United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations by princetonspia

United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations A Woodrow Wilson School Policy Workshop Report Fall 2019

United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute:

Overview and Recommendations

A Woodrow Wilson School Policy Workshop Report

Fall 2019

Advisor

Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer

Authors

Spogmay Ahmed · Toshiro Baum · Ben Brenner · Caroline Corcoran

Stephanie Dimos · Alli Divine · Mark Jahnke · Lorraine Keeler · Claire McGuinness

Djeniffer Melo · John Vrolyk · Gur Yalon

Members of the workshop team, after presenting at the US Institute of Peace. From left to right, front row: Djeniffer Melo, Ben Brenner, Toshiro Baum, Ambassador Chris Ross, Ambassador Dan Kurtzer, Caroline Corcoran, Alli Divine, Claire McGuinness. Back row: Mark Jahnke, John Vrolyk, Stephanie Dimos, Lorraine Keeler, Spogmay Ahmed, Gur Yalon. Source: Caroline Corcoran.

Published January 14, 2020

Cover and back photos: Lorraine Keeler

Cover illustration: Free Vector Maps.com

iv United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and

Recommendations

v Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................ 1 A FROZEN CONFLICT .................................. 6 THE STATUS QUO .................................... 10 U.S. INTERESTS ..................................... 17 RISKS TO THE STATUS QUO ............................. 24 SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS: Mitigation and Confidence Building .................... 31 LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATION A: Leverage Opportunities to Facilitate Resolution ......... 36 LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATION B: Resolution via Referendum With Independence .......... 40 Endnotes .......................................... 43

Preface

This report is the final product of a 2019 Policy Workshop sponsored by Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (WWS) as part of its Master in Public Affairs degree program. It results from the work of twelve graduate students under the supervision of Daniel C. Kurtzer, Lecturer and S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle East Policy Studies at WWS and former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and Israel. A draft of this report was presented at the U.S. Department of State and at a round table of experts at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

The report’s information and recommendations stem from over eight months of research, along with over 50 interviews conducted with a range of diplomats, policymakers, UN personnel, researchers, NGO staff, civil society leaders, and journalists, located in the United States, Morocco, Algeria, and the territory of Western Sahara. Interviews were conducted in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic.

All authors participated in the discussions, debate, and preparation of this report. The report presented here does not reflect the views of Princeton University, Ambassador Kurtzer, any individual student, or any person interviewed by this workshop.

Acknowledgements

We are deeply indebted to the many people with whom we consulted and made our research possible. In particular, we would like to thank Ambassador Kurtzer for his guidance throughout the research and drafting process, and Ambassador Christopher Ross for his gracious assistance in planning and gathering field research.

We extend our gratitude to the scholars and professionals who took the time to speak to our class in Princeton, including Secretary James Baker, Colin Stewart and Karen Wermester, Omar Farid and Rachel Smith-Levy, Ambassador Emilio Cassinello, Dr. Yahia Zoubir, and Ana Theofilopoulou; to everyone from Princeton University who supported us: Dean Cecilia E. Rouse, Associate Dean Karen McGuinness, former WWS Associate Director of Finance and Administration Jeffrey Oakman, Associate Director of International Travel Safety and Security Kara Amoratis, Faculty Assistant Bernadette Yeager; and everyone else at Princeton and around the world who helped make this workshop possible.

vi United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The current unresolved status of the protracted conflict over Western Sahara accommodates key U.S. interests in security and regional stability but puts other interests at risk.

The report defines U.S. interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as:

1. Security: Maintaining and deepening U.S. security and counterterrorism partnerships with regional partners;

2. Stability: Promoting and enhancing the regional stability necessary for inclusive prosperity and opportunities for U.S. businesses;

3. Conflict Resolution: Encouraging conflict resolution processes, preventing resurgence of violence, and countering extremist ideologies; and

4. Respect for International Norms: Promoting internationally-recognized standards of human rights and international law, and support for humanitarian aid.

The status quo has facilitated U.S. partnerships with regional actors—particularly Morocco— in support of interests (1) and (2). However, the status quo of indefinite ceasefire leaves potential benefits from interests (3) and (4) unrealized, and the potential of deteriorating conditions and increasing resentment at Tindouf refugee camps pose risks to all of the above interests.

Entrenched distrust between Morocco, the Polisario, and other key groups makes peaceful resolution by the parties unlikely under current circumstances.

Moroccan and Polisario perspectives are defined in opposition to each other. In the Polisario narrative, Morocco has occupied the territory in order to prevent the self-determination of its rightful occupants; in the Moroccan narrative, the Western Sahara has always been a part of Morocco, and the Algerian Republic has manipulated Sahrawis into acting against

At a Glance:

• The United States has not expended significant political capital on ending the frozen conflict because it does not threaten U.S. interests in the short term.

• However, there are several possible contingencies that may destabilize the conflict in the near future.

• U.S. policy should focus primarily on preserving immediate stability and supporting the UN process, and secondarily on creating conditions that can facilitate resolution in the event of one or more of the possible contingencies.

their own interests in an overarching attempt to weaken and destabilize Morocco.

Such narratives are widely broadcast and generally accepted in the respective areas. Both Moroccans and Sahrawis wholeheartedly believe in their versions of the events; their actions reflect genuine belief in their causes.

Absent a change in circumstances or measures to build confidence between the parties, these narratives make it unlikely either side will concede anything, even if negotiations restart. Both sides face domestic political constraints and have little incentive to deviate from previously articulated, hardline positions on autonomy or an independence referendum, and risk severe domestic consequences if they do so.

Several potential events may change the conflict’s circumstances in the near-term.

The report identifies several contingencies that may emerge in the coming years that could disrupt the status quo, and categorizes them based on likelihood and severity of impact. Likely contingencies include the following:

• Transition of Polisario Leadership: The advanced age of senior Polisario figures suggests that a new generation will lead the group in the coming years. Ascension of new leadership may present a rare opportunity

to renew progress toward a resolution, though it could also introduce new leaders frustrated with the UN and no longer willing to cooperate with the international system: the outcome is uncertain.

• Renewed hostilities: Polisario interviews suggest that elements in the Tindouf camps increasingly cite a return to violence as a near-term possibility. Outbreak of violence could drastically alter status quo conditions, exacerbating humanitarian conditions or, in a worst-case scenario, spurring regional war.

• Deterioration of humanitarian conditions at the Tindouf camps: Polisario refugees remain in camps, entirely dependent on international aid, with little ability to provide for their own basic needs. Reports suggest camp conditions are becoming increasingly dire and could result in a crisis either through deterioration or a natural disaster.

SPAIN SPAIN SPAIN SPAIN SPAIN SPAIN SPAIN SPAIN

The United Nations should retain the primary role in efforts to resolve the conflict.

Although the United States has an interest in reaching a resolution to the conflict, the UN has been the leading multilateral stakeholder and administrator of the political process around this dispute. As a result, we recommend the United States pursue a two-phase strategy premised on supporting the UN’s preeminent role in achieving an eventual resolution.

North Africa Atlas Map

MOROCCO MOROCCO MOROCCO MOROCCO MOROCCO MOROCCO MOROCCO MOROCCO

ALGERIA ALGERIA ALGERIA ALGERIA ALGERIA ALGERIA ALGERIA ALGERIA ALGERIA ALGERIA

MALI MALI MALI MALI MALI MALI MALI MALI MALI MALI MALI MALI

The region surrounding Western Sahara. The teams conducted interviews in Madrid, Paris, Casablanca, Rabat, Algiers, Tindouf, and Laayoune (La ‘Youn). Source: UNHCR.

The UN Personal Envoy of the Secretary General (PESG) should retain primary negotiation responsibilities, and the United States should leverage its “honest broker” role in support of the PESG. The United States should reinforce PESG by offering proposals for both parties to consider and negotiate under the PESG’s mediation. Interviews with Moroccan and Polisario representatives affirmed that both parties view the United States as a neutral party in the conflict with substantial influence that it does not exercise. As the primary drafter on the MINURSO mandate, the United States also has leeway to propose ideas which can constructively support the UN resolution process. Morocco and the Polisario will view proposals from the United States as neutral starting points for negotiation, rather than reject them categorically.

TUNISIA TUNISIA TUNISIA TUNISIA TUNISIA TUNISIA TUNISIA TUNISIA

The United States should not appoint a special envoy or create a new negotiation structure. Such actions would undermine the PESG’s primacy and delegitimize the UN’s role in conflict resolution. Such actions would also reinforce a new norm that governments may intervene or attempt to influence conflicts outside of internationally agreed upon forums.

LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA ARAB JAMAHIRIYA ARAB JAMAHIRIYA ARAB JAMAHIRIYA LIBYAN ARAB LIBYAN ARAB LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA JAMAHIRIYA JAMAHIRIYA JAMAHIRIYA ARAB ARAB JAMAHIRIYA ARAB

U.S. policy on the Western Sahara should focus primarily on preserving immediate stability under UN auspices, and secondarily on creating the conditions in which U.S. support of UN processes can facilitate eventual resolution based on likely contingencies.

2 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

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NIGER NIGER NIGER NIGER NIGER NIGER NIGER NIGER NIGER NIGER REP. OF CHAD REP. OF CHAD CHAD CHAD REP. OF CHAD REP. OF CHAD OF OF REP. REP. OF CHAD REP. REP. CHAD REP. CHAD REP. CHAD REP.

Casablanca Tangier Cadiz Jerez de la Frontera Córdoba Huelva Alicante Elx-Elche LISBON LISBON LISBON LISBON LISBON LISBON LISBON LISBON LISBON Tindouf Tindouf Tindouf Tindouf Tindouf Tindouf Lampedusa Lampedusa Lampedusa Lampedusa Lampedusa Lampedusa Ceuta (Spain) Asilah Ksar el Kebir Melilla (Spain) Sidi-bel-abbes Bordj Bou Arreridj M'Sila Bou Saâda Médéa El Asnam Mohammadia Banzart Collo Tebourba Jijel Guelma Le Kef Thala Khenchela Sbeitla Kélibia Nabeul Kalaa Kebira Mahdia Kayes Kaédi Kiffa Ayoun El Atrous Goundam Gao Santa Cruz de la Palma Güimar Las Palmas Arrecife Puerto del Rosario Tarhjicht Machico Kenitra Meknès Mohammedia Khouribga Fkih Ben Salah Safi Essaouira Berkane Jerada Taza Béchar Saïda Djelfa Laghouat Touggourt Zauara Al Khums Darnah Al Mari Badajoz Amadora Sevilla Tétouan Valencia Albacete Elche Murcia Jaén Cartagena Granada Almería Málaga Oran Pa ma Cagliari Annaba Palermo Cosenza Catanzaro Réggio di Calábria Catánia Siracusa Lárisa Pátrai Saint-Louis Agades In Salah Marzuq Marrakech Fès Ghudamis Sfax Banghazi ALGIERS ALGIERS ALGIERS ALGIERS ALGIERS ALGIERS ATHENS ATHENS ATHENS ATHENS DAKAR DAKAR DAKAR DAKAR DAKAR DAKAR DAKAR DAKAR DAKAR NOUAKCHOTT NOUAKCHOTT NOUAKCHOTT NOUAKCHOTT NOUAKCHOTT NOUAKCHOTT RABAT RABAT RABAT RABAT RABAT RABAT TRIPOLI TRIPOLI TRIPOLI TRIPOLI TUNIS TUNIS TUNIS TUNIS TUNIS TUNIS VALLETTA VALLETTA VALLETTA VALLETTA VALLETTA VALLETTA Dakar Dakar Dakar Dakar Dakar Dakar Dakar Dakar Dakar La 'Youn La 'Youn La 'Youn La 'Youn La 'Youn La 'Youn La 'Youn La 'Youn La 'Youn Rabouni Rabouni Rabouni Rabouni Rabouni Rabouni Rabouni Rabouni Rabouni Dakhla Dakhla Dakhla Dakhla Iriba Iriba Iriba Iriba Iriba Iriba Iriba Iriba Iriba Guéréda Guéréda Guéréda Guéréda Guéréda Guéréda Bahai Bahai Bahai Bahai Bahai Bahai International boundary Main road Migrnats / Asylum-seekers reception centre Secondary town / village Refugee settlement 250 to 500 metres (Above mean sea level) ELEVATION 0 to 250 metres Below mean sea level 500 to 750 metres 1000 to 1750 metres 750 to 1000 metres Refugee accomodation UNHCR regional office LEGEND UNHCR representation Refugee camp UNHCR field office UNHCR presence UNHCR sub office s Main town village (( ( (( ! ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! !! C Capital                        As of January 2007

Field Information and Coordination Division FICSS i Email mapping@unhcr.org Mediterranean Sea ATLANTIC OCEAN

The report offers immediate, primary recommendations focused on conflict mitigation. These recommendations are intended to maintain the current ceasefire and prevent deterioration into hostilities or humanitarian disaster. In addition, these measures are intended to change the dynamic around the conflict and negotiations. Currently, Moroccan and Polisario leaders and the Sahrawi public do not have sufficient trust in their counterparts to allow for constructive negotiation and dialogue. By building trust while also mitigating conflict, these measures will help support an eventual resolution.

Specific conflict mitigation recommendations include:

1. Reinitiate the UN process: Encourage the UN to quickly identify and appoint a PESG that satisfies the demands of Morocco and the Polisario.

2. Revitalize Good-Faith Measures: Encourage the UN PESG to focus on beginning or resuming good faith measures, including the family visit program, a human rights monitoring mechanism (either within MINURSO or outside of it), a revival of the UNHCR cultural seminars, and/or a tri-partite effort to document the fate of victims of the conflict. The United States can play the role of proposing these measures and allowing the PESG to mediate a negotiation between the parties on their implementation.

3. Improve Humanitarian Conditions: Interlocutors and UN agencies report deteriorating humanitarian conditions in the Tindouf Refugee Camps. As an initial step to accurately understand the situation, request an accurate count of refugees and formal review of the humanitarian assistance networks of the Tindouf Refugee Camps by UNHCR and WFP, and, in consultation with U.S. Embassy Algiers, consider issuing a humanitarian disaster declaration. The United States should also encourage potential donors to contribute.

4. Prevent Resumption of Hostilities: Issue

public and private statements that both parties must adhere to the ceasefire. Such statements should be coupled with an assurance that the United States will support the right of Morocco to self-defense, to reinforce to the Polisario that resuming conflict will not serve their interest.1

5. Increase Regular Contact with Polisario Representatives: Building relationships with Polisario officials will be crucial to understanding Polisario policy shifts and conveying messages to influence Polisario behavior in line with U.S. interests. The U.S. Government should encourage State Department officials to meet regularly with Polisario representatives in Washington, New York, and Algiers to build these relationships.

6. Encourage Moroccan officials to address Sahrawi mistrust by ensuring legal and human rights protections in the territory under Moroccan control: The Polisario and Sahrawi population mistrust any guarantees or protections offered by the Government of Morocco in negotiations, preventing resolution. U.S. Government representatives should draw upon the bilateral partnership with the Government of Morocco and encourage it to change law enforcement behavior in the Saharan territory they control. By doing so, the Government of Morocco can increase its credibility as a negotiating partner and remove some of the obstacles to an eventual resolution.

Recommendations

The report offers contingency-dependent recommendations focused on conflict resolution. Recommendations A and B reflect separate strategies toward conflict resolution—supported by 8 and 4 students on the workshop team, respectively. If and when events occur that significantly change the conflict’s circumstances, the report recommends the following:

Recommendation A:

1. The United States should leverage its position as an “honest broker” to promote a resolution to the conflict, similar to that proposed in the Moroccan autonomy plan.2 Interviews revealed that the Polisario and the refugee population do not trust the Moroccan Government to credibly negotiate on any resolution. The United States should not take the recommended actions below until this condition has changed.

2. In the event of Polisario leadership transition, the U.S. Government should develop and provide the UN PESG with a proposal for Western Saharan Autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty; this proposal would be approved via referendum that does not include independence as an option. The report outlines further conditions the U.S. Government should consider in developing this proposal, based on an assessment of Polisario and Government of Morocco interests.

U.S. endorsement of a resolution to the conflict that ends Moroccan sovereignty over the territory may prove an irreparable blow to the U.S.-Morocco bilateral relationship and significantly escalate regional tensions. Morocco has demonstrated refusal to participate in a political process wherein Western Saharan independence is a possibility, despite initially agreeing to the UN’s call for a referendum.

The proposed resolution – to be jointly voted on by the current inhabitants of Western Sahara and the Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf – would facilitate an expression of Sahrawi self-determination, legitimize the de facto reality of Moroccan control over the territory and definitively address humanitarian concerns. The Sahrawis could be encouraged to accept this proposal because autonomy guarantees a degree of self-governance, the Sahrawi population in Tindouf would have the opportunity to finally return to their homeland, and all Sahrawis would be guaranteed the right to ratify the arrangement via referendum.

Recommendation B:

An alternative proposal for conflict resolution advises the U.S. Government to prioritize its commitments to international law, promotion of human rights, humanitarian affairs, and longterm interests in Africa. It urges the U.S. to confirm its values to self-determination, decolonization, and multilateralism. It regards the current status quo as less durable than characterized and advises against premature U.S. support for Moroccan sovereignty before issuing a referendum. The alternative recommendation is as follows:

1. The United States should leverage its position as an “honest broker” to promote a resolution to the conflict within the UN process that aligns with international law and the MINURSO mandate, and that follows the framework of the 2003 Baker Peace Plan. The United States should encourage a referendum allowing for (1) independence, (2) autonomy, and (3) integration after a period of power sharing. This view does not depart from longstanding U.S. and UN positions on the dispute, restores the UN’s credibility on the matter, and guarantees legal self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. While this proposal poses the risk of delaying resolution due to Morocco’s resistance to the option of independence, a period of trust-building may bring all parties to the table.

2. The U.S. should avoid clear recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory, instead adhering to the prescription of a referendum. Recognizing Moroccan sovereignty contradicts U.S. neutrality in the dispute, disincentivizes Sahrawis from productively engaging with the international system, and excuses Moroccan exploitation of the region’s land, people, and resources. Furthermore, it threatens U.S. relations with those countries that support and recognize the SADR, including Algeria, South Africa, and Nigeria – all important to U.S. policy in the African continent.

4 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

A MINURSO map of the Western Sahara. The research teams visited MINURSO sites in Laayoune, Smaara, and Tindouf. Source: UNHCR.

A FROZEN CONFLICT

For almost fifty years, the Kingdom of Morocco (Morocco) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have contested control of the roughly 266,000 square kilometer territory of Western Sahara. The respective parties of the conflict justifiably argue that it must be considered in the context of its deep historical and cultural roots, which stretch back centuries.

While a full history is beyond this report’s scope, the territory’s phase of colonization serves as the starting point of this analysis.

Colonial and Pre-War Period

The Berlin conference of 1884-1885 granted Spain control of two Northwest African regions, Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro, that together comprised the “Spanish Sahara”3 and roughly included the territory today known as Western Sahara. After the Second World War, Spain consolidated these holdings into the “independent entity of Spanish West Africa.”4

This inaugurated a phase of tension between the region’s colonizing powers of France and Spain and local populations, punctuated by—among other events—Moroccan independence in 1957; the Ifni War of 1957-58; the “Sand War” between Morocco and Algeria in 1963; and eventually, escalating tensions aimed at forcing Spanish withdrawal.

In 1974, in response to significant pressure from groups in and around the Spanish Sahara (including Morocco and the Polisario) and international actors, Spain announced that it would relinquish control of the territory and issued a report “in favor of Sahrawi self-determination.”5

Absent a comprehensive plan to facilitate such self-determination, however, the situation deteriorated. Shortly after Spain’s announcement, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that, while there were legal ties between the territory and both Morocco and Mauritania, these

ties were “insufficient to justify decolonization of the territory by any means other than a popular referendum.”6

Green March and Open Warfare

Both the Polisario and Moroccans heralded the ICJ ruling as vindication of their claims to the territory. Moroccan King Hassan II, however, seized on the moment to call for a “Green March,” where 350,000 Moroccans traversed the Kingdom’s southern border in an attempt to claim the territory for Morocco.

The Green March constituted “one of the most controversial and divisive events in the region’s history,” becoming key to subsequent Moroccan efforts to cement and justify their control of the territory.7 Conversely, the March galvanized the Polisario, spurring its “own efforts to recruit guerilla combatants to fight against the occupation.”8

Shortly after the Green March began, representatives from Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain agreed to the Madrid Accords, which divided the territory between Morocco and Mauritania.9 In Western Sahara, open hostilities erupted as Morocco, Mauritania, and the Polisario each attempted to gain control over the territory. Mauritania abandoned the fight and Morocco occupied the southern area awarded to Mauritania.

The open warfare period lasted sixteen years, until UN intervention in 1991. The active conflict took place in a cold war paradigm, with Morocco “unequivocally anchored in the Western camp” and Algeria “perceived as an ally of the former Soviet Union.”10 In this context, the United States provided Morocco with support including “large-scale economic and military aid, military advisors and logistical assistance.”11

The warfare period resulted in significant displacement of civilians, particularly Sahrawis, “a reported majority” of whom fled to refugee camps in Algeria and Mauritania after Morocco dropped napalm and phosphate bombs on the original camps.12 Both sides were reported to have used arbitrary detention, torture, and

6 United States Policy on the

Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

Western Sahara

other methods in violation of international human rights standards, and both sides took considerable numbers of prisoners of war. While the Polisario released the last of these prisoners in 2005, it is unclear if Morocco still holds prisoners of war from this period. Both sides also accuse each other of deliberate targeting of civilians during and after the warfare period, but this has not been conclusively documented by monitoring organizations.

Morocco eventually adopted a defensive strategy premised on construction of a 900-mile long sand wall separating areas under Moroccan and Polisario control. By 1991, this “berm” facilitated Moroccan control of roughly 80 percent of the territory, including its major population centers, natural resources, and coastline. The Polisario retained control of the remaining 20 percent of the territory, primarily desert.

Ceasefire and Settlement Plan

In 1988, after thirteen years of open warfare, UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and Special Envoy for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) proposed to Morocco and the Polisario elements of what became known as the “Settlement Plan.” This plan led to a ceasefire in 1991, which was intended to lead to a definitive resolution within 24 weeks of implementation.

As set forth in UN Resolution 690, the plan established the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). MINURSO’s primary responsibility was to organize and supervise a “referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco.”13 To do so, the UN’s original plan called for two separate phases:

1. UN peacekeepers would monitor the ceasefire while a commission determined which Sahrawis would be eligible to vote in the referendum; and

2. Those qualified to vote would be authorized to return to Western Sahara under MINURSO’s supervision.

This initial “settlement” plan was intended to be implemented under the authority of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which requires the cooperation of the parties to the dispute in order to resolve it.

Reliance on Chapter VI reflected potential optimism that the parties themselves might resolve the conflict but may also have indicated division on the UNSC.

This division stems from geopolitics, which remain key to the stalemate’s endurance. Throughout the conflict, Morocco has “benefited from the support of three powerful members of the UNSC: France, the United States and Great Britain.”14 In particular, France serves as Morocco’s foremost international backer, holds a permanent UNSC seat and therefore can veto any proposal it perceives as harmful to its Moroccan interests.

Without UNSC pressure, full cooperation between MINURSO, Morocco, the Polisario, and other actors never materialized. A range of factors, including mutual distrust between Morocco and the Polisario and skepticism of the “integrity and transparency” of MINURSO’s process, indefinitely entangled implementation of the Settlement Plan.

Moroccan flags line the streets of Laayoune, Western Sahara. Source: Lorraine Keeler.

After years of arbitration of both sides’ appeals and grievances with the pre-referendum process, the UNSC suspended the referendum process, while stating that the international community’s overarching goal remained to facilitate “a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution to the question of Western Sahara.” The list of eligible voters, as determined by the UN Identification Commission, sent the voter rolls to Geneva for safekeeping in March 2004.15

The Central Question of Independence

Such a “realistic, practicable and enduring political solution” to the conflict has yet to be found The report contends that the conflict remains stalemated for two primary reasons:

1. The parties’ irreconcilable positions on the central question of independence and resulting domestic political constraints; and

2. The inability or unwillingness of UNSC members (including the United States) to

compel the parties to compromise from their hardline positions on the topic.

The Polisario rejects any proposal that does not include a referendum on independence; Morocco now rejects any proposal that broaches such an option.

This key question has remained unanswered despite efforts of four UN Personal Envoys of the Secretary General (PESG). Most notably, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s seven-year tenure as PESG culminated in two proposals that epitomize the independence/autonomy split.

Subsequent sections examine the failure of negotiation efforts to resolve this “central question.”

Baker I: Autonomy and a Referendum

Baker’s first proposal, offered in June 2001, called for a period of territorial autonomy, in which eligible Sahrawi voters (including both the Polisario and Moroccan settlers in the territory) would elect a local government responsible for most aspects of the territory’s internal governance, while Morocco would retain overall control and responsibility for its foreign relations.

After a period of transition, a referendum would take place in which an electorate of Sahrawis comprising both those remaining in Western Sahara and the Polisario would select between continuation of this autonomy or independence. Morocco “indicated it would accept” this proposal, but “Algeria and the Polisario were critical, in part because it did not spell out the options for the final status of the Western Sahara.”16

Deadlocked, the UNSC asked Baker to try again.

Baker II: Independence, Autonomy, or Integration

Subsequently, in May 2003, Baker proposed a UN-organized referendum in which the broader electorate of Sahrawis (including Moroccan settlers in the territory) would “choose between integration with Morocco, autonomy, or independence.”17

8 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and

Recommendations

The Polisario claims this military equipment captured in the 1970s and ‘80s could be “reactivated” if necessary. Source: Mark Jahnke.

Under Algerian pressure, the Polisario accepted this proposal. But despite French lobbying, Morocco ultimately rejected the second Baker plan. Failing to obtain Security Council support, Baker resigned.

Shortly thereafter, Morocco declared that it would accept only an autonomy solution, and that the Kingdom categorically would not “engage in negotiations with anyone over its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”18

The 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Proposal

Subsequent negotiations have done little to alter the parties’ positions. In 2007, after years of pressure from the United States, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Morocco proposed an updated framework for autonomy, the “Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Status for the Sahara.”

Like the initial Baker proposal, the Moroccan plan proposed establishment of a “Sahara Autonomous Region,” in which the territory’s inhabitants would have primary responsibility for self-governance under broad Moroccan sovereignty. The plan stated the provisions for autonomy “shall be submitted to the populations concerned for a referendum” to ratify them. 19

U.S. response to the Moroccan plan was laudatory: U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns described the Moroccan plan as “a serious and credible proposal.”20 Years later, in 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to the Moroccan autonomy plan as “serious, realistic, and credible – a potential approach to satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity.”21

Independence, however, remained the key distinction between Baker’s initial proposal and the Moroccan plan.

While Baker’s referendum proposal included independence as an option, the Moroccan plan gave Sahrawis the option of either territorial autonomy or direct integration into the Moroccan state; in either case, Moroccan sovereignty was non-negotiable.

Immediately before the Moroccans publicly released their second proposal, the Polisario submitted its own. This proposal reiterated the group’s long-held position that an independence referendum was the only acceptable means to resolve the conflict.

The Polisario offered what it characterized as “a mutually acceptable” solution by claiming that if Sahrawis voted for independence, the resulting government would offer citizenship to everyone currently living in the territory, and seek security and economic cooperation with the Moroccans.

UN PESG Peter van Walsum convened the parties four times in 2007 and 2008 to discuss the proposals, but positions remained hardened: the Moroccans would not consider a plan that included an independence referendum, while the Polisario would not consider one without the independence option.

Stalemate

The question of independence remains the central point blocking resolution.

Today, despite decades of negotiation and subsequent efforts of two more UN PESGs (former U.S. Ambassador Christopher Ross and former President of Germany Horst Köhler), the conflict remains essentially unchanged.

Decades of de facto control of the bulk of the territory, as well as U.S. and French statements describing the autonomy proposal as “serious and credible,” have calcified Moroccan resolve that their “territorial sovereignty” is non-negotiable. The Polisario position remains similarly static: an independence referendum, or nothing.

These positions, along with French ability to veto any UNSC proposal Morocco deemed prejudicial, have led to frustration on the part of UN PESGs: on his resignation in 2004, James Baker wrote that the “UN will never solve the Western Sahara without requiring that one, or the other, or both of the parties do something they do not wish to voluntarily agree to do.”22

THE STATUS QUO

The status quo of UN-brokered and monitored ceasefire reflects an uneasy stalemate, in which Morocco and the Polisario hold almost diametrically opposed visions of each other and of the territory’s future.

This section reviews elements of this stalemate including:

• Current status of the Polisario and the centrality of independence to the Polisario cause;

• Current status of Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara and its ideological centrality to the Moroccan state; and

• How the sides’ perceptions of each other dim prospects of resolving the impasse under current circumstances.

Frente Polisario

The Polisario Front’s legitimacy depends on achievement of its longtime goal: an independent Sahrawi state that controls the territory of the Western Sahara.

Since 1991, it has sought to realize this goal through a referendum on the territory’s future that includes an option of independence.

Formed in 1973, the Polisario Front began a guerrilla warfare campaign against Spanish colonial authorities and troops with its focus on obtaining decolonization and the self-determination of the Sahrawi nation. The Polisario resembled many contemporary national liberation movements, and aligned itself with the socialist and non-aligned camps during the Cold War.23

Throughout 1973 and 1974 the Polisario Front gained military capability, capturing weapons from Spanish armed forces. Sahrawi troops defecting from the Spanish armed forces augmented this capability. While it never achieved a technological or resource advantage over its enemies, the Polisario’s armed forces mounted a sustained and capable military challenge to its

enemies. The Polisario still retains armed forces in the Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the bulk of which are stationed in the Polisario-controlled territory east of the berm.

After Spain withdrew its armed forces from the territory in 1975, increased fighting and Moroccan pressure led Sahrawi civilians to flee the territory and settle in refugee camps around the Algerian city of Tindouf. In 1976, the Polisario declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The SADR acts as the state-in-exile of an independent Western Sahara and has administered services in the refugee camps and the territory it controls since its formation. The African Union and 85 countries recognize the SADR as the government of an independent Sahrawi state.

Since its formation, the Polisario has dominated the SADR, with Polisario members staffing all senior positions. The Polisario forms its members (including those who reside in the Moroccan-controlled territory and who keep their membership secret) into constituencies that elect delegates to a general congress.

This congress then elects a Politburo and secretary general. It also debates and amends the political program for the Front and SADR to pursue until the next congress. The Polisario Secretary General becomes the SADR President and selects a Prime Minister, who then selects a cabinet.

Since 1991 subsequent congresses and the SADR have reiterated their commitment to the ceasefire and UN process.

Throughout this period, both the Polisario and SADR have repeatedly stated that the referendum reflects the only mechanism to achieve Sahrawi self-determination. Both have also condemned terrorism, including public statements after terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003.

10 United

Policy

States

on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

Humanitarian Conditions in Polisario Camps

Polisario camps depend on international humanitarian support; insufficient levels of this support have prompted concern over conditions at the camps.

The current population of the Polisario camps is a disputed figure. UNHCR estimates that 173,500 refugees live in the five refugee camps around Tindouf, of whom 125,000 receive food assistance.24 This figure is disputed by both Morocco and Algeria. While UNHCR refers to these figures as conservative estimates, others, including interviewees, considered this population estimate to be high.

As the camps are administered by the Polisario and governed according to the SADR constitution, laws, and legal system, the Polisario are responsible for the conditions and any violations that occur within them. However, because the camps are located in Algeria, the Algerian government is also responsible under international law. This creates some complications with regard to accountability, as both parties are legally accountable.

UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations estimate that over 35 percent of the camp population is under age 18. Due to political resistance, a precise census has not been possible, and monitoring of human rights presents challenges. While the Polisario has publicly stated its openness to monitoring, Algeria often denies access to monitors. Monitors have assessed the human rights conditions in the camps as satisfactory but potentially threatened, and the situation with regard to human rights is generally assessed as being better than in Moroccan-controlled areas.

Individuals living in Polisario-administered refugee camps rely on external and humanitarian support. Several indicators suggest that current aid streams to camp are insufficient and have led to a deterioration of humanitarian conditions.

An April 2019 UNHCR and World Food Pro-

gram nutrition survey found increased malnutrition indicators in the camps. These included increases in:

• “Global acute malnutrition (from 4 per cent in 2016 to 7 per cent in 2019);

• Stunting (from 18 per cent in 2016 to 28 per cent in 2019),

• Anemia in children (from 38 to 50 per cent); and

• Anemia in women (from 43 to 52 per cent).”25

UNHCR is “struggling to meet international standards in its life-saving activities in the areas of protection, shelter, water and sanitation, health, nutrition, education, energy, provision of non-food items and livelihoods.”26 The daily minimum objective of providing 2100 calories per day per person is not constantly sustained, and often falls short because of the lack of a consistent aid pipeline. None of its targets in the above categories were met in 2018.

Lack of UNHCR funding has led to shortages of classrooms and teachers for youth in the camps; children in camps are often forced to drop out of school or attending boarding school if families can support the expense.

Concern over Resumption of Hostilities

Interviews with Polisario officials and Sahrawis residing in the Tindouf refugee camps identified a growing desire to return to hostilities with Morocco.

While the Polisario has officially endorsed the 1991 ceasefire, interviewees stated that many Sahrawis – especially youth – have grown increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress toward a referendum and resolution. Many Sahrawis reported that they consider the ceasefire to be void due to the failure to hold a referendum. Polisario officials and young Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps reported that their frustration has reached a point where it is now possible that the Polisario could decide to return to hostilities

against Morocco.

Certain flashpoints, such as perceived and substantiated human rights abuses by Moroccan security forces or perceived setbacks in the UN process may spark an outbreak of hostilities or other violence. Some interviewees also claimed that Sahrawis residing in Moroccan-controlled territory strongly share this frustration. While the report researchers could not verify these claims, it does raise the possibility of unrest or violence in the Moroccan-controlled territory.

Polisario Perspectives of Morocco

Polisario distrust of Morocco makes it unlikely the group will compromise necessitating an independence resolution.

co as an illegal occupier of the Sahrawi nation’s territory. In their mind, the 1975 Green March represented part of a coordinated invasion by the Royal Armed Forces. Since then, Moroccan presence in the territory represents continued colonialism, with Moroccan security forces and settlers replacing Spanish ones.

The Polisario’s main focus and effort remains fighting for the liberation of this “occupied territory.” Only replacing Moroccan control with an independent state will realize Sahrawi self-determination, it believes.

The Polisario maintains that the Sahrawi people constitute a different nation from Morocco, with an ethnicity, history, and language. As such, the Polisario views integration into Morocco as antithetical to the desires of the Sahrawi nation. While it tried to create an independent Sahrawi state through armed struggle prior to 1991, the movement now officially considers a referendum on independence to be the proper way to realize this goal. The Polisario remains convinced that Sahrawi public opinion, regardless of location, remains overwhelmingly in favor of independence and would vote accordingly in a referendum.

Polisario interviewees also reported a deep distrust of Morocco. Few believe that the Government of Morocco truly wants to engage in negotiations or can be trusted to adhere to anything it offers in negotiations.

As the Polisario Secretary General and SADR President stated, since the Government of Morocco cannot be trusted to respect political or civil rights, autonomy is akin to integration. Polisario views that the Government of Morocco systematically represses Sahrawis in the Moroccan-controlled territory reinforces this mistrust. Independent human rights monitors’ critical reports on the overall state of human rights in Morocco have also contributed to mistrust.”

12 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

The Polisario views the Government of Moroc- A mural inside a Polisario administrative buiding displays the flag of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Source: Toshiro Baum

Moroccan-Controlled Western Sahara

Within Morocco today, Moroccan control of the Western Sahara is a nearly unquestioned and politically sensitive fact of life.

As in 1991, Morocco today controls roughly 80 percent of the Western Sahara, including the region’s population centers of Laayoune, Dakhla, and Smara, along with its coastline.

Morocco considers the so-called “Southern Provinces” to be “part of its sovereign territory.”27 Protection of its control of these territories represents one of Morocco’s primary domestic and foreign policy concerns. Several interviewees noted that Moroccan representatives prioritize the Western Sahara issue, and are prone to react strongly and negatively to any international statements or actions perceived as remotely threatening to Moroccan control of the territory.28 Morocco has criminalized challenging Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara in the press or social media; state-dominated media coverage tends to relay stories of prosperity in the “Southern Provinces,” contrasted with characterizations of poverty and distress in the Polisario-run camps.

The state promotes messages of unquestioned Moroccan control. For example, outside Moroccan borders, popular mapping software “Google Maps” depicts a map of Morocco with a dotted border separating the internationally recognized borders of Morocco with those of the contested territory. Within Morocco, the dotted border disappears: a testament to the state’s internal sensitivity to and control of the Moroccan public’s perceptions of the issue.

Centrality to the Monarchy

Western Sahara’s Marocanité is as a central pillar of Moroccan national identity and the monarchy’s legitimacy.

In the 1970s, amidst civil and political upheav-

al, the Western Sahara issue began to play “a central role in the survival and legitimization of the Moroccan monarch.”29 In the years leading up to and following the Green March, King Hassan successfully leveraged the issue to unify political factions within the country behind the monarchy’s authority.

Subsequent decades codified the territory’s political significance. Current King Mohammed VI, as the son of the King who initiated the Green March and country’s “almost unquestioned leader in… the Western Sahara issue,” has continued this tradition.

Interviews underscored the territory’s political importance to the King. Several interviewees separately emphasized that the issue serves as one of the few issues within Morocco that enjoys near-complete unanimity of political and public opinion.

This unanimity, however, means that the issue is crucial to the monarchy’s endurance: scholars have suggested that “legitimacy” of the Moroccan monarchy “relies to a large extent on… guaranteeing a favorable outcome for Morocco of the Western Sahara conflict.”30

The monarchy’s hardline on the conflict reflects the issue’s importance. In his November 2019 speech on the anniversary of the Green March, for example, King Mohammed described the territory in the following terms:

“Morocco has always been clear in its position concerning the Moroccanness of the Sahara as much as in its firm belief in the justness of its cause and the legitimacy of its rights … The Autonomy Initiative provides for that solution, given that it is not only serious and credible, but also rooted in sound principles. …

It is the only way forward towards a settlement guaranteeing full respect for the kingdom’s national unity and territorial integrity. … Ours is a collective responsibility to safeguard our national unity and territorial integrity, and to promote comprehensive development throughout Morocco.”31

These themes—unity, security, and stability— constitute core premises of the Moroccan state and its unification under the monarchy.

The Kingdom considers international efforts to resolve the Western Sahara conflict via independence referendum as a threat to each of these pillars: it would undermine the Kingdom’s “unity” by splitting off a large territory; disrupt its stability with resultant political unrest; and pose a threat to its security through this unrest and creation of a potentially unstable Sahrawi state to the south. As a result, such efforts are perceived as a direct threat to the monarchy’s legitimacy.

Moroccan Investment

The Moroccan government seems willing to indefinitely subsidize settlement and local activities in the Western Sahara.

Since the 1991 ceasefire, the Moroccan government has spent billions of dollars in investment and military spending into Western Sahara. This funding suggests the Moroccan monarchy considers the area a political investment.

Such investment could be intended to achieve several interrelated goals for the Moroccan state:

• To improve living conditions for the territory’s inhabitants;

• To attract additional settlers from Morocco and incentivize Polisario defection;

• To further cement Moroccan control of the region and bolster the monarchy’s continued claims of control; and

• To demonstrate to the international community that Moroccan administration of the territory is benevolent and worthy of international recognition.

Moroccan-controlled portions of the territory reflect this sustained and direct state attention. Such areas have “some of the highest per-capita rates of housing, electrification, and roads in

Morocco.”32

Interviews suggested that those living in the territory generally pay no taxes and receive government-subsidized wages, housing and goods. Moroccan officials touted a proposed “New Model for the Southern Provinces,” which included almost 700 projects worth an estimated 7 billion euros. Such projects entail additional infrastructure investments, including construction of roads, housing, universities, and massive expansions of ports in Laayoune and Dakhla.

Morocco also controls the bulk of the territory’s natural resources: phosphate deposits, abundant natural fisheries, and potential offshore oil reserves. Revenue from exploitation of such resources help offset the costs of state investment, but scholarly research has suggested that the state’s “stated civil expenditures” exceed the “gross market value of the territory’s principal resources.”33

Moroccan officials assert that these investments are driven purely by wholehearted government desire to improve living conditions for people living in the territory, including Moroccan Sahrawis. This may indeed be the case, but such efforts also appeared to portray Morocco as “making good” on its control of the territory.

The activities of Morocco’s Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP Group) exemplify this state focus. OCP Group, through its fully owned subsidiary Phosphates de Boucraa SA (Phosboucraa), carries out active phosphate mining efforts at Western Sahara’s major mine. Interviews with OCP officials suggested that the company makes disproportionate investments in the Western Sahara, driven by a model which prioritizes duties to so-called “stakeholders” rather than traditional fiduciary duties to shareholders.

Company representatives emphasized that OCP’s approach is “not about the money,” and was instead focused on a range of local activities, including youth initiatives and scholarships.

Ultimately, it appeared OCP Group’s focus was not to achieve financial returns, but to further

United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

goals of the Moroccan state: to improve living conditions for the territory’s inhabitants; incentivize Polisario defectors; and demonstrate the state’s benevolence to outsiders.

Moroccan Perceptions of the Polisario

The deep trust deficit between Morocco and the Polisario impedes possibilities of resolution.

The UN’s latest renewal of MINURSO’s mandate calls upon Morocco, the Polisario, Algeria, and Mauritania to “cooperate more fully with each other, including through building additional trust… to achieve progress towards a political solution.”34

Deep distrust between the parties complicates attempts to build such cooperation and manifests in perpetual Moroccan skepticism of international, Algerian, and Polisario motives and actions relative to the conflict.

In stark contrast to Polisario narratives, the Moroccan state and interviewees repeatedly and consistently denied existence of a “Sahrawi people.” Instead of a distinct nationality, Moroccans characterized Sahrawi as an identity one element of the many different tribes present in Morocco, the Western Sahara, and other countries throughout North Africa. In such a conception, being a Sahrawi is a subset of being a Moroccan; just as, in other areas, one could be Sahrawi-Mauritanian, or Sahrawi-Algerian.

Within this Moroccan narrative, Sahrawis are not considered “others” but as parts of the Moroccan whole “Moroccans from the Southern Provinces.” This logic denies the possibility that the Polisario could reflect genuine desire of a Sahrawi people for independence.

Instead, scholarly accounts and interviews suggest that most Moroccans consider Algeria, not the Polisario, as the actual opposing party to the conflict. In this “Moroccan official discourse” adopted by the Kingdom’s leadership and promulgated through the state’s media channels, the Polisario “is a mercenary group financed by

Algeria.”35

Within Morocco, interviewees repeatedly emphasized their belief that the Algerian government deliberately caused the conflict and is manipulating Sahrawis in Tindouf toward an actual, malicious goal of destabilizing Morocco. Interviewees asserted that the Polisario are Algerian puppets, sponsored and propped up by the Algerian state in order to constrain Moroccan political and economic development. 36

Such widely promulgated Moroccan narratives appear intended to achieve two Moroccan political goals:

1. To invalidate Polisario claims to be the true representatives of the Sahrawi people.

By attributing actual responsibility for the war and ceasefire to Algeria, the Moroccan narrative delegitimizes the Polisario, and characterizes the overall conflict as a question not of self-determination but as a malicious Algerian attempt to destabilize Morocco.

Billboards likes these of King Mohammed VI of Morocco are prominently displayed in the center of Laayoune. Source: Fugu Tabetai/Flkkr.

Is the fall of the Moroccan Monarchy a Legitimate Threat?

A broad range of histories and analyses of the Western Sahara conflict speculate that loss of control of Western Sahara could have significant consequences for the Moroccan monarchy – potentially undermining its legitimacy and sparking civil unrest.

Does this represent a real concern for U.S. policy, or an overstated worry?

This question is by nature speculative so it cannot be answered conclusively. Some workshop interviewees posited that territorial independence would indeed undermine the monarchy. Others speculated that, while independence would threaten the monarchy, the Moroccan state could manage impacts through public messaging.

While in Morocco, the workshop team repeatedly queried interviewees on whether the monarchy’s legitimacy indeed depended on retaining control of Western Sahara. Responses from Moroccan sources universally indicated apparently sincere concern for the monarchy’s stability if the territory were to gain independence. Some cited possibility of mass civil unrest; others flatly asserted fear that “the King may lose his throne” if he were to lose the territory. Responses from Moroccan sources must of course be taken with a grain of salt; such individuals likely have incentive to portray the issue as non-negotiable.

Ultimately, absent strong interests or evidence of deception, the report contends that the U.S. should extend benefit of the doubt to Moroccan claims that the Western Sahara issue poses an existential threat to the monarchy.

While U.S. policy sometimes should diverge from the preferences of allies, those divergences must be justified with tangible interests that outweigh damage caused to the alliance. In this case, U.S. interests in changing the status quo do not outweigh an ally’s claim of an existential threat. Subsequent sections discuss these interests further.

The alternative proposal for conflict resolution expressed in this paper challenges this acceptance of Morocco’s claims to existentialism. While the monarchy has positioned the Western Sahara conflict as a matter of identity and existence, our field research could not accurately glean how the Moroccan public perceives the issue. If the monarchy reversed its position on the issue, it is also possible that it could affect public opinion in the same direction.

2. To cast Sahrawis as “victims” of Algeria, leaving open the possibility of a “return home.” In such narratives, most in the Polisario did not “choose” to leave Western Sahara but were forced to do so by Algeria.

By placing responsibility on Algeria, the Moroccan narrative is intended to allow Sahrawis in camps to return “home” to Morocco without broaching the difficult subject of the Polisario’s often-stated denunciations of the Moroccan state and monarchy.

Interviews and research suggest that such viewpoints are widely held in Morocco. This paradigm leads Moroccans to automatically construe Polisario or international actions relative to the conflict in bad faith.

Hardened Perceptions Counteract Change

Entrenched, mutual distrust between the Polisario and Morocco make peaceful resolution by the parties alone unlikely under current circumstances.

The conflict between Morocco and the Polisario today reflects two fundamentally different worldviews: one in which Morocco maliciously occupies the territory in order to prevent the self-determination of its rightful occupants, and one in which Algeria manipulates Sahrawis into acting against their own interests and preventing reconciliation with Morocco.

Individuals in Morocco and the Tindouf camps repeat their respective versions with deep belief and earnest fervor.

Absent a significant change in the circumstances of the conflict, such entrenched narratives make it unlikely that Moroccan or Polisario officials will compromise from their hardline positions. Potential domestic consequences for such compromises whether a threat to the Moroccan monarchy’s legitimacy or backlash from a Polisario official “giving up” on the movement’s independence dream are too severe.

16 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

Stances of Other External Players France

France has historically supported Morocco’s policy stances in the UNSC, meaning that any resolution that does not accord with Moroccan interests will almost certainly be vetoed. There are multiple reasons for this. Firstly, France and Morocco have long enjoyed close ties, whereas France’s fraught colonial history with Algeria colors its relations with the Polisario. Additionally, Morocco demonstrated its unwillingness to brook any softening of French support in 2014, when it temporarily suspended its counterterrorism and judicial cooperation with France due to France’s criticism of its human rights conduct in the Western Sahara. France is also concerned that if it deviates in its support, Morocco could respond by permitting increased migration into the south of Europe through Morocco.

Spain

As the former colonial power in Western Sahara, Spain has a longstanding interest in the conflict. There is a robust civil society in Spain that supports the Sahrawi cause, and lobbies to the Spanish government on their behalf. However, the strength of Spain’s support for the Sahrawis has waxed and waned, dependent on whether conservative or left-leaning governments were in power. Regardless, Spain has never taken a strong stance: former Minister of Foreign Affairs Miguel Nadal best characterized their position as one of “active neutrality.”

Russia

Russia has interests with all parties to the conflict, and has historically walked a neutral path in the UNSC. While it has recently been trying to strengthen its diplomatic ties with Morocco, it also has a longstanding relationship with Algeria which dates back to the Cold War. Also, Russia’s tensions with the United States and France in Syria have been known to affect its vote in the

Council. In short, Russia has no specific agenda that it is pursuing; its unrelated interactions with the relevant parties are usually determinative of its posture in the UNSC.

U.S. INTERESTS

The State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ (NEA) 2018 Joint Regional Strategy set forth the following elements of the Bureau’s strategic goals for the Middle East and North Africa region:37

• Enhance security, stabilization, counterterrorism, and conflict resolution;

• Promote inclusive economic growth, socio-economic development, open markets, and increased U.S. exports; and

• Improve governance, strengthen democratic institutions and processes, and support an engaged civil society.

Based on these strategic goals, the report contends that the following interests should drive U.S. policy on the Western Sahara conflict:

The Moroccan government has funded various develoipment projects in Western Sahara, such as this dairy farm in the deserts outside Laayoune. Source: Ben Brenner.

• Security: Maintain and deepen U.S. security and counterterrorism partnerships with regional partners;

• Stability: Promote and enhance the regional stability necessary for inclusive prosperity and opportunities for U.S. businesses;

• Resolution: Encourage conflict resolution processes and prevent resurgence of violence; and

• Respect: Promote internationally recognized standards of human rights and international law, and support for humanitarian aid.

Subsequent sections discuss these assertions in more detail.

Interest I: Security

U.S. security partnership with Morocco serves as the linchpin of U.S. regional security efforts.

The conflict’s ceasefire status quo accommodates this security partnership; U.S.-promoted efforts relative to the Western Sahara conflict should be calibrated to minimize disruption of the U.S.-Moroccan partnership, and open opportunities for further U.S.-Algeria collaboration.

The United States has a significant security interest in maintaining and promoting cooperation with the countries in North Africa pertinent to the Western Sahara conflict Morocco and Algeria.

Security encompasses not just counterterrorism but also power projection in the region. From a security perspective, the Mediterranean has been effectively a NATO “lake” since the 1950s, with close U.S. partners decisively controlling the entrances to the region.38

This hegemony denies the ability of rival powers to threaten NATO’s southern front, limits the reach of destabilizing transnational flows or

groups, and increases regional prosperity by facilitating trade.

U.S.-Morocco Security Partnership

The Western Sahara conflict’s status quo accommodates the long-standing, close geostrategic partnership between the United States and Morocco.

While U.S. interests ultimately support the conflict’s resolution, the current, unresolved status quo has facilitated maintenance and development of the U.S.-Moroccan security relationship.

The Moroccan monarchy is a key partner in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts, especially in preventing attacks on the Strait of Gibraltar and in the broader Sahel. This close security relationship was formalized with the Bush Administration’s designation of Morocco as a Major Non-NATO Ally (one of only 18) in 2004.39

The United States also has a primary security interest in maintaining access to the Mediterranean through partnership with Morocco. While Morocco is not a NATO member, the Kingdom’s borders represent NATO’s southern flank, and hold a key position for shipping routes and energy supplies for Europe and the world. As such, the region serves as the primary route of U.S. power projection into Southern Europe and the Western Mediterranean region.

Morocco has also consistently been a close and cooperative counterterrorism partner to the United States in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

Today, Morocco co-chairs the Global Counterterrorism Task Force (GCTF), leads the U.S.-funded Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), and takes a leadership role on deradicalization/CVE via Mohammed VI’s Institute for the Training of Imams.

Morocco is a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and has contributed F-16s from its air force to carry out airstrikes against

18 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

the group in both Syria and Iraq in cooperation with the coalition.40 While Morocco was a major point of origin for ISIS foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), the Kingdom has been broadly cooperative with the United States in efforts to prevent radicalization and repatriate, prosecute, and rehabilitate FTFs.41 In response to this threat, Morocco criminalized mobilization to join ISIS in 2015 and has subsequently proactively moved to arrest identified returning fighters immediately upon their return.42

Morocco also plays a key role in NEA-articulated strategic goals to “advance relationships with our partners that advance security through stability and counter extremist ideologies.”

Focus areas for ongoing U.S.-Morocco cooperation center on counterterrorism cooperation including taking a lead role on countering violent extremism (CVE) and religious moderation initiatives, as well as ongoing efforts against al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other Salafi jihadist groups.

Overall, the Western Sahara conflict has not hindered security cooperation between the United States and Morocco. U.S. efforts relative to the conflict should work to minimize disruption to this cooperation.

U.S.-Algeria Partnership

The United States maintains security cooperation with Algeria, but not at the same level of U.S.-Morocco partnership.

Algeria has demonstrated willingness to maintain counterterrorism cooperation, intelligence sharing, and arms sales with the United States, albeit at a much lower level than the Morocco-U.S. bilateral relationship. “U.S. bilateral aid in FY2018 comprised $1.3 million for International Military Education and Training (IMET) and $0.8 million for Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR).”43

Soviet support for Algeria during its war of independence contributed to deep Russian-Algerian relations in the present day that have always out-

weighed U.S. relations with Algiers. “Between 2015 and 2018 Algeria imported $4.1 billion in arms from Russia, $797 million from China, $646 million from Germany, and $27 million from the U.S.”44

Although Algeria proudly identifies with the Non-Aligned Movement in the Cold War, its behavior since independence has revealed a clear preference for Russia as a defense partner. Algeria’s alignment with Russia makes any form of comprehensive American security cooperation challenging. China is also an economic partner to Algeria, particularly on infrastructure projects.

After 9/11, the U.S. and Algeria increased cooperation on counterterrorism. However, tense relations between Morocco and Algeria related to several issues including the stalemate in Western Sahara have precluded progress toward Maghreb integration; the border remains closed between Morocco and Algeria.

Algerian investment in security and stability contributes positively to U.S. security. But despite cordial relations, Algeria’s continued close alignment with Russia, refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and continued suspicion of U.S. and NATO intentions prevent a deeper level of cooperation that would bring the relationship on par with that of Morocco.

The United States has an emerging economic partnership with Algeria, which could prove lucrative and prosperous for U.S. businesses.

U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks totaled $3.6 billion as of 2018. The United States and Algeria have one of the largest trade volumes in the region, driven mainly by Algerian hydrocarbon exports and sale of services by U.S. businesses. Additionally, Algeria has sought to transition from a centrally planned to a free market economic model. While progress on economic reform remains slow, Algeria represents a potentially large and lucrative market for U.S. business.

While resolution of the Western Sahara conflict

may bolster U.S.-Algeria security cooperation efforts, such a possibility is speculative and should not be considered a key motivator for U.S. policy on the matter.

Interest II: Stability

The status quo of UN-administered ceasefire has facilitated both relative stability in Northwest Africa and economic partnership between the U.S. and Morocco.

U.S.-promoted efforts relative to the Western Sahara conflict should be calibrated to ensure stability of key regional partners and open additional economic opportunity.

NEA strategic goals focus on promoting “inclusive economic growth, socio-economic development” and other aspects crucial to the region’s stability.

Such stability is necessary both to facilitate creation of economic opportunities for individuals in the region and for U.S. companies, and to prevent deterioration of state capabilities to detect, impede, and deter unlawful transnational behavior such as smuggling, trafficking, and illegal migration.

Moroccan Stability

Stability of the Moroccan monarchy has significant implications for key international concerns, including migration.

Morocco serves as an important counterbalance in a region beset by turmoil, including the failed state in Libya, ungoverned space in Mali, and popular unrest.

Despite the fact that the King makes all major decisions, Moroccan interviewees regularly cited the Kingdom’s role as one of the few “successful” democracies in North Africa, particularly when compared to other unstable situations in the region. Interviewees also emphasized Morocco’s role as a “gateway” from Africa to Europe.

Recent patterns of migration have given this role particular prominence, particularly in relations between the European Union and Morocco. Interviewees argued that the Moroccan government serves as Europe’s most reliable partner in management of migration flows. The Moroccan government also plays a key role in policing transnational smuggling and trafficking.

In this context, Moroccan interviewees asserted an independence referendum on Western Sahara would threaten the monarchy’s stability and, through it, the stability of all North Africa and Europe.

Previous sections have discussed the centrality of Moroccan control over the Western Sahara to the monarchy’s legitimacy. Interviewees asserted that an internationally mandated referendum on the territory’s independence would undermine the monarchy and destabilize the Moroccan state, posing severe ramifications for regional migration and trafficking efforts.

While the report cannot comprehensively assess such claims, they are nonetheless to be taken seriously by U.S. and European policymakers. This topic may underscore French resolve to oppose any UNSC action they perceive as detrimental to the Moroccan monarchy’s stability.

U.S. Efforts to Bolster Moroccan Stability

The bilateral relationship between the United States and Morocco reflects the high priority the U.S. places on the monarchy’s stability.

In addition to annual development aid (which totaled $56 million in U.S. Fiscal Year 2018), Morocco is the recipient of a $450 million compact through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.45 The compact targets employability and land productivity to improve Morocco’s economic growth prospects.

The U.S. collaborates with Morocco on “regional security issues” including efforts to bolster “Moroccan expertise in crisis management, border

20 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

security and terrorism investigations.”46

Morocco also is a key U.S. economic partner in the region. According to NEA, over 100 U.S. companies “operate in Morocco, particularly in the renewable energy, infrastructure, aviation, and environmental technology sectors.” Trade between the countries has expanded significantly: “from 2005 to 2017, the total value of Moroccan goods exported to the United States increased from $445.8 million to $1.2 billion, and U.S. exports to Morocco have increased from $480 million to $2.2 billion.”47

U.S. efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute must account for and work to minimize disruption to these stability and economic interests.

Algerian Stability

Similar to Morocco, Algeria remains a major security counterbalance. With the longest borders in North Africa, Algeria and its security forces are the linchpin in curbing transnational threats from trafficking, terrorism, and ungoverned space in the Sahara.

Algeria frequently refers to itself as a regional “security exporter” and views itself as the most competent security provider and leader. Recent popular unrest, and questions about the foundations of legitimacy in Algeria, have made political and military leadership wary of any rapid changes that could lead to destabilization.

Unlike with Morocco, the United States and Algeria do not have a deep bilateral relationship. The United States does not provide development or foreign assistance to Algeria, and only minor military assistance and arms sales. While the economic relationship between the two countries dwarfs the relationship between Morocco and the United States, the United States and Algeria do not have a free trade agreement, and economic relations remain limited to hydrocarbons and several other sectors.

However, unlike their counterparts in Morocco, the Government and Military of Algeria

view the Western Sahara dispute as a minor issue that does not bear on the stability of their state. While support for self-determination is a foundational principle of the country, the Western Sahara conflict’s resolution or irresolution does not threaten Algeria’s stability or economic well-being.

Algeria’s current political unrest deserves comment. Although it is unclear when the current political transition will conclude and what leadership changes will result, our assessment is that changing the long-held position of supporting the Sahrawi people and insistence on not being a party to the conflict will continue through the transition. The Algerian political establishment remains primarily concerned with domestic issues and does not place a high priority on reassessing foreign policy. Additionally, with continued insecurity in Libya, northern Mali, and Niger, the Algerian security services remain concerned about border security and do not wish to see a change in conditions on their western border. We can expect that national security will remain Algeria’s primary interest and expect it to act to maintain the status quo. It does not currently consider the Polisario a destabilizing fac-

Members of the research team, accompanied by Ambassador Chris Ross, meet with the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Source: Mark Jahnke.

tor in its security and thus a change in the status quo would be needed to prompt alternate policy.

Interest III: Resolution

Peaceful resolution of the conflict could improve U.S. partnerships in the NEA region and offer a wide range of benefits to U.S. interests in the region.

NEA strategic goals state that the bureau works to “encourage and enable national conflict resolution efforts,” in part to “prevent resurgence of violence” and to “assist persecuted ethnic and religious minorities.”48

Previous report sections have examined how the status quo accommodates U.S. security and stability interests.

However, peaceful resolution of the conflict through the UN process would offer significant benefits for U.S. interests. These include:

• Supporting potential Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement, which could facilitate deeper U.S. security and trade relationships with both partners;

• Renewing feasibility of Maghreb integration, which could promote regional political, and economic stability, dismantle physical, social, and economic barriers, and unlock opportunities for the private sector;

• Renewing international confidence in UN conflict mediation and resolution efforts and their abilities to resolve intractable conflicts;

• Definitively addressing longstanding humanitarian concerns about conditions in the Tindouf camps;

• Reducing Tensions in Franco-Algerian Relations stemming from French support of Moroccan interests on the UNSC and residual Algerian resentment from the colonial period;

• Reducing Moroccan-Spanish tensions stem-

ming from popular Spanish support for Polisario claims;

• Diverting Moroccan military spending toward more productive socioeconomic development goals.49

While the report has discussed how the conflict’s history and modern dynamics complicate resolution efforts, subsequent sections include recommendations for how the U.S. could leverage likely contingencies in the region to help facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Interest IV: Respect

U.S. policy should promote internationally recognized standards of human rights, international law, and humanitarian aid.

NEA strategic goals set forth that “respect for human rights…will lead to a more stable region.”50 As represented in this goal, the United States has an intrinsic interest in promoting respect for fundamental human rights. Because human rights violations are a key point of distrust and disagreements, working to impartially guarantee human rights protections can improve the climate of negotiations.

Helping people achieve freedom and self-sufficiency is not only a U.S. moral obligation and a representation of U.S. soft power; it also contributes to U.S. security and prosperity by creating a more peaceful world.

The report recognizes that violations of human rights anywhere are corrosive of the norms guaranteeing them everywhere; as a result, the United States therefore has a legitimate interest in protecting the essential freedoms of all the people of the Western Sahara.

Deteriorating conditions at the Tindouf camps conflict with U.S. interests in human rights and humanitarian affairs and create risk of renewed hostilities.

Previous sections discuss how shortages of foodstuffs and other vital goods have led to deteri-

22 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

oration of humanitarian conditions at the Tindouf camps.

Such conditions, along with seeming impotence of the UN process, have contributed to a growing atmosphere of concern and hopelessness in the camps, particularly among young Sahrawis.

Previous sections have discussed that Polisario officials and young Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps reported that frustration has reached a point where it is now possible that the Polisario could decide to return to hostilities against Morocco.

U.S. and UN efforts to improve humanitarian conditions in Tindouf support NEA policy goals and are important steps to facilitate peaceful conflict resolution.

At the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the international community collectively recognized that efforts to improve humanitarian conditions and advance sustainable development need to be aligned with efforts to promote peace and conflict resolution.

This humanitarian-development-peace nexus reflects the UN and World Bank “New Way of Working,” acknowledging that “Sustainable development and durable solutions to displacement are not possible without peace. Humanitarian relief, development programmes and peacebuilding are not serial processes: they are all needed at the same time.” 51

In this sense, U.S. efforts to address humanitarian concerns at the Tindouf camps can serve both to prevent the stalemate from deteriorating into open hostilities, and to help build conditions wherein negotiation efforts can take place.

Teammembers meet with the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior, which governs relations with what Morocco calls their “Southern Provinces.” Source: Lorraine Keeler.

RISKS TO THE STATUS QUO

Previous sections examine how the status quo in Western Sahara has remained relatively unchanged since commencement of the 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire.

However, in the coming years, several contingencies may emerge that could significantly alter the conflict’s circumstances, potentially creating windows of opportunity where the U.S. and international community can work to spur resolution of the conflict.

This section reviews several potential contingencies. It categorizes them based on likelihood of occurrence and severity of their impact on the status quo, and then discusses likely implications.

Contingency I: Polisario Leadership Transition Likelihood:

Moderate Impact: High

The advanced age of senior Polisario figures suggests that a new generation may lead the group within decades.

From 1976 to 2016, founding Polisario member Mohamed Abdelaziz served as leader of the Polisario and SADR president. After Abdelaziz’s death in 2016, the Polisario elected one of Abdelaziz’s contemporaries and fellow founder Brahim Ghali to lead the group.

As of the date of this report, President Ghali is roughly seventy years old.52 While President Ghali and the generation of original Polisario leaders may remain in control for several years, demographics suggest that a new generation of the Polisario that did not take part in the conflict’s 1970s-phase will eventually take control of the group. There is also a remote possibility of an unexpected death of one or more leaders, either of natural or unnatural causes, that could lead to an accelerated timeline for transition outside of the normal election cycle.

Ascension of a new generation of Polisario leaders could open an opportunity for renewed negotiations and compromise.

Previous sections have discussed that mutual distrust of the parties makes resumption of the conflict under current circumstances and with current leadership unlikely.

Ascension of new Polisario leadership could facilitate new UN PESG efforts to resolve the conflict, potentially including additional discussion between the parties and review of resolution options that fall short of independence.

The viability of such renewed efforts would depend on (1) greater levels of mutual confidence between the sides, facilitated by conflict mitigation strategies in the years preceding a leadership transition and (2) international assurances for the welfare of the Sahrawi people.

Some sources suggest that a new generation of leadership may be more entrenched in the current position, and would likely be less willing to engage with the UN process. Any contingency planning must take this possibility into account.

24 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

Homes of Sahrawi refugees living near the camps outside of Tindouf. Source: Mark Jahnke.

Contingency

II: Renewal of Polisario Hostilities

Likelihood: Low

Impact: High

During interviews, Polisario officials and residents in the Tindouf refugee camps reported increasing popular pressure to return to hostilities with Moroccan armed forces. While many noted that the Polisario’s official position is to uphold the 1991 ceasefire, several interlocutors noted that frustration with the status quo and the stalled referendum process has led many Sahrawis – especially younger ones – to call for a return to hostilities. As SADR Foreign Minister Mohamed Salem Ould Salek explained, those calling for a return to hostilities note that the ceasefire agreement is conditioned on a referendum. Based on this perception, without the referendum, the ceasefire becomes null and void.

Polisario officials and Tindouf residents have spoken about a return to hostilities with Morocco in the past. However, longtime observers of the Western Sahara conflict noted that the pressure and the threat of hostilities seems to have reached a higher point than they had observed before. Both officials and Tindouf residents pointed to the upcoming Polisario general congress beginning December 20, 2019 as a venue to debate and decide on a potential return to hostilities as an official policy. In addition, while Polisario officials claimed that they maintain a high level of discipline over the SADR’s armed forces (the Sahrawi Popular Liberation Army or SPLA), increased frustration with slow progress on a referendum could lead personnel to launch an unsanctioned attack on Moroccan personnel, or otherwise provoke a confrontation. While MINURSO or other channels could help prevent an unsanctioned incident from escalating into further conflict, there is a low likelihood that it could lead to a resumption of hostilities between the SPLA and Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR). Similarly, while not likely to happen, hostilities between the SPLA and FAR could inadvertently draw in Algerian security

forces, who maintain a robust presence in the border region.

A return to hostilities – either sanctioned by the Polisario or as an escalation from an unsanctioned attack – would significantly change the status quo. Militarily, the FAR would likely defeat the SPLA, and would use the resumption of hostilities to extend Moroccan control over the remainder of the territory. The FAR has greatly increased their military capabilities since 1991, while the SPLA would likely have to rely on the same equipment and low level of training that they had in 1991. By 1991, the berm’s effectiveness had ended the SPLA’s ability to launch guerrilla attacks in Moroccan-controlled territory, and increased technological enhancements have likely decreased the SPLA’s ability to conduct an effective guerrilla campaign.

A resumption of hostilities would threaten U.S. interests. While a military takeover by the FAR would present a de facto resolution to the conflict by bringing the entire territory under Moroccan control, such a move would not confer international legitimacy or recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty. Morocco would continue to face questions about the legality of its control over the territory, and could face diplomatic repercussions or economic sanctions from states or organizations that recognize the SADR.

A return to hostilities would also undercut regional stability and the use of internationally sanctioned methods to resolve conflicts. While unlikely, setbacks or defeat by the FAR would undermine the stability of Morocco, and could potentially require the United States to commit additional military assistance to the FAR. While also similarly unlikely, hostilities between Morocco and Algeria could lead to a wider regional conflict, threatening both regimes’ stability. A resumption of hostilities would also divert resources away from counterterrorism in the region. The collapse of the UN-monitored ceasefire and UN political process would also undermine belief in the ability of internationally recognized mechanisms to resolve conflicts.

Open hostilities would likely also worsen the

situation in the Tindouf refugee camps, as the SADR’s attention and resources turn to fighting with Morocco. While hostilities should not interrupt the distribution of food and other services to non-combatant Sahrawi refugees in Algeria, the SADR will likely have less personnel and capability to devote to providing services. Algeria and humanitarian organizations may also face increased scrutiny to ensure that aid does not reach combatants or SPLA personnel. Together, this would likely cause a further deterioration in living conditions in the Tindouf refugee camps and lead to a humanitarian crisis.

Contingency III:

Polisario-Linked Terrorism in Morocco or Western Sahara

Likelihood: Low

Impact: High

While an armed group, the Polisario has historically always limited its employment of violence to guerilla or unconventional

military actions, not terrorism. The Polisario has never engaged in and strictly denounces terrorism, including the 2003 terrorist bombings in Casablanca.

Moroccan attempts to link the Polisario to al-Qaeda and/or ISIS have not been materially substantiated. A very limited number of Sahrawis have left the camps to join al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)-related groups in Mali, and the Western hostages eventually transferred to jihadist group Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa were captured in the camps in 2011 while working as humanitarian staff.53

However, the Polisario leadership spoke openly of the camp’s simmering tensions as a driver of youth radicalization, suggesting that a lack of progress may lead radicalized youth to resort to violence or even terrorism in the future over the Polisario leadership’s objections. While it may be true, the argument has the structure of blackmail – that the Polisario leadership will be “unable to control their people” unless conflict is resolved to their liking. Moreover, if taken at face value, it calls into question the Polisario claim that they are capable of functioning as a state, if they cannot prevent even the limited territory of the camps from being used as a base for terrorism.

A Sahrawi separatist terrorist element would be greatly destabilizing for the Polisario.

The most likely terrorist is one operating independently of but ideologically aligned with the Polisario. Any such act of terrorism would throw the Polisario into a legitimacy crisis. If the leadership did not immediately denounce the terrorist attack, the Moroccan government could leverage the attack to pressure the international community to cut off the Polisario as a tacit acceptor – if not outright supporter – of terrorism. However, if the Polisario did immediately denounce the attack, they risk alienating their own youth and the loss of their monopoly on fighting for Sahrawi independence.

The Moroccan reaction is the key wild card.

26 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

Wreckage from the hostilities between Polisario and Morocco, outside the Museum of the Resistance outside Tindouf. Source: Mark Jahnke.

Assuming that no group claims responsibility or issues a public manifesto, the Moroccan government may be faced with a choice in ascribing responsibility. Historically, there is evidence that the Moroccan government may exercise discretion in ascribing responsibility for terrorism (e.g., the Moroccan government blamed AQIM for the 2011 Marrakesh bombing, despite the group denying involvement).54

Faced with a Sahrawi separatist attack, the Moroccan government may ascribe responsibility— to the Polisario, to independent Sahrawi separatists, or even to uninvolved jihadist groups—to maximize its own political gain, either domestically or internationally. Given they have not historically attempted to frame the Polisario for terrorism, there is little reason to believe they consider that either a workable or advantageous strategy. However, it is unclear what exactly they would see as best serving their interests should such an attack occur.

Any evidence of a direct Polisario-linkage –while highly unlikely – would tie the hands of the U.S. Clear evidence of a direct Polisario link to a terrorist attack would lead to significant and legitimate pressure to declare the Polisario a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The knock-on effect of such a designation would be to not only legally prevent U.S. engagement with the Polisario, but also delegitimize any calls on the Moroccan government to engage in direct negotiations with the Polisario.

Moreover, a direct Polisario linkage would create a self-defense justification under international law—if tenuous—for the Moroccan military to complete the destruction of the Polisario military and government. The Polisario, however, is undoubtedly aware of the implications of this line of action—which their long-standing strict disavowal of terrorism demonstrates.

Contingency IV: Deterioration of Humanitarian Conditions in the Tindouf Camps

Likelihood: High

Impact: Moderate

The Tindouf refugee camps are reliant on diminishing supplies of humanitarian aid; reports and interviews suggest basic human needs are not being met.

UNHCR and the World Food Program (WFP) administered a nutrition survey in April, finding that all malnutrition indicators increased, including “global acute malnutrition (from 4 per cent in 2016 to 7 per cent in 2019), stunting (from 18 per cent in 2016 to 28 per cent in 2019), anemia in children (from 38 to 50 per cent) and anemia in women (from 43 to 52 per cent).”55 Additionally, UNHCR failed to meet its targets for 2018, and falls short of meeting international standards in “protection, shelter, water and sanitation, health, nutrition, education, energy, provision of non-food items and livelihoods.”56 Field interviews with the Sahrawi Red Crescent

Members of the workshop team meet with local leaders at the camps outside of Tindouf. Source: Mark Jahnke.

indicate that the funding gap could be closed with additional support in the $30-$60 million dollar range, a relatively small figure in the context of international humanitarian aid.

The refugee situation poses concern because the duration of the conflict has led to donor fatigue and increased Sahrawi calls for a return to violence. If conditions in the camp continue to deteriorate, it could exacerbate the risk of conflict by augmenting the sense of despair and hopelessness among the Sahrawi youth. A general perception among people in the camps is that war could present the best way of increasing assistance because it would get the international community’s attention. Donors are perceived as more likely to donate to places experiencing violent conflict.

The risk of violent conflict could require a U.S. policy response, given U.S. interests in regional stability.

Contingency V: Moroccan Leadership Transition

Likelihood: Low

Impact: Low

Transition in Moroccan leadership would likely result in little change to Moroccan policies on the conflict.

Moroccan King Mohammed VI is fifty-six years old. The report will not speculate on King Mohammed’s health; regardless, if some event were to result in a transition of Moroccan leadership to his son, Prince Moulay Hassan, this likely would not result in significant or immediate change in Moroccan policy on the Western Sahara, and no change that would facilitate resolution.

A military coup in Morocco is highly unlikely and probably would not result in significant change in the state’s Western Sahara policy. A military regime would likely retain or take an even harder position on maintaining Moroccan control of the territory.

As reviewed in previous sections, Moroccans in all walks of life consider Western Sahara and the Sahrawi people a historical part of the kingdom. A new regime is unlikely to escalate tensions with Algeria but would likely seek to assert its power by not ceding ground in any front.

Contingency VI:

Natural Disasters Affecting Tindouf Camps

Likelihood: Moderate

Impact: Moderate

A re-occurrence of a natural disaster similar to the 2015 floods around Tindouf could have implications on humanitarian conditions in the camps

In 2015, Tindouf experienced catastrophic flooding that affected all five camps and impacted upwards of 57,000 people. These floods damaged and destroyed homes, crippled schools and health centers, interrupted food supply, and threatened water contamination. They were the result of rains that delivered the equivalent of ten years of the typical annual rainfall seen in the region – a scenario that could repeat itself due to climate change.57

The outcome of this scenario follows the trajectory laid out above regarding a deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the Tindouf camps.

Contingency VII:

Moroccan Leadership Transition

Likelihood: Moderate

Impact: High

A Presidential tweet could have significant implications on the conflict and would require immediate interagency response.

President Trump has demonstrated a tendency to tweet his opinion on or intent to promote certain policy positions over the course of his pres-

United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

idency. A tweet from President Trump recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara remains possible, particularly in light of Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit to Morocco in early December. This would mark a distinct change to U.S. policy on the issue and would likely elicit the following responses:

1. Morocco would immediately acknowledge and promote the President’s policy statement, as it is consistent with the central national belief that Western Sahara is a part of the Moroccan state.

The Moroccan government would expect clear actions from the United States demonstrating the change in policy position and would pressure other allies to take the same position. The Moroccan government would likely seek to memorialize the policy change within the UNSC, as Moroccan officials consistently expressed the desire for the conflict to be resolved through a UN process.

However, if the UN does not acknowledge Moroccan sovereignty over the territory alongside the United States, it is likely Morocco would still enact measures to consolidate its sovereignty knowing it has the backing of the United States. If the United States did not take action to support Morocco in enacting its sovereignty over Western Sahara, Morocco would react negatively and accuse the United States of not honoring the close partnership between the two countries as well as potentially enact measures to hurt U.S. priorities in the region.

2. The Polisario would react negatively to a public change in U.S. policy.

The Polisario considers the United States a potential honest broker in the situation and a recognition of Moroccan sovereignty would betray that position. Polisario leadership would likely lobby U.S. sympathizers and international allies to make stronger statements regarding the Sahrawi right to self-determination of Western Saharan sovereignty and intervene against efforts to memorialize

this position in the UNSC. They could also call for public demonstrations against the position in Western Sahara or in Morocco, which could risk turning violent.

3. Algeria would likely support the action the Polisario took in response to the statement.

Such a tweet would demonstrate a significant change in the U.S. position on the issue. Given the strong relationship between the United States and Morocco and Moroccan sensitivity on the issue of Western Sahara, U.S. actions would need to change to match its change in rhetoric. This may include extending counterterrorism support and US-

A sign in the center of the MINURSO team site, Smara. Peacekeepers from around the world are stationed at the small site. Source: Lorraine Keeler.

AID and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects into Western Sahara, as well as continuing to stand by the claim of Moroccan sovereignty over the territory in the UN and other international forums.

Sensitivity of the Moroccans to this issue and any changes in U.S. position on it would necessitate expedient action among agencies in Washington and U.S. Embassy Rabat to demonstrate commitment to any new U.S. position. Recognition of Moroccan sovereignty could also create tensions with or further antagonize U.S. relations with the 42 UN Member States which currently recognize the SADR, including Iran, Mexico, and others.

Contingency VIII:

President Trump Tweets Demand for Independence Resolution or Other Support for the Polisario

Likelihood: Low

Impact: Moderate

A Presidential tweet could have significant implications on the conflict and would require immediate interagency response.

Should Trump express demand for an independence resolution, it would likely inspire the Polisario to push for greater progress within the UN System—but it is difficult to predict the long-term implications of such a move.

If Trump’s tweet is perceived as a shift in U.S. neutrality, the Moroccan government may react by temporarily cutting off ties or threatening intergovernmental cooperation. However, Trump has become notorious for spontaneously tweeting his opinions; parties could view his expression as just another whim with no serious implications.

If this contingency emerges, it is important that the U.S. State Department and U.S. Mission to the UN retain their position as an honest broker to the conflict. While this would pose a credibili-

ty issue, they must reassert their commitment to the UN process, and ensure both parties that— despite what is posted on Twitter—the U.S. position will remain deliberative, careful, and in pursuit of the most amenable resolution.

30 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS: Mitigation and Confidence Building

The following recommendations serve a dual purpose: preventing a deterioration of the status quo, and shifting the leadership and popular dynamics around the conflict, to create an environment conducive to an eventual resolution of the conflict.

Previous sections have discussed how, at present, we assess that neither Moroccan nor Polisario leaders trust the counterparty to negotiate in good faith. Additionally, we assess that Polisario leaders and the Sahrawi population residing outside of Moroccan-controlled territory greatly mistrust the Government of Morocco. Based on this mistrust, they do not view any resolution short of full independence from Morocco as guaranteeing their rights.

To allow for an eventual resolution, trust must be built to the point where the Polisario and Sahrawi population can believe that the Government of Morocco will respect their rights. We base this argument on an assumption that Morocco will not accept any resolution that allows for an independent Western Sahara state.

Interviews with representatives from the Polisario and Government of Morocco revealed that both view the United States as an “honest broker” in the dispute. To them, the United States has tried to adhere to a fair resolution process through the UN, even as other parties have sought to disrupt it or gain unfair advantage. In addition to its fairness, both parties view the United States as a powerbroker within the UN process – both through its status as a UNSC permanent member and “penholder” on the MINURSO mandate.

As both an honest broker and a powerbroker in the conflict, the United States can play a unique role in supporting the UN process. Unlike other parties, it can recommend proposals and be assured that both the Polisario and Morocco will and must seriously consider them. We recommend the United States leverage this unique role to reinforce the UN political process. By proposing measures, the United States will prevent accusations of bias by either party against

the PESG. This will allow the PESG to play a neutral mediator role, changing the dynamic of negotiations and starting to build trust among the parties in the process. While the U.S. Department of State will take the principal role in this policy, it will require support from across the U.S. Government. As such, the Administration should proactively engage with the legislative branch so that the Congress can consult and advise on this policy, and the measures to implement it.

1. Re-initiate the UN process by appointing a “neutral nationality” Personal Envoy of the Secretary General (PESG).

The Government of Morocco and the Polisario have both placed restrictions on the nationality of a future PESG. The Government of Morocco has informally refused to accept any U.S. or Northern European (UK, Scandinavian, or German) national as the next PESG. For their part, the Polisario has refused to accept any French, Italian, Spanish, or Middle Eastern nationals, as well as any Muslims, as the next PESG.

Moroccan and Polisario interviewees described these restrictions as a necessary precaution to ensure the neutrality of the PESG. In their views, a PESG with those national, geographic, or cultural backgrounds would be susceptible to influence and overly sympathetic to the other side.

While these demands are onerous (and unfounded), we recommend that the United States urge the UN Secretary General to respect them in the PESG appointment. Appointing a PESG with a “neutral nationality” will help reinforce the perceived neutrality of the UN process for both parties and publics. Additionally, appointing a PESG with one of the blacklisted nationalities will automatically undermine legitimacy of the UN process for one party.

2. Encourage the PESG to start with good-faith measures.

The United States should encourage the new

UN PESG to begin their term by focusing on good-faith measures. Previous PESGs have started their tenures by seeking to restart negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. However, given the current trust deficit between the two leaderships (and their populations), restarting negotiations would not be productive.

Some policymakers previously engaged in the conflict questioned the role of good-faith measures, stating that they became a distraction to the main goal of conflict resolution, a “new topic to bicker over.” However, because of the intractable nature of the conflict and the total lack of trust between the two parties, we believe goodfaith measures are one of the only practical measures available to begin to repair relations between the parties.

The United States can play the role of proposing these measures, especially the most controversial. This will allow the PESG to mediate a negotiation between the parties on their implemen-

tation. Acting as a mediator on a U.S. proposal (rather than proposing it themself) will preserve the PESG’s neutrality.

Instead, the newly appointed PESG should focus on stabilizing the current status quo through good-faith measures. Over time, successful goodfaith measures will also change trust perceptions and build foundations for future negotiations.

Good-faith measures should focus on providing a tangible benefit to addressing the conflict’s effects on the population. Doing so will help mitigate potential conflict, as a return to hostilities or violence would jeopardize the good-faith measures’ continuation. Additionally, good-faith measures with a tangible benefit for the population will help address mistrust of the counterparty. Addressing mistrust among the Sahrawi population living in the Tindouf refugee camps will be especially important to future negotiations, and this population’s relatively small size means that even limited measures can have a large per capita impact.

Suggested good-faith measures include:

a. A resumption of the family visit program

MINURSO previously supported a family visit program that brought Tindouf camp residents to Laayoune to meet with family members living in the Moroccan-controlled territory. In unison with the family visit programs should be the revival of the UNHCR-managed cultural seminars that brought Sahrawis from both sides of the berm to conduct exchanges on various aspects of Sahrawi culture.

b. A UN human rights monitoring mechanism separate from MINURSO

While the parties differ on the exact nature of the mechanism, both agree on conducting human rights monitoring under UN auspices.

Polisario representatives and Tindouf camp residents repeatedly expressed a desire for a human rights monitoring mechanism during interviews.

32 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

An administrative building in the Raabouni refugee camp, outside of Tindouf, Algeria. Source: Toshiro Baum

Most expressed a desire to expand MINURSO’s mandate to include human rights monitoring, and noted that MINURSO is one of the only UN peacekeeping missions that does not have human rights monitoring included in its mandate.

The Government of Morocco has repeatedly expressed opposition to including human rights monitoring in MINURSO’s mandate. However, during interviews, Government of Morocco representatives noted that human rights in Morocco are already monitored under other UN agencies, like the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and treaty bodies.

We recommend that the United States propose a UN monitoring mission under the Human Rights Commission, and have the PESG mediate a negotiation between the parties on its mandate and implementation. The mission should monitor the human rights situation in the Tindouf camps, in Polisario-controlled territory east of the berm, and in Moroccan-controlled territory west of the berm.

Having an additional independent human rights monitoring mechanism will help reinforce popular trust in the UN process, while also addressing Sahrawi popular mistrust in Moroccan authorities and vice versa. Additionally, an independent monitor will help mitigate potential violence that could be driven by anger over perceived human rights abuses.

c. A multi-party effort to document the fate of victims of the conflict.

All of the parties to the conflict accuse the other sides of human rights abuses and war crimes against civilians and military personnel, a significant number of which have been substantiated by independent monitors. These include forced disappearances, torture or illegal punishment of detainees, illegal executions, and forced displacement. These abuses, along with others that have not been substantiated by independent monitors, have become central to popular and leadership narratives about the conflict, who cite them as a reason to mistrust the counterparty.

While not all of the accusations have been corroborated by international monitors, there exist a significant number of confirmed violations by all parties to the conflict.

As an initial step to begin addressing the mistrust between the two sides’ leaders and populations, we recommend forming a commission with Moroccan, Polisario, and Spanish representatives that seeks to determine the fates of conflict victims. The effort must also include representatives from the UN and INGOs or other nationalities to serve as experts or reinforce the commission’s impartiality.

Including Spanish representatives and extending the scope of the commission to include conflict victims from the colonial independence struggle will help insulate the commission from the current impasse, and reinforce the common ground for truth and reconciliation.

Importantly, the governments represented by the commission should agree to some form of amnesty for those involved in abuses. This understanding will help reinforce candor in the process, and allow honest documentation without fear of legal or other consequences that could polarize the proceedings. If the governments are not willing to accept full amnesty, they could agree to limited amnesty, which would allow citizens to file suit for damages with their own governments.

The United States could also convene international donors to create a compensation fund for the victims of the conflict. In addition to providing a financial incentive for participation, the fund would help reinforce the conciliatory power of the multi-party commission, by providing symbolic compensation for families’ losses.

4. Assess and address humanitarian conditions in the Tindouf refugee camps

Interlocutors from the SADR government, humanitarian donors, humanitarian organizations, and the diplomatic community shared that living conditions have deteriorated in the Tindouf

refugee camps. In their assessment, decreased funding for refugee services and food assistance have impacted vulnerable populations, particularly infants and children under five and pregnant and nursing mothers. If left unaddressed, this trend could result in a wider humanitarian crisis.

The report researchers did not have the means to independently assess humanitarian conditions in the Tindouf refugee camps, but several international human rights watchdogs have documented the urgency. The reported urgency of a potential humanitarian crisis justifies U.S. Government preventative action.

As a first step, the United States should push for an accurate count of refugees starting with an examination of the 2018 UNHCR report’s methodology. Next, a formal review of humanitarian assistance distribution should be conducted by UNHCR and WFP with some support from the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) as needed. Lastly, the United States should encourage contributions from potential donors for support of the Sahrawi refugee camps.

5.

Issue clear public and private

statements to prevent the resumption of hostilities

Polisario and Tindouf camp residents suggested in multiple interviews that pressure to return to hostilities with Morocco has grown. In addition, long-time observers of the Western Sahara, including former PESG Ambassador Chris Ross, reported that this pressure appears higher than in years past. In particular, interlocutors expressed concern that this pressure could lead the Polisario to shift its policy and potentially declare a return to hostilities when the five-year Polisario general congress convenes on December 20, 2019.

We recommend that the U.S. Government issue public statements calling on both parties to adhere to the ceasefire. These statements should be coupled with an assurance that the Unit-

ed States will support the right of Morocco to self-defense, to reinforce to Polisario leaders and Tindouf camp residents that resuming conflict will not serve their interest. Statements can be issued publicly by the U.S. Mission to the UN and in private to Moroccan and Polisario representatives by the U.S. Embassies in Rabat and Algiers. Swift action by the U.S. Government can help prevent a potential resumption of hostilities, and ensure that the ceasefire, a key component for gradual progress toward a resolution, remains in place.

6. Increase regular contact with Polisario representatives in Algiers, New York, and Washington.

U.S. Embassy Algiers staff acknowledged that they have limited means to assess popular opinion in the Tindouf refugee camps. Similarly, means to understand the Polisario leadership’s thinking remains limited. Adequate and accurate information will be crucial to mitigating and preventing any potential deterioration of the status quo, including a return to hostilities. Similarly, gaining a better understanding of Polisario leadership policy shifts will be crucial to supporting a negotiation and conflict resolution process.

We recommend regular contact between U.S. Government representatives, Polisario representatives and Tindouf camp residents. This includes ramping up regular working-level contact with SADR representatives in New York and Washington, and exploring information sharing with U.S. Government Department of Defense or law enforcement personnel on security issues such as trafficking.

The Government of Morocco may raise some objection to wider contact with the Polisario. The U.S. Government (particularly the U.S. Ambassador to Morocco) should be prepared to confirm to the Government of Morocco that these contacts do not constitute recognition of the SADR, and that U.S. diplomats meet regularly with a variety of groups.

34 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

Building sustained and wider contact with the Polisario will not only provide the U.S. Government with information, but also relationships it can leverage. Such leverage may be crucial to the success of eventual negotiations on a resolution, or during contingencies that may require Polisario restraint or action to avert a deteriorating situation.

7. Encourage the Government of Morocco to clearly and publicly protect free speech and other fundamental human rights in the territory,.

Achieving a resolution to the conflict will depend on popular trust of the Government of Morocco’s respect for legal and human rights, and, by extension, respect for any agreement negotiated between the parties. Without it, the Polisario leadership and Sahrawi population will not accept any resolution short of full independence, as they will not be able to trust Morocco’s commitments under any plan that involves Moroccan sovereignty over the territory.

In the current connected age and polarized atmosphere, even isolated incidents or unsanctioned abuses by Moroccan security forces can reinforce the perception of Moroccan authorities as untrustworthy. The Tindouf camp population’s recent connection to the internet has only further fueled this perception through increased sharing of stories, videos, and live streams of demonstrations over social media.

To address this popular mistrust, U.S. Government representatives should encourage their Moroccan counterparts to proactively foreswear political repression, human rights abuses, and use of excessive force by security forces in the Saharan territory under their control. Senior U.S. Government representatives (particularly the U.S. Ambassador to Morocco and Assistant Secretary for NEA) should deliver this message in private to the Moroccan Minister of Interior and the Royal Palace.

Applying this sort of pressure without damag-

ing the bilateral relationship requires that the pressure be contextualized as collaborative. The United States should suggest that, as a treaty ally, it is committed to helping Morocco achieve its own ends. Addressing the Polisario and Sahrawi mistrust of the Government of Morocco will boost the credibility of any legal commitments Morocco proposes in negotiations, and augment the chances that the other side will accept a Moroccan proposal. This will help provide Morocco with credibility that it will uphold fundamental rights and respect any agreement between the parties.

In addition, the United States could suggest that the Government of Morocco augment the reach and impact of its commitment by considering additional third-party monitoring. U.S. representatives can offer assistance in public diplomacy and social media outreach efforts, or other initiatives aimed at addressing perceptions of untrustworthiness.

While Moroccan interlocutors will likely claim that Morocco has always and continues to enforce their laws in accordance with legal standards for protecting human rights, U.S. representatives should stress the importance of perception rather than legal technicalities. As further evidence, U.S. representatives can point to specific ongoing issues (such as the trials following the Gdeim Izik camp protests) as examples of ways Moroccan actions continue to fuel the trust gap.

In private, U.S. representatives can encourage their counterparts to consider accepting political behavior (such as organizing protests or questioning the territory’s status) that might seem threatening—and might well cross the line elsewhere in Morocco. U.S. representatives should encourage their interlocutors to see public demonstrations, peaceful unrest, and political speech not as threatening, but as opportunities to publicly demonstrate that the Government of Morocco can be trusted to respect the rule of law and human rights. Given the Tindouf camps’ recent connection to internet access in the camps, this key population will witness and respond to a Moroccan change in behavior.

LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATION

A: Leverage Opportunities to Facilitate Resolution

In the event of Polisario leadership transition, the report recommends the U.S. develop and provide the UN PESG with a proposal for Western Saharan Autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, and encourage the PESG to mediate a negotiation on this proposal.

To succeed, any negotiated resolution to a conflict requires provisions that (1) make the agreement acceptable to the parties and (2) sustainable by providing for the interests of the parties and populations over the next several generations.

The assessment of the current Polisario and Government of Morocco positions and interests below seeks to identify the main contours of an acceptable and sustainable negotiated resolution to the Western Sahara conflict. While this should not prescribe the actual details of an eventual resolution, it will help the U.S. Government identify key focus areas for negotiations. In addition, those involved or observing the negotiation can use the baseline assessment of the parties’ interests and positions to identify trends and key shifts by either party that can be exploited to constructively influence the negotiation process toward resolution.

Polisario: position and interests

Since the conclusion of the UN Settlement Plan negotiations in 1988, the Polisario’s stated position on the future of the Western Sahara has been the exercise of self-determination through a referendum, with territorial independence as one of the options presented to voters. Polisario officials reiterated this position during field interviews.

But Polisario officials and Sahrawis residing in the Tindouf camps also expressed several underlying interests about why they want an independence referendum or about the outcome they hope will come from a referendum with independence as an option. Interests include:

• To return to the land they lived on for generations. They want to be able to go home to their territory without fearing for their safety. Sahrawis want to start lives, build homes, and engage in commercial activity to support themselves, their families, and their community.

• To self-govern upon return to the Western Sahara. Both the Polisario officials operating government ministries in exile and the teachers and health care providers offering services to Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps want to govern and provide services in the Western Sahara after returning.

• To utilize the natural resources in the Western Sahara to benefit Sahrawis. They want to extract phosphates and fish the territory’s waters.

• To find a solution to the conflict that makes the Sahrawi suffering “worth it.” Polisario officials who have asked that the Sahrawi people remain in the Tindouf camps for 43 years, instead of assimilating into Morocco or migrating to Europe, want to be able to offer their people a better option than the one currently available to them.

Without a negotiated agreement with Morocco, the Polisario’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement remains a situation of protracted displacement, reliant on humanitarian aid to meet basic needs and on the efforts of the UN PESG to bring about agreement on a resolution to the conflict. While the Polisario threatens to return to violence, they are too ill-equipped and too far outnumbered by Moroccan forces to render this threat a credible means to change the status quo.

The ability to build on any of the Polisario’s underlying interests is premised on policy change by the Polisario, likely due to a generational leadership change. Adherence to the party line that self-determination should be exercised through a referendum on territorial independence remains high, particularly among the older generation who lived through violent conflict with Morocco.

36 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

Recommended Tactics

A deliberate socialization process and implementation of a communications plan explaining how outcomes other than an independence referendum satisfy Sahrawi interests could pave the way for another solution. The United States should utilize the relationship-building efforts in the conflict mitigation phase to begin to influence the incoming generation of Polisario leadership early on; in dialogue, the United States should be clear-eyed and direct in communicating that it will not support the Polisario’s maximalist position of independence. The intent of this messaging would be to discourage the new generation from tying their political fortunes to achieving this end in the way that the current leadership has.

Government of Morocco: position and interests

While the Government of Morocco agreed to a referendum with independence as an option in the UN Settlement Plan, the Moroccans updated their outward position on a solution to the Western Sahara question in their 2007 “autonomy proposal for the Sahara, within the framework of the Kingdom’s sovereignty and national unity” and the opportunity for ratification by “the populations concerned in a free referendum.”58 Moroccan contacts reiterated this position in field interviews.

Morocco’s offer for Sahrawi autonomy via referendum, while maintaining Moroccan sovereignty, coupled with interviews with Moroccan officials, contains several underlying interests:

• To maintain stability within Moroccan territory in order to limit threats to the monarchy and ensure the continued rule of the royal family. Morocco fears independence for Western Sahara would threaten overall the integrity of the nation-state and trigger further splintering of the Moroccan territory.

• To earn international recognition for their sovereignty over the Western Sahara, and the

ability to exercise the rights that follow from that sovereignty.

• To maintain its status as a reliable security partner by United States and France, particularly in the counterterrorism sphere.

• To keep the large investments in infrastructure and development that it has made in Western Sahara—which is disproportionately higher than in other parts of the country—within Morocco’s borders. The Government of Morocco wants to be seen as a wise steward of state resources, so maintaining at least nominal control of territory which has seen heavy government spending remains a priority.

• To continue taxing corporations and individuals that benefit from the natural resources in Western Sahara. Keeping the resource-rich areas Morocco currently controls within Morocco’s borders will ensure tax revenue continues to flow to the Government of Morocco.

Morocco enjoys a better situation without a negotiated agreement than the Polisario. The Government of Morocco has de facto control over the resource-rich and most desirable parts of the territory and a strong security apparatus to suppress dissent from those who might seek to alter the status quo who reside in the Moroccan-controlled portion of the territory. While they still lack international recognition to exercise this control, this presents a minor hindrance. As such, the ability of a resolution to build on the interests of the Government of Morocco will likely require international recognition of de facto Moroccan control in exchange for protection of rights and other measures to preserve Sahrawi autonomy.

Expected contours of a resolution agreement should the parties agree to pursue autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty:

Recognition of Moroccan Sovereignty

We expect that any eventual resolution will require both the parties and the international

community (primarily the UN and UNSC permanent five) to recognize the King and Government of Morocco’s sovereignty over the territory. This will likely face resistance from the U.S. Congress, particularly influential members that strongly believe in the legitimacy of an independent Sahrawi state. While a change in Polisario leadership and policy to accept autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty may temper this resistance, the Administration should prepare to explain the necessity of recognizing Moroccan sovereignty, and adjust policy based on Congressional advice.

This will also require the international community (particularly Algeria and influential African Union states such as Nigeria and South Africa) to withdraw recognition of the SADR as a state. The agreement must remove independence as an option, either permanently or for a transitional period of several generations.

Articulating Sahrawi Autonomy

In exchange for recognizing Moroccan sovereignty, the Polisario and Sahrawi population will require a defined and detailed governance structure that delineates the powers and authorities reserved to the Government of Morocco and the local government of the Western Sahara province. Clearly laying out the outline of autonomy is of utmost importance to securing Sahrawi support for a proposal that grants the Polisario self-governance over Saharan territory.

• Grant Sahrawis Moroccan citizenship, and special legal status. This will also entail articulating the legal rights pertaining to this special status.

• Articulate the legal powers devolved to the territory under autonomy. To implement and guarantee this, we anticipate that the agreement will also need to do the following:

○ Negotiate a power-sharing agreement. An agreement that reserves a higher than proportionate influence for the Polisario and Sahrawi returnees will reassure the Polisario and Sahrawi population that they will continue to have self-governance over the territory and can assure the rights of those living in the territory. This could include reserving specific authorities to the Polisario or higher than proportional number of positions for the Sahrawi returnees. These could continue indefinitely, or for an agreed upon transitional period, after which it would reallocate to a more equal system proportionate to the population.

○ Integrate the Polisario security services. Allowing the existing Polisario services to provide security for their own community will reinforce returnees’ sense of security and trust in the resolution agreement. However, this will require training and equipping members of the existing Polisario security service to Moroccan standards and providing for resources and authorities for them within the existing Moroccan security service in the region.

38 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and

Recommendations

A mural inside a Polisario administration building. Source: Toshiro Baum.

○ Create a resource allocation framework.

The Polisario and Sahrawi population view the territory’s resources and the revenues that they provide as a benefit that should be reserved for them as a nation. Defining a framework that acknowledges this right, and grants them control over the allocation of benefits such as revenue and lucrative jobs, will help reinforce the resolution’s sustainability.

Ratification through referendum

We anticipate that popular Sahrawi opinion and views about the legal mechanisms for self-determination will require that any resolution agreement be ratified by referendum. Voting in a referendum is key to satisfying Sahrawi demands for self-determination. Absent a referendum, any negotiated settlement will not have popular or international legitimacy.

Resettlement and integration measures

In addition to long-term measures to reinforce the sustainability of the resolution, the resolution will likely require short-term measures intended to support the resettlement and integration of the refugee population. These may take the form of material benefits such as housing, educational scholarships, temporary stipends, or designated employment. Other measures could include legal or political measures such as an additional special status for refugees that grants them expanded political influence. The fact that Sahrawis will finally have the option to safely return to the territory they long inhabited and access available natural resources must be emphasized above all in making the case for resettlement of the Sahrawi community in exile in the Tindouf camps.

Messaging

Because this resolution requires deviation from both sides’ hard stances, it will be necessary to give careful thought to how leaders of each side will present the resolution to their constituents. All parties should take this challenge seriously and the United States and the UN should sup-

port Morocco and the Polisario in their messaging efforts, whether by providing funding or access to public relations expertise. A well-executed messaging campaign that is sensitive to the interests of each population could reduce the likelihood of violence and political liabilities for each side.

LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATION B: Resolution via Referendum With Independence

An alternative resolution recommendation, supported by a smaller contingent of students in the course, is that the U.S. urge the UN PESG and Security Council members to issue a referendum with options for: (1) independence, (2) autonomy, and (3) integration, preceded by a period of territorial power-sharing – as captured in the 2003 Baker Plan.

A resolution to the conflict that neglects the Polisario’s interest of self-determination by not including an option for independence and ignores international law sets a dangerous precedent for U.S. policy. Additionally, supporting a resolution that grants Moroccan sovereignty prematurely is not the most durable solution to this conflict. The risks include:

• Rewarding Morocco’s unwillingness to comply with international law;

• Removing the ability of the United States to be perceived as an honest broker and play a productive role in the resolution of this conflict by changing long-standing U.S. policy towards the conflict;

• Weakening the United Nations by undermining the promotion of international law;

• Damaging relations with countries that recognize SADR, including Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa which are important countries for U.S. policy in the African continent; and

• Pushing the Polisario away from the UN system, and increasing the costs of maintaining stability by disincentivizing Sahrawis to engage productively and peacefully in the resolution of the conflict.

This recommendation rests on a fundamental respect for international law, human rights, and humanitarian affairs. It also recognizes that a resolution to this conflict, which affirms the principle of self-determination, contributes to regional security, stability, and prosperity. The proposed resolution will likely face resistance

from the U.S. Congress, particularly members that believe that Moroccan control of the territory contributes to long-term stability in the region. While a shift in Moroccan policy would preempt this resistance, the Administration should prepare to explain the necessity of retaining the United States’ reputation as an honest broker and upholding international law, and adjust policy based on congressional advice.

This recommendation asks the U.S. Government to follow through on its commitments to the UN system. The MINURSO mandate still issues a call to “organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results.”59 Organizing a referendum will restore the credibility of the UN, and affirm longstanding U.S. policy on the issue. The most durable resolution that keeps the parties engaged in the UN system would be a version of the 2003 Baker peace plan because it requires both Morocco and the Polisario to try to win over the population though referendum after a period of territorial power-sharing. This recommendation aligns with the same U.S. policy interests:

• Security: The U.S., Algeria, Morocco, and the Polisario share an interest in continued and improved counterterrorism efforts in the region. Polisario intelligence is currently underutilized, yet they possess a comprehensive understanding of arms dealing, drug smuggling, and movement around their territory. By allowing the drug trade to proliferate beyond and through its borders, Morocco is undermining its own security and that of the region.

• Stability: Moroccan stability could be enhanced if it were not in stalemate with the Polisario on its border. Furthermore, Algeria has repeatedly demonstrated interest in improving its trade and bilateral relationship with Morocco, which would enhance territorial and economic security. Coordinated effort from the U.S. and others would encourage Morocco and Algeria to build cohesion across the larger Maghreb region. Most importantly, status quo conditions in the

40 United States Policy

Dispute:

on the Western Sahara

Overview and Recommendations

Western Sahara exacerbate the risk of conflict. Some Sahrawis have considered the prospects of war, which would only raise costs for all parties involved.

Whether the results entail autonomy, independence, or integration, tensions will not dissolve until the UN confirms its credibility and commitment.

• Respect: U.S. commitments to self-determination, human rights, and the betterment of humankind are inscribed in international law and the mandates of U.S. institutions. As the situation currently stands, Sahrawis living under Moroccan control face ongoing human rights violations. Although there are more documented abuses on the Moroccan side, the Polisario has also been accused of violating human rights. Until a resolution is reached, this reality will persist.

By adhering to international law and longstanding UN policy, this alternative recommendation affirms the position of the U.S. as an “honest broker.” However, it does raise the question: why would Morocco agree to, or even consider, a proposal that cites independence as an option?

• Resolution: Maintaining the status quo guarantees the continued denial of human rights and humanitarian considerations, and further threatens regional stability and security interests. countries like China for support and reliance. Morocco also receives substantial development assistance from the U.S., which it should not risk losing. As of 2017, total U.S. foreign aid to Morocco neighbored $491 million, the seventh highest in the Middle East and North Africa region. About 97 percent of U.S. assistance to Morocco is economic, and only 3 percent is military. The bulk of the foreign aid is through the Millennium Challenge Corporation of about $450 million aimed at improving access to higher quality education, workforce development, and land productivity. USAID is implementing $30 million worth of initiatives focused on strengthening primary education and improving youth wellbeing. Morocco also benefits significantly from the Free Trade Agreement and the Science and Technology Cooperation (S&T) Agreement, which have helped increase foreign direct investment in the country by improving the business environment.

There are several reasons why Morocco might change its position. First, as previously outlined, the costs of Moroccan investment in the region supersede the benefits to its own economy. The gains from natural resource exploitation do not compensate for Morocco’s extensive civil expenditures. Second, framing this discussion of a referendum as a long-term, multilateral vision for the region would pull in support from Algeria, the African Union, and Morocco’s European allies. The parties should be urged to think about the improvements to security and economic conditions that could come from settling this conflict in a peaceful manner that complies with international law. Third, Morocco should be reassured that the outcome of the referendum is not pre-determined, and Morocco has an opportunity to win over the entire electorate by pursuing genuine trust-building efforts and continuing to provide resources and opportunity to the territory.

Additionally, the U.S. maintains significant leverage in its bilateral relationship with Morocco. Morocco remains an important counterterrorism partner, and it is unlikely to turn to

The U.S. is an important partner for Morocco’s development goals. The perceived damage to Morocco-U.S. bilateral relations from including independence in a conflict resolution proposal is overstated, as Morocco would not risk losing its vital partnership with the U.S. Nonetheless, the U.S. should tread carefully in its negotiations. One way the U.S. can get Morocco to shift po-

A sign inside the MINURSO team site, Smara. Source: Lorraine Keeler.

sition on including independence in a referendum is to increase its economic assistance.

It is also unclear whether Morocco’s claims to existentialism are exclusive to the monarchy, or if public opinion actually possesses this view. If the monarchy changes its position on the Western Sahara, it may also be able to substantially shift public opinion. One can argue that Morocco has built this narrative of existentialism. King Hassan II was reportedly open to considering a referendum with the option of independence, whereas King Mohammad VI considers the territory existential to Moroccan territory and identity. Although it should be noted that, depending on the referendum outcome, the presence of an independent territory in what Morocco considers sovereign land does pose a risk of encouraging self-determination in the Rif area of Morocco; this is a possible source of instability if the kingdom does not message the change effectively.

Lastly, Morocco has been trying to reposition itself as a leader in African political and economic affairs. Morocco joined the African Union in 2017 after a 33-year absence and has actively tried to advance its economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa through business deals and diplomacy. It is currently in negotiations to

join the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the hopes of expanding its economic ties with West African states. Despite these efforts, the ongoing dispute over Western Sahara will continue to restrict trade with African states that recognize SADR and question the legality of Morocco’s claim to the territory, posing as a major roadblock to its economic aspirations in Africa. The SADR signed on to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), which signals the extent of recognition of SADR in the continent. Working with the SADR and the African Union may enhance Morocco’s leadership and image in regional and multilateral forums, given that so many African countries already recognize the Polisario.

This recommendation raises a second important question: if the referendum resulted in independence, would an independent Polisario-run state even be realistic? This is a major consideration, since there is no accurate way to pre-assess the outcome of the vote. Despite difficult conditions, observations from the refugee camps indicate that this may not be entirely unfeasible.

Since declaring itself a government-in-exile, SADR has established and operated—for decades now—a system of governance and institutions that serve as the foundation of a state. The Polisario has its own Congress, foreign ministry, an expansive diplomatic strategy, a defense ministry, military personnel, vibrant civil society, and even a human rights commission which has led to substantial progress in protection of rights relative to the Moroccan-controlled territory— despite ongoing challenges.

Undoubtedly, an independent Polisario state would entail an exercise in state-building, but the institutional basis for a sustainable state—as well as a young population eager to participate politically and economically—is present and cannot be denied. After an adjustment period that would require UN and Algerian support, an independent Polisario-run state could still contribute to a more stable region and could garner financial support and economic cooperation among the many countries that officially recognize the SADR.

42 United States Policy on the

Dispute: Overview

Western Sahara

and Recommendations

Tribal leaders hosted teammembers at a traditional Sahrawi dinner in Laayoune. Source: Lorraine Keeler.

Endnotes

1 A smaller contingent of the graduate students in the course (who adhere to Recommendation B in the report) believes this counteracts any efforts by the U.S. to be an “honest broker.” Both parties should equally adhere to the ceasefire; if the U.S. issues a particular warning or assurance to only one of the sides, it violates a position of neutrality and hinders negotiation processes.

2 The smaller contingent of graduate students, supporting Recommendation B, believes a reference to the Moroccan autonomy plan delegitimizes the position of the U.S. as an honest broker, and ought to be avoided in negotiations.

3 Bell, Ar vid and Tom O’Bryan. “A Puzzle Too Complex? James Baker’s Mediation Mission in Western Sahara, 1997-2004.” Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government 2019, 3. Theofilopoulou HKS study 3

4 Jensen, Erik, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate, 2nd edition. Lienne Rienner, 2011, 6.

5 Jensen, 13.

6 Janis, Mark, “The International Court of Justice: Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara,” Harvard International Law Journal, 609, 1976, 610 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103207

7 Theofilopoulou HKS study Bell, 4.

8 Theofilopoulou HKS study Bell, 4.

9 Jensen, 14.

10 Zoubir, Yahia, “Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XIV, No. 4, Winter 2007. https://www.mepc.org/journal/ stalemate-western-sahara-ending-international-legality

11 Zoubir.

12 Arieff, Alexis, “Western Sahara,” Congressional Research Service, RS20962, April 14, 2013. https://fas. org/sgp/crs/row/RS20962.pdf.

13 United Nations. ”Background: MINURSO,” 2017, https://minurso.unmissions.org/background.

14 Zoubir.

15 United Nations Security Council. “Security Council Adopts Resolution 2468 (2019), Authorizing SixMonth Extension of United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara.” | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. United Nations, 2019, www. un.org/press/en/2019/sc13795.doc.htm.

16 Arieff, 3.

17 Arieff, 4.

18 Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations. “Reply of the Kingdom of Morocco to Mr. Baker’s proposal entitled “Peace Plan for the Self-Determination of Western Sahara,” http:// www.mission-maroc.ch/en/pages/253.html.

19 Kingdom of Morocco. “Autonomy Plan: Kingdom on the Move.” http://autonomy-plan.org/the-autonomy-plan-for-sahara.

20 Burns as quoted in Arieff 8.

21 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri.” March 23, 2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/03/158895.html

22 Baker, James. Work Hard, Study ... and Keep Out of Politics! Northwestern University Press; First Edition, June 2, 2008, Memoir 354.

23 Polisario officials insist that the movement never received weapons from the Soviet Union, and that the movement has moderated its formerly Marxist-socialist roots. Since 1991, they maintain that the movement’s sole focus has been the liberation of the territory held by Morocco, and the establishment of a democratic nation-state.

24 UNHCR, “Sahrawi Refugees in Tindouf, Algeria: Total In-Camp Population,” http://www.usc.es/ export9/sites/webinstitucional/gl/institutos/ceso/ descargas/UNHCR_Tindouf-Total-In-Camp-Population_March-2018.pdf

25 United Nations Security Council S/2019/787. https://minurso.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ sg_report_english.pdf.

26 United Nations Security Council S/2019/787.

27 Arieff, ‘Summary.’

28 Arieff, ‘Summary.’

29 Messari, Nizar, “National security, the political space, and citizenship: the case of Morocco and the Western Sahara,” The Journal of North African Studies, Volume 6, Issue 4, 2001. https://www.tandfonline.com/ doi/abs/10.1080/13629380108718450, 48.

30 Messari, 48.

31 Morocco World News, “Full Text of King Mohammed VI’s 2019 Green March Speech.” https://www. moroccoworldnews.com/2019/11/286248/full-textking-mohammed-vi-green-march-speech/

United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations

32 Mundy, Jacob, “Moroccan Settlers in Western Sahara: Colonists or Fifth Column?” The Arab World Geographer, January 2012, Volume 15, Issue 2, 95-126. https://arabworldgeographer.org/doi/pdf/10.5555/ arwg.15.2.mgu34h2j94m7278u, 111.

33 Smith, Jeffrey, “The taking of the Sahara: the role of natural resources in the continuing occupation of Western Sahara,” Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 27, Issue 3, 2015. https://www.tandfonline. com/doi/abs/10.1080/14781158.2015.1080234, 272

34 United Nations Security Council. ”Authorizing SixMonth Extension for United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara.” October 31, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13561.doc.htm. “S_res_2440.Pdf.”

35 Messari, 55

36 The report does not in any way endorse or support these characterizations; it simply presents them as articulated by Moroccan officials.

37 The report omits discussion of NEA’s second strategic goal, “Advance Comprehensive and Lasting Arab-Israeli Peace,” as it is not immediately pertinent to the topic at hand.

Eg ypt in the Suez, Turkey in the Bosporus, and the UK/Spain/Morocco in the Strait of Gibraltar.

39 Alexis Arieff., “Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, 26 October 2018.

40 Counter-Extremism Project, “Morocco: Extremism & Counter-Extremism,” 26 December 2018, accessed via https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/ morocco#radicalization_and_foreign_fighters

41 Nathan Sales, “Opening Remarks During the GCTF ‘Threats, Challenges and Resources Related to FTF and Family Repatriation’ Side Event,” 24 September 2019, accessed via https://www.state.gov/openingremarks-during-the-gctf-threats-challenges-and-resources-related-to-ftf-and-family-repatriation-sideevent/

42 Ahlam Ben Saga, “How Morocco Deals with Terrorist Returnees, Other Islamic Radicals,” Morocco World News, 14 March 2019, accessed via https://www. moroccoworldnews.com/2019/03/268010/morocco-terrorist-returnees-slamic-radicals/

43 Arieff, Alexis. “Algeria: In Focus,” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, February 26, 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11116.pdf.

44 Arieff, Alexis “Algeria: In Focus.”

45 Foreign Assistance, “Foreign Assistance in Morocco,”

accessed via https://foreignassistance.gov/explore/ country/Morocco, and Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Morocco,” accessed via https://www.mcc. gov/where-we-work/country/morocco

46 Arieff.“U.S. Relations With Morocco.”

47 Arieff. “U.S. Relations With Morocco.”

48 U.S. Department of State. ”Joint Regional Strategy for the Middle East and North Africa.” August 23, 2018, ” https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ JRS-NEA-ME_UNCLASS_508.pdf.

49 List drawn from Zoubir.

50 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Regional Strategy.” JRS-NEA-ME_UNCLASS_508.Pdf. 6.

51 Oxfam. “The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: What Does it Mean for Multi-Mandated Organizations?” Oxfam Discussion Paper, 2019.

52 Benlakehal, Massinissa. “Western Sahara’s New Leader: The Struggle Continues,” https://www.alaraby. co.uk/english/comment/2016/7/19/western-saharas-new-leader-the-struggle-continues

53 American Foreign Policy Council, “Morocco,” March 2014, accessed via https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ wp-content/uploads/2014/03/AFPC_Morocco.pdf

54 Dario Cristiani, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Attacks Morocco’s ‘Kingdom of Corruption and Despotism,’” Jamestown Foundation, 13 December 2013, accessed via https://www.refworld.org/docid/52aeed444.html

55 United Nations Security Council S/2019/787.

56 United Nations Security Council S/2019/787.

57 Lecat, Ludivine, “Floods in Sahrawi Refugee Camps in Tindouf: Processes of Mobility and Immobility.” 2016, http://labos.ulg.ac.be/hugo/wp-content/uploads/sites/38/2017/11/The-State-of-Environmental-Migration-2016-204-228.pdf

58 Embassy of Morocco Australia-New Zealand-Pacific States, “Full Text of the Moroccan Initiative for an Autonomy Plan,” 2007, http://www.moroccoembassy. org.au/?q=full-text-moroccan-initiative-autonomy-plan

59 MINURSO, “Mandate,” https://minurso.unmissions. org/mandate