

drawn to the authors' views

vigilantism"

Rosenbaun and

further

political

vigilantism,

on "social-group-

"regime-control

vigilantism."

that social-group-control

from the establishment violence "directed

groups

redistribution is

and

Sederberg maintain

vigilantism stems

against

the typology of

competing

of

values

within

distinguished character

or

for,

by

or

system." 5

the

the

objective

advocating

communal, of

the

This

a form

economic,

origin.

or

Thus,

when a low-ranked group attempts to rise above its socially prescribed position; Klan

engage

in

act to check with

faith;

spark

dissident

anti-black

violence;

when

religious

groups

the rise of secularism, heresy, or competition

another

groups

when racial groups such as the Ku Klux

when

violent

political

the

anti-feudal

reaction; views

and

acts

when

generate

of

groups

vlo!ent

peasant

espousing

responses,

a

6 social-croup-control vigilantism exists.

The study

and

type is

vigilantism. violence

7

vigilantism

discussed The

by

essay

the

that

Here,

establishment

into the

a

defines

more

authors

violence

with

also

authors it

intended to alter the regime,

superstructure base."

of

is

coups,

upon

the

regime-control

as

"establishment

in order to make the

effective elucidate

bears

the

guardian

of

relationship

private armies, and

the of the

coersive acts of groups within an establishment. The in

the

anti-communist

Philippines

fall

vigilante in 22

both

movements types

of

developing

vigilantism.

Alsa Masa, the armed and spontaneous reaction of the people of

Davao

control of

City

fits

more

to

the

vigilantism.

On the

Philippine

Government

the

unarmed

Nakasaka

suggests

category

other hand, in

the

the

of

social-group-

the

participation

formation

flavor

of

of

the

regime-control

vigilantism. William

P.

Kreml's

essay,

Persoality,

provides

psychological

aspects

of

his

with

description

readers

a

us

Kreml

describe

state

of

some

Philippine

a

true

the

researcher

of

the

character. 8

and who

"lives

tension." 9

views

the

provides

essence

one

psychological

the

of

The author

personality as

Vigilante

discussion

of

vigilante

permanent

context,

a

vigilantism.

his

behavior,

vigilante's

with

The

the

in

In

a

the

spectre

of

urban violence as to mean or equate to what Kreml described as "permanent psychological tension." The

compilation

comparative F~ed

R.

ethnic

sense.

Of

der

Mehden

von

Violence.

Mehden's

minorities the

vigilante

violence

discusses

particular

possible

and

role

directed

instigated;

or spontaneously popular.10

phenomena

does

Philippines,

the

fact

that

to

23

root

against

author

but

Although the

of

communities the

also

play

communities

approved

"pariah"

the

violence

governments

government

relate

a

the essay by

The

"pariah"

directed;

not

the

Africa. that

at

is

in

"Pariah" Communities and

explains

Asia

vigilantism

interest

entitled

essay

in

discusses

government

also

In as, not

present in

present

the anti-

communist vigilante movement traces Its history from ethnic minorities,

mobilized

by

military

fight

Muslim secessionist movement

to

the

70's, makes the essay The protect

its

conducted

a

government

Natives

Phllinnines.

gives

In

comparative

minorities

in the

Philippines, and of

of

existence

of

natives

in

Marcos

government

and

the

In

the

relevant to the study.

is

by Lieutenant

Employment the

role

the

In

also

Colonel

political

discussed Antonio

in

S.

the

Nale

to

study

entitled,

in Counter-insurgency Operations In this

study,

account

of

the

the

counterinsurgency

Laos.

violence

then

Lt.

Col.

utilization

of

experiences

Nale

ethnic

in Malaya,

His positive endorsement of the use

counterinsurgency

is

concluded

with

this

statement: Regardless of their national identity, aborigines, hill tribes, natives, or whatever they may be called, have several things in common. They are the neglected and the most often exploited sector of society. They are simple and trustworthy people. They are clannish and good warriors. Because of these qualities, natives everywhere particularly in Asia are very good potentials for insurgency or counterinsurgency warfare, if properly employed. Theory and Tactics of Political Terrorism

The

book,

Political

Terrorism

by

Alex

P.

Schmid,

presents an in-depth discussion of political violence. volume

brings

together

and

literature

the

subject

of

to

main

provide

political

concepts, an

theories,

excellent

terrorism. 1 2 24

research The

The

data-bases guide

to

typology

of

terrorism various

as

presented

forms

of

by

Schmid

terrorism.

clearly

Of

discerns

importance

the

are

the

definitions provided which helps one to gradually grasp the distinctions between "insurgent

political terrorism, more particularly

terrorism,"

from

the

spectrum

of

political

violence. Relatedly, the identification the

process

author

writer

strategy,

presents

described

terrorism" 1 3

of

expounded

the

to

as

"a

significance

of

key mechanism

in

generate

significance

quoting R.M. Mombolsse's

the

of

support.

selective

The

terror

by

glueprint for Revolution:

Thus if the victim is a peace officer or an occupying soldier, others belonging to that class will identify themselves as members of a marked group. This group will probably be bol terrorized and subjected to disorientation effect. In the

the

highly

terror

in

context

of

selective

and

organizational

party

discipline

Sio sc

5iowly

adopted by the

the

discriminate work

during

the

deteriorated

-

CPP/NPA political

and

use

enforcement

chairmanship into

Party leadership

of

an

of

terrorism, political of

inter-

Jose

Maria

adventurist

in their

weapon

effort to sustain

the burgeoning Party and army. Guerrillas Richard historical lay

man's

and

Terrorists,

Clutterbuck, point

of

discusses

view.

approach

to

terrorism

and

the

Moreover,

the

author

The the

terrorist provides 25

book

a

book

written

terrorism provides

understanding intentions relevant

and

from a of

simpler

by the or

political activities.

observations

of

factors their

in an

media,

environment;

interrelationships,

which

and

people generate

police,

awareness

and and

15

develops cooperation In addressing terrorism. The by

Sam

volume

is

Sarkesian,

historians

on

Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare,

the

a collection tactics

and

of

by political

works

theory

of

edited

revolutionary

ccnflicts. The volume is a good research guide in the study of revolutionary warfare including terrorism.

Strategies and Tactics of Counterinsurgency to Combat Political Terrorism

Grant Tactics

Wardlaw's

tactics of political terrorism.

discusses

the

potential responses

aspects

of

Theory,

The author

counter-measures

that a government can adopt.

addresses topics such as the role of in

Terrorism;

and Counter-Measures gives a basic understanding of

the theory and also

Political

counter-terrorist

operations,

and

The book

intelligence agencies the

relationships

of

police to defense forces, the development of anti-terrorist legislation which

and

media

international

reporting

of

treaties, terrorist

and acts

the

way

in

might

be

nature

of

regulated. 16 The

author,

In

explaining

the

countermeasures against political terrorism took note of E. V. Walter's conclusion particularly

in

the

that

"it

Is

impossible

for states,

post colonial era, to pursue 26

policies

that

will,

except

conditions

and

rare

instances,

grievances,

terrorists. 17 Walter's

in

Wardlaw

conclusion

real

is

the

such

powers,

involvement

as

that

the

surveillance, of

media

restrictions,

cautioned

of

danger

of

armed and

of

comprehensive

counterinsurgency

Armed

Forces

and

Is

discussed

Modern

in

which

Ian

police internal

However,

he

results

in

18

strategies in

to

repressive

forces

others.

of

the

motivate

increased

overreaction

overview

of

response of

the destruction of the society being defended. A

many that

introduction

security,

the

imagined,

concluded

counter-measures greater

or

remove

F.

and W.

Counterinsurgency.

tactics

Beckett's

Comparative

techniques and experiences

are discussed and examined which

will

in

be

of

lessons

great

from

contemporary

import

strategies

and

counterinsurgency. failure

largely due

analysis

tactics

counter-insurgencies

America give examples of the

the

the

of to

of

in

of the

data.

The

recent

and

Rhodesia

and

Latin

multi-dimensional character of

Noteworthy is the author's finding

the

urban

guerrillas

the misreading of

the

in

Latin

that

America

Is

very fine distinction

between "public sympathy and public opposition." 19 Field provides end

of

Circular

the US the

Intensity

its

Conflict.

mobilization

Low-Intensity Conflict,

Army's doctrine for operations at the lower

spectrum

and emphasis the

(FC) 100-20,

of

Of

conflict

interest

is

referred the

field circular gives in

a

27

renewed

to the

counterinsurgency

to

as

a

Low-

importance

population and

environment.

The

FC,

in the discussion on security stated that "The security

effort

should

be

the

local

whereby

directed

toward

population

provide for its own security." Three at

hand.

other

These

are

books

establishing

can,

with

conditions

limited

support,

20

are

of

relevance

to

the

subject

On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism by

Ariel Merari;

Defeating Communist Insurgency by Sir Robert

Thompson,

Counter-Guerilla

and

Exience

by

Bohannan.

These

Colonel

strategies and

Napoleon

works

environments.

that

be

valeriano civic

returnees,

this

gather of the

and

the

of

Huk the role

historical

in

that

or

the

used

the

of

as

anti-communism such

Philippines.

FC

100-20

centralized

effective

sympathetic

population

Colonel

role

that Huk

in

the

relevant used

to

in an environment is

the

transpiring

importance

intelligence

operations.

is essential

28

the

techniques

what

stresses

counterinsurgency

of

experiences are

as

all-source

insights

populace

intelligence may find application

emerging

the

population and

from the

of

insurgency and

are

local

His

Charles

experiences

in

such

relocation

lessons

and

experiences

Campaign

of

The Philinoine

Valeriano

Importance

intelligence. 2 1

study

"unified, an

provide

from

the

played,

gathering of to

derived

during

action

D.

tactics developed

terrorist can

Operations;

in COIN.

of

system" 2 2

The

role

in a to

of a

Sumary

This

chapter

has

pertinent to the study.

reviewed

these

theories,

available

materials

It discussed the

relevant aspects

terrorism, and

counterinsurgency

of vigilantism, political as

the

concepts,

and

lessons

learned

relate

positively or negatively to the research. Having

scrutinized

the

available

literature,

the

stage is thus set to establish the methodology by which the data

collected

will

be

processed,

analyzed,

interpreted. This will be the focus of the next chapter.

29

and

MOT3S

Liddell-Hart, B.H. 1. Publishers, Inc., 1974) 369.

Sre

(Praeger

Sederberg, C. Peter and Jon Rosenbaun H. 2. • Violence." Establishment of An Analysis "Vigilantism: H. Jon Rosenbaun and Peter C. ed. Politics, Vigilante Sederberg (University of Pennsylvania Press, Inc., 1976) 4. 3.

Ibid.,

266.

4.

Ibid.,

5.

5.

Ibid.,

12.

6.

Ibid.,

12-17.

7.

Ibid.,

17.

8.

William P. Kreml, "The Vigilante Personality", SPolitic, ed. H. Jon Rosenbaun and Peter C. Sederberg ( University of Pennsylvania Press, Inc., 1976) Chapter 3. 9.

Ibid.,

43.

10. Fred R. von der Mehden, " Pariah Communities and Violence", Vigilante Politics, eds. H. Jon Rosenbaun and Peter C. Sederberg (University of Pennsylvania Press, Inc., 1976) 221. 11. Lt. Col. Antonio S. Nale, "Employment of Natives in Counterinsurgency Operations in the Philippines" (Masteral Thesis, Command and General Staff College, 1983), 91. 12. Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism; A Guide to Conceots. Theories. Data Bases and Literature. (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, Inc., 1975) 1. 13.

Ibid.,

201.

14.

Ibid.,

200.

15. Te

Richard L. Clutterbuck, Guerrillas (Chicago University Press, 1980) 11.

16. Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism Cambridge University Press, 1982) xi.

30

and

(Cambridge:

17.

Ibid.,

184.

18.

Ibid.,

184.

19. Ian F.W. Beckett, Armed Forces and Counter-insurgency (New York: St. Martin's Press, 123.

Modern 1985),

20. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, EL 100-20. Low-Intensity Conflict (Fort Leavenworth, Ks: U.S. Army CGSC, 1986), 3-3. 21. Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Exp!trlenc (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 241. 22.

U.S. Army CGSC, F

31

.0-20l,4-3.

CHAEPTER

I

I

I

METHODC:OOO

Introduction

The

purpose

investigative

of

this

framework

chapter

In

the

analysis,

and

interpretation

this,

data

collected

the

followed

by

a

description

used

data

collection.

in

research

will

survey

an

to

attempt

The set

the

data.

conclusions

establish

To be

techniques

be

achieve

discussed,

and

explained the

the

processing,

data.

study will

combine

approach

methods

later,

impacts

with

a

an

understanding

historical

the

of

a

method

in

of

the

in the Philippines. last

step

will

in

the

procedures drawn

are

utility

the completed

chapter

their

to

formulate

analysis be

simple

this

Philippines and

be

will

Moreover, of

the

the

To

establish

criteria The

of

generally

retrospective

developments

the

to

collection,

of

for

is

will

and

and

so

research

interpretation

established

relevant

also in

procedures

explain

to

that

the the

of the

thesis. intended

the COIN effort

possible application elsewhere.

32

and

in the

The~

The

data

classified consists Forces

as of

of

Schools

the

the

as

data

including

unpublished

violence,

vigilantism,

news

communist

had

topic

survey U.S.

year,(2)

(3)

and

Armed

Service

from

the

experiences

from data

minutes

data

of

Army

personal

and

or

Primary

a

in

generally

of

governmental

extracted

events

and

reports

and

of social scientists.

Secondary

as

from

school

who

records

scientific findings

well

(1)

transcripts

such

are

secondary.

1987-1988

thesis

project

personnel

persons

original

activities

and

collected

the

of to

researcn

Philippines

during

pertaining

this

primary

data

interviews

from

of

Dat.g

consists

of

dissertations insurgency,

accounts,

vigilante

and and

commentaries,

movements,

published theses

on

studies political

counterinsurgency as

and

analysis

political

of

anti-

violence,

and

government countermeasures.

The Procedures of Collecting Data

This situation its

as

study it

significance

about

its

is

is

to

intended

unfolding the

development. As

to describe in

the

observable stated

the

contemporary

Philippines conditions

above,

and

that

relate brought

the study relies

on

primary and secondary data. Data

for

a

"retrospective 33

survey" 1

of

a

population

having past experiences and/or of

anti-communist a

supplements

of

review

the

the

conditions

the

of

recent

Philippines By

materials.

past

which

brought

The understanding of the past provide

hopefully

will

present

the

historical

about the present situation. and

in

the past" 2 , the researcher aims to

"Illuminating aspects of discover

moveiaents

vigilaLe

in the evolution

involvement

utile

a

and

effective approach to counterinsurgecy.

Th

The feeling

urve

of security by the survey population is

deemed significant considering the factionalism existing Ln insurgency situation confronting

their armed forces and the their survey

nation

today. Given a

population

identity

of

rightist),

the

be

based

researcher

several

instituted. identify

may

concern

First,

the

used

survey documents. was

made

designed

to to

appear

as

the

their

knowledge

of

the

the

as

perceived

were

being

anonymity

requested

questionnaire.

office of the military attache was

of

assure

to

respondents on

responses

(widely

procedures

themselves

Washington

on

that

were

not

Second,

to the

in the Philippine embassy in intermediary

source

of

the

And third, the thesis committee chairman as

encourage

the

reseacher.

uninhibited

questions.

34

This

procedure

responses

to

was

survey

The Treatment of Data

The question step

treatment

and

of

data

sub-questions

processes.

First,

pertaining

will

to

basically

questionnaires

the

thesis

follow a three

from

the

survey

population will be screened to classify the respondents

in

accordance

or

staff

with

duties

their rank,

in

the

branch of service, command

field,

and

years

service. This screening will also survey questions

of

active

military

include classification of

into groups of related

items to the thesis

question and sub-questions. Second,

an

data 3 will

and qualitative

presented by David application

to

the

Questions

12 to

analysis

described

Process

in

analysis

16

first

data Fox

quantitative,

incomplete,

using the concepts

The quantitative approach finds eleven

require in

of

be conducted

J. Fox.

Education.

of

answer." 4

analysis

This

classifies

of

the application of

chapter

from

questions

22

of

step

Fox's

the

survey.

quantitative The Research

will

also

include

the

"respondents

who

refuse

to

these

data

results

will

as

incomplete

which

require attention. And

third,

the

applying

the

rules

described

seven

his

manual.

5

of

distribution,

The

proportions,

by

be

Lawrence

determination mean,

median,

survey will come from Clark's manual.

35

interpreted Clark

of and

the

in

by part

frequency

mode

of

the

The chapter Is an attempt to create the investigative

framework

This

framework,

research

that will as

be

used

explained

by Nan

in addressing five of

research:

namely;

collection,

data

measurement analysis,

in the Lin,

research proper. will

guide

the

the eight phases of social of

information

interpretation

and

items,

data

reporting,

and integration of findings in theory or pragmatic use. 6

The research basically uses the historical approach in its investigative design.

This methodology is, however,

reinforced

by

the

perceptions

and

interpretations

the

limited

use

population

of

of

retrospective of

Filipino

actual

survey

experiences

officers,

cadets,

of by and

enlisted personnel undergoing training in the United States of America. Lastly, this chapter also explains the specifics of the

method

used

in

the phases

of social

research.

details will steer the study in the following chapters.

36

These

Notes 1.

David

J.

Fox,

The Research Process In Education

(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,1969), 2.

Ibid.,

3.

Fox,

4.

Ibid.,

5.

Lawrence

429.

430. The Research Process In Education,

chaps.

21-22. 634. P.

Clark,

Introduction to Surveys and 8.

Inrviews (New York: Policy Studies Associates, 1981), York:

6. Nan Lin, Foundations of Social Research McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976), 5.

37

(New

CHAEiSTER

F INDI

IV

NGS

The communist guerrillas arrived shortly before midnight at an isolated village near here, and gathered residents for a meeting on the baskeball court. Sternly, the rebels warned the farmers that they should not Join the self-styled Citizens' AntiCommunist Army, a vigilante organization spreading through neighboring mountain villages. They were still lecturing when Just after daybreak, 14 Army regulars and 100 vigilante farmers armed with homemade pistols and rifles suddenly appeared. The surprised guerrilla 1 fired a few shots then fled down a jungle trail.

Introduction

This

incident,

special

report

familiar

and

terrorism,

to

the

growing

agitation,

anti-communist Philippines. developing

described

Washington

response and

vigilante Moreover,

into

a

by

of

Gregg Post,

the

propaganda movement

major

is

people

of Is

anti-communist

Jones

the

in

his

becoming towards

a the

CPP/NPA.

The

spreading

in

the

vigilantism

is

fast

in

the

the

determinant

factor

political development of the country. This corresponding

chapter

presents

interpretations

the

data

gathered

with

that

will

lead

study

38

the

to

the

findings.

will

be used

The

will

of

chapter the

describe

CPP's

the

political

evolution

under

effective

organizational

Commander

leadership Commander the

present

political practice

leadership

Bilog.

contemporary

Philippine

by

the

of

tool

Jose

and

Moreover,

the

insurgency,

as

perceived

Bilog.

This

researcher

in

account

of

Philippines.

chapter the

Finally, the

anti-communist

This

and analysis of

will

Maria

to

this

presentation

of

accompanying

related

survey

set

the

Sison

an

weapon

Rodolfo Salas, will

violence by

in

the

the

discuss the

present

capture

of

the

conditions

present

vigilantism. the

historical

vigilante

movement

stage

the

for

that

in

the

presentation

the survey data.

survey conducted.

these

thereafter

a

is deemed very relevant

determining

will

from

Party

brought about the evolution of anti-communist This

section

of enforcing

following

presentation

This

author

political

CPP/NPA,

historical

violence

tenure of

of

the

a

psychological

role

of

the methodology

terrorism.

the Party adopted during the

a.k.a. the

of

selective

discipline

in

interpretation of data.

firstly,

will,

very discriminate and

which

established

in the analysis and

This account

framework

the

chapter This thesis survey

will

will

be done

question

or

questions,

questions,

interpretations of these

present

and

findings.

39

the

the

through

results

individual

sub-questions, the

of

responses analysis

the to and

C(PP/NPA Political Terrorism

erring in

a

Rodolfo

the

five-man

NPA hit

the

squad himself,

terrorism

in

the

urban

terrorism

did

not

revolutionary

Having

in 1977.

Sison

villagers

a

as

strategy

until

of

Party

control

firm

of

capture

Jose Ma.

political

the

established

Salas

following

in

role

major

of

"revolutionary

the

coerce

employment

The

countryside. play

or

entice

to

Justice"

was

extent,

great

meting

of

pretense

the

under

practiced

a

to

Terrorism,

of

leaders

Party

to

security

providing

centers.

urban

the

to

and

members

highly

punishment

disciplinary

Party

of

execution

selective

ideologue

the

to

confined

was

Sison,

Ma.

Jose

the

of

as of

use

The

concerned.

the chairmanship

during

political violence founder,

is

insurgency

communist

the

far

as

tactic

new

a

not

is

terrorism

Political

the

chairman

founding

Party's

time

been a one

of a

leader

oversaw the growth of

Salas

weapon

supplementary

of

armed

struggle. 2 Ross Munro, described

Salas

Communist

Party

slaying

Salas,

of

three

of

mission

as

in

a Time a

who

spread

the

the

later

half

Navy

The

with

and

the

the

70's,

in

account 40

who on

and

fanaticism

revolutionary zeal of

" 3

officers

ruthless

Southeast

brilliant

Philippines,

US

1974.

combined

"ruthless

the

in

correspondent

of

leader

the

ambush

civic

action

communist the

of

the

led a

Asia,

style

Party's

of

cadres

the countryside during significantly

for

the

success

of

the

CPP/NPA

infrastructure

and

in establishing

network.

Munro

a new

added

united

that

front

comparing

Salas with Sison, the former: ... seems from the beginning to have been more concerned with ends than with means. Whatever is required to win the struggle for power is Justified. It was Salas for instance, who wrote or at least authorized those party's carte-blanche policy toward the klling of civilians In NPA guerrilla base areas."

The the

central

organizational

memberships. then

The

effect

economic

lure

process

of

the of

of

growth

ignored

by

decided in

success

move was

confronting

coersive

was

committee

into

Party

timed with

Marcos

terror

agitation

proceeded

almost

the

Marcos

regime.

By

in

19846

and

10,000

to

translate guerrilla

the

12,000

the

social

and

propaganda,

the

unnoticed Thus,

problem

combining

and

guerrilla strength of about 2,000 in 1981, 8,000

and

with

communist

to

the economic

regime.

political

1980

or,

from

a

at best, nuisance

it grew to about 1985. 7

by

Leif

Rosenberger's article in 1985 states that: ... CPP membership between 1980 and December 1983 grew threefold, from 10,000 to about 30,000. CPP regional organizations increased from 12 to 17 during the period. Guerrilla fronts jumped from 28 to 45. And the total of full- and part-time NPA fighters (excluding local village militia) Increased from 8,000 to 20,000 during the period.

The guerrilla statistics,

resulting membership, created

a

dramatic

increase

regardless great

demand 41

of

in CPP

within

party

and

exaggerated the

communist

insurgent The

movement

growing

was

sophisticated the

the

guerrilla

programs

in

activities in the

headed

part

in

was

the the

smaller

arms

ambushes

the

arms

raids

of

from

and of

Party's

Jalandoni,

much

less

its

the

late

70's

not

the

only

social

organizational

the movement 9

but

also

requirement

Moreover,

the

military actions military

the

not

logistics

army.

to

could

in

funding

and

isolated

towns could not cope with the

the

Luis

Party

support,

centers

insurgent

procurement

to

of

sufficiently

the

by

the

movement.

Western democracies

external

urban

communist

ex-priest

countryside

sustaining

much

local

This

the

around

nightmare

generated by

in

requirement

80's,

of

sustainment.

spread

sustainment

support

organ,

army.

early

a

logistical

thinly

network

"solidarity groups"

sustain

and

support

and

army,

becoming

external

international from

arms

guerrilla

archipelago,

Even

for

rate

ranging

of of

from

detachments

and

increasing demand.

These realities were aptly described by Munro as: ... Under Salas the CPP and the NPA had been paying less attention to ideology, and more to achieving victory; to collecting more money and guns to make that victory possible; arnl to cutting down anyone who might stand in the way.

Ross realities

created

of the means of

the

Party

Munro

a new kind of

by

stating

guerrilla

that

leader

these

unmindful

to solve the weapons and financial requirement

movement. to

continued

Mindanao

It in

was the

Romulo mid-70's 42

Kintanar,

sent

to conduct

training and

by

the

consolidation

organizational Improvised, to

CPP/NPA

(not ideological)

organized

assassinated

and

policemen

trained and

to take their guns.

windfall

selectively

by

the

older

generation

the application of the

needs

of

the

ot

small

hit

of

this type guerilla

teams

personnel

which

often

in

The added psychological

targeting

military personnel diffused any

the problem.1 1

nature

military

crowded areas,

from

who

remnants,

tested, and applied the most practical solution

the economic

Kintanar

of

corrupt

police

initial negative

Party

leaders

and

or

reactions encouraged

of error nationwide to augment movement.

This

urban

terrorism

was dubbed agaw armas (grab the weapons) operations. A more violent

experiment was

conducted by Kintanar

in the city of Davao to widen the CPP/NPA traditional base"

consisting

plantations, known

by

and

the

collection

of

mine

ranches.

mid-80's

from

vandalizing

of

operators,

The

as

hit

squads,

"sparrow

businessmen. businesses

logging more

units",

camps, commonly

enforced

Kidnapping,

bombing,

exacerbated

"tax

the

tax and

already

crippling violence of the aqaw armas operations. In the

late

NPA's

1985,

central

operational

command.

endorsement

of

Romulo

Kintanar was

military His

staff

and

promotion

urban guerrilla

promoted

saw

warfare

its not

in CPP

to

head

national only

the

publications

but also the widespread application of this tactic in other 12 parts of the country. Although the level of CPP/NPA political

terrorism

intensified, 43

it

nonetheless

attracted

marginal

attention

of

the

media,

religious

sector,

and

cause-oriented groups because of the following reasons:

by the more progressive elements

contingent were influenced of

Philippine

society

foreign-press

the

including

press

Manila

The

1.

were

and

preoccupied

with

the

thriving anti-Marcos reporting of the period.

Philippines,

particularly

(TFD),

Detainees committed

by

interview

of

military.

TFD

spokesman

1985,

"Definitely

rights

abuses

refused

to

to

our

committed

their

and

by

the

not

is

by

power

the

CPP

that

boycott

isolated

Revolution advocates

which of

Salas

late

described

1986. it

as

respect

the

February

James the

[is]

but

the

of

human

not

only

Instead

right

because

detainees

from

Marcos.

Party Clad triumph

44

Party

1986

struggle

the

NPA

to

summer

TFD

surprising

within

toppled

of

the

his

of

the

TFD

was

connected

13

CPP/NPA

political

leaders

in

the

the

militant

and

struggle of

of

from

the

inquiry

ex-political

with the communist movement. A

of

In

Force

violations

Munro

goverment."

abusf.s

This

by

Agcaoile

line

in

staffed

quoted

Fidel

inaction

revolt.

organized

As

Task

the

reporting

main

investigate

rationalized people

only

were

the

pro-communist

the

the

in

organizations

rights

human

The

2.

ensued

presidential the It

spite

outlined of

the

election

"People appears

eventually lost in

following

of

the

these

Power"

that

the

to the

more

arrest

of

developments

"Mindanao

faction"

of

(referring

Party

the

in

Kintanar

the

of

Among

executive committee).

politburo and

others these shifts included:

influence

growing

the

to

1 4

to made were Decisions partisan" units throughout the (19871.

"urban strengthen country since March

At the same time, there was a stepping-up of from slowly moving offensive, urban NPA's the "revolutionary punishment" of specific offenders to an "open season" stance towards topline counterwere there Also enemies. revolutionary unprecedented decisions to deliberately target US and other foreign personnel. New initiatives were made - first published in July - to establish or renew fraternal relations with communist parties in power, especially the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

The

of

evidence

shift

this

the

intensify

to

use

of

political violence is best described by the following: 1. government government's

The

Jaime

secretary

organization

2

on

assassination

August who

Ferrer of

unarmed

1987

of

local

sponsored

the

anti-communist

vigilantes. 2.

The assassination of three American servicemen

near Clark Air Force Base 3. (ABB)

from

Trebling 60-70

in Pampanga on 28 October 1987.

the size of

urban

the

guerrillas

Alex Boncayao Brigade to

about

300

and

the

organization of a similar partisan unit named Lorena Barros Brigade

(LBB) in

Lucena City, some

15

Manila.

45

250 kilometers south of

4. of

The

policemen

increase in the number of assassinations

and

military

immediately after the February 1987.

personnel

In

Metro

Manila

2-month ceasefire which ended on 10

By the end of October 1987, Time Magazine's

estimate of sparrow victims numbered more than 50 policemen and

military

personnel

including

four

Lieutenant

colonels. 16 The observations of Ross Munro In 1985 were echoed on September 1987 by Richard D. Fisher, Jr., policy analyst of

the

Heritage

Foundation

specializing

in Pacific

and

Southeast Asian affairs, when he wrote: A minimal program for the Philippines is outlined in the January 1985 program of its National Democratic Front (NDF). After establishing a "Peoples DemocratIc Republic," according to this document, the NDF will terminate all treaties with the U.S., cancel all foreign loans, and create "people's tribunals" that will "try and punish the enemies of the revolution." A preview of this, reminiscent of the rampage of Cambodia's Khmer Rouge a decade ago, began in late 1985, when an Internal CPP purge In Northern Mindanao went out of control. Witnesses report brutal summary executions of villagers suspected of being spies; 690 bodies are ei imated to reside In one "killing field" alone.

It

was

perpetrated

by

this the

environment communist

of

political

movement

in

Davao

violence, City

and

other urban centers, that drew response from the people and the

birth

of

anti-communist

direct and spontaneous.

vigilantes.

The

It was also violent.

46

reaction

was

Ov~w~h avA

3~Fetivevaemm a* AIiivn

Vtgt1avd~a

Ammurnim

hp Phittn~inai

Every society that is holding together contains groups who value their place in the system (even if it is modest) and who prefer things as they are. are escaping that criminals If they believe punishment because of corruption or leniency, or that people who seek a change In social status and approved values are gaining power, or that the legitimate authorities are unable or unwilling to preserve the present order, they freqffntly take

violent action to defend their position. The emergence of anti-communist vigilante movements in

the

Philippines

"People

Power"

response

to

came

right

Revolution.

after These

the groups

the

respective

atrocities of the 19 areas. Some of these

components

now

government

as effective

officially

February

instruments

evolved

CPP/NPA groups

acknowledged

by

of

1986

in

their

have the

in

armed.

national

counterinsurgency.

They not only enjoy the support of the military but also the local and national governments. have

been

viewed

psychological appears

to

gains be

psychological

with are

general

impact

in

concern on how successful To

date,

between

have been organized is again

banking

concern already

even

short

if

on

the

term, it

While

there

political is

viewed

and with

it will be in the long term. 250

to

600

anti-communist

throughout the country.

on people

insurgency problem which

significant

achieved.

agreement the

However, these groups

power

to

is spreading

47

contain

groups

The government the

communist

from the countryside

to the urban centers.

The

government has been inspired by

the success of two vigilante groups, the armed Alsa Nasa (People's Uprising) and the unarmed Nagkahlusang Katawhan (Nakasaka) or United People for Peace in

Aiang sa Kallnaw

getting the communist to surrender, particularly in Davao Davao del

people's

organizations

In

the country.

They are believed to be the

Sur.

City and

The

to

risen

have

up

against communism

Alsa Nasa and Nakasaka profess

freedom fighters but they differ in tactics. believes

to

be

The Alsa Nasa

that firearms must be carried by members to defend

themselves against the NPA. does

first

not believe

country's

such as

communism,

Indigeneous

weapons

monitoring and

other

"bullets and guns"

insurgency

operations against

that

On the

problem.

It

holding massive organizing to

ward

alarm systems,

hand, Nakasaka will solve the

conducts

peaceful

educational

campaigns

vigilantes

off

equipped

communists,

and

with

setting

up

designating runners

to

tip police or military of rebel movements. The Alia Nasa was founded in April 1986 by a former logistic officer of the NPA who was fed up with insurgent atrocities, forced

such

taxation

as

liquidation

imposed

communist movement.

on

of

the

non-sympathizers poor

to

support

and the

A year after it was founded, Alsa Nasa

has been credited by some government officials for the mass surrender members

of NPA rebels after have

helped

the

the 60-day ceasefire.

military

48

by

pinpointing

Its rebel

hideouts,

leading

atrocities,

and

confrontation.

them

the

there

It

fold

that

is

of

the

a

the

Alsa

mass

guarding

graves

respective

proved

insurgent elements. Hasa,

to

very

of

victims

villages,

effective

in

of

NPA

ready

for

neutralizing

Due to the rapid expansion of the Alsa

growing number law.

Nasa

Is

of

rebels

The

people

of

an

Important

coming

Davao

back

to

generally feel

factor

In

the

sudden

decrease of CPP/NPA activities in the area. The Nakasaka has been responsible for the surrender of many communist rebels. showcase

of

Thus, Nakasaka is considered a

a civilian group

that

has

stood

up against

communist rebels. On April 1987, President Aquino described Nakasaka

as

"embodying

positive community presidency."2 0

a

brand

action

of

of

the

Significantly, the

people

type

that

power-center won

her

the

government endorsed

the

formation of Nakasaka movements in rebel-infested areas of Luzon and the Visayas.

However, it was stressed that these

anti-communist vigilantes will not be armed with guns. The

growth

of

attributed

to

the

populace.

The

change

Alsa

support

Nasa

and

Nakasaka

of

the

government

in both

the

national

could and and

be the

local

leadership has given the people fresh hope for an improved life,

denying

fighting.

many

rebels

It is evident

of that

their there

reason

to

continue

is Indeed

a great

advantage of having civilians help in the counterinsurgency campaign them.

and

The

to

people

use

the

now are

insurgent's

own tactics

against

informing the military of 49

the

whereabouts

and the

hideouts

criminal elements as well.

the

vigilante

Assistant before

movement

Secretary

the

for

Subcommittee

not

only of

rebels

but

other

The growth and effectiveness

of

was

described

by

the

Deputy

East

Asia

Pacific

Affairs

on

Asian

and

Affairs

of

the

House

Foreign Affairs Committee on September 10, 1987 as: I noted In the May hearing of this subcommittee the growth of citizen's groups organized to defend their communities against communist depredations. In certain areas, such as Davao city on Mindanao in the southern Philippines, these groups have suceeded if dramatically reducing NPA influence and violence. This

observation supports

the

claim of

Ala

Nasa

supporters to correspondents Bob Levin and Lin Neumann

in

the

is

spring

of

"responsible

1987 for

that

the

the anti-communist vigilante

surrender

of

nearly " supporters and sympathizers since 1986. 22

10,000

NPA

President Aquino's announcement that the government will

adopt

the

Nakasaka

initiative

as

state

policy

and

programs brings to the fore the issue of vigilante action in fighting

communist

insurgency.

This

means

that

the

government will develop, organize and fund citizen's groups throughout the country, similar to the Nakasaka, to flush out

communist insurgent activities, assist the police and

military these

in

enemies

their of

counterinsurgency the

state

efforts,

in whatever

necessary.

50

way

and

fight

feasible

or

groups

awareness

growing

show the

of

people

the

with

5

Region

in

development

significant

a

of

the

A good example

threat posed by the communist insurgency. is

vigilante

anti-communist

of

proliferation

The

the

organization of vigilante groups as a result of the bombing of

If properly

area.

transportation groups

these

handled,

in

the

greatly

could of

campaign

counter-insurgency

the

bolster

paralyzed

which

bridges

five

the

Aquino

government because of the people's full support and active participation. development

Vigilantism is

peace

preserve

terrorism. reported

it

since

allows

positive

seen by many as a

action

civic

concerted

in areas troubled by

and order

to

insurgent

However, the government should investigate the coercion,

abuse,

killing

other

and

extra-legal

tactics employed by some vigilante groups to prevent this social

phenomena

from degenerating

into criminal elements

which could benefit the rebel In the end another possible the

problem.

is a need to examine closely the

long term impact of this project in relation to

government's

strong

There

thereby creating

and

program

responsive

to

build

democratic

the

foundations

institutions

in

of the

Philippines.

The fiur3=

This section will present a summary of data on the survey

population

and

the

general 51

characteristics

of

the

response.

The

factors

that

bear

on

the

survey

conducted

will also be presented.

The Survey Population The the in

known

research, Filipino

Continental

as established earlier,

military

U.S.

personnel

(CONUS)

as

survey. Ordinarily, an average

of

selected

undergoing

the

all

training

population

of

150 AFP personnel are

the in

CONUS undergoing

training according to the Office of

the

Defense

In

was

Attache

Washington.

However,

the

survey

conducted at the beginning of a calendar year when trainees have

either

training.

or

are being

processed

to

undergo

This oversight reduced the number of population

from about turnover

completed

150

to

resulted

questionnaires

a

low

67.

In

the

misrouting

which

in

This

turn

period of

affected

of

a the

trainee

number

of

rate

of

response.

The Response

Table 4-1

Survey Pogulation and ResDonse

Rank Level Senior Officers

Population I Response I % R/P I

11

1

6

1 54.5

Field Grade Officers I

18

1

9

1 50

Company Grade and Lower

38

1

9

1 23.7

I I

I

Unknown

Total

I

67

52

1

1

25

1 37.3

From Table 4-1 above, the rate of response is a low 37.3

percentage

personnel

points

in

of

the

Continental

Significantly,

the

personnel had the

company

population

U.S. grade

of

Service and

lower

67

AFP

Schools. level

AFP

lowest response rate of 23.7 percentage

points. The respondents two

from

distribution

service

commission.

branch

of

service

of

the

is 13 Army, six Constabulary, four Navy, and the

Air

regular officers, of

by

Force.

22

of

the

25

respondents

are

16 of whom are either cadets or graduates

academies.

Only

two

The

of

remaining

the

six

respondents

are

are

direct

reserve

officers coming from the ROTC program. The average length of service of the respondents is 17 years.

Orlain and Growth of Viallantim

Thesis

Question:

brought about the

What

are

organization and

the

conditions

that

growth of anti-communist

vigilantes in the Philippines? The

survey

data

questions

respondents

to

on

this

6 and

rank

thesis

7.

order

question

Survey

the

53

are

question

factors

responses

6 asks

that gave

to

the

rise to

anti-communist Alsa Kmsa (see Appendix C).

Survey question

7, on the other hand, asks the respondents to rank order the factors which made Alsa Mmsa a success.

Tables 4-2 and

4-3 below Illustrate the response.

Table 4-2

Origin of Ala masa I Rank Order 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 0 I I I I 1 21 1116

Factor Ouster of ex-Pres. Marcos Pres. Aquino's COIN Program

2

1

5

8

Creation of AFP Intelligence

5

12

17

12

1119

Govt./ AFP failure to I protect people 4

I 17

I 16

13

1

1 4

NPA violence

112

110

11

1 1

1

1

3

13

1

Others

Eighty-eight the

violence

Davao

City

perpetrated

as

vigilatism.

the

by

of

factor

the

the

that

111

respondents

NPA

bears

12

"sparrow most

on

point

to

units"

in

the

rise

of

A total of 11 or 44% say that the rise of anti-

communist vigilates the

percent

8

Government

in Davao City reflects the

and

the

military

to

protect

weakness of the

people.

Moreover, the

44% of the respondents say that the ouster of

ex-President

Marcos

vigilantism

in

Davao

has City.

no

relevance This

to

findings

the

rise

clearly

relate

to the discussions in the earlier section of this chapter.

54

of

q

4P-

Factor

Efficient police and military Support against CPP/ NPA violence

I I 1

Order Rank 1 4 1 3 1 2

1 5

1 0

I

I

I

I

I

I

I 2

Ill

I 5

I 1

I

I

5

I l18

I 1 5

I 1

I I

I 1

I I

2

i1

1 5

112

1 1

1

1

4

2

1 2

1 3

1

Good AFP Intel. Religious beliefs

against

CPP/NPA

followed 44%

the by

second

violence, that

factor

determinant combating

found

survey

the 18

sentiment

of

popular

72%

of

respondents,

or

HMsa

Alsa

made

having

a

in Davao

AFP

good

as

City.

a in

success This

is

11

or

organization,

military/police

and

votes,

4

growth

communist movement

efficient

16

1

1 211

2

Others

The

of J)_ajMAA

success

Table 4-3

intelligence

the

third important factor. The indicate

response

to

this

a contrary perception,

religious beliefs

particular 15

or

have no relevance

to

question

survey

60%,in

AFP

the

the success

that

of Alsa

Nasa in Davao City.

Role of PhiliDine Qaverninnt in

nti-Coamunist

Viailante Moveinnts

The spontaneous anti-communist

character and extra-legal

vigilantes

bring

55

the

the

study

nature of to

the

of

question

government

in

role

kind

these

of

movements.

Table 4-4 below relates particularly to these questions.

Survey Responses

Table 4-4

I NO I DA ISDA IRem

I SA I A

Question

I

(Alsa Hasa) effective

I

II

I

COIN Strategy?

I

II

I

I

I

1 1S A

I

1 15 1 8

8

survey Question

I

I 1

(Nakasaka) next step

I

I

in mobilization?

I

I

I

1

I

3 I NO I

I I I

3 1SA I I 2 1 SA

Survey Question

I

A1sa Hasa/akasaka is same as CHDF?

I

7 I 5 I

9

11

i 9 I

I 5 1 Survey Ouestion 10 I Incorporate movements I into COIN strategy? 1 16 1 6 1I Survey Question 11 Legend: SA : Strongly Agree NO : No Opinion

sub-question:

Government

organize,

vigilantes

as

part

Rem : Remarks

a

Philippine

the

Should

and direct

control of

15 1

A : Agree DA : Disagree

SDA : Strongly Disagree Thesis

I

the

anti-communist

counterinsurgency

comprehensive

programs?

to

responses

11

Question strategy

of

for

needed

data

The

question asks

if

11 a

13

question

Government

asking

should

of

Government

anti-communist vigilante movements. ended

sub-question the

which

exercise

communist vigilante movements.

56

questionnaire.

should

include

the

Question 13 is an open-

agency

command

the

are

counterinsurgency

comprehensive

Philippine

the

and

this

and

of

the

control

Philippine over

anti-

Of the 25 who responded or

64%

strongly

agree

movements should be strategy of the

the

the

Government.

from

anti-communist

16

vigilante

incorporated into a comprehensive COIN

incorporation.

distributed

that

to survey question 11,

The

two

Another

six or

24%

agree

three

or

12%

are

disagreeing

and

one

non-

remaining

strongly

to

response. The mood

response

that

pervades

relations. on and

to

survey

the

AFP

question on

13

civil

reflects and

the

military

The respondents are split in their perceptions

which agency control

of

of

the government should exercise command

the

anti-communist

vigilante

movements.

Half endorse civilian agencies including the Department of National police

Defense

and or

and control.

(DND)

while

military units However,

the

other

half

should provide

says

the

the

command

a closer look at the response shows

12 favors military, four pointing to DND, eight to civilian agencies common

and

one

concern

without

opinion

expressed

in

on

the

the

question.

survey

against

The local

executives exercising command and control is the history of mis-using

volunteer

unscrupulous

groups

politicians.

The

for

personal

response

also

ends

by

reflects

the

enduring traditional belief of the AFP on the principle of civilian

supremacy.

perceived

mistrust

government, exercise

of

the

Taking

between

response

command

and

the

rate

into

military and of

control 57

consideration

32%

the

favoring

remains

the

civilian the

civil

significant.

I

Role of Anti-Communist Viailant.

Thesis Question:

vigilantes

in

the

What

is

Mvesmnts

the role of anti-communist

counterinsurgency

effort

In

the

Philippines? This data

thesis

question

is discussed

by

presenting

from the survey questions that bear on the role of

anti-communist vigilantes in counterinsurgency programs, in other

government

Philippine and

12

programs,

society.

relate

to

and

Response

COIN

questions 10 and 14

to

in

survey

programs.

The

post-Insurgency questions

response

to

8,

11,

survey

impacts on other government programs.

The response to survey question 15 specifically relates to the role

in post-insurgoncy Philippine society.

In Counterinsurgency Programs Of

the

Alsa

Masa

COIN

strategy

violence.

or

respondents

16

anti-communist in

Another

areas

or

64%

strongly

vigilantes are

affected

eight or 32

by

agree

that

an

effective

CPP/NPA

political

agree and the remaining one

disagree strongly. As

presented

respondents endorse the

inclusion of

earlier,

in their

a

total

of

88%

of

the

response to survey ruestion 11

the vigilante movements in a comprehensive

COIN program of the Government.

58

The

52%

sees

no

movements Forces

response

to

survey question 12

difference

and

the

(CHDF).

respondents,

is

and

to

CHDF's

between

protect

depredations.

The

Civilian

commonality,

the similar

as

objectives

the

of

find

13 or

vigilante

Home seen

Defense by

the

both vigilantes

community

respondents

that

anti-communist

para-military The

shows

from

the

communist

differences

as

follows: 1.

Anti-communist

vigilante

movements

are

spontaneously organized by the people while CHDF units are deliberately formed by the Government through the AFP.

The

vigilantes are borne out of necessity to survive. 2. all

Membership

members

of

a

in

vigilante

community

as

movements against

is

the

open

to

selective

character of CHDF membership. 3. from

Logistical support for vigilante movements come

within

the

community

particularly

the

affected by CPP/NPA progressive taxation.

businesses

The CHDF's draw

their logistical support from the goverment. 4.

The

anti-commuailst

vigilante

movements

and

CHDF's differ only in name.

In Other Government Programs The

response

to

survey

question

10

(Table

4-4

above) shows that a total of 12 or 48% agree that Nakasaka and Alsa

Masa

Eight

32%

or

are

CHDF's

disagree

(home guards)

while

20%

have

with no

a new

name.

opinion.

This

59

•

,n

u

~

nn

m

~

u

~

nmnm

m

n

m

N

ovo

response, when cross referenced with the response to survey shows a perception that the objectives of both

question 12, vigilante

feel that

respondents

government

other

the

impact is

programs

In

coincide.

CHDF's

and

movements

of

essence,

vigilante movements if

complementary

not

a

14

can

the in

ready

substitute to the discredited CHDF's.

positive and

into

classified

survey

to

response

The

question

negative

impacts

other government programs.

movements to

be

of vigilante

The anti-communist

vigilante movements: Are a strong deterrent to urban terrorism;

1.

boost

great

2. Are

the government and

to

military

intelligence and counterintelligence efforts;

the

myth

Are

alternative

cheap

a

inexpensive method of debt

a third world,

to

military

the

movements are

Vigilante

of counterinsurgency.

requirements

for

against

of CPP/NPA omnipresence and invincibility;

4.

an

weapon

psychological

effective

a

Are

3.

organizing and maintaining an army ridden, and

economically dependent

nation like the Philippines;

threat

5.

Raise

and

are

community

can

awareness

people's

stand

reminder

effective

an

against

the

the

of

communist united

that

intimidation

and

a

violence

of the CPP/NPA; and, 6. themselves

Provide and

neutralization

of

a

venue

for

their

families

the

communist 60

ex-NPA's and

to

assist

insurgent's

safeguard in

the

terrorism.

On

the

other

hand,

the

negative

Impacta

of

the

vigilante movements as seen by the respondents include: 1. the

Vigilantism is reflective of the Government and failure

military's

terrorism

and

to

violence

of

secure the

the

people

CPP/NPA and

from

other

the

lawless

elements. 2.

they

when

movements

Vigilante

control may backfire on the COIN effort of

go

out

of

the Government

and its human rights standing before the western world. 3.

Armed

proliferation

of

vigilante firearms

movements

will

in the hands of

result

in

the

civilians which

may be a future problem of the Government.

In Post-Insurgency Philippine Society On

the

question

vigilante movements, 20%

of

these

society.

movements

a

future

role

for

of the respondents

in

a

anti-communist find no utility

post-insurgency

Philippine

To the 80%, however, vigilante movements can take

various roles that will ensure anti-communist

consciousness,

community defense, nurture become

an

Integral

part

of

the nation's defense forces, and serve as the Government's "eyes and ears" In the area. The response, although limited, validates the views of Colonel Victor Batac, captor of and

Joe Ma. Sison In 1976

formerly the Chief of Production Branch, Office of the

Deputy Chief of Constabulary Staff for Intelligence, C2:

61

"

|

•4=

•

Anyway, the CVGs (Civilian Volunteer Groups) can be transformed to a number of alternative organizations once the conflict Is over. They can become barrio ronda [village patrol). They can also form the core of sectoral organizations. They can serve as anti-crime forces. I have a high level of confidence that very few of these groups will ever degenerate into bandit groups and if they ever do so, it would be easier to neutralize them because

they will not have the Ideological commitment and the organizational backirg%. They wil not have the necessary public support.

General Coments

A

very

respondents President support

is

the

support

Aquino. the

sectors

significant

The

vigilante

observation vigilante

hesitancy

of

movements

is

by

some

of

movements

gets

President

Aquino

interpreted

by

in Philippine society, notably the military,

indicator emphatic

of and

executive

leftist

influence

unwavering

is

seen

ingredient

of

supporters

of

by

it's

in

her

endorsement the

vigilante

government.

from

respondents

continuing

the

a

an

success.

movements

argue

to

some as an

A

popular

as

from

more chief

important Moreover, that

the

polarization of Philippine society that can result from the unqualified endorsement of least

disastrous

political appeal of proponent of President re-endorse vigilante

the President,

consequence

to

the CPP/NPA.

the

"endorse

tomorrow" movements

yesterday,

attitude whom

I

toward

will 62

already

waning

As succinctly stated by a

anti-communist vigilantism

Aquino's

have at the very

quote

and critic of the disband the but

today,

and

anti-communist not

identify:

The President of the Republic can not go around saying --"Vell you see the communists are the enemies of the people but they are victims of circumstances and so we have to give them the chance but then they violated the law so that they have to be punished yet they are our brother Filipinos so we have to be more understanding

The

respondents

find

...

anti-communist

vigilante

movements as a "strong response against communism in the Philippines."

One

aptly

accounts

the

efficacy

to

the

Involvement of the people and the spontaneous nature of Its origin.

On the whole,

the response points to government

support and control.

This

chapter

has

presented

the

data

historical and survey research conducted.

from

the

These data were

analyzed, interpreted, and discussed relative to the thesis questions and sub-questions stated in chapter one. The the

data

findings base

presented from

in

where

this the

chapter

conclusions

recommendations of this study will be drawn.

63

will

form and

Rebel",

Against

Gregg Jones, "Civilians Aiding Fight 1. Washington Post April 1, 1987, A15. H.

Ross

2.

Cmmentar.

Munro,

"The

Rouge",

Khmer

New

8 no.6 (December, 1985): 19.

3. Ibid., 19. 4. Leif R. Rosenberger, "Philippine Communism and the Soviet Union", Survey: A Journal of East and West Studies 29 no.1 (Spring, 1985): 117. 5. 6. Marcos", 1987): 16.

Munro, "The New Khmer Rouge", 30. Communism After "Philippine Porter, (September-October 35 of Communism

Gareth Problems

7. "Insurgency

Jose and

P. Magno, Jr., Counterinsurgency

and in

A. the

James Gregor, Philippines",

Asian Survey 26 no.5 (5 May 1986): 502. 8.

Rosenberger,

"Philippine

Communism

After

Marcos", 118. "Confronting the Jr., D. Fisher, Richard 9. Asian Studies Mounting Threat to Philippine Democracy", Center@ Rackgrounder 67 (September 3, 1987): 6. "The New Khmer Rouge", 31.

10.

Munro,

11.

Ibid., 31.

12.

Ibid.,

32.

13.

Ibid.,

22.

Violence", Clad, "Betting on 14. James Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 17 September 1987, 35. James Clad, 15. November 1987, 24.

"War

on

Eal

the Streets",

FEER,

26

Mounting

Threat

to

24.

16.

Ibid.,

17.

Fisher,

"Confronting the

Philippine Democracy", 4.

64

C. Sederberg, 18. H. Jon Rosenbaun and Peter vigilante Politics, eds. H. Jon "Concluding Observations", of C. Sederberg (University Rosenbaun and Peter

Pennsylvania Press, Inc., 1976) 273. James Clad, "Vigilante 19. April 1987, 33. 20.

Power",

ESE,

23

Ibid., 32.

"Democracy In the David F, Lambertson, 21. Philippines", Department of State Bulletin 87 (November 1987): 21. Bob Levin and Lin Neumann, 22. Vigilantes", Maclean 100 (March 30, 1987): 26.

"A

War

of

Colonel Victor Bactac Is a young, respected 23. officer In the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Colonel Batac is Philippine Constabulary in particular. credited with the capture in 1976 of the then chairman of For years, subject officer the CPP, Jose Maria Sison. worked at the Production Branch, C2. He later headed that branch until his appointment as Provincial Commander of Colonel Batac Is a known close Albay, Bicol Region. associate of the renegade officer Colonel Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan. Colonel Batac's Insights and strategic mind is believed to be a major influence in the planning and execution of the "People Power " Revolution of 1986.

65

C H APTER

V~

CONCLUS

IONS

....It is to make the civilian "sea" no longer hospitable to the guerrilla "fish." The communists call this sea the "mass base," Inluding In that term all those not actively hostile to their guerillas. As they well appreciate, without this mass base no guerrilla movement can long survive. Neither can an indigenous government. Colonel N.D. Valeriano, AFP (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Charles T.R. Bohannan, AUS (Ret) Counter-Guerrilla Operations* The Philinine Exgerien=e (1962)

Tnttodurtlon In the preceeding chapter, the study presented the findings of the survey and the other data obtained from the research.

The

findings

of

the

study

identified

the

conditions that brought about the organization, the role of the

Philippine

control,

and

Government

the

future

in

the

role

of

organization,

direction,

anti-communist

vigilantes

in the Philippines. The findings

in

purpose

of

answering

this the

chapter

questions

Is

to

and

focus

on

these

sub-questions

in

chapter one. on the whole, the study pointed to the utility of

anti-communist

vigilante

66

movements

in

the

counter-

insurgency effort In the Philippines.

In the same manner,

the

kind

study

found

the

future

of

this

of

movement a

possible nuisance to Philippine society if no effective and efficient control mechanisms are established. Finally,

will

chapter

this

suggestions

make

for

future research on related issues identified In the course of the study.

The Research Ouestions

Questlon-_I. What are the conditions which brought about

the

organization

and

growth

of

the

spectre

anti-communist

vigilantes in the Philippines? This political

study

violence,

points the

to

resulting

of

economic

CPP/NPA

strain

of

*progressive taxes" exacted on the masses and businesses, and

the

inspiring motivation

Revolution people to

as

the

conditions

of

the

openly reject and

that

1986 bred

confront,

*People Power" courage

to

the

"v~gilante style,"

the communist movement. It appears that the CPP/NPA's experiment in urban terrorism and the bloody internal purges backfired.

Cadres

who got wind that they were already targets for liquidation did

the

military

most and

obvious

from

then

thing.. .sought on

fought

67

their

safety former

with

the

comrades.

Invariably also, the people had to choose from parting with the little that they had or drive the insurgents out. The continuing presence

violence Is

in the

established

countryside

spawn

a

where

insurgent

retaliation

in

kind.

Obviously, the insurgents have become more repressive than the politico-psychological intention of political violence, forcing civilians to fight or die. The editors P.C. Sederberg and H. Jon Rosenberger in their essay, concludina Observations stated that: ....as

long

maintain

as

a

individuals

strong

and

nocial

groups

and

exist

who

psychological

identification with the established order, significant challenges to that 1 order will most likely provoke violent resistance. Thus,

in the context of the recent and contemporary

Philippine

environment,

reaction

the

of

people

the to

violent

the

and

political

spontaneous

terrorism of

the

CPP/NPA is anchored on the following: i.

The

organization

movements

is

an

going out

of

control. The

traditional

use

discipline supporting

and the

CPP they

termed

anti-communist

CPP/NPA

to

apparatus

from their

(enforcing

Party

rural

population

into

urban based

was

resistance.

terrorism

terror

the an

vigilante

political

insurgents' departure

political

movement)

violent

launched

of

of

coercing

psychological sparked

outgrowth

of

The

the

logistical

provocation

violent

purge

that

and that the

in the Northern Mindanao in 1985 against what as

"deep penetration agents " 2

68

opened

the

eyes

of

not

only the

people

but

also

the

insurgent

members

of

the violent future of a communist victory.

The

risn

to

Party

leadership

of

the

strong

advocates of the use of terrorism as an important component of

the

revolutionary struggle,

such

as

Romulo Kintanar,

Jose de Vera, Roberto Tiamzon and others do not augur well for the peace and order of both urban and rural areas In the

Philippines.

terrorism

is

This

manifested

partisan units, the foreign

escalation

nationals

in

in

the

the

use

increasing

of

urban

number

of

inclusion of high ranking officials and

in

the

target

list,

and

the

exportation

of "sparrow operations" to Metro Manila. 2.

The

movements

is

a

the

Filipino

and

violence.

organization

of

manifestation

of

people The

ordinary

civilians

machines

during

provided

the

campaign

of

Revolution

of

to

the

1986,

the

that

military's

inability

grew

interrelated

factors

Alsa

and

organizations called

rise

Davao fear

of

out

of

to

of

found

courage

priests, against

"People

to

that

its

new

standing

1986

motivation

frustration

Nasa

coverage

bravely

in

the

vigilante of

stand together against dictatorship

media

terror

anti-communist

the

brought

war

The

Revolution the

3

Government

about

CPP/NPA

"People

protection

into

"vigilantes."

69

Marcos'

CPP/NPA violence,

provide

growth

and

Power"

against

City.

nuns,

the

local

Power" and and

are

formation

the the the of

self-defense

3. A significant formation

of

insurgent

loss of

element

anti-communist

that

brought

vigilante

movements

political appeal arising

violent

transition

from

popular

presidency

of

the

Marcos

Party's decision to boycott

the

is

the

from the non-

dictatorship

Aquino. 4

Corazon

about

to

the

Moreover,

the

the February 1986 Presidential

election which led to the ouster of Marcos is seen even by Party members as a strategic failure of the CPP's national leadership. secretary decision

The

surrender

in Northern to

described

boycott

it

leadership."

as

Froiland

Mindanao, the

a

of

is rooted

February 1986

"big

Mureal,

error

of

Front

in the

election.

the

3

Party Mureal

national

[CPP]

5

Question

2.

Should

the

Philippine

Government

organize, control, and direct the anti-communist vigilantes as part of a comprehensive counterinsurgency program?

The

Aquino

Government

took

the

correct

step

in

taking the lead in the organization, control, and direction of

the

anti-communist

vigilantes

in

the

find courage

Given a condition where

people

the

Philippines. to rise

against the communist movement, the opportunity to take the political and psychological initiative more than compensate for

the

risk

of

vigilantes going

out of control.

After

all, the purpose of a Government role in the organization, control, and direction of

vigilantes is to establish

70

the

mechanism which

will

provide

command

and control

of

the

anti-communist movements. This is social mobilization at work. It is the best

form of social mobilization for it is founded in a genuine people's rebuff of the communist movement. FC 100-20 states that

"popular

support

is

essential

counterinsurgency program. " 6

for

a

successful

Although the popular support

of the Aquino Government is not the result of preconditions stated

by

the

CPP/NPA

reaction

and

Government

their

and

communities, oppurtunity increase

such

capabilities, " 7

management vigilante

Circular

the the

to

to

as

but

the

"administrative

rather,

campaign

frustration

over

of

the

inability

the

situation

the

pursue

"institutional

people's

terror

military to secure affords

of

and

people

of

the

of

the

in

their

Government

development," 8

an and

its credibility before the people. Colonel

Ismael

Z. Villareal, Deputy J3 and Chief of

Staff AFP Operation Center,

in his article Negotiating with

the Communists in the Philippines wrote: .... the government should borrow a page from the CPP's own book and mobilize and organize the population in a pro-government cause. Just as the CPP concentrates on maintaining a sustaining prorevolutionary population, so the government needs its own well-organized and well-mobilized support structure. Military operations should be ordered only to strenithen, undergird, and sustain this primary effort. A support

reinforcing

view

of

unwavering

to anti-communist vigilante movements 71

government

was expressed

by Colonel Victor Batac In a note to this reseacher, wnich says:

Very few people realize that this [insurgency] is a zero sum game between the Insurgents and the Government. Once a civilian commits himself to fighting the Insurgents, that is one less guy that the communist terrorists (CTs) can Influence and mobilize against the government. The presence of volunteer [vigilante] groups In a barangay (village] also balances the terror poised by the CTs. It provides the other people the perfect excuie to reject or refuse to cooperate with the CTS. Colonel

Villareal

comprehensive

continued

counterinsurgency

by

concluding

strategy

that

should

a

give

priority to improved government services at the grass-roots level

wherein

communist

political

infrastructure

is

the

strongest. A role

in

related

and

relevant

anti-communist

agencies

should

communist

question

vigilantism

on

is

which

exercise command and control

vigilante

movements.

The

the Government's strategy of

lead

Department

the

organization greater

and

of

control

percentage

of

Local

of

the

the

same

Armed Forces of the Philippines that

has

over

the

the

capability

anti-communist

researcher feels survey

to

respondents

exercise vigilante

of

the

or

anti-

In

the

the giving

the

Governments

vigilante

is the

agency

respondents

survey endorse to

government's

in

movements. feel

that

the A the

governmental agency command

and

movements.

control The

that this equally divergent opinion of the

population

is

a

manifestation 72

of

the

following:

1. The responses are reflective of the experiences of

the

AFP

vigilante

officers

movements

encouragement

of a

who

by

witnessed

either

local

the

the

active

formation

of

participation

military commander

as

or

in the Alsa

Masn of Davao City or the initiative of the local political leader as

In the Nakasaka of Davao del Norte.

2.

The

within

the

On

the

other

by

politicians

responses

military on hard,

reflect

the

the

primacy of

enduring

belief

civilian authority.

a history of mis-using citizen's

for

their

personal

ends

explains

groups

the

other

half of the responses. Again, Batac

not

argues to

the

only

that

pragmatic

although

complete

the

the

civilian a

reseacher but

the

also

military

military,

of

Colonel

Colonel

connection

un-armed

such

views

viable.

"anti-communist

volunteers,

committed

finds

is

triad"

necessary of

organized

relationships

Batac

armed

masses, have

and

to

be

exercised covertly to maintain the spontaneous character of vigilante

organizing

and

organizations.

He

at

should

all

command

needed,

civilian, as

added

that

be

the

the

and

established

communication.

preferably

the

vigilante's

organizational commitment,

a

former

and

the

to

need"

for

such

connection,

facilitate

If

basic

organization, training,

Colonel communist

political

experience,

"felt

military

functions such as doctrine,

equipping,

act

sustain

Batac

points

cadre,

officer.

He

who

to

a

should

cited

the

knowledge of the enemy, level of

cadre's

own 73

experiences

to

rebut

CTs

propaganda as some of the advantages of a former CT cadre providing the leadership. Ultimately,

the

Government,

particularly

the

President, should provide the lead in harnessing the ground swell

against

communism.

President

Aquino

single unifying element, which can equal charisma and success of the

offers

the

if not better the

late President Ramon Magsaysay

while waging a campaign against the CPP/NPA predecessor in the 50's.

By placing a personal touch to her government's

endorsement simple initial

lip

of

anti-communist

service

as

Government

particularly parry

the

the

in

stand,

the

The

by

the

and

the

instead

ambivalence

of

counterinsurgency

countryside

political

insurgents.

depicted

movements

might

find

psychological

President's

new

the

effort

vigor

inroads

continuing

of

of

popularity

to the is

described by Time Magazine's interview of a rural vendor in November 1987:

Crossing herself, the fruit vendor offers a prayer for President Aquino. "Cory is our guiding light," she says, "our savior. She has not sinned against her fellowmeri, It's the people around her who have wronged us." Question vigilantes

in

3.

What

the

is

the

role

counterinsurgency

of

anti-communist

effort

in

the

Philippines? Carolina G. Philippines,

Hernandez, a

observed

"redemocratization"

in

process

respected professor

her In 74

1987 the

review

Philippines

in the

of

the

that

the

of

failure

the

peace

government's

prompted

initiatives

President Aquino to adopt a hard line approach towards the communist

insurgency and volunteers

civilian

of

the use

has reluctanly tolerated

counter-

of

conduct

the

in

Insurgency. 1 3 Dr. Hernandez added that: [anti-communist volunteers of use The vigilantes] would be controversial for as long as they remained inadequately - if at all-trained and long as the government supervised and for as response to insurgency,4 remained tilted in favor of the military approach. Alarming and damaging groups are

on

the

activities of The

increasing.

Committee on Human Rights on

Human

government

Rights

are

endorsing

in

by human rights

the anti-communist vigilantes of

report

latest

International,

Amnesty

accusations

New

the

London

the

York

based

Lawyers

based

(LCHR), and the Asian Commission in

one the

the

criticizing of

organization

Aquino

"Civilian

volunteer Self Defense organizations" (CvSos), the official term

for

vigilantes.1 5

anti-communist

Amnesty

International added that: ... these

"vigilantes",

which

the

government

"Civilian as disciplined to legitimize hopes (CVSOs), organizations" Self-Defense Volunteer In "have gone beyond purely defensive activity." retaliation for NPA killings, the London group claims the CSVOs have killed people who are not NPA fighters themselves.. .but unarmed member,* of legal, 0 leftwing organizations operating openly.

75

The survey echoes the apprehension expressed by the various sectors on the future threat posed communist

movements.

Movement

to

opposition

Marns Dlokno, head of the National

Disband

to

the

by armed anti-

Vigilantes

Aquino

(NMDV),

government's

commented

endorsement

of

In the

vigilante movements that: .... tapping

the

vigilantes

against

the

communists

would throw the country Into anarchy. The people did not overthrow the dictatorship only to find anarchy today. Only the rightists in the military and the US In~erventionists would benefit from such a situation. This same concern was echoed earlier

In the report

of a fact finding mission led by former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark, to wit:

These violation of human rights perpetrated by military and paramilitary units, including the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) and armed vigilante groups, suggest a serious situation which the Aquino governm t has failed seriously and actively to address. However, the

increasing

vigilante

behind

these

campaign

to

movements

voices

discredit

reveal

the

vigilantism in counterinsurgency. the

AFP

as

the

Chief "best

Insurgency." 1 9 statistical least

10

of

Staff, weapon

This

findings percent

of

of

described ever

the

concern and

anti-communist

efficacis"-

role

the

is

vigilante to

movements

counter

validated

by

the

that

"infiltrated

barangays-where

the

population,

without

76

of

General Renato de Villa,

invented

observation

moral

the AFP at

comprising

the majority, supports the insurgents- declined from last's year

(19861

decline

5,430

is

to

higher

current

the

in

areas

originated and developed as in

4,993." 2 0

[19871

where

vigilante

in Mindanao.

at 34% or from 3,219

movements

Here, the decline

of communist-affected barangays

the number

This

is estimated

in 1986 to 2,065 in 1987.21

Raegommdation

Although the mention of vigilante

movements

into

Philippines

was

discussed,

to

the

civilian

pattern

United

States

of

consideration. functions

of

the the

defense suggestion

volunteers

America's

National

The study of the

integrating anti-communist

National

into Guard

forces of the

a

of

the

respondent

mold

invites

of

the

serious

the history, organization, and Guard

is

therefore