Sharing the Future

Acronyms

SSE Support

SUYE

Social

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF

United

Fund

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The conflict in Syria has uprooted millions of people. Türkiye hosts the largest number of displaced Syrians in the world: 3.6 million. Many have been in Türkiye for over a decade. During this period, the Turkish government and civil society have dedicated significant effort and resources to providing basic protections and services. The focus is slowly shifting towards social harmonization. This report aims to offer recommendations to facilitate the social harmonization of Syrians in Türkiye.

Given that Syrians make up the vast majority of displaced people in Türkiye, our report and recommendations will predominantly focus on the Syrian population. However, we recognize that Türkiye is also home to hundreds of thousands of displaced nationals of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, among others, and many of these recommendations could apply to these populations, as well.

We define social harmonization as a progression towards Syrians’ equal participation in all areas of social life. This progression requires a holistic approach where gains in one domain support gains in other domains. For example, education improves labor market and language outcomes, which in turn foster social participation.

The first section of the report, Structural Barriers, will examine systemic bottlenecks to social harmonization in Türkiye, including funding, legal status, and misinformation.

Legal status is essential to Syrians’ ability to plan for their future. Türkiye implements a comprehensive registration process which extends temporary protection status to Syrians and international protection status to other groups. This process ensures access to education and health services, but restricts Syrians to their province of registration.

Opportunities for Action will identify opportunities for skill development and positive social interaction between Syrians and Turkish people.

Continued investments to strengthen Syrians’ skills are critical to their integration into society. For children, education is most important, but currently, only about twothirds of school-age Syrian children attend school. For adults, work-based programs, including vocation-specific language training, upskilling, and job-matching, can improve integration. Turkish language acquisition is critical for all Syrians, but learning opportunities are especially difficult for adults to access.

Meaningful, positive interaction between Syrians and Turkish people — in both public and private spheres — is also a major building block of social harmonization. Streamlining initial bureaucratic processes and prioritizing engagement with Syrian-led organizations will fortify service provision. Providing opportunities for Turkish people and Syrians to come together in pursuit of common goals, and expanding anti-misinformation programming, can additionally bolster a sense of belonging within Syrian and Turkish communities.

Social harmonization is a vast topic. We do not claim to offer a comprehensive account of any of the undertaken issues. In making these recommendations, our goal is to highlight current programs implemented by the central government, municipalities, and civil society; identify obstacles to scaling up these programs or increasing their effectiveness; and offer examples from other countries that can inform activities in Türkiye.

PHOTO: Ariel Rubin/UNDP

PREFACE

Acknowledgments

We are deeply grateful to Ayşegül Yalçın Eriş and to the many other individuals who supported us during our workshop. We thank the civil society members, government officials, and researchers who generously gave us their time and expertise and offered invaluable insights.

We are also thankful to Dean Amaney Jamal, Associate Dean Karen McGuinness, and other faculty and staff at the Princeton University School of Public and International Affairs who helped make this workshop possible. We thank specifically our advisor, Professor Filiz Garip. Her guidance, resourcefulness, and kindness throughout the semester were exceptional.

This report results from a policy workshop — part of the Master in Public Affairs degree program — at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs. It is prepared by ten graduate students advised by Professor Filiz Garip. The report’s content was presented to the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM), the primary nongovernmental organization (NGO) supporting Syrians in Türkiye.

Prior reports on this topic have outlined various factors that contribute to social harmonization, as well as principles that should guide the incorporation of these factors into social programs.1 Our report builds on these efforts. We combine insights from the academic literature, case studies from different parts of the world, and on-the-ground observations of several social programs in Türkiye.

The information and recommendations contained in this report reflect a semester of research and a week of fieldwork in three provinces (Istanbul, Ankara, and Eskişehir). The fieldwork involved visits to different initiatives and interviews with members of civil society, government officials, and researchers. Some recommendations were inspired by those we interviewed, but the report does not make any direct attributions. The report results from a collective effort; its content might not correspond to the views of any individual author or advisor, Princeton University, or any person or their organization interviewed as part of the workshop.

List of Organizations

During our fieldwork in Türkiye, we met with the following organizations: Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (SGDD-ASAM)

Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (PDMM)

Family Women Support and Disabled Center (AKDEM) Joaan Technology, Inc.

Refugee Support Association (MUDEM)

Eskişehir Metropolitan Municipality

Eskişehir Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (PDMM)

Presidential Directorate of Migration Management (PMM) Esenyurt Municipality

PHOTO: Ariel Rubin/UNDP

BACKGROUND

Türkiye has opened its doors to individuals seeking protection.

From its founding in 1923 through 2019, Türkiye welcomed more than 6.5 million people who were in need of protection.2 It is currently home to the largest population of forcibly displaced people in the world.3

(See Figure 1 for a comparison across countries.)

In 2012, the first Syrian individuals and families fleeing conflict and violence in their home country began arriving in Türkiye. A decade later, Türkiye hosts 3.6 million people from Syria and more than 300,000 individuals under other forms of protection — meaning that among the residents of Türkiye, approximately 1 in 20 is under protection.4

These are staggering numbers. The strain of integrating such a massive exodus has exacerbated tensions in a country already struggling with socio-economic and political fragmentation. Providing adequate services and support — such as infrastructure, education, housing, and employment — for millions of additional people remains a monumental challenge. One of the principal tasks for the Turkish government has been improving the livelihoods of not only a growing population of Syrians under temporary protection,* but also the Turkish communities that host Syrians, in both urban and rural areas across the country.

* In this report, for brevity, we will use “Syrians” to refer to “Syrians under temporary protection.”

** By the parameters defined by Türkiye’s Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2013) and the stipulations of Türkiye’s signing of the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Additional Protocol, refugee status is geographically limited to European citizens; because of this, we do not use the term “refugee” in this report. Also note that the subsequent 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation established procedures for the registration of people under temporary protection and further defined entitlements for those under temporary protection.

(Ineli-Ciger, “Implications of the New Turkish Law on Foreigners and International Protection and Regulation No. 29153.”)

With the support of funding from the European Union (EU), the Turkish government has implemented a wide-ranging, extraordinary response to the crisis. This report will identify opportunities to build upon this response.

In 2013, the Turkish parliament voted on a law which would establish a large part of Türkiye’s migration management framework and codify temporary protection status for those fleeing Syria.** It passed unanimously,6 making Türkiye one of the first countries to establish temporary protection status for Syrians.7 This form of protection allows the Turkish government to grant legal protection to all Syrians arriving in Türkiye, without the need to adjudicate individual requests for international protection. The law subsequently received praise from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for its incorporation of human rights and humanitarian principles.8

Most Syrians in Türkiye currently remain under temporary protection status.

Türkiye

Figure 1: People displaced across borders by host country at the end of 2021 Source: UNHCR 5

Map 1: Syrians under temporary protection status in Türkiye, top ten provinces (as of December 2022) Source: Presidency of Migration Management 9

The conflict in Syria continues, and there is a growing understanding that many Syrians will remain in Türkiye for the long term.

STRUCTURAL BARRIERS

This section highlights the structural barriers and limitations to social harmonization that are imposed by current Turkish migration policies and underlying funding mechanisms. The recommendations contained in our report are drafted for implementation within the current legal and regulatory framework. However, we recognize that long-term harmonization will likely require reforms of this system.

Funding mechanisms limit long-term planning.

The ability of the Turkish government, NGOs, and Syrian communities to work towards furthering social harmonization requires long-term planning beyond the provision of emergency services, and towards the construction of systems that are responsive to communities’ complex needs.

International funding plays an important role in this response. For example, during the 2016 to 2019 funding cycle, the EU devoted €2.4 billion of humanitarian assistance funding to assisting Syrians in Türkiye, including financing an Emergency Social Safety Net program that reached 1.5 million people.10 However, the short-term nature of funding cycles, particularly with respect to bilateral and multilateral EU funding, constrains national actors’ ability to plan programming focused on social harmonization beyond a two- or three-year time horizon.

Instead, the finite horizon of much of the multilateral funding for Syrians in Türkiye fuels a climate of policy uncertainty. As a result, the government must plan for the contingency of shouldering greater financial responsibilities, should the funding on which many social services rely come to an end. As the initial funding agreement draws to a close and the EU independently reassesses its own migration management frameworks, funding uncertainties present a major constraint.11

Temporary protection exacerbates feelings of uncertainty among Syrians.

The temporary nature of temporary protection constrains Türkiye’s ability to pursue long-term harmonization, as it imposes a “liminal legality” * — or a sense of “in betweenness” — on Syrians: while they are documented, Syrians live in a state of limbo between an unknown return (to Syria) and full integration in Türkiye.12

This sense of insecurity is compounded by uncertainty about the war in Syria, which means that individuals do not know how long they will remain in Türkiye. For example, with regard to language learning, many Syrians initially delayed studying Turkish in part because they assumed their stay in Türkiye would be short-lived. In this way, temporary status and uncertainty around the future of Syrians in Türkiye runs counter to the efforts to foster social harmonization by challenging their ability to invest in longterm plans.

The sense of liminal legality is heightened for the generation of children and young adults who are Syrians born and/or raised in Türkiye, but who are not Turkish citizens. The current legal framework puts many of these individuals at risk of future statelessness, further exacerbating the uncertainty and insecurity of temporary protection.

Place-based registration shapes Syrians’ mobility.

Under Turkish migration policies, Syrians — upon registration — are required to reside in a designated province to access social services. This place-based registration system is an important part of how Türkiye has been able to receive, process and provide services to an unprecedented number of temporary protection seekers. Benefits of place-based registration include the following:

• Service delivery: The Turkish government and local municipalities are better able to plan and distribute resources.

• Risk mitigation: Place-based registration allows local government officials and service providers to more closely track individuals registered within a given province and mitigate risks of human trafficking and other human rights abuses.

Despite these benefits, place-based registration also presents challenges for temporary protection holders by restricting their mobility and autonomy, particularly as many large, urban centers such as Istanbul are closed to new registrations.

Close to 1.2 million Syrians (38.9 percent) are estimated to live in provinces other than the ones where they were initially registered by authorities.13 This is because Syrians often prefer living in more urban and mixed environments where there is breadth in employment opportunities, diversity within the local population, and a higher likelihood of living near relatives and members of their ethnic or religious community.

*Arnold Van Gennep, in analyzing rites of passage, coined the concept of liminality. Victor Turner extended the concept to immigrants, given that they simultaneously belong to multiple groups with different norms. (Hajati, “An Exploration of the Dual Liminal Space.”)

**This excludes health care, which is available to Syrians nationwide at Migrant Health Centers.

This tension results in a continuous cycle in which Syrians are forced to choose between access to these services and better socio-economic conditions outside of their registered province.** Many conclude that these benefits outweigh the costs of losing access to public services.

By living outside of their provinces of registration, Syrians are also cut off from the formal labor sector and schools, two critical spaces for learning Turkish, promoting interactions between Syrian and Turkish communities, and gaining the skills necessary to build a new life in Türkiye.

• Labor formality: Syrians covered by the temporary protection regime can only work in the province where they were initially registered. If they leave their province, they are automatically blocked from entering the formal labor market. The exclusion of Syrians from formal job markets has led to an estimated 45 percent living below the poverty line.14 The long-term effect, especially in the context of growing globalization and digitization of work, is deep inequality, which could take several generations to reverse.

• Education: The registration policy hinders access to education either by preventing children from attending schools outside of their province of registration or by exacerbating the economic conditions that might lead families to send their children to work. 36 percent of Syrian children are currently out of school.15 Given the critical role that education plays in providing young people with the socio-emotional and academic skills necessary to thrive in their communities, low school enrollment rates of Syrian children will present an ever-growing constraint on efforts to support the social harmonization of younger generations.

Inaccurate data skew critical decision-making.

As noted, many Syrians live in provinces in which they are not officially registered. This poses a challenge for planning, as municipalities and NGOs do not know how many Syrians actually live in their province, and therefore cannot accurately assess their needs for public services. Consequently, inaccurate data on Syrian populations skew critical administrative decision-making, resulting in wellintentioned policies that are neither sufficient nor representative of Syrians’ needs. Our interviews revealed that this also places additional pressure on municipalities and organizations to use informal networks to determine where and to what scale needs are not being met.

Misinformation amplifies

social tensions.

Finally, a substantial constraint to the promotion of social harmonization is posed by misinformation and the social tensions stemming from the spread of “false facts” that affect Turkish people’s perceptions of Syrians. While this report will suggest some opportunities to mitigate the influence of misinformation, we understand that addressing the root causes of misinformation is beyond the scope of this analysis. Accordingly, we have included it as a part of the structural barriers within which our recommendations are framed.

Our desk research and fieldwork in Türkiye revealed that misconceptions about Syrians’ rights are inflaming animosity towards Syrians. This challenge was highlighted across all stakeholder interviews, including with the Turkish government, civil society, and NGOs.

Our analysis suggests that misinformation poses long-term constraints to social harmonization through two different channels:

• Misinformation exacerbates polarization between Turkish people and Syrians through the dissemination of prejudiced and xenophobic content on traditional media and social channels like Facebook and WhatsApp.16

• The spread of false or misleading information on services and opportunities available to Syrians (including access to education or the formal labor market) makes it more difficult for Syrians themselves to know their rights and to understand how to exercise them. For example, misinformation regarding required school enrollment fees can prevent parents from enrolling their children and therefore cut children off from accessing free public education.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION

We recognize the structural barriers outlined in the previous section require longer-term investments and decisions. Below, we focus on recommendations for the short- to medium-term that we believe are achievable within the existing legal, political, and social context.

PHOTO: EU/ECHO/Abdurrahman Antakyali

STRENGTHEN THE SKILLS OF SYRIANS — OF ALL AGES — TO ENGAGE WITH AND CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR NEW COMMUNITIES

EDUCATION

Safeguard children’s right to attend school

The Turkish government grants Syrians under temporary status access to the public school system, but only 64 percent of school-aged Syrian children are currently enrolled.17 This is a large improvement from the 2014 figure of 30 percent, but with a third still out of school, Syrian children remain vulnerable to child labor, social isolation, and structural poverty. (See Figure 2 for the historical trend.)

Our interviews with ASAM additionally highlighted the following challenges to enrollment and schooling in Türkiye:

• Restrictive school admission policies

• Prejudice and bullying

• Language barriers

• Child labor and financial insecurity

• Weak parental engagement

Due to financial insecurity, the fraction of Syrian children enrolled in school drops significantly starting around age 12, as shown in Figure 3. Boys’ school dropouts coincide with their entry into the labor market, whereas girls’ dropouts mostly occur right before they are married.20

Without education, already existing achievement gaps between Turkish and Syrian students will widen, limiting outcomes and deepening structural poverty.

We recognize that in the face of these challenges, ASAM has had noteworthy success — in partnership with UNICEF and the EU — through its Support for School Enrollment (SSE) program, which aims to increase enrollment by providing school supplies and counseling and informing families of their children’s educational rights. From October 2019 to September 2022, ASAM identified more than 118,000 out-of-school children, provided guidance counseling to over 106,000 of them, and successfully enrolled over 60,000 children in school.

Figure 2: Number of Syrian students in and out of school Source: Kırdar, Koç, and Dayıoğlu (the Ministry of National Education, Republic of Türkiye)18

SYRIAN MALE

TURKISH MALE

SYRIAN FEMALE

TURKISH FEMALE

Figure 3: Fraction of Turkish and Syrian children enrolled in school, by age Source: Kırdar, Koç, and Dayıoğlu (using data from the 2018 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey)19

PHOTO: EU/ECHO/Abdurrahman

Antakyali

PHOTO: Ariel Rubin/UNDP

WE SEE OPPORTUNITIES TO:

Increase funding for outreach teams within conditional cash transfer programs

The Turkish government currently implements a Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) program, which incentivizes school attendance through bi-monthly cash transfers and at-home visits. As of 2020, the program reached 89 percent of Syrian and other displaced children enrolled in school and resulted in higher rates of attendance among those who received CCTE.21

CCTE helps target vulnerable students, particularly adolescents between ages 10 and 18 who are out of school due to their family’s financial constraints. The program also focuses on overcoming non-financial barriers to school attendance — including disabilities and discrimination — through at-home visits.

CCTE outreach teams conduct these visits, which are critical for identifying and overcoming families’ distinct, and often overlooked, obstacles to attendance. These teams, however, are largely understaffed and underfunded.22 We believe that fortifying these outreach teams will catch vulnerable students who would otherwise fall through the cracks.

Expand socio-emotional skills training to all grade levels through the “Understanding Each Other” program

“Understanding Each Other“ (“Birbirimizi Anlıyoruz”) is an extracurricular program intended to strengthen social harmonization among third and fourth graders in Turkish public schools with a large influx of Syrian children.

In a trial, the curriculum lowered incidents of peer violence by 65 percent in a 10-day period.23 Syrian children who attended the program were 7 percentage points more likely to become friends with a Turkish classmate.24 Students from the program demonstrated more socially positive behaviors, such as trust, reciprocity, and altruism.

These results are especially important given the high incidence of bullying of Syrian children in schools, which the NGOs with whom we met often mentioned. The curriculum also significantly improved Syrian children’s language skills in Turkish.* This is a crucial finding, as it suggests that increasing social cohesion in the school setting may have positive effects on language acquisition.

Currently, this program is only available to students in the third and fourth grades, but could be expanded to reach students at all grade levels.

* The effect size was 0.13 standard deviations, which was significant at the 5 percent level. In education, this is considered a high-impact program.

PHOTO: Ariel Rubin/UNDP

PHOTO: Lassi Kurkijärvi

EMPLOYMENT

Increase access to formal labor opportunities

Syrians contribute a variety of skills and experiences to the Turkish economy, but are prevented from achieving their full potential due to an undersupply of formal work permits. As of 2017, nearly 941,000 Syrians were working in Türkiye. Of these, over 860,000 (91.6 percent) did so informally, occupying low-skilled positions in sectors where productivity is relatively stagnant.25 The exclusion of Syrians from formal job markets has led to an estimated 45 percent living below the poverty line.26

EMPLOYMENT

WE SEE OPPORTUNITIES TO:

Initiate a skills stocktaking exercise to increase employability

The diversity of the 3.6 million Syrians currently in Türkiye is both a challenge and an opportunity. It requires, as a starting point, identifying the skills they already possess by taking stock of their formal qualifications and previous professional experiences.

This stocktaking exercise can reduce three specific uncertainties for employers who are considering hiring Syrians:

1. Without a shared language, it is often difficult for employers to assess migrants’ professional potential.

2. Migrants often lack documents to prove their educational and professional qualifications.

3. Employers, unfamiliar with the business environment and educational system in migrants’ country of origin, often underestimate their skills.

We envision stocktaking to occur through a model similar to that of Germany, in which skills assessment is done through supervised, computer-based testing that lasts about four hours.27 The assessment asks participants to watch videos of individuals performing standard tasks in their respective occupations and identify errors or order the tasks chronologically. It does not require computer skills.

The assessment is designed to demonstrate individual competencies in a particular profession, even in the absence of formal certificates or diplomas. Testing could be offered in a number of languages, including Arabic, and encompass dozens of professions.

Implement a fast-track for highly skilled Syrians

Highly skilled Syrians are often underemployed due to the lack of a license or certification in Türkiye, as well as language barriers and stereotyping. A Syrian’s return on a college degree is five times smaller than one received by a Turkish person.28 There is an enormous opportunity to identify and employ this underutilized talent.

This can be done through job-matching, upskilling, and recruitment programs, which can utilize either a supply- or demand-driven model.

Supply-driven model

A supply-driven model seeks to discover talent within the migrant population and proactively embed qualified individuals in the formal economy. For example, a U.S.based nonprofit organization, Upwardly Global, supports employers in the recruitment process and connects them to refugees or displaced persons who hold at least a bachelor’s degree.

CASE STUDY 1 MACHINE LEARNING FOR JOB-MATCHING

A recent study measured the effectiveness of a machine learning algorithm, an artificial intelligence tool which predicts future outcomes from past data, to match refugees with employers and improve integration outcomes.32 The algorithm relies on input data on refugees’ background characteristics (country of origin, language skills, gender, age, etc.).

The researchers tested the algorithm on historical registry data from the U.S. and Switzerland and found that their approach led to gains of 40 to 70 percent, on average, in refugees’ employment outcomes compared to current assignment practices.33

Before being matched to a job opening, candidates participate in counseling and upskilling programs and are added to a recruitment database.29 Türkiye could implement a similar program to find currently underutilized Syrian talent and connect degree-holding Syrians to mutually beneficial employment positions.

Demand-driven model

A demand-driven model identifies needs within the national economy and retrofits the selection of migrant workers to meet these needs. Sweden’s Ministry of Employment utilizes a “Fast Track” initiative to speed up the labor market integration of refugees who have experience in industries suffering labor shortages.30 The fast-track program provides integration for around 20 different occupations, including licensed professions such as teachers and physicians and non-licensed occupations, like painters and construction workers.

The program begins with a mapping and validation of the refugees’ skills. Next, refugees enter a bridging program for their occupation in their native language and at the same time, enroll in Swedish language classes. Importantly, this allows them to continue working without having to wait until they become fluent in Swedish. The flexibility of this approach could be beneficial in Türkiye, given that less than a third of Syrians are advanced or fluent in Turkish.31

In contrast to more expensive interventions, like job training or language programs, a machine learning model is cost-efficient and can be immediately implemented within existing institutional structures. The algorithm can also be personalized: policymakers can choose which metrics of integration, optimal criteria, and constraints to teach the model. In this way, the algorithm can be altered and optimized to ensure unbiased outcomes. Finally, rather than making decisions autonomously, the algorithm can suggest a group of recommendations to a human decision maker — for example, a Turkish case manager — who makes the final choice.

How might this apply in Türkiye? A similar algorithm could be piloted in Türkiye through a randomized controlled trial design. The outcomes of this pilot could then be used to further train the model and increase its effectiveness in the Turkish context. The ability of the model to learn continuously without significant human intervention also makes it a highly sustainable tool for the long term.

Utilize existing job-matching platforms and technologies to pair Syrians with interested employers

Online platforms dedicated to refugees’ employment have been successfully tested to match refugees or other displaced persons within countries (e.g., Jobs4refugees in Germany) or across borders (e.g., Talent Beyond Boundaries). Given the structure of place-based registration, Syrians are currently restricted by their province of registration. Job-matching platforms in Türkiye should allow filtering by province and identify remote employment opportunities (i.e., work that can be completed digitally).

Implement employment mentor programs

Migrants often lack social capital and networks. One particularly cost-effective solution for providing such support is through mentorship programs. Türkiye could adopt a model similar to the mentorship program of the Danish Centre for Gender, Equality and Ethnicity, which connects women from refugee families and other migrant groups with mentors from their communities.34

Mentors can be migrants themselves or Danish citizens. The program has a clear focus on employment, with the aim of providing advice on career opportunities and job openings as well as offering support in the application process (e.g., with writing job applications and preparing for interviews).

Given that only 11 percent of Syrian women between the ages of 15 and 65 have income-generating jobs, compared to 71 percent of men (Figure 4), this program could be especially effective at bringing more Syrian women into the formal workforce.35

Figure 4: Employment of Syrians aged 15 to 65 years, by gender (as of 2017)

Source: Pinedo Caro36

PHOTO: EU/ECHO/Caroline Gluck

LANGUAGE

Expand Turkish language-learning opportunities for Syrians

In our interviews with stakeholders, Turkish language was repeatedly highlighted as a major barrier to social harmonization, given that language enables (or prevents) access to social networks, public resources, and employment opportunities.

The Turkish government has institutionalized languagelearning for school-aged Syrian children by incorporating all Syrian and Turkish students into the same classrooms since 2016. This initiative includes special adaptation classes to augment Syrian children’s acquisition of the Turkish language.

LANGUAGE

Syrian adults, however, require more creative policies. More than a decade into the Syrian crisis, the 2020 Syrians Barometer finds that, of a sample of over 1,300 Syrian adults, only around 27 percent consider themselves advanced or native-level Turkish speakers. 40 percent are intermediate, and the remaining are beginners or “don’t know at all” (Figure 5).37 This is largely due to time and financial constraints.

In our recommendations below, we focus on adult language acquisition.

WE SEE OPPORTUNITIES TO:

Make learning Turkish convenient for Syrian adults

Speaking Turkish is considered the most important factor for Syrians’ access to formal employment. However, many Turkish adults are already working informally and lack the time and resources needed to acquire a second language.39 In this sense, learning Turkish needs to be convenient for Syrian adults.

Conversations with contacts revealed a number of successes in the provision of language services, such as language classes provided by Zeytinburnu Support Center for Family, Women, and the Disabled (AKDEM) and the Syrian Support Workers Programme. However, we believe that in order to be most effective, adult language training should be part of a broader labor market strategy to formalize the Syrian workforce in Türkiye. Linking language to workplace skills training and tailoring it to be specific to the requirements of a particular industry are practical ways to enhance adult language skills. Vocational and industry-specific language training programs could be implemented in tandem with a job-matching scheme to effectively prepare Syrians for the formal workforce.

While there are limitations to this approach, in that it may be difficult to reach Syrians who are working in small, informal businesses, we believe an opportunity remains to:

● Provide sector-specific language training within broader vocational training and apprenticeship programs; and

● Target large, export-oriented Turkish companies with a focus on corporate social responsibility and the capacity to train and employ Syrians.

Additionally, we recognize that attaching language training to employment can perpetuate gender disparities, given that only 11 percent of Syrian working-age women have income-generating jobs.40 Parallel investments in childcare services could alleviate the family pressures placed on Syrian women and facilitate their attendance of language and vocational training programs.

Figure 5: Self-reported knowledge of the Turkish language among a sample of about 1,300 Syrian adults (December 2020 - January 2021) Source: Erdoğan (Syrians Barometer) 38

Encourage moderation in language-learning policies

Learning a new language requires time and repeated exposure. While Turkish language acquisition opportunities should be expanded, expectations must take into account the immense burdens that Syrians face in everyday life and how these pressures might impede their engagement with these programs.

CASE STUDY 2 THE RISKS OF OVEREMPHASIZING ACQUISITION OF THE HOST-COUNTRY LANGUAGE

In 2013, the Netherlands instituted a new policy requiring migrants — including refugees — to pass a language test within three years of arriving in the country. Those unable to pass faced a fine or an ineligibility for permanent residency. Although the Dutch government intended this policy as incentive for

In particular, as the Turkish government plans to expand its eight-hour newcomer orientation course (Social Harmonization and Life in Türkiye Training, SUYE) to 500 hours and bolster language-training components, it is critical that course outcomes and attendance are not tied to the provision of other services. Restrictive language learning policies that penalize individuals for slower language acquisition have been shown to be detrimental to social harmonization goals, as highlighted in Case Study 2.

language acquisition, it has wreaked havoc on social harmony. For example, according to researchers, “the change in policy contributed to an already existing public discontent and [has] furthered the creation of a vision of immigrants as outsiders and of Islam as a threat to Dutch democracy.” 41

What can Türkiye take from this? Tying language proficiency to migrants’ legal status has been detrimental to social harmonization, at least in the case of the Netherlands. Overemphasizing language acquisition in this way can place migrants in a precarious position.

PROMOTE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND MEANINGFUL SYRIAN-TURKISH INTERACTION

PHOTO: EU/ECHO/Caroline Gluck

GOVERNMENT

Further streamline Syrians’ initial interactions with government

Registration with the relevant Provincial Directorate for Migration Management (PDMM) is often the first instance of contact between a newly arrived Syrian and the local government. At our brief visit to the Istanbul PDMM, we caught a glimpse of a highly organized operation; the center processes approximately 8,000 cases per day, including 1,500 temporary protection cases.

After this initial registration, however, interactions with other government entities can be more difficult to navigate. For example, in our conversations with Turkish NGOs and experts, we learned that Syrian parents may face institutional obstacles when enrolling their children in school. We heard that school administrators cite quotas and overcrowding as reasons to deny enrollment to Syrian children. These administrators may assign children to faraway schools, which they are subsequently unable to attend due to the cost of transportation. ASAM’s SSE program has made significant strides in mitigating this challenge, but addressing it further upstream might yield even more extensive results.

GOVERNMENT WE SEE AN OPPORTUNITY TO:

In other words, school enrollment, healthcare planning, and registration for the SUYE social harmonization courses could occur in tandem — at the same time, at the same place — with registration. Integrating bureaucratic procedures in this way would reduce any burden and help ensure access to public services. Less tangibly, but equally as important, investing in these initial interactions will foster Syrians’ trust in local institutions and build their confidence in navigating public services.

CASE STUDY 3 ONE-STOP SHOPS IN PORTUGAL

In 2004, Portugal established National Immigrant Support Centers — or “one-stop shops” — in three major cities. The centers consolidate services related to documentation, education, health, and labor (among other domains) at one physical location. According to a report co-authored by the Portuguese government’s immigration authority and the International Organization for Migration,42 the government created the centers in response to several concerns:

• The process for obtaining residence permits was complicated, time-consuming, and costly, involving documents from multiple government departments.

• Procedures for new migrants — and the information about these procedures — were not standardized.

• All government departments were not necessarily equipped with the relevant linguistic and intercultural skills to serve new migrants.

How might this apply in Türkiye? By integrating these administrative processes into a single process in a single location, the Portuguese government saved time and resources while better serving its migrant populations. Türkiye could similarly streamline its government-run processes for registering newly arrived Syrians.

Incorporate school enrollment — and all initial needs — into the registration process or into a separate but similar “one-stop shop”

CIVIL SOCIETY

Prioritize engagement with Syrian-led organizations

Migrant-led organizations — formal or informal organizations established and led by migrants — are wellplaced both to disseminate information and to identify concerns and opportunities within migrant communities. These organizations benefit from in-group awareness and connections that other organizations might not have.43

UNHCR has recently reported some coordination with Türkiye-based Syrian-led organizations. For instance, UNHCR communicates with these organizations via an online information board, and has provided — in connection with a local partner — capacity-building training to 12 organizations.44 Many NGOs and municipalities with which we spoke, however, did not indicate strong connections with Syrian-led organizations.

CIVIL SOCIETY WE SEE AN OPPORTUNITY TO:

Strengthen NGO and municipality engagement with Syrian-led organizations

While NGOs and municipalities already provide admirable levels of assistance to the Syrian population, connecting with Syrian-led associations might help tailor the services provided and bolster the delivery of those services.

CASE STUDY 4 STRENGTHENING THE FORMALIZATION, NETWORK, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MIGRANT-LED ORGANIZATIONS

UNHCR and Intersos, a nonprofit humanitarian aid organization, have worked with migrant-led organizations across Italy to strengthen, formalize, and expand the organizations’ operations. The project, which began in 2018, is called PartecipAzione.

Migrant-led organizations supported by PartecipAzione have played a vital role in helping migrants navigate social services and obtain information. Beyond that, however, PartecipAzione has provided an avenue for Italian civil society organizations to collaborate with migrant-led organizations; they have coordinated advocacy strategies and built platforms for shared action. PartecipAzione increased membership in institutional coordination mechanisms by 60 percent and access to new funding by 76 percent.45

How might this apply in Türkiye? In addition to improved advocacy and coordination, supporting the formalization and growth of Syrian-led organizations would increase the organizations’ ability to collaborate with the Turkish government and NGOs in providing services for Syrian communities. Syrian-led organizations can also fill a vital information gap with respect to the needs of unregistered Syrians, for whom data collection is challenging.

INDIVIDUALS

Create opportunities for Turkish people and Syrians to work together toward mutual goals

ASAM, other Turkish NGOs, and local governments currently create opportunities for Syrians to socialize and learn alongside Turkish community members.

For example, ASAM and AKDEM organize “Talk and Tea” initiatives in which participants from Turkish and Syrian communities meet to chat or discuss books.

In Eskişehir, the Refugee Support Association (MUDEM) has partnered with the local government — with French government funding — to deliver four-week sexual and reproductive health courses for mixed groups of female Syrians and Turkish seasonal workers. Over the four weeks, participants study essential health information; beyond that, however, they learn that they share common challenges and concerns and — though language remains a barrier — build relationships with each other.

INDIVIDUALS WE SEE AN OPPORTUNITY TO:

newcomers46

One example is tandem language-learning, wherein a Turkish person and a Syrian would teach each other their respective languages (i.e., Turkish and Arabic). Local organizations like Ad-Dar, a community center for Syrians and Palestinians in Istanbul, have already started small-scale tandem language-learning projects. Larger, more formalized initiatives, however, could create even greater impact.

Tandem learning might be especially effective for reaching Syrian women, for whom social siloing is a greater concern. All participants in tandem learning gain a tangible benefit: either Turkish language skills useful in everyday life, or Arabic language skills potentially useful in Türkiye’s growing Arab tourism sector. Participants also build intercultural relationships that help counter community-based prejudices.

Expand win-win activities that might attract Turkish community members not otherwise interested in meeting

CASE STUDY 5 MEDIA LITERACY STARTS IN DAYCARE

“The first line of defense [against misinformation] is the kindergarten teacher.” —Jussi Toivanen, chief communications specialist for the Finnish prime minister’s office 49

In 2014, Finland launched an “anti-fake” initiative to train its population how to identify and counter false information. This initiative is part of a national strategy to create resilience among Finns, who are often the targets of external misinformation campaigns related to immigration, the European Union, and Finland’s entry to NATO.50

The Finnish educational system has played a crucial role in this program. Although critical thinking and media literacy were already components of the school curriculum, a revised curriculum — implemented in 2016 — included even greater focus on recognizing misinformation. Schools also have access to digital literacy “toolkits” developed by Faktabaari, a Finnish factchecking NGO.51

Note that Finland has repeatedly ranked first in the Media Literacy Index, a ranking of 35 European countries that is prepared annually by the Open Society Institute Sofia. The index rates resilience to fake news, as measured by media freedom, education, and trust in people.52

What can Türkiye take from this? Media literacy should be a comprehensive initiative — ideally starting at a young age, though inclusive of adults and senior citizens. Programming can also leverage partnerships between government and civil society or government and the private sector.

MEDIA

Establish long-term antimisinformation initiatives

Our contacts across all sectors — central government, municipalities, NGOs, and academia — cited misinformation about Syrians and Syrians’ access to benefits as a key challenge. One stakeholder stated that the challenge is not providing services to about four million Syrians, but rather educating 80 million Turkish people on migration and the human experiences of Syrians in Türkiye.

MEDIA

In response to the misinformation onslaught, the Turkish Presidency of Migration Management (PMM) organized False Facts, an anti-misinformation campaign. Through False Facts, PMM identifies, analyzes, and corrects common migration-related misconceptions. These include, among others, the accusation that foreigners under temporary protection status enter universities without sitting for entrance exams and receive a salary from the Turkish government.47 False Facts, however, is a short-term misinformation correction project.

WE SEE AN OPPORTUNITY TO:

Take this project a step further: beyond correcting misinformation, toward building community resilience against misinformation

Similar to a current effort piloted by the Canadian government to address COVID-19 misinformation,48 Türkiye’s approach should involve media literacy programming that can help both Turkish nationals and Syrians build the following competencies:

CASE STUDY 6

“BAD NEWS” AND THE GAMIFICATION OF MEDIA LITERACY

As developers and policymakers look to respond to the rapid spread and shift of the misinformation landscape, gamifying anti-misinformation training has proven effective.53

● Critically evaluate information they encounter on online platforms;

● Examine how algorithms and bad actors may affect the information they view; and

● Understand the strategies online actors employ to manipulate users and how to avoid falling prey to these strategies

These resilience-building initiatives should span various digital and analog platforms, integrate approaches that work for younger and older digital consumers, and incorporate gamification in the learning process, as in Case Study 6.

One example is “Bad News,” a free-to-play online game developed by two University of Cambridge scholars. Players take the role of a news producer who must maintain a sufficient level of credibility, navigating through various misinformation quagmires. The game builds resilience against fake news by raising a player’s awareness of how and why misinformation develops and spreads.54

What can

Türkiye take from this?

NGOs and the Turkish government have already developed and circulated digital tools to engage and educate the public. These anti-misinformation campaigns might benefit from gamified activities similar to “Bad News.”

CONCLUSION

Four in five internationally displaced individuals live in low- and middle-income countries.55

Türkiye is home to millions of Syrians fleeing the civil conflict in their country, a conflict which is now entering its second decade. Türkiye has a comprehensive infrastructure for registering Syrians, providing them with legal status, and meeting their basic needs. NGOs, such as ASAM, are spearheading programs to improve Syrians’ access to education, employment, and psychosocial support services. Given the large numbers of Syrians, however, these efforts can fall short of meeting the overall demand.

The international community has provided funding to support displaced people in Türkiye, but this funding remains sporadic and shortterm. It is difficult for low- and middle-income countries, like Türkiye, to bear the responsibility of supporting millions of displaced people on their own. The funding must continue in order for host governments to engage in long-term planning and ensure the well-being of both their citizens and Syrians.

Future initiatives need to prioritize investments in Syrians’ skills, including language, education, and training for the formal labor market. Equal opportunities in education and employment, combined with long-term legal protections, open the path for building relationships with the Turkish population. Current social tensions around migration, fueled by misinformation on social media and other platforms, do not align with Türkiye’s long history of welcoming displaced people.

A decade since the start of Syrians’ unprecedented displacement into Türkiye, we recognize the unwavering commitment of actors across the Turkish landscape — government, NGOs, civil society, and individuals — to advancing social harmonization. As protracted regional conflicts endure, we hope this report can aid in the continued efforts to adapt to the complex needs of Turkish people, Syrians, and other displaced populations in Türkiye.

OUR WORKSHOP TEAM

Ishita Batra is a Master in Public Affairs student at Princeton. Her interests are in evidence-based policy, gender-transformative policy, urban policy, and health policy. Ishita has worked in economic consulting in Washington, D.C., and monitoring and evaluation for the development sector in New Delhi. She holds a bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Pennsylvania. She is from New Delhi, India.

Vince Cauntay holds a bachelor’s degree in humanities and Spanish from Texas Tech University and is pursuing a Master in Public Affairs, focusing on migration and refugee policy, humanitarian assistance, and gender policy. He has five years of public service experience, including two years in Chongqing, China as an education volunteer, and three years in the San Francisco Asylum Office (USCIS, Department of Homeland Security) as a Legal Administrative Specialist and an Asylum Officer. This past summer, he worked with Mercy Corps on their Early Recovery Programs team for Venezuelan migrants and vulnerable Colombians in Bogota, Colombia.

Claire Dennis is currently pursuing a Master in Public Affairs with a Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy (STEP) certificate at Princeton. She is interested in global systemic risk and sustainability — particularly in the context of climate change, migration, and international development. Before Princeton, Claire worked for the U.S. Department of State at the Embassy in El Salvador, where she spearheaded the expansion of temporary work visas for economically vulnerable agricultural workers. This past summer, she worked on strategic planning with the United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary General in New York.

Elisa Dickey holds a bachelor’s degree from Indiana University and is pursuing a Master in Public Affairs in International Development. Her interests are communitybased protection for displaced communities and migration around the Mediterranean basin. Prior to Princeton, she worked at an international development organization, implementing U.S.-funded development programs. This past summer, she interned with the International Rescue Committee, conducting a needs assessment of migrants and refugees in Italy.

Tatiana Forero holds a bachelor’s degree in business and is currently pursuing a Master in Public Affairs. She has 6 years of experience in the education sector in Colombia, her country of origin. During the Venezuelan migration crisis, she worked at the Ministry of Education, which was in charge of allowing migrants to access public education. With some experience in educational assessment, in the summer of 2022 she worked as an intern in the Education Directorate at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Francisco García holds a bachelor’s degree in political science and international relations, and is currently pursuing a Master in Public Affairs in International Development. He has 5 years of experience in the Mexican federal government, where he managed the financial mechanisms of three projects in Central America to address migration through its root causes. In the summer of 2022, he interned at Innovations for Poverty Action Lab performing quantitative analysis and policy strategy for their early childhood education portfolio.

Helena Hlavaty holds a bachelor’s degree in economics from Middlebury College, where she also received minors in mathematics and Arabic. At Princeton, she focuses on international development and migration, with a particular interest in the Arab world. Before starting graduate school, she spent three years in Jordan, where she worked for a USAID project in the water sector. She also worked for two years in public policy research in the United States. This past summer, she interned with the OECD’s Regional Attractiveness and Migrant Integration unit.

Emily Magaziner is pursuing a Master in Public Affairs/International Development at Princeton University. Prior to Princeton, she worked for the U.S. Department of State, serving a two-year tour in Mumbai, India. In 2012-13, Emily was a Fulbright English Teaching Assistant at Nevşehir Üniversitesi in the Cappadocia region of Türkiye.

Kat Phan is an immigrant rights organizer, civic technologist, and graduate student at Princeton University. She led implementation and analysis of citizenship and language access programs and policies at the municipal level, and currently works on campaigns related to deportations and workers’ rights. Before Princeton, she studied computer science at Stanford University.

Vyette Tiya holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations from American University and is currently pursuing a Master in Public Affairs. Her interests include peace and conflict resolution, migration, and human rights. Prior to graduate school, Vyette worked for an international development organization that implemented U.S.-funded projects in East and Southern Africa. This past summer, she interned at Mercy Corps where she supported humanitarian aid advocacy in East Africa and the Sahel region.

Filiz Garip is a Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University. Her research lies at the intersection of migration, economic sociology and inequality. Her book, “On the Move: Changing Mechanisms of Mexico-U.S. Migration,” reveals the diversity of migrants from Mexico and their evolving migration patterns over time. Filiz received her Ph.D. in Sociology and M.S.E in Operations Research & Financial Engineering from Princeton University. She holds a B.Sc. in Industrial Engineering from Bogazici University, Istanbul.

NOTES

1 INGEV, “Social Cohesion in Türkiye: Programming Model and Guide.”

2 Republic of Türkiye: Ministry of Interior, “Presidency of Migration Management.”

3 UNHCR, “UNHCR Turkey - Fact Sheet February 2022.”

4 Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, “Geçici Koruma.”

5 UNHCR, “Global Trends Report 2021.”

6 Kanat and Üstün, Turkey’s Syrian Refugees: Toward Integration.

7 UN News, “Turkish Law on Protection of Foreigners Wins UN Praise.”

8 UN News.

9 Republic of Türkiye: Ministry of Interior, “Temporary Protection.”

10 European Commission, “Türkiye Factsheet.”

11 Terry, “The EU-Turkey Deal, Five Years On.”

12 Menjívar, “Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United States.”

13 Pinedo Caro, “Syrian Refugees in the Turkish Labour Market.”

14 Danish Refugee Council, “Syrian Refugees’ Perception of the (Formal) Labour Market in South East Turkey.”

15 Kırdar, Koç, and Dayıoğlu, “School Integration of Syrian Refugee Children in Turkey.”

16 Stieglitz and Ross, “The Impact of Social Media on Social Cohesion: A Double-Edged Sword”.

17 UNICEF, “65,000 Refugee Children to Benefit from School Enrolment Programme in Turkey.”

18 Kırdar, Koç, and Dayıoğlu, “School Integration of Syrian Refugee Children in Turkey.”

19 Kırdar, Koç, and Dayıoğlu.

20 Kırdar, Koç, and Dayıoğlu.

21 Ring et al., “Program Evaluation of the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) for Syrians and Other Refugees in Turkey.”

22 Ring et al.

23 Alan et al., “Building Social Cohesion in Ethnically Mixed Schools.”

24 Alan et al.

25 Pinedo Caro, “Syrian Refugees in the Turkish Labour Market.”

26 Danish Refugee Council, “Syrian Refugees’ Perception of the (Formal) Labour Market in South East Turkey.”

27 Bundesagentur für Arbeit, “My Skills: Identifying Professional Competencies.”

28 Pinedo Caro, “Syrian Refugees in the Turkish Labour Market.”

29 “Upwardly Global.”

30 Government Offices of Sweden: Ministry of Employment, “Fast Track: A Quicker Introduction of Newly Arrived Immigrants.”

31 Erdoğan, “Syrians Barometer 2020.”

32 Bansak et al., “Improving Refugee Integration through DataDriven Algorithmic Assignment.”

33 Bansak et al.

34 European Commission, “Kvinfo Mentor Network.”

35 Pinedo Caro, “Syrian Refugees in the Turkish Labour Market.”

36 Pinedo Caro.

37 Erdoğan, “Syrians Barometer 2020.”

38 Erdoğan.

39 European Commission, “Kvinfo Mentor Network.”

40 Pinedo Caro, “Syrian Refugees in the Turkish Labour Market.”

41 Yılmaz and Schmid, “Second Language Development in a Migrant Context,” 104–5.

42 Oliveira, Abranches, and Healy, “Handbook on How to Implement a One-Stop-Shop for Immigrant Integration.”

43 UNHCR, “Issue Brief: Promising Practices from Working with Refugee-Led Organizations in Europe”; Amnesty International, “Refugee-Led Organizations Need Support to Continue Their Vital Work.”

44 UNHCR, “Issue Brief: Promising Practices from Working with Refugee-Led Organizations in Europe.”

45 Intersos – Organizzazione Umanitaria Onlus, “What Is PartecipAzione?”

46 Zihnioğlu and Dalkıran, “From Social Capital to Social Cohesion.”

47 Pandir, “Media Portrayals of Refugees and Their Effects on Social Conflict and Social Cohesion.”

48 Government of Canada, “Projects Launched to Help Strengthen Canadians’ Resilience Against Harmful Online Disinformation.”

49 Quoted in Mackintosh, “Finland Is Winning the War on Fake News. What It’s Learned May Be Crucial to Western Democracy.”

50 Henley, “How Finland Starts Its Fight Against Fake News in Primary Schools.”

51 Henley.

52 Lessenski, “Media Literacy Index 2021.”

53 Basol, Roozenbeek, and van der Linden, “Good News about Bad News: Gamified Inoculation Boosts Confidence and Cognitive Immunity Against Fake News.”

54 Maertens et al., “Long-Term Effectiveness of Inoculation Against Misinformation: Three Longitudinal Experiments.”

55 UNHCR, “Figures at a Glance.”

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PHOTO: EU/ECHO/Caroline Gluck