Social science and energy issues by Instytut Politologii UG

Social Science and Energy Issues edited by Sylwia Mrozowska

Social Science and Energy Issues

Social Science and Energy Issues edited by Sylwia Mrozowska

Cover design: Joanna Bizior Layout: Małgorzata Piwowarczyk Proofreading: Anna Moskała

Project supported by a grant from Norway through the Norway Grants and co-financed by the Polish funds

Wydawnictwo LIBRON – Filip Lohner al. Daszyńskiego 21/13 31–537 Kraków tel. 12 628 05 12 e-mail: office@libron.pl www.libron.pl

Content

Preface and Acknowledgments S y lw i a Mrozow s k a

Part I 13

Social Science and Energy Issues On Technology – Society Studies L e c h W . Z ac h e r

The Challenges for Social Sciences in the Context of Natural Environment Protection A ndr z e j C h od u b s k i

Monitoring of Technology and the Inevitable Limits of Controllability (as Illustrated by the Criticism of Climate Engineering) E wa B i ńc z y k

Part II 69

The Acceptance of Energy Systems Public Understanding of Nuclear Energy. Polish Case Study S y lw i a Mrozow s k a & Ba r ba ra K ije wska

Public and Nuclear: between Disregard and Participation D rago Kos , Mar ko Poli č & N adja Že le zni k

109

The Role of Shared Group Beliefs, Framing Effect, Affect and Reasoning in Perception of Technology Tom as z B e sta

121

Complex Decision-Making with regard to Nuclear Risks: Advantages of Deliberative Democracy I le a na Das că lu

Part III Energy, Society, Institutions and Governance 137

Consumption of Petroleum and Natural Gas in the Republic of Armenia and its Energy Security – the Logistic Aspect P i ot r Kw i at k i e w i c z

147

Between Energy Security and Climate Change. The International Energy Agency and Challenges of Global Governance Mar e k R e w i zor s k i

163

Social Acceptance in the Process of Optimization of Strategic Decisions within the Scope of Energy Policy S y lw i a Mrozow s k a

179

Gender, Environment and Climate Change Ba r ba ra K i j e w s k a

193

The Relations between Indigenous Peoples and Extractive Industry in the Barents Region P r z e m ys ł aw S i e radz a n

211

National Energy Politics. A Case Study of the Slovak Republic and the Gas Crisis 2009 A ndr e a F i gulová

227

Notes on Contributors

Preface and Acknowledgments

Sy lwi a Mro zow s k a

The role of social sciences in energy studies is more and more appreciated and it is noted that such studies must become more socially oriented, interdisciplinary and heterogeneous. Problem-focused research activities that center on both physical and social processes include diverse actors and mix qualitative and quantitative methods and have a better chance of achieving analytic excellence and social impact (Sovacool, 2014; Sovacool et al., 2015). As Nobel Prize-winner Mario Molina notes, the global warming challenge is as much a matter of public policy and social science as engineering, physics, and chemistry (Ansdabehere & Fri, 2013). So far social sciences in Poland have not undertaken extensive research and teaching about the scale of the problems belonging to the field of socalled Science-Technology-Society (STS), which focuses on political and social dimensions of the development of science and technology, and covers issues concerning the relation among politics, society and power industry. The reasons for this state of affairs were identified, among others, by Lech Zacher – one of Polish scholars involved in STS and publishing an interdisciplinary scientific journal “Transformations” since 1992. The first reason enumerated by the author (Zacher, 2012) is the interdisciplinarity of STS, requiring the crossing of institutional boundaries heavily guarded by the Polish tradition of mono-disciplinarity. A lack of experience in conducting research jointly by representatives of social sciences and exact sciences has not been conducive to STS development in Poland. In addition, underdeveloped civil society, unable to articulate its concerns and fears related to technical risks, affected the emotional rather than substantive nature of public debates related to, among others, political 7

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decisions concerning the implementation of socially controversial technologies in Poland. The first of the mentioned problems is objectively the most difficult to overcome. Interdisciplinary research is undertaken when a certain theoretical problem requires the cooperation of representatives of various disciplines. It consists of the use of theoretical resources of different disciplines to solve problems arising at their interface. In addition, requiring coupling of theories belonging to at least two scientific disciplines it is always connected with ascertainment of explanatory borders of independently operating disciplines and theories (Poczobut, 2008). The ability to conduct interdisciplinary research is considered to be an extremely difficult scientific competence. The development of this type of research requires, inter alia, a long time horizon and considering the purposefulness of interdisciplinary research in the assumptions of scientific policy in Poland, which is directly connected with the possibility of funding this type of research. The second of the identified barriers to the development of STS slowly begins to be levelled primarily by the – enforced by the higher education reform in Poland – internationalization of research conducted by Polish researchers representing social sciences (Mrozowska & Penkowska, 2015) and the resulting experience in international interdisciplinary research teams and the transfer of this experience to the Polish soil. Until recently such research has been conducted by representatives of technical sciences, natural sciences or exact sciences. Nowadays more and more political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, economists, psychologists or pedagogues participate in international projects, among others, co-financed by the EU funds and programs such as HORIZON 2020 or Norwegian and international projects of the National Science Centre (NSC) and the National Centre for Research and Development (NCRD). The third barrier is directly related to the quality of civil society in Poland and the level of social capital. Political scientists and sociologists agree that changes in these areas require the realization by policy makers of the value of conscious and intentional inclusion of the public in decision-making processes involving decisions related to the implementation of the so-called “controversial technologies” and the preparation of the public to participate in these processes, among others, by promoting participatory tools and education about the application of these tools. A challenge in this area is the education of both the public and policy makers. 8

P re face a nd Acknowle dgme nts

The problem of the relationships among politics, society and power industry as a subject of research of social scientists has started to develop in recent years in Poland mainly for practical reasons. Political decisions concerning the construction of the first nuclear power plant, shale gas extraction or development of renewable energy sources (RES) in Poland have begun to arouse public concern and sparked public debate about their origins, purpose and consequences of their adoption. This has led to the beginning of research in energy sociology (Luck & Misiak, 2012), energy security (Soroka, 2015; Kwiatkiewicz & Szczerbowski, 2015), participatory technology assessment (Stankiewicz, 2014). Foundations and scientific societies have been created1 in order to carry out research in this area or promote its results. An important step towards the development of STS in Poland is also a growing number of monographs and articles by Polish authors from this field. The greater part of these publications is of empirical nature, the smaller part is theoretical. In 2014 there was published in Poland the first STS anthology (Bińczyk & Derra). STS development in Poland will also require the development of teaching in this area and the interest of students and postgraduates in these issues. The aim of this publication is to promote STS among students of social sciences in Poland and present chapters devoted to selected areas of STS. I would like to sincerely thank everyone who has supported my idea of editing this book, especially my wonderful, scientifically inquisitive students. I am very grateful to Barbara Kijewska and Michał Bogusz for many insightful comments on individual elements of the book. I am directing special thanks to Marta Szymczak and Anna Moskała for professional cooperation in the linguistic quality of the publication. Sylwia Mrozowska

E.g. Polish Association for Technology Assessment (PATA).

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References Bińczyk, E., & Derra, A. (Eds.). (2014). Studia nad nauką i technologią. Wybór tekstów. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. Kwiatkiewicz, P., Szczerbowski, R. (2014). Europejski wymiar bezpieczeństwa energetycznego a ochrona środowiska. Poznań: ESUS. Łucki, Z., & Misiak, W. (2012). Energetyka a społeczeństwo. Aspekty socjologiczne. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. Mrozowska, S., & Penkowska, G. (Eds.). (2015). Uniwersytet jutra. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Libron. Poczobut, R. (2008). Fenomen wielowymiarowości umysłu a emergencja. Z ontologii i metodologii badań inter- i transdyscyplinarnych. In A. Jabłoński, & M. Zemło (Ed.), Między unifikacją a dezintegracją. Kondycja wiedzy we współczesnym społeczeństwie (pp. 11–35). Lublin: Wydawnictwo Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego. Soroka, P. (2015). Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne. Między teorią a praktyką. Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa. Sovacool, B. K. (2014). Diversity: Energy studies need social science. Nature, 511, pp. 529–530. Sovacool, B. K., Ryan, S. E., Stern, P.C., Janda, K., Rochli, G., Spreng, D., Pasqualetti, M. J., Wilhite, H., & Lutzenhiser, L. (2015). Integrating social science in energy research. Energy Research & Social Science, 6, pp. 95–99. Stankiewicz, P. (2014). Zbudujemy Wam elektrownię (atomową!). Praktyka oceny technologii przy rozwoju energetyki jądrowej w Polsce. Studia Socjologiczne, 1 (2012), pp. 77–107. Zacher, L. (Ed.). (2012). Nauka technika społeczeństwo. Podejścia i koncepcje metodologiczne, wyzwania innowacyjne i ewaluacyjne. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Poltext.

Part I

Social Science and Energy Issues

On Technology – Society Studies L e c h W . Z ac her

Technology is not ‘outside’ of society but is a carrier and mediator of social relations, meanings and interests. —J. McLaughlin et al., ‘Valuing Technology – Organizations, Culture and Change’ (1999).

Historical Preface: Evolution by Revolutions It is nothing but a truistic observation that technology has always been important for man. Its performative and transformative power has been immense throughout human history. Table 1 illustrates the subsequent phases of the development of civilization and the corresponding cultures. Table 1 shows the evolution of technology and technology – culture relations. This evolution was interrupted and stimulated by many revolutionary changes connected with fundamental discoveries and inventions (e.g. electricity, nuclear power, semiconductors, antibiotics, TV, computers, mobile phones, ballistic missiles, spacecrafts, Internet and many more). Some of them gave their names to revolutions: the telecommunication revolution, the electronics and microelectronics revolution, the cyber-revolution, the computer revolution, information revolution, digital revolution, biotechnological revolution, nanotechnological revolution, and the like. Such terms are very common in both scientific and public discourse. Terminology, both in its abundance and novelty, is important since language determines our 13

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cognitive abilities and societal communication; moreover, it diffuses into political debates and mass media messages. Table 1. Stages of civilization development and technology – type cultures • Prehistoric stage (“struggle over fire” – culture of survival). • Preindustrial stage (many ages) – culture of subsistence (mostly agrarian). • Industrial stage (17th–19th centuries: population growth, mass use of natural resources, building factories, cities, infrastructure, building artificial environment on a large scale) – industrial culture, culture of denaturalization (conquest of nature). • Postindustrial stage: scientific and technological revolution (20th – century exploration, ICT, biotechnology, nanotechnology), scientific and technological culture, cultures of technologization and artificialization, cyber-culture emergence. • Coming age of risks and uncertainty (undesirable detrimental impacts of technology and growth) – emerging culture of risk evaluation, and culture of consequentionalism. • New struggle for survival (crises, demography problems, finances, economy, environment, climate turbulence, post-politics, conflicts and wars, mafia, terrorism, uncontrolled migration) – culture of global survival. • Sustainability vision and trajectory (global, national, local) – new discourse, concepts, strategies, and policies: emerging culture of sustainability. • Future-oriented civilization – culture of transition and change: towards transhumanism and posthumanism (total technologization, AI, cybernetization, robotization). • “World without us” – posthuman culture, machinekind culture (unpredictable future). Source: All the tables are the author's own elaboration.

Table 1 helps to interpret the multifaceted and changing relationship between technology development and culture embedded in societies. Culture determines, through its articulation of human and social needs, attitudes, aspirations, myths, and fears, a ‘shape’ of technology. The developing technology, especially when it becomes popular, effective, diffused, and produces positive effects (and also risks and detrimental impacts), has an influence on societies and their cultures. This dialectic, however, is not fully symmetrical and balanced. In some epochs, socio-cultural systems are equally influential or even dominate technological systems. 14

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So technological determinism (often propagated historically) seems not entitled. Nevertheless, such terms as technological optimism (or triumphalism) are present, often as unspeakable convictions, in media, politics and public debates, which may leave the impression that technology is always progressive and determines everything. It seems over time that technology in general is progressive, but only from the point of view of technological rationality and its set of technological criteria (e.g. speed, precision, efficiency, appropriateness, compatibility with other technical systems, etc.). Thus, scientific and technological advances do not automatically produce social progress, though they may help establish the preconditions for such progress. However, social rationality and its set of criteria of choice and evaluation (e.g. quality of life, health care, social security, education, sound environment, and so on) are not compatible with technological rationality. Technology-driven risks, uncertainty, dangers, negative impacts (e.g. technical catastrophes, environmental devastation) may overweigh technological advantages for people. At worst they can even threaten human survival; there are opinions that the 21st century is a critical period for humanity). Technological optimists like inventors and innovators think that ‘the more technology, the better’, underestimating the costs of new technology and its possible undesirable effects. So, social assessment of technology, including technology assessment, social and psychological impact assessment, environmental impact assessment, etc., is necessary to diminish or eliminate technological risks, dangers, bad effects, and to redirect or re-engineer emerging technologies to make them sustainable and human-friendly. In spite of the present efforts on both national and global scales (e.g. the Paris summit on climate change in December 2015), there is no guarantee that the planet and humankind will be saved. At any rate, a comprehensive and common strategy of sustainable development is necessary to attain a desirable future.

Deconstruction of the Technology Sphere Technology in a broad sense is a large complex system. It can be analyzed in general, as a whole or as a lot of subsystems, which may be more useful for policy-oriented goals and development strategies and implementations. A systems approach seems appropriate for studying technology, its development, and effects. However, it has happened sometimes that the conventional view of technology was reduced to a collection of bits, pieces, 15

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components, etc. Other interpretation assumes that a socio-technical ensemble (or better, a system) consists of components and their composition which are determined and kept together both by social relations and physical ties. Needless to say, technology is always in the making, and should be investigated in terms of its changing dynamics. Of course, technology’s performance and successes are subjects of various interpretations and valuations. Reference not only to technological rationality but also to its contextualization is important. There are controversies concerning the view that technology is socially constructed. It is true that man’s imagination, projects, skills, production of technical knowledge and technological objects, systems, etc., are a kind of constructive activity, and the same concerns the use (or ‘consumption’) of technology products which defines their meanings, significance and value. Users’ needs, hic et nunc, create a context. Moreover, in recent times users have become more active in innovation processes and are useful for shaping products. However, such an approach overlooks the fact that technology – its directions, processes, pace, etc. – have some autonomy. They are semi-autonomous and cannot be fully controlled. Market and competition also play a significant role. Various products of technology are invented, elaborated, and marketed often without any demand with the help of intensive marketing, so they are supply-driven. Thus, it is not in response to people’s needs and demands but rather a management of human desires, which is very effective in the case of children and youth. So in fact, new technology is not negotiated or properly evaluated. The monopolistic novelty prize cannot be questioned, and the same concerns the long-term effects, particularly detrimental ones. Technology products, to a large extent, are often enthusiastically welcomed by business, by the army, by consumers (e.g. new models of cars, computers, smartphones). So, this is rather a process of adaptation through purchases, government orders, and people’s consumption driven by ads (the Internet is a good tool nowadays). However, there are ideas and efforts aiming at a socialization and democratization of the production of knowledge, and also the technology and power relations between consumers and producers. These should not be overlooked or neglected. Societal pressure (mostly in Western democracies) becomes a factor in co-shaping and controlling technologies. Nevertheless, even together with government science and technology policies, norms and standards, legal regulations, and business strategies, a society is not able to command technology creation and use. Many tech16

on T e chnology – S oci e T y S T udi e S

nology ‘lines’ and production are difficult to change or substitute. There are some general ‘channels’ of technology – for example cars, computers, TV sets, smartphones, airplanes, tanks, and ballistic missiles. They can be improved and modernized, but they will not disappear in a short – or medium-time horizon. Fig. 1. Technology sphere – components, relations and interactions Figure 1. Technology sphere – components, relations and interactions

technical objects & materials

technical infrastructure & intelligent ambiance

technical models projects technical research, knowledge & skills

Sphere of TECHNOLOGY (system)

technologies & procedures (ways of doing)

technical culture philosophy & ideology of technology

effects of technology (good and bad)

input of science

influence of society consumers

CREATIVITY discoveries basic research intellectual drive education post normal science modes of knowledge production

technical research, thinking & imagination

CONTROL needs demands choices policies management technology assessment practicality

impact on environment

multifaceted social change

TRANSFORMATIONS

devastation artificialization alienation technological unemployment exclusion

technological civilization society man transhumanism & posthumanism from humankind to machinekind

Source: own elaboration.

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So a picture of technology should be complex, systemic, multifaceted and on the move. Figure 1 tries to deconstruct the sphere of technology. This conceptual framework shows many subsystems, as their interactions and feedbacks are not designed for simplicity and transparency in the figure. Figure 1 shows the technology sphere in the three dimensions: creativity, control, and transformation – respectively, cognitive, policy-oriented, and socially evaluated. It also considers such important factors as the inputs of science. Historically, science and technology were substantially separated. Science was mostly a cognitive and theoretical endeavor, while technology was more experimental and practical. Then technology was scientificated and became dependent not only on scientific research, but also on capitalist market mechanisms and on various stakeholders, mostly in Western democracies. So practicality, customers’ demand and a new mode of knowledge production (the so-called Mode 2, different from the basically academic Mode 1) included more innovative organizations – not only universities, but also customers and users, local communities, and other stakeholders. The Internet gave a boost to such an arrangement, and in this way technoscience was born. It is crucial for understanding technology to consider the different impacts, in particular those that are not desirable, unplanned, long-term, and require additional costs and activities (e.g. repairing a devastated environment), not to mention human losses and tough social problems, e.g. technological marginalization or exclusion of people who are sick, disabled, old, or those with obsolete knowledge and skills. Such people exist, even in advanced high-tech societies. Creating new technologies is always connected with prospective orientation, with visions based on predictable knowledge development, and on the imaginations of inventors, innovators, and futurists. Processes leading to the transhumanism era are already advanced (artificialization of human beings and their surroundings). Singularity is coming, as R. Kurzweil predicts – a point when artificial intelligence will surpass human intelligence, when a fusion of man and machine will take place. Regarding the posthuman era, one should interrogate not only sci-fi authors, but also emerging thinking machines, robots, and intelligent systems.

Impact Issues Technology as an intellectual, cognitive and research activity has its own ‘inner’ rationality, justification and empowerment. Yet technology in18

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vestigation and research are increasingly more expensive. Moreover, its performative and transformative power has been recognized by business as connected with the development of the capitalist system based on free market and innovation flows, commercialized and widely diffused, especially due to globalization. Practicality has won, and its market-oriented and post-normal (post-academic) orientation has given birth to the present techno-science. So, the costs of creation of new technologies, charged to governments and businesses, are legitimized and paid off by consumers. Thus, the effects of technology advances, and not only technology progress per se, are evidently fundamental. The effects are multiple: economic, social, cultural, etc.; they are short-term, long-term, for all, for some, costly or cheap, important or not, but usually they are not only positive. As a rule, there will be some or many negative side effects caused by an introduction or increasing the scale of new technologies. Often these negative effects were and are nowadays neglected or deliberately hidden by technologists, investors, entrepreneurs, companies, and marketers, or treated as a ‘necessary cost’ of progress. It depends on who is the evaluator – government agencies, business owners and managers, citizens’ experts – and impacted by technology people, NGOs, political and religious leaders and the like. Different rationalities will be applied, and not only technological ones; the agendas of different interest groups will be disclosed. So, a whole cycle of technology development, i.e. creation (see Table 2) and its applications and effects can be undermined. All interest groups, whether local, national, or global (as TNCs) have an agenda; some expect profits or dividends, others expect new technologies or warfare or consumer products or new medicines, some are shortsighted while others are looking prospectively and considering the interests of future generations; some are very egoistic, some more altruistic, and some more sensitive to poverty and people’s misery in many areas of the world. In any case, there is a great variety and complexity in the rationality criteria applied to technology applications and their multiple effects and detrimental impacts, not to mention risks, uncertainties, time horizons, costs, etc. In terms of governance of technology, social relations are complex, controversial, and politically bounded. There are at present growing hopes in the democratic performance of governance in procedures and institutions enabling the articulation of different rationalities, evaluations and interests (e.g. various sorts of TA, social impact assessment, environmental impact assessment, consensus conferences, technology choice panels, and other forms of deliberation and civil 19

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society participation in technological decision-making). This complex and multiple bounded situation of choice, management, politics, also ethics and responsibility (global too) is simply presented in Tables 2 and 3. The latter shows three spheres: technology, its application and impact, and some selected effects of technology use. The variety of societal interests involved is especially exposed. Both tables, although only conceptual frameworks, may serve to lead to a better understanding of the nature, performance and consequences of technology progress and use. Table 2. Technology cycle: creation (production) – applications – effects CREATION (Production)

–

R & D sphere technological ideas technical knowledge experiments discoveries input of science technological research development works innovations intellectual entrepreneurship

APPLICATIONS

–

innovative entrepreneurship creative adaptation imitation diffusion technology transfer filling gaps exploitation consumption sphere demand creation marketing market penetration

Techno-science science – technology – society networks feedback practicality orientation Mode 2 production of knowledge Technological rationality

economic VALUATIONS

EFFECTS

positive: health technologies economic growth social change (mobility) work effectiveness media influence culture access negative: environmental devastation dehumanization psychological over-individualization technological unemployment technical catastrophes and risks

socio-ecological rationality

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Table 3. Main motives and interests in three spheres: technology creation, technology application and technology evaluation TECHNOLOGY SPHERE

APPLICATION SPHERE

IMPACT SPHERE

Motives: • cognitive • career • ambition • prestige • financial • political influence

Motives: • profit-making • competitive advantage • military power • dominance

Motives: • facilitation of life • consumerism • keeping standard of living • better healthcare • improvement of environment

Interests: • group • institutional • professional • international centers • corporative

Interests: • industrial companies • business groups • business leaders • political power • new businesses • financial groups • international networks

Interests: • impacted people • political & religious groups • concerned citizens • NGOs • empowerment • participation in decisions • critics & opponents • marginalized & excluded

SELECTED EFFECTS military – industrial complex scientific and technical advisory bodies in politics responsibility, ethics, CSR government policies transnational corporations international law & institutions

social assessment of technology social control & protests democratization of technological decision-making deliberation & participation networking (also international)

More on Technology Performance and Its Transformative Power Many developmental processes are generated, caused, modified, stimulated or ‘stamped’ by technology. Exemplary technology-driven processes are listed in Table 4. Their order is de facto random. They represent different realms of development and human activities. Some of their names are names of processes per se, while some others are their types or characteristics. 21

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Technology-driven processes are often intertwined; some are general, and some overlap and converge. More thorough investigations are needed to properly recognize and assess them. Of course, all the mentioned processes should be contextualized; they may be separated only for analytical reasons. Moreover, they should refer to the real world – to existing regions, countries, and to cyberspace as well. Advancement of these processes is very differentiated, and the same is true for their courses, paces, costs, and effects. Their description, measuring, accountability (government, business, civic), and modeling can be used in theoretical discussions, in public debates and in policy-making. Additionally, many listed processes have both international and global dimensions. Their ‘products’ can serve both good and bad ends. This typical ambivalence toward technology advancements and uses should also be a subject of moral judgments. Table 4. Technology-driven processes (exemplary) denaturalization & detraditionalization (bodies, life, attitudes) miniaturization (various objects) acceleration (processes, transportation, information flows) artificialization (surroundings, man, intelligence) virtualization (production, politics) networking (cooperation) massification (production, access to info, amateurization) substitutions (natural resources, old solutions) devastations (technical catastrophes, environmental, accidents) technologization (life) technocracy (management, governance) informationalization (society) internetization (education, schools, media) modernization (economy, industry) globalization (transborder reach) diffusion of patterns (consumption, behavior, pop culture) innovativeness (education, economy, organization) cybernetization (cyber-culture, cyber man) stimulation (research, applications, use)

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creating demands (gadgetization, marketing, ads) surveillance (mass, global) military buildup (new arms, arms race, wars) manipulation & netocracy (politics) automation & robotization (production, social and medical practices) biologization (biotechnologies, genetic engineering, GMO, biomedicine) nanotechnologization (many applications) cosmization (space exploration)

With regard to the performative and transformative power of technology, it goes without saying that they are reflected in the technology-society discourse. New terminology is essential for such a discourse. New phenomena and new processes cannot be properly identified, recognized, analyzed and evaluated using an old theoretical toolbox, including its categories and terms. Regardless of its frequent fuzziness or only metaphorical meaning, the new terminology is vital for new approaches. New terms constitute a kind of keyword map enabling discursive inquiries. Needless to say, the present scientific vocabulary useful for technology-society investigations definitively goes beyond one discipline and vice versa; it is multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary; it is the way that science, technology, society – (STS) – studies are evolving nowadays. It is the only way to reach an in-depth understanding of new phenomena and processes connected with technology development – full of ambivalence, unexpected emergencies, risks and uncertainties, multiplicity of dimensions and characteristics, ambiguity and heterogeneity of effects and their valuations. So the use of technological etiquettes for civilizations, eras, socio-economic systems, economies, societies and other human organizations seems theoretically and practically justified and helpful in recognizing new developments (see Table 5). Table 5. Technological etiquettes for civilizations, economies, societies and human aggregates industrial civilization technological civilization (era, also man) scientific and technological civilization modern civilization

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industrial capitalism global technological capitalism information capitalism digital capitalism industrial and postindustrial society modern society/economy technological society/man innovative society/economy high tech society/economy tech advanced society computer society information society/economy spam society cyber-society/man network society/economy virtual society mass media society surveillance society knowledge-based society info-bio society trans- and posthuman forms of societies socio-technological systems techno-social aggregates e-swarm e-herd Internet communities network tribes info-mass cyberspace nomads

Final Reflections Concerning the Future Great technology potential and transformative power should be properly exploited in order to shape aÂ better future. Confining technology development and applications solely to the market, the military or profit-making contexts creates technological directions and consequences that are problematic, one-sided, and one-dimensional. Technology is socially produced in socio-cultural embeddedness; it is de facto financed by people (taxpayers 24

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and customers), so it should serve human ends. Technology in its production and use should not be harmful, oppressive or enslaving to societies, groups, or individuals. Such a demand is not utopian; also, it is not solely moral in its substance, but it is fundamental for attaining sustainability – i.e. a real chance for survival, for a better future, for more choice for the next generations. Technology can be very helpful here, but not exclusively technology. Many technologically supported remedies are designed and well known (see Table 6). They may allow not only for the conquest of nature, devastating and overexploiting it, but also for rationally saving space, water, sound atmosphere, energy sources and food – and, no less important, designing and using technologies that assure people (not only the rich in rich countries) a decent and just share in produced wealth, and also a share in the processes of its creation and distribution. This should be a new human right, the implementation of which can be supported by technological progress. Table 6. Technology in the shaping of the future

Basics of human life support: • space • atmosphere • water • food • energy

accessible in nature (but limited)

Methods multiplying

conquest of nature

transforming

overexploitation

enriching

devastation & waste production overgrowth & overfeeding

from basic human needs to wealth production and inequalities

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Technologically supported remedies: • information access, ICTs, free media • networking (also transborder) • medical technologies and pharmaceuticals • clean technologies (alternative energy sources for industry, transportation, households) • new professions and new workplaces • life facilitation (caring robots for old and disabled people) • growing role of social stakeholders in technological decision-making • citizen empowerment in politics • sustainable development requirements

References and Additional Bibliography Adas, M. (1989). Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Aronovitz, S. et al. (Ed.). (1996). Technoscience and cyberculture. New York: Routledge. Batteau, A. W. (2010). Technology and Culture. Long Grove, Ill: Waveland Press. Bernal, J. D. (1939). The Social Function of Science. London: Macmillan. Brand, R. (2005). Synchronizing Science and Technology with Human Behavior. London – Sterling, VA: Earthscan. Breton, Ph. (2011). The Culture of the Internet and the Internet as Cult: Social Fears and Religious Fantasies. Duluth, Minn: LitwinBooks. Cartelli, A. (Ed.). (2012). Current trends and future practices for digital literacy and competence. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Castells, M. (Ed.). (2004). The Network Society. A Cross Cultural Perspective. Cheltenham: Elgar. Dantzig, G. B. (1979). The Role of Models in Determining Policy for Transition to a More Resilient Technological Society, Laxenburg: IIASA.

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Dierkes, M., Hoffman, U., & Marz, L. (1996). Visions of Technology – Social and Institutional Factors Shaping the Development of New Technologies. Frankfurt–New York: Campus Verlag – St. Martin’s Press. Dinello, D. (2005). Technophobia! Science Fiction Visions of Posthuman Technology. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Featherstone, M. (2000). Technologies of Post-human Development and the Potential for Global Citizenship. In J. N. Pieterse (Ed.), Global Futures – Shaping Globalization. London-New York: Zed Books. Fisher, D., & Wright, L. (2001). On Utopias and Dystopias: Towards an Understanding of the Discourse Surrounding the Internet. Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, 6 (2)/2001. Fox, M. F., Johnson, D. G., & Rosser, S. V. (Eds.). (2006). Women, Gender, and Technology. Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois Press. Friedel, R. (2007). A Culture of Improvement Technology and the Western Millennium. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Fuller, S. (2011). Humanity 2.0: What It Means to Be Human Past, Present and Future. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hanks, C. (Ed.). (2010). Technology and Values – Essential Readings. MA – Oxford: Wiley – Blackwell, Malden. Harbers, H. (Ed.). (2005). Inside the Politics of Technology: Agency and Normativity in the Co-Production of Technology and Society. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Hughes, T. P. (2004). Human-Built World: How to Think about Technology and Culture. Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press. James, J. (2008). Re-estimating the difficulty of closing the digital divide. Journal of the American Society for Information Science & Technology. 59. 12. Johnson, D. G., & Wetmore, J. M. (Eds.). (2009). Technology and Society – Building Our Sociotechnical Future. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Keen, A. (2007). Cult of the amateur: how today’s Internet is killing our culture. New York: Doubleday. Kelty, Ch. M. (2008). Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Kirkup, G. et al. (2000). The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader. London: Routledge. Kurzweil, R. (2005). The Singularity Is Near. New York: Viking. Lie, M., & Sørensen, K. H. (Eds.). (1996). Making Technology Our Own? Domestication Technology into Everyday Life. Oslo – Boston: Scandinavian University Press.

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MacCarthy, E., & Kelty Ch. (2010). Responsibility and Nanotechnology. Social Studies of Science, vol. 40, no. 3, June 2010. Maines, R. P. (2009). Hedonizing Technologies: Path to Pleasures in Hobbies and Leisure. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. McInerney, P.-B. (2009). Technology Movements and the Politics of Free/Open Source Software. Science, Technology & Human Values, 34 (2) March 2009. Miller, V. A. (2011). Understanding digital culture. London: Sage. Morgan, K. et al. (Eds.). (2004). Human Perspectives in the Internet Society: Culture, Psychology and Gender, vol. 4, Wessex. Nye, D. E. (2006). Technology Matters – Questions to Live With. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Oudshoorn, N., & Pinch, T. J. (Eds.). (2005). How users matter: The co-construction of users and technology. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Philbrick, M., & Barandiaran, J. (2009). The National Citizens’ Technology Forum: lessons for the future. Science and Public Policy, June 2009. Plant, S. (1997). Zeroes and Ones: Digital Women and the New Technoculture. New York: Doubleday. Postman, N. (1992). Technopoly. New York: Vintage. Rheingold, H. (2002). Smart Mobs – The Next Social Revolution – Transforming Culture and Communities in the Age of Instant Access. Cambridge, MA: Basic Books. Rosen, B. C. (1998). Winners and losers of the information revolution: psychological change and its discontents. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Rycroft, R. W., & Kash D. E. (1999). The Complexity Challenge – Technological Innovation for the 21st century. London – New York: Pinter. Schroeder, R. (2007). Rethinking Science, Technology, and Social Change. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Seidensticker, B. (2006). Future Hype – The Myths of Technology Change. San Francisco: Bernett-Koehler Publishers. Smith, M. R., & Marx, L. (1994). Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Spiller, N. (Ed.). (2002). Cyber reader: Critical writings for the digital era. London: Phaidon. Stivers, R. (2004). Shades of loneliness: pathologies of a technological society. Lannan, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

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Sussan, R. (2005). Les utopies posthumaines: contre – culture, cyberculture, culture du chaos. Sophia – Antipolis: Omniscience. Taleb, N. N. (2010). Black Swan: the impact of the highly improbable. New York: Random House. Taylor, P. A., & Harris, J. L. (2005). Digital Matters – Theory and culture of the matrix. London – New York: Routledge. Tredinnick, L. (2008). Digital information culture: the individual and society in the digital age. Oxford: Chandos Publishing. Turkle, S. (1995). Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet. New York: Simon and Schuster. Vanderburg, W. H. (2005). Living in the labyrinth of technology. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Vanderburg, W. H. (2007). Technology and the Law: Who Rules? Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 27 (4), August 2007. Wajcman, J. (2004). Technofeminism. London: Polity/Blackwell. Woensel, van L., & Archer, G. (2015). Ten technologies which could change our lives – Potential impacts and policy implications. European Parliament Research Service – STOA. Wolfe, C. (2010). What Is Posthumanism? Minneapolis, IND: University of Minnesota Press. Zacher, L. W. (2007). E-Transformations of Societies. In A.-V. Anttiroiko (Ed.), Electronic Government: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools and Applications. Information Science Reference (IGI Global), vol. 6, Chap. 8.5, Hershey – New York. Zacher, L. W. (2008). Some Repetitive Reflections on Visioning the Future. In S. Sharma, P. K. Sharma (Eds.), Transformative Pathways: Attainable Utopias. Prateeksha Publications, Jaipur. Zacher, L. W. (2009). Information Society Discourse. In Encyclopedia of Information Science and Technology, IGI Global, 2 ed., Hershey, PA. Zacher, L. W. (2012). Society, Market and Technology Nexus as Contexts of ICT Policies and Applications: Some Issues and Reflections, International Journal of Information – Communication Technologies and Human Development, July – September, 2012, Vol. 4, No. 3. Zacher, L. W. (2012). Toward Democratization of Science and Technology Spheres. Some Opportunities and Problems. In A. Bammé et al. (Eds.), Yearbook 2011 of the IAS-STS. München – Wien: Profil.

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Zacher, L. W. (2013). Human and Societal Potentials for Transcending the Crisis of Civilization. In A. Targowski, M. J. CeliĹ&#x201E;ski (Eds.), Spirituality and Civilization Sustainability in the 21st Century. New York: Nova Science Publishers. Zacher, L. W. (2015). Digital Future (s). In Encyclopedia of Information Science and Technology, IGI Global, 3 ed., Hershey, PA.

The Challenges for Social Sciences in the Context of Natural Environment Protection A nd r ze j C ho dub s k i

Natural environment protection is seen today as one of fundamental challenges in countering civilizational threats resulting from scientific and technical development (Skolimowski, 1993). It is recognized that modern civilization not only creates new values which are widely accepted, but also degrades and destroys the natural environment and the world of values associated with it. In the modern development of civilization we witness a tendency to replace the natural world with the completely artificially produced world. And even to replace a humanist by a technocrat. Science plays an important role in the construction of the new civilizational order (Kuźnicki, 1999). It is noted that modern civilization orients itself increasingly on the achievements of science. At the same time, however, the nature of scientific work changes. In practicing it there is a tendency to move away from the individual’s research vocation (a scholar) towards research teams. There is a departure from the vision of inventiveness in favor of solving specific needs (tasks). The interest in ‘old’ knowledge diminishes for the benefit of the recognition of the present and sketching of visions of the future. Collaborative practicing of science increases the demand for the preparation of the scientific staff. In this situation, science becomes one of production factors. Another step is the fact that its functioning is conditioned by financial entities. First of all, the scientific community becomes depend31

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ent on the sponsorship of the state and its organs. Becoming a productive force, science loses its main vocation – freedom of research. Its task boils down to the recognition of specific tasks, mainly economic ones, which are supposed to bring economic benefits. In this situation, humanities and social sciences are marginalized (Chodubski, 2015, pp. 333–343). Scientific activity in countries with a high level of economic development is divided into: 1. Fundamental (theoretical) research, 2. Applied research (concentrated on the implementation of epistemic findings in the practice of the cultural-civilizational life), 3. R&D (Research and Development) – conducting research to meet specific business needs. Approximately 10 percent of the financing is allocated to the first of them, approximately 25 percent to the second one, and 65 percent to the third one. Humanities and social sciences are usually perceived as a subsidiary space for the avant-garde research areas in the field of cultural and civilizational progress (the natural and technical area). This subsidiarity boils down to raising the awareness of contemporary civilizational changes, including the awareness of people of the so-called transformation megatrends, such as: 1. The emergence of global cultural reality, 2. The formation of an information society that displaces the image of industrial life, 3. Moving away from centralizing reality in favor of the participation of cultural life entities, 4. Departure in the cultural life from paternalism, representative democracy in favor of participation, 5. Moving away from short-term thinking and acting for the benefit of a long-term strategy, 6. Moving away from forms of institutional support in favor of self-help, self-government, 7. Moving away from hierarchical connections in favor of the network (horizontal) order, 8. Departure from simple choices towards many possibilities, 9. Strengthening of values of tolerance for diversity of cultures, subcultures, 10. Recognition of humanization as a special value in the construction of cultural relations, with the acknowledgement of the need to strengthen cultural syncretism (Naisbitt, 1997; Toffler, 1997). Social sciences are assigned important tasks of explaining scientific and technological changes taking place at a rapid pace in: a) the sphere of economic life which is closely connected with the development of science, b) the emergence of new objects of labor – new raw materials, new applications of materials known for a long time (e.g. the use of crude oil in the food industry, the use of the properties of semiconduction of silicon known for a long time, production of synthetic crystals), c) new energy sources – nuclear energy, renewable energy sources (solar, geothermal, energy from oceans and waterways, biomass, controlled thermonuclear fusion), d) new 32

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measures of work – automation, robotics and computerization of the production process, e) the conquest of space (Polak, 1996, p. 61). From the point of view of environmental protection, the development of biotechnology is particularly important. Its consequences are reflected in medicine, food industry, agriculture, meteorology, environmental protection. The development of biotechnology is directed, among others, at a) ‘correcting nature’ (obtaining better quality of plants and animals, elimination of genetic diseases), b) obtaining materials unachievable by other methods, c) the use of waste materials as sources of raw materials and energy, d) obtaining renewable and affordable energy sources, e) reducing the energy consumption of products (Pohorecki, 1993). In scientific research in the social space the following global standards are recognized as important: 1. the creation of theoretical syntheses, 2. recognizing the dynamic, process nature of social life remaining in the course of ‘becoming’, 3. recognizing the role of individual and collective entities (e.g. social movements, leaders of cultural life), 4. recognizing the ‘soft’ space of cultural life (systems of values, norms, rules, mentality, forms of discourse), 5. the use of the recognition of cultural and civilizational reality by means of qualitative, interpretive methods, case studies (Nauka w Polsce, 1996, pp. 305–306). Representatives of social sciences undertake attempts to define the faces of the contemporary world, point to particularly important phenomena and processes, such as: 1. Safety of humanity, including the threat of using nuclear weapons in the case of war, 2. Protection of the natural environment, 3. Rapid growth of humanity on a global scale, 4. The problem of nourishing humanity, including the fight against hunger, 5. Risks of civilization diseases, 6. Revealed increasing distance between rapidly economically developing countries and underdeveloped countries, 7. Depletion of natural resources, 8. Social pathologies – an increase in organized crime, international terrorism (Mojsiewicz, 1998, p. 11). The Club of Rome, an international organization for the study of socioeconomic development in the world, has existed since 1969. It consists of economists, sociologists, political scientists, journalists and businessmen. The club prepares reports on the status and prospects of the development of modern civilization which are aimed at making people aware of the need for urgent changes, on the basis of a simple comparison between the world having completed dimensions and humanity which still wants to grow in numerical terms, and in terms of consumption and production. One of the 33

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reports indicated the existence of the terrible confusion of problems in the world, the roots and range of which people are not able to capture and from which humanity cannot get out. These are the problems of various kinds – uncontrolled population growth, differences and divisions between various nations, social injustice, hunger and malnutrition, poverty, unemployment, obsession with economic growth, inflation, economic crisis, energy crisis, crisis of democracy, financial imbalances, protectionism, illiteracy, anachronistic system of education, the rebellion of youth, alienation, excessive growth and decline of cities, crime, abandoned agricultural lands, drug addiction, arms race, increased aggressiveness, trampling of human rights, lack of respect for the law, nuclear madness, ossification of institutions, political corruption, bureaucratization, militarization, the destruction of nature, environmental degradation, the collapse of moral values, the weakening of faith, a sense of instability and so on. Each of these problems has its own dynamics of change, and all work simultaneously and continuously, one in association with the others (Pacej, 1987, pp. 71–72). Natural environment protection is considered to be ‘a burning issue’ surrounding every contemporary human being and entire humanity. The relationship between man and nature is subject to constant change. Man often destructively influences nature, the surrounding environment, i.e. especially the biosphere, which consists of air, flora, fauna, soil and water resources. Noting specific risks observed in the natural environment, climate change is usually mentioned, i.e. the warming of the globe. At the same time problematic issues are revealed, for example, whether carbon dioxide emissions are beneficial or harmful to the Earth? On the one hand, it is pointed out that carbon dioxide emitted by transportation and production means causes greenhouse effect harmful to nature; on the other hand, climatologists argue that there is no clear link between human activity and rising temperatures on the globe. With respect to the Antarctic, which takes approximately 14 million km2, or 10 percent of the Earth, on the one hand, we can see the decrease in permafrost constituting 75 percent of drinking water resources, but at the same time we perceive its growth from the bottom (more than 4 km thick ice layer). Man, however, is responsible for many changes in the environment, such as soil and water contamination or extirpation of forests. It is noted that environmental education plays an important role in the change of that reality (Kurnatowska, 1997). It is pointed out that the duty of education is 34

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to raise awareness of environmental objectives, such as the need to halt the degradation of land, ensuring the survival of species of flora and fauna, indicating ways and methods to eliminate risks. In this process lawyers, political scientists, psychologists, economists, culture experts, sociologists, etc., face important tasks. Their vocation is to identify changes in the human biotope. Legal regulations, including international and global ones, are important in this respect. Specific in this regard is combating environmental degradation, the perpetrator of which are, first and foremost, human beings. Of particular importance are activities of political institutions which generate decision-making processes shaping the natural environment. Among political and legal challenges there are such phenomena as: 1. Forest matters (it is noted that the surface of tropical forests is reduced by 11 million hectares per year, approximately 31 million hectares of forests in industrialized countries show signs of damage caused by acid rain), 2. Agricultural soils (the surface of topsoil decreases annually by approx. 26 billion hectares), 3. Formation of deserts (annually about 6 million hectares of new desert areas emerge), 4. Lakes (in industrialized areas biological life widely dies in them), 5. Fresh water resources (while groundwater is used on a large scale, the renewability of resources does not occur at the same rate, and a large shortage of water emerges (especially of drinking water in Africa and North America), 6. Changing variety of species of flora and fauna (every year several thousand species of flora and fauna die out; it is expected that over the next 20 years a fifth of all species could become extinct, 7. Sea level (it is expected that by 2100, sea levels will rise by 1.4–2.2 m), 8. Climate (it is forecasted that the temperature will increase by 1.5 – 4.5° C by 2100) (Bohdanowicz, 2001, p. 104). The attention of various specialized international entities concentrates on these issues. They deal with the recognition of the occurring global changes. They usually group scientists and employees involved in natural environment protection. These include, among others, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the World Ocean Circulation Experiment (WOCE), the World Climate Research Organization (WCRP), the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP), Africa Climate System Research (ACSYS). These organizations associate scientists, politicians and environmental activists. They define research problems, indicate analysis methods, stress that interdisciplinary, integration, systemic depictions are far-reaching. They elaborate research reports and take action for their dissemination through the organization of conferences, symposiums both 35

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at local, regional, and international levels. At conferences of particular importance are problems directly related to the population, for example pertaining to high consumption of water, electricity, food, the production of large quantities of waste. The urgent need for the development of the ecological consciousness of man is pointed to. It is emphasized, at the same time, that many countries allocate significant expenditure to natural environment protection. Denmark and Germany are in the lead in this regard. The problem of disposing industrial and especially toxic waste is of importance in the cultural practice and in the field of epistemic interests. The phenomenon of the search for landfills outside the country has become visible. In commercial transactions, highly developed countries have undertaken actions to transfer their waste to countries interested in obtaining new financial means. This reality has also become visible in Poland. For instance, France has attempted to transport pharmaceutical waste, Germany – rubble into the mining excavations in Opole province, the Netherlands – sludge. The phenomenon of waste disposal by sinking in the oceans is another example. Decisions made by international entities concerning the protection of the natural environment manifest themselves primarily in the sphere of slogans, in cultural practice they are realized to a limited extent. For example, in 1997 at the so-called World Climate Summit in Japan a decision was adopted to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. In practice, however, its multiplication has been reported. Environmentalists’ studies indicate a forecast that in this situation in the coming years 25 percent of the world’s biodiversity may die out. Environmental issues more and more often attract politicians’ attention. They notice that solving many environmental problems in a varying territorial scope depends on the decision-making process of a political nature. These issues have been recognized by NATO. It is noted that this interest results from objective reasons. Both the first and the second world wars and subsequent regional conflicts have shown that the natural environment becomes increasingly threatened with the development of new military techniques. The development of weapons of mass destruction has begun to raise concerns that their use can lead to irreversible changes in nature which will make further human existence impossible. Since the 1960s a growing sensitivity of societies about the issues of environmental degradation, including the one resulting from military activities, has been noted. People have also begun to notice that the degradation of the environment can have an impact on the occurrence of conflicts, includ36

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ing an armed conflict. In such a situation it was obvious that NATO has included environmental issues into its policy (Sołomacha & Wilczkowiak, 1997, p. 121). Environmental protection is important in the analyses of NATO due to: a) issues relating to strictly defensive matters, b) control of pollution, c) health risks (the occurrence of diseases, such as malaria, yellow fever, coma), d) the quality life. Recognizing the face of technocratic civilization it is usually indicated that it has ignored the basics of ecology. The reconstruction of challenges in this regard falls on social sciences, including political science, which is expressed in such areas as waking social consciousness expressing itself in social policy (the study of the relationship man-environment-politics), shaping of international systems (global phenomena and processes), recognition and shaping of governance, among others, in terms of nutrition, drinking water supply, prevention of civilizational diseases, generation of decisionmaking processes pertaining to environmental protection. An important challenge for social sciences is the recognition of the quality of the environment of human civilization. In this respect, geopolitical conditions are essential (Otok, 2012). It is noted that the principles and characteristics of the territory, geographical location and climate are important factors determining the behavior and cultural activities of people. The thought of Victor Cousin (1792–1867), French philosopher and politician, is often reminded: ‘Give me the map of a country, its configuration, its climate, its waters, its winds and all its physical geography, give me its natural productions, its flora, its zoology, and I pledge myself to tell you, a priori, what the man of that country will be, and what part that country will play in history’ (Bierzanek, 1990, p. 36). Currently, a still considerable challenge is to determine the spatial location of industrial plants, the operation of which determines the quality of the natural environment. At the same time the structure of industry branches and understanding of space are important. An important challenge in the demographic and sociological research are issues of settling population, and the level of urbanization, distribution of economic centers and social infrastructure (the ability to meet material needs of the population, population density and the access to the natural environment (forests, water, recreational space). An important determinant of decision-making on the quality of the human civilizational environment is the social awareness, that is a system of social values, the attitude of the population to the surrounding environment, 37

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the role of tourism and contacts with nature. These values are perceived and evaluated from the point of view of optimal conditions for human physical and mental development, as well as various determinants of human life. In this situation, the relativism in the perception of environmental quality is revealed. However, people share the thought of Greek philosopher Hippocrates, considered the so-called father of medicine (around 460–377 BC), that human health depends on its conformity with nature. Various concepts of the relationship between man and nature have appeared in the history of civilization thought. Among the Christians very popular is the biblical record in which God told people ‘Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over every living creature that moves on the ground’ (Genesis 1:28). In the seventeenth century, philosophers popularized the belief that man was created in order to control nature and the ambition of extending this rule is healthier and more dignified than any other. It was pointed out that people are ‘owners of nature’. It was only in the second half of the twentieth century that people began to notice the excessive exploitation of land and destruction of the environment. Also at that time ecological philosophy began to reveal itself (Skolimowski, 1979). It emerged on the basis of the analysis of the relationship between man and nature, the perception of the natural environment degradation, and the appearance of environmentalists. Political scientists and representatives of other social science disciplines have directed their attention to questions about the state of the natural environment, the scale of its degradation by technocratic civilization and search for ways to counteract phenomena defined as threats to human development. It is noted that in the development of civilization the improvement of nature has taken place in the context of facilitating human life, among others, by draining swamps, purification of rivers, construction of canals, new roads; it has been accompanied by the elimination of the so-called wildlife. At the same time the large-scale exploitation of natural resources for industrial purposes has taken place, and consequently there appeared the so-called contempt for what the earth has given and the unlimited human faith in technology. In reality, however, it is noted that non-renewable natural resources become depleted, including fossil fuels, certain atmospheric gases, radioactive elements, water in deeper underground strata. Thanks to scientific discoveries, non-renewable raw materials are replaced by artificially produced materials, but at the same time threats to humanity 38

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appear, such as the construction of nuclear power plants in order to obtain nuclear energy. It is noticed that beneficial technological achievements are more and more often connected with harmful side-effects which escape human control. The degradation of basic components of the biosphere (atmospheric air, water, soil) becomes apparent. The effects of environmental engineering are dangerous to humans (the creation of artificial lakes, dams, river diversion, which cause climate change, water relations, etc.). Due to changes in the natural environment, modern agriculture is sometimes identified with the industry. Its basic raw material – the soil – is replaced with an artificial reality. In the wake of this, the natural production of its products is abandoned, which, thanks to biotechnological, biophysical and biochemical knowledge, are replaced with artificial counterparts which are produced on a large scale and in the diversity of the product range. Due to changing energy sources, man adapts himself to the new, emerging, artificial cultural and civilizational environment, however, his lack of adaptation is revealed, he is excluded because of his inability to tame constant new transformations. Modern man is expected to be highly technical, to achieve a high level of economic life in a short time, to move away from cultural paternalism and responsibility for others. At the same time we observe the strengthening of the cult of youth, shortcut cultural life (Chodubski, 2013, pp. 139–155). Human economic activity has changed (disrupted) the circuit of elements such as carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus, sulfur; this has increased the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The consequences of the production and use of fertilizers are visible, inter alia, the amount of nitrogen has increased, which causes the formation of the stratospheric ozone layer, called a ‘hole’ as well as a ‘greenhouse phenomenon effect’, which disrupt the ecological balance. Important signs are revealed in the cultural order, the changing image of the natural environment, e.g. in irrigation systems; because of changing amount of precipitation, in some regions irrigation systems become useless. These changes are to a large extent a subject of recognition of social sciences, the vocation of which is a scientific prognosis (Chodubski, 2009, pp. 41–57). It is important to recognize threats to humanity arising from the rapid pace of changes of the natural environment. Attention is directed to air pollution resulting from heating homes with industrial waste (fumes emanating from furnaces), excessive exhaust fumes from means of transportation. It is noted that the industrial revolution taking place in the last three centuries, on the one hand, has given the world the benefits of greater prosperity, especially in developed countries, 39

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but on the other hand – has led to the large-scale devastation of the natural environment. Cultural heritage is destroyed, which leads to economic losses. According to pessimistic forecasts in the near future, non-renewable raw materials and energy sources may be depleted. It is predicted that in 2050 the population of the world will amount to 8.5 billion people. Famine and extermination of a significant part of the fauna and flora will be responsible for this sluggish population growth. Experts of the problem point that the relationships between man and nature are broken. The level of responsibility for environmental degradation diminishes. It is emphasized that thinking in utilitarian terms comes before the voice of conscience and the moral sense of responsibility (Ślipko, 1988, p. 26). Environmental protection problems are presented vigorously, at the same time their mythical depiction is usually revealed. Examples of the degradation are usually shown while the reflection on environmental challenges in the context of civilization change is omitted, the philosophy of ecological development of the world is ignored (King, 1992, p. 11). From the point of view of social sciences, a major challenge is the consideration of environmental issues in an integrated way in terms of a system. And at the same time three mutually coupled subsystems: social needs, economic activity and challenges in the transformation of the natural environment. An important challenge for social sciences is to analyze the issues contained in declarations and conventions pertaining to the natural environment (Juda, 1999, p. 317). Observing trends of civilizational changes in the context of their ecological development it is pointed out that at the current stage of development a single person is not able to cause its degradation, through the depletion of natural resources, but thousands of power plants, hundreds of factories and billions of cars can change it profoundly. Information about its condition coming from the media is chaotic, contradictory and confusing. Usually news about trends of changes are presented in the form of disconnected pieces of information which people do not perceive as a common message. And journalists usually do not have the knowledge required to assemble them into a coherent logical whole. For instance, as far as the climate is concerned, we can learn from some press articles that this is an important issue for humanity, while from others that it is a figment of ‘ecological fanatics’ threatening humanity with its destruction. These problems show up as well in the space of energy (Popkiewicz, 2013, pp. 427–428). In this case, the formation of future-oriented views and actions is done in different ways, it 40

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takes various forms; books and magazines and diverse reports published (mostly in English) for several years are its exemplification. Views of the future presented in them are often not very clear, too general is statements, or narrow, partial, fragmentary. Sometimes these are theoretical-predictive visions (civilizational, social, technical, political and other) or thematization. Visions often contain ideological and political topics. We observe in them the criticism of the current reality and they indicate predictions (forecasts, warnings), recommendations for prospective thinking (Zacher, 2006, p. 36). However, questions about what kind of world future generations will live in, what their prospects will be, are still important for the whole humanity. It is noted that human life is in a constant process of change and of environmental destruction. In technological civilization man has revealed its irrational exploitation which has triggered the state of biohazard for the entire planet today, in the face of high population growth on the globe it is anticipated that the threat to the environment will be increasing as a consequence of the necessity of maintaining (feeding) people. In this situation, the world’s political bodies, including the UN, speak in favor of conducting all economic activity in harmony with nature so as not to cause any irreversible changes in nature. They assume the implementation of the sustainable development of communication and production in harmony with the development of the natural environment; the economy of countries should conform to natural determinants. In recent years, the mass media have been commonly seen as an important tool generating threats to socio-political order. We witness the spontaneous development of the so-called investigative journalism. Media are oriented on sensationalism. They can quickly create heroes and also, in a short time, discredit them. With regard to natural environment protection, they reveal the so-called political correctness, and also its mythical depiction and sketching of worst-case scenarios of further development (Chodubski, 2014, pp. 39–57). In spite of many so-called weak links of functioning, the media are now an important institution shaping the consciousness of people, including the environmental awareness. In the generalizing reflection it should be stated that: 1. Environmental protection problems of the modern world due to their disputability and mythical depiction are an important research challenge for social sciences, 2. They are responsible for the integration of knowledge from different disciplines of cognition and systemic recognition, 3. The special vocation of social sciences is to conduct pragmatic research regarding the future 41

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development of the natural environment, 4. A threat to the natural environment is the pace and extent of modern civilization changes, including scientific and technical progress, 5. The vocation of social sciences in the context of environmental protection is shaping the environmental awareness of people, raising awareness of ecological values and their location in the philosophical space of the contemporary world.

References Bohdanowicz, J. (2001). Ku cywilizacji ekorozwoju. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego. Bierzanek, R. (1990). Współczesne stosunki międzynarodowe. Warszawa: PIW. Chodubski, A. (2013). Jednostka: aktor współczesnego życia kulturowego. Kognitywistyka i Media w Edukacji 2, pp. 139–155. Chodubski, A. (2015). Kształtowanie polityki naukowej w Polsce. Przykład przestrzeni politologicznej. In J. Marszałek-Kawa (Ed.), Od pedagogiki do polityki (pp. 333–343). Toruń: Wyd. Adam Marszałek. Chodubski, A. (2009). Prognostyka jako wyzwanie metodologiczne w badaniu stosunków międzynarodowych. Annales Universitatis Marie CurieSkłodowska. Sectio K Politologia, vol. XVI, (2), pp. 41–57. Chodubski, A. (2014). Zagrożenia cywilizacyjne współczesnego świata. In P. Kwiatkiewicz & R. Szczerbowski (Eds.), Europejski wymiar bezpieczeństwa energetycznego a ochrona środowiska (pp. 39–57). Poznań: FNCE. Kurnatowska, A. (Ed.). Ekologia. Jej związki z różnymi dziedzinami wiedzy. Warszawa–Łódź: PWN. Juda, J. (1999). Perspektywy rozwoju badań naukowych i technik ochrony środowiska przyrodniczego. In Perspektywy awangardowych dziedzin nauki, i techniki do roku 2010, Komitet Prognoz „Polska 2000 Plus” przy Prezydium PAN, Warszawa: PAN. King, A. (1992). Dalekie horyzonty ekologii. Łódź: Politechnika Łódzka. Mojsiewicz, Cz. (1998). Globalne problemy ludzkości. Poznań: Terra. Naisbitt, J. (1997). Megatrendy. Dziesięć nowych kierunków zmieniających nasze życie. Poznań: Zysk i S-ka. Nauka w Polsce w perspektywie XXI wieku. (1996). Komitet Prognoz „Polska w XXI wieku” przy Prezydium PAN. Warszawa: PAN.

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Otok, S. (2012). Geografia polityczna – geopolityka – ekopolityka – globalistyka. Warszawa: PWN. Peccei, A. (1987). Przyszłość jest w naszych rękach. Warszawa: PWN. Pohorecki, R. (1993). Biotechnologie dla celów pozamedycznych. In Perspektywy rozwoju nowych awangardowych dziedzin nauki i opartych na nich przemysłów wysokiej techniki. Komitet Prognoz „Polska w XXI wieku” przy Prezydium PAN. Warszawa: PAN. Polak, E. (1996). Przemiany cywilizacji współczesnej w sferze kultury materialnej. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego. Popkiewicz, M. (2013). Świat na rozdrożu. Katowice: Wydawnictwa SONIA DRAGA. Kużnicki, L. (Ed.). (1999). Perspektywy awangardowych dziedzin nauki i techniki do roku 2010. Komitet Prognoz „Polska 2000 Plus przy Prezydium PAN. Warszawa: PAN. Skolimowski, H. (1979). Medytacje o nędzach cywilizacji technicznej i blaskach życia ludzkiego. London: Odnowa. Skolimowski, H. (1993). Filozofia żyjąca. Ekofilozofia jako drzewo życia. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Pusty Obłok. Sołomacha, A., & Wilczkowiak, S. (1997). Polska-NATO. Materiały i dokumenty. Warszawa: Czasopisma Wojskowe. Ślipko, T. (1988). Granica życia. Dylematy współczesnej bioetyki. Warszawa: Akademia Teologii Katolickiej. Toffler, A. (1997). Trzecia fala. Warszawa: PIW. Zacher, L. W. (2006). Gry o przyszłe światy. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo WDN.

Monitoring of Technology and the Inevitable Limits of Controllability (as Illustrated by the Criticism of Climate Engineering)1 E wa B i ńc z y k

Introduction Social sciences as well as philosophy of technology increasingly stress the need to carefully monitor technoscience and its laboratories (Bińczyk, 2012, pp. 271–382). In view of the growing problem of the ecological risk, it is becoming more and more important to control the direction of the future development of global society. Unfortunately, the assessment of the impact of science and technology is significantly limited both from a theoretical and practical point of view. These constraints are related to the continuing popularity of the approaches such as scientism, technological instrumentalism, technological imperative, prediction dilemma, dilemma of experts as well as time discounting and unavoidable dilemma of control. This article discusses the nature of these limitations and describes some of their consequences. For this purpose we will refer to certain critical standpoints present in the philosophy of technology, Technology Assessment (TA) and Science and Technology Studies (STS). Using the example of the climate engineering project – which is quintessential for the Western 1

The Polish version of this article has been recently published in: Studia BAS – Biura Analiz Sejmowych (2015), 3(43), pp. 113–136.

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ideal of ‘manageability’ – we will show the difficulties lying at the heart of the idea of monitoring technology and shaping the future. On the one hand, through the use of geoengineering, we hope to control effectively the systemic risk of our own doing, which is to be achieved through our further intervention into the nature. On the other hand, climate engineers assume that it will be possible to obtain unproblematic political consensus as to who is going to control the Earth’s Thermostat. The utopia of managing the climate gives rise to many questions of utmost importance, concerning the nature of strategic long-term planning and creating desirable scenarios for the future. The analysis of the debate surrounding climate engineering will allow us to indicate certain limitations of the concept of controllability that, as it seems, are not easy to eliminate.

The Contemporary Face of Technology Assessment Various research that is being conducted nowadays is based on two different approaches, TA and STS. These two paradigms are becoming more alike, showing more and more similar characteristics, especially regarding longterm, strategic monitoring of science, technology and environment.2 This result can be ascribed to the evolution of TA, whose role, back in the 1980s, was limited to providing support and expertise in the scope limited to specific decisions (Grünwald, 2000, p. 136). The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) of the United States Congress was a consultancy providing expertise regarding the consequences of specific innovations. We cannot even speak of ‘recommendations’ here, instead an array of possibilities was presented in respect of a given problem and the decision-makers were free to choose (Decker & Ladikas, 2004, p. 2). The prevailing approach was technocratic, expertise-based, and paternalistic. TA allowed for emergency warnings. 2

Unfortunately, there is no space here to present a comprehensive analysis of differences and similarities between TA and STS. Maybe TA should not even be treated as an autonomous research area, but the kind of political consulting that uses the solutions of STS. The research on science and technology within the sociology of science seems to be more radical theoretically and philosophically. On the other hand, technology assessment aimed at various loss and profit calculations oftentimes retains traditional divisions between the nature, society and technology (these divisions are called into question in the dominating STS paradigm of the actor-network theory). Most frequently the problem of innovations is conceptualised within TA as the problem of the influence of technology on the society.

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Its role was to anticipate conflicts, create the methods of solving potential social problems or unrest, minimize potential risks, facilitate mediation between the parties and institutionalize debates. Significantly, the research focused on solving specific problems (problemoriented research), typical of TA approach, was from the beginning carried out outside of traditional disciplinary divisions. This manner in which the research was carried out prevented the occurrence of the phenomenon called expert dilemma (Decker & Grünwald, 2001, p. 34). This term refers to the situation of decreasing trust in expert knowledge in the society whose citizens witness more and more frequent controversies and conflicts between various expert opinions. The theoretical and practical tools utilized by TA were supposed to facilitate the interactions and communication among experts in various areas and even between the experts and laymen. The methods applied to the early TA projects aimed at attracting public support for innovations, increasing acceptance of the proposed new solutions, and even, so to speak, advertising technological advancements. The tools offered by TA made it possible to manipulate general public and it is the main area in which TA made a difference. Even if the need for including laymen or interested parties in the process of consulting new technologies was recognized, their role was limited to building consensus around innovations. Ordinary citizens were not able to decide on the direction of research, the nature and scope of the innovations, or on their potential future identity. However, in recent years we have been witnessing increasingly determined attempts to change TA. There are calls for wider discussions about the holistic visions of the future that guide our actions, as opposed to focusing merely on the assessment of specific technologies (Grin & Grünwald, 2000). As empirically we can establish only whether there is a public consensus at a given time, concerning a given innovation, it is nowadays seen as a mistake to make a long-term project dependent upon public approval. A growing number of TA researchers point out that conflicts related to technology cannot be avoided a priori (Grünwald, 2000, p. 105). It is a well-known fact that public attitudes are extremely unstable. They may depend on accidental and unforeseeable factors, such as natural disasters. Short-sighted and opportunistic approach which makes investment dependent upon public approval would eliminate long-term projects, as decreased public support would expose the decision makers to huge costs of withdrawing from the innovation. At the same time, TA researchers do not want to ‘lose the future’ (Grünwald, 2000, pp. 109 and 112) as a result 47

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of their resignation from shaping it. Nowadays, pivotal political decisions are made in respect of innovative projects which span over many years and have complex consequences. TA is trying to face the challenge of creating long-term planning procedures in line with the postulates of sustainable development. However, planning requires an approach that is flexible. As German thinker Armin Grünwald notices, the idea of shaping the future calls for a flexible approach making it possible to find the middle ground between paralyzing planning skepticism and undue planning enthusiasm (Grünwald, 2000, p. 127). Only a long-term perspective would allow us to identify the common good we want to achieve. We must not forget that the aggregated preferences of individual citizens cannot be treated as tantamount to the common good. By the same token, strategic planning must take into account the sphere of values we are seeking. We are not referring here to a single goal shared commonly on a universal level. As it seems, we should rather think in terms of a trajectory of many possible goals, instead of a single one, well-defined and commonly shared. What may potentially serve us as guidance are the scenarios we certainly would not like to come true. In any case, it is necessary that we have a serious and continuing discussion on our axiological preferences: what kind of world do we wish to live in and what kind of future do we want for the next generations? The assessment of technology is presently seen as a dynamic, multifaceted process, as opposed to some pre-defined result to be achieved. What is proposed as an alternative to attempts at guaranteeing support for specific innovations is a careful analysis of the very conditions for the consensus concerning the procedures safeguarding a rational assessment of the implemented technologies. What conditions would we accept? What difficulties may prove unavoidable?

Unavoidable Limits of Controllability Both effective management of scientific discoveries and technological innovations and monitoring of the global society of the future encounter obstacles that are difficult to overcome. Their nature is theoretical and philosophical, but they are reflected on a practical level. The first of these impediments is a broadly understood scientism reaching back to the age of Enlightenment. One of its principles is the belief that science is a vehicle for knowledge tantamount to the unproblematic good 48

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(Zybertowicz, 2003, p. 101), and that the effects of the development of science are bound to be valuable per se. According to this approach, the activities of scientists and experts are morally impeccable. They are on a quest for the Truth and during this journey they abolish harmful prejudices that stand in the way to reaching this goal. If we assume that laboratory sciences only discover the essence of things by lifting the veil off the hidden phenomena, then there is nothing that is done for this purpose that may be ethically problematic. Therefore, there is nothing about these branches of science that would require subjecting them to any political regulations and they should not be the subject of such limitations. This point of view leaves largely unrecognized the fact that the main activity of modern laboratories consists in effective manipulation of the selected aspects of the environment and involves interfering with them in order to find new and surprising possibilities.3 Technological instrumentalism accompanying scientism claims that destabilizing social and economic consequences should not be ascribed to technoscience as such, but they are a result of its achievements being misunderstood and misapplied. Scientific discoveries and technological innovations are neutral; what may be devastating, dangerous or harmful is the way they are applied by decision-makers. Technological instrumentalism treats laboratories as the institutions which are not of political concern, deeming their regulation groundless. It is not only science that is seen as unproblematically good, but also technology. Very often, faced with surprising, unwanted effects of scientific and technological progress, we hope to battle them through further… progress. A Polish sociologist, Lech W. Zacher, calls this mindset a technological imperative.4 According to the technological imperative, discoveries yet to be made and future technological innovations will be able to remove or assuage economic, social or environmental problems challenging the humanity (Zacher, 2007, p. 171). We seem to be unable to open up to other solutions and are bent on continuing what we already know: technological 3

It is about the areas of science that are well financed, most important from the point of view of the future of civilization, with temporary organizational forms associated with global industry, in which we observe growing global competition (Gibbons et al., 1994). Most often quoted in this context are biomedical sciences, neurosciences, pharmacology, computer science, materials science, nanotechnology and superconductivity. 4 This phenomenon is often referred to as technological fix or technological shortcut.

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imperative is founded on our faith in beneficial effects of unlimited scientific and technological progress. A fairly common psychological mechanism termed time discounting further hampers any potential monitoring of risks created by the science and technology. It is, to some degree, a natural tendency to ‘export’ potential civilizational risks into the far future and to focus on day-to-day benefits, avoiding ‘advance worrying’. We usually focus on immediate benefits and avoid considering long-term commitments or difficulties, claiming that we simply cannot afford to take into account future generations.5 This mechanism of time discounting prevents us from undertaking activities that would enable systematic institutionalization of political solutions such as, for example, a global and unified response to environmental problems. This mechanism renders any strategic planning just a superfluous eccentricity. The most significant difficulty paralyzing any potential attempts to monitor science and technology is the so-called dilemma of control (Collingridge, 1980). Trying to regulate innovations we always face an uncomfortable situation: it is either too early to forecast the impact of a given discovery or technology (which makes us helpless), or it is too late, when innovation has already been woven into the fabric of culture and society and the costs of withdrawing it would be too high. It is related to the unpleasant necessity to cover the costs of the ditched projects. Technology Assessment calculating these costs is thus hampered or constrained from the start. Last, but not least, there is a problem of the so-called prediction dilemma discussed within TA. At the heart of this phenomenon lies the fact that successful prediction of the risk means that the forecasted scenario will be prevented from happening. If we manage to shape the future taking into account the risks or undesired options, these forecasted scenarios will not come true (Grünwald, 2000, p. 122). In other words, successful extrapolation of trends often has an effect of a self-defeating prophecy. By the same token, we can never achieve success defined as providing a correct prediction of future risks. This lies at the heart of the reflection on monitoring science, technology and the environment: if we are warned against potential dangers early enough, we should be able to avoid them.

This view was expressed by many employees and students of AGH University of Science and Technology in Cracow, asked about the dangers related to the development of technoscience (Mucha, 2009, p. 170 et seq., cf. also Grünwald, 2000, p. 112).

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The Wicked Problem of Climate Catastrophe Horst W. J. Rittel, a theorist of social planning, as early as in the 1970s came up with the concept of, as he called them, wicked problems. They may be symptoms of a whole network of other connected phenomena and may be brought about by the feedbacks, among many factors, and their unpredictable interplay. The problems of this kind emerge from the relational systems whose limits are unclear (Rittel & Webber, 1973). It seems that the assumed risk of climate destabilization belongs to this category of problems. Attempts to assuage this risk will certainly encounter many other difficulties, the situation which flies in the face of the logic of optimal, rational, and well-calculated solutions. A German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, refers to the phenomena of this kind as modern systemic risk, as opposed to a calculated traditional risk, while Anthony Giddens calls them the manufactured uncertainty (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 2009). The risk of climate destabilization also forces us to radically redefine a traditional notion of Nature as well as to change the existing way we think of politics. There is no return to the Nature as a stable background for human activities. It has ceased to be neutral, acquiring instead a political and axiological dimensions. As the problem of climate change demonstrates, through our political decisions we constantly redefine the very notion of Nature as ‘things worth protecting’. Disputes concerning the future of climate also expose the fact that expert knowledge, political consulting and axiological assumptions are inescapably entangled. On the other hand, the humanity has never before faced the political challenge of a united, global response to climate catastrophe. Radical reduction of greenhouse emissions would be hugely expensive and would require the transformation of economies as well as a change in our lifestyles. In view of the above, potential climate destabilization is more than an environmental problem. Economic and social costs of global warming or weather anomalies, as well as potential conflicts they may lead to, must also be taken into account (Welzer, 2012). Climate change is not a phenomenon whose dynamics can be described easily.6 It cannot be prevented by introduction of a unified strategy or by finding some hypothetical, easily localized weak point. We are facing a task that is 6

The details of how climate sciences arrive at a consistent picture of climate change are presented in: Edwards, 2010. See also Bińczyk, 2013, pp. 48–66.

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much bigger. In the face of the threat of climate catastrophe, we must call into question the way in which we deal with energy policy, international hierarchies, global economic inequalities, security policy as well as our fixation of GDP growth that is fueled by rampant, credit-based consumerism (Bińczyk, 2015).

The Need for ‘Solid Emergency Plan’ and the Right to Experiment with the Weather The problem of harmful, excessive presence of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere was recognized as early as in the 1960s. In the face of climate challenge, in 1997 the Kyoto Protocol (the international treaty supplementing the UN Convention on Climate Change) was signed. It assumed that the state signatories would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5 percent over the following 15 years. However, it has not happened. Consecutive, annual conferences of the UN Convention have not brought satisfactory binding results. The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 2009 and the Warsaw Climate Change Conference in 2013 turned out to be spectacular failures. Among influential supporters of geoengineering (climate engineering) we will find David Keith who is a physicist, a chemist and an expert on atmosphere Paul Crutzen, as well as climate experts Ken Caldeira and John Shepherd (Keith, 2013; Caldeira & Keith, 2010). They claim that in view of failure of other solutions, the humanity will need a solid emergency plan, sooner or later. As they argue, their solutions will buy us time during a difficult transition to a low-emission economy. Their postulates attract media attention. In their view, we should develop research in the area of climate engineering as one of many possible options, just in case. Indeed, we may have no other choice: when the changes leading to the destabilization of the Earth’s atmosphere exceeded the critical point, we found ourselves in a very tight corner. It is worth noting that geoengineering anticipations can be traced back to old human dreams of having the power to influence weather conditions. As early as in the 19th century, an American entrepreneur, Robert St. George Dyrenforth, attempted to create artificial rain with the use of balloon flights and controlled explosions (see Hulme, 2014, p. 13). Since the 1960s various projects have been planned or implemented that interfered with climate conditions through building dams or modifying the course of rivers in order to melt parts of glaciers.7 7

Drying of swamps and deforestation may be treated as climate management since one of the aims of these projects was to liquidate ‘pestilent air’.

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The technology of cloud seeding was effectively applied for the first time by an American Corporation General Electric Company. The use of silver iodide helped to successfully speed up precipitation formation. The purpose of these projects was to protect given areas from floods. Technologies of cloud seeding were applied in Israel, China (during the Olympics in 2008) and in Australia and Indonesia, while battling forest fires in 2013. The application of technologies of weather modification soon stirred controversy over the right of local communities to natural weather that is free from human interference. In the course of the disputes, there appeared a claim that the artificial rain flooded someone’s field (Yearley, 2008, p. 939). Presently we are bound by the UN convention banning weather modification techniques (The Environmental Modification Convention, ENMOD).8 The Convention was signed in 1977 by 85 states. It prohibits military or hostile use of the methods described in this paper. There is no doubt that modern climate engineering is the most ambitious and the broadest project among all projects of this kind that have ever existed. The report of the Royal Society of 2009 titled Geoengineering the climate: Science governance and uncertainty describes two main types of geoengineering. The first type applies solutions such as: 1) introducing into the atmosphere small particles reflecting solar radiation (stratospheric aerosol injection) – this method consists in injecting aerosols absorbing solar radiation into the stratosphere, 2) proliferation – in the oceans – of algae which would consume the excessive carbon dioxide, 3) whitening pavements, roads and roofs in order to make them less reflective to sun rays, 4) whitening clouds hanging low over the oceans with the use of sea vessels spraying water, or, last, but not least 5) managing solar radiation (solar radiation management) by placing on the orbit trillions of small mirrors reflecting sun rays back into space (Royal Society, 2009). The second group of methods is based on technologies of carbon dioxide removal. The dominant method is called sequestration, i.e. capturing carbon dioxide directly from the air and storing it underground. Other geoengineering methods of removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere include liming the oceans, taking advantage of the process of disintegration of rocks containing silicates and even traditional reforestation (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2014). 8

The full title of this document is: The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

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It is difficult to establish precise criteria allowing us to define a given technology as geoengineering. Certainly, the key factor is the purpose, and the purpose is to stop negative processes that destabilize the climate. Climate engineering also assumes that the actions required to counteract the climate change must be undertaken on a global, planetary scale. Reforestation seems to be clearly distinguishable from other methods in that it does not require any novel solutions and thus it will be easier to assess its effects. Among the solutions described above, the project of stratospheric aerosol injection is deemed to be the most feasible and realistic. It is considered to be the cheapest and the easiest to implement.9 This is why its implementation is being seriously considered. It would involve injecting into the atmosphere huge amounts of hydrogen sulfide or sulfur dioxide (approximately 1–1.5 million tons of sulfur). It would last there for several years, oxidizing over time and creating small particles of sulfur aerosols that would diffuse sun rays. This idea was widely commented on in 2006 and it is supported by the researcher from the Netherlands, J. P. Crutzen, who received the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1995.10 One of the first international meetings on geoengineering took place in 2009 in Lisbon.11 In the same year, the American Meteorological Society adopted a strategy for climate engineering. A year later, the Asilomar Conference Center in California held a relevant conference. NGOs and research institutes started to publish reports concerning the future possibilities in this area of research. Under the influence of the Royal Society’s report we mentioned above and Asilomar conference, the Oxford University in Great Britain adopted in 2010 The Code of Conduct for Geoengineering Research. They postulate, among others, that – as the public good – geoengineering should be covered by clear regulations and should be subjected to independent assessment in line with participation principles.12 In the year 2011 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) organized workshops on geoengineering in Lima with 50 experts appointed by the governments of the UN member states. Half of them came from the 9

Particularly capturing carbon dioxide from the air is seen as not very promising and ineffective compared to the method of infusing the stratosphere with aerosols absorbing solar radiation (MacMartin, Kravitz, & Keith, 2014, p. 2401). 10 Crutzen points out that it is not the best solution for climate change and that ‘tampering’ with climate may worsen the situation of humankind (see Hulme, 2014, p. 4). 11 It was organized by International Risk Governance Council (Kintisch, 2010, p. 211 et seq.). 12 Retrieved from http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/oxford-principles/history/.

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USA, Great Britain and Germany. Developing countries were significantly underrepresented (Hulme, 2014, p. 84).

Blocking Experiments As we have already mentioned, it is difficult to precisely define what exactly counts as the experimental interference into climate. By the same token, it is difficult to clearly define which research conducted locally in the stratosphere or oceanic waters shall be banned and regulated. As a part of the experimental program LOHAFEX, created in the course of German-Indian cooperation, the year 2009 saw one of the first geoengineering interventions on a large scale. It was executed by AWI – the German Alfred Wegener Institute and involved six tons of iron in the form of ferrous sulfate being put into oceanic waters (iron fertilization). The experiment was carried out in the South-West bay areas of the Atlantic Ocean. The aim of the intervention was to stimulate the process of proliferation of algae absorbing carbon dioxide. The results suggested that interventions consisting in fertilization of oceanic waters do not disturb sea life. However, no significant carbon dioxide absorption was observed as a result of the LOHAFEX experiment. Approximately ten similar experiments were conducted between 1995 and 2012. There were attempts to block these experiments on the basis of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992 and the London Convention regulating the disposal of wastes and chemical wastes in the oceans. Greenpeace put forward a proposal according to which informed consent of all eighty-six states who were the signatories of the London Convention would be required for experiments in ocean fertilization. Obviously, the necessity to obtain such consent would be a significant, if not insurmountable obstacle for the researchers (Kintisch, 2010, p. 217 et seq.). Early tests on the diffusion of sulfur in the stratosphere conducted outside of laboratory were supposed to start in Norfolk, Great Britain, in August 2011. However, they were ditched within a month. In 2012 the body responsible for the tests, the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE), finally closed the project. This case exposed many problems concerning the legality of research related to climate/weather modification. Having learnt of the SPICE project, a group of Canadian environmental campaigners petitioned British authorities demanding that the project be discontinued (Hulme, 2014, p. 57 et seq.). It became clear 55

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that had the research started, any weather aberration in the area might have given rise to significant compensation claims. In the wake of a public debate, the sponsors decided to ditch the project. This incident shows that, with all likelihood, any potential tests interfering with the atmosphere and conducted outside of laboratory would lead to serious political, legal, and social conflicts. It must be pointed out that it is vitally important that there exists a transnational consensus concerning local geoengineering experiments. Such consent would certainly constitute a significant breakthrough indicating a change of course which, in line with the mechanisms lying at the heart of the dilemma of control, would be irreversible. As many critics point out, even if we were able to conduct field research and local geoengineering tests, it would not necessarily mean that we would also be able to conclusively predict and assess the results of these interventions. The number of factors that must be taken into account seems overwhelming, even with the help of (numerous) computer simulations. As it is often the case, climate experts still cannot deliver conclusive answers to questions that are far less complex.13

Rhetorical Traps of Geoengineering The manner in which the problem of climate change is presented has its rhetorical repercussions. According to Mike Hulme, a British climate researcher from the King’s College in London, the very focus placed on the measurements of global temperature plays a persuasive role (Hulme, 2014, p. 116).14 The measurements are not only symbolically inadequate, they are also politically dangerous. The rhetoric serves as a veil hiding the complexity of the problems. 13

Eli Kintisch illustrates this point with the example of a problem with explaining the change in the pace of growth of the forest in Petersham, Massachusetts, in 2009. Despite professional research, the scientists failed to solve the problem far less complex than climate interactions. 14 In 1996 the EU announced a plan to counteract climate change whose aim was to stop the process of the global temperatures increase (at the level not higher than 2ºC, compared to pre-industrial era). Similar references to the 2ºC indicator can be found in IPCC reports, as well as in the documents from the UN climate conferences, e.g. the Cancun Agreements of 2010.

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The problem of climate destabilization is not limited to temperature considered separately from other factors such as humidity, air pressure, chemical make-up of the atmosphere and of the oceans, and a complex interplay between these factors and atmospheric processes, eco-systems, sea currents, etc. Hulme compares global temperature indicator to the GDP indicator in economics. Both offer a dangerous simplification of complex problems (Hulme, 2014, p. 36). Focusing on the problem of global temperature only strengthens dangerous illusion of manageability, suggesting that the issue is trivial and can be solved by simple solutions, such as regulating the Earth’s Thermostat. It is a misleading and erroneous approach to consider this problem in terms of cooling the Earth down, as it simplifies the relations between humans and the climate: ‘It obscures most of what matters, in terms of weather, to humans and the things to which they are attached: rain to grow crops, wind to power turbines, cyclones from which to shelter, and the like’ (Hulme, 2014, p. 43). It should be stressed that not everyone treats the rise in global temperatures of the air as the most disturbing indicator, compared to the measurements of temperatures of the oceans, the occurrence of heatwaves, the measurements of properties of the Arctic ice cap and its shrinkage, or the rise of sea levels. We must remember that taking measurements of global temperature is a very complex scientific task that has been undertaken relatively recently. A planetary network of meteorological measurements was established only after World War II. Since the 1970s we have been using calculations and computer simulations without which we would not be able to create satisfactory climate models. The first index of air temperatures on land and sea surface was published in 1986. However, our satellite measurements are not very helpful here as they do not register the temperatures on the ground. As Hulme comments: ‘Precisely because of its global origins, the global temperature itself is an empirical impossibility. It exists nowhere and can be experienced by no one’ (Hulme, 2014, p. 39). Even a quick look at the vocabulary of the discourse on geoengineering and its metaphors reveals how persuasive this language is. Let us note that thanks to the geoengineering metaphor, we do not have to focus on the devastated and degraded planet any more. Instead, we can speak of a natural, creative use of human invention and human sophisticated skills and knowledge. Scientific and technological progress crosses yet another line. The metaphor of the Earth’s Thermostat as the human creation which, 57

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in a safe and predictable manner, allows us to sustain a desirable and stable temperature is quintessential for the fantasy of control inherent to this project. Geoengineering gives an impression that we have a chance to manage the problems we caused – we can control, regulate, stabilize, protect and even fix or cure the climate. At the same time, as researchers from the TA point out, while assessing the future we cannot guarantee that our solution will be effective. The number of options and trajectories effectively makes it impossible for us to come up with conclusive predictions. The assessment of the importance of specific aspects of technological change may prove incorrect. The dynamics of a society transformed by new technological solutions is never linear. This is why we should never buy into exaggerated promises of the success of a new innovation. The aim should rather be to ensure the best rational predictions on the basis of the current state of knowledge. Does geoengineering enable us to do so? The notion of a solid emergency plan plays a similar role. It is delivered by the engineers – the experts of the realm of predictable, usually safe mechanical technologies, the ones whom we can trust. Let us remember that the area of engineers’ activities and expertise is the realm of human artifacts. We often seem to believe that since we have produced a given artifact or effect, we will have no problems controlling it. However, the risk of climate catastrophe is an entirely different case. At the same time, the idea of solid emergency plan may appeal to pragmatic minds. The very term containing the word ‘engineering’ is misleading, as the projects involving intervention into the climate are not limited to engineers or scientists – they are global with their political, economic, social, and environmental dimension and they affect farmers, politicians and all the rest of us. Geoengineering does not release us from the duty to work diligently and tediously towards the creation of an international low emissions policy. However, it may serve as a rhetorical tool to divert our attention from this issue. Allowing us to ‘buy the necessary time’, it will reinforce our habit of time discounting. We will delegate the burning problem of climate catastrophe to some vague and nonspecific period in the future.

Regulating the Earth’s Thermostat (or Shall We Call It a Global Terrarium Project?) Climate engineering (as well as earlier techniques of weather modification) allows the humanity to cross another ontological line which was hitherto 58

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sacred: the line between the realm of nature and the realm of things we can manage, politically negotiate or technologically produce. Many critics accuse geoengineering of the folly of playing God. This situation provides a clear illustration of inadequacy of scientific assumption that our research in laboratories amounts to unproblematic unveiling of the mechanisms that govern the natural world. As can be seen, this research leads to solutions that may irreversibly change the way we treat the most fundamental issues. It must be stressed that all available models of stratospheric aerosol injection suggest that such an operation would result in a serious reconfiguration of the mosaic of regional and local climate conditions (Hulme, 2014, p. 51). The intervention on such a large scale would certainly have unpredictable and undesirable side-effects. Effective cooling of the atmosphere could not only lead to the occurrence of local weather aberrations, but it could also lead to unwanted changes in the entire atmospheric system and in the biosphere. Blue sky would rarely be seen (most likely the sky would be white). Obviously, stratospheric aerosol injection will reduce the scope in which we can use renewable sources based on solar energy. The current environmental damage will be exacerbated by the damage caused by the techniques of injecting sulfur into the stratosphere (the use of airplanes, bullets, artillery, etc.). We should bear in mind that the majority of geoengineering solutions are based on a broad application of technologies that are strictly military. Such actions might be accompanied by the consequences which cannot be presently predicted. With high likelihood we will need further interventions, further ‘emergency plans’. Geoengineering will start the new era of never-ending experiments. Instead of controlling the Earth’s Thermostat, we may leave the future generations with no choice but the one of living in the Unpredictable Global Terrarium (Kintisch, 2010, p. 243).

Political Consequences Geoengineering is criticized not only as a provisional solution (as it will require further experiments), but also as the one which is temporary to the core. With all certainty, any potential research in the area of geoengineering as well as the creation of a specific implementation strategy would weaken the political will to undertake competitive projects that we all need so badly. If we continue our current activities, cooling of the atmosphere will not counteract the problem of polluted air, soil and oceans that lie below the atmosphere. The project of stratospheric aerosol injection overlooks the risk of acidification of 59

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oceanic waters. Geoengineering protagonists are responsible for the delusion that we do not have to seek immediate solutions supporting low emissions policy and are guilty of reinforcing our natural, yet disastrous tendency to time discounting. The supporters of geoengineering are not only responsible for the manner in which their solutions are to be tested and implemented, but also for the conflicts these solutions will give birth to. The interventions described above may lead to the devastation of agricultural regions and may strengthen the dominance of the states financing geoengineering operations. Possible side-effects will certainly reach far beyond environmental issues. They will affect the balance of power and security – we may enter the era of tyranny of a new kind.15 The present state of affairs does not provide grounds to hope for the emergence of a global political consensus concerning the way we manage the Earth’s Thermostat. Could such consensus be created within the UN? Could a potential, informal consortium of states provide a sufficient support for political actions aiding the implementation of geoengineering solutions? Or may it be the case that an option of a unilateral treaty sanctioning the domination of one powerful state would prevail? It is clear that geoengineering technologies will be enormously profitable for some actors. Will they benefit private institutions or rather the most powerful states? Who is there to decide? We must also pay attention to the voices that the debate on geoengineering marginalizes. As we can observe, this debate is taking place only in and among the developed countries and the voices that are being heard are primarily the voices of the experts in science and technology. The participation of ordinary citizens, organizations of farmers, local grassroots movements or the spokesmen for the interests of the future generations is rather not to be seen. There are bound to be side-effects accompanying implementation of the solutions of climate engineering. Who is going to be responsible for such side-effects? Speaking of the future, we should pay attention to the scenarios that take into account high levels of political despair of the developing countries, as they are likely to bear the brunt of weather aberrations such as hurricanes, droughts, floods and changes in sea levels. It is believed that the project of stratospheric aerosol injection will have very negative influence on weather in the sub-Saharan region (Bunzl, 2011, p. 71). 15

Certain thinkers, such as James Lovelock, are already speaking of the necessity to introduce authoritarian political solutions – claiming that the gravity of the problem of climate change calls for such measures (Hulme, 2014, p. 135).

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Does not the very fact that geoengineering may drastically worsen the situation of any Earth’s inhabitants render this project unworthy of implementation? As the TA researchers point out, there are winners and losers to every decision concerning the implementation of specific technology. It is unavoidable. Innovations have an inherent, destructive aspect as they, if implemented successfully, replace older solutions bound to be degraded or destroyed with their users forced to pay the price of adapting to the new conditions (Grünwald, 2000, p. 102).16 This problem is largely ignored by technological imperative and scientific assumptions. Clearly, the issue of compensation for the losers would become a political priority. The victims will demand recognition. The debate concerning the rules of compensation that would be politically and ethically fair, as well as the institutionalization of the compensation payments, is fully fledged and ongoing.17 However, given the current state of knowledge about the complexity of the atmospheric system, we cannot conclusively identify the consequences of geoengineering interventions. We will not be able to assess which of them will result in damage in specific parts of the world and the effect of this situation will be new kinds of uncertainty. On the other hand, can we rule out that the countries from the regions suffering from undesirable weather aberrations may try to fix the problems with the use of climate engineering experiments independently? As it seems, the project of stratospheric aerosol injection would make it possible to carry out the interventions from the territory of one country. What if conflicted states started to conduct interventions against each other? We cannot exclude such a possibility. If we fail to create global, specific and enforceable rules governing geoengineering, such scenarios may come true (Kintisch, 2010, pp. 220–222).

Which Questions Does It Leave Us with? As Eli Kintisch describes, the survey commissioned by the Royal Society in Great Britain and conducted in 2009 on a sample of 1,000 people indicated that 47 percent of the surveyed expressed the opinion that the project of 16

Let us note the destruction of the facilities, ways of acting, and distribution channels, related to old solutions. 17 Influential American law theorists are involved, e.g. Cass Sunstein, Eric Posner, or Daniel A. Farber.

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stratospheric aerosol injection should not even be considered (Kintisch, 2010, p. 215). General public remains unconvinced, but should its voice be trusted and followed when it comes to such decisions? As TA researchers point out, this would not be a wise strategy. In order to shape the future, we must operate within certain invariable boundary conditions. There must be elements of our world that are stable – not all should be subjected to modification. We cannot plan successfully when chaos exceeds a certain level and we cannot assess the values, costs, advantages or risks related to a given proposal. Every scenario of a possible change takes into account only a limited number of selected factors and these factors come from a petrified pool of stable assumptions, such as, for example, a democratic society, the rule of law, the market mechanisms, social institutions and so on. The more stable these conditions are, the easier it is to make calculations and predictions. Considering possible scenarios for the future, we are guided by our past, which, even if accidental, is not unrestricted. Isn’t it true that geoengineering simultaneously tampers with the natural environment and politics in the game whose rules we do not know? The multitude of various factors that will come into play is a powerful argument against climate engineering. As Grünwald argues, experimenting with new solutions should be spread over a long period of time and should be gradual. ‘Learning society’ he describes in his works needs time to learn and test the consequences of the changes. Dramatic changes on a large scale should be avoided (Grünwald, 2000, p. 104). In the case of geoengineering there is a host of factors that come into play: environmental, as well as economic and political ones. Intervention would neither be gradual nor reversible. In the text titled Technologies of humility: Citizen participation in governing science, Sheila Jasanoff, an STS researcher, contrasts the technologies of humility, as she terms them, with the technologies of hubris (Jasanoff, 2003). Technologies of humility recognize the unavoidable limitations of human knowledge. They take into account the inescapable complexity of social and economic fabric. They also give the priority to moral considerations above all the others. In contrast, technologies of hubris are based on a false premise that technoscience is able to solve every problem. Climate engineering seems to belong rather to the category of technology of hubris than technology of humility. It is closely tied to the groundless optimism of technological imperative, presenting a persuasive illusion of engineers controlling what they have created – the Earth’s Thermostat. 62

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Following the logic of scientific arrogance, when faced with anthropogenic climate changes, climate engineers propose ‘more of the same’ – even more intensive interventions into the environment (Hulme, 2014, p. 104). To sum up, which problematic areas should the geoengineering project be confronted with? Let us try to enumerate them. Firstly, do we have the right to endanger the homeostasis of oceanic waters or risk the distortion of regional climate conditions in pursuit of a goal as trivial as maintaining the status quo of the consumption-driven societies? We do it in a situation where we still have at our disposal the solutions based on reduction of greenhouse gases that still seem viable. Alternative solutions are still possible, even though the rhetoric of climate engineering weakens the chances of implementing them. Secondly, the critics of the climate engineering project are concerned with the basic political issue: if we still have not been able to come up with a united, international, institutional solutions concerning the reduction of the emissions – how can we hope that we will be able to reach consensus on climate management? This will expose us to the kinds of changes that are unknown. Do we have the right to encumber future generations with the world struggling with a cascade of difficulties stemming from climate engineering, while we still have other options? Since, with all likelihood, we will not be able to manage the process of implementation of geoengineering, we should not conduct research in this area at all (Hulme, 2014, p. 70). In the face of the fact that, as we can see, the emergency plan would open the era of never-ending experiments, is it worth implementing at all? Thirdly, we will all certainly agree that in the face of such a grave problem as climate change we need more, and not less (well located) trust in experts. But is this the kind of expertise we seek while attempting to secure a sustainable future? If we are so talented and our knowledge is so advanced that we can dream of regulating the Earth’s Thermostat, why don’t we create procedures enabling us to effectively introduce the plan to reduce harmful emissions? Scientific optimism of technological imperative can be redirected and the risk can be minimized.

Conclusions Climate engineering incorporates all scientific hopes, embodying the technological imperative that offers an array of false expectations. It does not exempt us from the duty to battle the pollution of atmosphere, soil and 63

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water. It is developed in accordance with the principle of technological instrumentalism as a solution concerning the environment and, as such, it overlooks the key political issues related to its activities. It promises control and manageability despite the multitude of possible and largely unpredictable side-effects. Even the rhetoric of geoengineering brings about irreversible damage. It diverts our attention from alternative solutions that are still possible. It reinforces the mechanism of time discounting. As it seems, at present there are no reasons to justify such a disturbing project. Having said all the above, since we are not in danger of excessive euphoria, we should not fall prey to excessive skepticism. If, despite all our efforts, we finally reach the place where emergency plan will be necessary, we will probably need to use it. Still, we would need to carefully assess which methods are worth applying and we would have to consider not only any possible consequences for the environment, but also their socio-economic effects (we know today that reforestation is a definitely less risky option than stratospheric aerosol injection, as it is related to fewer processes with unpredictable consequences). As it seems, climate engineering is still in the first phase described in the dilemma of control, i.e. it is still too early to assess its potential consequences in a correct way. Because of this fact, the early scenarios of the future, such as the one proposed by Hulme, may be seen as implausible. Geoengineering research is selective, it is conducted on a relatively small scale and is often blocked. This is why the costs of withdrawing from this technology are still relatively low. It seems that we still can create alternative long-term strategies.

References Beck, U. (1992). Risk society. Towards a new modernity. London: Sage Publications. Bińczyk, E. (2012). Technonauka w społeczeństwie ryzyka. Filozofia wobec niepożądanych następstw praktycznego sukcesu nauki. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK. Bińczyk, E. (2013). Problem sceptycyzmu wobec zmiany klimatycznej a postkonstruktywizm. Przegląd Kulturoznawczy, 1 (15), pp. 48–66.

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Bińczyk, E. (2015). Fantazja wiecznego bogacenia się a irracjonalność późnego kapitalizmu. In T. Jackson, Dobrobyt bez wzrostu. Ekonomia dla planety o ograniczonych zasobach (pp. 7–22). Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK. Bunzl, M. (2011). Geoengineering harms and compensation. Stanford Journal of Law, Science & Policy, 4, pp. 69–75. Caldeira, K., & Keith, D. W. (2010). The need for climate engineering research. Issues in Science and Technology 26 (1), pp. 57–62. Collingridge, D. (1980). The social control of technology. London: Printer. Decker, M., & Grünwald, A. (2001). Rational technology assessment as interdisciplinary research. In M. Decker (Ed.), Interdisciplinarity in Technology Assessment. Implementation and its chances and limits (pp. 33–69). Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag. Decker, M., & Ladikas, M. (Eds.). (2004). Bridges between science, society and policy. Technology Assessment – methods and impacts. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag. Edwards, P. N. (2010). A vast machine: Computer models, climate data, and the politics of global warming (infrastructures). Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzmann, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1994). The new production of knowledge: The dynamics of science and research in contemporary societies. London: Sage. Giddens, A. (2009). The politics of climate change. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. Grin, J., & Grünwald, A. (Eds.). (2000). Vision assessment: shaping technology in 21st century society. Towards a repertoire for Technology Assessment. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag. Grünwald, A. (2000). Technology policy between long-term planning requirements and short-ranged acceptance problems. New challenges for Technology Assessment. In J. Grin, & A. Grünwald (Eds.), Vision assessment: shaping technology in 21st century society. Towards a repertoire for Technology Assessment (pp. 99–147). Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag. Hulme, M. (2014). Can science fix climate change? A case against climate engineering. Cambridge MA: Polity Press. Jasanoff, S. (2003). Technologies of humility: Citizen participation in governing science. Minerwa, 41 (3), pp. 223–244. Keith, D. (2013). A case for climate engineering. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Kintisch, E. (2010). Hack the planet: Science’s best hope – or worst nightmare – for averting climate catastrophe. Hoboken: NJ: Wiley & Sons.

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MacMartin, D. G., Kravitz, B., & Keith, D. W. (2014). Geoengineering: the world’s largest control problem. Proceedings, American Control Conference, pp. 2401–2406. Mucha, J. (2009). Uspołeczniona racjonalność technologiczna. Naukowcy z AGH wobec cywilizacyjnych wyzwań i zagrożeń współczesności. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, POST. (2014). Usuwanie gazów cieplarnianych. Infos. Buro Analiz Sejmowych 4 (164), pp. 1–4. Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in general theory of planning. Policy Sciences, 4, pp. 155–169. Royal Society (2009). Geoengineering the climate: Science governance and uncertainty. London: Royal Society. Welzer, H. (2012). Climate wars: What people will be killed for in the 21st century? Cambridge MA: Polity Press. Yearley, S. (2008). Nature and the environment in science and technology studies. In E. J. Hackett, O. Amsterdamska, M. Lynch & L. Wajcman (Eds.), The handbook of science and technology studies (pp. 921–947). Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Zacher, L. W. (2007). Transformacje społeczeństw: od informacji do wiedzy. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck. Zybertowicz, A. (2003). „W przyszłość wkraczamy tyłem”. Uwagi o cywilizacji współczesnej. In A. P. Kowalski & A. Pałubicka (Eds.), Konstruktywizm w humanistyce (pp. 99–102). Bydgoszcz: Oficyna Wydawnicza Epigram.

Part II

The Acceptance of Energy Systems

Public Understanding of Nuclear Energy. Polish Case Study1 Sy lwi a Mro zow s k a & Ba r ba ra K ije w ska

Introduction The Fukushima disaster in 2011 and Germany’s decision to phase out the use of nuclear energy by 2020, as well as the temporary closure of two Belgian reactors have resulted in a turn in public opinion against nuclear power in Europe. The position of the European Commission in this matter is neutral because it is the Member States that bear sole responsibility for the decision to use or not to use nuclear energy. Most of the fourteen states which have nuclear power plants are planning to uphold them or even to construct new ones. The Polish government, on January 28, 2014, adopted the Polish nuclear power program. It creates several conflicting emotions and expectations of stakeholders – similarly to other investments referred to as “uncertainty”. The Polish nuclear power program poses many challenges, such as the need to build legal and organizational infrastructure, scientific and research support, personnel training system, etc. Given the socio-political conditions in the country, including the lack of developed technology assessment by the Parliament, the social capital level, political 1

This research has been supported by the National Centre for Research and Development – Polish strategic research project Technologies facilitating the development of safe nuclear energy in Poland, WP1, Part 7 entitled A socio-political determinants analysis of nuclear technology implementation (2013–2015).

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culture, high controversy of nuclear technology (stigmatization) and a low level of knowledge about energy in Polish society, the construction process may be significantly longer. The process of nuclear power plant construction, the period of its operation, shutdown and radioactive waste storage are related to the necessity to adopt a specific solution for the provision of institutional and civil control over information transparency in this regard. Understanding the complexity of the social perception of nuclear technology could allow for the communication process to be adapted to a large extent to the needs and expectations of the community where they are to operate. The experiences of European countries which already have nuclear power plants specify the conditions for good communication and participation in energy projects. These include the recognition of different interests and perception of the local community, communication addressed at specific groups vital for acceptance, information distribution using tools and channels compatible with the residents’ needs, continuous dialogue with local groups, especially those in opposition. Communication problems with the society are multifaceted. The most important one being political, sociological, economic, ethical and psychological. In recent years in Poland we have seen more and more protests against unwanted investments. Such a situation may inspire to undertake research into the causes of these conflicts and seek pre-emptive solutions. European countries which have nuclear power plants use various tools for information distribution, communication and involvement of stakeholders in nuclear projects. This diversity is connected with many factors, among which are: the democratization level of the state, social expectations about the commitment level, energy culture, and political culture, the experience of the countries in nuclear projects implementation or stakeholder involvement and decision-making phase.

Methodology Technology assessment studies analyze and evaluate the prerequisites for and the positive and negative impact of introducing and applying technologies; identify areas of social conflict created by technology applications and point out and review optimal courses of action for improving the technologies considered and their terms of application (Simon & Bellucci, 2002; Klüver, Nentwich at al., 2000; Stankiewicz, 2014). A socio-political determinants of analysis of nuclear technology implementation in Poland aim to crate 70

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the social communication model regarding society and nuclear energy. The construction of this model includes identification of existing conflicts over implementation of Polish nuclear power program and analysis of possible methods stakeholder involvement. The research methods include: the review of existing literature, the analysis of policy reports, public option surveys and individual in-depth interviews.

Literature Overview A review of the scientific papers in terms of public understanding of science and technology, including public understanding of nuclear energy, allows us to identify several major problem areas including public understanding of science and technology (Besley, 2010; Joss, 2002; Nisbet & Goidel, 2007), risk perception and communication (Sjöberg, 2003; Covello, 1983), stigmatization and decision-making processes (Gregory, Flynn, & Slovic, 1995; Horlick-Jones, Prades, & Espluga, 2010; Visschers & Siegrist, 2013). European countries which have nuclear power plants use various tools for information distribution, communication and involvement of stakeholders in nuclear projects. This diversity is connected with many factors, among which are: the democratization level of the state, social expectations about the commitment level, energy culture, political culture, the experience of the countries in nuclear projects implementation or stakeholder involvement and decision-making phase (Ash, 2011; Windisch, 2008). Distinguishing marks of good communication and participation in energy projects include the recognition of different interests and perceptions of the local community; understanding of local communities; communication addressed to specific groups vital from the point of view of acceptance; transmission of information by means of tools and channels compatible with the needs of the population; continuous dialogue with local groups, especially those who are in opposition. The indicated factors should be taken into account both at the national and local level, as the differences in national and local contexts create different conditions for the emergence of social acceptance (ECN, 2008, p. 115).2 The issues of inclusion of stakeholders are recognized, among others, by international 2

Source: Factors influencing the societal acceptance of new energy technologies: Metaanalysis of recent European projects, p. 115. Retrieved from http://www.ecn.nl/docs/ library/report/2007/e07058.pdf.

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organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2005, 2004, 2002) or supranational ones like the European Union (EU), which attempt to develop public debate and show the value of inclusion of stakeholders in decision-making processes related to energy issues. An example may be the several years old Stakeholder Confidence Forum (Nuclear Energy Agency/OECD), whose purpose is to facilitate the exchange of experience in building effective dialogue with the public in order to strengthen confidence in the decision-making process regarding radioactive waste, while the European Energy Dialogue (Economic and Social Committee/EU), established in 2013, is to facilitate public participation in energy policy).

Context Being an EU Member State, Poland has been taking an active part in the development of a common energy policy and in implementing its main targets within the specific domestic conditions, taking into account sustained competitiveness of the country’s domestic economy, protected interests of the consumers, energy resources held, and the technological determinants of generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. In the report EU Energy, Transport and GHG Emissions: Trends to 2050,3 the European Commission forecasts the development of European power industry for the following four decades, as a result of implementation of the European climate policy. One finding is that by the year 2050 nuclear power stations will become one of the major sources of electricity in the EU, with a 21 percent share in energy generation, and the major zero-emission source beside the renewable ones. The Polish government made a decision about building the first nuclear power plant last year. An argument in favor of implementation of nuclear power technologies in the country is the need to provide appropriate energy security for Poland. This is achievable, mainly, through the diversification of the fuel base and production of energy at reasonable cost, while taking into account the environmental challenges. Within the following decades the goal thus defined is expected to be determined by investment needs related to the development of the produc3

EU Energy, Transport and GHG Emissions: Trends to 2050. Reference Scenario 2013, European Commission, 2013.

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tion infrastructure and by the participation of Poland in the implementation of the European Union’s climate and energy policies.4 Consequently, the structure of electricity generation mix will have to be gradually changed from high-carbon-emission sources to zero emission and low-emission sources. The purposefulness of implementation of nuclear power technologies in Poland in the context of carbon reductions is proved as legitimate by the McKinsey report titled Evaluation of the potential for reduced emissions of greenhouse gases in Poland until 2030.5 The report implies that for a structure of fuels that would theoretically ensure the largest possible reduction of CO2 in electricity production, the use of nuclear sources is the most advantageous and profitable option. In turn, a study of the costs and expenses of electricity prepared to the order of the European Commission has confirmed that scenarios based on a significant share of nuclear component (20–30 percent) prove to be cheaper and safer compared to those based on increased proportion of RES (Increase/decrease trends in electricity costs and expenses, a KEMA 912–704 final report for DG ENER, January 2013). Nuclear power industry is a stable and safe source of electric energy, whose advantage is used by fifteen out of the twenty-five EU Member States, and it is responsible for a third of EU electric output. On the European level, nuclear power is recognized as a technology which allows for meeting the objectives set by the EU energy action plans or roadmaps (“Energy Roadmap”, 2050). In order to quantify the PNPP objectives, and to enable the monitoring of its implementation, a set of implementation rates has been prepared with respect to the quantifiable objectives,6 which are presented in Table 1.

The Programme takes into account the objectives of Europe 2020 strategy adopted by the European Council on 17th June 2010 to benefit employment and intelligent, sustainable economic growth advantageous to social inclusion. 5 Compiled in 2009 on commission of the Ministry of Economy. 6 For NPPP Objectives nos. 1,2, 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, the measure will be the continuous implementation of the objectives.

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Table 1. PNPP Objectives implementation indicators Description of the indicators

Base value 2010

2020 value

Installed capacity in NPP (s) (MWe)

–

1,000 minimum

3,000 minimum (6,000 as a 2035 target)

Obj. 2: Ensure top achievable safety/security for NPP (s) (number of radiological emergencies at NPP).

–

0 (target)

Obj. 3: Implement efficient system for handling radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel

80%

100%

100% (target)

50%

55%

58%

60% (target)

Obj. 6: Reinforce domestic system of responding to radiological emergencies, incl. reinforce national radiation monitoring system

80%

100% (target)

Obj. 7: Prepare Plan for development of HR for the needs of nuclear power

1 (target)

1(target)

Obj. 9: Polish enterprises to participate in construction of NPP in Poland (% of project value)

10%

30%

60% (target)

Obj. 5: Acquire and sustain public support for nuclear power countrywide

2024 value

2030 value

Source: PNPP, p. 19.

The future structure of electricity generation in Poland will be heavily dependent on the climate policy being carried out, especially with regard to the functioning of the EU carbon emission allowance trading system (EU ETS) and the emission restrictions related to the entry into force of the EU Directives: IPPC7 7

Directive 2008/1/EC of January 15, 2008 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (OJ L 24, 29.1.2008, p. 8).

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(as from 2016) and IED8 (as from 2020). In the year 2030, electricity production by fuel, based on various sources, is expected to be as pictured in Figure 1. Figure 1. Forecast electricity generation fuel mix in 2030. With parameters defined for newly-built generation sources

Source: Forecast of the structure of generating capacities to 2030, with technical and economic parameters specified for the nuclear power plant, ARE S.A., September 2013, PNPP, p. 44.

On November 25, 2011 municipalities: Choczewo (location I), Gniewino, Krokowa (location II) and Mielno (location Gąski) were indicated by the PGE S.A. investor as potential sites for the construction of the first Polish NPP (please refer to Figure 2). On February 12, 2012 in the municipality of Mielno a referendum was held on the location of the power plant. The vote was attended by 2,378 people out of 4,171 eligible voters. The turnout amounted to 57 percent. 94 percent of voters were against the location of the power plant and the area inspection; 5.3 percent of them were in favor. In August 2013 representatives of nine municipalities of West Pomeranian 8

Directive 2010/75/EU of November 24, 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ EU L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17).

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Province signed a letter of intent in which they argued that the reactor is a threat to tourism on the central coast. Pursuant to the provisions of the document, the municipalities established a coordination team, consisting of their representatives, which presents their common position on the construction of the plant. The example of Mielno and the experience gained by countries which have nuclear power plants show the importance of the sensitivity to stakeholders’ diverse perceptions of the given energy investments and quick identification of conflicts of interest in the process of nuclear power implementation. Among the identified factors influencing the emergence of local conflicts and protests,9 the scientific research enumerates: the imposition of the investment in a particular location “from outside”; ignorance of technologies; disregard for the concerns of the local population and the lack of its inclusion in the decision-making process; the fact that the investment does not bring local benefits or the application of the policy of accomplished facts.10 Political causes of local conflicts, including those against energy investments, among others relate to the lack of democracy and participation. All of these factors were identified as taking place in the implementation of the Polish nuclear energy program and were identified by stakeholders covered by the IDI.11

Currently, the social resistance against investments moves from the position of unwillingness to undertake investments on one’s own grounds (the NIMBY syndrome – Not In My Back Yard) to the position of withdrawal from any investment anywhere (the BANANA syndrome – Build Absolutely Nothing Anytime Near Anyone). Other social protests include: the NIMBY syndrome (Not In My Back Yard), in Poland also known as “not in my garden!’; NIMEY (Not In My Election Year; NIMTOF (Not In My Time of Office) (Lesbirel 1996); LULU – (Locally Unacceptable Land Use) – land use unwanted by the community; PIMBY (Put In My Backyard) – build in my yard, social action in favor of investment location in return for incentives and CLAMP (Concentrating Locations At Major Plants). 10 See more, inter alia, in Predac, Collection of European Experiences in Local Investment, Paris 2003, as cited in Energetyka a społeczeństwo. Aspekty socjologiczne (Łucki & Misiak, 2012, p. 79). 11 IDI (N=19) Interviews conducted May–June and August 2014.

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Figure 2. Potential locations

Source: Own elaboration.

Both NPP locations (I, II) are situated in the north-central part of Poland, close to Pomerania coast. Choczewo is a rural municipality, with the population of 5,685 people, whereas, Żarnowiec is the former NPP construction site (until 1993). It is a region which is located close to the communes of Krokowa and Gniewino, with a total population of 18,171 people. In both regions tourisms and agriculture are main industries.

Results A preliminary analysis based on the IDI allowed us to identify conflicts on political, economic and social levels (Table 1).

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Table 2. Identified conflicts on the background of the implementation of the Polish nuclear energy program1213 CONTEXT

Conflict subjects

conditions

POLITICAL

Conflict villagemayor + supporters VS opposition in the municipality council

electoral period POLITICAL CULTURE DIVISION we-they LACK OF CULTURAL COOPERATION AND CONSENSUS BUILDING POLITICAL CAPITALISM nepotism LOW level of trust LACK OF PROPER COMMUNICATION (incomplete, out-OF-DATE ESPECIALLY between the MINISTRY OF ECONOMY – municipal self-governments PGE NPP1-municipal self-governments)

ECONOMIC

property owners (new residents)12 VS professionally inactive People without property residing since 1945.13

ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE MUNICIPALITY LOCATION (TOURISM) SOURCES OF INCOME DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE MUNICIPALITY

New residents who in the 1990s bought the land and built or renovated buildings (a house, a cottage, a farm) in order to rent them to holidaymakers. In their opinion it is impossible to reconcile the construction and operation of the power plant with the agro-tourism activities. The respondents indicated that in the event of receiving financial compensation covering the costs of the purchase / construction of a comparable facility they are able to withdraw from the protest. The technology itself is not a reason for this group’s protest, it is also not accompanied by reasons of an ecological nature. Among the respondents, there are also people protesting against the construction of a wind farm because, in their opinion, it will lower the qualities of the landscape which attracts tourists. For three years, after the government’s announcement of the decision to build a nuclear power plant and the preliminary indication of the location, the group has not taken any action to modernize their property for fear of losing the invested money, which deepens their frustration. 13 Professionally inactive people (group pejoratively referred to as ‘post state farm workers’) residing since 1945 seek their improved quality of life in the municipality (infrastructure and services), hoping (arguments of the self-government officials are quoted) that life in the affluent municipality will be better. They are the numerous participants of events organized by PGE and EDF and the unemployed expecting that perhaps one day the number of job offers will increase.

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SOCIAL

Employees of municipal administration VS residents against the NPP construction)14

THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS due to the NPP A privileged position in obtaining BENEFITS from the NPP EDUCATION ENTREPRENEURSHIP

women VS men (local15)

Social functions fulfiled by WOMEN AND MEN IN THE KASHUBIAN COUNTRYSIDE

new residents, retired people VS locals of working age

PERCEPtion of the place of residence

Source: own study on the basis of primary data.1415

Our research identified several factors which are the barriers against the acceptance of energy investment decisions in Poland. These are: the low level of trust in institutions, the acceptance of a paternalistic model of decision making (top-down) with the simultaneous questioning of it by being directly involved, location, community and low energy and ecological awareness. Out of six stages of inclusion of stakeholders (announcement, information, consultation, inclusion, cooperation and authorization), the presence of the first three with different levels of engagement was found. Among these conflicts, the most visible are the ones with the economic background associated with the perception of possible profits or losses in connection with the construction of the NPP. There is a clear awareness that not everyone will be able to achieve such benefits. Indigenous residents, contrary to the new residents, have a different perception of the place of 14

Municipal officials – arguments of civilization leap, new jobs – in the opinion of local citizen ‘participants of a fiery campaign for the NPP, participants of foreign trips, residents employed in the information centers, those who are commissioned by EDF to conduct the promotion of nuclear power plants in schools, conduct sailing lessons on yachts for children’. 15 The so-called ‘ordinary residents’ – indigenous peoples, not occupying a significant position in the municipality, the main motive is the fear of nuclear technology, they are afraid of a failure, do not trust the authorities and the investor, are convinced that in the case of emergency, e.g. contamination, ‘nobody will help us’, they do not express their opinion on a forum for fear of rejection.

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residence and model of life. What constitutes a value for a distinguished group of opponents of the NPP construction (new residents, the educated, pensioners, appreciating natural values of location municipalities) is not perceived this way by the locals. They often define their residence in negative terms (especially Choczewo: lack of modernization, lack of development opportunities, a sense of stagnation (even among youth)). For people of working age and their children an NPP is an opportunity to raise the standard of living, whereas for settled educated new residents it means the impossibility to achieve the purposes for which they chose this place to live. In addition, an NPP is a chance for local supporters to continue the tradition and lifestyle, in a situation when mobility is not appreciated an NPP gives multi-generational families the chance to remain in the given area (children’s care of their parents is valued). The level of knowledge and the degree of being informed result in the fact that support for and opposition against NPPs are very often conditional and built on the basis of the perception of economic losses and benefits rather than on substantive arguments. However, the assessment of the hitherto prevailing information and communication campaign by the respondents is very similar. Residents believe they are subjected to marketing and propaganda activities and “leaflet-poster” actions and do not notice any investor’s attempts or desire to recognize their concerns and doubts. They point to the one-way communication and the lack of subjective treatment, which they would want, in the implementation of the Polish nuclear power program. The government administration and local governments are perceived as imposing decisions by force, which causes resentment and resistance. The expertise knowledge deficit and the declared willingness to participate in consultations in the form of discussion are indicated.

Conclusion Our research revealed that attitudes towards nuclear power are complex and do not relate merely to the question of technology acceptance, which does not usually raise major controversies. The factors that determine the perception of nuclear power as important include: (1) the level of trust, (2) the political-economic context, and (3) the location, national and destination target dimensions of the investment; in particular, the level of trust in state institutions, government and politicians (the Minister responsible for the program), law regulating and inspection institutions (PAA, the Ministry of 80

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Economy, scientists) and market institutions (investors: PGE EJ1, technology providers: AREVA, Candu, and others). The research showed a low level of institutional trust, which confirms the general tendency among Poles (Czapiński & Panek, 2013, p. 425) – a high level of interpersonal trust (family and friends – more than two-thirds showed trust here) and low institutional trust (one third is showed trust here). As for institutions, we are dealing with the so-called negative trust; the research confirmed suspicions against persons and institutions responsible for the nuclear power program implementation, and these suspicions are deepened by the confusion resulting from a large number of agents involved in the development of PPEJ. These results point to the need to specify the leader-institution in the nuclear project. Moreover, the respondents’ opinion indicates that the distrust is further deepened through sponsoring educational exhibitions, training programs, briefings by foreign energy companies (e.g. Worley Parsons, EDF). The respondents refer to these activities as lobbying the negative sense16, while energy companies as activities in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainable development. The research findings indicate a number of new areas which require in-depth research in order to obtain full responses. One of them is the issue of the lack of willingness to “be involved”. Despite the low level of institutional trust, the respondents do not see themselves (the society) as a party involved in the decision-making, even if in a limited manner by way of a referendum. This may indicate that at this stage residents are not prepared to participate in nuclear power decision-making processes. The explanation of the tendency of individuals to get involved can be found in Dahl and Stinerbrickner (2007, p. 171). They point out the correlation between getting involved and meeting the following conditions: potential rewards, alternatives, being in control over the outcome; belief that the outcome will not be satisfactory if we do not take action; the level of knowledge and skills; the necessity to overcome as few obstacles to action as possible; participation motivated by others. 16

Lobbying and regional challenges in the EU – Among EU states, Poland stands out with its lack of acceptance of lobbying. In Polish public debate lobbying most often equals corruption-like activities. A similar perception of lobbying is also typical of various opinion polls institutions and organisations as well as journalists and publicists (Mrozowska, 2014, p. 126).

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Another important factor is the colloquial perception and acceptability of the technology and its risks. Gadomska (2008, p. 6) emphasizes that they are dependent on many factors, including social knowledge transfer processes on technological risks, on the style, content, form of communication and broadly on social context in which this transfer of knowledge and views on risk take place. Research findings from the Create Acceptance project (2008, p. 114) indicate that an essential element in determining acceptance conditions is to take into account national and local political, cultural (environmental and energy awareness, the level of research funding), institutional, social, economic, material and geographical contexts. The results of the above study coincide with those driven from the IDI. They lead to the conclusion that it is particularly important in the process of energy technologies implementation to ensure information availability, currency and reliability as to the transparency of political and economic decision-making. Particular attention should be paid to monitoring the availability of official communication channels (e.g. web pages of the concerned institutions). No information, lack of updates, not including sources and insufficient information at the local authorities’ level (municipality, district) facilitates the spread of a “culture of mistrust”.17 Communication activities should take into account the local and nationwide contexts. The nationwide context is one-sided communication from the leader-institutions which enjoy high social trust, whereas at the local level it is bilateral communication. Subsequent deductions lead to the conclusion that risk assessment triggers associations with nuclear disasters at Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011). The stigmatization effect appears only in targeted questions about risks. Another negative association is the military use and the risk of a terrorist attack of the plant. Currently, in the European public debate there is a clash of arguments in favor of nuclear energy development among which point to the need to reduce CO2 emissions – e.g. in connection with the implementation of Europe 2010 strategy by the European Union – and the supply security against arguments in favor of Europe’s withdrawal from nuclear power which raise the problems associated with the disposal of radioactive waste and plant safety. In the interviews, the argument regarding the emission reduction was raised 17

Understood as common and generalized suspicion towards people and institutions, compelling one constantly to monitor and control their activities for fear of fraudsters, abuses, lies, incompetence, plots and conspiracies (Sztompka, 2003, pp. 326–327).

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by only one respondent (business), whereas the issue of waste disposal was not raised. The situation may be related to objective factors resulting from the lack of fully formed public discussion on nuclear energy; this being due to the fact that there is no nuclear power plant in Poland and the fact that the respondents do not feel to be sufficiently informed in order to have an opinion on nuclear energy benefits and threats. The interviews allowed to identify the research areas which require in-depth interdisciplinary research in Poland involving e.g. sociologists, political scientists and psychologists. The continuation of research is an essential element to adopt solutions in communicating processes inside a power plant, control procedures and the participation in them by the Polish society. Implementing the solutions which already exist in countries with many a year experience in nuclear units operation may lead to the failure of many investments and emergence of conflicts around technology. The most essential factors related to the implementation of nuclear energy in Poland will have the adopted solutions in the field of social communication model including risk perception and the stakeholders involvement.

References Ash, J. S. (2011). Radiation or Riots: Risk Perception in Nuclear Power Decision Making and Deliberative Approaches to Resolving Stakeholder Conﬂict. Politics & Policy, June, pp. 317–344. Besley, J.C. (2010). Public Engagement and the Impact of Fairness Perceptions on Decision Favorability and Acceptance. Science Communication, 32 (2), pp. 256 –28. COM (2007). An Energy Policy for Europe, 001. CE Communication. COM (2011). Energy Road Map 2050. CE Communication. Covello, V.T. (1983). The Perception of Technological Risks: a Literature Review. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 23, Issue 4, New York, United States, pp. 285–297. Czapiński, J., & Panek, T., (2013), Diagnoza Społeczna 2013. Warunki i jakość życia Polaków. Raport (Social Diagnosis 2013. Conditions and Life Quality in Poland). Retrieved from http://analizy.mpips.gov.pl/images/stories/ publ_i_raporty/DS2013/Raport_glowny_Diagnoza_Spoleczna_2013.pdf. Dahl, R.A., & Stinerbrickner B. (2007). Współczesna analiza polityczna. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. 83

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Duncan, I.J. (1999a). Community that Accepts Risk Should be Rewarded. Risk, Decision and Policy 4 (3), pp. 191–199. ECN (2008). Create Acceptance Factors influencing the societal acceptance of new energy technologies: Meta-analysis of recent European projects. Retrieved from http://www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2007/e07058.pdf. EU Energy, Transport and GHG Emissions (2013). Trends to 2050. Reference Scenario 2013. European Commission. Gadomska, M. (2008). Potoczna percepcja i społeczna akceptacja skomplikowanych technologii. Przypadek syntezy termojądrowej. Postęp Techniki Jądrowej, Vol. 51, z. 1., p. 6. Gregory, R., Flynn, J., & Slovic, P. (1995). Technological stigma. American Scientist, 83, pp. 220–223. Gupta, N., Fischer, A., & Frewer, L.J. (2011). Socio-psychological determinants of public acceptance of technologies: A review. Public Understanding of Science, 21 (7), pp. 782–795. Horlick-Jones, T., Prades, A., & Espluga, J. (2010). Investigating the degree of “stigma” associated with nuclear energy technologies: A cross-cultural examination of the case of fusion Power. Public Understanding of Science, 21 (5), pp. 514–533. IAEA (2011). Stakeholder Involvement Throughout The Life Cycle of Nuclear Facilities, Vienna. IAEA (2012). Communication with the Public in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. Vienna. Retrieved from http://gnssn.iaea.org/actionplan/Shared%20 Documents/Action%2003%20-%20Emergency%20Preparedness%20and%20 Response/Communication%20with%20the%20Public%20in%20a%20Nuclear%20or%20Radiological%20Emergency.pdf. Joss, S. (2002). Toward the Public Sphere – Reflections on the Development of Participatory Technology Assessment. Bulletin of Science Technology & Society, pp. 219–231. Joss, S., & Bellucci, S. (2002). Participatory Technology Assessment – European Perspectives. London: CSD. Kijewska, B. (2014). Problematyka energetyczna w ujęciu politycznym: kwestie energetyczne w programach politycznych. Przegląd Naukowo-Metodyczny „Edukacja dla Bezpieczeństwa, Year VII, No. 3/2014 (24), pp. 1215–1227. Klüver, L., Nentwich, M., Peissl, W, Torgersen, H., Gloede, F., Hennen L., van Eijndhoven, J., van Est, R., Joss, S., Bellucci, S., & Butchi, D. (2000). EUROPTA. European Participatory Technology Assessment. Participatory Methods in Technology Assessment and Technology Decision-Making. The Danish Board of Technology.

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Łucki Z., Misiak W. (2012). Energetyka a społeczeństwo. Aspekty socjologiczne. Warszawa: PWN. Mrozowska, S. (2014). Lobbing a wyzwania regionalne w Unii Europejskiej. Gdańsk: Gdańsk University Press. Nisbet, M. C., & Goidel, K. (2007). Understanding citizen perceptions of science controversy: Bridging the ethnographic-survey research divide. Public Understanding of Science, 16, pp. 421–440. OECD (2002). Society and Nuclear Energy: Towards a Better Understanding. Nuclear Energy Agency. OECD/NEA (2004). Stakeholder Involvement Techniques. Short Guide and Annotated Bibliography. OECD/NEA (2005), Society and Nuclear Energy. Case Histories of Practical Communication Experiences. PISM Report (2014), Nuclear energy in Poland. Retrieved from http://www. pism.pl/publikacje/raporty-PISM/Energetyka-jadrowa-w-Polsce. Ramana, M. V. (2011). Nuclear power and the public. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 67 (4) pp. 43–51. Resolution of the European Parliament of 24th October 2007 on Conventional Energy Sources and Energy Technology. (2007/2091 (INI)). Ruuska, I., Ahola, T., Artto, K., Locatelli, G., & Mancini, M. (2011). A new governance approach for multi-firm projects: Lessons from Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3 nuclear power plant projects. International Journal of Project Management, Volume: 29 Issue: 6, pp. 647–660. Sjöberg, L. (2003). Risk perception, emotion, and policy: The case of nuclear technology. European Review, 11, pp. 109–128. Stankiewicz, P. (2014). Zbudujemy wam elektrownię (atomową!). Praktyka Oceny Technologii przy rozwoju energetyki jądrowej w Polsce. Studia Socjologiczne, 1 (212). Syryjczyk, T. (1999). Przesłanki decyzji w przedmiocie likwidacji Elektrowni Jądrowej Żarnowiec. Retrieved from http://www.syryjczyk.krakow.pl/ Elektrownia%20Jadrowa_T.htm. Sztompka, P. (2003). Socjologia (Sociology). Kraków: Znak. Visschers, V.H.M., & Siegrist, M. (2013). How a Nuclear Power Plant Accident Inﬂuences Acceptance of Nuclear Power: Results of a Longitudinal Study Before and After the Fukushima Disaster. Risk Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 333–347. Windisch, U. (2008). Daily political communication and argumentation in direct democracy: advocates and opponents of nuclear energy. Discourse & Society, Vol. 19 (1), pp. 85–98.

Public and Nuclear: between Disregard and Participation D rago Ko s , M a r ko Po l i č & N a dja Že le zn ik

Introduction The problem of risk and social trust connected with the resolution of a particular environmental problem, i.e. selecting the location of the nuclear object, is examined in this article. Attempts to locate such a facility have often proved unsuccessful. The main problem was not a technical one, but socio-psychological, namely the acceptability of this kind of facility. We shall try to analyze the framing of this problem. This introduces the problem of misunderstandings between general public, experts and state administration, caused not only by differences in perception of risk1 between involved parties, but also by distrust on the side of general public and stigmatization of nuclear technology. Both issues are strongly connected, as trust, values, equity and notion of social justice interact with risk perception (Kasperson & Dow, 1993). In a number of domains, mainly those connected to any kind of possible – real or imaginary – risk, distrust to official actors is increasing as is evident either through public opinion polls or concrete behaviors of people. Reactions to risky technologies and connected issues are increasingly influenced by the distrust in responsible institutions providing the 1

Lay public use more complex »multiatribute« definitions of risk, including additional considerations beyond the expected numbers of deaths (Morgan et al., 2002).

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information (Cvetkovich & Löfstedt, 1999). In fact, the solutions of many urgent problems that are perceived as risky or annoying are nowadays – at least in democratic societies – more dependent on public acceptance than on technical possibilities. Necessity to open the decision making process to public participation, and not simply »to educate« people, is increasingly evident. The solely technical approaches are withdrawing before the socially based ones. Radioactive waste management (RWM) is a typical case of such a problem, but there are also many others, subsumed under new, dread, involuntary or uncontrolled risks (Slovic, 1993; Morgan et al., 2002). Public and scientific knowledge, and consequently their attitudes, had changed over the time. Before the hazards of high-energy radiation were fully recognized, radioactive substances were advertised and X-ray pictures were freely taken (see Figure 1). What was earlier perceived as a nice prospect and advancement of technology, later became a dread threat. While up to seventies civil use of nuclear energy presented a sign of prosperity and development, during the later years its popularity decreased. Threats of earlier times were replaced by the new ones, especially after a number of disasters, e.g. Three Mile Island (TMI), Chernobyl and Fukushima. Atomic bomb becomes the prototype mental model of nuclear energy. Problems that were earlier perceived only or mainly as technological, e.g. energy problems, or constructing radioactive waste facility become increasingly social due to the increase in public concern and development of environmental movements. The route of evolution was similar for many of them: enthusiasm, skepticism and rejection. This stance revealed itself also in the prevailing type of socio-psychological research in certain domain. The story of nuclear waste is a typical example of this kind of development and will be presented here.

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Figure 1. Hand with the ring – one of the first X-ray pictures made by Röntgen in 1898 (Retrieved from http://psychology.wikia.com/wiki/File: Roentgen-x-ray-von-kollikershand.jpg), and advertisement for “Radium Therapy” sold to the public between 1915 and 1935 (Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_radiation_therapy)

Following Cvetkovich and Löfstedt (1999, p. 3) and reflecting changes in public attitude we could trace the characteristic evolution in the research related to risk assessment and management from: (1) initial issue of determination of the levels of acceptable risk; (2) risk perception with concern about differences between lay people and experts; (3) resolution of existing conflicts and application of concepts about risk perception to risk communication; and (4) current stage of focusing on trust which broadened the concern from assessment of only physical processes to understanding of social systems and their actors. Social trust defined in essence as ‘assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something’ (Merriam-Webster Dictionary) has also some additional characteristics (after Cvetkovich and Löfstedt, 1999; similar attitude could be find also in Kasperson and Dow, 1993), like implications of power and control difference, risk involvement, relationship expectations regarding person’s interests, the choice when and who to trust, impersonality aspects, etc. In their studies, Earle and Cvetkovich (1999) found support for the cultural-values hypothesis, namely that social trust is based on value similarity. Pluralistic social 89

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trust, rooted in the pasts of existing groups, and cosmopolitan one, that is multiple and based on a new sets of values, and as such more suitable for successful risk management, could be distinguished. For Löfstedt and Frewer (1998), risk perception is socially constructed. According to the theory of cultural biases (Adams, 1995; Löfstedt & Frewer, 1998) risk assessments are consistent with predominant worldviews and reflect them (hierarchic, fatalists, individualists, egalitarians and environmentalists). These ideas apply also for nuclear issues problem framing.

Frames and Backgrounds Public understanding of an issue depends on how it is framed. The concept stems from the work of Erving Goffman (1974, p. 21), who defined frames as ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable its users (individuals or groups) ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ events and occurrences, thus rendering meaning, organizing experiences, and guiding actions. Out of the two, the natural and the social frameworks that he distinguishes, the latter are of interest to us, as they provide ‘background understanding for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence’. For Kosicki (2002, p. 66), framing is a perspective from which to approach the study of public deliberation, the process of collective and open reasoning and discussion about the merits of public policy. Framing includes ‘the discursive process of strategic actors utilizing symbolic resources to participate in collective sense-making about public issues’ (Kosicki, 2002, p. 66). Framing is part of the broader processes of the selection and structuring of the social problems. In fact, framings are results, capable of change, of the perplexed and continuing “social construction” of reality – in this case, of public perception of nuclear technology. The frame that structures and selects is the one that possesses the power to determine relative hierarchies of importance, safety, danger, etc. In this respect, framing processes are an attempt to “invoke a particular image of an idea” about the safety or lack of safety of nuclear waste disposal or a nuclear power plant, for instance. It is quite obvious that these processes are open to variety of interventions and are, therefore, so complex and multileveled that precise management of the framing procedures is not possible. Empirical evidence of nuclear technology framing demonstrates that it is very difficult to be controlled. What is frustrating is that the process is not deterministic at all and that it can escape from the control of rational expert procedures. As a consequence 90

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the illusive framing procedures are a persistent problem in the technocratic style of nuclear technology management. Although nuclear technology is not a new discovery any more, it constantly provokes a range of reactions among different social groups. In a way, it is a paradigmatic modernist technology that reveals palimpsests of fears and fascinations. Among the general public, its schizophrenic image was efficiently established at the end of WWII with the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But according to Weart (1988), it is possible to trace much longer history of fearful affectionate images which are associated with this tremendously powerful technology. In social context, the power of nuclear technology, therefore, generates simultaneous reactions ranging from enthusiastic worship fascinations to strong skepticism and criticism and even fearful absolute denial. Ambiguous effects are further strengthened as a consequence of extreme time dimensions of radiation activity. The fact that radiation of spent fuel remains dangerously high for an unconceivably long period, far beyond any common sense experiences, adds strong incentives to the fascination and fear effects of NT. In common sense perspective, this seems as “other space phenomenon”. In this respect, it is also important that full understanding of these extraordinary powerful and sustained characteristics is limited to rather narrow expert groups. Further, it has to be considered that these elite groups, in fact entire nuclear complex, were and still are closely linked to the classified military endeavors.2 In fact conspiracy, secrecy, elitism, and exclusion of public are essential characteristics of the nuclear industry just because of its military origin and exclusive comprehension. On the basis of these observations it sounds reasonable to suppose that the fascination (Fa) – fear (Fe) syndrome3 form the initial and basic framing pattern of nuclear discourse. Of course on the background of the nuclear technology framing we should always consider also its utility/dependability as energy supplier in particular society. While nuclear power plant is active but useful, waste (repository) is passive but not useful. In this sense the dimension of dependability will not be relevant for discussion of radioactive waste, repository issue considered isolated, and the fear and fascination remain as the main dimensions of framing pattern. 2

The first and paradigmatic is, of course, Manhattan project. The first energy producing reactors were developed as a side product of military programs (Spence, 1986: 30). 3 This syndrome corresponds to classical ‚approach – avoidance’ situations in psychology.

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It must also be understood that multiple frames exist in particular society, where particular frame could prevail, with different groups holding each of them. Frames change through time and between groups. In the context of nuclear technology we could distinguish local/general (lay) public and administrative/technical public frames. It is particularly interesting to analyze the dynamics between different framing clusters. In this discussion, only local/general public frame will be considered as the most important issue in siting procedures. At the beginning, this frame was close or overlapping with the technical one, while later they diverge. It could be said that while technical frame is still saturated with fascination, general public frame is increasingly saturated with fear and stigma. It is possible to imagine four different ideal types of relations between enthusiastic supporters and skeptical critics of nuclear technology. In the model we suppose that fascination and fear attitudes are the extreme values of those two opposing attitudes, corresponding to four “ideal types” of social groups. Therefore different relations between fascination and fear are possible: 1. High fascination (FA) – low fear (fe): technology worshipper, 2. Low fascination (fa) – high fear (FE): critical anti-technologist; 3. High fascination (FA) – high fear (FE): interested hesitant; 4. Low fascination (fa) – low fear (fe): disinterested public. These four types are, of course, very rough generalization, nevertheless, there exist many subgroups in between. But it is important to stress surprising or at least unusual counter evolutionary development of the nuclear technology acceptability. At the beginning, the technology worshipers prevailed, but with the time passing critical and ambiguous second and third type are getting more support. In most cases, the developmental pattern of technology introduction and dissemination is just opposite – hesitation and caution at the beginning is being followed by broader acceptability or tolerability at least. To understand these changes, general chronology of nuclear technology (NT) development should be considered. To begin with, it seems sound to differentiate six chronological phases of nuclear technology perception: –– Prehistory – time before the first military use of nuclear power in 1945, when the capacities of nuclear technology were not widely known, but there existed vague, mythological perception of possible options (Weart & Spencer, 1988). These were the days of pioneering work of Nobel laureates Maria Skłodowska-Curie and her husband Pierre, 92

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Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen, and many others, not to mention Albert Einstein and his famous formula E = mc2. –– Military demonstration of nuclear technology efficacy in mass destruction (from 1945 on), when the extraordinary power of nuclear energy was efficiently confirmed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, causing immediate death of 120,000 people. –– Peaceful use of the atoms – endeavors in civil use of nuclear energy, electricity production and some other civil application of nuclear technology (from 1951 to 1978). –– Global nuclear accidents efficiently reconfirm the dangerous, fearful side of nuclear technology and gave strong incentives to anti-nuclear movements (from 1979 to 1988). –– The end of the cold war, terrorism and global warming – temporary relief from the possibility of global nuclear war, but new ambiguities affecting nuclear technology perception and framing (from 1989 to the present). Considering mysterious military connections of nuclear technology, the initial technocratic approach to management seems somehow reasonable. But the absurdity4 of the nuclear weapon proliferation during the cold war gave strong incentives to anti-nuclear movements and critics. These developments influence the attitudes on use of nuclear technology in nonmilitary purposes. It is important to stress that in the process of “civilizing” of nuclear technology the technocratic style became more and more inefficient, even counterproductive. Actually, rigid technocratic approaches start to irritate increasingly motivated antinuclear public. In addition, TMI accident and particularly Chernobyl and Fukushima catastrophes had changed global perception of nuclear technology. In this respect radioactive waste materials played a special role in configuring the technocratic credibility. Although at the beginning radioactive 4

With the words of P. Sloterdijk: ‘The overkill atmosphere becomes denser by the minute. The (extermination) factor grows monthly and its growth is, in the final analysis, the determining agent of our history. The overkill structures have become the actual subject of current developments’. (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 128) ‘In order to be able to “defend” itself, each part has produced instruments of destruction that suffice for the absolute annihilation of human, animal and even plant life’. (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 129). Nuclear fission is in any case a phenomenon that invites meditation, and even the nuclear bomb gives the philosopher the feeling of here also really touching on the nucleus of what is human (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 130).

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waste (RW) was not considered a serious problem, it turned out that this is one of the most persistent (“sustainable”) problems not to be solved by closed, autocratic, technocratic decision-making model. Unfortunately for the image of the nuclear experts, so far in most countries repeated efforts did not produce a legitimate solution for safe depositing of RW. Many failures evidently demonstrate the weak side of the technocratic approaches and, what is even more embarrassing, the inability to gain knowledge about the basic causes of the failures. All together they effectively undermine technical competency of technocracy in general public. From a common sense perspective it makes sense to deduce that if the most competent experts cannot find a safe location to construct safe waste depository, then we have to deal with rather limited expert competency. This contributed to the fact that, at least in public perception, technically “marginal” problem of RW has become one of the crucial or even strategic failures of the nuclear industry. Therefore, the unsolved waste problem became the symptom of the entire sector and starts to hamper further projects and even the operation of existing nuclear installations. All these developments influenced the framing process but, at the same time, the framing of the nuclear waste problem in public is also the origin of the failures. The side effect of these developments was slow and reluctant transition from technocratic decision-making model to participatory (sociotechnical, see other terminology) decision-making model. The recognition that perhaps the only chance to legitimate solution is the establishment of complementary socio-technical decision-making model starts to gain ground. This development was, of course, strongly in line with the general changes in modern societies, where the legitimization crisis is one of the basic structural problems.5 But it is important to stress that the shift from technocratic to participatory model in experts circles was essentially unwilling. It was somehow imposed as the only way out of the cul-de-sac and not reasonably accepted as better and democratic legitimate option of waste management. In fact, one of the most general characteristics of radioactive waste management in all “nuclear countries” is that participatory approach is introduced only after a number of technocratic failures. It is, therefore, understandable why only recently participatory approach is becoming institutionalized. 5

See Habermas (1987/91), Offe (1987) and others.

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The basic disposition of framing nuclear technology is currently developing from a technocratic into a participatory model. Behind this shift is a general change of “fascination – fear syndrome”. At the beginning, the fascination prevailed; skepticism or even fear was hidden or at least overshadowed by faith in unlimited technocratic competencies. This could be marked as “FAfe” framing. But along with somehow surprising and unexpected changes in legitimization processes on local, national and global level, the unsolved radioactive waste problem starts to play a more and more crucial role. Finally, it contributed to the substantial shift of the frame of minds from enthusiastic to a much more skeptical approach. This could be marked as faFE framing. Figure 2. Relationship between framing dimensions Participatory management (governance)

Enthusiastic attitudes (Fascination)

Skeptical attitudes (Fear)

Elitist management

According to this disposition of the basic framing dimensions, it is possible to construct general two dimensional system in which the framing process is developing in the course of time, and where both dimensions are not orthogonal (Figure 2). With the first dimension, we evaluate the changing general public attitudes, opinions about nuclear technology. As already mentioned, the extreme values of this dimension are fascination and fear. The other dimension evaluates style of decision making in the field. The extreme values here are authoritative elitist technocracy and democratic participatory decision-making. It makes sense to suppose that the 95

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fascination attitudes support technocratic style management and that fear, concerns and worries support participatory management. The interesting point to investigate is to discover how, during the development of modern “nuclear societies”, the framing has evolved. The basic assumption is that the changes are in high correlation with general development of legitimizing crisis in modern societies, with the specific nuclear technology developments. A number of context and time-specific frames could be detected and inserted in this system. An even more ambitious objective is to compare the differences in the framing of the nuclear waste problem between different societies. Although the general development is surprisingly similar, it is nevertheless possible to trace country-specific framing patterns. The inclination of the style of management dimension shows the shift of the framing patterns in comparative countries. Figure 3. Timeline of frames in four different countries Belgium Slovenia Sweden United Kingdom FRAMING DECISION MAKING PHASE TIMELINE

FASCINATION

TECHNOCRATIC APPROACH Prehistory Military use

-1945

1946 - 1950

FEAR Peaceful Use

1951 - 1978

Global Accidents

1979 - 1988

PARTICIPATION Global Warming

1989 - now

This simple, two dimensional model could help us to identify different but coexisting framing patterns and their evolution in the course of time. A comparative analysis of RW framings in countries with different political, social, economic and cultural background somehow surprisingly reveals that much of the waste images, i.e. framings, are quite similar neglecting rather substantial cultural, economic, political and other differences. Analyzing Belgium, Slovenia, Sweden, UK framing history6 it seems that that nuclear technology framings are constructed along universal patterns (Figure 3). 6

As exploratory material we use the Country Reports on RWM in Belgium, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK and some other texts produced by the CARL research group, which is an independent, self-supporting consortium of organizations from countries that have experience with stakeholder involvement in radioactive waste management.

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Stigmatization, NIMBY and Precaution In general, people currently strongly oppose any kind of facility connected with radioactivity in their vicinity and exhibit a ‘Not In My Backyard’ (NIMBY) attitude, even if they are perhaps aware of the necessity for the facility in the country. These attitudes all display characteristics of technological stigma, ‘as a mark placed on a person, place, technology, or product, associated with a particular attribute that identifies it as different and deviant, flawed, or undesirable’ (Kasperson, Jhaveri, & Kasperson, 2004). In this case, nuclear technology and places with nuclear facilities or radioactive waste are perceived to be unduly dangerous. In his book The Rise of Nuclear Fear, Weart (2012) presented the development of nuclear imagery from fantasies of radioactive hopes to nightmares of the planet destroyed. Between those extremes, there was not a lot of space remaining for a sensible discussion about nuclear issues and their potential for good and bad regarding mankind. In the process of coping with fears and real threats caused by improper uses of different technologies, the concept of a precautionary principle absorbing “notions of risk prevention, cost effectiveness in a looser economic framework, ethical responsibilities towards maintaining the integrity of natural systems, and fallibility of human understanding” (O’Riordan & Cameron, 1994) becomes increasingly important. Put simply, it is necessary to reduce potential hazards before there can be strong proof of harm, considering likely costs and the benefits of action versus inaction (Harremoës, Gee, MacGarvin, Stirling, Keys, Wynne, & Vaz, 2002). The general public is more often likely to prefer precaution, in contrast to scientists from the field and politicians. They are cognizant of the following precautionary principles (O’Riordan & Cameron, 1994): preventative anticipation, the safeguarding of ecological space, the proportionality of response or cost-effectiveness of margins of error, the responsibility of care or the onus of proof required from those who propose change, promoting the cause of intrinsic natural rights, and paying for past ecological debts. Nuclear issues became a typical case for taking precautions rather late, perhaps because of early medicinal uses The project unites four types of partners (Citizen stakeholders, Agencies responsible for radioactive waste management, social science Research organizations and Licensing and regulatory authorities) in four countries: Belgium, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK). See http://www.carl-research.org/

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of radiation and the trust in doctors, while the later motives of the nuclear industry are perceived to be less altruistic (Lambert, 2002). That it is not only, or above all, a matter of knowledge was clearly shown in the mental model of radiation study (Železnik, 2009). It was found that many incorrect, naive conceptions of radioactivity exist, but their influence on the attitudes toward the LILW repository was relatively weak (15 percent of explained variance). The most important factors that affect the attitude were perception of negative risk due to nuclear facilities, trust in the implementer, and fair compensation (together 68.6 percent of explained variance). By comparing the general public with the local community, the more specific public that has coexisted with the current NPP Krško block for more than 30 years and was intensively involved in local partnerships for the LILW repository siting, knowledge became more important (28.9 percent of explained variance), but negative risk perception, trust, and fair compensation prevail (63.7 percent of explained variance). The study confirms that a greater amount of knowledge was a correlate of a higher acceptance of the repository. Though the energy crisis and global climate changes provided a new impetus for the ideas of new nuclear power plant construction worldwide (while there are still unsolved problems of radioactive waste and spent fuel management in many countries), the March 2011 nuclear disaster in Fukushima warned that the risk could still be too high. As a consequence, some countries, like Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, have adopted changes in their national policy regarding new nuclear power plants construction under pressure from public opposition towards nuclear energy. Nuclear technology again became heavily stigmatized due to related perceived risk, and the siting of potentially risky nuclear objects is becoming increasingly difficult in any modern society, also in Slovenia. The reasons for this extend from general legitimization problems to the technocratic arrogance of the main proponents of such projects. In this respect, the siting problems associated with nuclear technology, in particular with radioactive waste facilities or power plants, are a paradigmatic case. Social acceptance of such facilities remains beyond the control of social, political, or expert institutions.

Trust and Acceptance Along with a deeply ingrained fear of radioactivity, the lack of trust in authorities emerged as one of the important reasons for opposition to anything 98

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nuclear. A number of studies (e.g. Pidgeon, Poortinga, & Walls, 2007) showed that risk perceptions and trust are often found to be inversely related. Löfstedt (2009, p. xv) even discusses post-trust societies, where “public trust does not simply disappear altogether, but is rather re-allocated” from regulators and industry to individuals or special interest groups “who are perceived not to have vested interests in the question at hand”. Pidgeon, et al. (2007), introducing ‘critical trust’, showed that a lack of trust in society is not necessarily bad. Critical trust, within a spectrum between rejection and uncritical acceptance, tries to reconcile actual public reliance on institutions with a critical attitude toward the same. This more dynamic and dialectical concept is perhaps the right answer for the current situation. Nevertheless, public participation in resolving certain concrete problems is framed with general distrust, and it is, therefore, unable to produce productive results. With this background, the possibility of solving critical environmental challenges with public participation is an illusion. Reestablishment of trust is, therefore, the necessary prerequisite for participation, which demands changes in policy that should, above all, prioritize people’s well-being.

Participation and Acceptance Normally, concerning nuclear objects, the final aim of public participation as viewed by implementers and authorities is the siting of the nuclear facility, while the aim of the public is that of achieving and maintaining control over the environment and over their lives. This asymmetry of interests leads to a number of misunderstandings and to a loss of trust. Nevertheless, it has become evident that public participation has remained a necessary condition for many situations, especially for solving different environmental problems. Public participation may, however, also be useful in broader application, as was demonstrated, for instance, in the theory and praxis of Yugoslav self-management,7 co-operatives in Italy and Spain, etc. Awareness of the necessity of public participation for solving different social problems was also supported by scientific publications (e.g. Arnstein, 1969; Connor, 1988; Fung, 2006; Lima, Moreira, & Marques, 2012; Rau, Schweizer-Ries, & Hildebrand, 2012). The active acceptance of certain projects is conditioned by public participation (Figure 1). 7

The system did not succeed in developing to its full potential due to the lack of political democracy and a consequential disintegration of the state.

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Figure 4. Dimensions of acceptance: active acceptance as positive appraisal and active contribution (Rau, Schweizer-Ries and Hildebrand, 2012)

Appraisal

(Active)

Acceptance

positive APPROVAL/ ENDORSEMENT

SUPPORT/ COMMITMENT

passive

active

Action REJECTION

RESISTANCE

negative

Rau et al. (2012) define acceptance with two dimensions, appraisal and action. Positive appraisal of nuclear energy is necessary for the acceptance of the same, which could be achieved – one could add – only through active public participation. Concerning nuclear issues, the public is rather active, as evidenced by a prevailing resistance to locating a nuclear object in the vicinity of the community, though also more passive rejection is frequently present. While Rau et al. (2012) differentiate three forms of acceptance on the renewable energy issue – general acceptance, acceptance of various technologies, and active acceptance – general resistance or passive rejection remain the most dominant tendencies concerning nuclear energy. If there is to be a future in nuclear energy, a transition to the upper part of the matrix in the public is necessary. One could, however, express a caution that participation should not be manipulated only as a means to this end. While Rau et al. (2012) consider acceptance (in their case of renewable energies) as a complex matter with numerous interrelated aspects – tech100

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nological (nature of technology, its hazards, etc.), locational (changes in the environment due to the object), and procedural (planning and decisionmaking processes) – the situation is similar concerning the acceptance of nuclear objects, although nuclear objects possess a negative connotation connected with each of the three aforementioned aspects. Nuclear objects are perceived as dangerous and as causing changes in the environment; frequently decisions are taken out of people’s hands. Therefore, public participation is – at least initially – a possibility to normalize the situation and to establish a safe arena for expressing opinions and decision-making, although a direct link between participation and acceptance has rarely been analyzed and explained (Rau et al., 2012), though concerning nuclear issues direct link is, at least implicitly, constantly present. Figure 5. Arnstein’s (1969) and Connor’s (1988) ladders of participation

If one begins with Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participations8 (Figure 5 left), one can see a ladder schematic as a guide demonstrating who is in 8

Arnstein (1969) drew on her experience with federal social programs in the USA, such as urban renewal, anti-poverty, etc. Though this is a different field of experience, participation displayed a general problem of the redistribution of power, when those in power are more or less prepared to involve citizens in decision-making, depending on the field. Arnstein also acknowledges certain limitations of her scheme, e.g. the non-homogeneity of those with/without power, the omission of the most significant

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power and on which rung the redistribution of power occurs via negotiation between citizens and those in power. While the two lowest rungs are non-participative, the next three present the first steps toward participation (having a voice but not possessing influence). Only with partnership, however, did redistribution of power appear via shared planning and decision-making. The last two steps are directed toward an even greater citizens’ power, one never achieved in nuclear issues. Unfortunately, in the nuclear field, despite all the efforts to establish greater levels of public participation, the processes remain more or less on the tokenism levels, if not on even lower levels. The LILW repository site in Slovenia commenced on nonparticipation levels and moved through tokenism levels to an approximation of partnership. Connor (1988) tried to establish some order among different conceptions of participation, trying to differentiate types of participation, the appropriateness of each type for different situations, and the transition from one form of public involvement to the other. To achieve a more systematic approach, he proposed a new ladder of participation (Figure 5 right). His ladder aimed at integrating various available approaches in order to simultaneously prevent and resolve public controversy about different proposals. In this sense, participation represents a means for solving and/or preventing conflicts among different parties. Participation programs, according to Connor’s model, should reflect the specificity of the given situation. There is a cumulative relationship between the rungs and several approaches could be used simultaneously.9 Transition from one rung to the next one is also considered.

roadblock to achieving a genuine level of participation, and the arbitrariness of the number of rungs, to which Connor (1988) adds a lack of logical progression from one level to another. 9 In Slovenia, different participatory approaches, namely, mediation and local partnership, were used successively during the siting process of the LILW repository.

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Figure 6. Participation pyramid (after Rau et al., 2012)

Rau et al. (2012) differentiate two groups of people in the participation process: those who involve others through participation and those who participate. Involving persons could appear in both roles, e.g. representatives of an NGO or citizens who would like to motivate others, but who are also involved. Arnstein’s ladder does not start with information, but considers it as the lowest step toward participation. Similar to Connor, Rau et al., Arnstein’s ladder includes information on the lowest level of participation, as its most crucial component. Concerning both levels, i.e. those of information and consultation, which Arnstein names tokenism, and considers to be without real sharing of power, Rau et al. (2012) believe that this is not necessarily so, depending on decision-makers’ willingness to share power. Both of the highest levels in the participation pyramid correspond, in a way, to Arnstein’s real participation levels. Rau et al., quote Lane (1995), who distinguished between participation as a means (e.g. to improve project effectiveness) and participation as an end (e.g. as an intrinsic value). Regarding nuclear issues, public participation is too often only a means to an end, and an equilibrium should be established between participation as a means and participation as an end. Otherwise, people feel manipulated.

Conclusions One can conclude that the nuclear objects siting problem has its roots not so much in the lack of understanding of general public attitudes and behaviors 103

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as it does in a strong wish of investors, implementers, and authorities to construct and use such a facility, and in general public opposition to this. Especially in smaller and/or densely populated countries, the siting of the nuclear facility could present an unsolvable problem under current conditions. Particularly with the background of the distrust so characteristic for the post-trust societies (Löfstedt, 2009), this remains a difficult task, even if the object is necessary because of safety reasons, e.g. a radioactive waste repository. The previous national history of narrow and one-sided technological approaches to nuclear objects siting, the lack of public participation, and the manipulation of the latter (e.g. the short-lived Local Partnerships in Slovenia and the long-term existence of the repository) increase distrust and suspicion among the general public and generate NIMBY situations. Processes still remain on the lower levels of participation ladders and participation was more a means to an end than a valuable principle of public functioning. Nuclear experts still persist in their narrow conception of risk and underestimate public knowledge, believing that all that is needed is a more educated and a less emotional public. They also tend to make similar decisions about the very different areas of concern of technical questions concerning the operation of the nuclear facility and wider social decisions about the introduction and use of this technology.

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The Role of Shared Group Beliefs, Framing Effect, Affect and Reasoning in Perception of Technology1 Tom as z B esta

Social Representations and Shared Group Beliefs The way in which information is presented to us and the trust to the source of the information are both important for constructing our cognitive representations of social problems or phenomena. Thus, I would like to start the introduction of the factors related to perception of technology, with a short overview of how people create meaning in social life. For this purpose, the classic idea of social representations would be very useful. Serge Moscovici coined the term, and he described it as the system of values, beliefs, and practices. They help to establish an order that will enable a person to orientate him or herself in his or her chaotic material and social world, understand and control this world, and evaluate it in a good/bad dimension. They also influence people’s perception of what other people think, i.e. what becomes a social consensus on important issues and how society understands social phenomena. Moreover, social representations enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a shared code for social exchange and for naming

This article is an extended version of the paper published previously in the “European Journal of Transformation Studies”, 2014, 2(2), 27–33.

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and classifying various aspects of the current world and the group’s history (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011; Moscovici, 1973; Moscovici, 1988). Often, the interpretations of the facts and history described by the social representations predominant in one’s group are only perceived as true because they are shared among members of this group and not because they possess objective evidence. Researchers found, for example, that the central elements of social representations dominant in one group are key to defining the social identity of the group members (Zouhri & Rateau, 2015). That is, psychologists have shown that those social representations could be considered ‘image reservoirs’ (see Duveen, 2001) that help people construct their social identities on the basis of narratives, social myths, and selectively chosen facts prevailing in one’s group or society. Social representations and lay theories related to the understanding of technologies may also affect social trust, especially trust in the government and the decisions politicians make. In previous studies researchers found, for example, that those individuals who exhibited lower levels of trust in government believed there was a greater risk associated with nuclear power plant accidents (Goodwin, Takahashi, Sun, & Gaines, 2012). Similar studies in Canada showed that confidence in the government’s actions was negatively associated with perceived risks associated with radiation (Hine, Summers, Prystupa, & McKenzie-Richer, 1997). When it comes to investigating the relationship between social representations and risk perception, one could cite Robin Goodwin’s works. He highlighted that social representations play important social functions in managing and justifying actions and beliefs. They help explain, for example, often seemingly “irrational” views on infectious diseases that individuals and whole communities present (Goodwin, Haque, Hassan, & Dhanoa, 2011). In fact, social representations help people to explain all sorts of complex phenomena and new technologies by anchoring them within the existing knowledge and stereotypes. This, in turn, might be a cause for the formation of new social problems, affect the reception of awareness campaigns, or distort and impede discussions on the advantages and disadvantages of technologies (Goodwin et al., 2011). Social representations are also related to the values prevailing in one’s cultural context. Values could be understood as guides for people, and people base their decisions on them. Values that people highlight (e.g. tradition, authority, self-development) indicate those areas of life that are most precious to individuals. Values can be defined as broadly articulated 110

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goals in life the function of which is to direct activities and attitudes (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000). In the area of technology perception, previous theories link cultural values to risk evaluation. For example, the Cultural Theory of Risk Perception, proposed by Douglas and Wildavsky, assumes that, based on the values most important to people, we can group individuals into four main categories: 1) egalitarians, 2) individualists, 3) hierarchists, and 4) fatalists (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). According to this theory, people with egalitarian attitudes are more sensitive to the risks associated with technology and the environment. More individualistic-oriented people are more concerned about the possibility of the outbreak of wars and threats to trade and financial markets. People who are hierarchy-oriented are sensitive to violations of rules, laws, and social order. In contrast, people who are fatalists demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to these risks. The results of other studies on the role of values suggest that values may be important predictors of the level of anxiety and risk assessment. For example, studies on the Schwartz theory of values’ structure showed that values which emphasize the importance of tradition, social conformity and security were related to the expression of concerns related to various social and natural phenomena (Schwartz et al., 2000). In addition, individuals who exhibited a high level of conservative values have greater concerns about contagion during the H1N1 influenza pandemic (Goodwin, Gaines, Myers, & Neto, 2011). Similarly, conservative values are to the perception of greater risk associated with earthquakes in Japan (Goodwin et al., 2012). Shared group beliefs also affect the way people discuss important issues and solve social problems. For example, research on information-sharing shows us an answer to the question of why members of groups fail to share information effectively. Studies repeatedly show that when people have information of two kinds – the first being information that is only available to them and the second information that is shared among group members – people tend to bring up arguments based on information that members hold in common before discussion (Stasser & Titus, 1985). So the answer to the question of why members of groups fail to share information effectively is biased information sampling (Stasser, Vaughan, & Stewart, 2000). That is, group members often fail to effectively pool and share their information because discussion tends to be dominated by (a) information that members held in common before discussion and (b) information that supports members’ preferences. 111

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When people base their evaluations of social objects, issues, events, or technologies on the information that their group members hold in common, this can have important social consequences. Because all of us live in some kind of information or filter bubble (for analyses of information bubble in the Internet see, for example, Pariser, 2011), we tend to befriend people who have similar views, so we get more information that supports our side of the discussion. We base our evaluations and decisions on biased information-sampling. This could lead to the false consensus effect: people think that most people think similarly to them, which can lead to radicalization of attitudes and social polarization (Burnstein & Schul, 1983).

Framing Effect Selective information bubbles serve as frames we use to interpret social issues, people’s behaviors and vague phenomena. Many studies show the importance of framing effect in understanding distortions in individuals’ perception of social life (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Iyengar, 1990; Listerman, 2010; Slothuus, 2007). Thus, the way the issues or technology is presented to us (by other people, media, and so on) could be very selective and frame our understanding of these phenomena. The framing effect is also related to the practice of presenting information about something or someone (an issue or a person) in a specific context, so that viewers or listeners will draw the conclusions that the person who presents the information wants them to have. People tend to evaluate objects by comparing them to easily available anchors, that is, to the context in which the object is presented. This context, or frame, could change the viewers’ perceptions without altering the facts. People’s tendency to base their judgments on the context is related to the cognitive mechanism known as anchoring heuristic (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Social representations and naive theories related to technologies and science, spread by media and by people from our “social bubble”, can work as frames for interpreting what is good and what is bad. The important role of framing effect in the area of public understanding of technology was shown, for example, by studies on social perception of unconventional oil and gas extraction using hydraulic fracturing/fracking (Clarke et al., 2015). The results suggest that people support more the energy extraction process when it is referred to as ‘shale oil or gas development’ versus ‘fracking’. This effect is related to greater perception of benefits versus risks when ‘shale oil or gas development’ label is introduced. These find112

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ings are explained in part by the fact that people associate ‘fracking’ with more negative thoughts and stronger negative impact on environment (see Clarke et al., 2015).

Affect and Availability Heuristics To understand information-processing distortion and biased perception of new technologies, two more psychological mechanisms are very important: people’s tendency to relay on (a) heuristic thinking and (b) the so-called motivated reasoning. Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that help people make decisions and judgments quickly, without elaborate mental processing based on analyzing all available information. They shape our decision-making and influence our understanding of the social and physical world. Classical studies on decision-making by Tversky and Kahneman showed how external situational factors and our cognitive tendencies related to how our brains work influence the results of mental shortcuts. For example, the representativeness heuristic is a tendency during the decision-making process to rely mostly on one’s past experiences. That is, the known issue or person is treated as a representative for the current evaluation of the unknown person or social issue. For example, we tend to associate some traits with people from particular professions and assume that people who possess such traits are more likely to belong to these professions. Doing so, people underweight the probability and statistical base rate that would indicate that only a very small percentage of people do such work or belong to that profession (Kahneman, 2011). Two important heuristics related to social perception of technologies and to risk evaluation are (1) the affect heuristic and (2) the availability heuristic. The affect heuristic describes people’s tendency to make judgments based on their emotions. Studies by Paul Slovic and his colleagues demonstrated that a person’s affect, how a person feels about a social issue or technology, is an important predictor of how that person assesses the risks and costs associated with a specific technology (e.g. Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). Our choices and evaluations of social phenomena are often expressions of people’s feelings toward a specific target. If people like the activity or technology, they consider it less risky and more beneficial. When they dislike an activity, the opposite happens: they perceive it as having more risks and fewer benefits (even when people 113

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have no information about risk nor evidence about its safety). Kahneman, summing up Slovic’s research, noted that when faced with a previously unknown dilemma or technology, we tend to ask ourselves these questions: Do I like I it? Do I love it? In general, how do I feel about it? The answers to these easy questions serve as an answer to this harder question: What do I think about it? (Kahneman, 2011). Another important cognitive shortcut that influences our judgments is the availability heuristic. Kahneman (2011) wrote in his book “in social context, all heuristics are equal but availability is more equal than the others’. Others often agree (see e.g. Sjöberg, 2000). The availability heuristic describes people’s tendency to rely on easily available, salient examples, images, and data. Media’s role in shaping easily available context and content is obvious. An example of this role is the so-called availability cascade, described by Kuran and Sunstein. This cascade is a self-sustaining chain of events. It may start with a media report of relatively minor event and lead to public panic and government intervention. Media stories about the possibility of risk related to an action or technology can catch the attention of some viewers and readers; they may react with fear and negative emotions, which may lead to more media coverage, and this – as a cascade – creates more emotional distress among the public and more emotional reactions. In summary, studies on heuristics shed light on how people rely on simplistic rules and cognitive shortcuts when evaluating social phenomena. This area of research highlights the role of cognitive distortions in risk perception and how cognitive distortions could be related to affective responses (and vice versa).

Motivated Reasoning The fact that our beliefs, preferences, and ideologies distort our perception of the social world and our information processing is now a truism in psychology. Many studies show that individuals can view the same event or technology differently depending on their preexisting preferences, beliefs, or worldviews. Classical psychological studies show that we process information based on our unconscious motivation to confirm our beliefs and to sustain our positive self-views. This effect is known as the believing is seeing effect, and the mechanism responsible for this is called motivated reasoning (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Kunda, 1990; Nam, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013; Shepherd & Kay, 2012). 114

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We, as people, are very good at finding and concentrating on information that supports our position and avoiding or downplaying information that opposes our preferences or beliefs. That is, we do not process information in an objective, cold, rational way. Quite the opposite – we process it with a tendency to adjust it to our needs. And we hardly ever know that we do this. One striking example of this effect is an fMRI study conducted by Drew Western and colleagues and published in the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006). For the study, researchers chose people who declared themselves strong Republican or Democrat supporters. The task of the participants was simple. They were presented with statements from their party’s presidential candidate (back then, they were Bush and Kerry) while their brains were scanned in fMRI machines. Psychologists were interested in two things: first, if participants would notice the same amount of contradictions in the in-group and outgroup politicians and second, how their brains would respond to the threatening information that their candidate could say one thing at one time and the next time say something totally opposite. The results confirmed the motivated reasoning mechanism: liberals saw more contradictions in the statements of the Republican candidate, and Republicans saw more in the liberal candidate. What is more, when researchers analyzed the brain scans, they confirmed that in the face of information that was threatening to the self, the brain areas responsible for rational processing of information were less active. In other words, when the conclusions of people’s thinking could be threatening to their beliefs and preferences, people think less rationally. Another good example of motivated reasoning is recent study conducted by Dan Kahan and colleagues (Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slovic, 2013). They showed that this motivated processing of information is also predominant among people with high numerical and logical skills. Even they rely upon simple heuristics when those heuristics lead to the answer that supports their preexisting beliefs (despite the fact that it is a wrong answer). Researchers found that people are able to draw logical conclusions and give good answers if the topic of the task is a neutral one (for example, the effectiveness of a skin cream) but not if it is emotionally engaging and important to the self. Participants first completed numeracy and logical reasoning tests to check their numeracy ability, and then they were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. For the two neutral conditions, people were asked to determine if a skin cream was good or bad for a skin rash, based on data given. Data were presented in such a way that using easy, heuristic thinking would lead 115

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to wrong answers. The third and fourth conditions involved an ideologically and emotionally engaging subject: gun control. Republicans in the USA are generally against bans on guns, and they think that such bans would lead to an increase in crime. Liberals tend to support bans on guns and believe they would lead to a decrease in crime. The results showed that for the skin cream condition, everything was as it should be: more numerically astute people gave correct answers more often. But when the numbers provided in the mathematical task conflicted with people’s beliefs about gun control, they could not do the math right – even those people with high numerical skills, liberals and conservatives alike. The researchers used gun control and crime as their example, but those conclusions also apply to all subjects that are emotionally engaging and that people have strong feelings about, including biotechnology, nuclear energy, and so on.

Summary To sum up, I would like to highlight that results of many studies suggest that it is very hard to convince people to change their minds when people already have strong beliefs about issues in dispute. It is very hard to convince even the people who have the ability to make inferences and draw logical conclusions from numbers and evidence and are scientifically literate. Thus, when analyzing issues related to social perception of technology or science, it is crucial to take into account psychological factors described above. On the societal level, scientists should popularize and explain both risks and chances related to new technologies to general public, to allow people build their opinions on empirical research. Moreover, what should be highlighted is the role of including general public and community members in dissemination of research, treating them as partners and not only passive recipients of expert information. Political and social communication is often focused on divergent opinions and debate-like, emotional verbal clashes, providing little support for working toward the integration of the different ideas from opposite sides. When it comes to the disagreements related to the technology that affects community members, there is rarely an opportunity for real learning about the issue or community engagement. When a zero-sum approach is taken in the decision-making process, the solution may be reached prematurely, and community members may perceive it as illegitimate.

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Complex Decision-Making with regard to Nuclear Risks: Advantages of Deliberative Democracy1 I le ana Das că lu

Introduction There is a consensus that both nuclear energy production and nuclear waste disposal give rise to significant moral challenges, particularly with respect to the ethics of risk and of the environment, as well as intergenerational justice. Such challenges have often been analyzed in the context of sustainable development, and the advantages of using nuclear power have been contrasted with the dangers stemming from the continuous reliance on fossil fuels. From this perspective, nuclear power would appear as more justifiable, as it produces cleaner energy, not jeopardizing the Earth’s climate by releasing greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Therefore, despite some loss in support for nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster, which determined a number of countries to move in the direction of renewable energy, the pressure of curbing levels of carbon dioxide emissions relaunched the debate on the desirability of nuclear power.

This research has been supported by the European project ‘Building a platform for enhanced societal research related to nuclear energy in Central and Eastern Europe’ (PLATENSO) – FP7-EURATOM (2013–2016).

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However, nuclear energy reveals high levels of complexity, which should urge caution from yielding to single-criterial comparisons. Some additional particularities relevant for the ethics of nuclear energy have been highlighted in the literature: the multi-sectoral expertise required to make sound decisions in this sector (engineering and economic aspects, sociology of consumption, ethical implications), the uncertainties affecting our knowledge of long-term risks, especially those associated with waste disposal (Taebi, 2012), or the role of emotions in shaping public attitudes towards the desirability of nuclear facilities (Sjöberg, 2007; Roeser, 2010), sometimes resulting in the social amplification of risk (Kasperson et al. 2003). Given the complexity which the nuclear sector generates with regard to policy-making impacting intra- and intergenerational safety and welfare, the contribution of social sciences to the debate is particularly relevant. Although the role of social sciences and, in particular, political philosophy has so far been rather marginal in the elaboration of strategies and policies for the nuclear sector, discussing normative models developed here may turn out to be fruitful in considering the merits of some of mechanisms that may be applied to decision-making in matters related to nuclear energy. This paper argues that, as compared to purely procedural democracy, deliberative democracy, which emphasizes the role of reasoned discussion on matters of common interest within a framework regulated by principles of fairness, provides decision-making models which are more compatible with the complexity of the nuclear sector. To do so, we begin by sketching an outline of deliberative democracy and discuss some advantages this model of decision-making has as compared to purely procedural democracy. We draw attention, however, that some objections targeting the latter may be equally valid in the case of the former, not being, therefore, sufficient to establish a general superiority of deliberative democracy over purely procedural democracy. However, we argue, deliberative democracy models may turn out to be particularly relevant in the case of decision-making in the nuclear sector, which presents a high level of complexity, correlated with the diversity of the outlooks of the potentially interested or affected parties. It would therefore be more fruitful for the purpose of making decisions with impact on the safety and wellbeing of both present and future generations to foster an unconstrained exchange of views in an ethically structured framework that could accommodate such complexity. 122

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An Outline of Deliberative Democracy One version of democratic models that may be examined in the context of decision-making in the nuclear sector is deliberative democracy, which reflects the ideal of public reason working for the common good. In contrast with purely procedural democracy, where the preferences of realistically defined self-interested agents are expressed mainly by means of voting, deliberative democracy has an intuitive appeal for seeming to reconcile better what is allowed by democratic mechanisms with what is required by justice. Thus, according to the normative conception of deliberative democracy developed by Habermas, the core meaning of democracy, expressed ‘in terms of the institutionalization of a public use of reason jointly exercised by autonomous citizens’ (Habermas, 1994, p. 3), should simultaneously meet the requirements of solidarity and civic self-determination. Correlatively, the purpose of the political process should be not only to protect basic freedoms and guarantee respect of basic rights, but also that of encouraging formation of political opinion and will. (Rawls, 1993; Habermas, 1994). The assumption that, as compared to purely procedural democratic models, deliberative democracy provides a better source for moral legitimacy relies on the view that public deliberation actually fulfills the function of a ‘fairness test’. As the general argument goes, bringing up an issue for debate eventually sheds light on the advantages and disadvantages that a certain option has for various parties, thus preventing the situation when votes are cast randomly, based on insufficient knowledge or manipulated by interest groups. In the end, confronting different opinions in a framework regulated by principles of justice – such as, for instance: the equal consideration of all voices, the precautionary principle, the duty to refrain from (irreversible) moral harm, or that of prioritizing the well-being of the worst-off – should make the outcome morally tenable, and not just preference-responsive. However, even if achieving a compromise between the preferences of individual agents with different values and interests on the one hand and a concern for justice and solidarity on the other is, in itself, a goal likely to attract support, the prevalence of deliberative democracy over procedural democracy is far from being unproblematic. First, a distinction should be drawn between the valid intuitions captured by deliberative democracy and the extent to which these can be sufficient to establish a general superiority of deliberative democracy over alternative decision-making models. As Cooke shows, two of the most often invoked 123

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arguments – that of the educative and, respectively, ‘community-generating’ power of deliberative democracy – depend on the acceptance of normative conceptions of knowledge and of views of the good life and, as such, they cannot be the purpose of engaging in public deliberation (Cooke, 2000). Secondly, on a closer scrutiny it will turn out that deliberative democracy is not immune to some objections that would seem to target primarily procedural democracy. For instance, it can be argued that procedural democracy invites shorttermism, in the sense that, most often, the results of the voting process reflect preferences for policies with rapidly visible benefits. Insofar as the outcomes of such policies promise to generate some improvements in the lives of those called to vote for them, they will be attractive both to the citizen and to the politician: the former is rational in wishing to have their immediate goals prioritized, and the latter is rational in pushing for a policy that, by meeting the goals of the voters, would help maximize their chances of being re-elected (Jacobs & Matthews, 2012). However, there are cases when selecting a policy which generates immediate positive outcomes for the present majority postpones or cancels other policies which would be simultaneously beneficial for both the present and the future generations. We can imagine, for instance, that many would prefer to benefit by tax exemptions now, as this would allow them to use more of their income for consumption and development, to the detriment of policies that would materialize investments beneficial for both the present and the future generations, such as costly technologies that mitigate the effects of greenhouse gases. Of course, this is a much simplified description of possible alternatives, and in order to be sound, it should be qualified by various criteria, such as: the welfare level of the current generation, whether it has a well-developed environmental conscience or rather it is at the stage of prioritizing material development, the level of social cohesion or inequalities, etc. However, the point of even such a simplified analogy would be that traditional voting mechanisms are perhaps more likely to push for a solution agreed for by the majority, even if it looked questionable from the perspective of intergenerational equity. In a certain sense, both procedural and deliberative democracy may lead to the same outcome. In the context of short-termism, both could encourage the selection of the policy which brings more rapidly visible benefits, and thus overlook the longer-term alternative policy or policies that would, 124

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nevertheless, be more just. And, taking into account the various possibilities open to traditional democracy to influence preferences prior to voting (debate, persuasion, lobby, biased presentation of alternatives or partial exploration of their consequences), it could be argued that a substantive deliberation would not make a significant difference with regard to the outcome: those called to engage in deliberation are bearers of interests and values which match their socially constructed views of the good life, and various interest groups can impose their views by persuasion, distortion of facts in the face of the less knowledgeable, bribery, etc. Moreover, in both cases, the rationality and moral quality of the decisions depend on the degree of information or education possessed by those called to have their say. The fact that deliberative democracy allows the less knowledgeable (‘the uneducated public’) to express their opinions just as the more knowledgeable should not work as an argument against the model itself. Purely procedural democracy accommodates the same dilemma, and in some cases, where incentives for increasing the level of information or awareness of the public are lacking, it may be even rational for the public to remain ‘ignorant’: ‘For most complex policy questions, it may be fairly time consuming for me to form an opinion or become well-informed. Yet I can be fairly confident that my individual vote or my individual opinion is unlikely to make much difference. Hence the calculation that it may be ‘rational’ for me to remain ignorant, as there are many more pressing demands on my time for activities in which I can actually make a difference’ (Fishkin & Laslett, 2003, p. 11). Unless otherwise constrained by some guiding principles, the objection goes, deliberative democracy would either take a just more sinuous way to achieve the same outcome or it would lead to non-action, if strict ethical principles advocated and agreed on by participants turn out to be inoperational. In order to clarify the distinction between purely procedural and deliberative democracy, some framework conditions for the success of the latter have been proposed: equality of access and equal opportunities for expressing an opinion, equal consideration of the points of view presented, as well as more substantive conditions such as ‘people only say things that they believe will help others to appreciate the reasons to hold one view or another among those that are in question’ or ‘anyone whose interests are at stake in the decision is either present or represented by an effective spokesperson’ (Estlund 2008, p. 175). 125

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Obviously, the point of such criteria, and of others emphasizing the need for logical and ethical consistency, as well as adversarial mechanisms of selecting arguments, is not to raise the bar so high as to make the procedure impossible. Assuming that each individual acts according to a public conception of justice and is bound to respect the same beliefs and principles that look reasonable in the eyes of all (Rawls, 2001) should be read as a normative prerequisite of the deliberative process, and not as something that can be faultlessly tested or instilled in everyone. In practice, it is problematic to guarantee that such a process would be immune to the asymmetry of power and information between the parties, to the rational aims of maximizing personal and short-term benefits, or to the dilemmas of prioritizing between equally important, but not simultaneously feasible goals.

Advantages of Deliberative Democracy for Decision-Making in the Nuclear Sector Despite such concerns, discussing deliberative democracy in the context of decision-making in the nuclear sector is worth receiving attention, as it could provide a model of complex social choice, which, under fair conditions, could overcome the disadvantages of binary choice models such as those encouraged by purely procedural mechanisms. One essential trait of decision-making on nuclear issues is that it contains a high level of complexity resulting from the combination of technical, economic, societal, and ethical aspects (Flüeler, 2006). Most often, these components are intertwined, and we lack context-independent criteria for establishing a hierarchy between them. Which one is decisive depends, in practice, on the priorities that emerge as a result of decision-making in the sphere of strategic policies – the proportion of the nuclear component in each country’s energy mix, the choice for storage options depending on the higher or lower risks of proliferation or geopolitical vulnerabilities, the costs which are deemed affordable or, on the contrary, prohibitive for selecting various production methods or developing technologies, etc. However, the central challenge for the nuclear sector, that of reconciling safety and welfare, brings to the forefront a vast number of concerns: how to deal with long-term uncertainties stemming from our imperfect knowledge of some technological implications, our causal influence on the number and identity of future people, how much weight should be given 126

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to heuristics, or how to consider in practice the cultural and perception dimensions of risk. Such aspects fuel a tension between the need for expertise and accountability in decision-making on the one hand and the right of every individual to have a say with respect to actions that may inflict harm on them on the other. Some steps have been taken in the attempt to reconcile both requirements, for instance, by advocating the need for multi-sectoral expertise in the nuclear sector (engineers, physicians trained in public health, occupational health, specialists in genetics, biochemistry, epidemiology, environmentalists, and social scientists), funding research to find more sustainable solutions for the nuclear sector (such as partitioning and transmutation), by adopting international standards that make it compulsory to consult the public before making a choice with the potential of risk and of broadening public access to information at all stages of nuclear processes. Nevertheless, the complexity of information and that of the criteria which ought to be taken into account when making decisions with impact on the wellbeing and safety of both present and future generations appear to require a similarly complex model of testing arguments for building consensus. It is for this reason that, as compared to traditional mechanisms employed by procedural democracy, deliberative democracy would provide tools that are more compatible with the particular complexity of the nuclear sector.

Nuclear Risks The main challenge that deliberative democracy is likely to face better than traditional democracy is that of responding to the complexity and particularities of nuclear risks, as compared to other risks implied by human activities, industries or technological development. Although many proponents of nuclear energy development insist on the idea that nuclear risks should be assessed primarily from an engineering perspective, which often allows them to present technological improvements and compliance with regulations in the field as sufficient measures to mitigate risks, a more complex analysis of nuclear risks reveals certain particularities. Firstly, it should be noted that nuclear risks represent a special category of risks generated by human activities, in the sense that they are associated with great time spans, comparatively low occurrence coupled with 127

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catastrophic potential, causality and liability are divided between a net of political and institutional actors, and, in general, there is comparatively little long-term experience with regard to risks that may occur at every stage of nuclear development (Flüeler, 2006; Taebi & Roeser, 2015). The uncertainties surrounding our prediction of risks are not only related to the behavior of radioactive substances in time, but also to issues such as the impact of very low doses of radiation on human health, the risk of human error in the case of plant operators, the risk of proliferation or terrorist attacks. Secondly, an argument valid for risks in general, namely that it is impossible to clearly separate the objective and the subjective dimensions of risks (Hansson, 2010), is worth unpacking in the case of nuclear risks. Despite the persistence of the models for risk assessment used in the scientific literature and transferred into international safety standards, the probability of undesired events or the magnitude of negative consequences are not the only factors shaping public attitudes towards technologies and human activities involving risks. In fact, it seems that a very important part is played by qualitative criteria such as: voluntariness or inevitability of being a part of the potentially risky situation; the extent of individual controllability (one’s own actions are rated as safer than those of others); familiarity or novelty; ‘ego-preference’, in the sense that the risks affecting us directly may be deemed unacceptable, while the same risks projected into the future may appear as acceptable (Birnbacher, 2010), ‘moral distance’, in the sense that the risks affecting those close to us are perceived as more serious than the same risks affecting those unrelated to us (Birnbacher, 2010). Usually, when decision-makers have to assess the desirability of a potentially risky policy or investment, they cannot take into account in a coherent and operational manner all these aspects, because the traditional notions of risks cannot anticipate or predict completely the nature of the public response. Even if public perception reflects to some extent individual subjectivity, economic interests or development priorities, it is equally indicative of some cultural values, which cannot be satisfactorily quantified in risk assessment (Kastenberg, 2015). However, even if policy decisions can be phrased in terms of avoiding undesirable events, some dimensions of risks are virtually impossible to quantify. Therefore, simplifying mechanisms are in the end used both for risk assessment, and for risk management. Given the diversity of factors which, in reality, influence risk assessment by laypeople and increase the divergence between promoters and policy 128

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makers on the one hand and public response on the other, an arena which could facilitate a free, yet guided, exchange of arguments presents certain benefits. Firstly, instead of confronting the stakeholders and the general public with a single choice, such as, for instance, asking the agreement of a local community to host a radioactive repository or a power plant, a substantive deliberation would initiate a breakdown of concerns and criteria of choice. Some of them would, in the light of the reasoned discussions, prove more valid than others, or it would turn out that some criteria are overly demanding (how much should the standard of protection be raised in order to cover events with next-to-zero probability? How many resources should the government allocate to invest in precautionary mechanisms?). It would thus establish which issues should be included on the agenda of the discussion and whether such issues should be weighed differently, thus leading to a more comprehensive and more accurate description of the views of all those potentially interested or affected by such an investment. Instead of being faced with the question of whether – given the presentation of the risks involved, and of the benefits that will accrue to them – members of the local community agree on the siting, the discussion forum should first screen the relevant issues that ought to be taken into account. In addition, deliberation would be useful for establishing that there is no single rule for deciding on matters involving risk – both quantitative and qualitative criteria matter, and although the latter appear to be sometimes hazy, they should not be dismissed beforehand as opinions produced by an uneducated public. Thus, it would provide some protection against misplaced elitism, in this case scientific elitism, or, in Estlund’s words, ‘the epistocracy of the educated’ (Estlund, 2008, p. 207). Secondly, deliberative democracy would ensure a better representation of the stakeholders who, in the end, are called to endorse the proposed investment by later voting in a referendum. Let us imagine that the community called to give acceptance on the siting of the repository is poor, with high unemployment rates and no other comparative opportunities for investment. Investors are deterred also by the status of the infrastructure, because of which there is no potential for tourism or alternative income-generating activities. Under such circumstances, the fact that the new repository would have some collateral benefits attached (it will generate jobs, the company commits to improve access to utilities, to build a motorway connecting that township to bigger towns, and also 129

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provide social schemes for the badly-off ) could veer the whole discussion towards the benefits and shift attention from other important issues. However, within the community there are, hypothetically, more riskprone and more risk-averse individuals, and their inclinations could be expressed in the arena helping to achieve a more balanced view. Some people fear the consequences the repository would have on the health of their children, others would protest against such incentives discarding them as mere bribery, and still others would request for more accountability of the authorities to protect them against risks. Although it can be objected that the interaction of such different views would in fact encumber the decision-making process by increasing polarization and obscuring the stakes of the discussion, dismissing them from discussion would violate the principle of equal respect owed to individuals in their capacity as morally autonomous agents (Cooke, 2000). Whether polarization and frontal protests should be avoided because they lead to inaction and obscure the real stakes of the debate is disputable: it could, on the contrary, be argued that in the absence of real opposition to some prevalent views, the merits and disadvantages of the various solutions would remain merely slogans, lacking both factual support and moral legitimacy. The challenges for deliberative democracy would, in our view, be how to fairly structure the framework of discussion so as to give weight to all points of view, and how to prioritize building sound arguments over merely achieving consensus. This, in Estlund’s words, would be ‘a model of civility in political participation that gives a principled place for sharp, disruptive, and even suppressive participation under the right circumstances, without jettisoning the whole idea of an ideal deliberative situation’ (Estlund, 2008, p. 184).

Conclusion Despite the general appeal for deliberative democracy as an alternative model of decision-making in the nuclear sector, there are, as we attempted to argue, a few specific arguments that would support considering the application of deliberative democracy to public policies requiring public acceptance with regard to nuclear development. Thus, the first general argument was that a lively exchange of views within a framework guided by principles of fairness (both intra- and inter130

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generational) would allow for a more comprehensive mapping of the real issues at stake. We argued that this is particularly important in the case of nuclear energy, which is a domain with high stakes attached to economic and strategic development, therefore more likely than others to be affected by distortion of facts and lack of a complete exploration of all its complex implications. Moreover, the problem of risk assessment in the nuclear sector reveals a gap between expert knowledge and laypeople’s assessment, which should be addressed not only by providing more (quantitative) information, but by adding more substance to the debate. It could thus turn out that many of the instruments in vogue in current decision-making processes on matters affecting individuals, such as the cost-benefit analyses, which should guide decision on siting of repositories or plant development, are misleading and insufficient unless otherwise qualified by ethical criteria. Deliberative democracy should turn useful at least in highlighting what is missing from the traditional models of decisions which offer simplified alternatives to people. The second argument was that deliberative democracy would provide more legitimacy to the decision-making process by allowing all those interested or affected by a certain decision taken in the nuclear sector to have a say. The general principles that every concerned individual should have a say in the deliberation, and all views should be treated with equal consideration should not obscure, however, the difficulties arising from combining a variety of more and less informed perspectives. However, the objection that deliberative democracy would in fact create an obstacle to reaching well-informed and fair decisions by the fact that it gives equal consideration to the ‘uneducated’ and ‘educated’ parts of the public should not be accepted without caution. Not only could this be more specific to purely procedural democracy, where those who are called to give their votes may lack any incentive from educating themselves with regard to the issue they are endorsing, but it is also counter-intuitive, given that, under positive conditions of interaction, the arguments presented could be more transparent and better screened for consistency than in other traditional decision-making models. In the third place, deliberative democracy has a particular advantage for decision-making in the nuclear sector because it allows the conjunction of scientific, societal and ethical concerns to form comprehensive criteria of decision-making. The fact that, in practice, this combination is rather thin, and prevalence is most often given to economic and scientific criteria, 131

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should not be regarded as unchangeable. In fact, the moral imperative of respecting the basic rights of every individual and of protecting the disadvantages from the consequences of risk imposition should make it clearer that ethical and societal concerns should be given much more weight in decision-making and not be manipulated towards obtaining public acceptance without substantive debate. The above discussion should not, however, make us overlook the difficulties which arise at the application of deliberative democracy models to decision-making in the nuclear sector. The possibility of encumbering the decision-making process by strictly applying ethical criteria that would, in practice, turn out to be difficult to operationalize would fuel the objection that deliberative democracy is just seemingly conducive to more moral legitimacy, but, in fact, it blocks the formation of consensus and that of making a decision on matters which may be vital and urgent. However, many of the practical difficulties of deliberative democracy do not necessarily speak against its relevance as a normative model, but rather insist on the fact that, in order for such a process to be put in practice, additional feasibility conditions should be met. For their most part, these refer to the institutional arrangements that should be designed in order to avoid the problems affecting decision-making models that are currently in vogue (asymmetry of information and power, possibility to manipulate public opinion, partial presentation of alternatives or of the implications of certain options). There is, thus, an additional reason to combine normative and feasibility concerns in social research related to the nuclear sector in order to produce action-guiding models that could, in the end, reconcile better the duty of ensuring safety and welfare to both the present and the future generations.

References Birnbacher, D. (2010). Emotions within the Bounds of Pure Reason: Emotionality and Rationality in the Acceptance of Technological Risks. In S. Roeser, Emotions and Risky Technologies. Berlin: Springer Verlag. Cooke, M. (2000). Five Arguments for Deliberative Democracy. Political Studies, 48, pp. 947–969.

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Estlund, D. (2008). Democratic Authority. A Philosophical Framework. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Fishkin, J. S., & Laslett P. (Eds.). (2003). Debating Deliberative Democracy. Blackwell Publishing. Flüeler, Th. (2006). Decision Making for Complex Socio-Technical Systems. Robustness from Lessons Learned in Long-Term Radioactive Waste Governance. Berlin: Springer Verlag. Habermas, J. (1994). Three Normative Models of Democracy. Democratic and Constitutional Theory Today, Constellation Volume 1, pp. 1–10. Hansson, S. O. (2005). Seven Myths of Risk. Risk Management. 7 (2), pp. 7–17. Hansson, S. O. (2010). Risk – Objective or Subjective, Facts or Values? Journal of Risk Research 13, pp. 231–238. Jacobs, A. M., & Matthews, J. S. (2012). Why Do Citizens Discount the Future? Public Opinion and the Timing of Policy Consequences, British Journal of Political Science, 42 (4), pp. 903–935. Kastenberg, R. (2015). Ethics, Risk and Safety Culture. In J. Ahn et al. (Eds.), Reflections on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident. Toward Social-Scientific Literacy and Engineering Resilience. Berlin: Springer Verlag, pp. 165–188. Pidgeon, N., Kasperson, R. E., & Slovic, P. (Eds.). (2003). The Social Amplification of Risk. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, Harvard University Press. Sjöberg, L. (2007). Emotions and Risk Perception. Risk Management. 9 (4), pp. 223–237. Taebi, B. (2012). Multinational nuclear waste repositories and their complex issues of justice. Ethics, Policy & Environment 15 (1), pp. 57–62. Taebi, B., & Roeser, S. (2015). The Ethics of Nuclear Energy. Risk, Justice and Democracy in the Post-Fukushima Era. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Part III

Energy, Society, Institutions and Governance

Consumption of Petroleum and Natural Gas in the Republic of Armenia and its Energy Security – the Logistic Aspect P i ot r Kw i at k i ew i c z

Import of Petroleum Products and Natural Gas – Political Conditions Currently the Republic of Armenia is identified with the Caucasus. The cultural and social conditions established by centuries-old historical tradition allow us to see this country, as well as the neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan, as part of the broadly understood Middle East.1 This interpretation is used in research in the field of energy security. In this case, it is in fact largely 1

More in the understanding of the English term Middle East than Near East, which in the literature is usually translated as the Middle East, although this term in a literal translation corresponds to the latter term. It is worth stressing that the understanding of the territorial scope of “the Middle East” is to some extent dependent on the domain of knowledge in which it is used. In the case of political science it is now seen mostly as an area stretching from Egypt to Iran, including Turkey in the north and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and the islands of the Persian Gulf. There are numerous studies of researchers from precisely this domain of knowledge who are willing to extend this territorial framework, for example the work by V. Guseynov (2007, p. 571). In the case of economic studies of the Oil & Gas industrial sector, the term ‘Middle East’ defines exclusively the areas of West Asia, including countries of the Arab East, as well as Israel and Iran. Turkey is qualified as belonging to Europe or Europe – Eurasia, while Egypt to Africa (“BP Statistical Review,” n. d.; EIA, 2014).

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determined by non-economic factors, the nature of which has a political dimension and has been shaped in the process of history. The reason for this state of affairs is the present territorial shape of the Armenian state within borders of which there are no significant proven deposits of energy resources (EIA, 2014). The lack of natural resources makes the Republic of Armenia a recipient entirely dependent on external sources of supply. This import is not possible from all directions. The location of the state on the most logistically rational transit routes of crude oil and gas from the Caspian Sea to the west is a huge potential, yet impossible to use. All pipelines bypass the territory of the Republic of Armenia. The responsibility for this status quo rests with the already mentioned determinants stemming from the region’s past and present historical policy.2 Given the above mentioned circumstances, it is reasonable, and indeed essential, to adopt in research on energy security of the Republic of Armenia and energy policy conducted by this state such assumptions which include a number of factors incorporated in the national consciousness of Armenians and their resultant attitude to the surrounding world.

Petroleum Products – Consumption ‘Armenia possesses no oil reserves, no oil production, and no refineries. There are no oil pipelines into Armenia, and refined products arrive through rail or truck shipments. In the mid-1990s there was some oil exploration by Greek and U.S. companies, but this activity ended in 1999 without success’ – the above description comes from a specialized Internet portal undertaking the issue of energy on the global scale (GENI, 2002).

The problem of the so-called historical policy, that is the manipulation of factual material for political needs, seems to be characteristic of the entire post-Soviet space, including also independent states known as the people’s democracies. The symbol of martyrdom in Armenia is precisely the Armenian Genocide which is inscribed in the identity of this state. Its rank and dimension dominate not only in politics but also in science, culture and arts. (Svazlyan, 2004). This state of affairs is present with particular strength in general studies presented by the Armenian side, for example the Armenian National Institute (ANI, 2015). Its main factors are reflected in the formula shaping the national consciousness of Armenians with the accompanying implications in foreign and domestic policy of the Republic of Armenia and the functioning of the Diaspora.

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This description can be regarded as an almost full-scale characteristics of the Republic of Armenia as far as crude oil is concerned.3 It is true in every detail, however, it does not reflect the energy specificity of this state. In fact, the demand for oil and its products is satisfied in the Republic of Armenia in total by import. Its size fluctuates around 46–47 thousand bbl/d. It is substantial consumption. In comparison with other countries in the region, it can even be impressive. For comparison, it is more than two and a half times higher than in the neighboring Republic of Georgia, that is the country which has two and a half times larger territory and 25 percent more inhabitants! This disproportion affects the whole range of factors, which are seen as determinants of demand for fuels. The mentioned information proves, among others, that the Republic of Georgia has population density which is half the size of its southern neighbor, which is an additional factor contributing to the mobility of citizens, and thus strengthening the demand for gasoline. Moreover, general statistics on the average number of people per square kilometer does not reveal the specificity of the region. In contrast to the Republic of Georgia, where vast valleys and low hills prevail, in the Republic of Armenia this type of land suitable for settlement is significantly smaller.4 Figure reports published for the purpose of information policy also do not take into account another feature which has an impact on domestic demand for oil and its products. In the case of the Republic of Georgia it is very significant, but extremely difficult to estimate the number of foreigners from neighboring republics of Turkey and Azerbaijan, who stay almost permanently within the boundaries of this state.5 In the Republic of Armenia, which is ethnically almost monolithic and which, due to its Christian identity, remains airtight and less hospitable to the citizens of the neighboring countries, the phenomenon is practically non-existent.6 3

‘A pipeline running from Tabriz to Jerasch will be launched soon. Its opening is scheduled for 2014. It will serve as a main line for the transfer of products: engine leaded and diesel petrol. Its transfer capacity is approximately 9,600 b/d, corresponding to 1,500,000 liters of fuel’ (Nieczuja-Ostrowski, 2013, p. 46). 4 A small percentage of land suitable for settlement is a major social and political issue faced by local authorities (Vardevanyan, 2002). 5 Georgia’s migration policy has already been repeatedly criticized by Armenia, which has expressed its concern over the settlement of border areas by the Muslim population (Jagielski, 1992). 6 Armenians constitute 98 percent of residents of Armenia (CIA, 2015).

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The analysis of the wealth of the inhabitants of the Republic of Armenia does not bring us closer to the answers to the questions about the cause of greater than expected oil consumption. Depending on estimations, gross domestic product per capita here amounts to approximately $6,000 a year according to purchasing power parity, which places the Republic of Armenia near the 120th position in the ranking of wealth.7 Armenia is directly preceded by, among others, Egypt, Guatemala, Congo, Mongolia, etc. Meanwhile, in the Republic of Armenia the consumption of oil and its products is higher than in Albania, which is similar to it in terms of population and area, but its inhabitants are statistically almost 50 percent richer. The consumption level exceeds even that which is recorded in much richer and larger Baltic states – Latvia and Estonia. At the same time, these countries are almost one hundred positions higher in the mentioned ranking as their GDP per capita in comparison with Armenian is impressive. In Latvia it reaches $20,000, while in Estonia it oscillates around $25,000. Table. 1. Selected determinants of consumption of petroleum products. State

Area (km2)

Population

Population GDP per density (peo- capitaa (PPP) ple/km2) in U.S. dollars

Oil consumptionb in thousands of barrels per day

Armenia

29,800

3,026,900

102

6,191

47.2

Estonia

45,226

1,311,870

23,400

Georgia

69,700

4,483,800

6,145

Albania

28,748

2,831,741

9,506

27.8

Latvia

64,589

2,000,000

31.4

19,120

32.4

a IMF (2014). b EIA (2014).

Considering all the above circumstances, the Republic of Armenia can be regarded as a complete phenomenon in terms of the volume of consumption of oil and its products.

In nominal terms, it is even lower. According to the estimates of the International Monetary Fund, Armenia’s GDP per capita in 2012 was $3,021 (IMF, 2013).

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The peculiarity is reinforced by the universality of the use of CNG by Armenians in cars, minibuses and commercial vehicles.8 In the case of public transport, it is used in more than 90 percent of vehicles used for this purpose (“Armenia Is a Trend-Setter”, 2006). This fact, often overlooked or marginalized in professional studies, is crucial for the specificity of the consumption of petroleum-based fuels in the Republic of Armenia and the energy characteristics of this state. In the first case, it makes quantitative data on import and consumption of petroleum products even more illegible and incomprehensible, while in the other case, it makes Armenia stand out against western, eastern and northern neighbors (EIA, 2014). The specificity of the region, manifested among others in the presence of far-reaching economic similarities in neighboring provinces occurring quite independently of their nationality, does not create the possibility for the appearance of such a far-reaching difference. Moreover, given the above described characteristics of these areas, the size of the territory is not conducive to the emergence of such disproportions. Distances between different administrative centers located on different sides of the borders do not exceed several dozen kilometers, which even in the mountainous conditions seems to be an insignificant distance. In conclusion, it is difficult to resist doubts about the reliability of the cited data. The fact that the world’s largest agencies quote them contributes to their credibility, but this, in turn, may be seen as a problem of those institutions. Reaching to the sources of information, that is reports of the Armenian side (the importer) and Russian oil companies (exporters), they authorize it by their reputation (IES, 2015).

Natural Gas – Consumption Natural gas is a key energy carrier in the Republic of Armenia. It is used by domestic industry, heating industry, as well as in households and transport. This widespread use is reflected in the consumption of this raw material. The comparison of data on local consumption of this raw material with such records from other countries similar in terms of population, wealth or occupied area confirms the recognition which this energy source has gained among Armenians. Armenia seems to be the leader here as well. This state of affairs significantly reflects the volume of consumption of petroleum 8

Usually with the payload not exceeding 5 tons.

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products mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. Low gas consumption could mean the domination of one of the fuels in the energy sector, which would explain its high absorption. Data on the satisfied demand for gas in Albania, so similar to Armenia in terms of the predominant air temperature, terrain, occupied area and population – which has already been used in the comparisons due to these similarities – only strengthen the mentioned difference and confirm the validity of doubts about the level of demand of the latter country for oil. Albania, consuming just a few percent of gas in relation to the amount used by Armenia, cannot thus level the differences in the overall energy balance connected with the consumption of the individual carriers. Table. 2. Natural gas consumption in m3. Source: Factbook (CIA, 2015). 2001

2005

2007

2008

2011

1,400,000,000

1,685,000,000

2,050,000,000

1,930,000,000

2,077,000,000

Albania

30,000,000

Georgia

1,160,000,000

1,500,000,000

1,490,000,000

1,730,000,000

1,970,000,000

Armenia

Natural Gas – Import A circumstance very favorable to strong internal demand for gas is its relatively low price in relation to petroleum products, which could provide an alternative source of energy. This property is perfectly reflected by the already mentioned significant percentage of cars using CNG as fuel. In return for taking full control of the local transmission infrastructure Gazprom, which has so far been the major shareholder with a package of 80 percent of the assets of the local company distributing the raw material (ArmRosGazprom), supplies it to Armenia for $189 per 1,000 m3 (“Gas Price Reduced, ” 2013). The price, which is more than two times lower than that paid by Poland and other European countries, is the result of close political cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia and the permanent presence of the Russian company on the local market. The agreement signed in autumn 2013 was another document that the Armenian government and Gazprom concluded. Key importance should be attributed to the contract concluded in March 2006 for the period of 25 years, which announced the company’s financial involvement in energy 142

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projects in Armenia. The plan is to increase the gas transmission to Armenia so that in 2018 it amounts to 2.5 billion m3 (Gazprom, 2014). The controversies caused by the supremacy of this gas company in Armenia are connected with the concerns associated with the concluded agreements about the total energy dependence of the country on the Russian Federation and the transfer of such a relationship to the realm of politics. In fact, they seem in this case somewhat irrational and confuse the cause and the effect. Geopolitical conditions and historical tradition influenced the fact the alliance with the Russian Federation became conditio sine qua non so that the Republic of Armenia could exist in its current national and denominational character (Charkiewicz, 2011). The presence of Russian economic entities is therefore a consequence, not a cause of the status quo. Gazprom is by no means the only supplier of natural gas to Armenia. In April 2002, Armenian Energy Minister Armen Movsisyan announced a plan to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Iran to Armenia (“Armenian minister announces” 2002). The main line was launched in late 2006. The official opening by presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Robert Kocharian took place in 2007 (Socor, 2007). The network now enables the transmission of 1.1 billion m3 of gas to Armenia. Ultimately, in 2019 it is to be over 2.4 billion m3 per year. For each cubic meter of gas Armenia transmits 3kWh to Iran (Socor, 2007). It is very probable that this investment spurred Gazprom to take the initiative in Armenia and to conduct the above mentioned purchase of the full package of shares in ArmRosGazprom, which was a strategic investment for the Russian company. The gas aspect of energy security of Armenia, which comes down to ensuring continuous supply of this raw material, was in the best interests of Gazprom. This is confirmed by further agreements and investments of the Russian concern. As announced by Chairman A. Miller, plans include increasing the transmission up to 2.5 billion m3. Taking into account both directions of transmission, i.e. south from Iran and north from Georgia, Armenia seems to have secured existence. However, the local transmission infrastructure is a constant problem. Gas pipes supplying households with gas are several dozen years old. Installed in the provinces without any plan or permit, they pose a threat not only of supply failure, but also to the life of the inhabitants of these towns. They often have a dual role: as transmission networks and at the same time railings separating pavements from streets, which indeed seems to be a regional specificity encountered equally often on the Georgian side of the border. 143

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Conclusions The demand for petroleum products and natural gas in the Republic of Armenia should be regarded as above average. Statistical data on the consumption of the former may raise some doubts. No circumstances justifying the presented size of consumption are known. No community in the region or a country with similar characteristics can be used as an analogy here. Therefore, it is difficult to unequivocally determine the state of Armenia’s energy security in terms of oil. The analyses of this type prepared for natural gas are much easier. Diversified supplies from two directions, from the south and north, and in prices belonging to the lowest in the world and in quantities adapted to the fast growth of local demand for this raw material look like a good forecast for guarantees of the supply of “blue fuel” to this state.

References Armenia Is A Trend-Setter In Use Of Clean Fuels & NGVs. (2006). Retrieved from http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Armenia+Is+A+Trend-Setter+In+U se+Of+Clean+Fuels+%26+NGVs.-a0156739549. Armenian minister announces new accord for proposed Iran-Armenia pipeline. (2002). Retrieved from http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/632. Armenian National Institute, n. d. Frequently Asked Questions about the Armenian Genocide. Retrieved from http://www.armenian-genocide.org/ genocidefaq.html#How_many. BP Statistical Review of World Energy See: Energy Information Administration, n. d. Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data. cfm?fips=AM&trk=m. Charkiewicz, P. (2011). Rosja gwarantem bezpieczeństwa Armenii. Retrieved from https://eastbook.eu/2011/08/country/armenia/armenia-08-08-2011-rosjagwarantem-bezpieczenstwa-armenii/. CIA, n. d,. Factbook. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/am.html. Denisov, A., N. Savkin, N., Demidenko, S. (Eds.). (2007). Bol’shoy blizhniy vostok: stimuly i predvaritel’nyye itogi demokratizatsii. Moscow: n/a. Energy Information Administration (EIA), n. d. Armenia. Retrieved from http:// www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AM&trk=m.

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Gas Price Reduced as Armenia Joins Customs Union, n. d. Retrieved from http:// asbarez.com/114797/gas-price-reduced-as-armenia-joins-customs-union/. Gazprom (2014). Gazprom increasing its stake in ArmRosgazprom to 100 percent. Retrieved from http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2014/january/ article182633/. GENI (2002). An Energy Overview of the Republic of Armenia. Retrieved from http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/national_energy_grid/armenia/ EnergyOverviewofArmenia.shtml. ES, (2015). Armenia – Oil – Total Petroleum Consumption. Retrieved from http:// knoema.com/atlas/Armenia/topics/Energy/Oil/Petroleum-Consumption. IMF (2013), World Economic Outlook Database. Retrieved from http://www. imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx. Jagielski, W. (1992). Zamieszkać z wrogiem. Gazeta Wyborcza, no. n/a, August 28, p. 6. Nieczuja-Ostrowski, P. (2013). Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Armenii w kontekście układu geopolitycznego na Południowym Kaukazie. In P. Kwiatkiewicz (Ed.), Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne – surowce kopalne vs alternatywne źródła energii. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Bezpieczeństwa w Poznaniu. Socor, V. (2007). Iran-Armenia gas pipeline: far more than meets the eye. Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 4. Retrieved from http://www.jamestown. org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32607. Svazlyan, V. (2004). The Armenian Genocide and Historical Memory. Yerevan: n/a. Vardevanyan, A. (2002). Natsional’naya programma deystviy po bor’be s opustynivaniyem v Armenii. Yerevan: n/a.

Between Energy Security and Climate Change. The International Energy Agency and Challenges of Global Governance M ar e k R ew i zo r s k i

Since its foundation, in response to the 1973 oil shock, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has arguably been the most important multilateral organization for energy-importing countries. Lasting more than 40 years alongside the plethora of global energy governance (GEG) institutions, the IEA managed to transform itself from an insurance regime for oil consumers, namely the advanced industrial democracies encapsulated within the Organization for Economic Coordination and Development (OECD), into a key global institution for sustainable energy policies. Swaying its ‘tasking’ and mission from energy security ensured by safeguarding tractability of global oil stockpiling system in the mid-1970s, to environmental protection and economic development which as heavyweight areas mounted in the 1990s, the IEA encountered a string of structural energy challenges. Five of them make the most of the picture: the rise of outside-the OECD world powers, climate change, ‘peak oil’ issue, geopolitics of oil and gas reserves and the importance of a new energy sources (Florini, Dubash, 2011). The IEA faces these challenges in multilateral environment which is profoundly fragmented, weak and incomplete. The main goals of global energy governance, i.e. energy security, fighting energy poverty and climate change mitigation, are far from being achieved due to shortcomings of the current set of international energy institutions. They can relatively well steer towards 147

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regulating a specific issue, but fail as a system of reliable, effective, and long-lasting multilevel solutions to the key challenges of energy governance. In this paper I will investigate development of the IEA as the center of key shifts in global energy governance. Using extensive body of literature I will highlight the focal points of the IEA’s mission, agency and challenges in global energy governance, which is increasingly unclear. Tentatively it is worth noting that despite many of international energy institutions which have existed for 40 years or more, and many still to come, there is no global World Energy Organization. The International Energy Agency, set up as an offshoot of the OECD, contrary to many ‘control rooms’ for international regimes as the World Trade Organization (the WTO), is far away from ‘horizontal’ dealing with energy issues, and offers fragmentary solutions instead. In following subsections of this paper I will outline the role of institutions in global energy governance as the IEA plays a central position amongst them. The next subsection will highlight the IEA’s origins, evolution and role. Then I will place the IEA in a global setting, looking at this institution as a part of a prominent family of bodies influencing transnational energy policy. In conclusions I will summarize considerations directed at cursory assessment of the agency’s efforts to play a significant role as GEG’s main performer.

Theoretical Framework A number of current public policy debates on energy security and geopolitics of energy as well as scholars involved are amply using theoretical lens in order to discuss how, since the late 1970s, international oil markets have transformed, what is the nature of the global energy market and how the oil shocks of the 1970s changed the rules of the game in energy regimes (not only international oil). Having discovered that in the aftermath of the oil shocks, energy-importing members of the OECD created emergency sharing mechanisms and combined forces to establish the IEA, which proved highly successful as an international oil market stabilizer, they focused on institutions which operate as safe-conduct mechanisms for oil and gas as commodities increasingly traded on a global scale. Institutions as international regimes contribute to effective management of collective problems. Neo-liberal institutionalists as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr. listed their beneficial functions. In the canonic work, published in 1977, they noticed that well-working institutions perform at least four 148

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valuable functions (Keohane & Nye Jr., 1977). First, they facilitate burden sharing by governments that otherwise could not contribute to collective obligations. Second, regimes serve as information providers to governments. Third, they help great powers keep multiple and varied interests from getting in each other’s diplomatic ways. Finally, international regimes help reinforce continuity when administrations change. Referring to energy regime, yet very inchoate in the mid-1970s, Keohane and Nye accounted ‘(…) international regimes (…) provide information to governments. Information encourages cooperation on other issues by governments that might otherwise act unilaterally. And where information reveals substantial shared interests, important agreements may result. International regimes make government policies appear more predictable, and therefore more reliable. Thus the IEA, by monitoring international oil stocks and planning for emergencies, may reduce competitive panic buying by governments and firms’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011, p. 285). In another passage they noticed that ‘regimes such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), have two key features. All these regimes were designed to resolve common problems in which the uncontrolled pursuit of individual self-interest by some governments could adversely affect the national interest of all the rest. All these regimes were formed not on a universal basis, but selectively (…) The IEA deliberately excluded non-members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011, p. 288). The abovementioned attributes of institutions were recalled more than two decades ago by Douglass North, who commented on their role vis-à-vis markets. In his view, institutions can be defined as the rules of the game according to which actors play (North, 1990). Comprising formal rules (laws, regulations) and informal constraints (norms, conventions) they usually take the form of enforcement mechanisms. In Stephen Krasner’s influential definition, which stresses the normative dimension of international politics, ‘international regimes’ are regarded as ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner, 1983, pp. 1–21). As has been said, the IEA is an institution which is today functioning as the pinnacle of energy regimes,1 nonetheless, as initially international oil regime, 1

Regimes should be distinguished from the broader concept of ‘institutions’. All regimes are institutions, but not every institution is a regime. The essential feature of regimes is ‘the conjunction of convergent expectations and patterns of behavior or practice’.

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it has predecessors. Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons aptly recalled the example of the ‘oil regime’ between 1945 and 1970, which consisted of the market activities of oligopolistically interdependent firms (the so-called ‘Seven Sisters’), the national rules of the producers, and ad hoc interventions by the United States (Haggard & Simmons, 1987, p. 495). They underlined that ‘The Seven Sisters’ undoubtedly followed certain ‘rules’ concerning production, exploration, and marketing. However, their behavior was variable depending on supply conditions, a particular market structure, and national regulatory environments. In contrast, the behavior of the major powers (the United States, France, the United Kingdom) was at odds with ‘rules’ and, to a large extent, unconstrained by proto-regime as exemplified by British, French, and American expectations during the Suez crisis. The rules of the game have changed following the 1973–74 oil price shocks, when major energy-consuming nations established the IEA. This body, as international oil regime pinnacle, was designed to fulfill specific functions. Firstly, the IEA was projected as the ‘backup utility’ in case of any market failures. In addition to working as epistemic community providing energy market statistics for governments, the IEA introduced certain rules for two specific mechanisms of short-term supply management. The International Energy Program (I.E.P. Agreement), founded in 1974, established the system of emergency oil reserves among IEA members. The IEP requires IEA member states to hold oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net oil imports and – in the event of a major oil supply disruption – to release stocks, restrain demand, switch to other fuels, increase domestic production or share available oil, if necessary. The second mechanism was Coordinated Emergency Response Mechanism (CERM, founded in 1979). Secondly, the IEA – as some other institutions – was designed to lower transaction costs (such as sharing and disseminating information). In this area the IEA focused on enhancing mutual understanding and promoting informal dialogue and deliberation of long-term issues between energy producers and consumers (Goldthau & Witte, 2010, p. 8). With the advent of global governance perspective, which evolved from international regime theory and dates back to Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992), the IEA and other international Regimes aid the ‘institutionalization’ of portions of international life by regularizing expectations, but some international institutions, such as the balance of power, are not bound to explicit rights and rules. See Oran Young (1979), p. 16.

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institutions have begun to be perceived through the prism of the myriad processes through which a group of people set and enforce rules needed to enable that group to achieve desired outcomes in the absence of any prospect of a formal world government to govern global-scale issues. Referring to ‘rules’, governance focuses on two groups of problems. The first one is anchored in ‘ (global) public goods’ (GPGs), while the second one touches upon the issue of ‘externalities’. Public goods and services are defined as products which are non-rivalrous in consumption and non-excludable. To put it simply, once they exist, no consumer can be excluded from consuming them, and no one’s consumption interferes with the ability of other consumers to consume them (Florini & Sovacool, 2009, p. 40). A good example of ‘energy-related’ public good is a traffic light. It is non-rivalrous in consumption because the pedestrian’s safe crossing the street (due to well-functioning of the light and obedience of drivers) does not distract from the light’s utility for other passers-by. The traffic light is also non-excludable (or excludable at prohibitive costs), as it would become extremely difficult to reserve usage for one person or group and to make all other people walk long distances to find a safe cross-way elsewhere. The other examples of public goods are: peace, national defense, provision of basic education for all residents, environmental sustainability, free trade, good macroeconomic management, public health, law and order based on democratic principles (Cowden, 1992; Mendez, 1997; Kaul et al., 1999). The problem with the public goods is that no one has an individual incentive to produce such goods, because once they are produced, everyone harvests the benefits of them, even if they do not pay (the so-called free-riding). As a result, ‘producers’ are reluctant towards supplying public goods. As Hardin (1968, p. 1244) and Olson (1971, p. 113) argue, even altruism or common purpose would not overcome the powerful incentive to avoid contributing personal resources to common endeavors. People fearing that expressing an interest would lead to ‘taxing’ them for using social infrastructure choose a free ride, which distorts markets rendering public goods undersupplied and resource allocations suboptimal. Therefore, adjusting a mechanism of supplying public goods requires deciding on a collective action basis about the rules governing selection of public goods considered essential to exist, producing and sharing GPG, finally paying for the cost of the goods or services provided. The second of the above-mentioned problems of governance is described as ‘externalities’. They arise when an individual or a firm takes action but 151

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does not bear all the costs (negative externality) or all the benefits (positive externality) of the action. In other words: ‘externalities are by-products of certain activities – spillovers into the public sphere’ (Kaul et al., 1999, p. 5). In the area of energy governance an example is environmental pollution. More specifically, many emerging markets spend huge amounts on fossil fuel subsidies, particularly those in the Middle East and North Africa. According to the IEA, estimated subsidies to fossil fuel producers amounted to $544 billion in 2012 (IEA, 2013, p. 55). Governments often try to justify this by citing their industrial policy and poverty reduction goals. Since many of these are authoritarian regimes, low prices for oil and gas are often politically important for domestic stability. Reducing or phasing them out, as Indonesia and Nigeria witnessed in 2012 and 2013 respectively, can lead to political perturbations. However, using fossil fuel subsidies is part of a wider system that obstructs efforts to halt climate change. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 2014 report, emissions from the energy sector account for 78 percent of the total GHG emissions increase in the past decade (IPCC, 2014). Continued fossil fuel use in the energy sector intensifies emissions and contributes to global warming while eliminating fossil fuel subsidies would help to reduce global carbon emissions. In 2013, the IEA estimated that a partial phase-out of subsidies would reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by some 360 Mt by 2020. (IEA, 2013, p. 81). It is worth noting, however, that finding solutions to the problems of setting efficient rules for regulation of global public goods and soothing externalities goes beyond the capacities of even the most resourceful states, rendering collective action necessary. ‘State failure’ is visible in decreasing capabilities of state actors to make and enforce rules which allow for maneuvering in complex interdependent environment, requiring decision-making across national boundaries. In the energy field, governments – attached to the traditional structure of international politics – encounter challenges of governance which go beyond old-style logic and demand border-crossing solutions using multiple channels of action between societies in interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations. In the energy field, an influential position is reserved for the International Energy Agency – an intergovernmental organization ‘hung’ between energy security and climate change and subscribing to a family of global energy governance institutions. The following subsections will focus on the origins, evolution, mission, agenda, role of the IEA in global setting and challenges ahead. 152

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Origins, Evolution, Agency and Mission of the IEA The International Energy Agency was established in 1974 in response to the first OPEC oil embargo. Initially, this intergovernmental organization was composed of 16 members of the OECD. In November 2015, the IEA was made up of 29 member states (IEA, 2015).2 The members cover vast regions of Western Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific, constituting the largest bloc of energy-consuming states, accounting for approx. 60 percent of world petroleum consumption (BP, 2009). The IEA is an offshoot of the OECD. Its members must also hold membership in the OECD and the secretariats of these organizations are located in the same building in Paris (9, rue de la Fédération). The IEA secretariat is led by an executive director, currently a Turkish economist and energy expert, Fatih Birol, who took over the above-mentioned chair on September 1, 2015. The pivotal role in establishing the IEA was played by the U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who in London Pilgrim address in December 1973 underlined the necessity to set the rules of collective response to rapid and unpredictable changes of international energy environment. Contrary to the OECD – ponderous and rigid in terms of decision-making and binding its members with commitments – the IEA was almost immediately hailed as a flexible institution using majority vote as well as consensus to make decisions legally binding its members (which amongst international organizations is rarely found) (Scott, 1994, p. 120). Following the oil embargo decided by OPEC, and after considerable confusion and disagreements, the United States finally organized a ministerial conference in Washington in February 1974, grouping OECD member states. Despite a confrontation 2

Before becoming a member-state of the IEA, a candidate must demonstrate that it: (1) has, as a net oil importer, reserves of crude oil and/or product equivalent to 90 days of the prior year’s average net oil imports to which the government (even if it does not own those stocks directly) has immediate access should the Coordinated Emergency Response Measures (CERM) – which provide a rapid and flexible system of response to actual or imminent oil supply disruptions – be activated; (2) has a demand restraint program for reducing national oil consumption by up to 10 percent; (3) has legislation and organization necessary to operate, on a national basis, the CERM; (4) has legislation and measures in place to ensure that all oil companies operating under its jurisdiction report information as is necessary. Retrieved from the IEA official website http://www.iea.org/countries/membercountries/ (accessed on 3.12.2015).

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between Henry Kissinger and Michel Jobert, the French foreign minister, disputes among the Europeans trying, in vain, to take a collective stance, and the lack of overall consensus, the conference mandated a working party to search for a collective answer to the crisis. In July and August, working party under the leadership of G. Ribberholdt from Denmark prepared the legal text for the treaty, focused on such issues as: (1) binding nature of legal commitments; (2) permanent supply reserves; (3) a crisis mechanism which would trigger an oil-sharing system (Davignon, 2014, p. 22). The negotiations led to signing, on 18 November 1974, an Agreement on an International Energy Program (EIP), which the IEA was created to implement.3 The Agency was bestowed on ‘powers’ in the energy field, reflected in the functions of the IEA. The first and most important of them was ‘overseer function’ of emergency oil-sharing system. The IEA members have been obliged to: –– hold supplies of crude oil and oil products equivalent to at least 60 days of net oil imports (later increased to 90). This ‘reserve requirement’ was decided to minimize the negative impact of supply disruptions and to manage the response to them. –– undertake programs of demand-restraint measures to reduce national oil consumption; –– participate in oil allocation among IEA countries in the event of a severe supply disruption.4 In addition, the IEA was bestowed on an additional set of coordinated stock-draw and other response measures, known as the Coordinated Emergency Response Measures (CERMs). These were established by the IEA Governing Board Decision of July 1984 and updated since. In taking this decision, the Governing Board recognized the importance of responding rapidly to a supply disruption in order to minimize the potential economic damage. CERMs may apply even if the oil supply disruption is not acute enough to activate the IEP emergency measures. Ann Florini and R. Scott aptly note that ‘CERM could be initiated upon authorization of the IEA 3

The signatories to the IEP were Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S. 4 See the IEA ‘Agreement on an International Energy Program’, article 2 and 3, Retrieved from http://iea.uoregon.edu/pages/view_treaty.php?t=1974-InternationalEnergyProgramme.AAYYYYMMDD.EN.txt&par=view_treaty_html, (accessed on 3.12.2015).

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governing board, after a consultative process, involving member states (…) measures could be initiated especially when oil supply disruptions were accompanied by public panic that resulted in ‘exaggerated’ crude oil increases not warranted by underlying oil market conditions’ (Florini, 2011, p. 41; Scott, 1995, p. 138). The IEA’s oil-sharing system has not always been effective in easing price shocks. During 1979 marked by the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, the system failed as it was difficult to come to an agreement between the IEA members as to how to effectively manage and use the oil stockpiles. Better handling of emergency situation by the IEA occurred during the Iran-Iraq war which erupted in 1980, when Secretariat prevented the competitive behaviors among oil-importers, which caused doubling in oil prices in the late 1970 (Keohane, 1984). Since 1990 the IEA’s emergency response system (CERM) has been activated three times: (1) during the first Gulf War in 1991; (2) in response to damaging hurricane Katrina in the Gulf of Mexico in 2005; (3) in June 2011 in response to the disruption of oil supplies and shortfall of Libyan oil production (Florini, 2011). The second function of the IEA has become providing knowledge about various energy issues including: world energy statistics, the restructuring of natural gas and electricity markets, transportation, technologies, energy efficiency and climate change.5 Being responsible for preparing highly respected global energy scenarios, the IEA fills the information gap resulting from the fact of inaccurate or incomplete reports prepared by oil corporations as BP or Shell and international institutions (e.g. OPEC), which are focused on chosen forms of energy or provide poorly elaborated extrapolations. The World Energy Outlook (WEO), regarded as the agency’s flagship annual publication, provides not only statistics and scenarios but 5

For example, before the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) – held in Paris in December 2015, the IEA published World Energy Outlook Special Report entitled ‘Energy and Climate Change’, where a bridging strategy has been proposed that could deliver a peak in global energy-related emissions by 2020. The Bridge Scenario were founded upon five measures: (1) increasing energy efficiency in the industry; (2) buildings and transport sectors. (3) progressively reducing the use of the least-efficient coal-fired power plants and banning their construction; (4) increasing investment in renewable energy technologies in the power sector from $270 billion in 2014 to $400 billion in 2030; (5) gradual phasing-out of fossil fuel subsidies to end-users by 2030; (6) reducing methane emissions in oil and gas production. Cf. ‘Energy and Climate Change’. World Energy Outlook Special Report, Paris: IEA 2015.

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also policy advice and long-term projections. Its complementarity makes WEO the most widely quoted source of information in the energy field, used by many institutions, such as the European Commission, as a first-choice source of data (EC, 2015). The IEA also formulates recommendations for such global governance institutions as the World Bank, UNFCCC or G7/20 on: energy efficiency (e.g. capacity building, district heating), gas supply security, renewable energies and cooperation which combines technical and advisory assistance with financial support for investments, pilot projects and revitalization of energy related measures. For example during G7 summit held on May 2014, members of this group requested the IEA to formulate recommendations to enhance gas supply security, encapsulated in The Rome Energy Security Initiative, which G7 Energy ministerial sent to G7 Leaders and endorsed during the summit held in Brussels on June 4–5, 2014 (G7, 2014, point 7). Further analysis, based on the IEA’s energy security mandate, was developed in cooperation with the European Commission and used the in-depth review of EU Energy Policy prepared by the IEA as recommendation in 2014 (IEA, 2014). Looking at the ‘knowledge hub’ function of the IEA as other key areas of its work one shall indicate: (1) providing options for global energy dialogues between non-member energy consumers and producers, corporations, international institutions and various other stakeholders, via numerous workshops, seminars, conferences, technical meetings and capacity building programs; (2) quadrennial peer reviews of all members’ energy policies; (3) publishing on monthly basis the so-called Oil Market Reports (albeit often contested as objective statistical report). Highlighting the two above-mentioned functions of the IEA, exceeding the traditional perception of this institution as a ‘firefighter’ putting out fire of high volatility of oil market prices, the IEA presents itself as a moderately effective ‘soft power’ institution, to a large extent shaping contemporary energy debate. Its agency and mission since 1990s waved from a coordinator of oil consumers’ responses to oil shocks (energy security) to a hub of broader energy expertise (energy security + climate change). However, the emergence of multipolarity, rising outside-the OECD world powers, climate change, ‘peak oil’ issue, geopolitics of oil and gas reserves and the importance of new energy sources pose serious challenges for the IEA and its ‘expertise power’. The next section will provide a cursory overview of some of them.

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The IEA in Global Context The already signaled fragmentation of global energy architecture leads to fragility of long-lasting solutions to the key challenges of energy governance. The IEA faces significant governance gaps which limit existing arrangements and make international organizations and agreements powerless. Thijs Van de Graaf aptly reconstructs three causes of this ‘state of play’. The first one, as he indicates, is the scope. He notes: ‘international energy institutions focus predominantly on the expansion of energy markets and far less on energy access for developing countries or environmental protection’ (Van de Graff, 2012, p. 4). Indeed, the fragmentation of global energy governance is a result of the fact that many energy institutions choose narrow activity than long-term efforts leading to developing ‘energy services’. In ‘an alphabet soup’ of GEG arrangements one can find: the WTO, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), OPEC, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), to name but a few. However, each of them is tied to its core sector, which might be oil/ gas/climate changes as for the IEA or IRENA (renewables). The second cause of GG fragmentation refers to representation. International energy institutions are fragmented along the producer-consumer divide (the IEA and OPEC), but also by the drift between the West and emerging powers as China and India, mushrooming as global leaders in the use of energy (Van de Graff, 2012, p. 5). The third cause is effectiveness. To put it simply, GEG institutions working in isolation are seldom able to reach their collective objectives. They are quite numerous but poorly networked at the same time. The IEA’s core mission is also hamstrung by challenges which arise from changes in the global demand for oil. It is worth noting that the global market for energy has changed significantly since the IEA was founded in 1974. The rapid growth of developing economies, especially China and India, has transformed the demand for energy products. While in the 1970s all of the major oil importing countries were members of the OECD, China and India have changed the landscape and increased the size of the global market. Shane Streifel indicates that China in the noughties has emerged as one of the largest consumers of most primary commodities (Streifel, 2007). Indeed, China is the world’s second largest oil consumer (12.4 percent), behind the leader – the U.S. – which consumes 19.9 percent (BP, 2015, p. 9). In 1995 China was importing just 0.4 million barrels of oil per day. In 2008, 157

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it was importing more than 4.2 million barrels per day – more than France and Italy combined. According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014), in September 2013 China’s net imports of petroleum and other liquids exceeded those of the United States on a monthly basis, making it the largest net importer of crude oil and other liquids in the world. The rise in China’s net imports of petroleum and other liquids is driven by steady economic growth, with rapidly rising Chinese petroleum demand outpacing production growth. Saudi Arabia is the largest supplier of crude oil to China. Among other important sources are Oman, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Angola, Venezuela, and Russia, whose share in import has risen since 2011 production decline in Iran, Libya, and Sudan. Similarly to China, India’s share in consuming energy is growing. At present this South-Asian giant is the world’s fourth oil consumer (4,3 percent), which means that it is using more than one-third of China’s oil demand (BP, 2015, p. 9). Because China, India and other significant consumers operate outside the IEA governance framework, the above-mentioned organization’s ability to accomplish its mission is limited, given that the IEA is empowered only to decide how imports are allocated among its members. This creates the situation where the IEA can be simultaneously effective towards its members while devoid of control in the event of a global oil crisis. Going beyond the IEA’s principal function, this organization is also experiencing difficulties in fulfilling its second function – being an authoritative source of information about various energy issues. Ann Florini (2011) points at heavy criticism regarding accuracy and reliability of reports and projections on oil, which, if inaccurate, may cause confusion in the oil market and lead to the volatile oil price fluctuations as the oil market takes signals from the IEA’s estimates on the projected shortage or excess of oil supplies. This situation may be, to some extent, triggered by shortage of the IEA’s staff (currently including about 240 energy analysts, modelers, data managers/statisticians, technicians, secretaries and support staff ) incapable of investigating fully the enormous range of issues which the Agency reports cover. Moreover, assessing some of them, as exemplified by the renewable energy, may result in duplicating work of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), established and supported in Germany, a state discontented with the IEA’s work on renewable energy and committed to organizing a concerted push on renewables without duplication of the IEA. The example of renewable energy shows that the IEA is currently somewhat lost between the need to accomplish its core mission, which is preventing 158

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and managing energy supply emergencies (narrow agenda) and extending scope of its activities directed, for instance, at renewable energy (broad agenda), which – given rigidity of structure and limited membership base of the IEA – may become ineffectual.

Conclusions The International Energy Agency, born in the heat of the 1970s oil shock, was designed as the ‘backup utility’ in case of energy market failures. Accomplishing its core mission defined by two functions: ‘overseer’ of emergency oil-sharing system and ‘knowledge hub’ providing knowledge about various energy issues, including world energy statistics, the restructuring of natural gas and electricity markets, transportation, technologies, energy efficiency and climate change – the IEA achieved a moderate success. In particular thanks to activating the emergency response system (CERM) in 1991, 2005, 2011, the risk of disruption of oil supplies was compromised. However, that feats may no longer be possible given that China, India and other significant oil consumers operate outside the IEA governance framework. Despite urging to broaden the IEA membership base by some policy-makers, including senior members of the President Obama administration and former Executive Director of the IEA, Nobuo Tanaka, it is unlikely to happen because of a number of reasons. The first obstacle results from a requirement whereby new IEA members first become members of the OECD. Given that India or China have little desire in sharing common burden, not to mention they do not meet ‘democratic criteria’ for accession as: an open market economy, democratic pluralism and respect for human rights, it is highly improbable to welcome them as fully-fledged members-states of the IEA. The second obstacle results from ‘free-riding’ of China and India on the collective action of the IEA in the event of an energy supply shock, gaining the benefits from the organization’s efforts to dampen and manage global demand without paying any of the costs. The third obstacle to IEA membership for these states is the financial and sovereignty costs of meeting the IEA’s regulations and requirements, especially the requirement to have the 90-day supply reserve of net petroleum imports. For these reasons, extending the IEA’s membership on leading oil consumers is unlikely. Nevertheless, the IAE should try to apply a ‘special treatment’ approach to China and India, and seek ways to coordinate more systematically with these important non-members, e.g. by holding summits and high-profile meetings devoted to energy issues. 159

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The IEA has much more room for maneuverability in performing its second function. However, producing 15–20 reports per year makes it necessary to deploy more highly specialized staff, able to prepare accurate and reliable reports and projections. This may allow to successfully transform the IEA from insurance regime for oil consumers into a key global institution for sustainable energy policies. The precondition of this process is, however, closer cooperation with other global governance institutions such as: G7/8/20, the World Bank, The United Nations using existing yet underexplored endeavors such as Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI), which brings together six international organizations – APEC, Eurostat, IEA, OLADE, OPEC and the UNSD, which focus on assessment of the oil data situation in their respective member states based on the collection of monthly oil statistics from each organization’s member states through a harmonized questionnaire on 42 key oil data points. Expanding institutional cooperation in energy regime powered on joint initiatives may mitigate negative effect of institutional fragmentation of global energy governance.

References: BP. (2015). BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Retrieved from https://www. bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2015/ bp- statistical-review-of-world-energy-2015-full-report.pdf. BP. (2009). BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Retrieved from http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/10_06_09_bp_report.pdf. Davignon, E. (2014). How it all started. The Journal of the International Journal Agency, 7EC. (2015). Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/ world-energy-systems-facing-long-term-stress-iea-warns. EIA. (2014). China is now the world’s largest net importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels. U.S. Energy Information Administration, 24 March. Florini, A. (2011). The International Energy Agency in Global Energy Governance. Global Policy, 2, Special Issue, pp. 40–50. Florini, A., & Sovacool B. K. (2009). Who governs energy? The challenges facing global energy Governance. Energy Policy, 37 (12), pp. 5239–5248. Florini, A., & Dubash, N. K. (2011). Introduction to the special issue: governing energy in a fragmented world. Global Policy, 2 (S1), pp. 1–5.

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G7. (2014). The Brussels G7 Summit Declaration. Retrieved from http://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143078.pdf. Goldthau, A., & Witte, J. M. (2010). The Role of Rules and Institutions in Global Energy: An Introduction. In A. Goldthau, J. M. Witte (Eds.), Global Energy Governance. The New Rules of the Game (pp.1–21). Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute. Haggard, S., Simmons, B. (1987). Theories of international regimes. International Organization, 41 (3), pp. 491–517. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ S0020818300027569. Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162 (3859). IEA. (2014). Energy Policies of IEA Countries. European Union. 2014 Review. Executive Summary, Paris: OECD/IEA. IEA. (2013). World Energy Outlook 2013, Paris: OECD/IEA. IPCC. (2014). Summary for Policymakers. In Climate Change 2014. Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, Cambridge and New York. Kaul, I., Grunberg, I, Stern, M.A. (Eds.). (1999). Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century. UNDP, New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Keohane, R., & Nye, Jr J. (1977). Power and Independence. World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Keohane, R., Nye, Jr J. (2011). Power and Independence. World Politics in Transition (4th ed.). New York: Longman. Krasner, S. D. (1983). Structural Causes and Regime Consequences. Regimes as Intervening Variables. In S. Krasner (Ed.), International Regimes (pp. 1–21). Ithaca, Cornell University Press. Mendez, R. (1997). War and Peace from a Perspective of International Public Economics. In J. Brauer, W. G. Gissy (Eds.), Economics of Peace and Conflict (pp. 307–336). Aldershot, U.K. and Brookfield, VT: Avebury Press. North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Olson, M. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Rosenau, J., & Czempiel, E-O. (Eds.). (1992). Governance Without Government. Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scott, R. (1994). History of the IEA: The First 20 Years, Paris: OECD/IEA. Scott, R. (1995). The History of the International Energy Agency: 1974â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1994. Volume Three: Principal Documents. Paris: OECD/IEA. Streifel, S. (2007). Impact of China and India on Global Commodity Markets Focus on Metals & Minerals and Petroleum. Washington: Development Prospects Group World Bank. Van de Graaf, T. (2012). Towards aÂ new multilateral energy architecture? Egmont, Security Policy Brief, No. 39. Young, O. (1979). Compliance and Public Authority. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press.

Social Acceptance in the Process of Optimization of Strategic Decisions within the Scope of Energy Policy Sy lwi a Mro zow s k a

Over the past two centuries in Western societies, tradition was replaced by the judgment of scientists. Paradoxically, however, the more science and technology permeate and modify life on a global scale, the less obvious the expert authority is. In discussions about risk, during which also the question of normative (self ) limitation is raised, the mass media, parliaments, social movements, governments, philosophers, lawyers, writers and so on get the right to express their opinion (Beck, 2013, pp. 18–19).

Introduction In recent years, in the European Union Member States a number of political decisions have been taken regarding the development, implementation or departure from the development of specific energy technologies. A part of these decisions has been directly related to the implementation by the EU countries of the current EU Strategy – Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, according to which by 2020 the EU is obliged to limit its greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent compared to 1990 levels (the European Commission, 2010). Although the formation of 163

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the national energy mix remains the exclusive prerogative of the Member States of the EU, they have to conduct their policy in line with the European legislation in the field of climate and energy and regulations pertaining to the common energy market. Other reasons for energy transformation in Europe include: striving for energy independence of individual EU Member States, the modernization of national energy systems, reaction to climate change and the international situation, including armed conflicts involving the countries – exporters of energy resources. Political decisions connected with the transformation of energy systems of individual countries very often directly affect economic competitiveness, energy independence or the fulfilment of the state functions of meeting social needs in this area. An example of a decision in the field of energy transformation is German Energiewende, that is a radical transition of domestic energy industry to renewable sources. The German government declared to reduce CO2 emissions by 2020 by 40 percent compared to the 1990 level, and by not less than 80 percent by 2050. A different decision was made in Poland. In contrast to Germany, which decided to “move away from the atom”, the Polish government decided to implement the Polish nuclear power program (PNPP, 2014). The main objective of the program is the implementation of nuclear power, which – as a consequence – will contribute to ensuring the supply of adequate quantities of electricity at reasonable prices, while fulfilling the environmental protection requirements. The strategic nature of decisions in the sphere of energy policy raises questions about the role of social acceptance in the process of their optimization. In order to find answers to this question, examples of conflicting models of energy industry development – paternalistic and democraticparticipatory – were presented (Lund, 2000). The essence of parliamentary and participatory technology assessment as methods of optimization of decisions was pointed out. Finally, the results of the research conducted at the potential locations of the first Polish nuclear power plant in the context of the conditions of the application of participatory technology assessment in Poland were evoked.

Criteria for the Optimization of Political Decisions Democratic states have developed various mechanisms of decision-making related to the implementation of technologies following a variety of motivations: from responsibility to the electorate to the fear of losing power. The 164

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differences in models used in decision-making result, among others, from different levels of democratisation of political systems. Democratic political systems differ in terms of the institutions of participation and exerting influence as well as the division and exercising of power. In addition, individuals differ greatly in the extent to which they influence and try to exert influence on the government of their state (Dahl & Stinebrickner, 2007, p. 160). One of the objective problems pertaining to making decisions regarding energy industry development is the matter of decision optimization. From this perspective, a political decision can be considered optimized if it simultaneously meets three basic criteria: axiological, praxeological and social ones. This means that it should be consistent with the traditional system of values, with specific social interests, and effective. The axiological criterion concerns the compatibility of the decision with the systems of values of the ruling group and a variety of large and small social groups, as well as their organizations. The praxeological criterion refers to the choice of methods and means of action. A political decision should be as effective as possible from the point of view of the assumed objectives using the least possible outlay. The social criterion is to ensure smooth implementation of the decision thanks to obtaining social approval for its content. This criterion is very important in the case of decisions which may directly disturb the interests of society. The lack of social acceptance can cause not only the lack of optimality of the political decision, but also the impossibility of its execution (Pietraś, 2000, pp. 130–131). “Acceptance” is a concept that involves a reaction to something which is proposed externally, whereby acceptance is “the act of accepting” and thus “to give an affirmative reply to” something. Social or public acceptance is generally defined as a positive attitude towards a technology or measure, which leads to supporting behaviour if needed or requested, and the counteracting of resistance by others (Batel, Devine-Wright, & Tangeland, 2013; Hitzeroth & Megerle, 2013). The acceptance of a political decision by a social group takes place at a time when the group is able to reproduce the decision situation, in which politicians made the decision, and when this assessment is accepted. Secondly, the acceptance becomes possible when members of the group can recreate a list of variants of the decision which policy makers have considered, and approve it together with the selection made. Thirdly, when members of the social group accept the preferences of the decision-making center (Cetwiński, 1981, pp. 134–137). 165

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Public acceptance is an important condition for the optimization of a political decision, and its absence is the cause of its falsity. “Decisions may encounter strong and active resistance of citizens, or latent resistance, not manifesting itself directly but hindering the implementation of the decision, or the indifference of society, or moderate support for the decision, or finally the full involvement of citizens in the implementation process. It seems obvious that the same decision can arouse quite different responses of different social groups (Pietraś, 2000, p. 131)”. The results of the research conducted within the Create Acceptance project (Factors influencing, 2008) on 27 case studies of implementation of energy investments show that an indispensable element in determining the conditions for acceptance is to take into account the national and local political context, as well as the cultural (environmental and energy awareness, the level of research funding), institutional, social, economic, physical and geographical (natural resources, forest area) contexts. The authors of the final report of the project identified a set of contextual functions which should be taken into account before the initiation of an energy investment. Among political and cultural functions the following were highlighted: government policy; types of government strategies in the field of new energy techniques and related topics; the stability of national policy; political culture (consensus, negotiations, confrontations); centralization of power of the national government; trust in institutions; traditions of undertaking initiatives: “top-down” or “bottom-up”; environmental awareness; past experience; attitudes towards the new technique (Łucki & Misiak, 2012, p. 131). In turn, the success of communication and involving stakeholders in decision making processes is influenced by legal, financial and organizational conditions, such as the level of political culture of society, including the inclination to participation, the level of energy culture, experience in conducting communication and cooperation with stakeholders in the field of nuclear projects, the “quality” of democracy, the level of “political capitalism” and others.

Technology Assessment (TA) Following Lund (2000) we can include elitist and democratic-participatory models to conflicting energy industry development models. The first one focuses on the assumption that ambitious energy policy does not need large public participation, and it can be realized by a strong central administra166

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tion in collaboration with several large organizations, while the other one is based on the premise that environmentally friendly energy industry can only arise as a result of active participation of many local communities and that only in this way it is possible to overcome the resistance of representatives of fossil fuels (Łucki & Misiak, 2012, p. 128). In the case of both models, Technology Assessment (TA) can play an optimizing role in the decision-making process. “The experiences of more than thirty years of its (TA) operation confirm the need for the application in political practice of certain tools to estimate the opportunities and risks of new technologies (...). The practice of technology assessment makes it possible – if not completely, then at least to some extent – to avoid violent social conflicts and to make better decisions” (Stankiewicz, 2010, p. 4). TA belongs to evaluation research (applied, pre-decision), focused mainly on politics (political solutions and legislation). An essential part of this research is the evaluation of effects of the introduction, increasing the scale of or modification of a specific technology (Zacher, 2013, p. 22). It is a young scientific discipline which emerged in the early 1970s. Since then the field has evolved through various stages with shift in perspectives, focuses, and approaches. The dominant actors in the field have been parliamentary and policy making bodies, although the subject is also practiced in academia, industry, and technological research. A wide range of methodological tools have been utilized in TA works ranging from analytic techniques to integrated impact analysis approaches (Tran & Daim, 2011). The genesis of TA is connected with the creation of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1972 in the USA (Kunkle, 1995; Sadowski, 2015). A year later the National Science Foundation (NSF) created a program of research on technology evaluation. It was defined as “the exploration and analysis of planned and unplanned consequences of the introduction into society of a new technology or the expansion of an already existing technology” (Coates & Coates, 2012, p. 403). The expected results or consequences of a successful technology evaluation include: modification of the project to reduce bad effects and/ or increase benefits; identification of needs for legal regulation or control; defining a surveillance program for the technology when it is launched; simulation of research and development for: a more reliable definition of risk, anticipation of expected negative effects and identification of alternative methods of achieving the objectives of the technology, identification of measures 167

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correcting negative effects; identification of control needs; encouraging the development of the technology in new areas; identification of needs for institutional changes; providing information to all interested parties; identification of new benefits; identification of intervention experiments; delaying of projects; identification of effects of only partial or increased implementation; prevention of the development of the technology (Coates & Coates, 2012). Decision-making and participatory models belong to the main TA models. The former ones were based on the division of tasks between science, technology and politics. Technique evaluation was perceived as a kind of an early warning system and political consultancy. The following models belong to this group: the American OTA model (Office of Technology Assessment); the strategic framework concept of TA as a kind of scientific research; the VDI model (Verein Deutscher Ingenieure). In turn, participatory technique evaluation assumes the existence of various conflicts in the area of technology. Within its framework TA is seen as a way of solving these conflicts (Kiepas, 2012). Parliamentary Technology Assessment (PTA) is a form of TA which is most frequently used in Europe. The Parliamentary Technology Assessment Model is understood as a mediating function between the spheres of parliament, government, science and technology, and society (Ganzevles & Nentwich, 2014). Moreover, from an institutionalist perspective it is argued that differences in the potential impact of TA activities in different countries are to be analysed in the context of the rules of the political game and the types of incentives that TA organizations face. The degree of autonomy/dependence and exclusivity/non-exclusivity of the assessment for the parliaments are essential for understanding the diversity of impacts (Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menendez, 2005). PTA has been institutionalised in many different ways: ranging from permanent parliamentary committees for TA, separate TA units as part of the parliamentary administration to independent institutions with a mandate to serve as permanent consulting institutions for Parliament (Grünwald, 2012). At the European Union level a network of European Parliamentary Technology Assessment (EPTA) operates, it is an inter-parliamentary forum for cooperation on issues related to the development of new technologies. Parliamentary Technology Assessment developed as a form of political consultancy, whereas the development of Participatory Technology Assessment was connected with the “expert crisis” which manifested itself, among 168

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others, in the production of conflicting expert opinions on the effects of given technologies. The crisis confirmed that science cannot investigate all the implications of the technology which can appear after its implementation. It contributed to reinforcing the processes of communication and transfer of knowledge to laymen and an increase in participation in decision-making processes of representatives of non-governmental organizations or citizens. With the spread of pTA, “TA ceased to be only the way of assessing new technologies, and has become the procedure of shaping, working out and making political decisions about the nature of technological innovations, conditions of their implementation, rules of functioning in social practice, methods of control, risk monitoring and management” (Stankiewicz, 2015, p. 49). Usually, the pTA involves a larger spectrum of actors than the traditional TA. It is combined of: politicians, NGOs, unions, journalists, scientists, technology creators and citizens. After all, similarly as in the classic TA, the main aim is to predict potentially negative results of technology implementation. The pTA allows making a better assessment, especially in the case of controversial technology. Such assessment will not be based only on narrow, specialist knowledge, but it will take into consideration also elements beyond technical (social and political) aspects of a planned project and the interest of society touched by its changes. It is supposed to resolve conflicts and create favourable conditions to reach a compromise. The discussion about the role of PTA and pTA in modern democracies covers not only the condition of modern democracy in general, but also the problem of control over the development of technologies or related risk, the consequences of the democracy deficit, and the ways to overcome it. The increased activity of citizens, conscious involvement in decision making is regarded as a form of eliminating the democracy deficit and increasing citizens’ responsibility for the decisions. On the other hand, it is noted that this process may also be the result of loss of confidence in public institutions and thus proves the devaluation of representative democracy (Mrozowska, 2011). Another view, according to which public participation in decisionmaking processes pertaining to technologies cannot eventually fully replace the democratically established instances and institutions, is raised in the context of the examination of the relationship of democracy to participation: “Under direct democracy, people participate directly in the decision-making processes of the demos. Under representative democracy, 169

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however, the demos elects people to make decisions on its behalf. Here a second democratic principle appears, whereby the demos must be able to hold their representatives to account for their actions? And ensure that they always act in the people’s best interests – the principle of popular control” (Beetham, 1999). Representative democracy, therefore, seems to require less participation (at the minimum, only the act of voting), but the people need to do more than vote in order to hold their representatives to account (Somerville, 2011). In order to be able to fulfil their functions, both parliamentary and participatory technology assessments must develop in proper conditions. These conditions apply to both the political system in which TA is developed and to the society in which it is to be applied. “Participatory technology evaluation assumes the achievement of a certain level of development of civil society, but also its dissemination should lead to the formation of conditions for the development of this society. Technology evaluation covers a variety of procedures which can be used to resolve conflicts. The dissemination of knowledge about the technique should lead to increased confidence and sensitivity of relevant individuals and social groups to the interests, needs and objectives related to the dissemination of the technique” (Kiepas, 2012). In countries belonging to the European Union decisions on changes in the direction of energy policy have been taken in several ways: imposed from above, in the PTA process or involving methods characteristic of pTA. In contrast to countries which have developed technology assessment, in Poland there is no institution with powers similar to those of member institutions of the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment (EPTA). Participatory technology assessment has not developed either.

Participatory Technology Assessment and Polish Nuclear Power Program The discussion about “consulting experts” or “inclusion of society” in decision-making process in the field of the energy industry intensified in Poland together with the decision to build the first nuclear power plant confirmed by the Polish Nuclear Power Program (PNPP) adopted on January 28, 2014 by the Council of Ministers. The program envisages the construction of two nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 4,500 MW by 2035 (PNPP, pp. 34 and 44). 170

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The Polish nuclear power program has raised many conflicting emotions and expectations of stakeholders. The research carried out in the years 2013–2015 in the area of the municipalities – the potential locations of the first Polish nuclear power plant (Mrozowska & Kijewska, 2015) showed that many of the interested parties reported their willingness to participate, however, they could not define their expectations about the scope or form of this participation. The authors of the PNPP also proposed a number of elements of “stakeholders inclusion”, but did not realize their announcement properly. Moreover, despite declarative calls from various entities for social dialogue, the majority of conducted information campaigns focused on simple convincing of the investment “opponents” and were not based on multi-faceted analyses of local communities (Mrozowska & Kijewska, 2014, p. 19). Local communities of potential locations of the first Polish nuclear power plant built their views of the controversial investment (location of the nuclear power plant) on the basis of randomly acquired knowledge. The residents declared the need for meetings with experts, at the same time pointing to its deficit. In addition, they had the need to define their position with respect to this investment but they did not point to the need to participate in strategic decisions. The opponents were largely not against “the technology” but against the methods of its implementation: the protracted decision-making process; the lack of clear, immediate and direct information communicated from the top (the government) to the bottom (the municipality) increased distrust towards the investment. Noticeable was the solidarity with the local authorities at the municipal level, which felt left out in many decisions and did not have the possibility of taking pre-emptive actions. As a result, the local authorities felt neglected at many stages of the decision-making process. This intensified the distrust of the local community in relation to the central government. At the same time the residents were subject to pressure from foreign interest groups (environmental, lobbying organizations). Opinions of selected stakeholders in relation to participation in decisionmaking about the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Poland are presented in Table 1.

171

Elitist model

“The decision is taken by the government, and where is the society? ”

“The decision should be taken at the government level”

Entrepreneur

“The power plant is always “It cannot be carried out a business done the by in a referendum, I think a particular company, the that the decision should decision of the investor, be taken by the state in the state as a regulator consultation with local communities living in the creating conditions” vicinity of the investment”. “Comprehensively everyone, the government, the local government, the community organizations, the residents”

Residents

Elitist and participatory Elitist and participatory Elitist model model in terms of location model in terms of location

“We – the nation”

Social organization

Local authority

Types of stakeholders

Source: Mrozowska & Kijewska, 2015, pp. 262–263.

Model type

Declared model of decision-making

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Expectations for participation in the project

Table 1. Opinions of selected stakeholders in relation to participation in decisionmaking about the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Poland

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In the case of the Polish nuclear power program, factors which had influence on shaping the attitudes of the surveyed stakeholders were mainly: the level of social capital; experience in the use of pTA tools; access to expert knowledge; the applied model of communication and political and economic conditions. The low level of social capital, including trust in the authorities, caused distrust for the controversial, long-term and “expensive” investment. The stakeholders showed their concerns about the possible emergence of political capitalism, lobbying, nepotism, corruption. The lack of negotiation, deliberation skills and the lack of knowledge about the procedures related to obtaining information on this type of investment favored the appearance of “helping hands”, e.g. international organizations opting “for” or “against” the PNPP and organizing training, workshops, conferences, seminars to persuade local communities to benefit from their experience in the fight to support or block location decisions. The local community gained knowledge about nuclear technology from public sources or from persons regarded as opinion leaders (not necessarily having expertise on the topic). At the same time it did not express interest in participating in the proposed participatory methods, primarily emphasizing the lack of knowledge about the methods of pTA with the interest in access to expert knowledge (participation in meetings with experts). An important factor in building public opinion was the position of the representatives of the local government or the opposition. The residents of the potential location of the first Polish nuclear power plant indicated that they had no knowledge about the potential gains and losses associated with the construction of the power plant. Finally, they pointed to the lack of consistent communication about the investment on the line the government-local government. Top-down decision-making resulted in the sense of processual injustice. A strong need to “be” informed was identified. The applied elitist model in the case of the PNPP increased the surveyed stakeholders’ distrust towards the government (Mrozowska & Kijewska, 2015).

Conclusion The processes of optimization of decisions relating to energy policy treat the issue of public acceptance as one of the criteria for its success. In many cases decisions in this area are controversial and involve many stakeholders. Many aspects and complexity of such decisions cause difficulty in assessing what methods of taking them are the most optimal. The elitist model 173

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does not provide for expanded public participation in decision-making, the participatory-democratic model is based on the recognition of the value of public participation in shaping decisions. Both models are used in decisions connected with energy policy. Often the former is supported by PTA and the latter by pTA. In decision-making processes of this type, TA can contribute to the optimization of the decision. However, the issue of matching TA methods to the conditions in which they are to be used is invariably important. In the case of the PNPP, the following questions remain open: who should be “included” and at what stage of the decision-making process, what methods of inclusion of stakeholders to the program implementation are the most appropriate taking into account Polish conditions, including the lack of experience of stakeholders? Answers to these questions require, above all, the development of research in this field, involving an in-depth analysis of the conditions which determine the development of adequate TA methods, especially in relation to the political system and social development. Thoughtless copying of effective methods used in other countries and attempts to implement them uncritically may lead to the situation in which the objectives of TA, which include the optimization of the decision-making process, are not achieved.

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Gender, Environment and Climate Change Bar bara K i j ew s k a

In the epoch of the Anthropocene, problems connected with the lack of access to clean drinking water, soil degradation, deforestation, pollution, harmful effects of industrial agriculture and animal husbandry as well as with the depletion of fossil fuels have become a reality. Ecological issues move from the margins of politics to its center, because environment pollution has no borders and equally applies to rich and poor countries. In the future, climate change may contribute to the emergence of armed conflicts in the context of control of natural resources. Currently, according to Albright (2007), a bigger problem is the shortage of food and drinking water and the loss of arable land. Climate change is the most expansive global environmental problem humanity is facing. It is characterized by economic growth, industrial capitalism, technological development and material prosperity (McCright, 2010). Climate change is not only a technical problem but also there are various social aspects to this issue including gender-specific aspects. Existing research has argued that climate change needs to be understood as a gender issue and has highlighted the differential impact climate change can have on women and women can have on climate change (Alston & Whittenbury, 2012; Dankelman, 2010; Aguilar et al., 2007; Sadegh at el., 2015). This paper presents the problem of relations of environment-energywomen in the institutional and feminist approaches (Marsh & Stoker, 2006). In institutional terms, the study presents actions of UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations which define the interests of women as far as the environmental issues are concerned. In feminist terms, the importance 179

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of gender differences and patriarchal structures in relation to the natural environment is shown. The issue of gender equality and women’s empowerment is considered to be an integral element of the development of the world. The presence of records on international and national levels (the United Nations and the European Union) pertaining to equal rights for women and men, and tools to promote increasing participation and role of women in the public space (labor market, education, political decision-making, the environment) illustrates a huge change which has taken place in this regard since the 1950s. Historically, the first step undertaking the issue of women and the environment was a conference in Nairobi, Kenya, organized by the United Nations in 1985 (UN, 1986), where the energy needs of women were included to pressing problems and the relationship between women’s poverty and environmental degradation was shown. Two years later the United Nations commissioned a global study on the environment by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). The WCED Commission (1997), known as the Brundtland Commission, from the name of the Chairman Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Prime Minister of Norway, identified the key issues in sustainable development, such as: living conditions, gender issues, resources, population pressures, international trade, education, and health. A result of the Brundtland Commission activities was another UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. A consequence of the conference was the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – an agreement specifying the foundation for international cooperation aiming at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the Action Programme – Agenda 21 (UN, 1992). Agenda 21 presents the way of preparation and implementation of programs of sustainable development in local life stressing women’s role in sustainable development by eliminating obstacles to their equal participation, particularly in decision-making. The issue of integrating women ‘into all policies, programmes and activities’, is expressed in Chapter 24, entitled Global Action for Women Towards Sustainable and Equitable Development. Also Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA), adopted in 1995 at the 4th UN World Conference on Women in 2015 marks its 20th anniversary (BPfA+20) among 12 (AL) sensitive areas in which the situation of women in the world should be improved, the eleventh point (K) refers to the issue of women and the environment and identifies three strategic objectives: K.1 – Involve women actively in environmental decision-making at all levels; K.2 – Integrate gender concerns and perspectives in policies 180

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and programmes for sustainable development; K.3 – Strengthen or establish mechanisms at the national, regional, and international levels to assess the impact of development and environmental policies on women. Although the ‘first stirrings’ of women’s environmental defense were introduced at the United Nations (1985), women’s role in planetary protection became clearly articulated in November 1991, when the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) organized the World Women’s Congress for a Healthy Planet in Miami, Florida (Gaard, 2015, p. 21). Attended by 1,500 women from 83 countries, the Congress formulated and unanimously adopted its own platform: Women’s Action Agenda 21. WEDO played a key role in crafting the strategy advancing women’s participation in the UNCED process. Only a small part of the demands of Women Agenda 21 WEDO was reflected in the UN agenda (Fig.1), however they had impact of its formulation. The UN focuses on women’s inclusion while WEDO makes a diagnosis and proposes changes which could be harmful to economic interests. Table 1. Comparing Women’s Agenda 21 and the UNCED Agenda 21 Issue/ Statements

WEDO Women’s Agenda 21 (1991)

UNCED Agenda 21 (1992)

Consumption

• A power that women have to drive industrial development that respects the environment and society • A power that may enable a world alliance to boycott current unsustainable production & consumption models

• Women’s role as consumers & impact of their purchasing power affects economies • Implement policies to change unsustainable consumption patterns • New technology can play a role in this process

Technology

• Involves destruction of nature • Has not been within reach of the needs of the poor, nor accessible to women, many of whom have been its victims • Ethical implications of technology & need to democratize it to make it available to & beneficial for women & marginalized groups

• Technology is a benefit in carrying out sustainable development • Reinforce research & promote new technology, and involve developing countries in technological development through knowledge transfer

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Issue/ Statements

WEDO Women’s Agenda 21 (1991)

UNCED Agenda 21 (1992)

External debt

• Industrialized countries must admit their exploitation of developing countries’ resources • Condemns the negative impact of the IMF and World Bank’s restructuring policies, especially on women & children • Proposes paying off external debt, and boycotting banks that uphold it

• Developing countries should pay off their external debt • Incentives for international cooperation to reduce debt were identified

Population

• Main causes of environmental degradation are military & industrial pollutants and capitalist economic systems, not women’s fertility rates • Consumption-to-waste ratio per person, which is much higher in the industrialized countries than in the poor ones, must be corrected

• Population growth is an unsustainable environmental pressure • Family planning policies and educational programs for women are needed • Raise the educational level of women • Promote women’s economic independence & participation in decision-making • War on poverty is a key factor in reducing demographic growth

(Data Source: Brú Bistuer & Cabo, 2004, for: Gaard 2015, p. 22)

Compared to UNCED, WEDO (as an NGO) presents views and activities which focus exclusively on the situation of women. A common theme for the UN and WEDO is the issue of underrepresentation of women in advisory and decision-making bodies concerned with climate change. WEDO calls on national governments to ensure gender equality in all initiatives related to climate change. The low representation of women affects directly the creation of, for instance, plans to mitigate the effects of disasters which do not take into account a female perspective. The need to incorporate a gender perspective into the policy of disaster risk management was formalized through the establishment, in 2007, of the Global Gender & Climate Alliance (GGCA) by the UN and nearly 100 182

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non-governmental organizations (including WEDO). The GGCA was set up to monitor the implementation of the UN mandate on gender equality, observation of equality of poor women and men in the access to financial mechanisms of the UN, setting standards and criteria for the fight against climate change while respecting the principles of gender equality, building policies, strategies and programs to combat climate changes on a global and local level, and building a network of organizations for the exchange of knowledge and experience as well as advocacy of a gender perspective in climate change. Another project for strengthening substantive representation of women was the creation of The Troika+ of Women Leaders in 2011 composed of influential women serving as ministers and parliamentarians. For example, Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Change (2010–14), is one of the women of the Troika+ working for the concept of gender as a key factor in the fight against climate change. According to Hedegaard, more information is needed on the relationship between gender and climate change. Within 21 years of climate negotiations, only one resolution of the UNFCCC – Decision 23/CP.18 called ‘Doha Miracle’ – contained references to the issue of gender, but only in the procedure for participation in the work of the committee. The issues of socio-economic situation of women, of how the adoption of ‘feminine and masculine’ behavior patterns is connected with global warming, were not undertaken. The report of the UNFCCC of 2015 points to a gradual increase in women’s participation in climate Conferences (COP), in the last Paris conference, women’s participation was at the level of 35 percent. Study Kruse (2014, p. 349) shows that women’s representation is higher in countries that enjoy a higher level of development and a higher degree of political gender equality. Studies which take into account gender confirm high costs incurred by women, especially in countries of the global south. Population migrations forced by disasters (floods, tornadoes, droughts) negatively influence family ties, which constitute the main support mechanisms for women (Patt et al., 2007). In their research, Naik, Stigter and Laczko (2009) indicate that in the situation of a natural disaster women mobilize social networks and remain in the place of residence, while men more often decide to migrate. Gender inequalities mean that women and children are 14 times more likely to die in ecological disasters than men (Aguilar, 2007; Aguilar, Araujo, & QuesadaAguilar, 2007). For example, in the 1991 cyclone and flood in Bangladesh, 90 percent of the victims were women. The causes are multiple: warning 183

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information was not sent to women, who were largely confined in their homes; women are not trained swimmers; women’s caregiving responsibilities meant that women trying to escape the floods were often holding infants and towing elder family members, while husbands escaped alone; moreover, the increased risk of sexual assaults outside the home made women wait longer to leave, hoping that male relatives would return for them. Similarly in the 2004 Tsunami in Aceh, Sumatra, more than 75 percent of those who died were women. In May 2008, after Cyclone Nargis came ashore in the Ayeyarwady Division of Myanmar, women and girls constituted 61 percent of the 130,000 people dead or missing in the aftermath (“Cyclone Nargis, ”, 2010). The report of Oxfam (2005, p. 4) pointed out that 77 percent of all the victims of the Tsunami in 2004 in Indonesian villages were women who during the wave strike were at home. The research of Gerd Johnsson-Latham (2007) from Sweden shows that women live in a more sustainable way and have smaller ecological footprints. Similar conclusions are drawn by Annika Carlsson-Kanyama and Riita Räty (2009). They studied the lifestyles of men and women during ten daily activities in Germany, Greece, Norway and Sweden. They concluded, for example, that men used more meat than women and they drive their cars over longer distance. On the other hand, the studies did not take into account a typically female activity connected with purchases of clothing (O’Cass 2004, p. 872), especially the so-called fast fashion/McFashion, the production of which, mainly in developing countries, has a highly detrimental impact on the environment. Gender socialization theorists (e.g. Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982) emphasize the different values and social expectations conferred to boys and girls through socialization into their society’s dominant culture. ‘Studies that find a direct effect of gender on environmental concern (wherein women express more concern than men do) – especially when controlling for key social roles variables – support this simple gender socialization argument… The different attitudes of men and women… reflect the different experiences, competencies, interests, and dispositions that come from performing (and being socialized to perform) these different roles’ (McCright 2010, pp. 69–71). Recapitulating, it should be stated that the relationship of gender and the environment depends on socially/culturally functioning gender roles (sex roles), the level of wealth/development and consumption models. One of significant factors influencing climate change is the issue of energy in terms of its sources, consumption and availability. Currently, about 1.4 billion people around the world (every fifth person) do not have access 184

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to electricity and for approximately 2.7 billion people (40 percent of the world’s population) wood and coal are the primary/only sources of energy (UNDP, 2011). Energy poverty and its effects in countries of the global south mainly affect women. In communities where only women are responsible for food (organization and preparation), childcare and paid work performed at homes, they most severely bear the burden of the lack of access to sources of effective (clean) energy. Every day, millions of women and girls around the world are exposed to inhalation of harmful smoke while cooking and hours of searching for energy resources (wood, biomass) needed for cooking. The dependence on inefficient cookers (furnaces) and fuels translates not into only health but also educational effects. Estimates gathered by the UN indicate that every year two million women and children die due to carbon monoxide poisoning (emphysema, cataracts, cancer, heart diseases, etc.). The studies of the Chinese community Midu Women (1999) shows that married women spend one to three hours each day on firewood collection and transportation. When the forests nearby have been cleared, the women have to traverse some 10 to 20 km to collect one bundle of firewood, which can only meet their needs for one or two days. Many girls drop out of school to help their mothers collect fuel. Women work longer and harder than men to fulfil their domestic and agricultural responsibilities. The consequences of energy poverty of women are also associated with the lack of opportunities of working at home. In developing countries, women represent the majority of informal employees. Access to clean and reliable energy (e.g. solar), especially from renewable sources, has a positive impact on the environment, education of children, quality of life, income and health.

Feminist Approach The concepts of the natural environment in feminist orientation developed in recent decades bring a look which takes into account the cultural and economic context of the existence of men and women. Ecofeminism appeared as a feminist social movement, the name of which comes from Françoise d’Eaubonne’s publication which, in 1974, called for a feminist revolution. D’Eaubonne blamed the patriarchal system and male domination for the environmental degradation, ‘the destruction of the environment and for the accelerated pollution that accompanies this madness, bequeathing an uninhabitable planet for posterity’ (1981, p. 64). In her understanding, the revolution is expected to bring new egalitarian 185

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relationships between men and women and between humans and nature (1981, pp. 66–67), and not the change of the domination model. Ecofeminism is a theory and movement that identifies oppression/violence against women with oppression towards the environment. Violence against the ‘mother Earth’ is intertwined with violence directed towards women. To the forms of oppression such as sexism, racism, classism, speciesism, etc. Adams (1993, p. 1) introduces the concept of naturism as oppression of nature. Philosophical premises of ecofeminism are based on questioning anthropocentrism, according to which man is the center of the world and all actions taken by him should conform to his needs. In the patriarchal order the natural feminine ability to create (fertility) and the ability to read the rhythms of nature has been pushed aside by the male tendency to rule thanks to unnatural creation – using the power of thought (cf. Fromm, 1999). Ecofeminism should be seen as a system of values and a social movement, often with political demands. Although internally diverse, its main assumptions following Howell (1997, pp. 233–235) can be summed up in four postulates. Firstly, the need for social transformation in which the reconstruction of values and relationships should take place through equality, cultural diversity, elimination of violence and hierarchy, and full participation. Secondly, the social transformation must be accompanied by intellectual transformation. Ecofeminism calls for breaking with the hierarchical and dualistic way of thinking – culture/nature, mind/body, reason/emotions, human/animal, subjectivity/objectivity, individualism/collectivism and public-male/private-female. Hierarchical thinking justifies devaluation and dominance, opposition to the subordination of women and nature is the basis of criticism and activism of ecofeminism. Faith in the patriarchal system of values highly appreciates linear thinking, as well as the mechanistic, analytical and rational values. The value of intuition, anarchist emotions and those referring to earth are perceived negatively as something passive, weak, irrational – and feminine. Dualistic thinking leads to a quite paradoxical perception of nature as, on one hand, inert, dead mass and at the same time wild, chaotic strength. Nature recognized in this way must be controlled and subordinated to human ends. Patriarchal mind objectifies in a similar manner, controls and takes away the value of everything that is accompanied by the term ‘female’. Thirdly, nature is a value which should transform human relationships with it, and not vice versa; in this regard ecofeminism draws from deep ecology. 186

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Fourthly, people are part of nature and take part (participate) in the ecological process. Just like bio-diversity, human diversity is a value. Feminist political ecology appeared in the 1990s as a feminist response to the ongoing discussion on sustainable development undertaken mainly from the positions of corporations, international organizations and states. It was a response to the effects of pro-development activities funded by international agencies – the World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA), which did not contribute to changes in the situation in the Third World countries, and more importantly worsened the position of weaker social groups, including in particular women. The green revolution has changed the local systems of production reducing access to resources used by women, at the same time it increased their workload (Robins, 2011, p. 63). Key works of Salleh (1997, 2009), Rocheleau, Thomas-Slater, Wangari (1996) on women and development of the environment, social movements (Alvarez, 1998) relate primarily to the criticism of rapid modernization. The researchers point to injustice and breaking of human rights. Their criticism, drawing from the Marxist concept of class conflict, concerns unjust social relations resulting from the level of wealth and the worse situation of women in this regard. The privatization of land, water and forests and displacement of indigenous peoples are carried out on a massive scale. The interference and dismantling of local communities in the name of realization of large investment (mines, hydroelectric plants) are carried out under the banner of development. It is opposed to corporate education and progressive militarization for the purpose of development. Feminist political ecology takes into account gender differences in the sphere of interests, knowledge, abilities and work arising not from biology but from social relations. The main areas of interest are the interrelationships among the socio-cultural gender, the environment, culture and the current economic system. Research in the feminist political ecology perspective on social complexity (community), ecology (place) and technology has led to the creation of an understanding of social movements, stressing the connections of culture/ nature networks with the place of life. An important area of research in feminist political ecology are climate change and climate justice, plunder of land on a global scale, displacement of rural population and the importance of the food crisis associated with the lack of control over expansion of industrial food monocultures and energy problems – production and emission of CO2 (Di Chiro, 2009; Seager, 2009). It is programmatically opposed to actions which jeopardize the environment and women, such as 187

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militarization, violence against women, the nuclear industry, investments which degrade the environment and cultural heritage. The researchers describe cases in which indigenous people become victims of even proecological investments. Salleh (2013) argues that mega-projects contribute to the phenomenon of the so-called ‘ecological refugees’. Representatives of political ecology point to the contradictions brought by neoliberal climate policy. For example, Peruvian researcher Isla (2009) described the effects of the application of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) provided by the Kyoto Protocol (1997), which allows companies or countries to settle their CO2 emissions in exchange for planting forests. The Ministry of Environment and Energy of Costa Rica instituted 25 percent of the country area as a ‘nature conservation area’. For this reason, the indigenous population was gradually displaced from the forested areas, which resulted in the loss of their livelihood. The offer of covering natural areas with protection in order to absorb CO2 resulted in cancellation of state debts by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (pressure of financial institutions) and was regarded as a success. On the other hand, the displaced people joined the slums on the outskirts of San Jose, and prostitution became the main source of income for the women. The reserve region is famous for the organization of tourist trips combined with sex services. Maria Mies (1986) argues that community members in the Third World dispossessed from their livelihood cannot expect to become dependent on wages. Peripheral landless women and men will not have the good fortune of their peers from the core countries to find a job and share the wealth extracted from colonies, because they themselves are the colonies. Different generic roles of men and women resulting from social, economic and cultural differences translate into differences in access to resources (e.g. land), types of activities and responsibilities. Not taking into account the gender perspective leads to the deterioration of the situation of women. Strategies pertaining to women and the environment require a common conceptualization about what should be included in the concept of the environment; a conceptualization which is both institutional and takes into account feminist positions and research. There is a strong need for further research on climate change and the availability and consumption of energy resources taking into account gender impact in various cultural and economic contexts. In developed countries the gender perspective should not be limited only to the analysis of women’s participation in government structures or agencies, but it should also be constantly used to monitor be188

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havior towards the environment (taking care of the environment, consumer behavior, green work places, raising funds for environmental investments) and energy consumption.

References Aguilar, L., Araujo, A., & Quesada-Aguilar, A. (2007). Fact sheet on gender and climate change. Fact sheet presented at the UNFCCC COP 13, held in Bali in December. International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Retrieved from http://www.genderandenvironment.org/. Alston, M., & Whittenbury, K. (Eds.). (2012). Research, action and policy: Addressing the gendered impacts of climate change. New York: Springer. Bokiniec, M. (2011). Pomiędzy „leczeniem ran” a „odzyskaniem Ziem. Kultura Współczesna, no. 1, pp. 55–65. Braidotti, R. (Ed.). (1994). Women, the Environment and Sustainable Development towards a theoretical synthesis. London: Zed Books−INSTRAW. Cyclone Nargis: Myanmar two years later. (2010). Ottawa: CARE Canada. Retreived from http://care.ca/main/index.php? en&cyclonenargis. Carlsson-Kanyama, A., & Räty, R. (2009). Report: Comparing energy use by gender, age and income in some European countries. Swedish Energy Agency. Retrieved from http://www.compromisorse.com/upload/noticias/001/1560/ foir2800.pdf. d’Eaubonne, F. (1981). Feminism or Death. In E. Marks, & I. de Courtivron (Eds.) New French Feminism: An Anthology. New York: Schocken Books. Dankelman, I. (Ed.) (2010). Gender and climate change: An introduction. London: Earthscan. Di Chiro, G. (2009). Sustaining everyday life, bringing together environmental, climate, and reproductive justice. DifferenTakes, no. 58. Gaard, G. (2015). Ecofeminism and climate change. In Women’s Studies International Forum, 49, pp. 20–33. Harris, R. (2010). Gender and Climate Change at Copenhagen COP-15. In WEDO’s Perspective on a History-making Year. WEDO, March 1. Isla, A. (2009). Who pays for the Kyoto Protocol? Selling Oxygen and Selling Sex in Costa Rica. In A. Selleh (Ed.) Eco – Sufficiency and Global Justice. Women write political ecology. London; New York, NY: Pluto Press. Retrieved from http://www.gift-economy.com/womenand/womenand_tragedy.html.

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Johnsson-Latham, G. (2007). A study on gender equality as a prerequisite for sustainable development. Report to the Environment Advisory Council, Sweden. Retrieved from http://www.uft.oekologie.uni-bremen.de/hartmutkoehler_fuer_studierende/MEC/09-MEC-reading/gender%202007%20 EAC%20rapport_engelska.pdf. Holmberg, K., & Hellsten, I. (2015). Gender differences in the climate change communication on Twitter. Internet Research, Vol. 25, Issue 5. pp. 811–828. Kruse, J. (2014). Women’s representation in the UN climate change negotiations: a quantitative analysis of state delegations, 1995–2011. Int. Environ Agreements, 14, pp. 349–370. Madeleine, A. (2007). Meeting of women leaders discusses global security, environment [Streaming video]. Retrieved from Associated Press Video Collection database. Marsh, D., & Stoker, G. (Eds.) (2006). Theory and Methods in Political Sciences. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. McCright, A. M. (2006). The effects of gender on climate change knowledge and concern in the American public. Population and Environment, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 66–87. Midu Women and Energy Technology in China (1999). Gender, Technology and Development, vol. 3, 2, pp. 299–311. Naik, A., Stigter E., & Laczko F. (2009). Migration and Natural Disasters. International Organization for Migration, Geneva. Retrieved from http:// publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mrs30.pdf. Neumayer, E., & Plümper, T. (2007). The Gendered Nature of Natural Disasters. The impact of catastrophic events on the gender gap in life expectancy 1981–2002. London School of Economics, University of Essex and Max Planck Institute for Economics. O’Cass, A. (2004). Fashion clothing consumption: antecedents and consequences of fashion clothing involvement. European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 38 Issue 7, pp. 869–882. Oxfam (2005). The tsunami’s impact on women. Oxfam Briefing Note. Retrieved from https://www.oxam.org.nz/sites/default/files/reports/The_tsunami_impact_on_women.pdf. Sadegh, S., Pazuki Nejad, Z., Mahmoudi, H., & Knierimc, A. (2015). Gender, responsible citizenship and global climate change. Women’s Studies International Forum, 50, pp. 30–36. Salleh, A. (1997). Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the Postmodern. London: Zed Books and New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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Salleh, A. (2009). Eco-Sufficiency & Global Justice: women write political ecology. London: Pluto Press and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Salleh, A. (2013). Zmiany klimatu a “inny ślad”. Przegląd Anarchistyczny. Retrieved from http://www.przeglad-anarchistyczny.org/artykuly/29-kapitalizm-i-ekologia/250-zmiany-klimatu-a-innyslad. Scheer, H. (2007). Energy Autonomy: The Economic, Social and Technological Case for Renewable Energy. Sterling. Soroptimist International of the Americas. (2011). WHITE PAPER: Reaching Out to Women When Disaster. Retrieved from http://www.soroptimist.org/ whitepapers/whitepaperdocs/wpreachingwomendisaster.pdf. Robins, P. (2011). Critical Introductions to Geography: Political Ecology (2nd Edition). Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons. UN (1986). Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements on the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/womenwatch/confer/nfls/ Nairobi1985report.txt. UN (1992). AGENDA 21. Retrieved from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ content/documents/Agenda21.pdf. United Nations Development Programme (2011). Human Development Report: “Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All. http://www.undp. org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2011%20Global%20HDR/ English/HDR_2011_EN_Complete.pdf. WCED (1987). Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future. Retrieved from http://www.un-documents. net/our-common-future.pdf. Rocheleau, D. E., Thomas-Slayter, B. P., & Wangari, E. (Eds.). (1996). Feminist Political Ecology: Global Issues and Local Experiences. Routledge: London.

The Relations between Indigenous Peoples and Extractive Industry in the Barents Region P r ze m ys ław S i era dz a n

Those who are most dependent on nature will also be most vulnerable —Berit Oskal Eira – Reindeer herder and former Norwegian Vice Minister of Labor and Social Inclusion

The Arctic is not seen as a desolate and peripheral space anymore. Its enormous oil and natural gas deposits, according to some estimations, may be equal to 25 percent of the world energy resources (Varsi, 2006). The unprecedented rise of the average annual temperature on the polar territories results in the melting of ice caps, which makes the natural resource deposits more accessible and extends the period in which the waters of the Arctic Ocean are navigable. This is the obvious reason why international companies, state governments and, last but not least, the world public opinion are paying much more attention to Arctic issues than before. The coast of the Barents Sea is a part of Arctic in which the natural resources are particularly abundant and accessible, which makes this area particularly important from the point of view of geopolitics and energy policy. This region, once peaceful and tranquil, became an arena of rivalry between regional powers and multinational companies, competing for its subterranean riches.

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Indigenous peoples, who have lived in this region for many centuries, became the main victims of the ‘race for resources’. The expansion of mining industry put the traditional lifestyle of native tribes under threat. The leaders of the states and the directors of business companies hardly ever perceive indigenous peoples as equal partners. Those who gain profits from the extraction of natural resources are often not particularly keen on any special rights for the native tribes. The expansion of natural resources extraction industry in the Barents Region poses a serious threat for the livelihoods of indigenous peoples who inhabit those lands since time immemorial, cultivating their natural economy and living in harmony with nature. The position of native tribes in the resulting confrontation of interests with multinational companies is very weak, even though the legal acts which protect the rights of indigenous peoples exist. Grassroots human rights activism, indigenous international cooperation and different actions in order to raise the awareness of the world public opinion seem to play a crucial role in the struggle of native peoples of the Barents Region for survival of their culture and traditional lifestyle.

The Barents Region as a Geographical, Political and Social Space The Barents Region (also called Barents Euro-Arctic Region) is the largest space of interregional cooperation in Europe. Its space is estimated for 1.75 million square kilometers and its population numbers 5.3 million inhabitants. It includes northernmost parts of Norway (Nordland, Troms, Finnmark), Finland (Oulu Region, Lapland and Kainuu) Sweden (Norrbotten and Västerbotten) and northwestern part of the Russian Federation (Arkhangelsk Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Komi Republic and Karelia Republic). The nature of the region is unique and very diverse with large areas of boreal forests in the south and tundra zones in the north. The large part of the region in located to the north of the Arctic Circle (“Barents Regions”, n. d.). The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), an international organization, was created as an international forum for intergovernmental cooperation on issues concerning the Barents Region by ministers of foreign affairs of Russia, Norway, Sweden and Finland, who signed the declaration of Kirkenes (since then this Norwegian city located nearby the Russian border is the seat of the International Barents Secretariat). The regional cooperation officially started on January 11, 1993. The foreign minister of Norway Thorvald 194

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Stoltenberg was perceived as spiritus movens of the project. The Barents cooperation fosters the development of cross-border contacts between people, economic development and cultural exchange. The main dimensions of the cooperation include economy, culture, trade, education, indigenous issues, youth policy, media and information policy, ecology, public health, and transport (Šilkin, 1993; “The Barents”, n. d.). A large part of contemporary Barents Region was historically the land of Sápmi – the traditional area inhabited by Sámi tribes before the creation of national borders and the emergence of contemporary states of Norway, Finland, Sweden and Russia (Lehtola, 2004). According to some historians, Sámi tribes settled in the Northern Scandinavia in the Stone Age, which places them among the earliest dwellers of Europe (Lundholm, Groth, & Petersson, 1996, pp. 107–111). For many centuries, Sámi tribes had a connection with reindeers – first by hunting, than by domestication and herding. The traditional unit of organization of social life based on reindeer husbandry is ‘siida’, which is a kind of clan or an alliance of a few families who share the duties connected to reindeer herding (Oskal, Turi, Mathiesen & Burgess, 2009, pp. 19–21). Sámi have pursued different kinds of nature-based livelihoods including fishing, trapping, family forestry, agriculture, gathering wild berries and other natural products and handicraft manufacture of traditional articles (Koivurova et al., 2015, pp. 11–51). The cultural legacy of Sápmi was one of the main inspirations for the founders of the Barents Region. Sámi, together with other indigenous peoples of the region, who still practice traditional lifestyle and economy, are very vulnerable to destruction and contamination of nature, which is caused mainly by extraction of abundant mineral resources of the region.

The Concept of Indigeneity The notion of ‘indigenous people’ remains controversial and arouses disputes. The commonly accepted definition of indigeneity in the international law has not been created until now. This kind of definition is not included in any of the international documents concerning the rights of indigenous peoples, including Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by General Assembly Resolution 61/295 on September 13, 2007. Some experts argue that any kind of precise definition is not necessary, because the term is clear and intelligible, while detailed disputes concerning the 195

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hermeneutics and semiotics distract our attention and make us divert from much more important problems. According to Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, adopted in 1989 (No. 169) by International Labor Organization, indigenous peoples are ‘tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations’ or ‘peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions’. The aforementioned definition remains hazy. According to this legal act, ‘Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply’. According to the report presented at the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination of Minorities in 1986 by the United Nations special rapporteur Martinéz Cobo, indigenous peoples may be identified as follows: ‘Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems’ (Martinez Cobo, 1986). This definition gained widespread popularity and has been used on a working basis by different groups and organizations that protect rights of indigenous peoples. According to this definition, individual persons can be perceived as members of an indigenous people when he or she identifies himself or herself as a member of an indigenous people and is acknowledged and accepted as the member of the people by the group. Although plenty of other definitions exist, including, among other, Canadian, Hawaiian, Metis and Finnish Sámi (Sarivaara, Maatta, & Uusiautti, 2013), the Martinez Cobo’s 196

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definition seems to be the most useful and adequate for the purposes of the following study. The indigenous peoples possess vast collective wisdom and invaluable skills inherited from previous generations. Their unique system of values is based on holistic perception of the world and veneration of natural forces. This worldview is not compatible with consumerist and materialist outlook which dominates in the contemporary world, according to which the biosphere is a huge reservoir of resources for the world market economy and the ultimate goal of the existence of nature is satisfying human needs.

The Indigenous Peoples of the Barents Region The total population of the Barents Region is approximately 5.3 million people, the vast majority of which is allochthonous. The exact number of indigenous people on this area is difficult to estimate precisely because of different degrees of identity or assimilation among people with indigenous background. According to the data of The Working Group of Indigenous Peoples (WGIP), which was established on a permanent basis by the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in 1995, there are 85,000 Sámi inhabitants in the historical area of Sápmi, the traditional homeland of this native Arctic people. Between 50,000 and 60,000 of those are living in Norway, about 20,000 in Sweden, some 7,000 in Finland and around 2,000 in the Russian Federation. Around 7,000 Nenets people are living in the Russian Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Approximately 6,000 Vepsians are living in the Republic of Karelia (“Working group”, 2013). Those ethnic groups are perceived as indigenous by the authorities of every single state of the Barents Region. Sámi are the only group in the European Union considered to be indigenous. They are an ethnic minority living in northernmost territory of Sweden, Finland, Norway and north-western Russia. Their historical homeland stretches from central Norway and Sweden through northern Finland (Lapland) to Kola Peninsula in Russia (Lehtola, 2004, pp. 9–14). They are not a homogenous ethnic group. Within the area of Sápmi the following groups dwell: Coastal (Sea) Sámi, Forest Sámi, Mountain Sámi, Skolt and Kola (Russian) Sámi. The first three groups are described as West Scandinavian Sámi, two latter groups as East Sámi. Moreover, there are Sámi people who abandoned their traditional lifestyle and left the territory of Sápmi (Lundholm, Groth, & Petersson, 1996, p. 111). 197

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The Nenets peoples, historically known as Samoyeds, are an Uralic native people of Arctic Russia. According to the latest population census in 2010, there are 44,857 Nenets in the Russian Federation. The overwhelming majority of them live in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Nenets Autonomous Okrug (“Informacionnye materialy”, 2010). Two main varieties of Nenets language are Tundra and Forest. Nenets language is considered endangered, because majority of fluent speakers are elderly people. Traditionally, reindeer herding, hunting and fishing were the main economic activities of this nomadic Arctic ethnic group (Janhunen, 1993). The Finnic minority of Vepsians is the smallest indigenous group in the region. According to the Russian Federation population census of 2010, there are 8,240 Vepsians in Russia. Most of them live in the Republic of Karelia. The younger generation of Vepsians is almost assimilated into the Russian society and the Vepsian language is on the verge of extinction. The main cultural center of this small ethnic group is Shyoltozero in Karelia, which in the years 1994–2004 was a center of Veps National Volost – a small Veps administrative self-governing unit (“Vepskaâ”, 1999). However, there are three other ethnic groups which are not included in this list. The first two are two Finno-Ugric nationalities of North-Western Russia: Komi and Karelians. Both groups have their own autonomous republics within the Russian Federation. According to current Russian legislation, they do not fulfill the requirements necessary for being granted an ‘indigenous’ status. In the Russian Federation, ‘Small indigenous people of the North, Siberia and the Far East” is not only an ethnologic, but also legal, social and political term. The ethnic groups which were granted this status are perceived as threatened by disintegration and loss of their ethnic and linguistic identity and thus are entitled to certain privileges and special protection. The status is granted to ethnic communities of less than 50 thousand members dwelling their ancestors’ lands in the Russian North, Far East and Siberia, who cultivate their traditional lifestyle (“Ob obščih principah”, 2000). The ethnic groups which have been granted a status of small indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East are listed in the legal act, as well as territories of traditional natural resource use (“O teritorii tradicionnogo”, 2001). According to the population census of 2010, the number of Komi people equals 228,235 and the number of Karelians equals 93,344 (“Informacionnye materialy”, 2010). Both numbers distinctly exceed the threshold of 50,000. What is more, the degree of assimilation of both groups is nowadays quite high and their lifestyle can hardly be described as 198

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traditional. The third group which is not acknowledged as indigenous are Pomors – a small people of disputed ethnic status who reside in the area of the White Sea and the Barents Sea coast. They are descendants of the ancient inhabitants of the Novgorod Rus who have been settling on the lands of the Far North since the Middle Ages. Historical Pomors spoke a unique dialect of Russian, had a strong feeling of separateness. After the October Revolution, Pomor identity has been forgotten for many years, but was partially revived in the late 1980s and 90s by ethnologists, scholars and local activists. Nowadays, the ‘Pomor question’ is seen as controversial – some journalists and politician perceive ‘Pomor rebirth’ as a threat to Russian statehood and the result of activity of external factors. Russian authorities perceive Pomors merely as an ethnographic group and a part of Russian ethnos (Sieradzan, 2015). The survival of the unique livelihood and culture of indigenous communities of the Barents Region is possible only under the condition of the existence of territories of unspoiled nature. Nowadays the extractive industry companies continue their expansion on the traditional areas of native tribes of the European Arctic. The resource extraction companies strive towards maximizing their profit, which is incompatible with the system of values of the indigenous peoples and their material culture, which includes the traditional ways of natural resources use. The preference for income of multinational companies over the collective rights of native tribes is a dominating trend of the contemporary civilization.

Mining Industry, Indigenous Peoples and International Law The discussion on the status of indigenous peoples as a subject of international law goes on since the 1970s (Barsh, 1986). Nowadays a few acts of international law protect the native populations from the expansion of resource expansion companies, the most important of which is Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2007. According to its article 2, ‘Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity’ (“Declaration on”, 2007). Article 8 of the Convention obliges the states to defend the indigenous peoples dwelling on their territory from any form of forced assimilation, 199

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destruction of their culture or any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities, any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources, any form of forced population transfer which has the aim of violating any of their rights, any form of forced assimilation, and, last but not least, of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them. Article 25 protects the indigenous peoples from the resource mining companies by securing their right to maintain and strengthen their spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands and waters, seas and other resources, while article 26 – to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess. Article 28 concerns restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned (“Declaration on”, 2007). Another crucial act is Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention adopted by International Labor Organization in 1989, which establishes the minimal standards in the field of protection of indigenous peoples for states-signatories. Article 15 of this act safeguards the rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands, including the right of these peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation of these resources. According to article 16, the indigenous people shall not be removed from the lands which they occupy, save the exceptional circumstances (if this kind of exceptional measure is considered appropriate, such relocation shall take place only with their free and informed consent) (ILO, 1989).

Resource Mining as a Threat to Indigenous Peoples of the Barents Region The extraction of natural resources is a source of numerous threats for indigenous peoples of the Barents Region who still cultivate their traditional livelihood. The traditional economy of semi-nomadic Sámi and Nenets tribes is based on reindeer herding, hunting, gathering and fishing, which require uncontaminated nature. The main threats for native lifestyle result from the mass colonization of allochthonous people (mining industry employees), who do not feel any emotional connection with the Arctic territories inhabited by indigenous peoples, perceiving them as an unapproachable and unwelcoming ‘no man’s land’. The development of industrial and 200

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transport infrastructure, as well as the process of the extraction of natural resources itself, lead to deforestation and contamination of water, air and soil. As a result of mining industry expansion, the biological diversity of the natural environment is lowered, which leads to destruction of the herding and hunting grounds, fisheries and plants used in traditional natural folk medicine (Hendriksen, 2006). For the indigenous peoples, the High North is a natural environment and the territory of ancestors. Their way of life is perfectly compatible with its harsh climate, which is perceived by them as an inseparable aspect of reality. What is even more important, the native peoples dwell on their territory before the period of the extraction of the resources, during the extraction and after its termination. During the resource extraction, which usually brings the local prosperity, the indigenous people hardly ever benefit from the investments. In most cases, the income gained from the resource extraction is not invested in causes connected with autochthonous communities. The inflow of population from the outside often leads to acculturation of the native people, which is tantamount to disintegration of traditional social structures. It is not uncommon that the members of indigenous communities are being marginalized, excluded and perceived as lower category of people. The natives are being stigmatized as ‘wild’, ‘uncivilized’, ‘barbaric’ and ‘backward’. Indigenous dwellers of the territories of natural resource extraction usually do not benefit from the investments, but they are the ones who suffer from the consequences of the natural environment contamination, destruction of the traditional ways of natural resource use and disintegration of the tribal model of social life (Hendriksen, 2006). Because of that, the interests and needs of the native people should be priorities during the investments of mining industry. The right to reindeer herding is reserved only for Sámi in both Norway and Sweden. About 10 percent of Swedish Sámi are engaged in reindeer husbandry. The size of the herding area represents over 50 percent of Sweden’s territory. Unfortunately for the indigenous people, most of the Swedish natural resource deposits are located in these areas, thus causing obvious conflicts. The Norwegian Sámi population uses approximately 40 percent of the area on this country’s mainland for reindeer herding purposes (Koivurova et al., 2015). As professor Timo Koivurova states: ‘Most reindeer herder households have members with other work in the public or private sector. Reindeer herding is dependent on state subsidies and has low financial value creation, however, reindeer herding is considered 201

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the most important Sámi cultural identity marker, even though most Sámi people have other livelihoods’ (Koivurova et al., 2015). The indigenous peoples should be allowed to make decisions over the resources located on the territories of the ancestors. The fundamental indigenous rights shall include the right to prevent the harmful and destructive mining investments. Every new project of the extractive industry in the High North should be preceded by fair consultations with the members of the native inhabitants of this territory. The consultations should be accompanied by independent research in order to analyze the social and ecological costs of the investment.

Indigenous Peoples and Extraction Industry – Rebellion and Cooperation The Barents Region, which for centuries has been a homeland for many indigenous tribes, is very rich in valuable natural resources, both in the sea and on the land. The immense value of many of those natural riches became widely known to the public only in the second half of the 20th century, which was fostered by the unprecedented development of world industry and rapid growth of the demand for energy. The process of gradual depletion of easily accessible reserves of organic energy sources became an important stimulus for the development of new mining technologies and the search for new deposits of oil and natural gas in not easily accessible areas of the Far North. What is more, a significant increase in prices of energy resources (mainly crude oil) in the years 2004–2014 has made cost-intensive extractive industry investments in sparsely populated and poorly industrialized regions with unfavorable climate much more profitable than before. The Arctic Russia-Scandinavian borderland, which was relatively poor for many hundred years in comparison with neighboring territories and was perceived as a remote frozen wasteland far away from the main centers of civilization, suddenly became an object of interest for mining entrepreneurs. Large-scale oil investments evoked hope for the improvement of the financial situation, but also anxiety and fear of destruction of ecosystems and traditional lifestyle. The expectations concerning the impact of investments were very different among indigenous peoples and non-native population. Egil Olli in his address pronounced during the seminar Extractive industries and indigenous peoples organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway and the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples in the Barents 202

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Euro-Arctic Council, in cooperation with the Centre for Sámi Studies that took place on the University of Tromsø in 2012: Yes, it is no doubt true that there is a treasure trove under the earth in Sámiland. There are assets which, with wise management, can provide prosperity and development for many generations to come. But I believe this treasure will be difficult to get hold of if we do not take the interests of the people, animals, fish and plants that live on the land, in the water and the sea into necessary consideration. The rights of the indigenous people and others must be respected, important interests must be safeguarded, and the value created must also benefit the local and regional levels (“Extractive industries”, 2012). When handled properly, resources extraction could potentially be an opportunity for the local tribal communities. Unfortunately, the reality seems very pessimistic for the members of indigenous tribes. The rights of native peoples are protected by the law, but authorities and companies have many possibilities of avoiding the legal procedures in order to maximize the income. The indigenous communities react differently to the challenges connected with new investments on their traditional pastures and hunting grounds. There were some cases when they remained passive, being not strong and well-organized enough to fight for their rights effectively. However, tribal people of the Barents Region are sometimes able to resist the industrial expansion and they proved that they are able to associate, organize the actions of protest and achieve their social and economic goals. When StatoilHydro’s LNG plant was built in Hammerfest (Finnmark, Norway), many representatives of the local population hoped that this investment would have positive effects for local community. The local Sámi reindeer herders were anxious of the forthcoming changes and their effect on the future livelihood, but they found themselves under a strong pressure of the expectations of the Norwegian majority. As Aslak Ante M. J. Sara, the head of Fala reindeer district said, ‘It became difficult for us to show the impacts that this development would have on our reindeer herding, and when compared with the large oil and gas installations, our small industry would seem like a drop in the ocean’ (Oskal, Turi, Mathiesen & Burgess, 2009, p. 29). Sámi reindeer herders were skipped during the process of negotiations, because the LNG-plant itself was not placed directly on reindeer pastures. However, the construction of the plant resulted in many side projects – petroleum development, power lines, infrastructure development, housing and roads – which affected the life of Sámi tribes 203

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much more directly. As a result, the pastures in the area of Hammerfest were reduced. According to Maret Sara from Karasjok, the mining companies are the major threat for reindeer herders. Once the deposits are found, their extraction is inevitable, and native tribes must make a room for it, even if it interferes with pastures or migration routes. Some herders are afraid that they are no longer able to sustain their traditional lifestyle, since reindeer husbandry is impossible without the large pastures (Oskal, Turi, Mathiesen, & Burgess, 2009, p. 29). Among the Nenets reindeer herders in the Russian Federation the situation is also very difficult. According to some estimations, more than 70 percent of Russian inland natural gas deposits are located on the territories inhabited by Nenets tribes. This region is crucial for the state energy projects. The extraction of gas requires building an extensive network of roads, pipelines and railroads, which are built on reindeer pastures, which are the herders’ key resource. The extraction of gas contaminates water of lakes, which damages the traditional Nenets fisheries. Construction companies often leave materials that can be hazardous for reindeers in tundra. What is more, the indigenous people of the Russian coast of the Barents and Kara Seas suffer greatly from the increased climate variability. Some Nenets people realize that the gas reserves which lie under traditional pastures are limited and hope that the peace and harmony of their traditional lifestyle will return after the depletion of the deposits (Oskal, Turi, Mathiesen, & Burgess, 2009, pp. 47–52). The most important protest of Sámi was so-called ‘Alta controversy’, when Norwegian government decided to build a dam and hydroelectric power plant on the Alta river in Finnmark that would create an artificial lake and flood the Sámi village of Máze. The situation resulted in a massive protest of indigenous people, which aroused interest of public opinion around the world and fostered the rise of Sámi identity. The activists performed many acts of civil disobedience, including blockade of the construction site and a hunger strike in Oslo. The government suppressed the rebellion using riot police and the power plant been built in 1982. However, the scale of the protest was tremendous and the Sámi indigenous movement became much stronger after the incident. The native question was raised onto the national political agenda, the history of repression against Sámi became discussed again and the national identity revival took place (Lundholm, Groth, & Petersson, 1996, p. 113). 204

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The movement against the construction of a dam on the Alta river was not directly connected with extraction of mineral resources, but became a model and a symbol of rebellion of native people against the industrial expansion. There is an obvious connection between the Alta rebellion and the emergence of Sámi national rebirth, which led to introduction of Finnmark Act by Norwegian Parliament in 2005. According to this document, the entire population of the Finnmark county has been granted special rights to the natural resources of the region. The native rights were specially emphasized in this document. The purpose of the introduction of this act was ‘to facilitate the management of land and natural resources in the county of Finnmark in a balanced and ecologically sustainable manner for the benefit of the residents of the county and particularly as a basis for Sámi culture, reindeer husbandry, use of non-cultivated areas, commercial activity and social life’. The protest of Sámi in the Swedish city of Jokkmokk against the iron ore mining investment was an example of a well-organized protest action. The protests started in early 2012 and reached their peak in July 2013, when the Sámi activists and their supporters blocked a mining road in order to prevent the workers from British Beowulf Mining company from drilling on the traditional land of indigenous peoples, used by them for reindeer herding (“Sámi protest”, 2013). In August, after a month of protest, dozens of demonstrators remained in the place of protest. Some protesters tied themselves to pipes, other delayed test blasting by sitting in trees at the site (Törnkvist, 2013). A young Sámi reindeer herder Niila Inga from the community of Laevas described the struggle of their people against the main state-owned mining company in Sweden (LKAB) and the hardship for her community created by extensive mining on the pastures: ‘We have gradually, bit by bit, had to move out of the way as mines expand, and our migration routes and pastures have become tailing ponds or waste rock dumps. Today, the reindeer have still not accepted that their pasture lands have been turned into industrial areas, so most of the year the reindeer end up there, and we spend a lot of energy and time trying to get them out of these dangerous areas, in co-operation with LKAB. In the current situation, our communication is good with LKAB: it has only taken a little over 100 years to work that out’ (“Extractive industries”, 2012). According to her relation, some people perceive indigenous peoples as a kind of reactionaries who try to hold back the inevitable industrial progress. 205

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According to her relation, the situation gradually improves. The example of such an improvement is the city of Kiruna conversion. Large parts of the city of Kiruna had to be moved for mining to continue, and in the project which involved not only houses to be moved, but also railroads and roads. The Sámi communities concerned participated in the decision-making process and their arguments have actually been listened to. The Sámi cause has become institutionalized. Saami Council, an umbrella organization of different Sámi associations founded in 1956, remains a particularly important international indigenous forum. In every Barents State Saami parliaments exist (although their impact on reality varies; Kola Sámi Assembly is still not recognized by Russian authorities). The native peoples of the Barents Region take an active part in the world movement of indigenous peoples. Their representatives are active within the World Council of Indigenous Peoples founded in Vancouver, Canada, in 1975, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Barents EuroArctic Council and the Arctic Council (Stępień, 2013). Most of the companies which extract the natural resources on the territory of the Barents Region (Shell, Statoil, British Gas and Sibineft) have created the documents explaining their policy towards the indigenous peoples. This kind of declarations usually are, however, a part of public relations strategy aimed at creating an image of ‘socially and environmentally responsible’ companies, which do not strive towards maximizing the income at any cost. Practically, the undertaken actions (consultations with the members of local communities, paying compensations, support for the local culture) are often simulated operations, aimed at improving the reputation of the company rather than compensating the harmful effects of mining. *** The indigenous peoples are the main victims of the harmful effects of the natural resource extraction, who hardly ever benefit from the positive sides of those investments. Due to their unique lifestyle and system of values based on a deep connection with nature, they are particularly vulnerable to the contamination of the environment and climate change. Even though the indigenous peoples of the Barents Region are particularly active and self-aware, they are much weaker that the energy companies they have to confront with. The international legislation protects their rights, but, unfortunately, this protection is often only formal and exists only in theory. 206

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The extraction of natural resources on a land inhabited by indigenous tribes should be based on a set of fundamental and unbreakable rules. The consent of indigenous peoples shall be the prerequisite of any resource extraction project. If an investor and native people manage to reach an agreement, the indigenous people shall receive a fair compensation for any discomfort connected with the investment and participate in the income and other benefits from the extraction process. The project, negotiated and accepted by all sides concerned, shall be transparent and clear, which is only possible when the representatives of the indigenous peoples inhabiting the territory participate in the controlling organs of the whole enterprise. If the aforementioned prerequisites are not matched, the actions of the mining company should be evaluated as illegal and immoral.

References Barents Region, n. d. Retrieved from http://www.barentsinfo.org/Barents-region. Barsh, R. L., (1984). Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 80, No. 2. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Adopted by General Assembly. (2007). Resolution 61/295. Extractive industries and indigenous peoples. (2012). Tromsø. Retrieved from https://uit.no/Content/327123/Extractive%20industries%20and%20indigenous%20peoples%20-%20Sep%2010%202012%20-%20Report.pdf. Hendriksen, J. B. (2006). Oil and gas operations in Indigenous peoples lands and territories in the Arctic: A Human rights perspective. Gáldu Čála – Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights, No. 4/2006. ILO. International Labour Organization (1989). Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention. No 169. (Entry into force: 05 Sep 1991). Ob obščih principah organizacji korennyh maločislennyh narodov Severa, Sibirii i Dal’nego Vostoka Rossijskoj Federacii. (2000) Zakon RF. Informacionnye materialy ob okončatel’nyh itogah Vserossijskoj perepisi naseleniâ 2010 goda. (2010). Retrieved from http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/ perepis2010/perepis_itogi1612.htm. Janhunen, J. (1993). UNESCO Red Book on Endangered Languages: Northern Asia. Retrieved from http://www.helsinki.fi/~tasalmin/nasia_report.html.

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Koivurova, T. et al. (2015). Legal Protection of Sami Traditional Livelihoods from the Adverse Impacts of Mining: A Comparison of the Level of Protection Enjoyed by Sami in Their Four Home States. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2015, pp. 11–51. Legal Relations and Management of Land and Natural Resources in the County of Finnmark. (2005). Finnmark Act No. 85. Lehtola, V. P. (2004). The Sámi People – Traditions in Transition. Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press. Lundholm, K. O., Groth, Ö. J., & Petersson, R. Y. (1996). North Scandinavian History. Luleå: n/a. Martinez Cobo, J. R. (1986). Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7, and Adds. 1–4. Retrieved from http://undesadspd.org/IndigenousPeoples/LibraryDocuments/Mart%C3%ADnezCoboStudy.aspx. Oskal, A., Turi, J. M., Mathiesen, S. D., & Burgess, P. (2009). Ealat. Reindeer Herders’ Voice: Reindeer Herding, Traditional Knowledge and Adaptation to Climate Change and Loss of Grazing Land. Alta: Arctic Council. O teritorii tradicionnogo prirodopol’zovaniâ korennyh maločislennyh narodov Cevera, Sibiri i Dal’nego Vostoka Rossijskoj Federacii ot 7 maâ 2001. (2001). Zakon RF. Sámi protest against British mining company, (2013). Retrieved from http:// www.survivalinternational.org/news/9529. Sarivaara, E., Maatta, K., & Uusiautti, S. (2013). Who is indigenous? Definitions of indigeneity. European Scientific Journal, vol. 1. Sieradzan, P. (2015). The „Pomor Question” in the Context of Russo-Norwegian relations. Miscellanea Oeconomicae, 2/2015, pp. 239–250. Šilkin, S. V. (1993). 11 ânvarâ – načalo Barenceva Arktičeskogo Sotrudničestva. Retreived from http://www.norge.ru/barents_11jan1993/. Stepień, A. (2013). Rola ludów rdzennych w budowaniu Arktyki jako regionu politycznego. In Łuszczuk M. (ed.). Arktyka na początku XXI wieku: między współpracą a rywalizacją (pp. 373–398). Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), n. d. Retrieved from http://www.beac. st/en/Barents-Euro-Arctic-Council. Törnkvist, A. (2013). Swedes’ anger mounts over Beowulf mine plants. The Local. Retrieved from http://www.thelocal.se/20130813/49616. Varsi, M. O. (2006). Preface. Gáldu Čála – Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights, No. 4/2006.

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Vepskaâ nacional’naâ volost’. (1999). Retrieved from http://www.gov.karelia.ru/ Regions/Veps/vepnac.html#1. Working group of indigenous peoples. (2013). Retrieved from http://www.beac. st/en/Working-Groups/Working-Group-of-Indigenous-Peoples.

National Energy Politics. A Case Study of the Slovak Republic and the Gas Crisis 2009 A nd r e a F i g ulo vá

Energy security is one dimension of state security and in the last few decades it gained a special interest in the EU and worldwide. Itself, the notion of energy security could be understood and defined in many ways, taking into account different components and variables. One of the most used and known definitions of energy security is the one provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2013): ‘Energy security refers to the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price. However, a more famous and more universal definition comes from a specialist in this field, Daniel Yergin, who defines it as ‘availability of sufficient supply at affordable prices (Yergin, 2006, p. 71). Yergin (2006) also explains that there is a different approach to energy security in energy-exporting countries, for which mainly the security of demand is the issue, as their economies are usually heavily dependent on incomes coming from the production and distribution of energy sources. And on the other hand, there are energy-importing countries, such as the EU, for which the security of supplies and reliability of the trading partners are the most important aspects. The above mentioned description is applicable to this case study, in which different countries involved in the gas conflict acted according to Yergin´s definition. I explain that the 2009 gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia, which affected not only the member states of the EU by cutting off the gas supply, 211

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is responsible for strengthening of energy security of the EU and consequent cooperation of the member states in this field. As an outcome of the crisis, there were provisions and actions taken not only to avoid another possible crisis, but it also pushed the EU to act and think as one entity (in contrast with the current 2015 refugee crisis). And the Slovak Republic with its political process is being used as an example.

Slovakia and Energy The Slovak Republic as one of the EU member states is very energy dependent and thus also relevantly vulnerable. According to Eurostat, energy dependency of the Slovak Republic in 2013 was 59.6 percent. (Eurostat, 2015). ‘When taking into account primary sources in the country, the Slovak Republic’s import is almost 90-percent dependent, in which the following are imported: 100 percent of nuclear fuel, 98 percent of natural gas, 99 percent of oil and 68 percent of coal (Ministerstvo Hospodárstva SR, 2014, p. 22). Vulnerability of the country is not only in the dependency, but also in the structure of economy, which is one of the most energy-demanding among the EU countries. Slovak energy mix (portfolio of energy consumption versus imported primary sources of energy) consists of 35 percent of natural gas, 25 percent of nuclear power and 18 percent of oil (Ministerstvo Hospodárstva SR, 2008). And 74 percent of Slovak energy mix is generated from only one country – the Russian Federation. These two factors and, of course, some others – geopolitics and politics – played the most important role in the first real energy crisis in the country in 2009.

Gas and Crisis Natural gas became a part of energy mix just recently in the 1950s, as it was taken as a by-product of the oil extracting. Today, however, it is one the fastest growing primary energy source – affordable and relatively clean fossil fuel in the group of non-renewable sources. It is still mostly transferred via pipelines, but the market is growing in the field of liquefied gas as well as shale gas. The price of natural gas is still very dependent on oil prices and because of return on investment the majority of the contracts are signed for 10 – 15 years. Also, in the case of natural gas contract, there is a typical ‘take or pay provision, which means paying contractually specified minimum quantity of output, regardless of the actual consumption. 212

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The relationship of the EU and gas has one special feature – most of the last newcomers (latest enlargements) are dependent on the energy supply from Russia via different pipelines: Brotherhood, Yamal (–Europe) or Nord Stream and others (see picture no. 1). The root of the problem dates back more than a decade, to the time when the EU first tried and failed to create a unified energy policy. In principle, the member states have long agreed on the benefits of aligning their energy interests. In practice, they have opted to ‘go it alone rather than reorient state policy to support shared energy priorities. The net effect has been near-total dependence on Russian gas (in some countries, as high as 100 percent); non-transparent agreements with Kremlin-backed companies; limited import alternatives; and a lack of collective bargaining in price negotiations (Mitchell & Doran, 2009). As such, then, energy security and vulnerability of the EU as a whole is at stake. Not only to all former Soviet allies was gas supply flowing since 1972 uninterrupted, i.e. 37 years, until January 2009. Picture 1. Gas supplied by Russia. Source: The Economist (2014). Retrieved from the Economist. http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/04/daily-chart-1

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January 7, 2009 is the date, the first time in the history (of the Slovak Republic) when gas supply from the east was cut off. It lasted for thirteen days – until January 20, 2009. Overall, the gas shutdown touched 17 countries, of which 12 were the EU member states. Why exactly did it happen? Who was to blame? Who won and who lost? Ukraine gas system was built as a part of internal gas supply of former USSR to export it to neighboring countries and then further west as major transit but also its own supplier. Underground storages in western Ukraine serve to balance the volumes of consumed gas and seasonal fluctuations in the transit system (among the largest in the world). This whole system works in a single mode along with its Russian part and its center of transit operations control is in Moscow’s Gazprom (Rusnák, 2010). According to Duleba (2009), the main problem of dispute lays in the contractual policy set up long time ago. And also in the price of the gas and the conditions of the payment. In 2003 in the post-soviet context, Russian policy was trying to change the condition of supply to former Soviet republics to the market one. Or, as proposed to Ukraine (and also Belarus), keep the old price and let Gazprom enter into the ownership of transit company. The contract change proposed in 2004 was signed by Leonid Kučma, the prime minister of Ukraine, when the proposal also contained the condition of creating joint gas venture between Gazprom and Naftogaz. However, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 changed these plans, as the new political representatives refused to follow the new contract and also approved new law on banning privatization of the transit gas pipeline. Gazprom reaction in 2006 served as a model for 2009 – a shutdown of the gas supplies for 4 days for Ukraine, which did not, however, influence other countries and it was considered a commercial dispute. The result was again a new contract signed in 2006 between Naftogaz, Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo (RUE), a Swiss company owned by Gazprom (50 percent) and two Ukrainian businessmen (50 percent). According to Duleba (2009), this agreement was quite disadvantageous for Ukraine (the price of gas was 4.5 times higher and was fixed only for a year; the price for transit of the gas stayed almost the same ($1.093 to $1.6) and was fixed for five years; RUE gained monopoly on the gas supply for Ukraine from Russia and Central Asia and also possible re-exportation of it. This contract thus provided a problematic element to the Ukrainian and Russian gas relationship as the price of the gas had to be negotiated every year (see for more details in Duleba, 2009; Pirani, Stern, & Yafimava, 2009; or Rusnák, 2010). 214

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Hirman (2009) argues that „Russia and Gazprom are just trying to gain control over the transit through Ukraine. In other words, gas dispute was more of obtaining Russian geopolitical power back. Hirman’s argument was confirmed by the gas crisis 2009. Orban (2010) claims and gives examples how Russian energy factor is a tool of the country’s diplomacy in the late decade. Famous author, Lucas (2008), is explaining four ways and methods how current Russia is enforcing energy policy as the main center of the Russian diplomacy and thus continuously improving itself as a geopolitical power. Also Vondra (2009) claimed back then that ‘some will see the gas dispute as an attempt by Russia to sow seeds of discord between the EU and Ukraine just as the Eastern Partnership is starting to take shape; some will add that Ukraine has fueled our suspicions by the lack of transparency in its transit arrangements. Even a few years later, there is no general consensus as to whose responsibility it was and who gained something, who should be blamed, who should pay the costs… It can only be generally claimed that irresponsibility of Russia as a supplier and Ukraine as a transit country and their lost reliability as business partners were true and have its consequences. In the next part, it will be briefly explained how it all happened and then further the consequences will be presented.

Chronology New contract negotiations between Gazprom and Naftogaz for 2009 started in autumn 2008. However, at the end of the year there was no success of consensus (see more details in SPP, 2009; Pirani et al., 2009; Duleba, 2009). As the first day of 2009 came, with no new contract in power, Russia suspended the gas supplies to Ukraine due to Ukraine’s deficient payments. On January 2, 2009 the then Ukrainian president, Juščenko, informed by letter addressed to the eight governments of concerned countries and the EU that the new gas deal talks were not successful, but assured the addressees of a forthcoming solution. And the Ukrainian minister of energy went to talk with his colleagues in Prague, Brussels and then Bratislava. By then, the signal coming from Europe was more of disinterest and commercial dispute of these two countries (Rusnák, 2010). On January 5, 2009 Gazprom ‘claimed that since the beginning of 2009 Ukraine had stolen gas and called upon Ukraine to make this up by supply215

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ing from its own resources. Ukraine claimed that technical gas was needed to operate network (Pirani et al., 2009, p. 20). Since then, the communication of both actors was ineffective, the responsibility was searched for, both sides to be blamed, press conferences were held and proclaimed ‘their own truth. On January 7, 2009 gas supplies were cut off completely with the explanation that Ukraine drained gas from the pipelines to the storages and thus started to use supply for its own needs. New phase of the dispute started as it became an international problem. The Czech Republic, EU presidency country at that time, became a mediator of the conflict. For the next few days, new talks have been called upon in Prague, Berlin and Brussels and both capitals concerned. And the Czech presidency sent out a delegation to both countries and even the countries concerned started their own diplomacy. A commercial problem became a political one. The most important thing was to actually find out the facts and the state of gas transit system – observers’ monitoring mission. The so-called shuttle diplomacy of Mirek Topolanek, the then head of the Czech presidency in the EU, on January 10, 2009 brought from Kiev to Moscow a draft compromise text protocol about the monitoring mission. However, the president of Russia, Dmitrij Medvedev, refused to sign the protocol, because the procedures in Ukraine and in the EU were not followed as agreed – the Ukrainian side added, without the knowledge of Russia, a statement about no illegal gas consumption on the Ukrainian side of the pipeline, while the opposite was claimed by the Russian side (Rusnák, 2010). However, ‘monitors were deployed on January 11 and 12. Any hopes that the monitors would allow gas flows to resume rapidly dissipated and the period of January 13–17 was spent in mutual recrimination (Pirani et al., 2009, p. 23). At the same time, most of the countries concerned started to experience harms on the economies, and some started to fear consequences also on households and people. On January 17 and 18, 2009 a summit on resumption of gas supplies took place in Moscow. On January 19, the then prime ministers of Russia and Ukraine, Vladimir Putin and Julia Tymoshenko respectively, signed an agreement on immediate and full restoration of gas supplies to Europe. Ukraine paid debts from the 2008 gas supply. Also a new supply and transit contract for period of 2009 – 2019 was signed. The agreement does not address the issue of Gazprom’s share in the Ukrainian gas market, and RUE was removed. New price for gas is calculated via formula for the European 216

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price and for transit the price should rise the following year (2010) 2 to 3 times. According to Rusnák (2010), ‘these contracts clarified relationship of Ukraine and Russia in the gas industry, that for a long time traumatized Ukrainian internal policy (p. 107). On January 20, 2009 Russia renewed gas supplies to Europe.

Slovakian Steps in the Crisis Gas supply to Slovakia is based on the 21-year Framework Agreement signed in 2008 with Slovak Gas Industry, SPP group. Russian gas transit via the Uzhhorod corridor passes through the territory of the Slovak Republic. There is a current contract with Eustream a.s., the operator of Slovakia’s gas transmission network, for gas transportation to Baumgarten (Austrian border) through 2028 (“Gazpromexport, ” n.d., para 3). For transit in the country, the entry point – Velke Kapusany at UkrainianSlovak border – is very important; that is measuring stations where SPP group importer receives gas from exporter, Gazprom. In other words, no other company in the Slovak Republic has any contractual obligations towards Naftogaz, Gazprom subcontractor. On January 7, as mentioned above, in the Velke Kapusany stations there was ‘0 at the point of delivery, the Government of the Slovak Republic declared a state of emergency (until January 18, 2009). SPP group also asked to introduce ‘consumption level no. 8, which means only a necessary level for industrial companies with consumption in excess of 60,000 m3 a year to reduce their gas consumption to the level of the safety minimum (Presskit, 2009, p. 5). Overall, more than 770 companies had to adjust limitations to the production avoiding damages to their technology. As there is 15 percent of electricity supplies produced by power plants fueled with natural gas, the electricity transmission system was destabilized and companies providing these services were also affected. The problem was that even if there was enough gas in the storages based in the west of the Slovak Republic, there was no way to supply the eastern part. ‘Slovak government develops all possible diplomatic initiative also within the EU, because it is a matter of energy security… (“Fico hľadal plyn” 2009) as the question concerning the next steps of government in this time of crisis would be. Not only Robert Fico, the prime minister at that time, but also the then Slovak president, Ivan Gasparovic, travelled with the Slovak minister of economy on January 16 to Kiev to try to solve the problem. 217

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Robert Fico’s official visit to Kiev and Moscow was on January 14. According to the diplomatic information, the Slovak delegation in Kiev had to wait much longer than the confirmed time and in the end the meeting was very short and accompanied by media. Mainly Russian media then selected information from the prime minister’s conversation – Fico’s critical statement addressing Kiev (Rusnák, 2010). Elsewhere, also the Slovak prime minister blamed Ukraine for the responsibility for the gas shortage (see more in Duleba, 2009). While in Moscow, the visit proceeded much more with all the diplomatic tributes. Prime Minister Fico warned that Ukraine was “losing the trust of European partners because of its behavior” (“Putin accuses Ukraine”, 2009). At that time the Slovak Republic was almost 11 days without gas import. Slovak delegation requested Ukraine to agree upon the ‘swap operation between Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine (to deliver 20 mm cm of gas) to solve the acute problem in Slovakia.1 However, Ukraine disagreed with the proposal and confirmed its own inability to provide such an operation. While the shuffle diplomacy of the EU and the country itself was coming up with no real solutions, on commercial side SPP group started to work on alternative supplies not only to delivery to the people and companies, but also to stabilize the whole system. Additional gas deliveries were agreed on with other shareholders of the company (E.ON Ruhrgas and GDF Suez and RWE), also from natural gas storages located in the Slovak Republic. And on January 17, SPP group ‘managed to find a technical solution that made it possible to switch to reverse flow of the transit system (Presskit, 2009, p. 6). And on January 18, 2009, for the first time in the transit history, gas started to flow from west to east, from Lanzhot station in the Czech Republic. Thanks to this and despite the lack of restoration of gas supplies from Russia, it was possible on January 19, 2009 to lift the gas consumption restriction for industrial consumers and adjust the consumption level to level no. 3 (Presskit, 2009). As the agreement between Russia and Ukraine was reached on the same day, on the next day Eustream company and SPP group restored the transmission of gas from east to west 1

According to this operation – Russia would deliver gas to eastern part of Ukraine and Ukraine would allow the same amount to go from its wester storage to Slovakia. But Ukrainian system was at that point working in reverse . Naftogaz could not accept gas only through one pipeline corridor without returning the flow to east –west direction, making it impossible to supply large population centers in eastern Ukraine in particular (Pirani et al., 2009, p. 24).

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within seven hours, which was important not only for Slovakia, but also for other customers in Western Europe. According to Robert Fico, Slovakia during that period was losing €100 million daily (“Fico hľadal plyn”, 2009).

Lesson Learned so far Almost 20 crisis days of the stoppage of the gas flow from the east to the west meant that not only politicians, energy companies, but customers – citizens – started to talk more about energy security and the real meaning of it. The then minister of economy, Lubomir Jahnatek, commented that the price of gas will not be the only criteria for evaluation of future gas supply in the Slovak Republic. In other words, gas crisis showed that Russian gas could be under certain conditions too expensive, if the Slovak Republic had to pay at the beginning of each year €1 billion, this price was simply unacceptable (Duleba, 2009).

The Next Steps in the EU The political position of the EU remains stable through 2009, and also under the Czech and the next Swedish Presidency the same. Gas supplies for European consumers are driven by long term contracts within the two parties. Transit issues are purely bilateral issues of the countries concerned. The European Union has adopted – also in response to this dispute – a policy of increased attention to the fulfillment of the tasks, by which the member states could be better prepared for a next possible crisis, some in the form of legislation changes as such: In July 2009, the European Commission presented a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 16, 2009, concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Directive 2004/67/EC. ‘The January crisis demonstrated the need to define more clearly the roles of the gas industry, Member States and the Community institutions to deal with a supply disruption in the short term and to provide for the necessary infrastructure in the longer term. A lesson from the crisis is that for measures to be consistent and effective, they have to be prepared well in advance and to be coordinated at Community level (“Proposal”, 2009). These rules were effective immediately without transposition period in November 2010 after approval in the Council and Parliament. Each of the member states had to 219

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establish The Competent Authority responsible for establishing: a Preventive (and Emergency) Action Plan laying down standards relating to supply that evaluates the risks, draws up preventive measures and provides information on public service obligations. But ‘the main objective of the proposal is to increase the security of gas supply by creating the incentives to invest in necessary interconnections to meet the N-1 indicator2, as well as the reverse flows ( „Proposal”, 2009). Coordination group for gas was created and all the new institutions are coordinated within the group established by the EU. The Proposal also stresses the importance of solidarity and information exchange between the Member States in the management of a supply crisis, as confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty, Article No. 100. In November 2010 the European Commission approved a strategy ‘Europe 2020, which focuses on five priorities. Besides internal market questions, it also addresses energy security. It sets out four measurements that should strengthen the external dimension of the EU energy market and it asks that member states at bilateral meetings act for the benefit of the entire EU, not just in their own interest, as it is now (Mišík, 2012). Besides legislative changes, in March 2010 the European Commission and Gas Transmission Europe (GTE) issued a study with 43 infrastructural projects the implementation of which could mean better interconnection of European gas projects, also during a threat of disruption. These projects should be funded from approved European Economic Recovery plan (2008) and its European Energy Programme for Recovery (EERP) adopted in July 2009. Also in November 2010 the European Commissions approved Energy Infrastructure Package to increase energy security of the member states which are also part of Energy Community Treaty. EIP defined a new method of identification and prioritization of infrastructure projects in the field of gas that should be finished by 2020 (Duleba, 2012). One of the biggest European energy priority is North – South gas corridor for greater energy security in the region. A study released in January 2012, ordered by the European Commission provided by Kantor Management Consultant Company in cooperation with Booz&Co., assessed the importance of 22 projects of gas interconnection planned in this corridor. 2

Indicator N-1 – member states are also obliged to cover gas demand for seven days of extreme cold and for 30 days of high consumption according to the states data taking into account statistically the coldest period of the last 20 years.

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Two out of these 22 projects based in Slovakia were on the first two positions in terms of importance (Duleba, 2012). Picture 2. North – South connection

Source: own elaboration.

The first (already existing) one was construction of a new gas pipeline interconnection with Hungary. 110 km long pipeline connects, since July 2015, Veľký Krtíš on the Slovak side (18.6 km) with Vecses in Hungary (92.1 km). It cost €170 million and the contribution of the EU was €30 million. The second one is the construction of a new, 164 km long route connecting Poland and Slovakia – 106 km on the Slovak side and 58 km on the Polish side. Part of this is a proposal of the construction of an LNG terminal in Świnoujście in Poland (operating since 2015). And from Slovakia further to Baumgarten (Austria).3 Such a connection would be very promising to link 3

Baumgarten is a hub that was meant to connect two planned pipelines at that time – Nabucco and South Stream. Nabucco plan was canncelled in 2014. South Stream shortly after.

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the aforementioned LNG terminal in Poland and the Adria LNG terminal in Croatia, which would mean possible diversification of the suppliers (trading on economy markets). And all the connection described above could and should work in the reverse direction, as the EU proposed. In October 2010 a reverse flow was introduced in Baumgarten hub. 50 percent of the investment worth €4 million was financed by the European Union and the second part by an Austrian company, OMV group. (At that time, hopes for South Stream and Nabucco pipelines were still at a high level.) And in 2011, also the Czech and Slovak reverse flow was opened, similarly to the Polish-Czech one, all with the EU financial help. The lesson learned from the gas dispute of 2009 is that because of the EU proposed provisions, V4 countries strengthened their energy security by focusing on diversification of the ways for the gas as well as suppliers.

TheNnext Steps in the Slovak Republic Economic and foreign policy as well as security interest of Slovakia since January 2009 was mainly in keeping supplies from Russia via Ukraine stable and reliable and thus trying to keep transit status quo. And further, deeper regional cooperation with other neighboring countriesy and V4 format, so that new gas connection may bring new diversification of routes as well as suppliers. The steps taken in Slovakia were, firstly, mainly legislative, also coming out from the EU legislation. In March 2009, an amendment of the Energy Act was approved. It explained a broader definition of standard security of supply of natural gas. It regulated the situation of full stoppage of the gas flow and defined standard security obligation to ensure supplies for the gas market participants4 (Ministerstvo Hospodárstva SR, 2009). Another amendment of Act on Regulation of Network industries introduced regulated access to gas storage, and directly stated prices for storage of gas in comparison with the prices of storage with other member states. At the time of crisis, there is a change of mode of access towards gas storage in Slovakia, irrespective of the ownership of the gas stored in, the government has the right to use it 4

In other words, there are changes to follow for securing gas supplies for consumers as such, e.g.: In case of interruption or restriction of gas supply for at least 10 weeks in the 30 percent of the total sum of the daily volume of gas supplies; or consumption of gas in five days in a row when the average temperatures are below - 12o C.

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for supplying consumers in the public interest. Even at the industrial part some changes were made. Following new legislation (on both levels – the EU and Slovak), SPP group diversify gas supplies by signing new contracts with different suppliers (also mentioned above), as new alternative diversification sources valid until 2019. In other words, ‘SPP group is topped off with 880 mm cm of gas in a one-year contract agreed with Gazprom. What is also important, new contracts are independent of the transit via Ukrainian land (Duleba, 2009b, p. 37). Gajary Baden gas storage after completing in 2014 gained greater capacity for natural gas. This project was financially supported by the European Commission of non-repayable grant of €3 million.

Winners and Losers January gas crisis 2009 assured almost everyone involved – politicians, energy companies and citizens as well – that there is a need for construction of alternative gas routes, whether from north or south or on bottom of the sea. The crisis became a catalyst of provisions that led to lesser dependency of the EU on Russian gas and its lesser vulnerability. However, this dependency will still be present because as the EU is dependent on Russian gas, Russia is economically dependent on its export to Europe. However, some countries, like the Slovak Republic, will by these provisions be bypassing traditional transit route, and thus the Slovak Republic will lose its transit advantage. The implications of the crisis were political, but also technical. Those more of technical results are described above (infrastructural projects of new connections, new legislative and regulatory mechanism). However, crisis outcome also demonstrates the EU political responsibility – the EU responsibility towards less secure and more energy vulnerable member states, responsibility towards eastern border (and Eastern Neighborhood). In other words, words of Vondra (2009) that could be applied even after seven years: “It is in our strategic interest that our closest partners apply the same standards as we do, standards crucial to ensuring that the market economy functions and that democracy is respected. Since then, there is proposal on building up European architecture of energy security via Energy Union with new rules built on already existing standards like liberalization of the energy market. Slovakian political lesson learned could be seen also in appointment of the vice-president of the EU, Maroš Šefčovič, responsible for the ‘energy Union project. 223

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Answering the question the crisis brought – about the winners and losers of that situation – depends on the perspective that one chooses. Russia in the end (and according to some experts) strengthens its role in the mess of Ukrainian politics anyway. However, Gazprom lost on revenues and thus on possible investment in the gas sector. Ukraine since then has been unable to reach consensus on which direction to choose (towards the EU or closer to the east) and, thus, the uncertainty is still present. And Slovakia as a member of the EU fulfilled most of the provisions, so that when there is a question every December whether the Slovak citizens should be afraid of gas shortage, the answer is no. The gas crisis made EU start to act as a whole towards its member states. Even though with energy, and energy contracts, it will always be a ‘country know-how and responsibility, the gas dispute 2009 showed that even the EU can work ‘one for all, all for one as in the Musketeers. And successful realization of the North-South connection would be one exceptional example of such cooperation.

References Deutsch, J. M. (2011). The crisis in energy policy. Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University Press. Duleba, A. (2012). Meniace sa postavenie Slovenska na plynárenskej mape Európy a bezpečnosť dodávok zemného plynu. Parlamentný kuriér, číslo CCXIII. pp. 36–37. Duleba, A. (2009). Poučenia z plynovej krízy v januári 2009: Analýza príčin vzniku, pravdepodobnosti opakovania a návrhy opatrení na zvýšenie energetickej bezpečnosti SR v oblasti dodávok zemného plynu. Bratislava: VC SFPA. Retrieved from http://www.sfpa.sk/dokumenty/publikacie/281. Eurostat, (2015). Energy dependence. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6614030/8-09022015-AP-EN.pdf/4f054a0a7e59439f-b184-1c1d05ea2f96. Fico hľadal plyn v Moskve. Zatiaľ ho nemožno čakať. n. d. Denník SME. Retrieved from http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/4262838/fico-hladal-plyn-v-moskve-zatialho-nemozno-.html. Gazpromexport. n. d. Slovakia. Retrieved from http://www.gazpromexport. ru/en/partners/slovakia/.

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Hirman, K. (2009a). Príčina krízy: plynová vojna o Ukrajinu. ETREND. Retrieved from http://blog.etrend.sk/. Hirman, K. (2009b). Rúra proti našim záujmom. ETREND. Retrieved from http://blog.etrend.sk. Hirman, K. (2010). Bruselenie Valašiek, naša zahraničná politika po novom: Energetická bezpečnosť – Achillova päta zahraničnej politiky SR? Bratislava: Kalligram, s.r.o. IEA (2013). Energy Security. Retrieved from http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity. Klepáč, J. (2010). Security of Natural Gas Supply in Central Europe. Case study of Slovakia, International Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, SFPA, Vol XIX, No. 1/2010. Bratislava: RC SFPA. Lucas, E. (2008). Nová studená válka. Praha: Mladá Fronta. Ministerstvo Hospodárstva SR (2008). Stratégia energetickej bezpečnosti SR do roku 2030. Retrieved from http://www.economy.gov.sk/index/ go.php?id=2228. Ministerstvo Hospodárstva SR (2009). Správa o výsledku monitorovania bezpečnosti dodávok plynu. Retrieved from http://www.economy.gov.sk/ spravy-o-vysledkoch-monitorovania-bezpecnosti-dodavok-elektriny-aplynu-5851/127536s. Ministerstvo Hospodárstva SR (2014). Návrh Energetickej Politiky Slovenskej Republiky. Retrieved from http://www.rokovania.sk/Rokovanie.aspx/Bod RokovaniaDetail?idMaterial=23993. Mišík, M. (2012). Kríza jako liek? Vlpyv plynovej krízy v roku 2009 na zvyšovanie energetickej bezpečnosti krajín V4. In I. Dudinská, & V. Dančišin, (Eds.), Kríza v politike – politika v kríze. Zborník z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie konanej v dňoch 15-16. február 2012. Mitchell, A. W., & Doran, P. B. (2009). The European Gas Crisis: Czech Presidency Sees Opportunity. Retrieved from http://www.cepa.org/content/ european-gas-crisis-czech-presidency-sees-opportunity-0. Orban, A. (2008). Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International. Pirani, S., Stern, J., & Katja Y. K. (2009). The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Retrieved from http://www.oxfordenergy.org/2009/02/the-russoukrainian-gas-dispute-of-january-2009-a-comprehensive-assessment/.

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Presskit, (2009). ZHRNUTIE priebehu a dopadov krízy v dodávkach zemného plynu v januáry 2009, SPP, a.s., Bratislava. Retrieved from http://www.spp. sk/download/presskit/2009-01-27-SPP-Presskit-SVK-final-WEB.pdf. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 July 2009 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Directive 2004/67/EC. (2004). Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52009PC0363. Putin accuses Ukraine of holding Europe hostage over gas row. (2009). Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/15/ukraine-russia-gas-. Rusnák, U. (2010). Pozastavenie dodávok ruského plynu cez Ukrajinu do EÚ v januári 2009: antická dráma alebo marginálna epizóda na trhu s plynom? In Ročenka zahraničnej politiky Slovenskej republiky 2009. Bratislava: VC SFPA. Slovák, K. (2009). Plynová kríza obnažila slovenskú bezmocnosť. ETREND. Retrieved from http://ekonomika.etrend.sk. Vondra, A. (2009). Gas crisis should not be wasted. Retrieved from http://www. politico.eu/article/gas-crisis-should-not-be-wasted/. Yergin, D. (2006). Ensuring Energy Security. Foreign Affairs, Volume 85 (2): 69–82. New York: Council on Foreign Affairs Relations. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/ga/61/second/daniel_yergin_energysecurity.pdf.

Notes on Contributors

BE STA TO M AS Z

Assistant Professor at the Institute of Psychology, the University of Gdańsk, Poland. He is broadly interested in the issues of social identities, group behavior and social movements. More specifically, his research interests include group processes related to personal and group identity fusion, motivated reasoning, risk perception, evaluation of out-groups, and collective action engagement. He has co-authored articles in journals such as Applied Research in Quality of Life, Journal of Community Psychology, The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, The Journal of Social Psychology.

BIŃCZYK EWA

Professor of the Nicolas Copernicus University in Toruń and the head of the Philosophy of Science Research Unit at the Institute of Philosophy (NCU). She is the author of Modeling Technoscience and Nanotechnology Assessment. Perspectives and Dilemmas (co-authored with Tomasz Stępień, 2014), Technoscience In the Risk Society. Philosophy in the Face of the Unwanted Consequences of the Practical Success of Science (2012), A Picture that Captivate Us. Contemporary Views of Language in the Face of Essentialism and the Problem of Reference (2007) and Sociology of Knowledge in the Bible (2003). Her research interests include sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), philosophy of science, philosophy of technology and science and technology

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studies (STS). She is currently working on a project entitled Rhetoric and Lethargy of the Anthropocene. A Fiasco of the Politics of Nature and the Irrationality of Late Capitalism.

CHODUBS KI ANDRZEJ

Professor., Ph. D; political scientist; Professor at the Institute of Political Science of the University of Gdańsk; his research interests focus around: political science research methodology, globalization, history of science. Author of several monographs, studies and edited books. He has written 1,200 articles and studies; member of scientific committees in national and foreign institutions and editorial committees of dozen periodicals, member of the Committee of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

DASCALU ILEANA

PhD student of the Faculty of Philosophy (the University of Bucharest), with a thesis on Equality of Opportunity and Intergenerational Duties. Her research interests focus on intergenerational justice, environmental ethics and the contribution of social sciences on the governance of resources. She is a researcher within the Research Centre for Intergenerational Justice, Social Responsibility and Sustainability (DIRESS) of the Faculty of Philosophy and a member of the EURATOM-PLATENSO project.

FIGULOVÁ ANDREA

Associate Professor at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations, the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, the Comenius University in Bratislava. In 2011 she defended her dissertation on Energy security – a part of the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic and the European Union. In her research she focuses on the Slovak politics and foreign policy with the emphasis on energy and security issues.

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KIJEWSKA BARBARA

Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science, the University of Gdańsk. Member of the research project “Public Understanding of Technology” (2013–2016) UG. She was involved as a Co-investigator or main researcher in national and international research projects (granted by, for example, the National Centre for Research and Development, European Commission Jean Monnet Programme and Norway Grants in the Polish-Norwegian Research Programme). Her main areas of research are gender issues and mass media in political science.

KO S DRAGO

Associate Professor of urban and environmental sociology at the University of Ljubljana. His work includes research projects on community studies, spatial planning, developmental and environmental problems, etc. From 1989 to 1992 he was Vice President and from 1995 to 1998 President of the Slovene Sociological Association. At XII World Congress of Sociology in Madrid (1990) he was elected Yugoslav representative in the Board of the Research Committee 21 – Urban and Regional Development. From 2001 to 2003 he was Vice Dean for research activities at the Faculty of Social Sciences, the University of Ljubljana. Since 1998 on he has been the head of the Research Center for Urban and Environmental Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana.

KWIATKIEWICZ P IOT R

Political scientist, graduate of the University of Poznań, Association Professor at the Department of Logistic, Chief of the Group of Logistic Security and Defense at the Military University of Technology. Author of 4 books and over 35 scientific articles. Participant of numerous international conferences and international research projects dedicated to the politics of the Caucasus region. His latest book is “Political changes in Azerbaijan. From Soviet republic to the modern state” (ed. 2013). His scientific interests include relations between gas & oil markets and political systems; international relations of the countries in the Middle East; energy policy; future of the energy development.

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M ROZOW S KA S YLWIA

Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science, the Faculty of Social Science, the University of Gdańsk, manager of research and development undertakings, coordinator and co-investigator of many research and didactic projects (NCBR, the European Commission, Norway Grants, the International Visegrad Fund). She is a founding member of the Polish Association for Technology Assessment. Her main research focuses on strategy, lobbying, participation in the European Union decision-making process, especially in the area of energy policy. She is an author of books, chapters and articles in this area.

POLIČ M ARKO

Ph.D., a retired Professor of general and environmental psychology at the Department of Psychology, the Faculty of Arts, the University of Ljubljana. He is active in the fields of Environmental Psychology, Psychological Aspects of Disasters and Crisis Management, as well as Traffic and Political Psychology and was engaged in a number of international, EU and Slovenian research projects in these fields, but especially in environmental questions and psychological aspects of disasters and accidents including traffic behavior, crisis management and EIA (e.g. FLOODAWARE, SARTRE 2, 3 and 4, ARROWS, PREVENT, AEVMS, UPTUN, EUSHIRES, COWAM, CARL, IPPA, InSOTEC, PLATENSO and others). He published more than 400 papers and publications and over 20 books or chapters in them.

REWIZOR S KI M AREK

Ph.D. in the field of Political Science, lawyer, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science, the Faculty of Social Science, the University of Gdańsk. Member of the Polish, British and European International Studies Association and the Polish Association of Political Science. He taught at the Institute of Political Science and Management at the University of Tallinn. Author of 10 books, as well as more than 70 articles and studies in the field of International Relations and European Studies. His recent publications include: “From Washington to St. Petersburg. Development

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of the G20 as a New Centre of Global Governance”, published by Logos Verlag Berlin in 2014, and “The European Union and the BRICS Complex Relations in the Era of Global Governance”, published by Springer International in Heidelberg and New York in 2015. Research interests: International Political Economy, Global Governance, G7/G20, BRICS, Emerging Markets, the EU Institutional System, Economic Security.

SIERADZAN P RZE M YS ŁAW

Political scientist, graduate of the University of Warsaw, Ph.D. in humanities. Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science, the Faculty of Social Science, the University of Gdańsk. Author of 2 books and over 30 scientific articles. Participant of numerous international conferences. Coordinator of two international research projects dedicated to the politics of the North Caucasus. Visiting researcher at the University of Lapland (Rovaniemi, Finland) and the Barents Institute (Kirkenes, Norway). His latest papers include The „Pomor Question” in the Context of Russo-Norwegian Relations, “Miscellanea Oeconomicae” 4/2015 and Siberian Separatism and Russian Post-Imperial Statehood, “European Journal of Transformation Studies” 2014 vol. 2, supplement 1. His scientific interests include political processes of post-Soviet space, the Far East and the Arctic, ethnic minorities, indigenous issues, doctrines of political radicalism and existentialist philosophy.

ZACHER LECH

Professor, Ph. D., economist, sociologist and futurist, Director of the Center of Impact Assessment Studies and Forecasting, Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland; Member of the Committee of the Future Studies “Poland 2000 Plus” at the Presidium of the Polish Academy of Sciences; member of the International Studies Association and International Sociological Association, European Association for the Study of Science and Technology; Editor-in-Chief of the interdisciplinary journal “Transformations” (Polish and English issues; indexed in EBSCO Publishing, Index Copernicus and ERIH). Author of several books and many articles on globalization, science and technology impacts, information society, and the future.

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Ĺ˝ELEZNIK NADIA

Ph.D., physicist, master degree in reactor physics and Ph.D. in psychology, director of REC in Slovenia, specialist for nuclear technology and radioactive waste management, risk perception, communication, education and training in environmental projects. She has more than 28 years of experience in research activities, as civil servant with governmental examination and in the implementation of different related projects. Her deliverables included strategies and programs for nuclear area, development of legislation, cost assessment and investment programs, feasibility studies for environmental projects, remediation plans and their implementations, safety assessment and reports, radiological investigations and dose assessments, QA/QC plans and procedures. She is involved in development of communication strategies and plans, assessments of public acceptability of nuclear facilities and related surveys, education and training in the communication and stakeholder involvement, development of information materials and tools and related research. She has been involved in more than 20 international projects, also as coordinator and leader, and is an author of around 200 papers. She serves also as an expert for International Agency For Atomic Energy and the European Union.

The role of social sciences in energy studies is more and more appreciated and it is noted that such studies must become more socially oriented, interdisciplinary and heterogeneous. However, hardly any extensive research and teaching was undertaken in Poland about the scale of the problems belonging to the field of the so-called Science-Technology-Society (STS) which would be focused on political and social dimensions of the development of science and technology and would also cover the issues concerning the relations between politics, society and energy industry. The aim of this publication is the promotion of STS among young researchers and students of social sciences in Poland and the presentation of chapters devoted to selected areas of STS.

ISBN 978-83-65148-66-7

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