Princeton School of Public and International Affairs Policy Workshop Report
Fall 2022
Cover Photo: Building of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in 2019.
(Source: Tiksa Negeri/File Photo/Reuters)
Princeton School of Public and International Affairs
Policy Workshop Report
Fall 2022
Faculty Advisor
Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer
S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle East Policy Studies
Authors
Harrison Fuller • Julia A. Herrle • Samantha Libraty • Jared A. Lockwood • Matthew D. Lillehaugen • Jessica Moore • Andrew Olivieri • Adam H. Sigelman • Ashley M. Stracke
The Blue Nile Falls, Ethiopia. (Source: CNN/Deagostini/ Getty Images)
This report is the final product of a policy workshop sponsored by the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs as part of the Master in Public Affairs degree program. It results from the work of nine graduate students advised by Ambassador (Ret.) Daniel Kurtzer. The students briefed the report’s content to the U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa on December 21, 2022 and the U.S. National Security Council staff on December 11, 2022.
The report’s information and recommendations stem from months of research and interviews with current and former government officials as well as experts and members of civil society from the United States, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. The group conducted virtual and in-person interviews in Princeton and Cairo, Egypt. [Note: The group was unable to travel to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, but conducted interviews with lead Ethiopian negotiators virtually and in Cairo.]
Throughout the report, interviewees are referenced according to their preferences, either by name, indirectly by title, or anonymously. This practice allowed interviewees to speak freely. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of any individual author, the workshop director, Princeton University, the U.S. State Department, or any interviewee or their affiliated organization.
We are deeply grateful to the many people who supported us during our workshop. We thank the government officials, researchers, and others who generously lent their time and expertise to us. Their contributions to our understanding of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its history were invaluable.
We would like to thank Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer for his mentorship and Bernadette Yeager for her support during our workshop. We are also thankful to Dean Amaney Jamal, Associate Dean Karen McGuinness, Laura Kijewski, Ann Lengyel, and everyone else at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs who helped make this workshop possible.
The authors would like to thank the following people for their contributions:
• American University-Cairo Dean Dr. Noha El-Mikawy and panel of water experts and university students
• Professor Khaled AbuZeid
• Ambassador Seleshi Bekele Awulachew
• Lauren Ploch Blanchard
• Sanda Chao
• Dr. Steven Cook
• William Davison
• Ambassador Mohamed el-Molla
• Jeffrey Feltman
• Julian Hadas
• Ambassador Mike Hammer
• Essam Heggy
• Dr. Mohamed Hela
• Ambassador Hassan Ibrahim Musa
• Abdurehman Jemal
• Kholood Khair
• Ambassador Jessica Lapenn
• Dr. Nadia Makram Ebeid
• Dr. Marwa Mamdouh Sale
• Bethany Milburn
• Dr. Abdel Monem Said Aly
• Dr. Mohamed M. Nour El-Din
• Daniel Paul-Schultz
• Ambassador Geeta Pasi
• Deputy Ambassador Qudsi Rasheed
• Ambassador Daniel Rubinstein
• Dr. Salman M.A. Salman
• Dr. Aaron Salzberg
• Dr. Mohamed Sameh Amr
• Ambassador David Satterfield
• Atef Sayed
• Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry
• Ms. Susan Stigant
• Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Dr. Hany Swailem
• Lara Talverdian
• The Egyptian GERD Negotiating team
AU - African Union
BCM - billion cubic meters
CDCS - Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CFA - Cooperative Framework Agreement
DoP - Declaration of Principles
EPRDF - Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
GERD - Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
HAD - High Aswan Dam
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IPoE - International Panel of Experts
NBI - Nile Basin Initiative
NISRSG - National Independent Scientific Research Study Group
PRC - People’s Republic of China
TPLF - Tigray People’s Liberation Front
UAE - United Arab Emirates
UN - United Nations
UNEP - United Nations Environment Programme
UNSC - United Nations Security Council
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
USBR - United States Bureau of Reclamation
USDA - United States Department of Agriculture
USIP - United States Institute of Peace
For over a decade, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan have engaged in a dispute over Ethiopia’s building of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the largest dam in Africa and one of the largest in the world. Given Egypt’s reliance on the Nile River for 92 percent of its water; Ethiopia’s need to develop its economy and support its growing population; and Sudan’s agricultural, water security, and development needs; the GERD has become a thorny political issue that has poisoned relations among the three countries and risks drawing the region into prolonged conflict. Due to competing urgent regional priorities and the difficulty of achieving a negotiated GERD agreement, the United States and others in the international community may be tempted to put this dispute on the backburner. However, if the conflict intensifies, which could be sparked by prolonged drought, increasing water demands, or the construction of additional upstream dams, the consequences could be catastrophic.
In order to promote peace and stability in the region, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute should remain a high priority of the United States and the international community. While ideally Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan should enter into a formal agreement that would include drought mitigation measures, an information sharing process, and a conflict resolution mechanism,
Fishermen on the Nile in Egypt. (Source: The New York Times)
the current political context and barriers make achieving a legally binding agreement unlikely in the near term. For these reasons, the Princeton Nile Waters Policy Workshop Team recommends the following steps to make progress on issues related to the GERD dispute until a formal agreement can be adopted:
• Establish drought management measures. We recommend that Egypt and Ethiopia develop a plan for drought management measures as an intermediate step to reduce tensions between the two parties and address the significant risk posed by sustained periods of drought. Instead of engaging in a formal negotiation process, the United States and international community could encourage Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia to exchange information via diplomatic notes as part of a coordinated planning process to address different drought scenarios. These notes could include a plan for cooperation during a drought along with each country’s domestic plans to reduce long term water consumption.
• Promote inter-dam communication. Based on conversations with various stakeholders and the flooding that took place in Sudan in 2020, we believe there is currently insufficient coordination among the three countries in their inter-dam operations. The United States should focus on establishing regular, consistent, and mutually agreed upon inter-dam communication as the most immediate action. Inter-dam communication could be achieved by encouraging Sudan and Ethiopia to establish a committee, through which Sudan could then coordinate separately with Egypt. Alternatively, the United States could encourage direct communications between the technical experts of all three countries, who appear to be closer in agreement than their political counterparts. Communication could be as simple as implementing a technical and apolitical website that would allow each of the parties to regularly publish and glean helpful information to improve the operations of their own dams.
• Support AU-led negotiations. The African Union (AU) continues to be the best forum to secure some level of buy-in from the three main parties as well as other riparian states, given its status as a pan-African organization that has acted as a mediator in other disputes on the continent and given that the 2019-2020 Washington Process produced terms that were highly favorable to the Egyptian position, making direct U.S. mediation a difficult sell. Moreover, given that Ethiopia stands to benefit most from the status quo, choosing to support its preferred mediator may be the only way to get the country back to the table. External partners, especially those on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) — the UK, France, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — should provide the AU with support during the negotiations.
• Accelerate efforts to reduce Egypt’s reliance on water-intensive agriculture. To promote greater water use efficiency and water security in Egypt, the United States should step up its efforts to encourage Egypt to reduce its demand for water in parallel with its efforts to resolve the GERD dispute. This includes encouraging Egypt to transition away from crops like cotton and rice, which require large amounts of water, and to less water-intensive crops, such as wheat. In the long run, the United States could help the Egyptian economy diversify away from the agricultural sector with the support of USAID.
• Bring Ethiopia to the table by supporting the country’s development. It is important that the United States and international community reopen Ethiopia’s access to capital in a phased approach that incentivizes the government to engage seriously in GERD negotiations and creates stronger linkages based on mutual benefit among all parties. The United States should help revive Egyptian private sector investment in Ethiopia, which had been partly disrupted by the internal conflict, and provide funds for small-scale alternative energy projects to help provide access to electricity to rural communities. Alternatively, the United States may want to consider support for future projects along the Nile in exchange for meeting measurable milestones toward a comprehensive agreement with Egypt, Sudan, and other riparian countries where appropriate.
Successful U.S. engagement on the GERD would provide benefits to millions of Africans across the Nile basin. It would reduce the risk of escalation of conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt, promote regional cooperation, contribute to Ethiopia’s and Sudan’s development goals, and strengthen U.S. ties and influence in the region. Moreover, it would reduce the risk of escalation in a conflict that could destabilize the region and have devastating humanitarian impacts. Despite the significant challenges to reaching a comprehensive agreement, the United States should continue to support the parties in pursuing a long term, formal resolution to this dispute; simultaneously, the United States should take immediate steps to promote cooperation among the parties on key intermediate issues and to increase the efficiency of their water usage and their resilience to drought.
The Nile River is the longest river in the world and passes through eleven countries. The Blue Nile, the largest contributing tributary of the Nile, starts in Lake Tana in Ethiopia and merges with the White Nile - the Nile’s second largest tributary by volume - in Sudan before continuing on to Egypt and exiting into the Mediterranean Sea. Given the region’s arid climate, the inhabitants of the Nile River Basin have sought to control the river’s waters throughout history.1 These conflicts date back centuries: some scholars suggest that Ethiopian emperors have used the Nile as a coercive diplomatic tool against Egypt since as early as a thousand years ago.2
When the British colonized Egypt in the late 1800s, they signed various treaties concerning uses of the Nile and pursued a range of tactics to protect their interests in Egyptian agriculture.3 These tactics included support for Italy’s efforts to colonize Ethiopia.4 In 1929, Egypt and Britain entered into the “Nile Waters Agreement,” a treaty in which other riparian countries would need to obtain permission from Egypt before pursuing any projects or efforts that would impact the volume of Nile water flowing into Egypt’s water share.5 In 1959, Egypt and Sudan entered into an agreement that claimed rights over the entirety of the Nile. The 1959 treaty asserted that Egypt and Sudan would “jointly consider and reach one unified view” regarding any other riparian state’s “claim [of] a share in the Nile waters.”6
In 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was launched to “achieve sustainable socio-economic development through equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources.”7 By 2011, six of the Nile Basin countries, including Ethiopia, signed the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA, also known as the Entebbe Agreement), a proposed agreement that would establish legally-binding principles, rights, and obligations regarding uses of the Nile River. The CFA does not attempt to quantify the water rights of Nile Basin states, though its principle of “equitable and reasonable utilization” would entail a near-certain reduction of the shares claimed by Egypt and Sudan in their 1929 and 1959 agreements. Consequently, Egypt and Sudan have rejected joining the CFA.8 The CFA requires six ratifications to enter into force; to date, only Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda have ratified the treaty.
Against this historical backdrop, Ethiopia’s then Prime Minister Meles Zenawi decided to operationalize plans for a Blue Nile dam, which was originally proposed for construction in the 1950s and 1960s by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR).9 Work on the dam began quietly in 2010.10 In 2011, Prime Minister Meles officially announced the multibillion-dollar Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), originally christened the Grand Millennium Dam. The GERD, which will be the largest hydropower dam in Africa once fully operational, is a critical part of Ethiopia’s plans to modernize and become a regional economic power. The expansion of transmission lines associated with the GERD is expected to facilitate energy exports to neighboring countries and provide 65 million Ethiopians with access to affordable energy.11 In order to reach its full power-generation capacity, the GERD reservoir must remain filled at or above a certain level at all times.
Due to constraints in access to credit through international financial institutions, Ethiopia raised significant funds for the dam via domestic bonds and voluntary contributions. Ethiopian leaders blame Egypt for their inability to raise international funds for the GERD, alleging that Egypt pressured the United States to block World Bank or other funding for the project due to the lack of a water sharing agreement between the two African countries.
The announcement of the GERD, which is located 20 miles away from Ethiopia’s border with Sudan, surprised both Egypt and Sudan. The announcement also coincided with the Arab Spring in Egypt, which resulted in the removal of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak from office. Egyptian officials later speculated that Ethiopia purposely moved forward with construction during a time when Egypt was vulnerable.12
In 2012, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia formed a 10-member International Panel of Experts (IPoE) to assess the construction of the GERD and its impact on downstream neighbors.13 The report was not publicly released, and all three parties interpreted its findings differently. Ethiopia believed the report “showed the dam offers high benefit for all three countries,” while Egypt argued the report called for additional environmental and social impact assessments.14 Despite Egypt’s calls
for a halt to dam construction, Ethiopia began to divert the flow of the Blue Nile in order to build the GERD, again surprising Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia’s diversion of the flow of the river further escalated tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia.15
Despite these rising tensions, a breakthrough came in 2015 in the form of the Declaration of Principles (DoP). The DoP, which was signed by all three parties, was seen as a preliminary step to solving the dispute by outlining the following ten principles: the need for cooperation; development and regional integration; avoidance of significant harm to riparian countries; equitable and reasonable use; implementation of the IPoE’s recommendations on the filling, operations, and safety measures of GERD; confidence building; information exchange; respect for sovereignty; and peaceful settlement of disputes.16 Although the declaration called for further studies to be completed in fifteen months, Ethiopia refused to pause construction.17 When BRLi, the French firm that conducted the study, completed its report in 2017, both Sudan and Ethiopia expressed reservations over the legitimacy of the findings on the economic, social, and environmental impacts of the GERD.18 By the end of 2017, Ethiopia had completed at least fifty percent of the construction of the dam.
In 2019, the United States hosted Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan in Washington to set a timeline for four rounds of meetings to resolve outstanding issues on filling and operating the GERD. Ethiopia withdrew from the final meeting in early 2020 citing dissatisfaction with the negotiation process, prompting the United States to finish hosting the talks with just Egypt and Sudan. At the conclusion of the negotiations, Sudan declined to formally consent to the text, leaving Egypt as the only signatory.19 These talks, known as “the Washington Process,” have implications for Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt’s perceptions of the United States’ future role in resolving the dispute, described in the Box below.
Still without an agreement, Egypt requested that the Arab League support Egypt and Sudan in the dispute, but Sudan did not agree to the resolution in front of the Arab League for fear that doing so would damage its relationship with Ethiopia. Ethiopia offered a partial agreement to Egypt and Sudan to cover the initial filling terms, since the rainy season presented an opportunity for Ethiopia to fill the GERD. Egypt and Sudan, however, rejected the Ethiopian proposal.
In May 2020, Egypt submitted a 17-page letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) protesting Ethiopia’s actions and demanding a halt to GERD construction until an agreement was signed. In its own letter to the UNSC, Ethiopia responded that it did not have to seek Egyptian approval for GERD construction and blamed Cairo for the failure of previous negotiations. While Ethiopia decided to move ahead with the dam, Egypt again requested United Nations (UN) intervention, citing a threat to international peace and security.20 However, the Security Council demurred on the Egyptian request, preferring for the dispute to continue to be handled by a regional body such as the African Union.
The African Union took up the role of mediator in July 2020, when Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia agreed to resume talks under African Union (AU) leadership. These negotiations took place during
the same month that Ethiopia began its first filling of the reservoir. Observers from the European Union and United States as well as legal and technical experts attended the talks and expressed hope that they would result in a negotiated settlement. Reports noted progress, indicating that the AU’s “involvement [had]...halted a regional axis formation and eased the pressure on regional states to choose sides.”21 Ultimately, the talks did not satisfy the demands of the three parties. Egypt wanted assurances that it would receive sufficient flow of water in the case of a drought, Sudan wanted a binding agreement for resolving future disputes, and Ethiopia wanted a guarantee of their sovereign ability to fill the GERD without intervention; no party was willing to make the requested concessions to the others.
By mid-2021, Ethiopia decided to move forward with the second filling of the GERD despite the lack of a comprehensive agreement. AU-led talks again failed to reach a negotiated settlement on the filling after Ethiopia rejected the timeframe outlined. Egypt then brought the issue back to the UNSC in July 2021. After a draft resolution put forth by Tunisia failed to garner sufficient support, the UNSC issued a presidential statement “encouraging” the parties to resume AU-led negotiations.
Egypt continues to raise the issue of the GERD at the UN, in its bilateral meetings, and in other international fora. In the meantime, Ethiopia continues to fill the GERD reservoir without an agreement in place.22
The War in Tigray started in November 2020 when Ethiopian President Abiy Ahmed launched what he called the “Mekelle Offensive” in response to alleged attacks carried out by security forces loyal to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the former ruling party of Ethiopia, against federal military bases in Tigray.23 The civil war has displaced over five million people internally and forced millions more into neighboring Sudan.24 The U.S. government has criticized the Ethiopian government for blocking food, water, and medical aid from entering the Tigray region and pointed to credible reports of ethnic cleansing and other human rights abuses being committed against Tigrayan civilians by government-aligned Eritrean and Amharan forces.25 26 There have also been unverified reports of Egypt and Sudan providing military support to the TPLF, which some experts and officials claim has further complicated efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the GERD dispute. On November 2, 2022, the Ethiopian Government and TPLF leaders signed a peace agreement that called for the “immediate and permanent cessation of hostilities,” aid and reconstruction, and access to humanitarian assistance.27 On November 15, 2022, humanitarian assistance began arriving in Tigray.28
While the peace accord is promising, the agreement is still nascent. It is critical that the United States and the international community remain focused on helping Ethiopia carry out its commitments, which means there may be little bandwidth within the Ethiopian government to focus on a meaningful resolution to the GERD dispute. However, given Egypt and Sudan’s alleged role in the conflict, a resolution on the GERD may help lower tension in the region.
Currently, Ethiopia is operating the GERD with no agreement and limited coordination with Sudan and Egypt. However, the disagreement over the GERD will continue to plague relations in the Horn of Africa and could lead to a broader conflict. According to climate models, the Nile’s flow will be more variable in the future, while demand for water in the region is growing.29 The most concerning scenarios involve long periods of extreme drought.
While all sides have publicly stated a desire to avoid conflict, a few warning signs indicate that military escalation is not entirely off the table. Egyptian journalist and researcher Mohammad Maher argues that the combination of Egypt and Sudan’s diplomatic escalation in the lead up to the second filling, Egypt’s military alliances with Ethiopia’s neighbors, and Sudan and Ethiopia’s military clashes on their shared border may lead to conflict, especially given Egypt’s “history of responding to perceived threats to the Nile with force.” He cites an event in the mid-1970s in which the Egyptians reportedly blew up a shipment of equipment for an Ethiopian dam.30 Leaked statements by Egyptian officials indicate they also contemplated using military force against the dam. In 2010, WikiLeaks published emails from a high-level Egyptian official who wrote, “We are discussing military cooperation with Sudan…If it comes to a crisis, we will send a jet to bomb the dam…or we can send our special forces in to block/sabotage the dam.”31 In June 2013, a live broadcast showed Egyptian parliamentarians debating dispatching spies to sabotage the dam or funding Ethiopian rebels to attack the government.32 This rhetoric has continued in more recent years. In June 2021, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry announced that “all options are on the table to deal with the GERD.”33 Although Shoukry later clarified that his statement did not refer to military options, experts argued that he could have been referencing an Egyptian airstrike.34
If an armed conflict were to take place, it would have significant regional impacts. Attempts by the main parties to form alliances with other riparians such as South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea to exert pressure during CFA negotiations as well as Nile Basin countries’ involvement in each others’ diplomatic and security affairs may increase the likelihood that an armed confrontation over the GERD would become regional.35 A regional conflict would harm U.S. interests by causing instability that terrorist groups could exploit, disrupting trade and shipping patterns in the Red Sea, and creating humanitarian crises. In fact, the U.S. Institute of Peace reported that, given the enormous populations of Ethiopia and Sudan, the failure of either of these states would create the largest humanitarian crisis in modern history.36
There is also a general sentiment among some African experts and officials in the region that the United States has not focused enough on Africa. These critics claim the United States has taken a reactive approach to issues in the Horn, focusing mainly on counterterrorism and security issues. Meanwhile, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become Ethiopia’s largest lender and trading partner.37 38 Furthermore, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) released a report in 2020
outlining how Middle Eastern countries including Qatar, the UAE, and others have increasingly sought to influence activities in the Horn of Africa. According to the report, rivalries between countries in the Middle East are already causing instability.39 For example, the USIP report stated that “Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces have been deployed to Yemen and to Libya at various points to augment Saudi and Emirati-backed forces.”40 For this reason, the Institute recommends that the United States create a strategy that encompasses both the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.
The United States’ relationships with Egypt and Ethiopia are two of its most important relationships in the region. Egypt is an important partner for maintaining regional stability, countering terrorism, and advancing maritime security goals. Additionally, according to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, Egypt exerts significant regional influence, particularly through its soft power among Arabicspeaking countries and via its leading role in the Arab League.41 Egypt has also served as a strategic partner in promoting peace with Israel, including with the Palestinians.42 On maritime security, Egypt is part of the U.S. Central Command’s Combined Maritime Forces, and Egypt assures U.S. military ships expedited naval access through the Suez Canal.43 In sum, the United States’ strong relationship with Egypt is essential for both trade and military operations on land and at sea. However, the U.S.Egyptian bilateral relationship has suffered in recent years with the United States’ emphasis on democracy and human rights concerns, leading Egypt to diversify military and trade relationships with Russia, the PRC, and European nations. Russia is now one of Egypt’s principal arms suppliers.44 Successful U.S. involvement in the GERD dispute could help rebuild the U.S. relationship with Egypt, while an unsuccessful strategy could push Egypt further toward Russia and the PRC.
The United States’ main interests related to Ethiopia include regional stability, economic development, and countering Russian and PRC influence. According to Lauren Blanchard of the Congressional Research Service, Ethiopia is important due to its “size, susceptibility to food insecurity, and position in a volatile but strategic region.”45 The region itself is strategically important because of the United States’ counterterrorism efforts in the Horn.46 The United States also invests heavily in Ethiopia; in 2021, Ethiopia was the largest recipient of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance, and the United States was Ethiopia’s top humanitarian donor.47
Successful engagement on the GERD could further all these U.S. interests. It would reduce the risk of escalation of conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt, promote regional stability, contribute to Ethiopia’s development goals, and strengthen U.S. ties and influence in the region.
In November 2019, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi asked former U.S. President Donald Trump to help Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan come to an agreement on the filling of the GERD.48 At the time of the request, Ethiopia had not yet begun filling the reservoir. President Trump appointed Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to lead the negotiation process. Over the course of three months, Secretary Mnuchin convened meetings with the three countries.49 However, when Ethiopia saw the final text of the proposed agreement, it released a press statement indicating that the country was disappointed with the results of the negotiations and criticized the final text as not accurately reflecting the discussions.50 While Egypt moved forward with signing the agreement, Sudan later decided not to sign it, citing concerns that Ethiopia was not a party.51 Ethiopian officials shared with the Princeton Policy Team that the agreement included language similar to that found in the colonial-era 1929 and 1959 Nile Treaties that excluded Ethiopia.52 Because of how the Washington Process unfolded, Ethiopian experts believe that the United States has lost its credibility as a neutral mediator in future negotiations. However, because President Trump committed to helping Egypt enter into an agreement with Sudan and Ethiopia, Egyptian officials continue to look to the United States for leadership in resolving their concerns on the GERD.53
Since Ethiopia announced the construction of the GERD in 2010, Egypt has insisted the dam’s filling and operation be conducted in coordination with the Egyptian government and guaranteed by a binding agreement. Without this coordination, Egypt has called the GERD an “existential threat” to the country’s water security, food security, and economic growth. In addition to Egypt’s dependence on the Nile, Egypt also believes it has a historical claim to the Nile’s waters given the two colonial-era treaties Egypt signed with Sudan. Egypt has reiterated that it has negotiated with Ethiopia and Sudan in good faith. Egypt preferred the Washington Process over the ongoing AU-led talks due to Egypt’s friendly relationship with the United States and the relatively favorable terms that the Washington Process produced for Cairo.
One of the driest countries in the world, Egypt views its water security as necessary for guaranteeing its own food security and achieving sustainable economic growth, particularly through agricultural activity. Egypt depends on the Nile River for 92 percent of its freshwater needs; 85 percent of this freshwater comes from the Blue Nile that originates in Lake Tana in Ethiopia. Given Egypt’s water scarcity, which existed prior to the GERD, the Egyptian government has implemented several water conservation initiatives such as reuse, desalination, and public awareness campaigns.
In addition to its concern over water scarcity, Egypt worries that the unilateral filling and operation of the GERD on the Blue Nile will impact the operations of Egypt’s High Aswan Dam (HAD) located downstream from the GERD. The HAD is Africa’s second most powerful hydroelectric dam, generating 2.1 gigawatts annually.54 To compensate for the lack of rainfall, the HAD supports Egypt’s irrigation scheme, allowing Egypt to produce water-intensive crops in the Nile Valley such as cotton, sugarcane, and rice.55
Egypt also prizes the HAD for its role in controlling flooding in the Nile River Valley. Prior to the construction of the HAD, the valley would experience annual floods during Ethiopia’s and Sudan’s rainy seasons. Although flood control is considered a positive consequence of the HAD, the annual floods were vital to the fertility of the land by carrying sediments downstream. The sedimentation process also protected the delta from coastal erosion. In addition, the floods would flush waste from the delta, improving the quality of water.56 Egypt worries the GERD will exacerbate water quality issues and erosion, in turn further depleting fertile farmland, reducing biodiversity, harming the fishing industry in Lake Nasser, and accelerating the erosion of the Nile Delta. This erosion, according to one Egyptian expert interviewed for this report, could increase the likelihood of blockages in the Suez Canal akin to the Even Given debacle that blocked the waterway for six days in 2021.
For these reasons related to both water quantity and quality, Egypt has argued that coordination between the GERD and the HAD is necessary, particularly in periods of drought. In a June 2021 letter to the UNSC, Egypt warned that the HAD barely has enough water to operate in years of average rainfall due to evaporation losses.57 In the event of a prolonged drought, Egypt estimated that it will face a water shortage of 123 billion cubic meters (BCM) over a period of 20 years, according to simulations based on data from the severe drought during the 1980s and early 1990s.58 The HAD would not be able to operate in this scenario, threatening Egypt’s hydroelectric capacity and agricultural activities. Though these predictions depend on the actual fill rate of the GERD reservoir and potential impacts of climate change, even Ethiopia’s own projections show that hydroelectric output at the HAD may decrease by up to 25 percent during years of average rainfall due to the GERD.59
The combined fear of poor management of the GERD and a prolonged drought is the crux of Egypt’s existential crisis. According to Egyptian analyses, the socioeconomic cost of a prolonged drought would equate to 290,000 Egyptians with lost incomes, 130,000 hectares of uncultivated land, $150 million in increased food imports, and $430 million less in agricultural production.60 The government fears this doomsday scenario would result in a host of social problems including increased poverty, rising social tensions, deteriorating health conditions, and migration.61 Consequently, high-level Egyptian officials have considered the GERD’s perceived threat to Egypt’s water security as tantamount to a threat to the country’s national security.
Not only do Egyptians view the Nile as vital to their water security, they also consider it a critical aspect of their national and cultural identity. Egyptians quote Aristotle’s adage that “Egypt is the gift of the Nile” and Herodotus’ proclamation that “Egypt is the Nile, and the Nile is Egypt.”62 They speak of their ownership of the Nile waters in terms of 4,000 years of history dating back to biblical times. In Egyptian media, Egyptian leaders speak in terms of Egypt’s “God-given” or “historical”63 rights as the “stewards”64 of the Nile waters, giving them a greater claim to the river compared to upstream riparian states.65 Egypt justifies its present claims of historical rights to the Nile by pointing to the 1929 and 1959 treaties.
Egypt feels it has made earnest attempts via multiple channels and mediators to come to a negotiated agreement over the GERD with Ethiopia. Egyptian officials blame Ethiopia for the failure of past negotiations and question whether Ethiopia is stalling intentionally to gain time to build and fill the dam. Egypt has also expressed interest in a formal information-sharing mechanism to allow Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to coordinate the operations of the GERD and the HAD.66 Ethiopia, in turn, says it would only enter into such an agreement if Egypt shares HAD data reciprocally, which Egypt considers unnecessary since the HAD is located downstream from the GERD.
Ultimately, Egypt has invested significant time in these talks and blames their failure on the Ethiopians’ lack of political will. The Egyptian government fears that although Ethiopia continues to engage in negotiations, it has only proven it will continue to act unilaterally until the GERD is completed and functioning. Egypt fears this will set a precedent for future projects Ethiopia has planned on the Blue Nile, some of which may be consumptive dams with the potential to prevent more water from reaching Egypt.
In July 2022, an Egyptian professor of engineering hydrology published Google Maps imagery showing what appeared to be cracks in the GERD saddle dam, causing alarm that the saddle dam could collapse and raising questions about the quality of its construction. Failure of the saddle dam could lead to a sudden outpouring of more than 50 BCM of water from the GERD reservoir, resulting in catastrophic flooding in Sudan and an immense human and economic toll.67 However, technical experts assert that the probability of a catastrophic dam failure is very low
To Ethiopia, the GERD is a responsible infrastructure project that is necessary to develop the country’s economy and improve the livelihoods of its people. The government has rejected demands for a binding agreement on the coordinated use of the dam, viewing those demands as attempts by Egypt to control Ethiopia’s sovereign decision making processes. Despite Ethiopia’s intentions to fill and operate the dam unilaterally, the government has referred to the GERD as “a site of cooperation” in official documents and touts the benefits it will have for other African countries. These benefits include reduced flooding in Sudan and energy exports for its African neighbors. To date, Ethiopia has completed its third filling of the dam and inaugurated the use of its second turbine in August 2022.
Despite boasting one of the fastest growing economies between 2005 and 2015, Ethiopia is still considered one of the poorest countries in the world given its per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $944.68 As of 2021, Ethiopia also held a national debt equal to 52.95 percent of its GDP.69 In addition to its outstanding debt, the Ethiopian government relies heavily on foreign assistance and direct investment. In 2020, the World Bank reported that Ethiopia received $5.3 billion in foreign assistance.70 Ethiopian leaders have viewed this reliance on foreign assistance as a national security threat and a point of “national disgrace.”71 Projects like the GERD, Ethiopian officials say, are necessary to propel the country forward on a path of economic self-sufficiency
In addition, Ethiopia continues to struggle with key development challenges, including low levels of human capital and high levels of food insecurity. The conflict between the government and the TPLF has exacerbated these conditions by causing internal displacement and damaging crucial infrastructure in the country’s north. In this difficult climate, the private sector has not been able to grow or create jobs. There are concerns the labor market, which is already struggling to employ the country’s young population, will be unable to absorb the country’s conflict-displaced workers.72
The Ethiopian government has described the GERD as an answer to these challenges. In the short term, the construction of the dam will stimulate the economy by creating an expected 12,000 jobs.73 Once fully operational, the electricity generated by the dam will provide access to 60 million
Ethiopians. Consequently, Ethiopia remains focused on completing the GERD and planning for eventual export of electricity, which is “expected to secure hard currency” for subsequent infrastructure projects.74
Despite boasting one of the fastest growing economies between 2005 and 2015, Ethiopia is still considered one of the poorest countries in the world given its per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $944.75 As of 2021, Ethiopia also held a national debt equal to 52.95 percent of its GDP.76 In addition to its outstanding debt, the Ethiopian government relies heavily on foreign assistance and direct investment. In 2020, the World Bank reported that Ethiopia received $5.3 billion in foreign assistance.77 Ethiopian leaders have viewed this reliance on foreign assistance as a national security threat and a point of “national disgrace.”78 Projects like the GERD, Ethiopian officials say, are necessary to propel the country forward on a path of economic self-sufficiency.
In addition, Ethiopia continues to struggle with key development challenges, including low levels of human capital and high levels of food insecurity. The conflict between the government and the TPLF has exacerbated these conditions by causing internal displacement and damaging crucial infrastructure in the country’s north. In this difficult climate, the private sector has not been able to grow or create jobs. There are concerns the labor market, which is already struggling to employ the country’s young population, will be unable to absorb the country’s conflict-displaced workers.79
The Ethiopian government has described the GERD as an answer to these challenges. In the short term, the construction of the dam will stimulate the economy by creating an expected 12,000 jobs.80 Once fully operational, the electricity generated by the dam will provide access to 60 million Ethiopians. Consequently, Ethiopia remains focused on completing the GERD and planning for
eventual export of electricity, which is “expected to secure hard currency” for subsequent infrastructure projects.81
Finally, the GERD remains but one part of Ethiopia’s development plan for the Blue Nile. Ethiopia has long understood the untapped potential of the Blue Nile and the role it could play in its country’s development. In 1964, the Ethiopian government invited the USBR to assess the Blue Nile and identify potential projects, including dams for both irrigation and hydroelectric power. Ultimately, USBR proposed four sites for dams on the Blue Nile and Atbara Rivers, including the site where the GERD is being built. Ethiopians see the GERD as the first of multiple steps tapping into the potential of the Blue Nile.
Ethiopia has been embroiled in political instability in the last decade largely due to the country’s ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural differences. There are over 80 different ethnic groups in Ethiopia, and only a minority of Ethiopians speak the official language, Amharic.82
To address these tensions, the Ethiopian government ratified a new constitution in 1994 that established a federal system with eleven states drawn largely along ethnic lines.83 However, many Ethiopians claimed the borders were ill-defined, and various ethnic groups remained skeptical of the central government. The Ethiopian constitution also provides each state the power to secede.84 For these reasons, maintaining the unity of the Ethiopian state has not been an easy task. Led by the Tigrayans, the four-party coalition
“We have finished with the syndrome of dependence.”
– Zadig Abraha, Deputy-Head of GERD Coordination 92A GERD Bond. (Source: The Brenthurst Foundation/Greg Mills)
government that drew up Ethiopia’s 1994 constitution remained in power for nearly 30 years. To maintain unity, the central government focused on infrastructure projects to connect the country’s states including roads, railways, and telecommunications.85 It was this investment that helped grow Ethiopia’s economy between 2005 and 2015.86 However, this growth did little to reduce ethnic tensions. Resentment towards the Tigrayans, who represented only 5.7 percent of the population, resulted in protests starting in 2010. In 2018, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn stepped down and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was appointed by the coalition to fill the role.87 While Prime Minister Abiy was re-elected in June 2021 for another five-year term, his position remained dependent on the support of the coalition government.88 Amidst this backdrop, Prime Minister Abiy has continued to promote large-scale infrastructure projects like the GERD to distract from internal tensions, including the conflict with the TPLF that began in 2020.
In the media, which has become increasingly polarized, the GERD remains a symbol of national pride, partly due to the belief that it was financed by the Ethiopian people.89 Because of the lack of external financing, the government deducted money from the paychecks of civil servants, issued bonds, ran lotteries, and undertook other efforts to mobilize national support for the project.90 While there is some disagreement about whether the entire $4-billion project was publicly financed, it has become a point of prestige for all Ethiopians. “There is only one thing that brings all Ethiopians together, and that’s the GERD,” according to one former U.S. official who worked in Ethiopia.91
Although 85 percent of the Nile waters originate in Ethiopia, Ethiopia has arguably gained the least from the river of all Nile Basin countries; construction of the GERD is thus part of an effort to right this historical imbalance. With the GERD squarely within its borders, Ethiopia has claimed a sovereign right to move ahead with the dam’s construction, filling, and operation even in the absence of an agreement that would allow for monitoring, coordination, and info-sharing with Egypt and Sudan. The dam represents Ethiopia’s assertion of its right to a share of the Blue Nile waters that it has always possessed but never fully utilized. According to Ethiopian officials, international scrutiny of the GERD perpetuates the historical imbalance that has long existed. Ethiopian officials point out that no other dam on the Nile has received such a high level of scrutiny even though Egypt, Sudan, and other Nile riparians have been building dams since the 1960s.93
Ethiopia justifies its right to correct this historical imbalance with a core tenet of international transboundary water resource governance: the “equitable and reasonable utilization” principle. This principle allows each riparian “to use and develop an international watercourse in a manner consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse and subject to consideration for the interests of other watercourse states.” The principle is general and subject to interpretation; the UN Watercourse Convention specifies that equitable and reasonable utilization requires taking into account “all relevant factors and circumstances” such as geography and hydrography, social and economic needs, population dependency, effects of use on other watercourse states, existing and potential uses, conservation of the watercourse, and availability of alternatives to a particular use.94 The Ethiopian government argues that Ethiopia has historically not used its equitable share of the Blue Nile and that it will operate the GERD in a manner consistent with international law. Egypt counters that Ethiopia has failed to appropriately account for Egypt’s existing use of the Nile. Egypt also cites another principle of international watercourse law, the obligation not to cause significant harm to other watercourse states, as further proof for the need of an agreement. The precise interpretations of “equitable and reasonable utilization” and “obligation not to cause significant harm” remain points of contention between the two countries.
“If you are a really good person, pray for me for just one thing—that I can manage our debt.”
– Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed 95
Despite initially supporting the GERD in 2013, Sudan became concerned by Ethiopia’s disregard of the DoP as Ethiopia began to unilaterally fill the dam. Sudan faces immediate threats to its own water security given that its Roseires Dam sits 100 km downstream from the GERD and is only one-tenth of the size. Concerned about flooding due to poor coordination between the dams, Sudan supports a legally binding agreement that forces Ethiopia to share information required to operate its dam properly. In this dispute, Sudan finds itself to be the weakest party, especially given its recent military coup and its own development challenges.
Like Egypt, Sudan claims “historical rights” to the Nile River waters according to the two colonialera treaties. For this reason, Sudan also refused to sign the CFA over Article 14b, which excluded the clause promising “to not adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin state.”96 However, Sudan was not always opposed to the GERD. In fact, in 2013, then President Omar al-Bashir told the Ethiopian ambassador to Sudan that he supported the dam.97 A year later, President al-Bashir noted the potential benefits the GERD would provide for Sudan, saying, “Aswan is useful to Egypt, and GERD is life to Sudan.”98 Even after construction started on the dam, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ghandour stated, “We made sure that the dam is being built in a safe way so that Sudan is not harmed,” signaling that he was content with the assurances provided by his Ethiopian counterparts.99
However, Sudan changed its position once Ethiopia began unilaterally filling the dam in 2020 and aligned itself with Egypt. The two countries lobbied unsuccessfully for the UNSC to lead a negotiation process among the three parties. Sudan also began to align itself militarily with Egypt, which sent a strong signal of protest to the Ethiopian government ahead of the second filling. In March 2021, Sudan and Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement in response to increased instability in the Horn of Africa, including the armed conflict within Ethiopia.100
Egypt has called for political stability in Sudan since the October 2021 coup and has considered playing a mediating role in a negotiation to secure a transitional government. Despite this political turmoil, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan have continued to cooperate on issues related to the GERD. Following the Sudanese leader’s visit to Cairo in March 2022, Egypt announced humanitarian assistance for Sudan ahead of the third filling of the GERD scheduled in July, which both countries condemned.101
Perhaps the greatest concern for the Sudanese is the operability of the Roseires Dam, which supplies the country with 80 percent of its electricity. In general, electricity access in Sudan is low; only 39 percent of the population was connected to the national grid as of 2016. Sudan is also heavily reliant on hydropower, which supplies the country with 75 percent of its electricity.102 The Roseires Dam, a hydropower dam that produces 1,800 megawatts annually, is one of six dams that Sudan has built on the Nile. Only 210 kilometers downstream from Roseires is the Sennar dam, an irrigation dam that has less than one percent of the storage capacity of the GERD.
Failure at the Roseires Dam has the potential to affect the lives of the 20 million Sudanese who live along the Blue Nile. For this reason, Sudan seeks some information-sharing mechanism that would allow it to properly operate its own dam. Without information from Ethiopia regarding the release of water at the GERD, Sudan cannot coordinate releases at its Roseires Dam, leaving itself at risk for both flooding and droughts. Flooding did occur in 2020 after the first unilateral filling of the GERD, which shut down 13 water stations and caused significant power outages according to Sudan’s Water Resources Minister Yasser Abas.103
Fearing a similar situation ahead of the second filling, Sudan sent a letter to the UNSC in June 2021. In the letter, Sudan cited technical experts who said flooding from the second filling of the GERD could result in a 47 percent decrease in the hydropower generation at the Roseires Dam and a 45 percent decrease at the Merowe Dam due to flooding. Ultimately, the second filling decreased water flow to the Roseires Dam by 50 percent, impacting irrigation systems and decreasing the amount of available drinking water.104
Like Ethiopia, Sudan faces its own development challenges, which it has been unable to address fully due to its own tumultuous political history. Historically, Sudan has relied heavily on oil exports to bolster its economy. However, when oil-rich South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011, Sudan lost more than half of its government revenue.105 As a result, economic growth declined, and inflation increased to double-digit levels, leading to violent protests in September 2013. However, the secession was not the only cause of Sudan’s emerging economic crisis; many structural economic problems can be traced back to President Omar al-Bashir’s rule from 1993 to 2019. Under President al-Bashir, the country incurred $60 billion in debt, which has limited its access to international loans. Currently under military rule, Sudan lacks the stability and international legitimacy required to pursue additional development projects.
The country’s challenges include equitable access to water and sanitation. Seventy-three percent of Sudan’s freshwater needs come from the Nile River and its tributaries.106However, its access to the Nile River has not translated into water security for the Sudanese. Approximately 17.3 million people lack access to drinking water, and 24 million lack access to sanitation facilities.107 The spread of waterborne diseases, including cholera and diarrhea, is also a concern during periods of flooding. Flooding complicates waste removal, leading to an increase in the prevalence of these illnesses. Therefore, Sudan views the proper management of the GERD as necessary to addressing its own water scarcity and sanitation concerns.
Furthermore, the Nile River is inextricably linked to Sudan’s agricultural activities. After South Sudan seceded, the Sudanese government grew even more reliant on agriculture to drive its economy. In particular, Sudan has parceled and sold land to foreign governments, including the Saudi Arabia, which leased one million acres in 2016, and Bahrain, which leased 100,000 acres shortly thereafter.108 Development experts and economists agree that Sudan could feed water-scarce countries in the Middle East as well as food-poor countries in Africa. As of 2020, agriculture made up 40 percent of Sudan’s economy and employed 80 percent of its workforce.109 This agricultural activity accounts for a whopping 97 percent of Sudan’s water use.110 According to Sudan’s letter to the UNSC in June 2021, the GERD threatens over 70 percent of its irrigated agriculture and could result in “loss of over half of its agricultural floodplain agriculture.”111
Ethiopia has stated its intention to export electricity generated at the GERD, which could help promote development in Sudan. However, the Sudanese government indicated that they would like an agreement.112 This illustrates that Sudan’s fears over GERD’s impact on its domestic development projects overshadow its hopes for imported energy.
There are eleven riparian countries that share the Nile waters. Together, the countries have been involved in the NBI, founded in 1999, to promote cooperative management of these water resources. Notably, outside the three parties involved in the GERD dispute, other riparian countries have not sided with any party in the dispute. While these upstream countries have remained silent, it does not mean they do not have a stake in a conflict whose outcome will likely set a precedent for future projects on the Nile. Egypt has helped fund several infrastructure projects in riparian countries, including the Julius Nyerere Dam project in Tanzania and a solar power plant in Uganda. However, Ethiopia has maintained the GERD will provide benefits to its neighbors through energy exports. Being courted by both Egypt and Ethiopia, riparian countries have preferred to stay neutral and support the AU-led process.
Above: Ambassadors and representatives from Nile Basin Member States, a delegation from the European Union, and representatives from the Nile Technical Advisory Committee meet in 2022 (Source: Nile Basin Initiative)
Prior Page: A Sudanese farmer plants crops along the Nile in 2009 (Source: Council on Foreign Relations)
Both President El-Sisi and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed face challenges at home that they fear threaten their hold on power. The two leaders may seek to use the GERD to rally unified domestic support in face of these internal challenges, making concessions on the GERD politically costly. In Egypt, the government has struggled to facilitate sustainable economic growth since the fall of Mubarak in 2011. Instead, the government accumulated external debt to fund large-scale infrastructure projects. Propped up by foreign investment, Egypt became vulnerable to external shocks like the war in Ukraine. Between February and March 2022, nervous investors bracing for a potential global recession decided to pull out $20 billion from Egypt.113 To address Egypt’s economic instability and high levels of debt, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a $3 billion loan. Shortly after, the value of the Egyptian pound plummeted to 24 pounds against the dollar due to the loan’s condition for implementing a flexible exchange rate regime. The loan includes other conditions related to governance and structural reforms that may lead to economic pain for Egyptians in the short-term.
Scholars have argued that the Egyptian government has painted Ethiopia as a boogeyman that threatens their water security - and thus, their livelihoods - to drum up domestic political support. Viewed in this way, Egypt’s saber-rattling and threats of “all options on the table” may not have targeted Ethiopia but rather served as a way to stoke nationalist fervor in Egypt.114
As an economic crisis plagues the Egyptians, political instability and armed conflict have also threatened Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s hold on power in Ethiopia. Since 2020, the Ethiopian military has been fighting the TPLF in Tigray, resulting in a civil war that has left thousands dead and has displaced millions. There have been reports of human rights violations committed by all parties involved.115 In December 2021, armed forces in the Amhara region increased their violence against ethnic Tigrayans. Meanwhile, ethnic violence and uprisings have continued elsewhere in the country alongside the Tigray conflict. The Ethiopian government has been battling ethnic militia who have launched attacks in the region where the GERD is located. Escalating waves of ethnic violence in the Oromia region have taken a mounting humanitarian toll and threaten Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s control.
The GERD is one of the few domestic issues that has support from virtually all Ethiopians, regardless of ethnic and religious affiliation. As previously mentioned, ordinary Ethiopians financed the dam through the purchase of dam bonds or through small (often forced) salary donations. Some local taxi drivers don #MyDam stickers to publicly display their contribution to the dam.116 Furthermore, there is evidence that the Ethiopian government conducted public campaigns on Facebook to target its own domestic audience with nationalist rhetoric in support of the dam. The campaign was particularly active between 2020 and 2021 during the intensification of the conflict in Tigray.117 To deal with its fragmented society, the government has rallied behind the GERD as a national symbol
to garner support for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
If both leaders continue to feel unstable in their positions of power, they may continue to use the GERD to drum up public support, further entrenching them in their respective positions. With GERD as a politically salient issue for both domestic audiences, any concessions made by the leaders to solve the dispute might cost them significant political capital.
Although the GERD dispute has received the most international attention, the Gibe III is another example of a transboundary dispute between Ethiopia and another riparian country, Kenya, that has arisen due to a lack of consultation and coordination with neighboring governments and their communities. In 2016, Ethiopia inaugurated Gibe III, a hydroelectric dam on the Omo river. The river supplies 90 percent of the water to Lake Turkana in Kenya. Hundreds of thousands of Kenyans living downstream also rely on the annual flood to support their crops, and the lake is an important source of fish stocks. According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the lake’s water level dropped 363 meters the year the dam opened.122 During the same year, communities complained that the amount of water released by the dam was not enough to sustain agricultural activities. Furthermore, Ethiopia will divert most of the water from the dam to its Kuraz Sugar Development Project, the country’s largest agricultural venture.123
Both Egypt and Ethiopia are jostling for influence in the Horn and in Africa and the Greater Middle East as a whole. This geopolitical rivalry may also complicate GERD negotiations. In addition to Egypt’s efforts to control use of the Nile, Egypt has also made efforts to ensure Ethiopia remains weak and unable to pursue future projects on the river. For this reason, Egypt supported Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia and currently hosts Eritrean opposition groups in the country.
118 Although Egypt has denied any involvement in the recent conflict with the TPLF, if rumors of its support were true, they would represent yet another example of Egypt’s attempts to destabilize Ethiopia.
Ultimately, the GERD is a direct challenge to Egypt’s historical dominance over Nile waters.119 By pursuing its own development, Ethiopia hopes to realize its identity as an “African lion” - a term used to describe Ethiopia during its economic boom between 2005 and 2015.120 To gain influence
over its neighbors, Ethiopia has continued to refer to the GERD as “a site of cooperation” that will benefit all its neighbors’ needs for electricity imports.
Following the political turmoil of the Arab Spring, Egypt’s resulting domestic problems, and the rise of the Gulf countries as hegemons in the Arab world, Ethiopia may see an opportunity to increase its regional influence. While Egypt has had to rely heavily on financing from its Gulf allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have fostered ties with Ethiopia and have indicated they remain unwilling to take sides in the dispute.121 In this context, Ethiopia may see the GERD dispute as part of its larger efforts to reshape geopolitics in the Horn of Africa.
Given that it stands to benefit from the status quo, Ethiopia lacks incentives to come to agreement on the GERD. Meanwhile, Egypt lacks diplomatic, political, or economic leverage over Addis Ababa to push it toward an agreement. Although Egyptian officials have not ruled out the possibility of military action in a time of crisis, most analysts agree that it would be expensive and prohibitively difficult logistically and diplomatically for Egypt to render the dam inoperable. Consequently, a clear power imbalance exists in favor of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa has little incentive to make concessions in a trilateral context in which it holds all the cards. Any agreement, therefore, will likely require some form of external pressure or incentives to make the prospect of compromise appealing to Ethiopia.
Mutual distrust between Egypt and Ethiopia exacerbates this power dynamic. Each country views the other as a regional rival attempting to exert undue influence over internal affairs. The Ethiopian government perceives Egypt’s insistence on a GERD filling and operational agreement as an attempt to place legal restraints on Ethiopia’s sovereign right to development. Rumors of Egyptian support for TPLF rebels in the Ethiopian civil war further fuel the Ethiopian government’s skepticism toward Cairo. Reports of Egyptian “meddling” in Tigray, including through the alleged provision of materiel to rebels, are regularly cited as evidence of Cairo’s desire to keep Ethiopia weak.
Egyptian officials view the construction of the GERD as an Ethiopian attempt to place a stranglehold on Egypt. They claim that Addis Ababa has no intention to accept an agreement and is intentionally stalling negotiations to make the construction of the GERD a fait accompli. Even if an agreement is reached, Cairo has little faith that Addis Ababa would adhere to its terms; Egyptian officials claim that Ethiopia has regularly abrogated its Nile-related promises, including the 2015 DoP, which they cite as evidence of bad faith. Egyptian officials say that Prime Minister Abiy lacks the political will necessary to sign onto an agreement, especially given his use of the GERD as a way to unify the country amidst serious internal strife.
Against a backdrop of historical animosity dating back thousands of years, Egypt and Ethiopia’s mutual distrust is exacerbated by their competition to be the region’s dominant power. Consequently, an undercurrent of power struggle permeates the gridlock over the GERD even when officials agree on technical solutions.
Some Egyptian water experts have suggested distinguishing between “green water” and “blue water” when addressing the question of water management. Blue water includes stores of surface and groundwater, such as lakes, rivers, dam reservoirs, and aquifers, that can be extracted for use. The Nile and its tributaries, for example, are sources of blue water. Green water consists of water originating from precipitation that does not contribute to usable stores but that temporarily remains in the ecosystem as moisture before it is lost to evaporation or transpiration from plants. Green water is site-specific and has limited uses, the most significant of which may be rain-fed agriculture.124 Egyptians who advocate for distinguishing between blue and green water in a GERD agreement are effectively making the case that Egypt should get the rights to more of the Nile waters because, unlike Ethiopia, Egypt receives essentially no green water. However, because the uses of green water are relatively limited in Ethiopia at this time, we assess that this distinction is not helpful for addressing the GERD dispute.
Perhaps the greatest barrier to reaching an agreement is deciding on the scope and form that an agreement would take. Egypt and Sudan prefer a legally binding agreement that would: 1) govern the filling and long-term operation of the GERD; 2) provide assurances that Egypt and Sudan’s “current use” of Nile waters will not be adversely affected; 3) guarantee a minimum level of water flow during periods of drought; 4) establish a dispute resolution mechanism through a third party; and 5) address future development on the Blue Nile. Ethiopia, meanwhile, prefers an informal understanding like the CFA, which would not mandate coordination or information-sharing but rather promote cooperation over all Nile waters. Due to concerns over sovereignty, Ethiopia opposes any agreement that would subject the country to international arbitration or allow for punitive measures imposed by a third-party in case of a dispute; it instead prefers that disputes be resolved directly between the heads of state of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan according to the
procedures detailed in the DoP.
Despite the lack of an agreement, Ethiopia maintains that it will operate the GERD in a manner that benefits both its development and the needs of its neighbors. The government asserts it does not need an agreement to complete the filling of the dam and begin operating the GERD responsibly. Consequently, assurances for a drought mitigation protocol are unnecessary in its view. Ethiopian officials are adamant that the GERD not be beholden to Egypt’s drought management plans. In other words, Ethiopian officials say that Ethiopia should not bear responsibility for Egypt’s water security in times of drought. Instead, they say that Nile riparians should bear the burden of drought management equitably and take measures to reduce their water consumption; in Ethiopia’s view, Egypt is not willing to do enough to reduce its dependence on the Nile. In this vein, Ethiopia is hesitant to agree to obligatory information-sharing systems, instead preferring the flexibility to pick which information it shares and how frequently.
The UAE has been involved in GERD negotiations since Sheikh Shakhboot Bin Nahyan was appointed the UAE’s Minister of State for African Affairs in early 2022. Little public information about the UAE process is available, though news reports indicate Minister Shakhboot has assembled a team of technical experts to aid negotiations. Publicly, the UAE effort is conducted in support of the AU-led process, though the extent of the coordination between the two efforts is unclear. Given Minister Shakhboot’s apparent interest in resolving the GERD dispute, the United States should coordinate bilaterally with the UAE to ensure the two countries’ efforts complement one another in moving the AU-led process forward.125, 126
To promote peace and stability in the region, the GERD dispute should remain a high priority of the United States. Ideally, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia should enter into a formal agreement that would address issues like drought mitigation and information sharing and would include a conflict resolution mechanism. However, the current political context and barriers described above make achieving a legally binding agreement unlikely. Given current constraints, we recommend that the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa focus on helping the countries establish a mechanism for drought management as a means to reduce tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, address Egypt’s top concern, and build momentum toward the possibility of a comprehensive agreement.
Given that Ethiopia has shown little interest in entering into a formal agreement that only addresses drought management, we recommend that the United States encourage both countries to come to an understanding on drought mitigation through the exchange of diplomatic notes. The content from these notes can be used to inform a full agreement if and when conditions become more favorable.
Next, the United States should help the three countries establish consistent, regular, and mutually agreed upon inter-dam communication channels to address the immediate need of coordinating dam operations to protect existing water infrastructure (e.g., Roseires Dam and High Aswan Dam) and prevent flooding that could impact or displace people living in the Nile Basin. Meanwhile, the United States should use its tools of influence to incentivize each party to remain engaged in the AU-led negotiations with the ultimate goal of signing a formal agreement. These tools of influence include promoting development and water management projects in both Egypt and Ethiopia, which have the additional benefit of increasing their resilience to droughts. We provide greater detail of these recommendations below:
Until a legally-binding agreement can be established, we recommend that Egypt and Ethiopia develop a plan for drought management measures as an intermediate step to reduce tensions between the two parties and address the significant risk posed by sustained periods of drought. Instead of engaging in a formal negotiation process on drought management, the United States and international community should encourage Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia to exchange diplomatic notes as a part of a unilateral but coordinated planning process to deal with drought scenarios. Compared to formal talks, which have repeatedly failed, notes will provide each party a space to move from their public positions and signal to each other potential concessions.
It is understood that the three countries have already discussed mitigation measures during previous negotiations that would address dry years, droughts, and prolonged droughts. Whatever has been agreed upon should serve as a baseline for the diplomatic notes. Additionally, the notes should outline a process for what meetings or actions should be initiated if conditions for an extreme drought are observed. For example, the three heads of state could agree to meet when such conditions are initially detected; or alternatively, the AU could convene the three leaders with the other Nile Basin countries as observers. The notes should also be used to share each party’s domestic plans to reduce water consumption during drought, which would help allay Ethiopia’s concerns that Egypt is not doing enough internally to prepare for a worst case scenario. Although the exchange of these notes would fall short of a formal agreement - which would be Egypt’s preference – it would allow both parties to openly communicate and negotiate the key issues without the pressure of their constituencies. This solution of coordinated unilateralism, if managed well, could also allow Egypt and Ethiopia to claim a political victory internally. Egypt would get in writing what it needs the most – drought management – while Ethiopia would avoid having to sign a binding agreement that would limit its future development.
While establishing a protocol for drought management is critical to de-escalating tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, the three countries need to exchange day-to-day information on dam operations to protect the other water infrastructure along the Nile. The exchange of information to coordinate dam operations is both beneficial and feasible in the near-term. If Ethiopia operates the GERD in coordination with dams in Sudan and Egypt, it has the potential to benefit all three countries by regulating the flow of the Nile throughout the year and alleviating the impact of year-to-year variability in volume of river flows. However, with opaque and uncoordinated operating procedures, the GERD could cause preventable droughts and flooding in downstream countries. Based on conversations with the Egyptian government and the 2020 flooding in Sudan, we believe that there is currently insufficient coordination among the three countries; we therefore believe that establishing regular, consistent, and mutually agreed upon inter-dam communication among the three countries is the most immediate action the United States should focus on achieving.
We identify two options to secure this information without a binding agreement. First, Sudan and Ethiopia could establish their own committee, akin to the committee Sudan and Egypt formed after the 1959 treaty, to coordinate the operations of their dams. Ethiopian officials have alluded to talks already taking place with the Sudanese government to address Sudan’s concerns over the lack of timely information. The United States should encourage the continuation of these bilateral efforts. If Sudan succeeds in receiving the information it needs from Ethiopia, it should transmit this information to Egypt through its committee on dam operations. This option would effectively allow Ethiopia to side-step the need for cooperation with Egypt while ensuring Cairo still receives information in a timely manner.
As a second option, the United States could encourage direct communications between the technical experts of all three countries. According to Egyptian officials and others, the technical experts from the negotiating teams are in closer agreement than their political counterparts. The U.S. Special Envoy should explore meeting with these experts to assess opportunities for more direct engagement among them and identify any resources required that would facilitate inter-dam communication. An illustrative example could be a website on GERD operations managed by the Ethiopian technical experts. The website could remain technical and apolitical but would allow other parties to glean helpful information to improve the operations of their own dams.
Concurrently, the United States should continue to actively support the AU-led negotiations with the objective of achieving a formal agreement at a later point. Though its headquarters location in Ethiopia has raised some concerns about perceived ties to Ethiopia, the AU continues to be the best forum to secure some level of buy-in from the three main parties as well as other riparian states given its status as a pan-African organization that has acted as a mediator in other disputes on the continent. Moreover, given that Ethiopia stands to benefit most from the status quo, choosing to support its preferred mediator may be the only way to get Ethiopia back to the table. U.S. support to AU-led negotiations on the GERD also provides an opportunity for the United States to strengthen the AU and support regional cooperation. For these reasons, the parties and the international community would see a solution crafted with the help of the AU as both legitimate and sustainable.
To start, backing the extant AU process rather than creating a new process reduces opportunities for either Egypt or Ethiopia to continue to shop between the United States, the AU, the UAE, or other fora for the venue that is likely to produce the friendliest terms. The Washington Process during the Trump administration produced terms that were considered highly favorable to the Egyptian position, which would make direct U.S. meditation a difficult sell. Given the complexities related to creating parallel negotiation processes and the United States’ compromised legitimacy as a mediator, we recommend that the United States encourage Egypt to remain engaged in the AU process despite its concerns over the AU’s perceived bias toward Addis Ababa. To help assuage
these concerns, the United States could pledge to serve in the role of observer and dedicate time and resources to ensure the impartiality of the process.
Without active support from external partners, the AU may lack the leverage to push the parties away from their stated positions and toward agreement. In addition to playing an observer role, the United States should involve other interested parties to support the process, including the UK, France, and the UAE. Since they are members of the UNSC, UK and France participation could maintain Egypt’s interest in the AU-led process, especially given that Cairo ideally wanted negotiations to be mediated by the UNSC itself. More observers to the process will also increase pressure on the three parties to come to an agreement and on the AU to mediate in an impartial manner.
Next, the United States should acknowledge the AU’s past successes in resolving regional issues while offering to support the AU on the GERD. In addition to leading talks related to the GERD, the AU is also tasked with leading the peace process in Ethiopia, which will require an enormous amount of resources. With this in mind, the U.S. Special Envoy should engage the AU in discussions on ways to support conflict-resolution within the AU. If there is openness to receiving technical assistance on this issue, as well as on transboundary water issues, the United States could offer to provide this support.
One shortcoming of the AU’s approach to resolving the GERD dispute is the fact that the AU chair rotates annually among AU member states. The lack of continuity has stalled progress and allows each member state to intervene in ways that advance their own interests. The U.S. Special Envoy could discuss this with the AU to evaluate options to restructure how the GERD dispute is managed within the body. A potential idea for restructuring could be the creation of an AU Commission or an AU Special Envoy responsible for leading negotiations indefinitely
Lastly, support for continued negotiations will help maintain open communication channels among all three parties involved. While the desired outcomes for each party are largely known, these ongoing talks can help the AU discern potential areas for agreement. Therefore, U.S. support for the AU process, in parallel with its immediate support for drought mitigation measures and inter-dam communication, is necessary to ensure that the AU can capitalize on the moment when conditions do become favorable for securing a formal agreement.
Our three prior recommendations are designed to specifically address the GERD dispute; however, there are underlying issues that also deserve attention including inefficient water use and increased water demand in Egypt. Given that Egypt’s concerns about the GERD relate primarily to the threat the dam poses to Egypt’s water supply, the United States should step up its efforts to encourage Egypt to reduce its demand for water in parallel with its efforts to resolve the GERD dispute. In the short to medium term, the United States could aid Egypt’s efforts to reduce the amount of
water it uses for agriculture. Although Egypt is a relatively water-efficient producer, the farming sector accounts for 80-85 percent of the country’s water consumption.127 Crops like cotton and rice require large amounts of water and yet are a significant portion of Egypt’s agricultural production. The United States could encourage Egypt to transition over time away from these products and increase its production of crops that require less water, such as wheat. Increasing Egypt’s wheat production could be an especially fruitful endeavor, given growing pressure on the global food supply from an increasing world population and Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Over the long run, the United States should help the Egyptian economy diversify beyond the agricultural sector. This will by no means be an easy task: agriculture accounts for nearly 12 percent of Egypt’s GDP and 25 percent of its employment.128 However, USAID could play a significant role in implementing this recommendation. Diversifying the Egyptian economy and strengthening its long-term outlook is squarely in line with USAID’s 2020-2025 Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Egypt, which has a stated goal of creating “a more inclusive and globally competitive economy for the benefit of all Egyptians.”129 Presently, the CDCS suggests that “Egypt’s most effective option for increasing the amount of water at its disposal is to increase water reuse” and notes that doing so could “effectively increase Egypt’s supply of clean water by up to 10 percent.” While USAID’s strategy addresses the supply side of Egypt’s water usage, the agency might consider whether to also focus on reducing Egypt’s demand for water, especially water used for agriculture. Egyptian officials have demonstrated a strong commitment to enhancing the country’s ability to reuse water and may also be willing to undertake long-term projects to reduce agricultural water consumption.
Efforts to reduce water consumption in Egypt through a transition away from water intensiveagriculture could also help ease tensions with Ethiopia. In communications, Ethiopian officials have objected to serving as Egypt’s “drought management tool” and instead have called on Egyptians to review their current use of water. Therefore, by taking responsibility for reducing its own water consumption, Egypt would be signaling to Ethiopia that it is not relying on the GERD as its sole mechanism for ensuring water security.
The GERD represents the aspirations of Ethiopia to become a middle-income state and assert itself regionally. It is important that the United States and international community reopen Ethiopia’s access to capital in a phased approach that incentivizes Ethiopia to engage seriously in GERD negotiations and creates stronger linkages based on mutual benefit among all parties. Given that Ethiopia will likely need more capital for future development projects and its current economy remains unstable due to burgeoning debt, we recommend that the international community invest in its agribusiness, drip irrigation, and small-scale alternative energy projects.
To start, we recommend that the United States help revive Egyptian private sector investment in Ethiopia, which had been partly disrupted by the internal conflict. Assuming that the current peace deal holds, the United States should meet with Egyptian private companies previously involved in Ethiopia, like Elsewedy, to identify potential projects related to agriculture and energy development. The United States could also meet with the EgyptEthiopia joint investment council–formed in 2018 to facilitate foreign direct investment in both countries–to assess their current projects and opportunities for funding agribusiness projects in Ethiopia.130 These initiatives would be mutually beneficial to both parties and would signal Egypt’s support for Ethiopian development.
While Egyptian private investment would serve as a confidence-building tool, the United States could also offer funds for small-scale alternative energy projects to incentivize Ethiopian engagement in AU-led talks. Given that Ethiopia lacks a power grid capable of distributing electricity produced from the GERD, small-scale alternative energy projects could fill in energy gaps in rural areas that currently lack access to electricity. Alternatively, the United States may want to consider funding and providing technical support for future dam projects in Ethiopia, provided they would not impact water flow to downstream countries. The potential for United States support for future development projects may be an enticing reason for Ethiopia to expedite reaching an agreement on the GERD and other projects along the Nile. In order for this incentive to be effective, the United States would need to condition the release of funds for any proposed project on Ethiopia reaching measurable milestones toward a comprehensive agreement with Egypt, Sudan, and other riparian countries where appropriate. To assuage Egypt’s concerns, the United States would also need to take appropriate measures to ensure that these projects would not negatively affect the drought management measures detailed in any GERD agreement.
Likelihood: High
Potential Impact: High
When full, the High Aswan Dam can help Egypt meet its water needs during periods of drought for up to two years. A prolonged, multi-year drought like the one in the 1980s would devastate Egypt’s agricultural sector, which accounts for 11 percent of the country’s GDP and nearly 25 percent of its employment. This scenario would increase the potential for instability. Under prolonged drought conditions, the need for an agreement on GERD operation would become more urgent. Facing a water shortage with economic consequences, Cairo would likely intensify its efforts to reach a compromise with Addis Ababa and may be willing to drop some of its demands. Ethiopia, for its part, will face international pressure to operate the GERD in a manner that would minimize water loss to Egypt. If Egypt perceives Ethiopia as unwilling to cooperate, however, it may be tempted to escalate the situation, including the unlikely but possible scenario of military action.
Likelihood: Medium
Potential Impact: Medium
Ethiopia’s civil war dimmed the prospect of a GERD agreement for several reasons. First, the Abiy administration had less time to deal with the GERD while it focused on retaining control of the country. In addition, the administration sought to paint Egypt as an enemy, possibly in attempts to distract domestic audiences from the war. Allegations of covert Egyptian support to the TPLF did little to help Cairo’s image. With a ceasefire agreement in place, the Abiy administration’s needs for a scapegoat are reduced, potentially allowing more space for GERD negotiations. A resumption of conflict would likely again make GERD progress more difficult.
Likelihood: Low
Potential Impact: Low
In a country characterized by intense polarization, the GERD stands out as a nationally-unifying issue. Ethiopians of all ethnic and political affiliations see the dam as a project of national pride and an opportunity for development. Even if the Abiy administration is ousted, a new regime is unlikely to take a significantly different position on the GERD. Regime change could disrupt or set back negotiations, but is not likely to change the basic substance of an agreement.
Likelihood: High
Potential Impact: Medium
Sudan’s weak government and internal conflict have prevented it from staking out an independent position on the GERD. As a result, Sudan is often discounted as a player in negotiations over the dam. While it is unlikely that Khartoum will emerge as a negotiator to defend its independent interests, Sudan influences negotiations by siding with one party or the other. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the country’s current leader, has a close relationship with the Egyptian government and has backed Cairo’s position. General Burhan’s deputy and chief rival, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemetti” Dagalo, however, is considered more sympathetic to Ethiopia. A reversal of Sudan’s position on the GERD could strengthen Addis Ababa’s hand and hamper negotiations. It is also possible that Sudan and Ethiopia could come to a bilateral dam agreement. While a bilateral agreement could set a precedent for terms that Cairo finds unacceptable, it could also present an opportunity to address some of Egypt’s most serious concerns in the absence of a direct EgyptEthiopia agreement.
Given that significant challenges within Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan require immediate attention, it may seem enticing for the United States to allow the simmering conflict regarding the GERD to remain on the backburner. However, if the conflict intensifies, which could be sparked by extreme drought, additional water usage, or the building of additional upstream dams, the consequences will be far more catastrophic than those that the three countries face today. Given the existential nature of the Nile to Egypt and the severe and long-overdue economic development needs of Ethiopia, it is likely that a conflict between the two countries would enmesh the entire region and create a humanitarian crisis larger than any seen to date.
For that reason, it is necessary that the international community take the concerns on the GERD seriously and take measures to 1) build confidence among the three countries through means outside of those involving the Nile, 2) build transparency through regular third-party communication and coordination, and 3) create a bare minimum agreement that can be built upon in the future as more trust is developed.
Because Ethiopia no longer sees the United States as a neutral third party, the United States cannot formally lead efforts on an agreement going forward. Instead, the United States should support the African Union-led talks. The African Union should use the conflict on the GERD as a pilot project to reorganize itself so that it can better address conflicts on its own in the future. The African Union should be actively supported not only by the United States but also by the international community, including the European Union.
It is fair to say that Ethiopia currently has a stronger negotiating position than Egypt. There is no obvious reason for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to re-enter negotiations on the GERD, especially since Ethiopia has been able to successfully fill the dam without repercussions to date. For that reason, we believe that the United States and the international community should develop scalable economic development incentives to bring Ethiopia back to the table.
Developing an agreement on the GERD will go a long way toward building trust between the countries, strengthening U.S. alliances, and ultimately supporting the desperately needed economic growth in the region.
Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer (Advisor) - Daniel C. Kurtzer is the S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle East Policy Studies at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs. During a 29-year career in the U.S. Foreign Service, Ambassador Kurtzer served as the United States Ambassador to Israel and as the United States Ambassador to Egypt. He was also a speechwriter and member of the Secretary of State George P. Shultz’s Policy Planning Staff; and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs and as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research.
Kurtzer was a member of the Middle East peace team for Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He played an instrumental role in formulating and executing American policy, in particular helping to bring about the Madrid peace conference. Following that breakthrough, Kurtzer was named as the coordinator of the multilateral peace talks; served as the U.S. representative to the bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and Syria; and chaired the U.S. delegation to the multilateral refugee negotiations.
Kurtzer is the co-author of Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East; co-author of The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2011; and editor of Pathways to Peace: America and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. After retiring from the State Department, he served as a member of Secretary of State John Kerry’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board, and as an advisor to the bipartisan Iraq Study Group. In 2007, he was named the first Commissioner of the professional Israel Baseball League.
Ambassador Kurtzer received his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University
Harrison Fuller - Harrison was born and raised in Las Vegas, Nevada. He graduated from Whittier College with majors in political science (with an international relations concentration) and applied philosophy, and a minor in French. His primary interest is in humanitarian assistance, specifically in the areas of poverty reduction and economic growth. Driven by his interest in international development, Harrison has worked for numerous nonprofit organizations with focus on increasing civic education and creating trauma-informed workplaces. He has also conducted research concerning community-driven development in Tanzania. At SPIA, Harrison is pursuing a Master in Public Affairs, with a concentration in international development. His goal is to provide education, healthcare, and other needed resources to communities across the globe so that they become selfsufficient, productive, and most of all, violence-free. He is also incredibly grateful to be selected as a 2021 Payne Fellow, and completed an internship this past summer working as a program analyst for USAID in Abuja, Nigeria. Harrison looks forward to starting an exciting career with USAID as a Foreign Service Officer, following his graduation from SPIA in 2023.
Julia A. Herrle - Julia was born and raised in Wexford, Pennsylvania. A member of the 2023 Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative (SINSI) cohort, Julia graduated magna cum laude from the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs in 2019 with certificates in environmental studies and in values and public life. Julia is passionate about addressing the humanitarian impacts of climate change and is especially interested in the challenges that climate change poses to global food and water security, displacement, and stability. For her first SINSI graduate fellowship rotation, Julia worked in the State Department as a Policy Advisor in the Africa Bureau’s Office of Regional Peace and Security. She then moved to the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration where she covered climate migration in the Office of International Migration and Sudan and South Sudan in the Office of Assistance for Africa. She finished her rotations at the Department of Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, covering Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Response, and Global Health Engagement. In her spare time, Julia loves hiking, cooking, and reading mystery novels.
Samantha Libraty - Samantha was a U.S. Department of State contractor, and worked within the Office of International Religious Freedom for three years. Her portfolio included coordinating the 2019 Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom and covering human rights issues in Europe and South Asia. Samantha is also passionate about educational equity; she is the co-founder and COO of Fascination Lab, an education startup, bringing experiential learning to classrooms and professional development programs. For her MPA internship, Samantha split her time between the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, where she worked as a Refugees and Disasters Initiative Consultant, and the International Medical Corps, where she served as an Emergency Response Unit and U.S. Program Consultant. Samantha plans to pursue public service following her time at SPIA. She was born in Los Angeles, California, but spent her formative years in Bangkok, Thailand, and Newton, Massachusetts. She finds it a sweet coincidence to return as a “Tiger” as she was in high school in Newton.
Matthew D. Lillehaugen - Originally from northwestern Minnesota, Matthew studied political science and global studies at Concordia College, where he also completed minors in mathematics and physics. Upon graduation, Matthew served as a James C. Gaither Junior Fellow with the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. In this role, his work spanned from studies of electoral politics and urban criminality in India, to research on regional defense cooperation and ballistic missile defense. At the conclusion of the fellowship, Matthew joined Assess Transform Reach Consulting, in Kabul, Afghanistan. Matthew’s time in Afghanistan further contributed to his interest in the intersection of conflict and governance, particularly in the context of insurgencies and civil wars. For his MPA internship, Matthew returned to Carnegie to contribute to research on democratic decline and current practices in democracy promotion. After Princeton, Matthew intends to pursue a career in government service, ideally working on issues related to stabilization, peacebuilding, governance, and development in fragile and conflict-affected settings.
Jared A. Lockwood - Jared is from rural Missouri and earned his bachelor’s degree in international relations from Princeton University. As an undergraduate, Jared studied Japanese language, was awarded the Osawa Fellowship to spend a summer teaching English in Japan, and interned at Liger Leadership Academy in Cambodia. Jared enrolled in SPIA as a Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative (SINSI) Fellow immediately after graduating from Princeton in 2019. After his first year in graduate school, Jared spent two years in absentia to complete SINSI Fellowship rotations with the U.S. Government. During that time, Jared worked at the Defense Department, State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia. After graduating in 2023, Jared hopes to begin a career in public service.
Jessica Moore - Originally from New York City, Jessica obtained her bachelor’s degree in political science and Latin American studies from Vanderbilt University. During her undergraduate career, she interned at the City Council of Medellin in Colombia and studied abroad in Santiago, Chile. Following graduation, Jessica taught English at a university in Quito, Ecuador, for nearly a year. Afterward, she moved to Washington, D.C., where she worked at the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) between 2016 and 2021. At PADF, she managed civil society and human rights programming in closed societies. She returned to PADF this past summer to work as a short-term consultant on a PRM-funded program to support Venezuelan migrants in Aruba.
Andrew Olivieri - After several deployments to Afghanistan as a part of 2nd Ranger Battalion, Andrew separated from the military to pursue his bachelor’s degree at Wesleyan University, where he studied comparative politics with a focus on the Middle East and South Asia. He then worked as a defense consultant in the Washington, D.C., area, working with clients that combined his interest in technology and national security policy. This summer, he completed his MPA internship with the U.S. State Department. After graduating from Princeton’s School of International and Public Affairs, Andrew hopes to work on issues of governance and security in conflict-prone, fragile states.
Adam H. Sigelman - Adam is a Foreign Service Officer in the U.S. State Department specializing in public diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa. He has served in Yemen, Madrid, Jerusalem, Morocco, and Algeria and speaks Spanish, French, and Arabic. Following his year at Princeton, Adam will return to the State Department where he will be the Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy, after which he will serve as the Political Chief of the Syria Transition and Response Team (START) in Istanbul. Adam received his bachelor’s degree from Dartmouth College, where he studied Romance Languages and Government.
Ashley M. Stracke - Ashley spent nearly 15 years working for the City of Los Angeles, most recently as the Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff for Mayor Eric Garcetti where she oversaw the development of the $145 million Housing and Community Development Consolidated Plan Budget, the Mayor’s General Manager Review process, and advised the Chief of Staff and Mayor on employee relations matters. Prior to her job with the Chief of Staff, Ashley was Director of Neighborhood Services and helped oversee the City’s emergency response to COVID-19, focusing on programs to support older adults and low income families.
1 Kimenyi, Mwangi S. and John Mukum Mbaku. “Governing the Nile Basin: Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile River.” Brookings Institution Press. 2015. www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt130h973.12.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Kimenyi, Mwangi S and John Mukum Mbaku. “The limits of the new ‘Nile Agreement.’” Brookings Institution, 28 Apr 2015. www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/04/28/the-limits-of-the-new-nile-agreement.
6 Agreement Between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters. Cairo, 08 Nov 1959. treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20453/volume-453-I-6519-English. pdf.
7 Tawfik, Rawia. “Revisiting Hydro-Hegemony From a Benefit Sharing Perspective: The Case of The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” German Development Institute, May 2015. www.idos-research.de/en/ discussion-paper/article/revisiting-hydro-hegemony-from-a-benefitsharing-perspetive-the-case-of-the-grandethiopian-renaissance-dam.
8 El-Gundy, Zeinab. “Gerd Timeline: From Construction till Expected Resumption of African Union-Mediated Talks - Foreign Affairs - Egypt.” Ahram Online, 06 Oct 2021. english.ahram.org.eg/News/426270.aspx.
9 Tawfik, Rawia. “Revisiting Hydro-Hegemony From a Benefit Sharing Perspective: The Case of The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” German Development Institute, May 2015. www.researchgate.net/ publication/338209427_Revisiting_Hydro-hegemony_from_a_benefit-sharing_perspective_The_Case_of_the_ Grand_Ethiopian_Renaissance_Dam.
10 Ibid.
11 Patel, Sonal. “Ethiopia Produces First Power at GERD Mega-Dam.” POWER Magazine, 20 Feb 2022. www.powermag.com/ethiopia-produces-first-power-at-gerd-mega-dam.
12 Lashitew, Addisu. “Why Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan Should Ditch a Rushed, Washington-Brokered Nile Treaty.” Brookings, 18 Feb 2020, www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/02/18/why-ethiopia-egypt-and-sudanshould-ditch-a-rushed-washington-brokered-nile-treaty.
13 El-Gundy, Zeinab. “Gerd Timeline: From Construction till Expected Resumption of African Union-Me diated Talks - Foreign Affairs - Egypt.” Ahram Online, 06 Oct 2021. english.ahram.org.eg/News/426270. aspx.
14 “GERD Panel of Experts Report: Big Questions Remain.” International Rivers, 31 Mar 2014. archive.interna tionalrivers.org/gerd-panel-of-experts-report-big-questions-remain.
15 “Ethiopia Ratifies River Nile Treaty amid Egypt Tension.” BBC News, 13 Jun 2013. www.bbc.com/news/ world-africa-22894294.
16 El Tawil, Noha. “Declaration of Principles on Renaissance Dam Is ‘exclusive Agreement’ Binding Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan Together: Intl. Law Expert.” EgyptToday, 23 Jun 2020. www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/88909/ Declaration-of-Principles-on-Renaissance-Dam-is-exclusive-agreement-binding.
17 Rizk, Mariam, Osman El Sharnoubi, and Pasant Darwish. “Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan Sign Declaration of Principles to Resolve Nile Dam Dispute - Politics - Egypt.” Ahram Online, 23 Mar 2015. english.ahram.org.eg/ NewsContent/1/0/125869/Egypt/0/Egypt-Ethiopia-and-Sudan-sign-declaration-ofprin.aspx.
18 “Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt diverge over GERD’s impact.” Sudan Tribune, 19 Nov 2017. sudantribune.com/ article62210.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 “The AU’s Role beyond the Gerd Negotiations.” ISS Africa, 04 Sep 2020. issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/ the-aus-role-beyond-the-gerd-negotiations.
22 Maher, Mohamed. “Navigating the Ongoing Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Negotiations.” The Washington Institute, 29 Sep 2021. www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/navigating-ongoing-grandethiopi an-renaissance-dam-negotiations.
23 “War in Ethiopia.” Council on Foreign Relations, 20 Oct 2022. www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/ conflict-ethiopia.
24 Ibid.
25 Statement by Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on 10 Mar 2021. www.c-span.org/video/?509633-1/house-foreign-affairs-committee-hearing-biden-administration-foreignpolicy-priorities.
26 Walsh, Declan. “Ethiopia’s War Leads to Ethnic Cleansing in Tigray Region, U.S. Report Says.” The New York Times, 26 Feb 2021. www.nytimes.com/2021/02/26/world/middleeast/ethiopia-tigray-ethnic-cleansing.html
27
28
“Turning the Pretoria Deal into Lasting Peace in Ethiopia.” International Crisis Group, 23 Nov 2022. www.crisis group.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/turning-pretoria-deal-lasting-peace-ethiopia.
“ICRC: Humanitarian convoy arrives in Ethiopia’s Tigray.” Associated Press, 15 Nov 2022. apnews.com/article/ africa-ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-3796944fa3625e6f2c626dc5d11c3e47.
29 Meetings Coverage, Security Council, “Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan Should Negotiate Mutually Beneficial Agreement over Management of Nile Waters, Top Official Tells Security Council.”
30 Maher, Mohamed. “Navigating the Ongoing Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Negotiations.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Fikra Forum: An Initiative of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 Sep 2021. www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/navigating-ongoing-grand-ethiopian-renais sance-dam-negotiations.
31 Abebe, Daniel. “Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile: The Economics of International Water Law.” Chicago Journal of International Law 15, no. 1, 2014, 27–46.
32 Michel, David. “A Breakthrough in Cooperation on the Nile?” Stimson Center Program in Environmental Security, 22 Apr 2015. www.stimson.org/2015/breakthrough-cooperation-nile.
33 “All Options Are on the Table to Deal with GERD Crisis: Egyptian Foreign Minister.” Ahram Online, 14 Jun 2021. english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/414242/Egypt/Politics-/All-options-are-on-the-table-to-deal-with-GERDcri.aspx.
34 Mohyeldeen, Sherif. “The Dam That Broke Open an Ethiopia-Egypt Dispute.” Carnegie Middle East Center, Feb 2021. carnegie-mec.org/2021/02/12/dam-that-broke-open-ethiopia-egypt-dispute-pub-83867.
35 Lawson, Fred H. “Egypt versus Ethiopia: The Conflict over the Nile Metastasizes.” The International Spectator 52, no. 4, 02 Oct 2017, 129–44. doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2017.1333272.
36 Final Report and Recommendations of the Senior Study Group on Peace and Security in the Red Sea Arena. U.S. Institute of Peace, 29 Oct 2020. www.usip.org/publications/2020/10/final-report-and-recommendationssenior-study-group-peace-and-security-red-sea.
37 “China’s EximBank withholds $339 mln in funds to Ethiopia, cites debt repayment pressures.” Reuters, 16 Aug 2021. www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-debt-idAFL8N2PN47O.
38 Ethiopia (excludes Eritrea) Trade. World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solutions, 2020. wits.worldbank.org/ CountrySnapshot/en/ETH
39 Final Report and Recommendations of the Senior Study Group on Peace and Security in the Red Sea Arena U.S. Institute of Peace, 29 Oct 2020. www.usip.org/publications/2020/10/final-report-and-recommendationssenior-study-group-peace-and-security-red-sea.
40 Ibid.
41 Sharp, Jeremy M. “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations.” Congressional Research Service, 13 Jul 2022. sgp. fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Blanchard, Lauren Ploch. “Ethiopia.” Congressional Research Service, 03 Aug 2020. crsreports.congress.gov/ product/pdf/IF/IF10185.
46 Blanchard, Lauren Ploch. “Ethiopia’s Transition and the Tigray Conflict.” Congressional Research Service, 09 Sep 2021. crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46905/4.
47 Ibid.
48 Lashitew, Addisu. “Why Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan should ditch a rushed, Washington-brokered Nile Treaty.” Brookings Institute, 18 Feb 2020. www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/02/18/why-ethiopia-egypt-and-
sudan-should-ditch-a-rushed-washington-brokered-nile-treaty.
49 Ibid.
50 “Ethiopian Government Statement On GERD Negotiations.” Fana Broadcasting Corporate, 29 Feb 2020. www. fanabc.com/english/ethiopian-government-statement-on-gerd-negotiations.
51 El-Gundy, Zeinab. “Gerd Timeline: From Construction till Expected Resumption of African Union-Mediated Talks - Foreign Affairs - Egypt.” Ahram Online, 06 Oct 2021. english.ahram.org.eg/News/426270.aspx.
52 Meetings held 17-20 Oct 2022.
53 Meetings held 17-20 Oct 2022.
54 “Aswan High Dam.” NASA Earth Observatory, 08 Jun 2015. earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/85992/aswanhigh-dam.
55 El-Sherif, M. “Egypt,” FAO, accessed 27 Nov 2022. www.fao.org/3/v9978e/v9978e0e.htm.
56 Arthur, Michael and Demian Saffer. “The Nile River and Aswan Dam,” Water: Science and Society, accessed 27 Nov 2022. www.e-education.psu.edu/earth111/node/887.
57 Edrees, Mohamed. “Letter dated 11 June 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.” Egyptian Mission to the United Nations, 11 Jun 2001.
58 Ibid.
59 Mulat, Asegdew and Semu Moges. “Assessment of the Impact of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Performance of the High Aswan Dam.” Journal of Water Resource and Protection, 6, 2014, 583-598. www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=45460.
60 Edrees, Mohamed. “Letter dated 11 June 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.” Egyptian Mission to the United Nations, 11 Jun 2001.
61 Ibid.
62 Rahman, Majeed A. “Water Security: Ethiopia–Egypt Transboundary Challenges over the Nile River Basin.” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 48, 2012, 1. doi.org/10.1177/0021909612438517.
63 Ibid.
64 Nasr, Hala and Andreas Neef. “Ethiopia’s Challenge to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile River Basin: The Case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” Geopolitics, 21, 2016, 4. www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/ 14650045.2016.1209740.
65 Mbaku, John Mukum. “The controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” Brookings, 05 Aug 2020. www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam.
66 Lashitew, Addisu. “The United States must not pick sides in the Nile River dispute.” Foreign Policy, 14 Mar 2020. foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/14/ethiopia-egypt-gerd-united-states-must-not-pick-sides-in-the-nile-river-dispute.
67 “Professor warns of cracks in saddle dam of Ethiopia’s mega hydropower project.” Egypt Today, Jul 2022.www.egypttoday.com.
68 “GDP per Capita (in current US$) - Ethiopia.” The World Bank, 2020. data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. PCAP.CD?locations=ET&most_recent_value_desc=false.
69 The Oxford Handbook of the Ethiopian Economy. Oxford University Press, 2019.doi.org/10.1093/oxford hb/9780198814986.001.0001.
70 “Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$) - Ethiopia.” World Bank, 2020. data. worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=ET.
71 The Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy. The Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Information Press & Audiovisual Department, Nov 2002. chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/ national-security-policy-and-strategy.pdf.
72 “The World Bank in Ethiopia.” World Bank, 06 Oct 2022. www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview.
73 “Explore All Countries – Ethiopia.” The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency, 25 Oct 2022. www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ethiopia.
74 Tawfik, Rawia. “Revisiting Hydro-Hegemony From a Benefit Sharing Perspective: The Case of The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” German Development Institute, May 2015. www.idos-research.de/en/ discussion-paper/article/revisiting-hydro-hegemony-from-a-benefitsharing-perspetive-the-case-of-thegrand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam.
75 “GDP per Capita (in current US$) - Ethiopia.” The World Bank, 2020. data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. PCAP.CD?locations=ET&most_recent_value_desc=false.
76 The Oxford Handbook of the Ethiopian Economy. Oxford University Press, 2019. doi.org/10.1093/oxford hb/9780198814986.001.0001.
77 “Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$) - Ethiopia.” World Bank,2020. data. worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=ET.
78 The Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy. The Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Information Press & Audiovisual Department, Nov 2002. chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/ national-security-policy-and-strategy.pdf.
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80 “Explore All Countries – Ethiopia.” The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency, 25 Oct 2022. www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ethiopia.
81 Tawfik, Rawia. “Revisiting Hydro-Hegemony From a Benefit Sharing Perspective: The Case of The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” German Development Institute, May 2015.www.idos-research.de/en/ discussion-paper/article/revisiting-hydro-hegemony-from-a-benefitsharing-perspetive-the-case-of-thegrand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam.
82 “Explore All Countries – Ethiopia.” The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency, 25 Oct 2022. www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ethiopia.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Seid, Yared et al. “African Lions: Ethiopia—an agrarian economy in transition.” The Brookings Institution, 17 Aug 2016. www.brookings.edu/research/ethiopia-an-agrarian-economy-in-transition.
86 The Oxford Handbook of the Ethiopian Economy. Oxford University Press, 2019. doi.org/10.1093/oxford hb/9780198814986.001.0001.
87 Gedamu, Yohannes and Georgia Gwinnett College. “Here’s how Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed Rose to Power to Bring Change in the East African Country.” CNBC Africa, 04 Feb 2019. www.cnbcafrica.com/2019/heres-howethiopias-abiy-ahmed-rose-to-power-to-bring-change-in-the-east-african-country.
88 “Ethiopia Election: Abiy Ahmed wins with huge majority.” BBC News, 11 Jul 2021.www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-57791868.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Anonymous, Meeting held Sep 2022.
92 Wuilbercq, Emeline. “Ethiopia’s Nile Dam Project Signals Its Intention to Become an African Power.” The Guardian, 14 Jul 2014. www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jul/14/ethiopia-grandrenaissance-dam-egypt.
93 Anonymous, Meeting held Oct 2022.
94 “Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.” United Nations, 21 May 1997.
95 Anderson, Jon Lee. “Did a Nobel Peace Laureate Stoke a Civil War.” The New Yorker, 3 Oct 2022. www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/10/03/did-a-nobel-peace-laureate-stoke-a-civil-war.
96 “Agreement on the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework.” nilebasin.org/images/docs/CFA%20-%20English%20 %20FrenchVersion.pdf.
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98 “GERD Life to Sudan, Says President Al-Bashir.” Walta Info, 14 Oct 2010. waltainfo.com/15351.
99 Aman, Ayah. “Sudan FM ‘confident’ Ethiopia Dam Won’t Harm Egypt.”Al-Monitor,12 Oct 2016. www.al-monitor. com/originals/2016/10/egypt-interview-sudan-foreign-minister-gerd-ethiopia-libya.html.
100 “Egypt, Sudan Sign Joint Military Cooperation.” Sudan Tribune, 02 Mar 2021. sudantribune.com/article67401.
101 Mahmoud, Rasha. “Egypt Steps up Support to Sudan Ahead of Nile Dam Third Filling.” AL-Monitor, April 15, 2022. www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/04/egypt-steps-support-sudan-ahead-nile-dam-third-filling.
102 Mondal, Alam Hossain and Claudia Ringler. “Long-Term Optimization of Regional Power Sector Development: Potential for Cooperation in the Eastern Nile Region?.” Energy 201, 15 Jun 2020. 117703, doi. org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.117703.
103 Amin, Mohammed. “Floods in Sudan Stoke Concerns over Ethiopian Dam.” Anadolu Agency, 09 Oct 2021. www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/floods-in-sudan-stoke-concerns-over-ethiopian-dam/2360870.
104 “Water Flow to Sudan’s Roseires Dam Declines 50% as Ethiopia Starts 2nd GERD Filling.” Daily News Egypt, 17 Jul 2021, dailynewsegypt.com/2021/07/17/water-flow-to-sudans-roseires-dam-declines-50-as-ethiopia-starts2nd-gerd-filling/.
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106 “Sudan: First State of Environment and Outlook Report 2020.” United Nations Environment Program, 07 Oct 2020.
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111 Ibrahim, Mohamed and Mohamed Elbahi, “Letter Dated 22 Jun 2021 from the Charge d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” 22 Jun 2021.
112 Amin, Mohammed. “Floods in Sudan Stoke Concerns over Ethiopian Dam.” Anadolu Agency, 09 Oct 2021. www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/floods-in-sudan-stoke-concerns-over-ethiopian-dam/2360870.
113 Gbadamosi, Nosmot. “What Caused Egypt’s Economic Tailspin?.” Foreign Policy, accessed 29 Nov 2022. foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/02/egypt-economy-sisi-imf-cop-27-united-nations-climate/.
114 Shea, Joey. “The GERD’s Digital Theater.” Middle East Institute, 08 Nov 2021. www.mei.edu/publications/ gerds-digital-theater.
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117 Shea, Joey. “The GERD’s Digital Theater.” Middle East Institute, 08 Nov 2021. www.mei.edu/publications/ gerds-digital-theater.
118 Kimenyi, Mwangi S. and John Mukum Mbaku. “Governing the Nile Basin: Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile River.” Brookings Institution Press. 2015. www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt130h973.12.
119 Tawfik, Rawia. “Revisiting Hydro-Hegemony From a Benefit Sharing Perspective: The Case of The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” German Development Institute, May 2015. www.idos-research.de/en/ discussion-paper/article/revisiting-hydro-hegemony-from-a-benefitsharing-perspetive-the-case-of-the-grandethiopian-renaissance-dam.
120 Wuilbercq, Emeline. “Ethiopia’s Nile Dam Project Signals Its Intention to Become an African Power.” The Guardian, 14 Jul 2014. www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jul/14/ethiopia-grandrenaissance-dam-egypt.
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