Cyprus and its Surroundings: A Pathway for a Stable Eastern Mediterranean

Cyprus and its Surroundings: A Pathway for a Stable

Eastern Mediterranean

Princeton School of Public and International Affairs Policy Workshop Report

December 2020

Faculty Director Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer

S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle East Policy Studies

Authors

Kaira Bakkestad-Legare

Rebecca Gorin

Fatima Khan • Rocio Cara Labrador

Daniel Morales

Jake Gutman

Patrick McDonnell

María Alejandra Moscoso

Maggie Tennis • Victor Yau

Jeff Phaneuf

Published December 21, 2020

Cover Photo: Unsplash/Hert Niks

Back Photo: Unsplash/Nikos Aggelidakis

Members of the workshop team meeting over Zoom. From left to right, top row: Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer, Rebecca Gorin, Fatima Khan, Patrick McDonnell. Middle row: María Alejandra Moscoso, Jeff Phaneuf, Maggie Tennis, Jake Gutman. Bottom row: Kaira Bakkestad-Legare, Daniel Morales, Rocio Cara Labrador, Victor Yao. Source: Rebecca Gorin

This report is the final product of a 2020 Policy Workshop sponsored by the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA) as part of its Master in Public Affairs degree program. It results from the work of twelve graduate students under the supervision of Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer, Lecturer and S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle East Policy Studies at SPIA. A draft of this report was presented to the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.

The report’s information and recommendations stem from months of research, along with interviews conducted with a range of diplomats, policymakers, UN personnel, researchers, and civil society organizations representing numerous stakeholders and perspectives on the Cyprus problem. The full list of interview subjects is located in the Appendix. Unfortunately the group was unable to travel to Cyprus and the region to conduct further research and interviews due to COVID-19-related restrictions so all interviews were conducted virtually.

All authors participated in the discussions, debate, and preparation of this report. However, the report does not necessarily reflect the views of any individual author, facilitator, Princeton University, the U.S. Department of State, or any person or their affiliated organization interviewed as part of this workshop.

Preface Acknowledgments

We are deeply indebted to the many people with whom we consulted and made our research possible. In particular, we would like to thank Ambassador Kurtzer for his guidance and support throughout the research and drafting process.

We extend our gratitude to the scholars and professionals who took the time to speak to our class in Princeton and offer their experience to inform our report. Our report would not have been possible without the generosity of their time and wisdom.

We are also thankful to everyone from Princeton University who supported us: Associate Dean Karen McGuinness, Associate Director of Finance and Administration Ryan Linhart, and everyone else at SPIA who helped make this workshop possible.

Executive Summary

The Cyprus issue is increasingly important for U.S. strategic interests that extend far beyond the island’s shores. This report presents key U.S. interests in the conflict and outlines shortterm and medium-term recommendations for U.S. policy. We identify five overarching interests for U.S. foreign policy in the region, which we rank in descending order of importance:

1. Foster strategic stability in the increasingly volatile Eastern Mediterranean

2. Limit the influence and ambitions of Russia in Cyprus

3. Reaffirm a strong NATO alliance

4. Enhance stability in Cyprus to protect U.S. regional interests and support UN efforts to create conditions for a settlement

5. Maintain the U.S. military’s ability to project power into nearby regional hotspots.

Source: Wikimedia Commons/Golbez

Recommended U.S. Strategy in Cyprus

We propose three objectives for U.S. policy in Cyprus. For each objective, we specify shortterm and medium-term policies, which are detailed in the “Recommended U.S. Strategy for the Cyprus Conflict” section of the report.

Objective One: Limit Turkey’s destabilizing actions in the regional hydrocarbon competition

Turkey is taking an increasingly aggressive maritime posture in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkish President Erdogan’s unilateral efforts to delimit maritime boundaries and growing reliance on “gunboat diplomacy” could eventually jeopardize the stability of the region. Turkey’s growing aggressive naval actions and its interference with vessels licensed to explore hydrocarbons off the coast of Cyprus have implications for Freedom of Navigation and could hinder the U.S. military’s ability to project power into the region. Moreover, conflict over hydrocarbons and maritime boundaries could escalate between Greece and Turkey, potentially threatening the integrity of the NATO alliance. The United States must signal that it will take a stronger stance on the Turkish government’s efforts to lay claim to hydrocarbon resources through force of arms.

Objective Two: Counter Russian influence in the Republic of Cyprus

The Republic of Cyprus’ financial and military ties with Moscow work against the U.S. agenda of competing with Russia, a key great power rival. Russia aims to deepen its official ties with the Republic of Cyprus, fill vacuums of U.S. leadership in the Eastern Mediterranean and advance its counter-NATO agenda. Greater Russian involvement in Cyprus would sow further instability in a region where Russian intervention is already undermining U.S. regional interests, such as in Libya and Syria.

Objective Three: Shape conflict dynamics within Cyprus to support a future settlement process

Growing ethnic tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots provide spoilers the opportunity to take advantage of the internal conflict for their own interests. The United States should aim to shape existing conditions to bring the two Cypriot communities together through low-cost, high-impact efforts that incentivize cooperation between the two communities.

Introduction

The island of Cyprus has emerged as a geopolitical hotspot in the Eastern Mediterranean, requiring greater U.S. policy attention in the coming years. Historically, the Cyprus problem has been rooted in competing ethnic and nationalist identities between the two communities of the island: the majority Greek Cypriots and the minority Turkish Cypriots. Although Cyprus suffered bouts of intense violence in the early Cold War period, the situation on the island has settled into a protracted status quo.

The two Cypriot communities remain deadlocked in a conflict that involves competing claims to territory, ethnic identities, and geopolitics between the two communities’ “motherlands,” Greece and Turkey. Although Cyprus has experienced low levels of violence since the 1980’s, new sources of tension pose threats to the stability of the island’s current environment. Interstate disputes over the island’s offshore hydrocarbon resources are intensifying. The economic aspirations of the Turkish Cypriots in the North, especially among youth, continue to go unmet. Russia has deepened its financial and military ties to the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) over the past decade, Turkey has adopted an increasingly aggressive stance in the Eastern Mediterranean, and China has signaled a burgeoning economic interest in Cyprus.

Despite the island’s relatively stable history, intractable conflicts do not remain frozen forever. Instead, they can deteriorate with little warning, as illustrated by the recent escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the situation in Western Sahara. The incoming administration should stay ahead of the conflict curve and chart a strategic policy for Cyprus that addresses novel threats to the status quo and regional stability.

This report seeks to build upon existing U.S. foreign policy doctrine that positions the Eastern Mediterranean as a strategic space deserving special attention through a tailored foreign policy framework. The transition to a new administration presents an opportunity for considered analysis of this conflict and region of the world to redefine America’s compelling interests and priorities. Our analysis also considers potential scenarios that can threaten the stable status quo.

To that end, this report presents a comprehensive strategy on the Cyprus conflict linking it to U.S. foreign policy priorities in Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean region, and the broader international environment. The analysis and policy recommendations put forward in this report make the following assumptions about the character of the conflict and its regional environment.

• At the local level, we assume the continuation of the internal conflict’s status quo, characterized by a largely stable security situation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. To the extent that any inter-communal conflict occurs in the coming years, our strategy assumes that violence would be rare and hyperlocalized as it has been since Turkey’s military intervention in 1974.

• Our report assumes that Turkish President Erdogan remains in power through at least the first several years of the incoming administration and maintains Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy approach in the region. A sudden leadership change in Turkey, such as through a military coup or an electoral defeat in Turkey’s national elections scheduled for 2023, would necessitate reevaluating the U.S. strategy for Cyprus that is recommended in this report.

Cyprus and Its Surroundings

The Cyprus Problem: History and Background

Today, the stalemated conflict in Cyprus is largely non-violent. Yet, the status quo belies the island’s turbulent and violent history throughout the 20th century. To this day, the island’s violent experience in the last century continues to resonate strongly among Greek and Turkish Cypriots. One need only stroll along the UN-patrolled Green Line bisecting the island to observe the scars of past violence and the competing historical narratives between the two communities.

Numerous internationally led negotiations have foundered since the conflict’s history. UN Special Envoy Jane Holl Lute led the most recent initiative aimed at finding common ground between the two sides, which ultimately proved unsuccessful. Understanding the historical narratives will prepare the incoming administration to avoid the strategic mistakes made by past U.S. administrations on the Cyprus problem. This section reviews major periods in the conflict’s history, to include: 1) the pre-independence period, 2) the Turkish military intervention in 1974, and 3) subsequent attempts to broker a peace settlement.

Pre-Independence Period: From One Foreign Ruler to Another

The Ottoman Empire

Throughout its history, Cyprus has been the bridge between three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. Cyprus is the third largest island in the Eastern Mediterranean, a geostrategic location of crisscrossing maritime lines of communication.1 The island has fallen prey to the intervention and occupation by ancient regimes and foreign powers.2 The Ottoman Empire’s rule over the island began in 1571, when it wrested control over the island from Venice. Ottoman administration of the island lasted for 308 years and shaped the island’s political geography in ways that are seen today.

During Ottoman rule, thousands of Turkishspeaking Muslims were settled on Cyprus, diluting the Greek Cypriot dominance on the island. This small but meaningful Turkish minority became a growing concern not just for the Greek Cypriot population that inhabited the island, but also the Greek state that aimed to have Cyprus achieve enosis i.e. reunite with Greece. The Ottoman millet system of governance further solidified the divide between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, creating separate systems of education that accentuated cultural differences.3

British Colonial Rule

In the 1878 British-Ottoman agreement, Britain gained de facto control over Cyprus and ruled the island until the 1960s. The impetus for Britain’s acquisition of the island centered on the island’s geostrategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean, which provided an outpost from which to counter Russian imperial designs.4 Within Cyprus, the British authorities created two separate councils for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, dividing the population along ethnic and religious lines. This limited selfgovernance in Cyprus matched how Imperial Britain ruled other parts of the British Empire.5 While the Greek majority often rebelled against British rule, the Turkish Cypriots largely preferred British rule over the island’s enosis with Greece. Some Turkish Cypriot movements advocated for taksim, or partition of the island.6 Although only present in small areas of the island, Turkish Cypriots enjoyed significant minority rights in the Greek majority state of Cyprus — rights that Turkish Cypriots feared would be revoked if Cyprus successfully achieved enosis.

In 1955, a violent nationalist guerrilla organization, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), arose with an aim of achieving enosis and ridding the island of its “undesirable” Turkish Cypriot minority. Turkish Cypriot communities launched an armed retaliation in the 1950s-60s, which led to the creation of the paramilitary

organization, the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT).7 From 1964 until 1974, most Turkish Cypriots were cramped in scattered enclaves, comprising only 2 to 3 percent of the island’s territory and existing under a parallel administration of their own.

The Constitutional Government: 1960 to 1963

In August 1960, Cyprus gained its independence from Britain after a multi-year resistance campaign organized by the EOKA. The island’s independence was the product of three separate international agreements signed in 1960: the Zurich Agreement, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance. The treaties were agreements between the three “guarantor powers” (Britain, Turkey, and Greece) and the newly independent Republic of Cyprus.8 Today, the treaties also represent continuing obstacles to achieving greater convergence between the interests of Greek and Turkish Cypriots on a negotiated settlement.

The Zurich Agreement created the binational and consociational constitution for the independent Cypriot state. The constitution stipulated that the president of a unified Cyprus would be a Greek Cypriot elected by the Greek Cypriot community, and the vice president would be a Turkish Cypriot elected by the Turkish Cypriot community.9 The Treaty of Guarantee was signed by Britain, Greece, and Turkey, and sought to defuse the dispute between the three guarantor powers. Under the Treaty of Guarantee, each of the guarantor powers committed to forging a consensus if faced with a Cyprusrelated crisis.10 If no consensus was possible, however, the guarantor powers reserved the right to intervene unilaterally on the island.11 The Treaty of Alliance provided for soldiers from Greece and Turkey to protect the island. The 1960 Treaty of Establishment also created the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs), which allowed Britain to retain 98 square miles of the island as sovereign British territory for

military purposes.12 Though they were signed six decades ago, the treaties have become part of the conflict’s modern lexicon.

Almost immediately after the island’s independence, the constitution was beset with problems. For instance, Greek Cypriots resented what they viewed as the overrepresentation of Turkish Cypriots in the national legislature and military. Turkish Cypriots for their part resented the dominance of the Greek language in official government business and glaring economic inequalities between Greek Cypriots in the South and Turkish Cypriots in the North.13 In 1963, the Greek Cypriot President Makarios III issued plans to modify the constitution, leading to increased tensions and violent clashes between the two communities. Starting in 1964, the Greek Cypriots enforced an economic blockade of northern Cyprus in part to stem the flow of lethal arms and strategic materials to Turkish Cypriots.14 This greatly affected the living standards of Turkish Cypriot communities around the island and led to the de facto division of Cyprus.15

The 1974 Turkish military intervention

In 1974, a coup backed by the military junta in Greece toppled the Makarios regime and replaced him with a hardline Greek nationalist. In response, Turkey launched an invasion into northern Cyprus, justifying the action as consistent with Turkey’s right to intervene unilaterally under the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkish military airborne and maritime forces conducted a two-phased military intervention that captured the northern part of the island. The Turkish invasion was catastrophic for the Greek Cypriots. Thousands of Greek Cypriots were killed or wounded, with many more missing. Nearly 160,000 Greek Cypriots fled the fighting and were forced to abandon their homes in northern Cyprus. The Turkish invasion cemented the Cyprus conflict as a proxy war within the Greek-Turkish conflict. Consequently, Turkish Cypriot and Greek

Cypriot populations became more politically and economically divided.

Unsuccessful attempts at conflict resolution: 1974 to Present

Since the separation of the island in 1974, there have been numerous failed attempts at negotiating a solution. Although the internal security situation has remained stable, the conflict has settled into a limbo where the ceasefire prevails, but a resolution is nowhere in sight.

In 1977 and 1979, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots reached two High Level Agreements under the mediation of the United Nations Secretary General, setting the contours of negotiations for the following decades.16 As part of the 1977 High Level Agreement, both sides recognized the objective of future negotiations was forming a Bicommunal Bizonal Federation (BBF) that guaranteed the political equality of the two communities. The 1977 High Level Agreement also stipulated that freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and the right of property were “open for discussion” under the BBF framework. These three issues have continued to remain the primary sticking points of ongoing discussions. In the 1979 High Level Agreement, both sides agreed to discuss the island’s “demilitarization” without specifying the precise mechanisms to achieve that outcome. Both sides also agreed the island’s independence should be “guaranteed against union in whole or in part” with any other country, principally Greece or Turkey.17

In 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan began drafting a plan to create a United Cyprus Republic under a BBF framework with two constituent states: the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State. The final April 2004 version of the plan provided for a six-member presidential council made up of four Greek and two Turkish Cypriots, an alternating president and vice president, a bicameral legislature divided proportionally

to each community’s population, and a supreme court with equal numbers of Greek, Turkish, and non-Cypriot judges.18 The plan also advocated for a reconciliation committee to bring the two communities together. The plan also outlined a gradual demilitarization of the island, which aimed to eventually achieve a “total withdrawal” of Greek and Turkish forces.19 The Greek and Turkish contingents were each permitted a maximum of 6,000 forces until 2011.20 After 2011, Greece and Turkey were each allowed to keep 3,000 forces on the island until 2018 or the accession of Turkey to the European Union (EU), whichever occurred first. Thereafter, each contingent would be subject to a review every three years with the aim of achieving total withdrawal.21

However, the plan was rejected through popular vote in the 2004 Referendum, with 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots in favor, but only 24 percent of Greek Cypriots supporting the plan.22 Turkish Cypriots supported the increased economic power, disproportionate political power relative to population size, and territorial gains they would have enjoyed under the plan’s provisions. Greek Cypriots opposed the plan since it permitted Turkish troops to permanently remain on the island, and absolved Turkey of responsibility for the 1974 invasion and war crimes. Despite the failure of the Referendum and the continuation of the conflict, the RoC became a full member of the EU on May 4, 2004, after years of negotiations.23 The EU notably recognized RoC de jure control in northern Cyprus, which has further complicated the conflict.

From 2008 to 2015, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders engaged in multiple dialogues, all with limited success. From 2008 to 2010, RoC President Demetris Christofias and president of the self-proclaimed TRNC, Mehmet Talat, failed to come to an agreement.24 Starting in 2010, President Christofias negotiated with the newly elected leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Dervis Eroglu, but talks abruptly halted in 2012 due to public

Lessons Learned from Previous Talks

The Annan Plan

Several features of the Annan peace process led to its demise in the referendum stage. The proposed Senate structure gave Turkish Cypriots veto power, which Greek Cypriots feared would paralyze decision-making given the lack of trust between the two ethnic communities and their respective political representatives. Greek Cypriots feared that a strong central government would make the Turkish Cypriots more powerful and, therefore, open a pathway for taksim backed by Turkey. Moreover, the Greek Cypriots perceived the power-sharing as unfair as 18 percent of the population would have 30 percent of power. Moreover, the negotiators did not engage Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in their process, which reduced buy-in from ordinary Cypriots, particularly the Greek Cypriot community. A lack of transparency around the negotiations, coupled with the complexity of the plan, made it difficult for Cypriots to understand the terms and engage in a public and informed debate about its merits.

The 2015 - 2017 Talks

The discussants ultimately disagreed over core security issues in the settlement process. Attendance by Turkey at the Geneva conference foiled progress on security and territorial issues, as Ankara immediately opposed territorial concessions that Akinci accepted and refused to abolish the Treaty of Guarantee.33 In part, Ankara’s objective seemed to be stalling the talks, thereby demonstrating the potential for Turkey to behave as a spoiler in future negotiations. This round of negotiations also illustrated Turkey’s unwillingness to give up its role as a security guarantor of Cyprus, which will surely cause Ankara to inhibit future talks.

Source: Unsplash/Klāvs Taimiņš

Cyprus and its Surroundings

discontent on the island.25 In 2014, the newly elected RoC President Nicos Anastasiades resumed talks with Mr. Eroglu, but both sides failed to achieve any progress.26 Talks were once again suspended in late 2014 over disagreements regarding Turkish incursions into the RoC’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and energy negotiations.27

In 2015, UN Secretary-General António Guterres led the most recent round of UN-facilitated talks between President Anastasiades and president of the selfproclaimed TRNC, Mustafa Akinci. The international community viewed these talks as the best chance for Cyprus to achieve a settlement after witnessing considerable progress between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators. However, the negotiators soon found themselves at odds over security issues. Additionally, at the January 2017 Geneva conference, Turkey adamantly opposed the territorial concessions that Akinci accepted and refused to abolish the Treaty of Guarantee. In June 2017, Guterres presented the “Guterres Framework’’ as a last-ditch attempt to guide intercommunal discussions on six core issues: security, troops, territory, equality, property, and power-sharing. Ultimately, negotiations failed and Guterres closed the talks in July 2017.28

Within the Guterres Framework, which in part advocates for a new system of security guarantees, UN Special Envoy Jane Holl Lute has been repeatedly unsuccessful in compelling the sides to agree to a Terms of Reference document to initiate talks.29 The challenges in restarting negotiations have highlighted many barriers to achieving a settlement, including the issue of security guarantees, nonrecognition of TRNC sovereignty by Nicosia, how the two communities will maintain ties to Greece and Turkey, the status of Turkish immigrants in the North, and the ongoing dispute over energy resources.30

The historical precedent illustrates several significant challenges to reaching a settlement in Cyprus, but it also provides several entry points for future actors when the prospects for resolution ripen. For example, both sides seem willing to compromise on aspects of property rights and territorial transfers.31 With the right leaders in place, a compromise on one or both of these issues could facilitate discussion on other core sticking points. In the next round of talks, negotiators would do well to engage CSOs on both sides to foster debate and understanding about a plan’s terms and to gain support from local institutions and political parties.

However, the challenges to future negotiations remain significant. Importantly, the UN has committed itself to a BBF solution through UNSC resolutions, which has limited the body’s flexibility in exploring or supporting novel approaches. In addition, decades of unsuccessful UN talks have contributed to broad skepticism among both communities of the UN-led process. Relatedly, peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts through both Track 1 and Track 2 avenues continue to suffer from “peace fatigue,” and have failed to effectively address the security angle of the conflict. Finally, the patriarchal character of Cypriot politics and historical exclusion of female participation threatens an inclusive and effective resolution to the conflict.32

Secretary-General António Guterres (centre) meets with Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades (left) and Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci in 2017. Source: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

An Unsustainable Status Quo

A Complacent Conflict

AlthoughCyprus has been divided for nearly 50 years, the island has experienced few instances of violence since 1974. Yet, the length and relative stability of the conflict has produced an embedded sense of complacency, both on the island and within the international community. This relative comfort with the conflict’s status quo has reduced the incentive for actors to commit to long-term and extensive negotiations toward a settlement.

The success of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which will soon reach its sixtieth year of operation on the island, may actually impede peacemaking, since the absence of war reduces the parties’ incentive for negotiation.34 The United States and the UN likely do not want UNFICYP to become a perpetual peacekeeping force. In addition, numerous barriers to restarting talks, including the issues of security guarantees and non-recognition of the government in the North, reinforce the complacency surrounding a solution. Furthermore, the conflict is old enough to have become grounded in the identity and belief systems of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Transforming ingrained understandings of the conflict and the ‘other’ will be difficult to disrupt.

Although the status quo may be comfortable, it is not sustainable. The history of protracted conflicts illustrates that stalemates often evolve into flashpoints of conflict — and frequently with little warning. The 2016 and 2020 clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh were triggered after approximately two decades of a relatively nonviolent ceasefire. Meanwhile, one RoC government representative cautioned that the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict are “shifting quickly.” That official’s warning demonstrates the need for renewed

efforts to manage the conflict to prevent tensions from escalating further and forestall Turkey’s creeping annexation from hardening the island’s division.

Unforeseen developments could escalate the conflict, given that it features half a century of mutual suspicion and distrust. Recent developments, such as the energy dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey’s call for a two-state solution,35 could lead to violence within the next decade. A compounding factor is the growing economic frustrations of a younger generation of Turkish Cypriots in the North. Lessons from conflicts in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and Israel-Palestine illustrate how young people may inherit, internalize, and accelerate the grievances of their parents.36 Policymakers should prepare in advance for the potential that violence is renewed on the island.

Regionally, the Cyprus conflict could impact the energy dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean, perhaps jeopardizing U.S. economic interests and international freedom of movement. Unilateral maritime delimitation efforts by Turkey and exploration of offshore hydrocarbons have created new tensions in the conflict that could jeopardize the stability on the island. It is not unlikely that Turkish and Greek or Cypriot ships could experience an altercation off the coast of Cyprus or in the Aegean Seas that could trigger a broader conflict. Furthermore, prolonging the dispute for too much longer increases the likelihood that Turkey deepens its involvement in the conflict. The international community will find it more difficult to coordinate a peace process between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots if Turkey continues to increase its interference in the energy dispute.

On a global scale, maintaining the status quo could harm U.S. interests in limiting Russian

influence in the region, and that of China to a lesser extent. The continued presence of UN peacekeepers on the island enables Russia and China to exert power through their positions on the UNSC for the biannual UNFICYP mandate renewals. In addition, Russia actively benefits from the conflict’s existence. So long as the RoC and Turkey do not recognize one another, the EU and NATO are not fully able to cooperate. Moreover, the conflict perpetuates the rift between NATO members Greece and Turkey.

Finally, on a hyper-local scale, the reliance of the RoC’s economy on tourism is endangered by the continuation of the status quo. The existence of the border wall and constant potential for instability is not desirable for the tourism industry. Given the number of locations competing with Cyprus for tourists, managing the conflict internally should be an important goal for the Greek Cypriots if they wish to maintain a competitive edge in this industry.

The conventional assumption holds that the next ‘ripe’ moment for a settlement would be Turkey’s eventual accession to the EU. However, Turkish irredentism and worsening relations with the West impede this goal. Instead, the imminent transition to the new Administration is an opportunity to prepare for future negotiations by introducing new ideas and policy interventions. Laying the groundwork in President-elect Biden’s early days could be a catalyst for a future settlement process.

The following section outlines potential scenarios and how they may play out if the current status quo were to be maintained.

Scenario One: Turkey’s Creeping Annexation of the TRNC

For decades, Turkey has been the only external power influencing politics and the economy in

northern Cyprus. In recent years, Turkey has strengthened its control over the statelet by imposing economic regulations, supporting increased settlement by Turkish nationals, and dictating northern Cyprus’ foreign policy. Ankara’s rhetoric has grown more bellicose, as illustrated by Turkey’s more aggressive support for a two-state solution, Erdogan’s support for opening Varosha beach, and Ankara’s promotion of Turkish Cypriots’ rights to independently pursue hydrocarbon exploration off the coast of northern Cyprus.

U.S. policymakers have yet to address Turkey’s creeping annexation in northern Cyprus as it does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests on the island. While an explicit attempt at annexation, such as Russia’s military interventions in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 or Israel’s legislation that effectively annexed the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem, may seem unlikely, the United States should pay attention to Turkey’s creeping annexation of the self-proclaimed TRNC. Just as Israel has attempted to change the facts on the ground in the West Bank through Israeli settlements, Ankara could establish the self-proclaimed TRNC as a Turkish territory through gradual and piecemeal measures and the settlement of Turkish nationals.37 Creeping annexation tightens Ankara’s grip on a portion of the divided island and would prevent the reunification of Cyprus. Indeed, Ankara’s new support for a two-state solution indicates that the country is interested in blocking a settlement that would unify the two Cypriot communities.38

Creeping annexation of northern Cyprus by Turkey would significantly limit the prospects for achieving unification of the island. Moreover, as Ankara’s interest in exploiting hydrocarbons off the coast of Cyprus grows, creeping Turkish annexation over northern Cyprus likely will cause Ankara to become even more bullish on regional energy disputes, challenging the RoC’s sovereignty over its energy resources and fostering greater instability. Finally, tighter Turkish control

over the statelet could exacerbate tensions in the region and within NATO by bringing Turkey into even closer proximity to the RoC and Greece.

Scenario Two: Major Hydrocarbon Discovery in Disputed Waters

At present, Cyprus’ major gas fields lie outside areas disputed by Turkey or the selfproclaimed TRNC, offering some hope that geopolitical contests will not impact their development. However, as exploration and drilling activity intensifies in contested areas, Turkey is growing increasingly confrontational in defending against perceived encroachment. The discovery of a major gas field in the RoC’s claimed continental shelf, that either overlaps with the continental shelf claimed by Turkey or is contested by the self-proclaimed TRNC, could serve as a catalyst for conflict.

Ankara claims that Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7, delineated by the RoC, overlap with Turkey’s continental shelf.39 A major hydrocarbon discovery in this region could provoke a standoff between Turkish and Cypriot ships if both countries issue licenses to explore the disputed area. Since Turkey does not recognize the government of the RoC, there could be no negotiations to defuse and resolve the dispute, increasing the likelihood of escalation into violent conflict.

A major gas field could also be discovered in an area contested by the self-proclaimed TRNC. This scenario presents the possibility for even more provocative Turkish action, acting at the behest of the self-proclaimed TRNC, within the territorial waters of the RoC. In 2018, Turkish naval forces interfered with a drilling vessel chartered by the Italian company Eni that was licensed by the RoC. The incident occurred in an area that was indisputably within Cypriot waters but to which both the RoC and the self-proclaimed TRNC had granted licenses for exploration.

Turkish drilling vessel Yavuz was operating in disputed waters until October 12, 2020 while the Turkish seismic survey vessel Barbaros Hayreddin Pasa is still operating south of Cyprus. Moreover, Turkey conducted live-fire military exercises off the coast of Cyprus in September 2020.40

While it is possible that a major hydrocarbon discovery in waters claimed by both the RoC and self-proclaimed TRNC could provide an opportunity for discussing a revenue sharing agreement, this is an unlikely outcome. Precedent has shown that hydrocarbon exploration and discovery off the coast of Cyprus has exacerbated conflict, both on the island and between major powers in the Mediterranean region.

HMS Enterprise visiting Cyrus and carrying out rescue exercises in September 2020. Source: Sovereign Base Areas Administration and British Forces Cyprus

Cyprus and its Surroundings

Scenario Three: An Accidental Naval Incident Between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea

In a bid to reassert its national sovereignty over its “Blue Homeland” and “rightful claims” to hydrocarbons in the Aegean Sea, Turkey sends out exploration vessels to disputed waters. They pair this action with the resumption of unregistered overflights from the Turkish military. Greece denounces these flights as transgressions of international air traffic regulations and sends its own jets to intercept. While the air confrontation avoids the mistakes of the past,41 the situation on the sea escalates.

Greek naval ships attempt to intercept the Turkish exploration vessel and force it to leave the disputed area. The exchange results in a collision, leading to significant damage to the Turkish ship as well as loss of life. Seeing this as an escalation, Turkey dispatches military vessels to the disputed area and claims a right to defend itself and the “territorial integrity” of its maritime boundary. A red line is drawn around the disputed area with Turkey vowing to defend it with military force. Greece sends its own ships in response. The Turkish navy uses warning shots to deter Greek approaches into the disputed area.

In such a scenario, the United States should call for an immediate end to the warning shots as well as the buildup in the disputed waters. Furthermore, the United States should be prepared to denounce Turkey’s provocative actions by establishing a territorial zone. The United States may have to send its own naval assets to manage the boundary of the newly claimed maritime territory of Turkey between the Greek and Turkish naval forces until a resolution is reached between Athens and Ankara.

Scenario Four: Increasing Violence Between Greek and Turkish Cypriots

It is December 2021. In light of a successful COVID-19 vaccination campaign in Cyprus, the RoC and the self-proclaimed TRNC have agreed to partially reopen crossing points for Turkish Cypriots to enter the southern part of the island.42 A group of thirty Turkish Cypriots, consisting of families and migrant laborers assemble at the buffer zone to be escorted to RoC territory by UNFICYP soldiers. However, as they step across the gate, a group of farright Greek Cypriot protesters ambush them with stones and Molotov cocktails.43

The scuffle ends with one Turkish Cypriot woman dead and sixteen others, including children, severely injured. Authorities capture the perpetrators, but within weeks the RoC courts acquit them with slaps on the wrist. Outraged by Greek Cypriot violence against Turkish Cypriots and the RoC’s reluctance to administer justice, Turkish Cypriots begin organizing to take revenge. They recruit and deploy youth groups to harass and assault Greek Cypriots across the Green Line. President Anastasiades of the RoC, President Sakellaropoulou of Greece, and Prime Minister Mitsotakis of Greece condemn the violence as “depraved indecency” while President Erdogan applauds the Turkish Cypriots’ “activism.” Rhetoric between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots grows more hostile until both sides are threatening one another with armed force.

If such a scenario occurs, we recommend that the United States issue a public statement condemning all acts of intercommunal violence occurring in Cyprus. The United States should urge the UN to deploy additional peacekeeping troops to Cyprus to curb civilian-initiated violence. The United States should also urge the RoC, Greece, and Turkey to de-escalate tensions with the threat of harsh sanctions should armed conflict break out.

Key Actor Interests

Greek Cypriots

The official Greek Cypriot position is reunification of the island through BBF that features a strong central government and the legal and territorial integrity of the island.44 The RoC and the Greek Cypriot community support a resolution that would provide for a single state and government for the entire island of Cyprus. The majority of the population opposes the current status quo. The Greek Cypriots primarily trust the RoC government to facilitate a fair peace agreement. They strongly distrust the United Kingdom and the Turkish Government as peace brokers.45

The BBF approach faces three significant challenges: apprehension over power-sharing agreements, concerns that political equality for Turkish Cypriots would hinder governance, and a fear of secession by Turkish Cypriots supported by Turkey. These challenges were demonstrated in the Annan Plan, which proposed a BBF structure with a parliamentary system and a presidential cross-voting arrangement. The proposed Senate structure allowed Turkish Cypriots veto power, which Greek Cypriots feared would impede joint decision-making. Greek Cypriots also feared that a strong central government would make Turkish Cypriots more politically powerful, eventually facilitating Turkish-backed de facto division of the island.46

The discovery of natural gas off the Cypriot coast has complicated negotiations for a peace settlement. The RoC rejects Turkish and Turkish Cypriot access to what Nicosia and the international community view as the sovereign natural resources of the RoC.

Turkey’s commitment to protecting the interests of Turkish settlers in northern Cyprus creates an additional challenge for

Greek Cypriots. Nicosia worries that Turkish Cypriot fears about security are exaggerated to form the basis for eventual Turkish intervention. Indeed, the 2017 UN attempt to abolish the Turkish and Greek unilateral security guarantees failed definitively. Going forward, Greek Cypriots have acknowledged that the process of withdrawing Turkish troops, albeit incomplete, could be a starting point for a peace settlement.47

Turkish Cypriots

The self-proclaimed TRNC is a territory in northern Cyprus recognized only by Turkey. Turkey offers the Turkish Cypriot minority military protection through a decades-long deployment of Turkish troops. Turkish Cypriots have long viewed Turkish soldiers on the island as their only protection against cultural and even physical extinction. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots are perpetually reliant on Turkey to sustain their economy given international embargoes against their ports. Ankara maintains substantial political, economic and territorial influence over the Turkish Cypriots.

The self-proclaimed TRNC supports a resolution that would provide for two separate and internationally recognized states. They would strongly oppose a resolution that would provide for a single state and central government for all of Cyprus in any form that compromises political equality of Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots primarily trust the Turkish Government, given their political and economic dependence on Turkey, and their self-proclaimed TRNC leadership to reach a fair peace deal representing their interests. They strongly mistrust the Greek Government and RoC leadership in the peace process.48

The increased presence of Turkish settlers

Cyprus and its Surroundings

has changed the demographics north of the Green Line. A paucity of accurate statistics on Turkish Cypriots complicates negotiation towards political equality for this minority community.49 Efforts have been made to integrate Turkish Cypriots in Turkish culture, given their ethnic, cultural and religious differences from Turkish settlers (who represent Laz, Kurdish, Turk and Arabic communities).50 However, Turkish Cypriots are concerned that their Cypriot culture is being diluted with the increased arrival of Turkish settlers.

As an unrecognized state, the self-proclaimed TRNC has no international backing and support without Turkey’s protection. Yet, Turkey’s insistence on maintaining the anachronistic Treaty of Guarantee, a right to intervention, and a permanent troop presence, continues to impede the Turkish Cypriots’ flexibility in settlement talks. The Turkish Cypriots repeatedly have emphasized a desire for “bizonality and political equality of the two communities,” but it is unclear how achievable that plan is without Turkey’s support.51 Furthermore, now that Ersin Tatar, a right-wing Turkish nationalist with close ties to Ankara, has won the self-proclaimed TRNC’s presidential election, unification appears to be a more distant vision than before. Indeed, Tatar supports Turkey’s call for separate sovereign administrations of the island.52

Turkey

The historical goal of Turkish policy in Cyprus was to prevent the island from falling under Greek hegemony. While countering Greece in Cyprus remains strategically salient, new Turkish interests are influencing Ankara’s Cyprus policy. Erdogan views Turkish interests in Cyprus through the prism of a tense regional struggle over hydrocarbons, maritime law, and the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Domestically, Erdogan is pursuing a nationalist foreign policy in the region, including in Cyprus, Libya, and Syria, with the aim of appealing

to the nationalist sentiments of the large majority of Turkish voters, which have by and large supported Turkish adventurism in the region. Erdogan likely calculates his aggressive stance in the region by buttressing political support among his AKP party and the MHP party, an ultranationalist Turkish party that entered into coalition with the AKP in 2018.53 These matters have raised the stakes of the Cyprus dispute for Turkey, and for international actors who wish to integrate Turkey into a settlement process for Cyprus. Since the 1974 invasion, Turkey has focused on fortifying its military presence in the Turkish-occupied zone of northern Cyprus and supporting the self-declared state of the Turkish Cypriots. Between 1999 and 2010, Turkish foreign policy softened toward the Cyprus conflict as Turkey and the EU negotiated Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership. Turkish leaders were dismayed at the failure of the Annan Plan Referendum in 2004 and the subsequent admission of the RoC into the EU. Starting in 2016, Turkish foreign policy took a nationalist and hardline turn after Erdogan forcibly repressed a military coup against his rule.

The broader bilateral relationship between the United States and Turkey has grown increasingly strained. During the Bush and Obama administrations, the United States upheld Turkey as an example of a modern, secular and westernizing democracy on the edge of the Muslim world. However, today Turkey is no longer a reliable ally to the West. Erdogan’s policies seem part of an irredentist attempt to reclaim the influence of the former Ottoman Empire. The recent evolution of Turkish foreign policy constitutes a strategic pivot away from the West in an effort to establish Turkish dominance in the region.

Turkey’s demands for an internal Cyprus political settlement have remained relatively consistent since the failure of the Annan Plan in 2004. Generally, Turkey’s minimal conditions for a negotiated settlement are threefold. First, security guarantees must be credibly extended to the minority Turkish Cypriots. Second, any

settlement of the Cyprus conflict must also include a concomitant economic opening by the international community towards the currently embargoed self-proclaimed TRNC. Third, Turkish Cypriots in northern Cyprus must be granted a degree of political autonomy under any governance framework in a future settlement, regardless of whether such a deal creates a unified Cypriot state or a looser federation. In November 2020, while making a defiant speech at a ceremony in northern Cyprus, Erdogan insisted that a two-state solution to the conflict should be negotiated on the “basis of sovereign equality” because there are “two separate peoples and states” on the island.54 The two-state solution would see the permanent division of the island between the Turkish Cypriot North and the Greek Cypriot South rather than a negotiated solution based on the BBF framework. Erdogan’s public support for a two-state solution could be part of a concerted effort to apply greater Turkish pressure against the RoC in future negotiations.

Former Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu outlined these three objectives in 2010, stating that Turkey’s goal was “to establish an arrangement in Cyprus where the existence, security, freedom, and economical welfare of the Turks living in Cyprus are guaranteed and assured.”55 The contours of these three Turkish objectives have evolved to some degree based on fluctuations in the Turkish foreign policy.

Beyond its three ongoing core demands for an internal political settlement, the Turkish government also insists on its right to preserve a robust Turkish military presence in northern Cyprus. Previous peace talks have struggled to overcome Turkey’s insistence on this issue. Between 2016 and 2017, UN-mediated talks in Switzerland between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots collapsed in large part because of Turkish resistance to reducing Turkey’s military forces on the island. Turkish negotiators also pushed for the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, or a framework modeled closely to it, as part of a deal.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is employing a dual-track policy of naval power projection and regional outreach to assert its claims over natural gas deposits near Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea.56 Erdogan and the Turkish military have declared a new doctrine of “Blue Homeland” that aims to achieve Turkish naval supremacy over 189,000 square kilometers of waters in the Eastern Mediterranean.57 Erdogan indicated his intent to expand naval competition in the waters near Cyprus during a public speech in September 2020, suggesting that Turkish maritime pressure on the issue will intensify in the coming months.

The Turkish government opposes the internationally recognized definition of EEZs, as delineated under UNCLOS, and supported by Greece and the RoC. They claim that islands do not generate full maritime zones when they are competing directly against continental land areas. The United States contends that states, which includes island states, should negotiate with their neighbors to delimit EEZs. Turkey is adamant that Cyprus, along with Greece’s network of islands in the Eastern Mediterranean, is not entitled to the full extent of the EEZ. Instead, the Turkish position is that Cyprus is making EEZ claims that, in fact, belong to Turkey.

Greece

Greek policy toward Cyprus mirrors the struggle between Greece and Turkey for influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the eyes of Athens, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and its subsequent military presence demonstrate an irredentist Turkish desire to expand eastward into former Ottoman territories, posing a direct threat to Greek sovereignty. In response, Greece continues to call for sanctioning Turkish aggression in international forums, maintaining a military presence in the RoC, and increasing engagement in gas exploration efforts off the coast of Cyprus, both to counterbalance Turkish exploration and in the hope that gas

Cyprus and its Surroundings

U.S. - EU Cooperation in Cyprus

As a member state of the EU, the RoC plays an influential role in EU institutions given the European Council’s consensus decision-making process. Similarly, EU membership has given the union unique influence in Cyprus, particularly through the application of EU laws known as acquis communautaire. Many EU laws and policies align with broader U.S. policy goals in Cyprus, offering opportunities for the United States to work closely with the EU to advance common interests. Notably, the United States and the EU decided to place limited sanctions on Turkish officials in December 2020 over Turkey’s decision to activate the Russian S-400 air defense system and its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.83 While the sanctions were limited and applied for different reasons, they indicate broader U.S.-EU geopolitical alignment in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Without displacing the role of the UN in the Cyprus problem, the United States and the EU could expand their involvement between the two communities to build confidence and attempt to settle issues outside of the immediate conflict. Although it would require significant shuttle diplomacy and concessions from both parties, one step could be to urge Turkey to drop its veto of RoC membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace in exchange for the RoC allowing goods to be exported and imported directly to northern Cyprus from EU member states. This measure could entrench steps toward EU acquis communautaire and lessen northern Cyprus’ dependence on Turkey. Moreover, Cyprus remains the only EU member state that is not a member of NATO or the Partnership for Peace.84 Joining the Partnership would allow for better EU-NATO coordination due to current policies inhibiting cooperation until all EU members are affiliated with the alliance.85 Such a step could also expand U.S.-Cyprus and even UK-Cyprus cooperation under the auspices of the alliance. Other positive outcomes could include the RoC ending its veto over engagement between EU defense institutions and Turkey.

Another area of potential U.S.-EU cooperation is travel security and terrorism. As an EU member state, Cyprus is obligated to join the Schengen Area, which it is currently working to achieve.86 Assuming it eventually joins the Schengen Area, the RoC will likely turn its efforts to join the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP). As a result, the EU and United States have an opportunity to concurrently push Cyprus to implement the requirements for both programs now. While Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, Carl Risch’s announcement of a working group with the RoC on the VWP suggests progress is being made, an interagency U.S.-EU working group on Schengen-VWP would ensure consistency, allow the two powers to align the timing of possible announcements, and collectively ensure the strongest protections for both EU and U.S. citizens.87 Moreover, such a joint U.S.-EU working group could be extended to other EU countries that are not yet Schengen or VWP participants including Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania.

The EU also aims to create a Mediterranean gas hub south of Europe by supporting two strategic projects— the Cyprus East Med Pipeline and the Cyprus LNG terminal. The United States has a role to play in the EU’s natural gas market by reinforcing competition and optionality. The EU and the United States agreed to strengthen strategic energy cooperation in July 2018 and to work toward facilitating large-scale U.S. LNG exports to Europe. Since the political agreement, the EU and the United States have held the first business forum under the U.S.-EU Energy Council, as well as the May 2019 joint visit by Maroš Šefcovic and U.S. President Donald Trump to the Cameron LNG facility in Louisiana, which will start exporting to European and Asian markets at the end of 2019. 88

patronage will legitimize its claim to disputed maritime boundaries with Turkey.

Greece played a pivotal role in the conflict’s trajectory by lobbying for the RoC to accede to the EU without a settlement. Greece threatened to veto nine candidates’ applications for EU membership should the RoC membership be denied or postponed based on lack of a political settlement.58 In 2004, the RoC joined the EU through the Treaty of Accession. Since then, Greek Cypriots have enjoyed disproportionate economic growth and stability compared to Turkish Cypriots, thereby reducing pressure on Greece to act as the sole guarantor of the RoC. Since 2004, Athens has taken a less active role in Cypriot matters, following a doctrine of “Nicosia decides, Athens supports.”59 Domestic issues in Greece, such as the 2010 bailout and the Syriza-led populist backlash, have also rendered Greek policy toward Cyprus more reflexive in recent years. Today, Greek policy toward Cyprus is mainly driven by security considerations, heightened by energy interests and the contestation of its maritime borders with Turkey.

Athens’ main priority is to counter Turkish expansionism in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a result, Greece prioritizes maintaining its own regional sphere of influence. In Cyprus, this means protecting the territorial and political integrity of the island from Turkish aggression, both by enlisting the help of international partners and by maintaining troops in the RoC. Greek troops—known as the Hellenic Greek Force, or ELDYK—have been stationed on the island for the past 60 years.60 Greece lobbies for security guarantees against Turkish aggression more generally in international forums, including the EU, the UN, and NATO.

In the broader Eastern Mediterranean, Athens’ security interests are intertwined with energy interests. Greece views its participation in gas exploration in the Cypriot EEZ both as a hedge against Turkish incursion and as a path to legitimizing its contested maritime claims.61 The RoC has delineated thirteen oil

blocks within its EEZ and has been conducting exploratory drilling in the area since 2007. Greece will likely increase its participation in the EastMed Gas Forum to keep Turkey from advancing its regional ambitions. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis will also likely continue to join the RoC in calling for EU sanctions on Turkey over its gas exploration in the RoC EEZ. Both measures hamper the prospects of a settlement.62

Russia

Russia has demonstrated largely consistent interests and foreign policy toward the decades-old conflict in Cyprus. After the Soviet Union fell, the Russian Federation deepened cooperation with the RoC, including through arms transfers and cultural connections. After joining the EU, Cyprus sometimes acted as a mouthpiece for Russian interests. In recent years, this relationship helped Moscow by facilitating Russian involvement in the Syrian war and providing a haven for Russian oligarchs. Meanwhile, the persistent conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots accommodates Russia’s central objective to counter NATO hegemony. By preventing recognition of the RoC by Turkey and stoking tensions between Turkey and Greece, the Cyprus conflict hinders EU cooperation and NATO unity.

Greek Cypriots have long maintained financial and military ties with Russia.63 Since the late 1980s, Russian support has helped the RoC fill a void left by the 1987 U.S. decision to end arms transfers to the island. At the time, the United States was trying to prevent an arms race that would thwart a solution to the conflict.64 Instead, Russia has supplied military equipment to the RoC since the 1990s, which also allowed Moscow to foster closer military relations with Nicosia. More recently, in 2011, Russia granted the RoC a 2.5 billion euro loan, a substantial amount for a nation with a national income of only 17 billion euros, to help the country weather a financial crisis. Two years later, the Kremlin improved the loan’s terms at a cost to Russia.65

Cyprus and its Surroundings

The Kremlin also expressed potent support for the RoC’s energy rights in its EEZ.

In 2015, the RoC and the Kremlin pledged continued military cooperation, among ten other cooperative agreements, during a state visit of RoC President Nicos Anastasiades to Moscow. The 2015 military agreements between Russia and the RoC gave Russian ships access to Cypriot ports, which Moscow sought after losing a coastal military base in Syria.66 Russian vessels used in Syria have visited Cypriot ports that may have facilitated support for the Bashar al-Assad regime.67

Cyprus is of special interest to wealthy Russians seeking offshore banking. Rich Russians are known to funnel money to island accounts to avoid paying taxes in Russia, concealing the money’s source under alleged foreign investment. In 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that Cyprus was the target for more than one third of outward Russian investment.68 Cyprus has encouraged this behavior to some extent: in 2013, following the RoC’s financial drought, the government awarded nearly 1,500

passports to Russian investors through a “citizenship by investment” scheme, also known as the “golden passports” scheme, where wealthy Russians essentially could purchase Cypriot citizenship. Those passports comprised almost half of the total 3,000 issued, but the policy, finally was suspended by the RoC government in November 2020.69 Ironically, the RoC’s status as an EU member, with a stable legal system, strong property rights, low taxes, and light regulation, makes it a desirable location for financially successful Russians to park their money. Cyprus is also a top destination for Russian tourists and expats. In 2017, at least a third of Cyprus’s three million tourists were Russian.70

In the late nineties, the desire of the RoC to join the EU added a new dimension to RussiaCypriot relations and Russia-EU relations. Moscow likely worried that Cypriot accession to the EU might hand Cyprus over to European and Western interests, at Russia’s expense. If the whole island acceded to the EU following a settlement of the Cyprus conflict, that would present an opportunity for Turkey to join the EU, thereby aligning NATO and the EU and

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov meets with Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades during his visit to Cyprus in December 2015. Source: Russian Embassy in Cyprus

pushing Turkey away from Russia’s sphere of influence. In 2004, just when it seemed the Annan Plan would succeed, Russia vetoed a UNSC resolution that would have enabled UN peacekeepers to implement the terms.71 Russia also helped tank the island’s Referendum on the proposal by pressuring the Cypriot communist party Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú (AKEL) to lobby against the plan, which eventually led to its rejection by the Greek Cypriot community.72 With its rejection, the RoC joined the EU divided from the self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot leadership in the North.73

The relationship between Cyprus and Russia changed somewhat after the RoC gained membership in the EU, since EU accession naturally aligned the RoC more closely with Europe. Yet, there is evidence that the RoC occasionally elevates Russian interests within the EU framework, somewhat hindering total cooperation between the RoC and other EU states.74 Most recently, Cyprus refused to approve EU sanctions on Belarus, Russia’s ally, unless the body approved punitive sanctions on Turkey for “gunboat diplomacy” in the Eastern Mediterranean.75 The RoC also opposed EU sanctions against Russia in 2016, and even passed a resolution to remove them.76 Finally, the RoC is the only EU member that maintained military cooperation with Russia following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea.77

Today, Moscow fears that U.S. policy changes will undermine Russian-Cypriot cooperation and lead to warmer relations between Cyprus and the West. Russia initially condemned early reports of the U.S. decision to partially waive defense trade regulations, calling it “anti-Russian plans” that would lead to the U.S. militarization of the island.78 Russia clearly fears increased U.S. support to Cyprus that may disrupt Russian military interests, or pull Cyprus closer to NATO.79 Russia’s anticipation of this development may activate and reinforce its opposition to any new attempts toward a settlement of the dispute, given that a settlement would overcome the

main barrier to stronger Cypriot relations with NATO countries.

China

China’s interest in Cyprus is more recent and primarily economic but may be following a trend toward greater economic penetration that facilitates burgeoning security interests in the region. In 2016, the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) sought to operate parts of Cyprus’ Limassol port.80 Although COSCO’s bid was unsuccessful, China nevertheless demonstrated that its state-owned firms are interested in expanding their economic reach into Cyprus and the broader Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, China tried to buy a stake in Israel’s Haifa port, located close to an important Israeli naval base and the site of U.S. naval fleet exercises. These developments demonstrate Beijing’s possible intention to use economic means to facilitate ends that improve Chinese security monitoring and posture within the Eastern Mediterranean.81

The 5G issue, a notable source of tension between the United States and China, is playing out in Cyprus. Washington and Beijing waged a tug of war over whether the island would use Chinese 5G networks, such as Huawei, that would give China a substantial foothold in Cyprus. In October 2020, Cyprus and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Science and Technology that put Cyprus on a path to join the Clean Network, a Trump administration initiative to create a collection of countries that commit to using trusted and secure 5G networks. Yet, it is unlikely that Chinese 5G firms will abandon their desire to expand into Cyprus.82

The United States should be concerned with managing the conflict in Cyprus and tensions in the region to avoid greater internationalization of the conflict, competition with other great powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, and budding economic cooperation between Cyprus and China that could carry over into the security sphere.

Cyprus and its Surroundings

The Gender Perspective

Work on the Cyprus question has largely overlooked the gendered perspective.89 Compared to other EU countries, gender inequalities in Cyprus are most pronounced in the political representation of women.90 Prior to 1974, the narrative of women involved in the conflict highlighted their status as victims or aides within the armed struggle between both sides. On the Turkish Cypriot side, women took up supporting roles for the paramilitary organization, TMT. On the Greek Cypriot side, women served as helpers and messengers for EOKA.91

More recently, incidents of rape around Nicosia have illustrated the failure of Cypriot authorities to protect women from sexual violence.92 Although official data are limited, interviews with Turkish Cypriot women revealed women’s suffering throughout the conflict.93 Often, men were prioritized by officials when negotiating prisoner exchanges and returns to the North, leaving women languishing in confinement for months or years. A 1974 law to legalize abortion was passed as an emergency measure to prevent pregnancies resulting from wartime rape of women on both sides of the conflict.

In 2009, a Gender Advisory Team (GAT) was established on the basis of UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) to expand women’s participation in the peace process in Cyprus. The GAT recommended the following measures:

• Increase women’s representation on key issues: property, economy, governance and citizenship;

• Involve women belonging to minority groups in reconstruction and development initiatives;

• Ensure gender-sensitive economic planning and resource-sharing; and

• Overall, transition from a militarist, patriarchal and nationalist culture to a ‘peace culture.’

In addition, cooperation between civil society actors led to the creation of the Technical Committee on Gender Equality, which aimed to integrate gendered provisions into future peace negotiations and constitutional arrangements.94 Other initiatives include the “Home of Cooperation,” a center located in the buffer zone that engages Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth, artists, and activists in peace-oriented programming, and the “Hands Across Divide,” an organization that coordinates women’s participation in political intervention and leads gendered dialogues around the conflict.95

Women and girls are disproportionately impacted in conflict settings deeming their participation in peace building a necessary condition. Research on Women, Peace and Security shows that increased gender equality lowers the propensity of conflict and women’s participation in a peace negotiation increases the likelihood that the resulting agreement succeeds.96 The U.S. government should work alongside these initiatives and support local efforts aimed at fostering a gender-inclusive environment for future peace negotiations. To promote the agency and inclusion of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot women, the United States should advance a settlement process that reduces institutional gender barriers and designs resolutions on territorial adjustment and missing persons that incorporates a gendered perspective.

Maria Hadjipavlou speaks at a panel discussion on sexual violence against women in Cyprus in December 2015. Source: UNFICYP/Juraj Hladky

Recommended Strategy

Recommended U.S. Strategy for the Cyprus Conflict

Althoughthe situation within Cyprus is stable for now, the regional offshore energy dispute and intensified Turkish belligerency are raising the potential for renewed escalation in the Cyprus conflict. The highly charged visit by Erdogan in November 2020 to Varosha, a disputed town near the dividing line between the RoC and northern Cyprus, is yet another indicator that the situation in Cyprus is at a critical juncture, thereby requiring renewed and proactive U.S. policy focus. The United States cannot afford to wait until the protracted Cyprus conflict boils over, creating another regional armed conflict attracting intervention by U.S. great power rivals and spilling instability into the geostrategic Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, this section outlines a more strategic approach to the Cyprus conflict that grounds U.S. policy within broader U.S. interests mentioned below.

In May 2014, Joseph R. Biden became the first U.S. Vice President to visit Cyprus since Lyndon Johnson in 1962, stating that he had “come to primarily underscore the value the United States attaches to our growing cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus.”97 Since Biden uttered those words in 2014, the risks to U.S. interests in Cyprus and the geostrategic Eastern Mediterranean have grown due to an increasingly belligerent Turkish foreign policy and resurgent great power competition with Russia. What happens within the Cyprus conflict has growing implications for achieving U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

On the Cyprus issue, we argue in this section

that the incoming administration should be concerned with five broad U.S. interests: (1) fostering strategic stability in the increasingly volatile Eastern Mediterranean, (2) limiting the influence and ambitions of Russia in Cyprus, (3) reaffirming a strong NATO alliance, (4) enhancing stability in Cyprus to protect U.S. regional interests and support UN efforts to create conditions for a settlement, and (5) maintaining the U.S. military’s ability to project power into nearby regional hotspots. Subsequent sections will turn to translating these generalized U.S. interests into recommended objectives that include actionable policies on the Cyprus problem.

Interest One: Foster strategic stability in the increasingly volatile Eastern Mediterranean

Since the Second World War, U.S. administrations have grasped the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean for deterring U.S. geostrategic rivals and securing the U.S. alliance network in Western Europe. Although the Cyprus conflict has been largely stable since the 1970s, the surrounding regional context has been far more volatile and violent. The Arab Spring that swept the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 saw popular protests morph into violent revolts, sparking civil wars and insurgencies in Syria and Libya. In 2014, Vice President Biden echoed the importance of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean security architecture during his visit to the island, when he declared that “this island can and should be the bedrock of stability and opportunity for Europe and for the East Mediterranean.”98

The United States is already grappling with instability in the Eastern Mediterranean owing to internationalized civil wars in Libya and Syria. An unstable Cyprus would add another source of regional instability. Flare

Cyprus and its Surroundings

ups between Turkey and Greece or Cyprus may require the United States to deploy naval assets to “keep the peace,” which diverts U.S. attention and resources away from securing American interests in other regional conflicts. Recently, tensions escalated over hydrocarbon deposits near Cyprus between countries in the Eastern Mediterranean energy framework — consisting of Cyprus, Greece, and Israel — and Turkey. Ankara is increasingly wielding “gunboat diplomacy” to assert its claims and those of the self-proclaimed TRNC. Turkey’s aggressive maritime posture, support for a two-state solution for Cyprus, and perpetual conflict with Greece all contribute to instability in the region and cast a shadow on prospects for a settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

Interest Two: Limit the influence and ambitions of Russia in the region

The United States should be concerned about the deepening Russian influence in the RoC and the region. Moscow views its relationship with the RoC as a strategic military partnership, which allows Russia to project power in the region and sow dissent within NATO. Russia has supplied military equipment to Cyprus since the 1990s, fostering closer military relations with Nicosia, and Moscow recently signed a deal with the RoC expanding Russian naval access to Cypriot ports. Russia has increased its financial penetration in Cyprus, which would reduce the RoC’s reliance on Europe and the West.

The era of great power competition has raised the potential for renewed violence in the Cyprus conflict. Given the rising Russian use of Syrian ports in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is increasingly important that the United States and its allies carefully monitor Russia’s expanding influence in the region. Additionally, Russia is adept at recognizing and exploiting cleavages to weaken American alliances. The most recent example is Turkey’s procurement of S-400 missiles from Russia, which caused a rift in U.S.-Turkish relations and ultimately led to the removal of Turkey

from the F-35 program and the imposition of limited sanctions.99 Maintaining U.S. partnerships with regional allies in the face of continuously more aggressive Russian foreign policy will be a key challenge.

Given the concern about great power competition, the United States should also pay attention to China’s growing interest in Cyprus. China’s involvement in Cyprus is still nascent and primarily economic in nature, yet its investments are growing on the island. Budding economic cooperation between Cyprus and China could create opportunities for Chinese-Cypriot cooperation in both the economic and security sphere in the future.

Interest Three: Reaffirm a strong NATO Alliance

Escalating skirmishes over disputed maritime boundaries around Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea are threatening an already tenuous relationship between Greece and Turkey, two members of the NATO alliance. Both countries have been NATO members since 1952 and are critical elements of NATO’s southern flank. Tensions grew in August 2020, when Turkish and Greek warships collided in the Eastern Mediterranean, after Ankara deployed its research vessel to an area that Athens claims as its maritime territory. The prospect of conflict between Turkey and Greece threatens the integrity of NATO as the strength of an alliance rests on the relationships between its members.

A growing bilateral crisis between Greece and Turkey also has implications for both the Cyprus conflict and regional security structures. Turkey’s adventurism in the Mediterranean is drawing France into the maritime disputes, with President Macron offering political and military support to Greece. The 2019 maritime deal between Turkey and Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) included a military cooperation pact that expanded military cooperation, providing the GNA security against opposition

forces backed by France and Egypt.100 Furthermore, Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 system, agreement with Libya’s GNA on Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundaries, and involvement in the Syrian conflict have hardened divisions within the NATO alliance. As the incoming administration seeks to strengthen relationships within NATO, managing Turkey’s ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean and returning to a productive relationship with Ankara are important prerequisites.

Disputes between NATO members may prevent the execution of drills and other preparatory activities, thereby undermining the organization’s efficacy. Just as important as its military might is NATO’s deterrence capabilities — if its credibility is downgraded or its ability to respond quickly is diminished, there could be detrimental effects for the alliance’s deterrence capabilities. Perceived weaknesses in the alliance could inspire attacks against members, particularly if they suspect an anemic response. Thus, with NATO forces deployed globally assisting American troops, a key pillar of U.S. national security has been and remains the integrity of NATO.

Interest Four: Enhance stability in Cyprus to protect U.S. regional interests and support UN efforts to create conditions for settlement

Although reaching a resolution to the Cyprus dispute is a lower priority for U.S. interests, ensuring that the conflict does not intensify and spill over into the Eastern Mediterranean is vital to broader U.S. interests. Indeed, an escalation of the domestic dispute would draw in other powers, such as Turkey, Greece, or even Russia, which could further aggravate tensions within NATO, jeopardize maritime access, and destabilize the region. Confidence building measures that supplement UN-led multilateral efforts towards a settlement, can mitigate the potential for violent conflict or destabilizing the status quo.

Interest Five: Maintaining the U.S. military’s ability to project power into nearby regional hotspots

The UK’s SBAs afford the U.S. military additional options for future contingencies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, and North Africa. Unfettered access to the Eastern Mediterranean provides the United States and our allies with strategic military options in an increasingly volatile region. The SBAs allow for effective military response capabilities, which in turn enhance the U.S. ability to exercise military force through alliance coalitions. British aircraft based at the SBAs have joined the U.S.-led military operations in Syria and NATO operations in Libya.101 By providing key British military capabilities in the region, the SBAs enhance the U.S. military’s ability to conduct military operations through alliances.

Having access to the SBAs can also be crucial during a regional emergency that requires rapidly evacuating U.S. citizens and U.S. government personnel from unstable countries. The close proximity of Cyprus to multiple regional conflicts, including Libya and Syria, makes the SBAs well positioned to host evacuated U.S. personnel if conditions in a regional country deteriorate rapidly. For instance, during the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon, several thousand U.S. diplomats and personnel were evacuated by naval transport and helicopter from the U.S. Embassy in Beirut to Cyprus. The evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens from Lebanon during July and August 2006 was one of the largest oversea evacuations of American citizens in history.102 Another crisis in Lebanon is possible given simmering tensions between Hezbollah and Israel and civil unrest surrounding the poor state of the Lebanese economy.

If U.S. relations with Turkey continue to sour, having an additional base for U.S. forces in the region outside of Incirlik grants the UK and the

Cyprus and its Surroundings

United States more freedom to plan. Erdogan routinely threatens the closure of Incirlik to punish what he views as undesirable U.S. policy actions. In November 2020, Erdogan reacted to a recent U.S. Senate resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide with a threat that Turkey would shut down Incirlik and a second U.S. military installation, Kurecik radar station, “if necessary.”103 Some U.S. observers have called for drawing down U.S. forces at Incirlik due to concerns that it gives Erdogan greater credibility within Turkey’s domestic political scene and undue leverage over the United States. If the incoming administration decided to draw down the U.S. force at Incirlik, it could potentially redeploy such personnel to the SBAs which would still provide access to the Middle East region.

Any hard decisions on Incirlik and the SBAs must be taken with consideration of the fact that Erdogan may, for purposes of shoring up domestic political support, overreact to U.S. action and attempt to close Incirlik or more closely involve the Turkish military with the Russian military. However, failing to provide the U.S. military with alternative basing options presents a strategically undesirable reliability on an undependable ally.

Proposed U.S. Policy Objectives on Cyprus

This report lays out three objectives that should guide the incoming administration’s strategy on the Cyprus conflict. Objective One relates to Interests One, Three and Five; Objective Two relates to Interests Two and Three; and Objective Three relates to Interest Four.

Under each strategic objective, this report recommends short-term and medium-term policies based on in-depth research by each workshop participant and interviews with former and current officials from various stakeholder governments, the RoC, the self-proclaimed TRNC, the UK, and the United States, as well as the UN. Short-term

recommendations are those actions that the United States can realistically achieve within the first two years of the incoming administration’s first term. Medium-term recommendations involve complex policy actions that would likely require more than two years to accomplish and are less crucial to securing the most important U.S. interests.

The recommended policies seek to leverage the full toolkit of U.S. national power, to include military, economic, and political, requiring coordination across departments and branches of the U.S. government. U.S. departments and agencies with envisioned roles in our recommended strategy include the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury and Commerce, and the U.S. Intelligence Community. Congressional support and outreach to the American Greek activist community, one of the most influential ethnic lobbies on Capitol Hill, will also be important for implementing policies requiring legislation.

Objective One: Limit Turkey’s destabilizing actions in the regional hydrocarbon competition

With its increasingly aggressive posture in the region, Turkey has become less reliable as a U.S. ally and a partner in the NATO alliance. On the hydrocarbon dispute, unilateral maritime delimitation efforts by Turkey are creating new tensions in the conflict that could jeopardize stability in Cyprus. In midNovember, President Erdogan made a highly provocative visit to the self-proclaimed TRNC, meeting with the newly elected leader in northern Cyprus, Ersin Tatar, and declaring his support for a two-state solution for the conflict. Turkey’s militarized approach in the hydrocarbon dispute and its provocative rhetoric on the internal conflict pose risks to the conflict’s stable status quo.

The transition to the incoming administration offers an opportunity to reset expectations

on the regional hydrocarbon issue and, more generally, in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Tensions between the United States and Turkey, which are currently the highest in decades, revolve around Turkey’s S-400 acquisition, its democratic backslide, and its military adventurism in multiple regional civil wars.104 Erdogan himself harbors a growing list of grievances against the United States. These include U.S. support to the Syrian Kurdish militias, unfounded suspicions regarding U.S. involvement in the 2016 coup attempt, and Fethullah Gulen’s presence in the United States.105 Most recently, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on Turkey in December 2020 for Turkey’s acquisition of Russia’s S-400 air defense system, which Erdogan called a “hostile attack” on Turkish sovereign rights.106

The United States must clearly signal it will not tolerate designs by the Turkish government or any foreign power to lay claim to gas and oil resources through force of arms and will defend regional states that are pursuing peaceful commercial collaboration, including the RoC, Israel, and Greece. As such, we recommend the following:

Short-term Recommendations

Frame the Greece-Cyprus-Israel energy triad as an anchor of regional stability that the United States will support: The United States should support and promote the regional energy cooperation among three American partners (Greece, Cyprus, and Israel) as a democratic foundation for the region and a strategic regional partnership

Hydrocarbons in Focus

Exploratory drilling off the coasts of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey have unearthed substantial natural gas reserves at the turn of the last decade.112 Three gas fields were discovered in Cyprus’ maritime zone at a time when the island was experiencing an economic slump. The hydrocarbon discovery gave Cypriots hope that they might reduce their dependence on oil imports, become a gas exporter country, and boost their economy.113 The hydrocarbon discovery was also strategically important to Europe, given the EU’s goal to diversify its energy resources to reduce dependence on Russia.

The RoC and the EU believe that the RoC has the legal authority to sign international agreements and issue licenses for resource exploration within its EEZ, given that the RoC is the internationally recognized government of the island. The RoC government established a sovereign wealth fund for hydrocarbon revenue and declared its intention to share profits from these resources with the Turkish Cypriots once the conflict is resolved and the island is united.114

Yet, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots condemn Nicosia’s action as unfairly unilateral. Turkish Cypriots, with support from Ankara, have called for a suspension of RoC hydrocarbon activity or the development of a bicommunal body under UN supervision that would determine a profit-sharing mechanism for hydrocarbon resources.115 Turkey objects to the Greek Cypriot administration of hydrocarbon activities both because Ankara does not recognize the RoC as the legitimate government of Cyprus and because Ankara claims that a portion of the RoC’s EEZ overlaps with Turkey’s continental shelf.116 Turkey’s claims are not reflected in internationally recognized agreements and Ankara refuses to sign the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).117

Cyprus’ major gas fields lie outside the area disputed by Turkey and the self-proclaimed TRNC, offering some hope that geopolitical contests will not impact their development.118 That has not prevented Turkey from growing increasingly confrontational to defend against perceived territorial encroachment and the threat of competition from Cypriot gas. Turkey may also be reacting to its own exclusion from the newly formed EastMed Gas Forum (EMGF), a partnership of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Greece, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority aimed at developing a regional gas market in the Mediterranean. Turkey has been further isolated by the EastMed pipeline project, an intergovernmental agreement between Cyprus, Israel, and Greece to build a pipeline that could transport 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year and would stretch from Israeli and Cypriot gas fields to Italy via Greece.119 Turkish vessels have long interfered with energy exploration activities and have most recently conducted live-fire military exercises off the coast of Cyprus.

The hydrocarbon discovery has not been an external catalyst that brought the two sides together; rather it has exacerbated tensions and made the conflict more difficult to resolve. The gas issue has triggered a new constellation of geopolitical threats for Cyprus, but at present, the island has not reaped any of the expected economic benefits, and it could be several years until Cyprus can extract and transport its gas reserves. At that point, Europe’s primary market for natural gas may be saturated. In addition, Turkey is likely to undermine any attempt by Cyprus to export gas through a marine pipeline to Cairo.120 Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has substantially decreased the price of natural gas, which reduced investor interest in Cypriot energy exploration.

Regardless of whether the EastMed pipeline is viable, the project will deepen cooperation among Israel, Greece and Cyprus. The United States is expanding its own cooperation with these states through the 3+1 strategic framework, a forum that presents opportunities for collaborating on natural gas, environmental issues, and cyber security.121

that may expand into greater maritime military cooperation. Within the first months of the Biden Administration, the U.S. State Department should declare U.S. support for emerging partnerships in the realm of hydrocarbon exploration between regional states, including Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt. Such messages would anchor regional stability and Turkey’s growing influence in the region.

Work with regional partners, including Israel, Greece and Cyprus, to increase joint military exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean: These could range from non-inflammatory exercises that occur in the jurisdiction of a member of the GreeceCyprus-Israel triad to more provocative exercises that take place in disputed waters.

However, this risks further isolating Turkey and providing fuel for Erdogan to further inflame ethnonationalism in Turkey. Turkey could escalate tensions with more provocative acts in disputed areas.

Medium-term Recommendations

Encourage a bicommunal initiative to establish a profit-sharing mechanism for hydrocarbon revenues derived from resources off the coast of Cyprus: The United States should support Track 1.5 efforts to facilitate resource sharing and joint ownership of hydrocarbons by funding academia and think tanks. Track 1.5 provides an opportunity for officials within the RoC government to act in an unofficial capacity to

begin discussions on an intransigent issue. RoC policy, that negotiations with Turkish Cypriots regarding resource sharing will only occur once the conflict is resolved, constrains government officials from negotiating on hydrocarbon sharing mechanisms. As a result, unofficial diplomacy is required to make progress on negotiating the details of how potential profits from natural gas could be shared between the two communities.

Objective Two: Counter Russia’s influence in the Republic of Cyprus

The RoC continues to maintain financial and military ties with the Russian government through illicit money laundering and occasional port calls by Russian naval assets. Such strategic interactions between Russia and the RoC, an EU member state, work against the U.S. agenda of competing with Russia, a key great power rival. Russia for its part aims to fill vacuums of U.S. leadership in the Eastern Mediterranean, advance its counterNATO agenda, and deepen its official ties with the RoC. Greater Russian involvement in Cyprus would sow further instability in a region where Russian intervention is already undermining U.S. regional interests, such as in Libya and Syria.

During interviews, current and former senior U.S. officials acknowledged that it would be difficult for the United States to completely replace Russia on the island. Many U.S. officials based their assessment on Russia’s deep cultural ties to the Greek Cypriot community, such as their shared Orthodox religious identities, and sizable Russian investments on the island that have enriched Greek Cypriot elites through “pay to play” politics. That said, U.S. officials noted the RoC government has been more receptive recently to U.S. requests for downgrading the RoC’s official cooperation with Russia.

We propose the following steps to drive a greater wedge between the RoC and Moscow. Given the long history of cooperation between

the countries, these measures are aimed at incrementally chipping away at Russia’s influence and positioning the United States as the RoC’s strategic partner of choice.

Short-term Recommendations

Work through official, diplomatic channels with the RoC government to express that the United States categorically opposes the Russian Navy’s port calls in the RoC: The U.S. government should also consider declassifying intelligence demonstrating that Russian military vessels stopping at Cypriot ports are not conducting humanitarian missions in the region but rather supplying military arms to the Syrian regime and Russian forces in Syria.

Renew the conditional waiver on defense trade regulations and consider expanding it to incorporate lethal military equipment: The U.S. government’s restrictions on the transfer of military arms to the RoC were created in the 1980s with the aim of preventing an arms race on the island [see Appendix B for background on the U.S. Defense Trade Regulations with the RoC]. Given that the Turkish military maintains tens of thousands of troops on the island, the United States should renew waivers for non-lethal equipment, consider expanding the scope of non-lethal equipment that the United States transfers, and consider allowing lethal aid, although that could cause tensions with the Turkish government. Russia is Cyprus’ main supplier of arms, but the United States should seek to supplant that position by renewing the existing waiver and reviewing possible mechanisms to expand it. The United States should ensure the extension to the defense trade regulations is conditional on RoC efforts to make progress on limiting Russian port calls.

Strengthen capacity in the RoC to combat Anti-money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (AML/ CFT): The United States should support RoC enforcement of anti-money laundering

UK Sovereign Base Areas in Focus

The SBAs are two military bases that are considered sovereign UK territory on the island of Cyprus. In the 1960 Treaty of Establishment, the UK negotiated with the future Cypriot government to retain 98 square miles, around 3 percent of the island, making up two bases, one in the southwest known as Akrotiri or Western SBA and one in the east known as Dhekelia or Eastern SBA.122 Today, the SBAs host over 3,100 military personnel, 4,000 dependents and civil servants, and 11,000 Cypriot nationals, according to the SBA administration.123

The bases have served as key staging areas for UK and U.S. military operations in the Middle East and North Africa.124 In fact, RAF Akrotiri is the largest British air base outside the UK mainland. RAF Akrotiri hosts the majority of SBA air assets, which include strategic airlift, search and rescue capability, air-to-air refueling aircraft, air superiority fighters, and ground surveillance aircraft. The base also hosts the 903 Expeditionary Air Wing, which was reformed in late 2014 to support UK operations against the Islamic State over Iraq and Syria, known as Operation Shader. In May 2019, the UK deployed several of its F-35Bs to RAF Akrotiri to participate in strikes against ISIS.125

In addition to the anti-ISIS strikes, the base was used as the staging ground for the UK’s contributions to other coalition operations in the region. In 2011, aircraft were deployed from RAF Akrotiri as part of Operation Ellamy, which was the UK mission enforcing the NATO no-fly zone in Libya.126

RAF Akrotiri was also the launching pad for UK Tornado aircraft involved in the 2018 U.S., UK, and French strikes against Syrian military bases over the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons in Douma.127

policies and conduct risk assessments of highrisk sectors in the economy in accordance with recommendations by the EU Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). Additionally, the United States should encourage the IMF and other financial institutions that have provided financial assistance to Cyprus to support the implementation of anti-money laundering efforts in Cyprus.

The United States, in collaboration with the RoC, can create joint investigative teams to share bank information, identify shortfalls in the AML/CFT legal and regulatory framework, and provide recommendations to improve enforcement; and conduct risk assessments of high-risk sectors, including real estate, casinos, legal persons and arrangements. Wealthy Russians will have less incentive to

invest in the RoC and will lose influence if there is less Russian money on the island.

Given shared concerns about Russian influence and terrorist financing, the United States and the EU can work towards AML/ CFT in accordance with recommendations by MONEYVAL and the 2020 U.S. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).107 The United States should provide inputs to the EU comprehensive policy on AML/CFT scheduled for 2021, which Cyprus would eventually implement.108 While engagement with the self-proclaimed TRNC is limited, the United States and the EU can improve AML/ CFT frameworks as part of the EU acquis communautaire in northern Cyprus. The EU is already providing technical assistance to northern Cypriot authorities under EU auspices so additional U.S. technical assistance to the EU could reduce the political

Unlike other overseas UK territories, the SBAs are run by the UK Ministry of Defense and do not contain settled British civilian populations. As a former UK official said, “They’re not colonies as such, they’re sovereign areas governed by the commander of British forces.”128 At the same time, the SBAs operate differently than most overseas U.S. military bases, which are typically leased from the host government for a set amount of time and are subject to greater restrictions at the direction of the host government.

Nevertheless, the RoC has generally opposed the continued presence of the SBAs. A former Cypriot official described the SBAs as a “bitter” price to pay for independence from the UK and a case of “amputated decolonization” since the areas remain under British rather than Cypriot control. Some scholars have also argued that the SBAs are inconsistent with the principles of self-determination in the UN Charter since the UK forced Cyprus to agree to the bases in order to secure independence.129

In international negotiations, the SBAs became an important issue of negotiation during the Annan Plan process. As an enticement to the Greek Cypriot community, in February 2003 the UK offered to transfer 45 square miles or almost half of its SBAs on the island, 90 percent to the Greek Cypriots and 10 percent to the Turkish Cypriots, if the two sides agreed to the plan.130 The areas would have largely been lands that were already inhabited by Cypriots and not used for direct military purposes. Additionally, the offer which was codified in Annex II of the Annan Plan also clarified the maritime borders around the bases, though the plan was never implemented after its failure to gain support in the RoC.131 The UK repeated the offer again in 2009.132 The status of the SBAs came up again during the negotiations at Crans Montana in 2017 and once more the UK reportedly offered to give up around half of its SBA territory as part of a negotiated settlement.133

sensitivity with the RoC and advance U.S. interests.109

To measure if these policies are working to decrease Russian influence in Cyprus we propose the following metrics: 1) the prevalence of Russian narratives in traditional and social media spaces, 2) a contraction in formal diplomatic relations, 3) frequency of Russian naval visits to Cypriot ports, and 4) influx of Russian money on the island. We delineate these monitoring efforts in Appendix C.

Continue and expand U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) for the RoC to promote U.S. defense doctrine and standards through professional military education, training, and relationship-building for RoC officers: The United States introduced

IMET for fiscal year 2021, and should seek to continue and expand the program in fiscal year 2022 to a larger cohort of officers. While this initiative would be subject to congressional appropriations, the new administration nevertheless should announce its intention to maintain and expand the program in fiscal year 2022 to signal the importance of the U.S.-Cyprus relationship to both the RoC and Congress.

Continue working within NATO to assess its deterrence capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean: The United States should advocate that NATO commission an updated evaluation of its deterrence capabilities in its southern region, given changes, such as increased Russian influence and the Turkish purchase of the S-400s. The study should seek to understand the shifting geopolitical landscapes, including

Cyprus and its Surroundings

the implication of deploying lethal and non-lethal equipment to member states. The product of this assessment should be actionable recommendations for NATO and member states that guide the reallocation of resources to ensure NATO can respond to malign Russian influence in the region. This would not only be a chance for the United States and its allies to take stock of their capabilities but would also be an important opportunity for the upcoming administration to reset U.S. priorities in the region.

Medium-term Recommendations

Expand technical assistance to Cyprus that strengthens democratic institutions, reducing the incentives for illicit finance and Russian investment: This technical assistance could involve trainings and capacity-building conducted by the State Department’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) for banks, investigators,

prosecutors, and the judiciary. These trainings would aim to increase the RoC’s effectiveness at prosecuting money laundering offenses and confiscating illegal proceeds. Moreover, the U.S. government should facilitate publicprivate partnerships between U.S. financial technology companies and the Cypriot banking sector and encourage American businesses to expand operations to Cyprus to improve access to finance and investments for Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Increase U.S. funding for and engagement with local initiatives aimed at countering Russian-backed messaging and disinformation

campaigns

on

the island: Moscow excels at conducting influence and disinformation campaigns to gain control over local political movements and sway public opinion. Historically, Russian soft power has similarly impacted events in Cyprus, including when Russian influence over AKEL likely swayed the Greek Cypriots to reject the Annan Plan

A CH-47 Chinook flight engineer assisgned to the 1-214th General Support Aviation Battalion, enjoys the view during a training flight over the island of Cyprus on Jan. 15, 2020. Source: U.S. Army/Maj. Robert Fellingham

in the 2004 referendum.110 In fact, Cyprus is already the home base of one hub of Russianbacked information warfare. A publishing company called The Soul, run by Russian nationals, frequently buys Facebook ads targeting U.S. citizens with false information about controversial political issues.111 The Soul also produces pro-Russia content and spreads disinformation about local politics. The United States can increase funding to help local organizations, and the U.S. Embassy expand media and digital literacy programming on the island.

Objective Three: Shape conflict dynamics within Cyprus to support a future settlement process

The transition to the Biden Administration is an opportunity to lay the groundwork for future negotiations in the Cyprus conflict by introducing new ideas and areas of policy innovation. The United States should invest in relatively low-cost, high-impact efforts to reduce the trust gap between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Gradual efforts aimed at confidence building will improve the likelihood that future settlement negotiations succeed at a time when the conflict is sufficiently ripe for a settlement. Such investments today can better position the United States to create background conditions that incentivize cooperation on the part of the two communities. Laying the groundwork in President-elect Biden’s early days could be a catalyst for a future settlement process and better position the United States to exploit favorable changes to conflict dynamics.

Short-term Recommendations

Existing U.S. policies that should be continued during the incoming Biden Administration include:

Reiterate U.S. Support for the Bizonal, Bicommunal, Federation Framework: For decades, the official U.S. position

has been that the BBF framework is the starting point for a political resolution to the Cyprus conflict. This is in keeping with past U.S. administrations and international negotiations since at least the 1980s. In sustaining our support for the BBF construct, the United States should signal its desire to see one Cyprus governed under a federation system of government. The inflammatory calls for a two-state solution to the conflict by new president of the self-proclaimed TRNC Tatar and President Erdogan, including during their joint commemoration in November 2020 of the self-proclaimed TRNC’s founding, pose the most serious challenges to the BBF framework in decades. Without firm and high-level U.S. statements stressing the need for a solution based on the BBF, Turkish Cypriot leader Ercin Tatar and Erdogan may be emboldened to intensify their calls for a two-state solution.

Continue withholding U.S. official recognition of the TRNC: The TRNC is a self-declared state that is only recognized by Turkey and is dependent on Turkey for its economic and military support. Although we suggest ways that the United States can deepen intercommunal ties, the United States should maintain its policy of non-recognition towards the TRNC.

Beyond these existing policies, the incoming administration should take the following measures to better prepare conditions within Cyprus for the future resumption of a negotiation process. These include:

Work through USUN to increase UN assistance to the bicommunal Technical Committees on Cultural Heritage, Economic & Commercial Matters, Gender Equality, Crossings, and Missing Persons in Cyprus: These Committees are led by representatives from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and are already implementing concrete confidence-building measures that promote reconciliation efforts between the two communities. The UNDP has also

facilitated bicommunal collaboration projects such as the restoration of the Monastery of Apostolos Andreas. Expanding and improving these confidence-building measures will promote people-to-people diplomacy and help both communities develop a shared identity. Initiating grassroots attitudes and perspective transformations among non-state actors would contribute to thawing tensions in official diplomatic negotiations.

Activate and increase funding for past and existing U.S. programs promoting bicommunal cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots: Since the 1980s, the United States has funded programs such as the Cyprus America Scholarship Program, Action for Cooperation and Trust, and Bicommunal Support Program. These programs have encouraged Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth and professionals to study

The Future of UNFICYP

UNFICYP’s presence in Cyprus, though important for deterring violence, has helped maintain a relatively comfortable status quo for nearly sixty years. It has had moderate success as a peacekeeping force, but it has not managed to help the Cypriots reach a peace deal after many decades.

UNFICYP is responsible for numerous humanitarian activities in Cyprus meant to bring together both communities, promote peace, and strengthen relationships. They also work in the buffer zone to remove mines and to facilitate farming by establishing and monitoring the supply of water and electricity across both sides. These components of the UNFICYP mission are seen as successful and are important tools in the peacemaking process.134

While the violent aspect of the conflict has been dormant for decades, there is legitimate fear on both sides about a future without UNFICYP. The Greek Cypriots fear Turkish aggression without the presence of UNFICYP as a deterrent. The Turkish Cypriots benefit greatly from humanitarian work that UNFICYP leads. The threat of UNFICYP’s withdrawal may give the UN enough leverage to reset the negotiations and add a sense of urgency to the discussion. However, previous threats of withdrawal have not moved the parties closer to negotiation so any plan that involves withdrawal needs to be credible and accepted by both parties.

Finnish UNFICYP soldiers bicycling to Nicosia from Dhekelia pass a checkpoint in 1964. Source: UN Photo/BZ

Canadian UNFICYP soldier on sentry duty at Paphos Gate to OP on Hermes St. in Nicosia in 1973. Source: UN Photo/Yutaka Nagata

with, collaborate with, and learn from one another. By expanding and enhancing these bicommunal trust programs, the United States can encourage individual Cypriot citizens to recognize the value of multiculturalism and inclusion. These programs would also foster a new generation of diplomats who will approach settlement negotiations with more collaborative and considerate attitudes.

Support novel Track 2 efforts to facilitate confidence-building between the two sides: Track 2 dialogue allows actors more bandwidth to explore innovative measures to enhance cooperation and understanding. Thus far, all Track 1 diplomatic efforts by the UN and other international mediators have failed. Therefore, the United States should support private citizens, civil society organizations, and academics to explore novel and innovative solutions that could foster a productive and cooperative environment for renewed settlement talks.

Medium-term Recommendations

Work to resolve the Missing Persons issue: The United States should provide support to the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP). U.S. support will contribute to recovering and identifying the remains of the 2,000 persons reported missing during the inter-communal fighting in the 1960s and the events of 1974. Previous excavations conducted by the CMP have successfully returned close to 1,000 identified individuals to their families reducing ethnic tensions around a volatile issue.

Create forums for peacebuilding involving key stakeholders: The U.S. should form a U.S. Institute of Peace Task Force to create and implement a roadmap for bridging ethnic, religious, social, cultural and political divides between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The Task Force will engage communities on both sides, identify their needs and demands, and craft policy recommendations for strengthening intercommunal relations. It will work with

local organizations to identify and bring together diverse stakeholders from both communities to engage in peacebuilding discussions.

Strengthen economic collaboration between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots: U.S. officials should reactivate the Cyprus Partnership for Economic Growth to reduce economic disparities between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The initiative will bring Greek and Turkish Cypriot-led businesses and chambers of commerce together through joint ventures.

Broaden ownership of the peace process: U.S. policy should focus on increased participation from groups that have been historically marginalized in the peace process to form favorable public opinion on reconciliation efforts. This can help enable and sustain conditions for a peaceful settlement by empowering local actors and displacing the role of Turkey, Greece and Russia to maintain divisions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots for their own interests. The U.S. could expand women’s participation and leadership in negotiating and driving peacebuilding. Other groups that can be engaged include civil servants, religious leaders, students, academics and community workers.

Track 2 Performance Indicators

The U.S. State Department could evaluate the effectiveness of the Track 2 initiatives mentioned above based on metrics that include: political representation of women from Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities; frequency of contact between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot youth; number of joint programs on peacebuilding led by leaders in both communities; number of joint ventures between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot-owned businesses; and frequency of communication between RoC government officials and Turkish Cypriot leaders.

Conclusion

Morethan half a century of diplomatic engagement has failed to solve the Cyprus problem. The perennial conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean is marred with resignation and often overshadowed by some of the more volatile conflicts in its neighborhood. However, Cyprus is a stable democracy and a reliable American partner in the region. U.S. political, military, and economic interests at the regional and global level benefit from a robust partnership with Cyprus and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Stability on the island and in the region requires the United States to challenge growing assertiveness by Turkey and expanding influence by Russia, while contributing to efforts that will foster peace and manage sources of tension in Cyprus itself. As the division of the island enters its sixth decade, the time is growing ripe once again to pursue another round of settlement

negotiations — this time with the constructive engagement of women, young people, and civil society organizations — before Ankara’s creeping annexation over northern Cyprus squashes the opportunity for peace.

Failure to reach a settlement, or to manage the tensions on the island and in the Eastern Mediterranean caused by clashes over energy and territory, will lead to greater instability and risk pulling the United States into another conflict situation in the region. It is imperative to resolve existing disputes over hydrocarbons to avoid spoilers from disrupting a potential peace process in Cyprus. The imminent transition to the incoming administration is an opportunity to reinvigorate U.S. policy and diplomacy toward Cyprus that would lead to a more stable and prosperous RoC and protect U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean into the next decade.

Members of the workshop team preparing for their briefing over Zoom. Source: Rebecca Gorin

Source: Congressional Research Service

Appendix A: Our suggested statement for the Biden Administration regarding the U.S.-Republic of Cyprus strategic partnership, outlining the main contours of the U.S. Cyprus strategy articulated in this report.

Office of the Press Secretary

[To be released after or during a senior level (Assistant Secretary or above) meeting between the governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Cyprus.]

Statement by the President on Encouraging Conflict Resolution in Cyprus

The United States supports the return to settlement talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities under the bizonal, bicommunal federal framework. The United States stands ready to assist our Cypriot friends to settle a conflict that has divided both communities for over five decades. We call on the leaders of both communities to de-escalate tensions and return to productive talks. President Biden has long supported settlement talks among the two parties, commending both communities for their historic progress towards settlement on one of his last calls with foreign leaders as Vice President in 2017.

We continue to recognize the strategic importance of Cyprus and its many decades as a strong U.S. partner in the region. As the United States seeks to expand cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus on a range of issues including trade, investment, and security cooperation, we are deeply concerned about the malign influence of Russia and other foreign powers in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

We are also concerned about intensifying hostilities in the region. The United States strongly condemns Turkey’s provocative behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean. We call on Turkey to respect international norms and laws regarding maritime boundaries and natural resource development.

The United States calls on the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to restart talks on a comprehensive and fair settlement for the benefit of all Cypriots and for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Appendix B: Background on U.S. Defense Trade Regulations with the Republic of Cyprus

In 1987, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to restrict U.S. sale or provision of military aid with the goal of avoiding an arms race and fostering reunification efforts on the island. In December 2019, Congress passed the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019.135 This Act lifted the prohibition, allowing for the export, re-export or transfer of arms and services on the U.S. Munitions List to the RoC. The aim is to advance U.S. security interests in Europe by helping to reduce the dependence of the government of the RoC on other countries, including countries that pose challenges to U.S. interests around the world, for defense-related material. Some restrictions remain, the Secretary of State may deny exports based on “credible human rights concerns,” and the Act requires the U.S. President to certify annually that the RoC is working to implement AML regulations and taking steps to deny Russian military vessels port access.

However, in October 2020, the Trump Administration took advantage of a provision in the Act and in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2020 allowing the President to waive the AML and port access limitations and allow transfers of non-lethal defense articles and services if “it is essential to the national security interests of the U.S.”136 According to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in the State Department: “The interagency license approval process will review potential exports to Cyprus on a case-by-case basis to ensure only non-lethal defense articles and defense services are approved for export.”137 If the administration deems it necessary, the United States could permit exporting lethal aid. Additionally, if there is a certification of the above, then the administration cannot have a policy of denying defense articles to the Cypriot government. While the waiver can only last one fiscal year, there is no explicit language forbidding the administration from renewing it.

The authorizing legislation refers to the U.S. Munitions List (USML) codified in regulations under part 121 of title 22 in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), but the list does not explicitly differentiate between lethal and non-lethal articles and services. U.S. law already provides mechanisms to allow lethal aid and Congress could make it easier by removing the limitations. However, Congress intends for Cyprus to make efforts to combat AML and deny Russian naval visits, the latter of which will be challenging for the RoC government to achieve. A Biden Administration may face some political pushback if they extend the waiver or even certify Cypriot progress if there is no meaningful reciprocation from the Cypriot government. Additionally, any progress an incoming administration can attain from Cyprus would have to outweigh the inevitable fallout from Turkey should the United States permit lethal aid to the Cypriot government.

Appendix C: Monitoring Russian Influence

The United States may evaluate if new policies are working to decrease Russian influence in Cyprus by measuring 1) the prevalence of Russian narratives in traditional and social media spaces, 2) a contraction in formal diplomatic relations, 3) frequency of Russian naval visits to Cypriot ports, and 4) influx of Russian money on the island.

To evaluate the first metric, the State Department’s Bureau of Global Public Affairs Research and Analytics team and Global Engagement Center’s Science and Technology team could utilize custom, advanced analytics tools to measure the relative volume and engagement with Russian media sources and Russian-based accounts on Cypriot social media compared with U.S., European, and Cypriot sources. These reporting tools could assess how Russian influence in the media space has changed over time, especially while the United States is implementing other short and medium-term recommendations in this report. To evaluate the second, the appropriate offices should track the number of state visits and signed agreements between the states and note in particular decisions by either side to jettison planned agreements, such as Russia’s decision to throw out a tax deal this past August.138

In addition, the same office should track the number and type of Russian calls to Cypriot ports to assess whether these are decreasing.

Finally, given that billions of dollars in Russian money is registered in Cyprus but invested in other locations, the United States should assess whether the number of Russian bank accounts on the island and the amount of money in those accounts continues to decrease. Similarly, understanding the level of Russian tourists, as measured by the number of tourists annually and the proportion of Cypriot GDP composed of Russian tourism, will help the United States understand the role that Russian tourism plays in perpetuating Cyprus’ interest in appeasing its Russian demographic. In particular, it will be important to evaluate if Russian tourism to Cyprus rebounds to previous levels following the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, the pandemic’s effect of virtually eliminating Russian tourism could be an opportunity for U.S. policy to prevent it from returning to prior levels, thereby cutting off one mechanism of Russian influence on the island.

Interviews

We are grateful to diplomats, scholars, and professionals who took the time to speak with our policy workshop and helped inform the ideas and perspectives presented in this report. The content of the report does not necessarily reflect their views or the views of their affiliated organizations. They are listed below in alphabetical order with their relevant affiliations.

Álvaro de Soto, Professor, Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA), Sciences Po and former UN Under-SecretaryGeneral and Special Adviser on Cyprus to UNSG Kofi Annan (1999-2004)

Dr. Olga Demetriou, Associate Professor in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University

Amb. (Ret.) Kathleen Doherty, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Cyprus (2015-19)

Dr. Erhan Erçin, former Special Representative of the “TRNC President” and Turkish Cypriot negotiator (201620)

Amb. (Ret.) Jeffrey Feltman, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs (2012-18) and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State (200912)

Prof. Ronald J. Fisher, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus of International Peace and Conflict Resolution, School of International Service, American University

Amb. Judith Garber, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Cyprus

Prof. Alexis Heraclides, Professor Emeritus, Panteion University

Ms. Polly Ioannou, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations

Mr. Nick Larigakis, President & CEO, American Hellenic Institute

Amb. (Ret.) Thomas Miller, former U.S. Ambassador to the Hellenic Republic (2001-04) and Special Coordinator for Cyprus (1997-99)

Amb. (Ret.) Peter Millet, CMG, former High Commissioner of the United Kingdom to the Republic of Cyprus (2005-10)

Admiral Michael Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2007-11)

Mr. Matthew Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Amb. David M. Satterfield, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey

Dr. Christos Sofianopolous, Head of the Political Section, Embassy of Greece to the United States

About the Team

Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer (dkurtzer@princeton.edu)

Ambassador Kurtzer is the S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle East Policy Studies at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA). During a twentynine-year-long career in the Foreign Service, he served as the U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Israel.

Kaira Bakkestad-Legare (kairab@princeton.edu)

Prior to SPIA, Kaira served as a Senior Policy Officer at Global Affairs Canada, where she worked to develop a new Arctic foreign policy for Canada and supported Canada within the Arctic Council. She was responsible for co-editing the report and conducting research on hydrocarbons and geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Rebecca Gorin (rgorin@princeton.edu)

Rebecca is studying international relations at SPIA. She previously worked at the U.S. State Department to build research and analytics capabilities for public diplomacy. She was responsible for co-producing the final report and drafting sections on UNFICYP and Russian monitoring.

Jake Gutman (jgutman@princeton.edu)

Jake is studying foreign policy and national security issues at SPIA and previously worked as a legislative aide to U.S. Senator Cory Booker. He was responsible for co-producing the final report and drafting sections on the Sovereign Base Areas and U.S.-EU cooperation.

Fatima Khan (fkkhan@princeton.edu)

Fatima is concentrating in international development at SPIA and previously worked at the Punjab Chief Minister’s Office on policies related to women’s empowerment, law & order, taxation and other social reform in Pakistan. She was responsible for coediting the final report and focused on local perspectives on the Cyprus conflict.

Rocio Cara Labrador (rociol@princeton.edu)

Cara is studying international relations and conflict studies at SPIA. She previously worked at the Council on Foreign Relations as a writer on Latin America and as a Fulbright scholar in Colombia. She was responsible for drafting sections on Greek policy and interests toward the Cyprus conflict.

Patrick McDonnell (pm18@princeton.edu)

Pat is studying international relations and national security law at SPIA as well as Harvard Law School, previously he served as an Army intelligence officer with deployments to Afghanistan and Europe. He drafted sections related to the law of sea, maritime borders, and defense trade regulations.

Dan Morales (danielpm@princeton.edu)

Dan is a U.S. national security professional with eight years of experience working on security and military issues in the Middle East and North Africa and traveling to the region on multiple short-term and longer-term assignments. As one of two drafters, Dan was responsible for drafting various sections of the final workshop report and focused his individual research on Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy interests in Cyprus and the broader East Mediterranean region.

María Alejandra Moscoso (mmoscoso@princeton.edu)

María Alejandra is studying foreign policy and international relations at SPIA and previously worked as a Program Specialist for Stabilization and Development with Creative Associates International. As a 2019 Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs Fellow with the U.S. Department of State, Alejandra is eager to represent and serve her community through a career in the Foreign Service.

Jeff Phaneuf (jphaneuf@princeton.edu)

Jeff is a former Marine Corps infantry officer who also worked for U.S. Rep. Seth Moulton. He was responsible for overseeing the group’s digital archives and researching the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

Maggie Tennis (mtennis@princeton.edu)

Maggie studies foreign policy and national security at Princeton. Previously, she worked for Ambassador Strobe Talbott at the Brookings Institution on U.S.-Russia foreign policy. She was one of two main drafters of the final report and conducted research on Russian and Chinese interests in the Cyprus Conflict.

Victor Yau (vyau@princeton.edu)

Victor studies international relations and diplomacy at SPIA and previously served as an artist-diplomat for the U.S. government. He co-wrote the report’s sections on historical background, conflict resolution efforts, and Track II initiatives.

Cyprus and its Surroundings

Endnotes

1 lke Dağlı, “The Cyprus Problem: Why Solve a Comfortable Conflict?,” Oxford Research Group (blog), April 5, 2017, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-cyprus-problem-why-solve-a-comfortableconflict; John S. Bowman, “Cyprus,” Encyclopedia Britannica, December 15, 2020, https://www.britannica. com/place/Cyprus.

2 Andrew Borowiec, Cyprus: A Troubled Island, Non-Series (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000), 11–20, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=69326&site=ehost-live.

3 Eleni Apeyitou, “Turkish-Cypriot Nationalism: Its History And Development (1571-1960),” The Cyprus Review 15, no. 1 (2003): 68.

4 George Horton Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 2.

5 Ilia Xypolia, “Cyprus: Dangerous Row over Gas Exploration Dates Back to British Colonial Meddling,” University of Aberdeen, July 11, 2019, https://www.abdn.ac.uk/socsci/blog/cyprus-dangerous-row-over-gasexploration-dates-back-to-british-colonial-meddling-/.

6 Borowiec, Cyprus: A Troubled Island, 33.

7 Dan Lindley, “Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus,” International Studies Perspectives 8, no. 2 (May 1, 2007): 8, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2007.00282.x.

8 Borowiec, Cyprus: A Troubled Island, 40; BBC, “Timeline: Cyprus,” BBC News, December 13, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1021835.stm.

9 Borowiec, Cyprus: A Troubled Island, 41.

10 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland et al., “Treaty of Guarantee,” August 16, 1960, 3, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CY%20GR%20TR_600816_Treaty%20 of%20Guarantee.pdf.

11 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland et al., “Treaty of Guarantee.”

12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland et al., “Treaty of Guarantee.”

13 Borowiec, Cyprus: A Troubled Island, 50.

14 Borowiec, 63.

15 Borowiec, 174.

16 Vincent L. Morelli, “Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive” (Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2019), 11, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41136.pdf.

17 Ergün Olgun, “Cyprus: Towards a Settlement?” (Foreign Policy Institute, 2015), http://foreignpolicy. org.tr/cyprus-towards-a-settlement/.

18 Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, “The Annan Plan” (United Kingdom Parliament), paras. 33–34, accessed December 17, 2020, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmfaff/113/11305. htm.

19 “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (Annan Plan Text),” March 31, 2004, http://

www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf.

20 “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (Annan Plan Text).”

21 “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (Annan Plan Text).”

22 Morelli, “Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive,” 3.

23 Nathalie Tocci, “Towards Peace in Cyprus: Incentives and Disincentives,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 10, no. 1 (2003): 199–212.

24 Morelli, “Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive,” 4–5.

25 Morelli, “Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive.”

26 Morelli, 10.

27 Morelli, 10.

28 Saim Saeed, “UN Chief: Talks to Reunify Cyprus Collapse,” POLITICO, July 7, 2017, https://www.politico. eu/article/un-chief-talks-to-reunify-cyprus-collapse/.

28 Saim Saeed, “UN Chief: Talks to Reunify Cyprus Collapse.”

29 Morelli, 25–26.

30 Morelli, 32.

31 Jeffrey Feldman, Workshop Interview, November 9, 2020.

32 Olga Demetriou, Workshop Interview, November 12, 2020.

33 Morelli, 22.

34 Nicholas Sambanis, “United Nations Peacekeeping In Theory and In Cyprus: New Conceptual Approaches and Interpretations” (Thesis (PhD), Princeton University, 1999), 1.

35 Nektaria Stamouli, “Erdoğan Calls for ‘Two-State’ Solution for Cyprus,” POLITICO, November 15, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/erdogan-calls-for-two-state-solution-for-cyprus/.

36 Haggai Kupermintz and Gavriel Salomon, “Lessons to Be Learned From Research on Peace Education in the Context of Intractable Conflict,” Theory Into Practice 44, no. 4 (October 1, 2005): 293–302, https://doi. org/10.1207/s15430421tip4404_3.

37 Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, “Settlements,” January 16, 2019, https://www.btselem.org/settlements.

38 Irem Koca and Jonathan Spicer, “Erdogan Visits Northern Cyprus, Calls for Two-State Solution for Island,” Reuters, November 15, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-turkey-idUSKBN27V0BB.

39 Tolga Demiryol, “Between Security and Prosperity: Turkey and the Prospect of Energy Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Turkish Studies 20, no. 3 (May 27, 2019): 442–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.20 18.1534204.

40 Thomas Wintle, “Turkey Announces Military Exercise off Cyprus Coast despite EU Threats,” CGTN, September 12, 2020, sec. Europe, https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2020-09-12/Turkey-announces-militaryexercise-off-Cyprus-coast-despite-EU-threats-TJbN84x60M/index.html.

41 “Greece, Turkey Defuse Crash Row,” BBC News, May 23, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

44 - Cyprus and its Surroundings

europe/5010736.stm.

42 Associated Press, “Split Cyprus’ Rival Sides Agree Crossings’ Partial Opening,” WSLS, May 21, 2020, sec. Business, https://www.wsls.com/business/2020/05/21/split-cyprus-rival-sides-agree-crossings-partial-opening/.

43 “TRNC Condemns Far-Right Greek Group’s Violent Protests, Urges Greek Cypriots to Take Action,” Daily Sabah, October 13, 2020, sec. Politics, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/trnc-condemns-far-rightgreek-groups-violent-protests-urges-greek-cypriots-to-take-action.

44 Jonathan Warner, David W. Lovell, and Michalēs Kontos, Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem. (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016).

45 “Solving the Cyprus Problem: Hopes and Fears” (Cyprus 2015 Initiative, June 28, 2011), https://www. undp.org/content/dam/cyprus/docs/ACT%20Publications/Civil%20Society/cyprus2015%20solving%20the%20 cyprus%20problem%20en.pdf.

46 Warner, Lovell, and Kontos, Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem., 189.

47 F. Cochrane, N. Loizides, and T. Bodson, Mediating Power-Sharing: Devolution and Consociationalism in Deeply Divided Societies, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2018), 91, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351250566.

48 “Solving the Cyprus Problem: Hopes and Fears.”

49 “Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality,” Crisis Group Europe Report (Brussels: International Crisis Group, March 14, 2014), 96, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/westerneuropemediterranean/cyprus/divided-cyprus-coming-terms-imperfect-reality.

50 “Divided Cyprus,” 91.

51 Alexis Heraclides, “‘What Will Become of Us without Barbarians?’ The Enduring Greek–Turkish Rivalry as an Identity-Based Conflict,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 12, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 115–34, https:// doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2012.661944.

52 Deutsche Welle, “Turkish Cypriot Hardliner Ousts Incumbent President in Northern Cyprus Vote,” Deutsche Welle, October 18, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-cypriot-hardliner-ousts-incumbent-presidentin-northern-cyprus-vote/a-55314270.

53 Henri J. Barki, “How Erdogan Muscled Turkey to the Center of the World Stage,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 19, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-erdogan-muscled-turkey-center-world-stage.

54 Amberin Zaman, “Erdogan’s Call for Two-State Solution in Cyprus Dims Hopes for Turkish ‘reset’ with West,” Al-Monitor, November 16, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/11/turkey-cypruserdogan-two-state-solution-drilling-east-med.html.

55 Canan-Sokullu Ebru, Debating Security in Turkey: Challenges and Changes in the Twenty-First Century (Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Lexington Books, 2013), 116, http://dspace.conacyt.gov.py/xmlui/ handle/123456789/32202.

56 Aykan Erdemir and Philip Kowalski, “‘Blue Homeland’ and the Irredentist Future of Turkish Foreign Policy,” War on the Rocks, September 30, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/blue-homeland-and-theirredentist-future-of-turkish-foreign-policy/.

57 Cengiz Candar, “Turkey’s Blue Homeland Doctrine: Signaling Perpetual Conflict in the Mediterranean and Rough Waters Ahead,” The Turkey Analyst, August 26, 2020, https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkeyanalyst-articles/item/648-turkey’s-blue-homeland-doctrine-signaling-perpetual-conflict-in-the-mediterraneanand-rough-waters-ahead.html.

58 European Parliament, “Cyprus and the Enlargement of the European Union,” August 8, 2000, https:// www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/1a1_en.htm.

59 “Divided Cyprus.”

60 Hellenic Republic: Ministry of National Defence. “Defence Minister’s Mr. Panos Panagiotopoulos Statement Following His Visit at the Hellenic Force in Cyprus (ELDYK) HQ,” n.d. http://www.mod.mil.gr/en/press-releases/ defence-ministers-mr-panos-panagiotopoulos-statement-following-his-visit-hellenic.

61 Heraclides, Alexis. “Imagined Enemies: The Aegean Conflict.” Mediterranean Politics 16, no. 2 (2011): 221–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2011.583740.

62 “EU Breaks Deadlock to Impose Belarus Sanctions, Turkey on Notice.” Al Jazeera, October 2, 2020, sec. European Union News. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/2/eu-breaks-deadlock-to-impose-belarussanctions-turkey-on-notice.

63 Stefanini, Sara. “Cyprus Fears Russia Could Wreck Reunification.” POLITICO, January 12, 2017. https:// www.politico.eu/article/cyprus-fears-russia-could-wreck-reunification/.

64 Hadjicostis, Menelaos. “Cyprus: US to Lift Cyprus Arms Embargo in Security Boost.” AP NEWS, January 18, 2019. https://apnews.com/article/c2f22403b5da4097a2dccca0aa637038.

65 “Russia Interested in Close Cooperation with Cyprus – Russian Foreign Minister.” Russkiy Mir Foundation, November 10, 2011. https://russkiymir.ru/en/news/127096/.

66 Reuters Staff, “Russia, Cyprus Sign Military Deal on Use of Mediterranean Ports,” Reuters, February 26, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-cyprus-military-idUSKBN0LU1EW20150226.

67 Luke Harding, “Russian Expat Invasion of Cyprus Also Has Sinister Overtones,” The Guardian, January 26, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/26/cyprus-russian-invasion.

68 Ben Judah, “Did Putin Sink Cyprus?,” The New York Times, April 3, 2013, sec. Opinion, https://www. nytimes.com/2013/04/03/opinion/putins-role-in-cypruss-collapse.html.

69 Michele Kambas, “After Outcry, Cyprus Suspends Its Citizenship for Cash Programme,” Reuters, October 13, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/cyprus-citizenship-int-idUSKBN26Y17D.

70 Helena Smith, “‘Patience Is Running out’: Pressure on Turkey and Greece as Cyprus Talks Open,” The Guardian, June 28, 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/28/a-best-and-last-hope-talks-beginover-cypriot-reunification.

71 Carol Migdalovitz, “Cyprus: Status of UN Negotiations,” Congressional Research Service, May 19, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IB89140.pdf.

72 Carol Migdalovitz, “Cyprus: Status of UN Negotiations.”; Stefanini, Sara. “Cyprus Fears Russia Could Wreck Reunification.”

73 Tannam, Etain. “Cyprus and the Annan Plan Negotiations: An Organisational Model.” Irish Studies in International Affairs 27 (2016): 189–200. https://doi.org/10.3318/isia.2016.27.4.

74 Christou, George, and George Kyris. “The Impact of the Eurozone Crisis on National Foreign Policy: Enhancing Europeanization in the Case of Cyprus.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 55, no. 6 (2017): 1290–1305. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12557.

75 Robin Emmott Strupczewski Sabine Siebold, Jan, “EU Leaders Break Deadlock to Impose Sanctions on Belarus,” Reuters, October 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-summit-idUSKBN26M58G.

76 “Cyprus Parliament Calls for End to EU Sanctions on Russia,” EURACTIV (blog), July 8, 2016, https:// www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/cyprus-parliament-calls-for-end-to-eu-sanctions-on-russia/.

77 Holly Ellyatt, “Why Russia and Cyprus Are Getting Cozy Again,” CNBC, February 26, 2015, https://www. cnbc.com/2015/02/26/bff-why-russia-and-cyprus-are-getting-cosy-again.html.

46 - Cyprus and its Surroundings

78 Menelaos Hadjicostis, “Cyprus: US to Lift Cyprus Arms Embargo in Security Boost,” AP NEWS, January 18, 2019, https://apnews.com/article/c2f22403b5da4097a2dccca0aa637038.

79 “US ‘Wishes to Damage’ Russia-Cyprus Ties,” Financial Mirror (blog), September 3, 2020, https://www. financialmirror.com/2020/09/03/us-wishes-to-damage-russia-cyprus-ties/.

80 Elias Hazou, “Cabinet Approves EuroGate, Dubai Ports Bids for Limassol Port,” Cyprus Mail, February 25, 2016, https://cyprus-mail.com/2016/02/25/cabinet-approves-eurogate-dubai-ports-bids-for-limassol-port.

81 Yossi Melman, “China Is Spying On Israel to Steal U.S. Secrets,” Foreign Policy, March 24, 2019, sec. Argument, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/24/china-and-russia-are-spying-on-israel-to-steal-u-s-secretsputin-netanyahu-xi-haifa-ashdod-iai-elbit/; Daniel Estrin and Emily Feng, “There’s A Growing Sore Spot In IsraeliU.S. Relations: China,” NPR, September 11, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/11/757290503/theres-a-growingsore-spot-in-israeli-u-s-relations-china.

82 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, “Statement by Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Cyprus on Accusations against China on 5G-Related Issues by U.S. Under Secretary of State Keith Krach,” October 24, 2020, http://cy.china-embassy.org/eng/sghd/t1826440.htm.

83 Laurence Norman, David Gauthiar-Villars, and William Mauldin, “U.S., EU to Impose Sanctions on Turkey Over Missile System, Energy,” Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2020, sec. World, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ eu-to-impose-new-sanctions-on-turkey-officials-over-energy-activities-in-eastern-mediterranean-11607648191.

84 “NATO Membership for Cyprus. Yes, Cyprus.,” Atlantic Council (blog), April 1, 2019, https://www. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-membership-for-cyprus/.

85 Alan M. Janigian, “The Cypriot-Turkish Conflict and NATO-European Union Cooperation” (Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 3. https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/55628.

86 “Cyprus Meets Schengen Requirements for Personal Data Protection,” SchengenVisaInfo.com, July 14, 2020, https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/cyprus-meets-schengen-requirements-for-personal-dataprotection/.

87 “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Cyprus,” United States Department of State, accessed December 18, 2020, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/cyprus/.

88 “European Energy Security and Transatlantic Cooperation,” Atlantic Council, June 24, 2019, https:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/european-energy-security-and-transatlanticcooperation/.

89 Umut Özkaleli and Ömür Yilmaz, “‘What Was My War Like?,’” International Feminist Journal of Politics 17, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 137–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2013.833700.

90 “Gender Equality Index: Cyprus,” European Institute for Gender Equality, accessed December 18, 2020, https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2020/country/CY.

91 Olga Demetriou and Maria Hadjipavlou, “Women and Peace Negotiations in Cyprus,” in The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict Studies (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 1–9, https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-030-11795-5_105-1.

92 Olga Demetriou, “The War That Keeps on Raping: Femicide and Sexual Violence in Post-Conflict Cyprus,” accessed December 17, 2020, http://feministiqa.net/the-war-that-keeps-on-raping/.

93 Özkaleli and Yilmaz, “‘What Was My War Like?’”

94 Demetriou and Hadjipavlou, “Women and Peace Negotiations in Cyprus.”

95 Demetriou and Hadjipavlou.

96 “Facts and Figures: Women, Peace, and Security,” UN Women, accessed December 17, 2020, https://www. unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/peace-and-security/facts-and-figures.

97 “Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden to the Press at Larnaca International Airport,” The White House, May 21, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/21/remarks-vice-president-joebiden-press-larnaca-international-airport.

98 “Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden to the Press at Larnaca International Airport.”

99 “US Imposes Sanctions on Turkey over Russia Weapons,” BBC News, December 14, 2020, https://www. bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55311099.

100 Michaël Tanchum, “How Did the Eastern Mediterranean Become the Eye of a Geopolitical Storm?” Foreign Policy (blog), August 18, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/18/eastern-mediterranean-greeceturkey-warship-geopolitical-showdown/.

101 “Libya Update,” GOV.UK, March 20, 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/libya-update--2.

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103 Matt McGarry, “Analysis: Turkey Once Again Threatens to Close U.S. Bases,” ABC News, accessed December 18, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/International/analysis-turkey-threatens-close-us-bases/story?id=67751304.

104 Reuters Staff, “Even after S-400 Sanctions, U.S. Hopes for Resolution with Turkey,” Reuters, December 14, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-sanctions-erdogan-resolution-idUSKBN28O2MS.

105 Nick Danforth, “Why Turkey Doesn’t Trust the United States,” Foreign Policy (blog), July 15, 2019, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/15/why-turkey-doesnt-trust-the-united-states/.

106 Tuvan Gumrukcu Erkoyun Ezgi, “Erdogan Says U.S. Sanctions an Attack on Ally Turkey’s Rights,” Reuters, December 16, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-turkey-sanctions-erdogan-idUSKBN28Q1GZ.

107 “Cyprus Should Pursue Money Laundering from Criminal Proceeds Generated Outside of the Country More Aggressively,” Human Rights and Rule of Law, accessed December 18, 2020, https://www.coe.int/en/web/ human-rights-rule-of-law/newsroom-2020/-/asset_publisher/UORLPrekXNpu/content/cyprus-should-pursuemoney-laundering-from-criminal-proceeds-generated-outside-of-the-country-more-aggressively.

108 “Commission Steps up Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing,” European Commission, March 7, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/home/en.

109 “Money Laundering,” International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2020), 95. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Tab-2INCSR-Vol-2-508.pdf.

110 Etain Tannam, “Cyprus and the Annan Plan Negotiations: An Organisational Model.”

111 “The Biggest Social Media Operation You’ve Never Heard of Is Run Out of Cyprus by Russians,” Lawfare, December 18, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/biggest-social-media-operation-youve-never-heard-run-outcyprus-russians.

112 Yuri M. Zhukov, “Trouble in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea,” Foreign Affairs, March 20, 2013, https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cyprus/2013-03-20/trouble-eastern-mediterranean-sea.

113 James Ker-Lindsay, Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution, International Library of Twentieth Century History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), chap. 10, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=t rue&db=nlebk&AN=942070&site=ehost-live.

- Cyprus and its Surroundings

114 Paola Tamma, “Uniting Cyprus with Gas Bonanza Money a ‘Pipe Dream,’” POLITICO, June 4, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/cyprus-off-shore-gas-turkey/.

115 James Ker-Lindsay, Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution, chap. 10.

116 Press Release Regarding The Conclusions Adopted By The Eu Foreign Affairs Council, “Press Release Regarding The Conclusions Adopted By The Eu Foreign Affairs Council,” July 16, 2019, http://houston.cg.mfa.gov. tr/Mission/ShowAnnouncement/360192; Demiryol, “Between Security and Prosperity.”

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