Addressing China's Human Rights Violations

ADDRESSING CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Table of Contents

BACKGROUND & METHODOLOGY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 02.

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 05. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 00.

01. CONCLUSION 06.

UYGHUR REGION (XINJIANG) 03. OUR WORKSHOP TEAM 07.

HONG KONG 04. ENDNOTES 08.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Our sincere thanks go out to the civil society members, community activists, government officials, and researchers who graciously shared their time and expertise throughout this workshop. Their critical contributions and insights were truly invaluable.

ACADEMIA SINICA

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM HOUSE

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP KENNETH ROTH

JUDICIAL REFORM FOUNDATION

LAM WING-KEE LU JUN

NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

NEW SCHOOL FOR DEMOCRACY OCCUPY CENTRAL

SHAWN SHIEH

SOPHIE RICHARDSON TENG BIAO

THOMAS E. KELLOGG & ERIC YAN-HO LAI ALVIN CHEUNG

CAUSEWAY BAY BOOKS

BACKGROUND INFORMATION & METHODOLOGY

This report is the outcome of a graduate-level policy workshop at the School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA) at Princeton University. The policy workshop is a graduation requirement for the Master in Public Affairs degree program at SPIA.

All members of the project team participated in research, discussions, and preparation of the report. The 10-person team interviewed relevant experts from domestic and international organizations in Taipei, Taiwan and summarized their findings in support of this report. In addition, the team conducted several inperson and virtual interviews in Princeton with relevant stakeholders as well as extensive desk research.

The findings and recommendations contained in this report synthesize the experiences, priorities, and concerns conveyed through these interviews and research The report does not necessarily reflect the views of any individual author, individuals associated with the workshop, or Princeton University.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This comprehensive report meticulously examines human rights violations by both the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as well as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), providing crucial insights and recommendations for the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Lawyers and Judges. The report is structured into three distinct sections: the Uyghur Region (Xinjiang), Hong Kong, and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

UYGHUR REGION (XINJIANG)

Highlighting the well-documented atrocities in Xinjiang, this section, written by Omar Elhaj and Elmir Mukhtarov, also reveals less-reported state mechanisms facilitating abuses. It emphasizes the weaponization of China's legal system, utilizing a “rule by law” approach, and explores the role of lawyers and judges as both perpetrators and victims within this context. Recommendations advocate greater scrutiny toward the Chinese criminal justice system and greater protection for Uyghur activists.

HONG KONG

Providing a brief history of Hong Kong, reviewing existing literature, and presenting fresh findings from field research, this section written by Anna Blue and Benjamin Anderson addresses the distinct challenges faced by human rights defenders Recommendations focus on upholding international legal precedent, supporting human rights defenders, and countering official misleading information from China and Hong Kong.

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

Detailing pervasive harassment, forced displacement, and consequences of disbarment, the PRC section, authored by Kelsey Mason and Aasha Shaik, explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) weaponizes employment and mobility to silence activists. The authors recommend dissemination of supportive materials and statements for legal advocates defending human rights in China, and publicly supporting local efforts highlighting China's unequivocal violations of international standards.

UYGHUR REGION (XINJIANG)

The atrocities and human rights abuses occurring in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Republic (XUAR) are well documented and widely known This section reveals less-reported state mechanisms facilitating abuses. It emphasizes the weaponization of China's legal system, utilizing a “rule by law” approach, and explores the role of lawyers and judges as both perpetrators and victims within this context. Recommendations advocate greater scrutiny toward the Chinese criminal justice system and greater protection for Uyghur activists.

INTRODUCTION

This section concerns the independence of judges and lawyers in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Republic (XUAR) The atrocities and human rights abuses occurring in the Chinese subdivision are well documented and widely known. Forced sterilization, arbitrary detention, religious suppression, forced assimilation, and forced labor are just a few of the documented abuses that have been described as genocide. But less reported are the state mechanisms through which these abuses have been allowed to take place. These mechanisms are precisely what concern the Special Rapporteur on the independence of lawyers and judges with respect to Xinjiang. Though much of this genocide is extrajudicial, China’s legal system has also been weaponized to justify its violations. In fact this “rule by law” system has been increasingly utilized in response to global criticism. As such, an exploration into the judicial system is of utmost importance in order to understand the dynamics of the genocide moving forward.

This section comprises five parts. First, we provide a brief background of the genocide itself. Recognizing that this information is likely widely known, we hope this background provides the relevant context which concerns independence of lawyers and judges.

The second section will lay the groundwork explaining how the genocide has played out extrajudicially. This section will mainly cover violations of Uyghur rights that have occurred outside of the courts. The next two sections consider the two mandate-relevant phenomena of lawyer/judge independence in Xinjiang: lawyers and judges as perpetrators, and lawyers and judges as victims. The “Perpetrators” section will discuss how lawyers and judges have been used to further violate and deprive Uyghurs of fundamental freedoms. The “Victims” section will discuss how lawyers and judges brave enough to speak out are persecuted and stripped of power. Lastly, we provide recommendations.

Source: Europe’s reaction to Chinese repression of the Uighur minority group has been limited | John MacDougall/AFP via Getty Images

BACKGROUND

“Xinjiang,” alternatively called the Uyghur region or East Turkestan, is an autonomous province and the largest subdivision of the PRC. Located in the northwest, its 25 million inhabitants are roughly 50 percent Uyghurs, 35 percent Han Chinese, 6 percent Kazakh, with the remaining population belonging to many other ethnic groups. [1] Its long history as an entity detached from China informs its political situation today. Despite being part of PRC, it shares greater cultural identity with its eastern neighbors (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan) than with the rest of PRC. [2] The Uyghurs are a Turkic group that predominantly practice Islam. The Chinese government, both before and after the establishment of the CCP, has extensively carried out repressive policies against the non-Han Chinese, predominantly Muslim population in Xinjiang.

Factions within Xinjiang mostly Uyghur nationalists have advocated for independence from the rest of China. This movement for an East Turkestan has served as a pretext for the fomentation of ethnic strife and tension in the region. Uyghur lawyer Nury Turkel wrote that “since 9/11, China has used Uyghur’s Muslim faith as an excuse to portray the population of eleven million as potential Al-Qaeda terrorists.” [3] Most importantly, this plea for autonomy and ethnic tension was the impetus behind the most recent wave of repression against Xinjiang, starting in 2014.

In May 2014, China launched its “Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism” (严厉打击暴⼒

怖 活 动专项⾏动) in Xinjiang [4] President Xi stated that the goal behind this “People's War" was to prevent the "Three Evil Forces" of separatism, terrorism, and extremism After three years of deploying troops and crackdowns in the region, President Xi ordered CCP officials to “round up everyone who should be rounded up ” [5] By April 2017, targeted policies and mass arrests had begun on a large scale Monitoring systems were installed to detect if citizens were Uyghur An AP article notes that, “Chinese authorities expanded the definition of extremism to include displays of religion such as growing a long beard or wearing a veil ” [6] These justifications opened the floodgates for mass detention.

The internment of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in camps is widely considered to be the largestscale arbitrary detention of ethnic and religious minorities since World War II. [7] As of 2020, estimates stated that Chinese authorities detained and imprisoned up to 1.8 million people. [8] Most of these people are Uyghurs but the government has also targeted Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and foreign nationals as well. Calling them “vocational training centers,” the Chinese government heavily invested in internment camp development between 2017 and 2021 Within these camps, religious and ethnic minorities have been subjected to violations such as forced labor

Two examples of persecution are Meryem Tomur and Tureli Rozi, both of whom are women from Konasheher who have been sentenced to five years in the camps. Their charges are common of Uyghurs: "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" (寻衅滋事罪), and "gathering a crowd to disturb social order" (聚 众扰乱 社 会 秩 序 罪 ). [9] Other common justifications include having previously gone abroad, being religious, being in contact with the outside world, using foreign phone apps (such as WhatsApp), or simply being influential members of theirsociety.[10]

Torture is also common. An example of an Uyghur subjected to this is Bagdat Akin, a Kazakh in Xinjiang. He writes in his appeal letter, “They illegally detained me for interrogation and forced me to make a false confession by using tasers and beating The policemen took me for interrogation when I arrived in the country on May 20, 2017, saying that they would ask me some questions During the interrogation, they tied both of my hands and legs, deprived me of sleep (by not allowing me to sleep), and beat me using various sticks, sharp wooden objects, electric wires, and electric prods, torturing me with heavy beating I was tortured like this, in the interrogation center with both my hands and legs tied up, without any sleep, from May 20, 2017 to June 9, 2017 For 20 days, I was being tortured and interrogated ”

Another is Kayrat Samarkand, who said that "[t]hey made me wear what they called 'iron clothes,' a suit made of metal that weighed over 50 pounds [23 kg] It forced my arms and legs into an outstretched position I couldn't move at all, and my back was in terrible pain They made people wear this thing to break their spirits After 12 hours, I became so soft, quiet and lawful " [11]

Women, such as Zumrat Dwut, have been forcibly sterilized to reduce population numbers. Others have experienced forced abortion, brainwashing, rape, and other crimes. [12] Standard Uyghur language textbooks have been outlawed and their authors have been killed or imprisoned for life

Activists, intellectuals, lawyers, religious figures, and other Uyghurs have been either imprisoned or exiled. Religious desecration has also been common. Over 16,000 mosques have been destroyed since 2017. [13]

Though global criticism has encouraged the PRC to abandon and reduce the amount of camps since 2021, the Chinese have moved to more formal means of persecution. This development makes the mandate of the Special Rapporteur especially relevant. Our sections below build on this.

Source: Who are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide? By BBC News

A NOTE ON GENOCIDE & CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

We understand the complicated nature and high bar of labeling acts of violence as genocide and crimes against humanity.

This report is not meant to argue why we think the crisis in Xinjiang constitutes genocide. Given the nature of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, there may be limitations regarding what can be said. However, given the evidence presented in this report, we believe that China’s actions overwhelmingly indicate an intent to destroy, in line with the definition presented above. If lawyers and judges are helping perpetuate genocide, then this also falls under the mandate.

If lawyers and judges are also victims of genocide, then this is also under the mandate. And if it is genocide, then this report is certainly a matter of jus cogens.

Regardless of the application of the label of genocide, there should be no debate about crimes against humanity. Almost every country in the world has embraced the notion that crimes against humanity should be prohibited. This issue has been elevated to the point that it is customary international law and meets the general practice requirement.

We will spend the rest of the report arguing why this legal, judicial, and extrajudicial repression constitutes crimes against humanity.

EXTRAJUDICIAL REPRESSION

Some of the repressive cases in China occur within the judicial system, with the country legitimizing repression using counter-terrorism laws and national security. [14] Some occur outside the legal system altogether. Particularly substantial here is the extra-judicial detention and internment system, used heavily by the CCP since 2017, with estimations that as much as 30% of south XUAR’s Uyghur population was detained. [15]

Most of these arrests, trials, and sentences have been carried out en masse. Donald C. Clarke, a professor at the George Washington University Law School who specializes in Chinese law and has written about the mass detentions in Xinjiang explained that “it’s impossible to imagine that even if a judge in Xinjiang wanted to give a fair hearing to a defendant, that such a thing would be possible.” [16] He continued, “if they’re not having mass trials, then what they’re having is, essentially, judges giving blank documents to the police or prosecutors so they can just fill in the blanks.” [17] While basic procedural protections exist, the authorities can easily circumvent them. The government regularly deprives suspects in political cases of all protections. The CCP directs the police, the procuratorate, and the judiciary to work together to meet political objectives, which often results in depriving any semblance of due process. For many victims, their imprisonment comes with no lawyer to represent them or judge to adjudicate their case. According to one account, over a dozen eyewitness accounts act as testament to the complete absence of lawyers and anything that even resembles due process, with formal written documentation either scarce, absurd, or nonexistent. [18] One example is that of Zharasbek Auelaqyn, a Kazakh tradesperson who was detained for three months in the summer of 2017. A report in Xinjiang Victims Database (which aims to congregate information about individuals who are detained in Xinjiang) writes that no one would reply “when Zharasbek asked, around thirty times, if he could hire a lawyer. They would just ignore him.” [19] Another is Nurmemet Memetimin, a 34-year-old Uyghur sentenced to 17 years of prison in 2019 for his religion. An account from his wife states the following:

“After I came back to Kazakhstan, my husband was permitted to call his mother. He said he wasn’t in the camp any longer. Now I’m in a prison, he told her.Theyhadtransferredeightthousand people overnight from the camp to a prison in Kunes, forty miles away. They numberedeveryperson,somyhusband was able to find out how many there were in total. His own number was six thousand and something. As far as I know, there wasn’t any trial or any sentence.” [20]

The Chinese government argues that the detention centers serve the purpose of providing vocational education to counter religious extremism and thus is not a prosecution mechanism. As such, people detained in these camps tend not to be officially charged with any crime, and thus have no legal way of countering their arbitrary detention. Therefore the detention systems de facto operate independently of the Chinese legal system. Even when there might be a court procedure, arrests were arbitrary and included “people detained for having relatives abroad or downloading certain cell phone applications”, according to Darren Byler. [21] [22]

According to the few people who managed to flee China after their detention, the centers are filled with torture, rape, forced labor, and ill-treatment.

It is beyond question that these camps are in direct violation of The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which reflect both informal and formal obligations applicable to the PRC

In recent years, the Chinese government has argued that the VETC system has been reduced. Satellite imagery suggests that some of the “reeducation” camps were eventually turned into prisons and detention centers, while others continue to operate. It appears that the focus of the CCP has shifted away from the detention camps to more targeted and lengthy imprisonment sentences to ethnic Uyghurs on the grounds of counter-terrorism. [23]

Though extrajudicial repression has been the preferred method of persecution by the CCP, it is by no means the only strategy used The mandate of the Special Rapporteur may touch on this extrajudicial repression, but the bulk of the focus should be on persecution within the legal and judicial system. We discuss this below.

LAWYERS & JUDGES AS PERPETRATORS

“In a normal trial, you’d also have a lawyer at your side. Someone to act as an intermediary between the judge and the client, someone to defend you. The shield to protect you against the judicial machinery that was unleashed on you. Next to me, I only had my instructor, her face expressionless and her mouth zipped shut. For the nine minutes that my trial lasted, she did not say a word.” - Gulbahar Haitiwaji, Uyghur prisoner [24]

Gulbahar is a French-Uyghur from Ghulja who Chinese authorities had persecuted before. She was detained on January 29, 2017 at the Karamay airport, as she was returning from Ghulja, after which her family in France would no longer be able to contact Gulbahar directly. After spending around half a year at one camp, she was sentenced to 7 years at a "court hearing" that took place on the camp premises, which is common for victims of this genocide. She reflects more on her trial below.

“No, this trial was not a trial but, as to be expected, everyone acted as if it were: the policeman-slash-judge, his lackeys (seated to his right and left, also in uniform), and the instructors who must have taken pride in playing lawyer, raising an eyebrow whenever the judge started to speak, and replying with a superficial smile to the worried looks from their clients. And finally, the four of us, the accused, ensnared in a judicial system that was Kafkaesque and illegal, where justice did not exist and in which, as was all too obvious to us, it was not a matter of us being judged for our acts but sentenced systematically for who we were: Uyghurs.”

This section will focus on the weaponization of the justice system in order to formally prosecute Uyghurs, leading to high numbers of prisoners. Though examples are hard to find, stories like Gulbahar’s are not unique. This repression has relied heavily on the use of justices and lawyers as agents of Chinese repression. The use of the formal criminal justice system may be part of the authorities’ efforts to “legalize and normalize” the Xinjiang crackdown. Recent official speeches and government reports emphasize that “counterterrorism and stability maintenance” in Xinjiang have to be “legalized and normalized” (

). [25] Despite its increased use recently, this phenomenon is not new. Professor Martin Flaherty frequently notes that the PRC maintains a system of “rule by law” as opposed to “rule of law” in its judicial system. This utilization of the law therefore extends to every victim of the CCP, not just Uyghurs. Moreover, an AP article notes that “China is relying on a system of long-term incarceration to keep the Uyghurs in check, wielding the law as a weapon of repression.” [26]

It is helpful to show how the incarceration system works for most persecuted minorities. A snippet from Art of Life (a site focused on emerging forms of art and politics in Northwest China and Central Asia) does this well:

Source:TheElephantintheXUAR:III “Inaccordancewiththelaw”byGeneA Bunin

“The standard procedure as experienced by most who get sentenced through the legal system may seem laudable by comparison. Here, the local neighborhood and village administrations appear to have minimal, if any, involvement, and it is the police, the procuratorates, and the courts who run the show. In the typical case, the individual is first detained by the police and a detention notice is issued to relatives. The police then have up to 37 days to have the procuratorate approve the formal arrest (releasing the individual if the proper warrant cannot be secured). This, too, is followed by a formal arrest notice being issued to relatives, and sometimes publicly. Following a period of investigation, the police send the relevant materials to the procuratorate, which then files a written indictment against the individual, sending it to the court, while notifying – again, in writing – the individual of their right to legal assistance The court hearings that follow are documented in written verdicts, with the defendant allowed to appeal, also in writing After the individual is found guilty and transferred to prison, the prison as well issues a written incarceration notice to the individual’s family to say that they have received the new prisoner Overall, the procedure is well defined, appears to be consistent across all of China, and leaves an enormous paper trail.” [27]

Source: Data from Human Rights Watch

This criminal justice system results in a mass system of mass incarceration. Xinjiang boasts the largest criminal population of any subdivision in the world. Much of this is owed to the rapid rise of criminal prosecutions and convictions in the region since 2017. In 2017, arrests in Xinjiang accounted for 21 percent of all arrests in the PRC Since then, according to Xinjiang High People’s Procuratorate, 540,826 people in Xinjiang have been prosecuted. [28] Given that China’s conviction rate is above 99 9 percent, almost all of these people have been convicted. [29] Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Konasheher (Shufu) county, Kashgar prefecture, southern Xinjiang Located in the heartland of the province, and typical of many other counties in the region, nearly one in 25 people has been sentenced to prison on terrorism-related charges, which makes it the highest known imprisonment rate in the world [30] According to a Human Rights Watch report, “Konasheher county’s imprisonment rate is more than 10 times higher than that of the United States, one of the world’s leading jailers, according to Department of Justice statistics It’s also more than 30 times higher than for China as a whole, according to state statistics from 2013, the last time such figures were released ” [31] These sentences average around 10 years per prisoner

A 2022 Human Rights Watch Report notes that “These formal prosecutions, in which many people received punishments without being tried, are distinct from the arbitrary detentions in the extralegal ’political education’ facilities.” [32] When any semblance of due process occurs, judges and lawyers are complicit in persecution. An example of someone falling victim to this repressive system is Rahima Senbai, a Kazakh woman who was arrested in 2017 for using WhatsApp, a common justification used to round up ethnic minorities. In her year in prison, she describes her experience:

“Except for the day I arrived and the day I left, only one day in the camp was different. That was the day of the open trial. They brought in seven women from a nearby prison who had been charged with gathering in a private home to pray together. During Ramadan, in the evening, you celebrate auyzashar ["mouth opener"], and the seven women had organized a meal and a prayer. That was their crime. At the trial, they read these accusations and sentenced each of the women to seven years in prison. They called it open court. None of the women spoke.” [33]

Human Rights Watch explains that “The Chinese government may have hoped that formally prosecuting people in Xinjiang would avoid the limelight of mass detentions in extralegal political education camps ” [34] Indeed this has increasingly been used to point attention away from internment camps, yet both the camps and prisons have run in parallel Chinese authorities point that this is “in accordance with the law” (依法), which an Art of Life social analysis says are “two characters that appear an incredible number of times in the documents produced by the courts, procuratorates, and public security organs ” [35] Art of Life argues that this is in fact against even Chinese and Xinjiang law, and for good reason Released CCP documents show that “detainees are to be kept for a minimum of one year in the [re-education] centers.”[36] Independent Chinese legal experts say this is a violation of China’s own laws because it exceeds legal maximum detention times for people who are not formally charged and sentenced for a crime. [37]

Whether the lawyers and judges are staying within the party line to preserve their own safety or acting out of their own free will is unknown Nevertheless, the effect of lawyers and judges on the fate of otherwise innocent, marginalized people is definitionally not independent and worth scrutinizing Our examination of court documents yields the same conclusions One example of general procedure being violated is a 2017 case of a Xinjiang chicken farmer who was prosecuted for “subversion” as a result of his comments in different QQ (a popular messaging application in China) group chats A Shanghai lawyer was summoned to take the case because no local lawyer would dare do so. The lawyer was told he would have access to “most of the case files” and that, this being a subversion case, he is not allowed to pursue an innocence defense When the lawyer asks about the legality of all this, he is told that “this is Xinjiang ” The trial is described from the lawyer’s perspective:

With the hearing started and the examination of the evidence completed, the prosecutor issued the prosecution’s statement, meticulously laying out the first set of arguments from the prosecution. I then replied with my first set of the defense’s arguments:

First, that thoughts do not constitute a crime;

Second, that the number of posts was far from [the stated] 1200, and if one were to remove to duplicates and count according to the number of articles, the number was actually 440,

Third, that not all of of the posts were inciting subversion of state power and that many were just venting the individual’s frustration towards society, with it necessary for the purposes of the hearing that there be clear demarcation between freedom of speech, freedom of the citizen to issue criticism and suggestions, and the act of inciting subversion.

Fourth, that some of the posts using contemptuous language towards the country’s leaders or hisoritcal figures only constituted the act of insult of character, and did not meet the conditions for inciting subversion;

Fifth, that the commemoration of certain historical events and the sympathy towards certain criminals, as seen in some of the posts, is an expression of one’s feelings, and that this sort of expression of one’s feelings has also not reached the basic theshold for it to be considered a crime;

Sixth, that what the defendant opposed in his posts was our party’s single-party monopoly on power, when in reality our country only has our party as the leader, with other democratic parties all taking part in what is a multi-party system, and this it canot be a crime of the defendant’s opposition is to only one of them;

Seventh, that with regard to the severity of the prison term, one could consult the term given to the individual surnamed Jiang in the reent incitement of subversion of state power case heard by the Changsha intermediate court, where jiang had written over 30,000 posts and had over 30,000 followers, and was sentenced to two years by the court, while the defendant in this case has, even if we adopt the count given in the indicitment, written only 1200 posts, with all of the people in the different qq groups combined totaling less than 2000; both the number and reach are less than a tenth of Jiang’s, and the five-years-plus sentence demanded by the prosecutor is clearly abnorammly heavy, and devoid of factual and legal foundations.

The prosecutor then put forth the second set of arguments, underscoring the special political circumstances and the backdrop of preserving stability in Xinjiang, thereby finding strict punishment necessary in order to guarantee border-region stability I then replied that, even with preserving stability as the aim, one still had to preserve stability within the legal framework, and could not abandon the basic term-determination principles and the requirements of equilibrium in the rule of law

When, following the court’s final statements, the presiding judge said that the court would adjourn for five minutes, I felt a pang of disheartenment – had they already decided things in advance? Five minutes later, the judge resumed court, fixing the relevant evidence and saying that this was an important case that would require the hearing committee to discuss and come to a decision, with the date for the next court session to be announced at a later time

With the hearing concluded, I went to have a short exchange with the judge.

“If you think that a person like him needs to be sentenced to 5 years or more,” I said, “then you are seriously overestimating him.”

“You don’t understand the situation we have here,” the judge told me.

The task of preserving stability is a very difficult one.” [38]

The most obvious legal issue at play here is crimes against humanity. Though not codified in a separate international convention, Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines these crimes to be “the systematic deprivation of human rights against a civilian population” through imprisonment, torture, rape, group-based persecution, enforced disappearance, among other crimes. Because China is engaging in these acts, China’s legal and judicial system should be seen as engaging in crimes against humanity. These substantive offenses have already been embraced by the international community, meaning they should be considered as violations against customary international law. Effectively, this means China’s signature status to the Rome Statute should not be relevant. China’s weaponization of lawyers and judges breaches what the world has already accepted.

For the few that are able to have their hearings outside of prison, the justice system is stacked against them. Though only a small part of the genocide machine, lawyers and judges facilitate this injustice by legitimizing illegitimate due process.

L A W Y E R S A N D J U D G E S A S V I C T I M S

The lawyers and judges who are ethnic Uyghurs undoubtably face colossal pressure from the CCP. For those who are brave enough to resist the illegitimate court procedures, or the extrajudicial mass detentions, the consequences have been grave. Ghalip Qurban’s case demonstrates this clearly.

Ghalip was the deputy head of the Intermediate People’s Court in Urumqi and a member of the CCP up until his arrest in April 2018. [39] The official charges on him are bribery and “two-faced officials,” which refers to a term used the by Chinese governments where ethnic minority party members appear loyal to the CCP on the surface, but secretly “work against the state”. It is likely that he was arrested for speaking out about the threatment of Uyghurs and other ethnicities in Xinjiang and filing an official complaints to Beijing. Anonymous Uyghur sources tell that Qurban was deliberately delaying the court procedures in “terrorism” cases in XUAR, which led him to be questioned by the State Security Department multiple times, before his eventual arrest. He was removed from his post in the court six - twelve months before his arrest.

The arrest of Ghalip Qurban not only demostrates the pressure on ethnic Uyghur lawyers and judges, but also that even those who are the party members and try to provide constructive feedback to Beijing are not safe from prosecution.

The repression of ethnic Uyghurs Lawyers and Judges extend to other minorities as well, such as the Kazakh people A prime example of this is the arrest of Kazakh legal consultant named Qaliolla Tursyn [40]

His “crime” was helping the family of Zhumakeldi Ahai to write a formal complaint Ahai was an ethnic Kazakh who was beaten to death by the Dorbiljin Country authorities Because of his involvement in the case, Qaliolla was sentenced to 20 years in prison sometime in late 2018 - early 2019 The authorities informed his family that Qaliolla died on Deceember 2020 His family believes that the death is likely because of torture and ill-treatment, given Qaliolla’s already fragile health conditions before the imprisonment

Another obstacle for lawyers in XUAR cases is the extreme control of information by the CCP As the few leaked documents show the unlawfullnes in majority of cases in Xinjiang even under Chinese law, the party is doing utmost to prevent these court documents from getting to anyone outside Despite legal records bening accessible in the rest of the country, “almost 90% of criminal records in Xinjiang are not public” [41] This was the reality that Muherrem Muhemmed’eli Baqi faced when he tried to help his father Muhemmed’eli Tursun - a farmer and Friday imam who was sentenced to 6 years in prison for the infamous “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” charge in 2017. [42] Muherrem (resident of Japan) tried to help his father by hiring a lawyer in China, but was told that the inner-China based lawyer could not obtain the court documents as XUAR-based lawyer(s) told him that the “documents could not be sent outside”.

It is clear from the evidence that lawyers and judges in China who want to resist the actions of the CCP become victims of illegitimate prosecution themselves, irrespective of their ethnicity or party membership.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The HRC should open an inquiry into the Chinese criminal justice system in Xinjiang. This deviates from previous inquiries which have tracked the genocide more generally. In order to understand how China legitimizes its imprisonment, greater scrutiny needs to be given to its criminal justice system; specifically the conduct of its lawyers and judges.

The Special Rapporteur can spread the work of civil society initiatives, such as the “Xinjiang Victims Database” which aims to gather information about individuals facing prosecution in XUAR, by providing information and sharing their work to the awareness of the greater public.

The Special Rapporteur can recommend that governments ensure that Uyghur activists who took refuge in their countries are protected from international repression and that their families/relatives can apply for fasttrack asylum given their potential targeting by the CCP

HONG KONG

Hong Kong, as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) with a unique legal and political standing in China and a significant global role, warrants special attention. This section provides a brief history of Hong Kong, reviews existing literature on lawyers, judges, and the rule of law in the SAR, and presents findings from our field research. Our recommendations aim to support human rights defenders, uphold international legal standards and precedents, and counter misleading information from China, promoting the truth about the rights of lawyers and judges in Hong Kong.

B A C K G R O U N D

Since it was transferred back to China in 1997, Hong Kong has experienced dramatic changes in its rule of law, fundamental freedoms, political system, and overall autonomy. In the two decades that followed the handover, the “One Country, Two Systems” framework was fairly successful, allowing Hong Kong to operate as a world financial center, as a base for civil society organizations in Asia, and as an “island” of democratic ideals.[1]

However, all was not right in Hong Kong, as illustrated by pro-democracy demonstrations that took place in 2014. The eventual arrest and prosecution of several Umbrella Movement student organizers foreshadowed the complete deterioration of the the “One Country, Two Systems” framework a few years later. In 2019, pro-democracy activists, together with those who resisted a proposed extradition agreement with the PRC Central Government, kicked off protests that, among other demands, asked for a legitimate democratic election of the Chief Executive and Legislative Council. While Western observers believed the protests signaled Hong Kong was visibly chafing under the pressure of Chinese control, China believed the protests were rooted in economic woes, leading the government to decide to exert a firmer grip over the region. [2] During the summer of 2020, in response to the growing opposition to the Chinese Communist Party, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee enacted the National Security Law.[3]

The PRC’s most aggressive attempt to undermine human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong, the National Security Law (NSL) prohibited activities related to secession, subversion, terrorism, collusion with external elements, and seditious acts.[4] Experts agree that the NSL created a parallel legal system to Hong Kong’s existing Basic Law and instituted a mainland-controlled security apparatus.[5] In July of 2022, the UN Human Rights Committee expressed their deep concern over the number of individuals arrested under the NSL and urged the Hong Kong government to provide explicit assurances to civil society that they would not be tried under the law.[6]

In March 2021, the Chinese legislature substantially overhauled Hong Kong’s electoral system to curtail public participation and install a system that prevented candidates from vying for election when not endorsed by central authorities.The overhaul in 2021, when combined with the extensive extraterritorial reach of the NSL and the malicious misuse of British colonialera laws, resulted in a political and legal system in Hong Kong that is exclusively controlled by the CCP in China.

In Hong Kong, lawyers are both victims of, and participants in, an increasingly problematic legal system. Attorneys, when they defend clients targeted by the government, become human rights defenders themselves, while prosecutors - often under pressure from the government - reinforce the dangerous weaponization of the law to crack down on opposition. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, among other expert observers, has described how adverse incentives put in place by the Chinese government and the threat of disciplinary action have led prosecutors to put political considerations above the integrity of the Prosecution Code.[7] Human rights and prodemocracy lawyers, in particular, have been the target of law enforcement. Several have been disbarred or detained, such as arrested veterans like Martin Lee, Margaret Ng, and Chow Hangtung,[8] while many more have fled the region to escape arrest or violence. Between June 2020 and December 2022, more than 100 lawyers reportedly escaped Hong Kong for the United Kingdom and Australia.[9]

Recent policy and administrative adjustments have also indirectly undermined the independence of lawyers by restricting the right of an individual to an attorney of their choosing. Of particular significance, in May of this year, the Hong Kong Legislative Council amended the Legal Practitioners Ordinance to prevent foreign lawyers from participating in cases tried under the NSL. [10] Not only did this measure undermine the right of a defendant to obtain foreign counsel, but it also narrowed the discretion that judges formerly had to decide on a case-by-case basis if foreign counsel should be allowed to participate. As the Special Rapporteur herself has previously noted, modifications to the legal aid scheme also represent undue interference with the legal profession, [11] as they remove assistance for lowincome defendants who cannot afford a lawyer and limit judicial review.

There is growing concern about signs of declining judicial independence. Alvin Cheung, a former barrister of Hong Kong and a current Assistant Professor at Queen’s University Faculty of Law in Ontario, Canada, points out that there have been four main threats to the independence and impartiality of judges in Hong Kong: (1) the imposition of the NSL; (2) threats to the final adjudication power of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (HKCFA); (3) political pressure directed at the composition of the HKCFA; and (4) overt threats by the PRC and state-affiliated actors directed at the judiciary as a whole.[12] The enactment of the NSL reduced judicial autonomy and eroded local jurisdiction of the courts.[13] According to Dr. Yan-ho Lai, a member of the Asian Civil Society Research Network, because of “...the state-sponsored media propaganda shaming certain judges’ handling of political trials in Hong Kong as well as China’s governing agenda of ‘patriots administering Hong Kong,’ judicial appointments and promotions have become much more politicized…”. [14]

It would be incorrect, however, to claim that the NSL marked the beginning of the degradation of the legal system. On the watch of Rimsky Yuen, Hong Kong’s third Secretary of Justice who served from 2012 to 2018, the constitutional order in the city had already begun to crumble. While Yuen claimed to abide by and uphold local laws as Secretary of Justice, his critics accused him of caving regularly to the CCP and even pursuing combative and vindictive penalties against pro-democracy activists. The Justice Department, for instance, used the colonial-era sedition law to target and take down political opponents while Yuen personally led a re-sentencing effort against dissidents who had served their terms and expelled pro-democracy figures from the Hong Kong legislature. Yuen’s efforts provided an early blueprint for ideas and methods that would later manifest in the NSL.[15]

Finally, there is increasingly extensive evidence that the court system in Hong Kong actively violates the legal rights of civilians, including undermining due process and delivering overly punitive sentences. The government uses various laws, ranging from the colonial-era Public Order Ordinance to the National Security Law, as instruments to deter individuals trying to exercise their freedom of speech and assembly rights and to ban pro-democracy civic groups from operating. Not only does the government prohibit bail to most NSL detainees, but it also denies individuals accused of NSL crimes their right to a jury trial.[16] In an analysis of 1,592 prosecutions of the protestors arrested during the 2019 demonstrations, the Georgetown Center for Asian Law found that civilians experienced much higher incarceration rates than protestors during the 2014 Umbrella Movement.[17] The Center also reported increasing issues with false accusations and testimony by police officers in cases against protestors.

Our own field research, conducted in Taiwan in October of 2023, confirmed and augmented previous reports Although our team was unable to travel to China due to safety and security concerns, we were able to meet with dozens of activists and non-profit organizations (many of whom were exiled from or escaped Hong Kong) on the ground in Taiwan In the following section, we highlight into the outcomes of our research, covering key themes, prominent threats to the independence of lawyers and judges, and potential solutions We also pay special attention to uplifting stories or narratives that we felt were underrepresented or underaddressed in current research

FRESH PERSPECTIVES

Given the limited access to China for foreign researchers, studying China's treatment of judges and lawyers can be difficult, if not nearly impossible. As a result, we focused on interviewing academics, dissidents, and experts on the ground in Taiwan, and later, over Zoom from the United States. While the people we interviewed had diverse ideas and experiences, there were several discernable themes to highlight. Experts expressed the view that China has effectively constrained and captured Hong Kong's judicial system but also indicated that there are still valuable examples of resistance as well as outstanding opportunities to provide support to lawyers and judges in Hong Kong.

The Judicial Reform Foundation (JRF) offered a helpful schema to frame China’s legal approach in both the mainland and Hong Kong. Its members argue that the PRC government carries out repression and abuse through three tools: (1) draconian law, (2) inconsistent law, and (3) the vacuum of law. Draconian law characterizes the explicit authorization of illegal practices, such as torture. Inconsistent law describes how different policies are often at odds with each other and therefore create confusion and chaos that is difficult to navigate, especially in the courts. The vacuum of law is the lack of law where there should be legislation or regulation; that vacuum produces ambiguity that gives the PRC a leg up in politicizing different cases and judgments. We believe this schema perfectly contextualizes certain decisions and endeavors by the PRC government in Hong Kong, as described below.

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW IMPACT ON THE JUDICIARY

The NSL continues to compromise the impartiality of judges, constituting a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which remains technically incorporated in Hong Kong's Basic Law. The ICCPR binds China’s policies in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region because of the decision by the United Kingdom to extend its ratification of the treaty to its territories in 1976. China agreed to guarantee that the ICCPR should remain in effect in Hong Kong in Annex I, Section XIV of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and Article 39 of the Basic Law. Despite the ICCPR's articles enshrining the right to a fair trial and presumption of innocence, China's ongoing efforts to weaken Hong Kong’s legal system raise concerns about the continued violation of these principles. The Chief Executive has exclusive power to select the list of judges eligible to hear NSL cases, which shows that Hong Kong stretched the narrative of necessary security to the point of hand-selecting judges to enforce the NSL’s mandate.[18] To choose judges, the Chief Executive consults with a Committee for Safeguarding National Security, which includes a national security advisor appointed by the PRC.[19] The selection process leads overseas judges to be excluded from NSL cases.[20] Instead, overseas judges get Potemkin dockets, as it is not in the state’s interest that they hear state security cases.

The arrangement is mutually beneficial because many foreign judges prefer to avoid any NSL involvement; the result is defendants lose out on judges who might be less beholden to the Chinese government. Local judges, on the other hand, are mostly wholly loyal to the desires of the government because they can be dismissed immediately from their positions if charged with endangering national security (a violation that is completely ill-defined). According to Alvin Cheung, “Whenever the government invokes national security, judges for the moment fall in line. Additional pressure isn’t necessary when they’ve already stacked the deck.”[21]

The NSL has also created a new incentive structure for judges who want to get promoted. In mainland China, there is ample evidence that judges are evaluated by political elites, according to rigid performance metrics.[22] In Hong Kong, evaluations of judges now concern their loyalty to the NSL and the CCP’s interpretation of the law.[23] In light of such incentives, judges in lower level courts have become more hostile to peaceful protests and to the exercise of free speech. [24] The JRF argues that judges operating under the NSL have become “legal technicians,” since they interpret the law by the letter and as strictly as possible. Most significantly, the NSL has ensured that judges never deviate from the expectations of the government; procedural rulings almost always go in the government’s favor, with a close to 100% conviction rate.

When it comes to the rights of defendants, the NSL breaks with pre-existing laws in Hong Kong as well as international law. For example, in March 2021, when forty-seven Hong Kong SAR nationals were charged with conspiracy to commit subversion for their efforts to organize an unofficial primary, defendants were charged despite participating in events protected under international human rights law.[25] Regarding changes to pre-existing laws in Hong Kong, in NSL cases, a jury is not obligatory, and the state can appoint lawyers instead of allowing defendants to pick their own. The NSL also bans “collusion with foreign forces,” a vague prohibition that has essentially blocked funding from flowing into Hong Kong and disallowed collaboration between Hong Kong activists and the international community.

CAPTURE OF THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL

The current situation with the Court of Final Appeal (CFA), Hong Kong’s highest court, raises concerns about its ability to uphold its obligations to ensure the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence under the ICCPR. The increasing capture of Hong Kong’s CFA has led to doubts about whether the CFA is able or willing to exert a moderating influence on the rest of the judiciary.[26]

In March of 2022, two Supreme Court judges from the United Kingdom resigned from their positions on the CFA because threats to civil liberties made their role “untenable.” [27] The resignation of the judges is a testament to (1) how quickly rights have deteriorated and (2) how difficult it is to exercise judgment as a legal practitioner in Hong Kong. According to Professor Alvin Cheung, some overseas judges have remained in Hong Kong, primarily because they believe the CFA can still act when it matters, but that possibility seems increasingly unlikely. The CFA has shown it is willing to meddle, when necessary, to reach the outcome it wants.[28]

To cite on of the most prominent examples, Hong Kong media tycoon Jimmy Lai, held in custody starting December 3, 2020, was released on bail in late December as a result of a lower court decision. As the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted in their March 2023 communications, the Hong Kong government appealed that decision, and the CFA mandated that Lai be brought back into custody in February of 2021.[29] The courts contradicted themselves, exemplary of inconsistent law, and confirmed the fact that the NSL puts the onus on the defendant to prove themselves innocent. There are several examples of the CFA forcing lower courts to fall in line, such the sentencing and subsequent re-sentencing of Hong Kong democracy activists Joshua Wong, Alex Chow, and Nathan Law.[30]

MASS TRIALS & EXIT BANS

In another possible breach of the ICCPR’s articles concerning the right to a fair trial and presumption of innocence, the government in Hong Kong has resorted to mass trials as a strategy to prejudice the legal position of defendants Law professors Thomas Kellogg and Eric Lai pointed to a case from the 2019 protests, during which hundreds of individuals were arrested for peaceful demonstrations and then tried en masse, which made it difficult for the lawyers to manage and adequately defend the defendants [31] An individual who participated in the 2019 protests as a passive bystander could be sentenced for three to four years, without video evidence, says Kinman Chan, since presence at the roundup was suitable enough for a guilty verdict [32]

In another case, 47 democracy activists, who tried to stand for election in primaries in July 2020, have been subject to a mass trial that continues in the fall of 2023.[33] The mass trials exhibit how judges manipulate the law to try dissidents According to Alvin Cheung, the former Hong Kong barrister, the CCP deliberately postponed sentences of certain dissidents until after they had tried everyone else, a vindictive tactic to keep them detained in poor and abusive circumstances [34] 32 of the 47 defendants were denied bail and have been unable to escape detention for years, a blatant violation of international law.[35]

Even if human rights defenders do manage to escape jail or to return to society after serving time, they typically face stringent restrictions put into place to prevent them from living their daily lives Dissidents, for example, may be limited on the number of hours they are permitted to work. [36]

In addition, post-release confinement in Hong Kong keeps people both inside the country and away from international attention The Hong Kong government has used exit bans, which infringe upon the due process rights and civil liberties of human rights defenders Exit bans are a common tool for intimidating and silencing lawyers All civil servants in Hong Kong, aside from lawyers, take a public oath voting to be faithful to the Special Administrative Region.[37] This is significant as it indicates that lawyers might be among the few remaining human rights defenders with some flexibility and independence However, when lawyers decide to take on the cases of dissidents or activists, they are often not prepared to become human rights defenders themselves nor to see their entire families become enemies of the state [38] The government may seize passports or identity documentation of lawyers’ families, or put the attorneys on a “suspended sentence” that involves constant monitoring and bans on working in the legal profession.[39]

DECLINE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

An active civil society plays a crucial role in monitoring and reporting potential injustices, ensuring fulfillment of international legal obligations by disclosing potential human rights violations. Unfortunately, Hong Kong’s civil society has been severely diluted. This development is partly because of the aforementioned National Security Law, but also stems from the PRC’s “Foreign NGO Law.” The “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations in the Mainland of China” was adopted by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in the spring of 2016, but the full ramifications of the law have just recently become clear in Hong Kong. As a result, it was a dominant theme of field research interviews. The expansive scope of the NSL, combined with the NGO Funding Law, make Hong Kong organizations wary about soliciting and collecting funds from abroad.[40] What remains of Hong Kong civil society would benefit tremendously from efforts to mobilize domestic resources and build local legitimacy, but for now, limited funding has forced many organizations to shut down.

The number of foreign NGO representative offices in Hong Kong has dwindled from 55 in 2017 to 5 in 2022 (a number that does not even capture the 46 offices that chose to de-register), and those NGOs that remain tend to focus on less-politicized issues like trade issues, environmental activism, or advocacy for the rights of minorities.[41] The “Foreign NGO Law” is particularly important for the legal system because it has undermined the ability of legal practitioners to engage with outside thought and hampered the legal departments at universities from appropriately training lawyers through exchanges and international learning. In general, the law has curbed the number of large gatherings, restricted academic institutions, and produced a general exodus of academics and activists from Hong Kong.[42]

Some associations have played a large part in reinforcing Chinese priorities. The Hong Kong Law Society and Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) have both become more conservative in their management, often issuing statements that are explicitly pro-China and anti-rule of law. For instance, in a November 2023 press release, the HKBA criticized a bill recently introduced in the United States Congress and stated that they are “justifiably confident that Hong Kong judges have always and will continue to operate independently and apolitically.” [43] Although lawyers in Hong Kong are trained by three universities, rather than the government, the CCP has extended tight control over those universities through their boards and by dissolving student unions. There are now more Chinese professors than overseas professors in all three universities.

INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY

Our interviewees did not hesitate to offer opinions on what the United Nations can and should do to respond to the crisis in Hong Kong. Before 2014, many activists in mainland China and Hong Kong were hesitant to use the Special Rapporteur or other UN mechanism because they wanted to maintain positive and constructive channels of communication with the Chinese government. [44] After 2016 crackdown in China and the 2020 crackdown in Hong Kong, those same individuals realized the connections that they had built up had not done them any good.

As a result, utilizing the Special Rapporteur mechanism has become essential. “The less we use the UN, the more ineffective it will become,” explains the JRF, “It's still good for experts in other countries to know about the issues.”[45] That being said, JRF notes the operational difficulties they bear in trying to raise awareness about “the issues,” saying that it should be easier for Taiwan-based groups to submit reports to the United Nations.[46] JRF, for example, cannot submit reports because of Taiwan’s status unless they partner with human rights groups in other countries, and that restriction can lead to silencing groups that have unique insight into problems in China.

One example that stands out, as previously noted, as a model for how international pressure can work: five feminists were arrested in China in 2014 for their activism, but advocacy at the global level on their behalf contributed to their quick release after 33 days in detention.[47] Alvin Cheung argues that, although there is a limit to how much China cares about international insistence, a letter from the Special Rapporteur is significantly more difficult to dismiss than demands from professional associations.[48]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the last few years, Hong Kong has confronted the deterioration of a once-greatly admired legal system, the result of repressive laws, restricted rights, and attacks on the independence of lawyers and judges Below, we have grouped several suggestions for the UN Special Rapporteur into three categories: (1) recommendations related to international law and the United Nations system, (2) recommendations to support human rights defenders, and (3) recommendations related to education and awareness The Special Rapporteur should consider the following actions, which range in size and effort required, to help address the failing rule of law in Hong Kong

As the Special Rapporteur previously noted in her April 2023 communications, the NSL is at odds with several international legal obligations, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [49] The NSL also deeply threatens the autonomous system set up by the Basic Law and the rights enshrined in the local Bill of Rights Ordinance For instance, Article 66 of the Basic Law states that the Legislative Council (LegCo) is the authoritative legislative body of the SAR; Beijing effectively supplanted the LegCo by directly applying the NSL to Hong Kong and thereby undermined local selfdetermination [50]

The Special Rapporteur should take the opportunity to issue a statement, possibly framed as a follow up to her April 2023 communications, that asks Beijing to account for and respond to the degradation of the Basic Law The statement should include advice on measures that the government of China can take to appropriately respond to the loss of independence for judges and lawyers, including:

Disallowing the participation of non-judicial representatives in the judicial complaints mechanism in order to prevent undue political influence, as noted by the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales [51];

Inviting foreign judges from other common law systems to participate in Hong Kong’s legal system, which will address the shortage of judges in the SAR and improve transparency (a fact noted by analysis from the U S -Asia Law Institute; [52]

Removing and disavowing any remaining British colonial laws; inviting; and Stopping its intimidation of the Hong Kong Bar Association, including threatening to revoke its ability to license barristers to practice

Separately, the Special Rapporteur should alert UN agencies about the risks posed by the so-called “Article 23” package, a set of new security legislation planned for this year in Hong Kong Amnesty International has called Article 23 plans particularly dangerous, and the Special Rapporteur can provide an effective “early warning” to the international community

In a recent public address, Chief Executive John Lee articulated a desire to regulate “soft resistance,” a signal that Hong Kong officials may seek to more completely control the flow of information [53] Not only does the language suggest the government’s intention to violate Articles 10 and 11 of the ICCPR, but it also raises important questions about what information will be accessible to legal professionals when Court trials, as opaque as they already are, could become complete black boxes [54] Public questions put to the government in a formal statement may shame Hong Kong officials for their ambiguity and delay any official implementation of Article 23. Relatedly, in anticipation of any discontent that might be triggered by a 2024 security law, the Special Rapporteur could solicit commitments from the Hong Kong government to allow residents to protest freely and peacefully

If appropriate, the Special Rapporteur may also raise a complaint to the UNHRC about the repeated violation of the ICCPR in Hong Kong. Domestic remedies have either been exhausted or are impossible to pursue because of political pressure applied by the CCP. If the Special Rapporteur is unable to file a complaint herself, her office can refer the individual cases from activists in Hong Kong to the Centre for Civil and Political Rights, which can represent victims of violations.

Alternatively, the Special Rapporteur should seek to create objective measures to assess the performance of Hong Kong’s legal system against the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, and the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors. The principles are universally agreed-upon authoritative standards that could help highlight specific discrepancies or instances of wrongdoing. Furthermore, the standards could be used as a baseline to monitor future developments in the legal system or as a public record of tools used by authoritarian governments to reduce independence and increase repression. Not only would such an evaluation fill a market need for more transparent and consistent data on Hong Kong, but it would also provide the Chinese government with the opportunity to provide a considered response to specific criticisms. It is critical that the Special Rapporteur dispel misinformation and counter false narratives peddled by shell organizations like the Hong Kong Bar Association.

We support the recent decision by the Special Rapporteur to ask permission to conduct an official visit to Hong Kong. Such a request “officially puts Hong Kong on the agenda”[55]. Not only would a visit give the Special Rapporteur first-person insight into issues on the ground and access to influential thought leaders in Hong Kong, but it would also signal to the Chinese government the interest in Hong Kong from the office of the Special Rapporteur. Although the request may not be granted, there is symbolic value in having it turned down.

If denied permission for an official visit, the Special Rapporteur may nonetheless be able conduct an academic visit to meet with influential academics in closed-door discussions. The Georgetown Center for Asian Law recommended an academic visit, explaining that the government in Beijing may be more amenable to an academic visit than an official visit because it will not result in a press release nor a formal report to the Human Rights Council. Instead, the results of an academic visit can be used as leverage in private conversations with the Chinese government.

Although it is likely the academic visit would be highly surveilled and therefore less authentic and trustworthy, an academic visit would still be useful for two reasons. First, an academic visit reinforces the international norm of transparency; travel should be open and information should be free-flowing. By traveling to Hong Kong, the Special Rapporteur will show that China cannot deny visibility into the issues on the ground. An academic visit would be on the Special Rapporteur’s own terms. Secondly, an academic visit could help draw attention to how far academic freedom has fallen in Hong Kong. In the previous academic year, more than 360 scholars left their jobs at Hong Kong’s eight public universities.[56] Not only do faculty and staff widely fear for their livelihoods, but curriculum content is manufactured and censored in a way that prevents independent intellectual thought. Beijing interference in Hong Kong’s universities directly undermines the training and development of lawyers and judges.

For the greatest impact, strategizing within the United Nations system should be coupled with direct support to human rights defenders. Given that one of the functions of the HRC Special Procedures involves activating and mobilizing the international community, the Special Rapporteur should consider working with certain countries to prevent the extradition of human rights lawyers. [57] Lobbying countries to modify their extradition practices could protect human rights defenders, like Nathan Law, who escaped from Hong Kong from being returned to the SAR. Many Western countries, like the United States and the United Kingdom, have already suspended pre-existing extradition treaties with Hong Kong, but the mass termination of treaties by non-aligned countries will send the message that China cannot circumvent international law through bilateral action. The Special Rapporteur might consider using international asylum law to her advantage to help protect escaped activists from Chinese attack.

Similarly, we recommend the Special Rapporteur urge foreign governments to reject cooperating with NSL cases. Such a statement would convey the message that extraterritorial repression by the Chinese is legally unacceptable and antithetical to the country’s supposed commitment to selfsovereignty. When Hong Kong authorities announced bounties on eight exiled democracy activists in July 2023, they demonstrated their willingness to intimidate and harass individuals across state borders.[58] Only five months later, in December 2023, Hong Kong again showed a disregard for human rights norms, and the city’s growing desperation, when they announced even greater bounties on five additional individuals.[59] Not only should the Special Rapporteur advocate for those charges to be dropped, but she should consider recruiting the governments of United Nation member states to make a joint public statement that they will not cooperate with any NSL cases domestically or abroad.

We urge the Special Rapporteur to consider supporting policy changes in countries that host relocated Hong Kong human rights defenders. Although it may be outside the immediate scope of the Special Rapporteur mandate, multiple interviews recounted the need to improve support for human rights defenders abroad and it would be remiss not to mention it. Some places, such as Taiwan, have burdensome taxation and reporting laws that make it difficult for relocated groups to set themselves up in country.[60] The Special Rapporteur might consider working closely and privately with those places to amend their laws to be less onerous.

When groups, such as the New School for Democracy, the Global Innovation Fund, or Amnesty International, leave Hong Kong for fear of attack or shut down, they relocate to countries with vastly different expectations for non-profits.[61] Not only do those groups need help navigating a new regulatory environment, but they also need to be set up for success so that they can effectively communicate with activists and underground networks back in Hong Kong. It is important for the Special Rapporteur to support their work so that the international community retains a channel of information and exchange with Hong Kong.

International legal action is most effective when combined with smaller-scale efforts that incentivize cooperation or penalize Chinese government wrongdoing Just as the CCP relies heavily on subtle political and behavioral interventions, rather than large-scale sweeping policy changes, the Special Rapporteur can help counter the collapse of legal and judicial independence in Hong Kong with the following steps It is important to note that some of the below recommendations may be outside the scope of the Special Rapporteur mandate, but we offer them for consideration in the case that all other options fail

We recommend the Special Rapporteur collaborate with multinational businesses still operating in Hong Kong, particularly major American tech companies, to leverage their financial influence against Chinese government attempts to restrict information flow through the court system For example, during the summer of 2023, the government sought an injunction to ban the 2019 protest anthem “Glory to Hong Kong” from various social media and streaming platforms, which Google refused to do [62] The Hong Kong High Court then rejected the government injunction request, citing the right to freedom of expression The case was a radical exception to most decisions by the High Court, but it showed that, if technology companies refuse to cooperate with government pressure, they can possibly empower and support legal professionals in Hong Kong To counter such requests, as demonstrated by Google's refusal in the case of “Glory to Hong Kong,” the Special Rapporteur can privately encourage these companies to actively defend against such small injustices in court Several international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, have recommended such a strategy This approach could transfer the burden of activism from vulnerable Hong Kong communities to powerful and wealthy corporations, making them less susceptible to threats from China

Lastly, there are smaller-scale opportunities to promote exchange and support the practitioner community Travel outside of Hong Kong for students, and particularly students of law, can be extremely dangerous, as demonstrated by the recent arrest of a student returning from Japan.[63] If possible and within her institutional capacity, the Special Rapporteur could encourage relevant civil society organizations to sponsor an exchange program that invites law students, lawyers, and judges to travel between Hong Kong and other countries under the protection of the United Nations The Law Society of Hong Kong, which claims to maintain a wide global network for knowledge exchange, might consider hosting or supporting a training for Hong Kong lawyers According to our interviews, some experts believe that Hong Kong lawyers have not been making enough human rights arguments when defending activists in court.[64] The decision to avoid human rights based-arguments may be due to self-concern, but it might also stem from lack of familiarity with persuasive arguments Plus, there is value in airing human rights concerns if only to draw further attention to attacks on civil and political rights in Hong Kong

The Special Rapporteur should also work closely with the governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and other common law countries to ensure that their legal professionals stay involved in the Court of Final Appeals. The foreign judges that sit on the CFA are a key lifeline for the outside world; at a minimum, they provide insight into CFA decision-making and, at best, they act as a more independent and moderating force less vulnerable to Beijing’s whims.

If there is a positive takeaway from this report, it's that Hong Kong has not completely transformed into an assimilated, indistinct, and unidentifiable entity within China. Judges, lawyers, and courts retain some elements of the formerly independent and highly regarded system founded in English common law. However, experts suspect that the crackdown on human rights will only worsen unless action is taken to reduce the tension between China and the United States. Such tension has made the environment within Hong Kong more politicized, high-strung, and dangerous for everyone but particularly for pro-democracy activists. If Hong Kong is a victim of China’s compensatory overreach, then it is likely that positive progress for the independence of lawyers and judges will be impossible without normalized relations between China and the Western world.

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Detailing pervasive harassment, forced displacement, and consequences of disbarment, this section explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) weaponizes employment and mobility to silence activists. Recommendations include disseminating supportive materials and statements for legal advocates defending human rights in China, and publicly supporting local efforts highlighting China's unequivocal violations of international standards.

INTRODUCTION

Since Xi Jinping assumed the presidency of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and took on the role of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the world has witnessed China’s further weaponization of the law and the subsequent repression of Chinese citizens This section presents a framework that provides important background on the issue before characterizing the nature of the PRC’s coordinated harassment to repress lawyers, judges, and other human rights activists The following discussion will present a new conceptual framework for understanding the CCP’s repression of lawyers and human rights advocates through the repressive control of both employment and mobility

In recent months and years, the CCP and the Chinese government have made an exerted effort to curtail legal experts’ autonomy by weaponizing their employment through institutional exploitation via the All China Lawyers Association (ACLA) and weaponizing their mobility through the CCP’s overwhelming integration into the Chinese government’s lawmaking process. These two actions, in tandem with allconsuming government and Party harassment, render legal activists and experts in China effectively unable to defend human rights across the country.

BACKGROUND

Lee Ming-Che, a Taiwanese democracy activist who was imprisoned in China from 2017-2022, believes judges and lawyers in the PRC lack true independence: the judicial system is controlled by the CCP and the Chinese government, and there is no independent judiciary.

Lee described how, instead of reporting to judges, police and prosecutors are the highest authority. In that way, the court system in the PRC is the opposite of that in the West. In China, the branches of the government responsible for prosecution have risen out of the police structure. And in their court system, judges are not members of the party, but prosecutors are – and constitutionally, the court system must follow the party. In his words, “prosecutors own the judges.” If a judge offends the prosecution, they could be audited for corruption; judges also face an annual performance evaluation based on political principles.

Similarly, lawyers also face a yearly audit, and if they are found opposing CCP stances or what the police want, their licenses can be revoked. People we spoke to at Academia Sinica described the process for someone accused in the court system, relaying that subjects are not allowed to hire their own lawyers, but receive a government-appointed one. If an individual does hire a lawyer, that lawyer will not be permitted to see their client while they are detained. In addition, family members are not allowed in the courtroom during proceedings, and prosecutors can block journalists and other counselors from seeing the trial. These closed trials therefore –very literally – limit transparency.

In addition to these structural issues and yearly audits, lawyers also face harassment and abuse by the government Lu Jun, a lawyer and antidiscrimination activist who con-founded the NGO “Beijing Yirenping Center”, cited the Jasmine Revolution in 2011, during which time many lawyers “disappeared” in Beijing and elsewhere in China. Lawyers who try to be independent and go against the CCP’s wishes can be charged with crimes, including “pocket crimes” like “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” as well as “disturbing public/social order,” “engaging in illegal business,” and others, per Teng Biao, a Chinese lawyer and activist. However, there are also many more serious crimes that authorities have used to target lawyers and human rights defenders, such as “overthrowing state power,” “incitement of subversion,” and “separatism.” Authorities also sometimes use non-political criminal charges, like fraud or tax evasion, to punish dissidents and activists. The charges are very arbitrary, according to Teng Biao, as is the process that follows: regardless of the kind of crime, the whole criminal process is determined by political interests and political will. Procedure plays barely any role.

As a result of these structural issues, lack of independence, and harassment for dissent, many activists try to leave the PRC However, the CCP also heavily restricts the mobility of those it has targeted, making any such attempts difficult or impossible

GOVERNMENTAL HARASSMENT OF LAWYERS AND ACTIVISTS

Lawyers and legal activists who act in ways the CCP and government do not like often face harassment through a range of methods. These methods can include warnings and house arrest, unemployment, forced displacement/relocation, intimidation, surveillance, arrest, disappearance, conviction, detention, and torture. Surveillance systems monitor everyone, with particular focus on those who may be engaged in activities that go against the government’s wishes. Lu Jun also spoke to this, saying that it is very normal for lawyers to be visited by bar association officials, government officials, police officers, and other authorities when there are cases that the government does not want pursued. Those officials will tell them that this case is sensitive, and that they hope they stay far away and do not get involved. If the activists do not follow those instructions, they can be subject to the many methods of harassment outlined by Teng Biao. Authorities can also use collective punishment, i.e. targeting the subjects’ family, relatives, and friends as well, to try to pressure the subject into submission. For example, multiple people spoke about how the children of lawyers and activists are often unable to go to school because of their parents’ activities: government officials will visit schools those children attend and speak with their teachers.

More extreme methods of harassment include forced psychiatric treatment – the Judicial Reform Foundation (JRF) recently published a book compiling 30 cases of forced psychiatric treatment on human rights defenders – and “forced trips” where police show up at one’s house and force them and their families to leave their homes An anonymous activist we spoke to said that these trips can be up to six months long, with the goal of getting these “troublemakers” out of the city and away from their networks and connections, while destabilizing their family lives

JRF gave us an anecdotal example of this. They told us about a lawyer who was captured in 2015 and released in 2021. The government and police sought to prevent him and his family from residing in Beijing, and drove him back to his village in order to cut his connection to other human rights activists and networks. Last April, they sent people to bang on his door in the middle of the night, used intimidation, and severed his lease. In the 6 weeks that followed, the lawyer and his family had to move 13 times – and the CCP even told hotels not to accommodate the family. The government would cut their appliances, gas, water, and other utilities wherever they went and, through today, the lawyer and his family continue to be harassed on a daily basis. JFR emphasized that this is not an isolated case; this kind of harassment is a longstanding practice, and when someone is being targeted, the problem extends to everyone they know.

PERSONAL ACCOUNTS

EXPERTS ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT OTHER KINDS OF HARASSMENT BY CHINESE AUTHORITIES AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES,

SOME OF WHICH ARE DETAILED HERE. THESE ACCOUNTS ARE CRITICAL DUE TO THE DIFFICULTIES IN COLLECTING DATA ABOUT SUCH INSTANCES OF GOVERNMENT BACKLASH IN THE PRC,

Teng Biao shared a case that occurred during COVID-19, when everyone was required to have a house code; if your house code turned red, you could not travel. He spoke of two human rights lawyers who planned to go to Shanghai to meet a client, another human rights defender. Suddenly, their house code turned red, barring them from traveling to Shanghai. This change in house codes had nothing to do with COVID exposure, but was reportedly merely used as a pretext restrict the travel and efforts of human rights lawyers.

Teng Biao was personally targeted because of his human rights work, research, and criticism of the CCP and Chinese government. He was disbarred and banned from teaching and eventually was fired by the university. He was kidnapped by secret police and tortured.

Lee Ming-Che was also personally targeted for his pro-democracy activism. He was lucky – in his words – to have an unrelenting wife advocating for him. However, she too faced pressures: Chinese agents reached her in Taiwan, and told her to keep quiet and that Che would then be treated better in prison. Lee Ming-Che also gave us an example of another lawyer who was prosecuted in China, and described how the government used technology to undermine his support. Specifically, the government used deepfake technology to doctor incriminating photographs of the lawyer, and sent them to his wife in the United States to try to hinder her advocacy on his behalf.

Lu Jun provided insight into an incident where his organization planned to convene a conference at a local hotel On the morning of the scheduled event, the hotel abruptly asserted that the conference room lacked essential utilities such as electricity and running water, making it unsuitable for the gathering These purported issues were not genuine but rather a manifestation of the hotel succumbing to police pressure, discouraging the hosting of the conference due to its sensitive subject matter

Shawn Shieh, founder of Social Innovations Advisory which focuses on building a resilient civil society in China and elsewhere in the global South, spoke to us about a labor case that received a great deal of attention when workers in a Taiwanese shoe factory who had not received backpay carried out a strike. His organization, the China Labor Bulletin, helped organize the workers to conduct collective bargaining – something that has no legal basis there, but that they thought was something they could push for and was worthwhile. The group was able to get the company to come to the table, and negotiated millions in compensation for workers. However, soon after the case happened – around 2015 – members of the labor NGO that had been training and organizing the workers were all detained and tried. Shawn found them lawyers, but the lawyers did not have access to their clients and pressure was placed on their families. One of the labor activists received a suspended sentence, while one had to serve time. All were pressured to confess. Some had their parents visited and harassed by police, and the one person who refused to confess received a jail sentence. Once activists were detained, they were monitored. If they received a suspended sentence, they were under probation and had to wear a bracelet. They also were not allowed to work – at least in their field.

EACH OF THESE ACCOUNTS PAINTS A PICTURE OF THE KIND OF HARASSMENT AND LIFE-THREATENING CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LAWYERS FACE WHEN GOING AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN CHINA;

ABUSE IS CHRONIC AND IMPACTS ACTIVISTS’ LOVED ONES, EVEN THOSE ABROAD. THESE METHODS – LEGAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL –ALL HINDER LAWYERS FROM PURSUING JUSTICE.

IT IS ALSO WORTH NOTING THAT THE ARBITRARY NATURE OF THE TARGETING HAS A CASCADING EFFECT: ONE HIGH PROFILE CASE OF A LAWYER BEING PUNISHED IS ENOUGH TO INSTILL FEAR IN HUNDREDS OF OTHERS.

THE CCP DOES NOT ACTUALLY NEED TO REPRESS EVERY LAWYER; BY SINGLING OUT EVEN JUST A FEW, THE CCP DETERS ALL THE OTHERS AS WELL.

USING INSTITUTIONS TO WEAPONIZE EMPLOYMENT

The CCP has effectively co-opted the institution that dictates the lives of its members. That agency is the All China Lawyers Association (ACLA) an organization through which lawyers in China are officially credentialed and associated – the equivalent of a bar association in the United States. In liberal democracies, these types of associations operate without government meddling. The ACLA, on the other hand, is a quasi-governmental organization aligned with the CCP and, like any other faction of the Chinese government, is intended to reflect the will of the Communist Party. [1] One important way this function manifests is through the annual review process for lawyers. Individuals who are barred through the ACLA must have their licenses renewed annually, and they “pass” their review after being assessed by local CCP-controlled associations And new restrictions may place lawyers’ future license renewals even further at risk The ACLA relatively recently promulgated regulations prohibiting lawyers from “hyping up” cases – this could mean publishing letters, organizing gatherings, or generating public opinion of any kind [2]

Aside from the yearly recertification for lawyers, lawyers can further face disbarment at any moment The JRF specifically noted that over the past five to ten years, approximately 45 human rights lawyers being disbarred – often over very light crimes [3] Other experts made clear that lawyers could be visited by bar association officials if lawyers were taking up what the CCP would deem a sensitive case [4] In this way, it is clear the CCP has successfully co-opted institutions to use individuals’ employment as a bargaining chip.

The CCP has taken great pains to control lawyers’ and legal activists’ behavior. One prominent reason for this is lawyers’ and broader human rights advocates’ ability to bring to light forms of association that endanger the CCP’s unrivaled dominance This includes lawyers who directly support and defend organizations that blatantly reject the CCP, such as Falun Gong. That said, just because some lawyers take actions that are blatantly threatening to the CCP, other legal experts are not spared Next on the list of those jeopardizing the Party’s future are criminal defense lawyers – for the CCP, they only get in the way of their targeting of specific individuals for a host of illegitimate reasons. After these individuals come tort lawyers, who are particularly cumbersome to the CCP when they take on cases regarding government misdeeds An example of this came after a 2008 earthquake in China. Over 50 children were killed when their school collapsed, likely due to shoddy construction and government investment; a lawyer representing the parents of these children sued on their behalf This lawsuit was, of course, dismissed [5] Finally, even corporate lawyers who take an interest in any of these issues on the side are problematic to the CCP. All of these lawyers are explicitly targeted by the Party because of the threat they pose to its continued power and authority

While the CCP’s harassment comes in many flavors, we have highlighted their use of institutionalized pressure on employment through the ACLA because it seemed to be particularly effective at signaling the potential for more dire threats. Among these are detention, arrest, and torture. Lu Jun highlighted stories of former colleagues taken for interrogation or even sentenced to jail – and upon their release were still being visited by bar association officials. [6] Perhaps more importantly, however, because of the CCP’s integration with the ACLA, Party officials have the opportunity to ensure disbarment has debilitating effects on a person and their family. As the JRF made clear: the government (as an extension of the CCP) can “ensure you are not able to work.” They – government officials –“want to cut the maintenance for your daily living.” Moreover, these lawyers cannot pick up where they left off following disbarment and find a new job. When combined with the Party’s other strategies, such as the extrajudicial harassment outlined in the previous subsection, the issue of disbarment is intensified. With the CCP involved, disbarment is the beginning of the end, not a slap on the wrist.

While individuals could still procure work as an unlicensed legal activist, likely taking on sensitive cases, disbarment leaves them quite vulnerable to finding new or other employment for the purposes of securing stable income. While the CCP’s stripping of lawyers’ credentials appears less intensive compared to their other extreme and violent forms of harassment, it drains the victims of their financial livelihood – and because of the CCP’s broad influence, it ensures individuals have a hard time finding other sources of income. It is an action that has enormous rippling effects.

This issue of employment weaponization raises several considerations regarding international law and recognized international standards. Although China has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), it has signed it. Because of this ratification, there are still grounds on which to bring to light egregious violations. With regard to lawyers’ ability to perform their duties, we argue the PRC has flagrantly disregarded the ICCPR – specifically, Article 14 that broadly protects individuals’ right to a fair trial.[7] The CCP’s politicization of the ACLA and weaponization of the legal profession prevents individuals from retaining legal assistance, which is a protected right under Article 14. Because of the CCP’s extreme action taken against lawyers who threaten its survival, which is institutionally executed via the ACLA, all persons are clearly not equal before the courts – a right that is secured under Article 14 of the ICCPR.

Additionally, the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers also functions as crucial standards which broadly protect the legal profession’s right to practice freely without undue interference. [8] The CCP in this context has also violated several of these principles, such as Principle 23, which entitles lawyers to freedom of expression, belief, association, and assembly, as well as the right to participate in public discussions about the law and human rights protection. In the PRC, however, any lawyer taking advantage of this fundamental right, particularly in a way that threatens the CCP or gets in the way of the CCP’s objectives, is at high risk of being immediately disbarred and thus cut off from future livelihood. Principle 24 also permits lawyers to form and join self-governing professional associations which protects their interests. The ACLA, however, is governed by the CCP and serves the interests of the CCP. Principle 25 states professional associations must cooperate with governments to ensure equal access to legal services, and protects lawyers’ right to counsel and assist clients without interference in accordance with the law. In this case – the government is not cooperating with the ACLA, but rather controlling it in a self-serving way that directly aims to prevent lawyers from assisting their clients freely. There are several other relevant principles, but we have highlighted these three to showcase the extent to which China routinely and systematically bucks standards endorsed by the UN in the context of institutionalized weaponization of employment.

CCP OVERSIGHT TO WEAPONIZE MOBILITY

Disbarment can inflict severe and far-reaching consequences on individuals. One might consider relocation as a straightforward solution to counteract these dire circumstances. And yet, the CCP has rendered this impossible in many cases. Using lawful ways to weaponize mobility is a widespread tactic employed to further prevent the livelihood of lawyers who threaten the preponderance of the CCP. Because the government is merely a vehicle the CCP uses to “legalize” its violations of international law, customs, and norms, it has predictably ensured the passage of laws that authorize these violations. Among them is the Counterespionage Law of the People’s Republic of China, which was passed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on April 26, 2023 and became effective on July 1, 2023. This revised law expands upon the government’s ability to “combat espionage,” on the grounds of national security concerns, with little specificities or definitions used, thereby keeping the possibilities broad for government and CCP intervention. [9]

Among the provisions included in the new counterespionage law is expanded power for law enforcement in particular. Specifically, Articles 33 through 35 authorize exit and entry bans , likely to prevent those who threaten or question the CCP’s power from leaving the country – regardless of whether or not they are a citizen of another country. [10] Thus, a human rights lawyer who has been disbarred may well also face significant obstacles. Without freedom over their mobility, and lacking a license to practice their profession, the CCP has, without even using detention or arrest, essentially left these individuals with nowhere to turn. They are effectively jailed inside the country. For instance, on June 9, 2023, Li Heping, a lawyer with a record of defending human rights in China, and his family were prevented from going on a summer vacation to Thailand. [11]

Exit bans have exacerbated effects and consequences that extend to families. Consider Shawn Shieh, who worked to strengthen civil society and report on worker’s movements in China for several years. He eventually had to leave because of warnings he received regarding his work. Shieh made the decision to take his children out of Beijing as well, fearing that they may eventually face an exit ban. [12] As the PRC continues to codify exit bans, there will be an increasing number of those who cannot leave, even though it may very well be in their best interest to do so from a safety and employment perspective. These exit bans effectively hamstring the whole family from being able to provide for themselves – particularly when they already face incessant harassment at home and have few employment prospects following disbarment of the lawyer in the family.

It is clear from the expanded ability to enforce exit (and entry) bans in recent legislation that the CCP is taking additional steps to limit individuals’ movement, activists and their families can be left with nothing – especially when one considers the added effects of harassment and disbarment. These exit bans make it so lawyers, judges, and legal activists are unable to continue their important work elsewhere. They allow the CCP to cut this work off at the source, hoping to dwindle the amount of activism and effort these individuals contribute to the fight for human rights in mainland China.

This hamstringing of mobility has important implications regarding the PRC’s adherence to widely accepted international standards. In addition to the newest Counterespionage Law most recently passed, there are other domestic laws that arguably authorize exit bans in China. It is clear that these bans violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ Principle of Freedom of Movement, which, in part, protects individuals’ right to leave any country, including their own, and return to their country. [13] This newest iteration of a codified authorization of exit bans signals a continued and strengthened effort on the part of the CCP to violate this fundamental right recognized by the UN. Furthermore, Principle 16 of the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers asserts that governments shall ensure various protections for lawyers, among which is the assurance that lawyers are able to travel and consult with their clients freely both within their own country and abroad.[14] Exit bans have the strength to prohibit lawyers from realizing this right, and it also has the effect of potentially barring Chinese individuals abroad who are experiencing CCP harassment from retaining a lawyer they can meet in person.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend you continue to disseminate materials and clear statements of support for the legal advocates doing work to defend human rights in China. It is clear that activists have tempered expectations when it comes to China’s willingness to adhere to relevant UN principles that protect basic human rights. Legal advocates’ and activists’ confidence in multilateralism could use a boost. It will be exceedingly important to continue to call out behavior within the international community and foster UN forums through which it is possible to criticize China’s violations of international law and accepted international standards. “Xi cares about international pressure less and less. But the people on the ground care,” Jun reflects. In order to encourage the important work that must happen locally on the ground, it is important for the UN Special Rapporteur to continue to show public, unwavering support for the efforts undertaken by lawyers and human rights advocates in China.

We conclude China has unequivocally violated countless rights and principles that protect individuals’ employment choices, as well as their freedom of mobility These rights and principles are enumerated in internationally recognized standards It is important to call this out publicly from the UN Doing so would help achieve several goals For one, it signals to activists and lawyers on the ground that the UN recognizes their efforts and the challenges they endure to continue practicing law, whether licensed or unlicensed. Public statements also help to legitimize the UN’s capabilities among those on the ground, who have limited faith in any institution’s ability to curtail the CCP Published recognition will also reinforce these standards’ legitimacy within the international community and hopefully deter future bad actors from taking steps similar to what has already happened in the PRC Finally, public acknowledgement of these violations makes clear to the CCP that they are not able to take these steps without notice There very well could be further consequences, including public naming and shaming, if it continues along this line

CONCLUSION

This report considered the opportunities that exist to address China’s human rights violations employing UN mechanisms, as well as ways to counter China’s attempts to co-opt the UN’s human rights framework.

To this end, and understanding that China presents a multitude of human rights problems, which we divided into three sections, we present the following recommendations:

UYGHUR REGION (XINJIANG)

The HRC should open an inquiry into the Chinese criminal justice system in Xinjiang.

The Special Rapporteur can spread the work of civil society initiatives.

The Special Rapporteur can recommend that governments ensure that Uyghur activists who took refuge in their countries are protected.

HONG KONG

Enforce International Law and bolster the United Nations system

Increase Support for human rights defenders

Promote Education & Raise Awareness

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

Recognition of Violations of International Law and Recognized International Standards

Material Broadly Supporting Lawyers and Human Rights Advocates in China

Our Workshop Team

Ben Anderson is a Louisville, Kentucky native and attended the University of Louisville, where he majored in Political Science and Peace Studies. After graduating, he was a Fulbright Fellow in Taichung, Taiwan, and studied Mandarin at National Kaohsiung Normal University. At Princeton, he studies international development, and this summer, he interned in Taipei at International Crisis Group

Anna Blue originally hails from Washington, D C She is a second-year Master student at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs, where she studies issues at the intersection of democracy and technology Before arriving at Princeton, Anna worked in international crisis management for Meta, Inc for three years Her other work experience includes serving at a think tank in Los Angeles and conducting research on digital government services in Estonia as a Fulbright Fellow She has a B A in International Relations from Stanford University, where she wrote an honors thesis on religious violence in Mexico

Marissa Bray, a Southern California native, is a second-year Master’s student at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs She graduated from Cornell University, where she studied government and French, then moved to Washington, D.C. to work as an analyst in the national security space. At Princeton, Marissa focuses on international relations, and spent the summer working on peacebuilding efforts at the United Nations in Nairobi.

Omar Elhaj is a Palestinian and Muslim-American. His experiences and identity have informed a passion for human rights and ethno-religious conflict prevention. He wrote his senior thesis on academic conceptualizations of the Islamic State, linking the terrorist group closer to pre-1948 Zionist groups and contemporary white nationalist groups in the US. After graduating from the University of Virginia, Omar worked as a data analyst at NGA in Washington, D C , performing modern data analytics on a broad array of national security-related issues

This past summer, he interned at Al-Haq, a Palestinian human rights organization, where he researched Israeli settlement finance He is interested in intersections between mass atrocity, war, and authoritarianism

Kelsey Mason is originally from North Carolina, and came to Princeton from Washington, D C after four years in the United States Senate Most recently, she was a professional staff member on the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee She was responsible primarily for the Ranking Member's K-12 education portfolio. During the summer following the first year of her MPA at Princeton, Kelsey worked at the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) in the Section of Education for Inclusion and Gender Equality Kelsey graduated from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Elmir Mukhtarov is a second year master student at School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA) from Azerbaijan. His undergraduate education at Qafqaz University focused on economics. Before joining SPIA, Elmir worked at a Baku based think-tank called Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD) where his work focused on public finance and natural resource revenue management. In SPIA, he focuses on international development and economic policy. This summer, Elmir interned at the Ministry of Finance of Azerbaijan.

Casimira “Cassie” Rodriguez, a native of San Bernardino, California, is a graduate student and a Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative (SINSI) fellow at Princeton’s School of Public and International Affairs. She graduated from Princeton in 2019 with an A.B. in Politics and certificates in East Asian Studies and the History and Practice of Diplomacy, completing a senior thesis on Japanese security policy. Following graduation, she studied advanced Japanese at the InterUniversity Center for Japanese Language Studies as a Blakemore Freeman Fellow. In 2021, she was awarded a position in Pacific Forum’s inaugural cohort of next-generation Japanese and American leaders conducting research on various facets of the U S.-Japan Alliance She subsequently published a paper on the evolution of U S.-led alliance systems in East Asia As part of her SINSI fellowship, she completed two years of federal government service She worked as a foreign affairs officer on the Japan Desk at the Department of State and as an Assistant Foreign Policy Advisor at USINDOPACOM

Aasha Shaik is from New Jersey and studied Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University. She is in her final year of a joint MPA at Princeton SPIA and a JD at Yale Law School. Aasha’s past experience includes years of gender equality advocacy work at the United Nations, as well as domestic civil rights and criminal justice work. She is committed to using her JD-MPA to serve alongside communities traditionally marginalized by our sociopolitical and justice systems. This past summer, she worked on civil rights litigation in Washington, D.C. Aasha has been honored to be the 2019 Truman Scholar of New Jersey and a featured activist in ABC’s 2020 International Women’s Day special, aired across the nation.

Faculty Advisor

Martin S. Flaherty is Leitner Family Professor of Law and Founding Co-Director of the Leitner Center for International Law and Justice at Fordham Law School. He is also a Visiting Professor at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, where he was Fellow in the Program in Law and Public Affairs, and a Visiting Professor at Columbia Law School and Barnard College in New York. Professor Flaherty has taught at China University of Political Science and Law and the National Judges College in Beijing, and co-founded the Rule of Law in Asia Program at the Leitner Center as well as the Committee to Support Chinese Lawyers, an independent NGO on which he serves as Vice Chair. Flaherty has also previously taught at Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul, Queen’s University Belfast, Cardozo School of Law, St. John's University School of Law, and the New School. Previously Professor Flaherty served as a law clerk for Justice Byron R. White of the U.S. Supreme Court and Chief Judge John Gibbons of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

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4 Davis, M (2020) Making Hong Kong China: The rollback of human rights and the rule of law International Affairs, Volume 97 (2), pgs. 77-111. [DOI: 10.1093/ia/iiab006] https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab006

5 Davis, M (2020) Making Hong Kong China: The rollback of human rights and the rule of law International Affairs, Volume 97 (2), pgs 77-111 [DOI: 10 1093/ia/iiab006] https://doi org/10 1093/ia/iiab006

6 United Nations Human Rights Committee (2022, July 27) UN Human Rights Committee issues findings on Hong Kong, Macao, Georgia, Ireland, Luxembourg and Uruguay. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/un-human-rights-committee-issues-findings-hong-kong-macao-georgiaireland

7 Congressional-Executive Commission on China (2022, July 12) Hong Kong Prosecutors Play a Key Role in Carrying Out Political Prosecutions https://www cecc gov/publications/commission-analysis/hong-kong-prosecutors-play-a-key-role-incarrying-out-political

8. Pomfret, J., Torode, G., Roantree, A., & Lague, D. (2022, December 29). Lawyers exit Hong Kong as they face campaign of intimidation Reuters https://www reuters com/investigates/special-report/china-lawyers-crackdown-exodus/

9 Pomfret, J , Torode, G , Roantree, A , & Lague, D (2022, December 29) Lawyers exit Hong Kong as they face campaign of intimidation Reuters https://www reuters com/investigates/special-report/china-lawyers-crackdown-exodus/

10. Yam, K. & Kellogg, T. (2023, May 23). In Hong Kong, Another Blow to the Rule of Law. Lawfare. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/in-hong-kong-another-blow-to-the-rule-of-law

11 Satterthwaite, M (2023, April 19) Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights https://spcommreports ohchr org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27992

12 Cheung, Alvin (2022) Assessing recent developments affecting judicial independence in Hong Kong https://static1 squarespace com/static/5e82486306a01f462e200412/t/63fe3ae5d519120c3d9693f8/1677605606211/Assessing+R ecent+Developments+Affecting+Judicial+Independence+in+HK+%282022%29.pdf

13 Lai, Y (2023) Authoritarian crackdown without bloodshed: China’s securitization in post-NSL Hong Kong Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, pgs 75-117

14. Lai, Y. (2023). Authoritarian crackdown without bloodshed: China’s securitization in post-NSL Hong Kong. Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, pgs. 75-117.

15 Cheung, A (2018, January 23) Who’s to Blame for Hong Kong’s Weakening Rule of Law? ChinaFile https://www chinafile com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/whos-blame-hong-kongs-weakening-rule-of-law

16. Wong, L., Kellogg, T. E., & Lai, E. Y. (2021, June 28). Hong Kong’s National Security Law and the Right to a Fair Trial: A GCAL https://www law georgetown edu/law-asia/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2021/06/HongKongNSLRightToFairTrial pdf

17 Chan, J , Lai, E Y , & Kellogg, T E (2023, October) The Hong Kong 2019 Protest Movement: A Data Analysis of Arrests and Prosecutions Center for Asian Law https://www law georgetown edu/law-asia/wpcontent/uploads/sites/31/2023/10/GCAL-HK-2019-ARREST-DATA-REPORT-FINAL-OCT-2023.pdf

18. Shieh, S., Personal Communication, October 17, 2023

19 Cheung, A (2022) Assessing Recent Developments Affecting Judicial Independence in Hong Kong https://www ayhcheung com/hkcfa-overseas-npjs-opinion

20. Cheung, A. (2022). Assessing Recent Developments Affecting Judicial Independence in Hong Kong. https://www.ayhcheung.com/hkcfa-overseas-npjs-opinion

21 Cheung, A , personal communication, November 10, 2023

22 Kinkel, J & Hurst, W J (2015) The Judicial Cadre Evaluation System in China: From Quantification to Intra-State Legibility. The China Quarterly, no. 224, 933.

23. Cheung, A., personal communication, November 10, 2023.

24 Kellogg, T & Lai, E , personal communication, November 3, 2023

25 Kellogg, T & Lai, E , personal communication, November 3, 2023

26. Kellogg, T. & Lai, E., personal communication, November 3, 2023.

27 Sands, L (2022, March 30) Top UK judges resign from Highest Court BBC https://www bbc com/news/world-asia60926831

28. Cheung, A., personal communication, November 10, 2023.

29. Mandates of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. (2023, March 17). China Communication Report. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights https://spcommreports ohchr org/TmSearch/Mandates?m=31

30 Cheung, A , personal communication, November 10, 2023

31. Kellogg, T. & Lai, E., personal communication, November 3, 2023.

32. Chan, K., personal communication, October 17, 2023

33 Tung, C & Lee, S (2023, October 11) UN 'very troubled' over mass trial of Hong Kong democracy activists Radio Free Asia

34. Cheung, A., personal communication, November 10, 2023.

35 McCarthy, S (2023, December 20) Two Major National Security Trials Are Putting The Spotlight Back On Civil Rights in Hong Kong CNN https://www aol com/two-major-national-security-trials-015051554 html

36 Shieh, S , personal communication, October 17, 2023

37 Judicial Reform Foundation , personal communication, October 22, 2023

38 Causeway Bay Bookstore, October 16, 2023

39. Shieh, S., personal communication, October 17, 2023

40. Shieh, S., personal communication, October 17, 2023

41. Venazi, A., Chong, V. & Batke, J. (2018, June 6). Here’s How NGOs Are Allowed to Operate in the P.R.C., Hong Kong, and the United States. The China NGO Project.

42. Shieh, S., personal communication, October 17, 2023

43 https://www hkba org/uploads/f4f475ac-fa37-49d9-a2cf-78ac1729933e pdf

44 Shieh, S , personal communication, October 17, 2023

45. Judicial Reform Foundation., personal communication, October 22, 2023.

46. Judicial Reform Foundation., personal communication, October 22, 2023.

47 Cheung, A , personal communication, November 10, 2023

48. Cheung, A., personal communication, November 10, 2023.

49. Satterthwaite, M. (2023, April 19). Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights https://spcommreports ohchr org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27992

50 Wong, L & Kellogg, T E (2021, February) Hong Kong’s National Security Law: A Human Rights and Rule of Law Analysis. Center for Asian Law. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/law-asia/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2021/02/GT-HKReport-Accessible.pdf

51 Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales (2023) BHRC Special Report on Judicial Independence in Hong Kong SAR: Applying the ABA Judicial Independence Monitor Toolkit https://barhumanrights org uk/bhrc-publishes-newreport-on-judicial-independence-in-hong-kong-sar-applying-aba-judicial-monitor-toolkit/

52. Chan, J. (2022, May). A Reputation Tarnished: Reflections on the Resignation of Overseas Judges from Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal. U.S.-Asia Law Institute. https://usali.org/usali-perspectives-blog/a-reputation-tarnished-reflections-onthe-resignation-of-overseas-judges-from-hong-kongs-court-of-final-appeal

53 Hong Kong Free Press (2023, August 5) Explainer: What is ‘soft resistance’? Hong Kong officials vow to take a hard line against it, but provide no definition

54. Kellogg, T. & Lai, E., personal communication, November 3, 2023.

55 Kellogg, T & Lai, E , personal communication, November 3, 2023

56 Tsoi, G (2023, December 13) Hong Kong's universities shrivel in Beijing's grip BBC

57. Kang, D. (2023, September 16). Laos deports human rights lawyer who was fleeing state pressure back to China. KLTV.

58. Feng, E. (2023, July 3). Hong Kong police issue arrest warrants for 8 political activists living in exile. National Public Radio

59 Vinall, F (2023, December 16) Blinken denounces Hong Kong government’s bounties on overseas activists The Washington Post

60 Judicial Reform Foundation, personal communication, October 22, 2023

61 Yiu, P (2021, February 26) Exclusive: Two rights groups quit Hong Kong as security law sends shudders through NGOs Reuters https://www reuters com/article/us-hongkong-security-ngo-exclusive/exclusive-two-rights-groups-quithong-kong-as-security-law-sends-shudders-through-ngos-idUSKBN2AQ16M/

62. Pang, J. (2023, June 14). Hong Kong protest anthem's online presence fades as government seeks total ban. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/versions-hong-kong-protest-anthem-no-longer-available-itunes-spotify-2023-06-14/

63 Leung, H (2023, June 19) Hong Kong student arrested over ‘seditious’ posts handed strict bail terms incl deleting all social media apps Hong Kong Free Press https://hongkongfp com/2023/06/19/hong-kong-student-arrested-overseditious-posts-handed-strict-bail-terms-incl-deleting-all-social-media-apps/

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2 https://www cecc gov/sites/chinacommission house gov/files/2022 CECC Report pdf

3. Judicial Reform Foundation interview.

4 Lu Jun

5 https://www nbcnews com/id/wbna28368992

6. Lu Jun

7. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

8 https://www ohchr org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-role-lawyers

9 https://www loc gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2023-09-21/china-counterespionage-law-revised/

10. https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2023-09-21/china-counterespionage-law-revised/

11 https://safeguarddefenders com/en/blog/china-s-exit-bans-are-now-so-extreme-one-man-escaped-jet-ski

12 Shawn Sheih

13. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-humanrights#: :text=Article%2013,to%20return%20to%20his%20country.

14 https://www ohchr org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-role-lawyers

15 Teng Biao