Kurdish Hizbullah in Turkey: Islamism, Violence and the State by Mehmet Kurt

Kurdish Hizbullah in Turkey Islamism, Violence and the State

Mehmet Kurt

1 Historical Overview of Hizbullah

History is what hurts.

Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious

theory, data, and methodology A study into Hizbullah requires a multidimensional approach, ranging from the history of the organisation’s name to its activities; its supporter base to its alleged connections with the Turkish state and the deep state in the 1990s; the Hizbullah-affiliated NGOs to the officially recognised Hüda-Par party; and from the Kutlu Doğum (Blessed Birth) celebration to the development of publishing activities. Despite the fact that Hizbullah appears in newspapers, features in political debates, and is relevant to both daily life and the agendas of other political organisations, information about it is scarce and often contradictory. This is because Hizbullah remained underground and was very careful not to publicise its activities until 2002. Although there was some change to the organisation’s clandestine nature following its engagement with civil society (even forming a political party) Hizbullah continues to retain its almost secretive nature and there is reluctance by members to talk to outsiders about the inner workings of the organisation.

The qualitative methodologies employed in this study aim to reveal hidden or implicit sociological meanings, properties, and implications, facilitate layered interpretations, and render unheard ‘voices’ audible (Have, 2004, pp. 4–5). My motivation to adopt an ethnographic perspective within a qualitative research paradigm relates to the nature of the research topic. The most important advantage of using the ethnographic method is that the researcher, after some time in the field, ‘becomes invisible’ (Berg, 2001, p. 147). What I mean by becoming invisible is the minimising the influence of the researcher on the production of data by virtue of his ‘presence’ and position in interactions.

It is crucial that the researcher spends sufficient time in the field to allow

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rapport to be developed between the researcher and the informants.

Only then can informants begin to trust the researcher.

In the search for appropriate methods for researching the secretive realm of Hizbullah, I realised that Grounded Theory responded well to my methodological considerations and challenges. The researcher uses Grounded Theory practises with the focused attention of a surgeon and runs a constant analysis of the concepts and signifiers emerging from the data. In studying a ‘closed’ organisation like Hizbullah it is crucial to provide more than just descriptive information. I wanted to move beyond external appearances, to grasp Hizbullah’s organisational sense of itself, and the motivation of its members – beyond that superficiality offered by the media, public opinion, and the justice system. When using this method, one is not required to consider every piece of data as ‘true’.

As Ingersoll points out, researchers embark on a process of continuous comparison as they analyse the first field data; contrary to the other popularly used methodologies in social sciences, this process facilitates the integration of newly emerging, important information into the study in the ensuing phases of research. In that sense, Grounded Theory is in keeping with the essence of ethnography as it allows for continuous development of the research subject throughout fieldwork and a comprehensive analysis of the emergent concepts (Ingersoll and Ingersoll, 1987, pp. 93–7).

Having discussed the theoretical and methodological tools employed in this study, I would like to move on to the difficulty of problematising the history of a political and religious movement whose structure and past have been the subject of much debate. This difficulty is exacerbated by the constant repetition in the literature of incomplete or even false information and its presentation as historical data.

My aim in this chapter is to reveal the different stages that Hizbullah has undergone since its foundation using references to Hizbullah’s own publications (books, theses, and other resources), the information published in the media on Hizbullah, and the interviews conducted with former or present members of the organisation who have personally witnessed various periods of Hizbullah’s history.

In terms of sources and data selection I must emphasise that at times I had to select between contradictory information with a critical eye and using a complicated analytical process. In addition, a number of Master’s theses on Hizbullah,1 mostly written by students at police academies, have been used as resources in this study, albeit only rarely and after

historical overview of hizbullah . 11

much deliberation. These theses tend to examine Hizbullah from a limited security perspective, use resources that rely on data produced by the same institutions in which they were written, and suffer from ideological bias and questionable sources.2 Another problematic body of sources is what I found in police archives.

The most important archive on the subject, the Hizbullah Archive, was seized by the police after Operation Beykoz on 17 January 2000 and still remains closed.3 The security forces have allowed certain information to be released but largely for their own agenda and image-setting purposes.

I was unable to access the police archives as a resource for this study because it is impossible to obtain any information other than what is already available to the public. However, some of the works I cite in this study use police archives as secondary sources.

Hizbullah members often emphasised in their public statements and during the series of trials following Operation Beykoz that the Hizbullah Archive should be opened to the general public. Being the compiler of the so-called Beykoz Archive, Hizbullah constitutes the only other party – in addition to Turkish security officials – that knows the contents of the archive. Thus, the information contained in the archive is available through Hizbullah members who participated in Hizbullah activities, prepared reports, or were involved in the creation of the archive.

If Hizbullah is willing to share the archive with the general public, then it is puzzling that Hizbullah members do not discuss issues relating to the archive publicly. Security officials claim that the archive is not made accessible to the general public because of its potential to cause public indignation due to the violent nature of the visual content. It is clear, however, that these same officials do not act so considerately with other groups such as the PKK. This naturally raises the widely suspected Hizbullah–‘deep state’ connection as potentially the main reason behind the continued closure of the archive. There is little doubt that it would be immensely useful both for researchers and the general public if the archive were accessible to them. While the archive remains closed there is the risk that the information it contains will be revealed selectively, by security officials, with the intention of manipulating public opinion.

Despite the fact that the Beykoz Archive could reveal much about Hizbullah’s perpetration of violent acts and the possible connection between Hizbullah and the deep state, it is not enough to analyse Hizbullah only using the Beykoz Archive. After moving into the legitimate sphere in the 2000s, Hizbullah and its affiliated organisations have

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been transformed into a social movement. Therefore, the information that has been provided by first-hand witnesses constitutes the primary source used in this study. The significance of this study derives from the fact that it is based on in-depth interviews, life stories, and oral history narratives of Hizbullah members and people who witnessed various periods of Hizbullah’s past and observations in the field. As such, this chapter is the first text investigating the history of Hizbullah by relying on social history.

the historical and sociological conditions of hizbullah’s emergence A movement cannot be investigated independently of the historical and sociological conditions of its emergence. It would be impossible to understand the mechanisms behind Hizbullah’s past, the outcomes of its emergence, and the phases it has undergone without taking into account (a) the Islamic movements and thinkers which influenced Hizbullah’s understanding of Islam; (b) Turkey’s relationship with Islam and religious groups as a secular republic during the process of modernisation and urbanisation; (c) Turkey’s approach to minorities and ‘handling’ of the Kurdish issue; and finally (d) the unique sociological and historical conditions of the Kurdish area in Turkey where Hizbullah emerged.

The concept of Islamism goes back as far as the formation of empires and the imposition of Western colonialism through the formation of nation-states (Kayalı, 1997). Almost all empires and states developed certain political reflexes as a result. Islamism can be considered to be one of these reflexes and was embraced as a political solution to varying degrees by the Ottoman Empire and many other countries (Kayalı, 1997). In the Islamic world, colonialism had not only been perceived as the loss of military and political power but also the humiliation of an Islamic lifestyle that was seen as superior.

The two ideologies that emerged out of these sentiments were Islamic modernism and secular nationalism. According to Demant (2006, pp. 91–5), save for a few exceptional countries, secular nationalism is on the brink of extinction, while from the 1950s onwards Islamic modernism became a very popular ideology in Muslim countries. In the Sunni world, Abul A’la Maududi (Pakistan) and Sayyid Qutb (Egypt),

historical overview of hizbullah . 13

and in the Shia world, Khomeini are considered pioneering figures developing the concepts of Islamism.4 Wiktorowicz defines Islamism much more broadly in order to encapsulate all the activities carried out within its realm. According to him, Islamist activism encompasses a broad spectrum of activities such as expansionist movements, terrorist activities, collective action associated with Islamic symbols and identities, the construction of a state governed by Islamic law, and the promotion of Islamic spiritualism in society (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 2).

Demant suggests that Islamism can be investigated in three stages.

The first stage is the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) in Egypt led by Sayyid Qutb. Writing in the twentieth century, according to Qutb, who was influenced by the ideas of Maududi, Muslim countries had been experiencing problems because they had moved away from Islam and these problems could be rectified by organising social and political life in accordance with Allah’s orders as prescribed in Islamic law. Qutb interprets the state of the society at the time as a second jahiliyah (period of ignorance of divine guidance) and the only solution he offers is the construction of a world based on Islam (Demant, 2006, pp.

91–107). Naturally, the Muslim Brotherhood movement cannot be fully understood only by looking at Qutb’s writings. Many other thinkers and texts influenced the Muslim Brotherhood, the first and foremost being the movement’s founder Hassan al-Banna’s Kumpulan Risalah Dakwah.

The Muslim Brotherhood movement spearheaded many debates in the Islamic world, including the organisation of law and daily life in secular systems that they described as tağuti5; whether worship practices such as the congregational Friday prayer can be viably carried out in dar al-harb countries, that is, countries that are not governed according to Islamic law; or whether taxes should be paid in these countries.6 Furthermore, it should be emphasised that these debates have been actively carried out within many Islamist groups in Turkey, especially within Hizbullah, and that the diverging attitudes and opinions that exist with regard to these debates is one of the main reasons for the emergence of different Islamist fractions and approaches in Turkey.

According to Demant, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 marks the onset of the second stage of Islamism. The forced modernisation that began with the toppling of Mohammad Mosaddegh as a result of a CIA-supported coup and the reinstitution of the pro-Western Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power in 1953 was met with much opposition from the Shia in Iran.

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Consequently, Ruhollah Ayatollah Khomeini led the Islamic Revolution supported by many groups, mullahs, and intellectuals, with ideological support from the Sorbonne-educated Ali Shariati. Shariati is known as an eclectic thinker who brought together ideas from Marxism and Shia mysticism in his analyses, and has exerted great influence on the Iranian people (Demant, 2006, pp. 110–26).

The third phase in Islamism begins after the First Gulf War and is marked by the global prominence – and notoriety – of Islamist organisations (Demant, 2006, pp. 127–35). Although in some works7 Hizbullah is treated in the same category as those groups which emerged in this third phase and which may or may not have global influence, I argue that Hizbullah resembles and is comparable to Ikhwan or Hamas in terms of its organisational structure and principles. I will discuss these issues in more detail below.

In order to understand Hizbullah, the second issue that calls for analysis is the process of modernisation in Turkey and the Turkish state’s approach to Kurds and Islam. Having been founded on secular and nationalist principles, Turkey was governed by strictly modernist and secularist principles until the 1950s. Gareth Jenkins examines this period in his book Political Islam in Turkey and offers a detailed analysis of how Islam moved from the periphery to the centre in Turkey through urban migration during this period (2008, pp. 81–182). The Milli Görüş (National Vision) movement emerged as a result of this process of social mobilisation and set the historical and sociological scene from which the main Islamist parties in Turkey emerged, such as Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party), Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party), Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party), Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party), and the AK Party (Justice and Development Party).

In her book Islamist Mobilization in Turkey (2002), Jenny White examines this period up to the mid 1990s within the context of the local administration policies of parties representative of Milli Görüş politics and in Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks (2013), she analyses the post-28 February 1997 period from the perspective of the prominent discourses of the AK Party era. In Islam and Modernity in Turkey (2011), Brian Silverstein focuses on how the modernist discourse, which emerged within the Ottoman Empire as a reaction to colonialism, transformed traditional Islamic discourses and understandings of Muslims in Turkey and, in contrast to many Muslim countries, how these discourses and

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understandings underwent transformation through people’s interaction with the secular state structure.

The modernist mindset of the Turkish state had always been met with reactions from people who led more traditional and religious lives. However, between 1950 and the establishment of the Milli Nizam Partisi on 26 January 1970, those with Islamist outlooks tended to be affiliated with central-right political parties. The momentum Islamist politics gained at the time continued to rise after the 1980 military coup.

Although the secular elements within the Turkish state attempted a post-modern coup d’état on 28 February 1997 in order to clamp down on the rise of Islamist politics, the coup failed and Islamist politics evolved into a new kind of mass movement from the time of the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) to the founding of the AK Party.

The Turkish state’s modernist and nationalist policies caused similar reactions in the country’s predominantly Kurdish southeast. Since the Sheikh Said uprising in 19258 (Olson, 1989), over a dozen religiously or ethnically motivated Kurdish uprisings have taken place against the state. Turkey has responded to the evident discontent by adopting even harsher assimilationist policies (Üngör, 2011). The PKK emerged in the 1970s as one of a dozen Kurdish political factions (Marcus, 2007).9 In time, the PKK was to distance itself from the Turkish left and in doing so became the most powerful Kurdish political force in Turkey through the assimilation, weakening, or elimination of other Kurdish organisations.

As a result of the bloody war between the PKK and the Turkish state which started in 1984, thousands of civilians lost their lives, millions of Kurds have been displaced, and the atmosphere of violence in the Kurdish region of Turkey has had a serious impact on the sociological texture of the region. While Islamism has emerged as a public resistance movement in Turkey and managed to reach the centre using an Ikhwanist, that is, Muslim Brotherhood-influenced perspective, Kurdish political movements continued their activities, largely on the periphery, and violence became a common means employed by the actors involved.

Hizbullah was established in Batman10 prior to the military coup on 12 September 1980, at a time when the Ikhwan influence was on the rise, the conservative Milli Görüş line was gaining traction, the Iranian Revolution had taken place, the conflict between the left and right in Turkey had reached a peak, and the PKK had emerged as a militant force. At the time of Hizbullah’s emergence there were many left-wing organisations of various sizes as well as Islamic organisations and

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groups operating in the Kurdish region of Turkey. Among the Islamic organisations that emerged during my interviews were Partiya İslâmîya Kurdistan (The Islamic Party of Kurdistan), İslâmî Cemaat (Islamic Cemaat) and/or Hizbi İslâmî (Islamic Sect), Hareketa İslâmî11 (Islamic Movement), Fedaiyên Îslâmê (Guerrillas of Islam), Batman Fecir group,12 Menzil, Tevhid, Selam,13 Vahdet, and İlim/Cemaata Ulemayên İslâmî14 (The Community of Islamic Scholars). Although these organisations often had theoretical references in common, they differed in terms of their goals and methods. For example, while some of them adopted violence as a method, others organised themselves around a bookshop or madrasa and pursued regular tebliğ15 activities. In fact, the attitude towards violence stands out as the fundamental point of difference between these organisations. The fragmented state of Islamist politics in the Kurdish region of Turkey was eliminated by Hizbullah between 1980 and 1990 through means similar to those employed by the PKK in dealing with other Kurdish left-wing organisations in the area.16

imagining the ummah17 from the provinces: the establishment of hizbullah The story of the leader of a political movement makes a good starting point from which to tell the story of the movement itself. In the case of Hizbullah, which is inherently a leader-centred organisation, Hüseyin Velioğlu’s life story offers many insights into understanding the movement he led. In fact, the story of Hizbullah from its establishment until Velioğlu’s death can be best understood by studying Velioğlu’s life story.

According to Hizbullah’s official website, www.huseynisevda.biz, Velioğlu was born in 1952 in a village in Batman and lived in central Batman until high school. He finished high school in Mardin and headed to Ankara to study finance at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Ankara University, graduating in 1980.18 He interrupted his studies during his first year for unknown reasons and returned to his village.

There he spent his time reading Said-i Nursi’s Risale-i Nur corpus in the mountains, where he would often go to retreat. The Hüseyni Sevda website talks about this period, quoting Velioğlu’s own words: I picked up the Risale-i Nur corpus and headed to the village. For a whole year I read the Risale in the mountains surrounding the village.