Responsible Management: A Framework for Promoting U.S. Interests in the South China Sea

RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT

A Framework for Promoting U.S. Interests in the South China Sea

Princeton University School of Public and International Affairs

December 2022

Advisors:

Dr. Zack Cooper

Gregory B. Poling

Authors:

Allison Blauvelt

Samantha Emmert

Matthew Fiorelli

Benjamin Jebb

Alisa Laufer

Luke Maier

Jacobo McGuire

Jennifer Shore

Wyatt Suling

Ellen Swicord

This report is the outcome of a graduate policy workshop at the School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA) at Princeton University. The policy workshop is a graduation requirement of the Master in Public Affairs (MPA) degree program at SPIA. All members of the project team participated in research, discussions, and preparation of the report. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of any individual author, individuals associated with the workshop, the U.S. government, or Princeton University.

Suggested Citation: Princeton University. (2022).

Responsible Management: A Framework for Promoting U.S. Interests in the South China Sea. Princeton School of Public and International Affairs.

Recommendations to Build Claimant State Capacity

Recommendations to Increase Regional Cooperation

I. Executive Summary

How can the United States advance its interests in the South China Sea without triggering unwanted escalation? This report seeks to answer this question by analyzing the current state of affairs in the South China Sea and providing tangible policy recommendations for the United States.

U.S. objectives in the South China Sea include upholding international law and preserving freedom of navigation. However, recent Chinese activities have degraded the marine environment, threatened other countries’ economic security, and called into question continued U.S. access to the South China Sea in a crisis or conflict. China’s growing power and the complicated web of interests across the Indo-Pacific have made it difficult for the United States to formulate an effective strategic response.

This report asserts that the United States can advance its interests in the South China Sea by adopting a strategic framework around the organizing principle of responsible management. In particular, a responsible environmental management approach would reinforce key tenets of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy by facilitating environmental protection and resilience, bolstering economic prosperity, and easing tension among states by reducing competition over scarce resources. Regional cooperation on environmental management may undercut China’s ability to carry out environmentally damaging activities by unifying other states in the development of a common solution. Environmental management could also deepen cooperation between the United States and claimant states, increasing prospects for future cooperation in other areas.

This strategic framework should be pursued through two main lines of effort: (1) building claimant state capacity to enforce existing laws for protecting the marine environment, and (2) increasing regional cooperation on environmental management.

The United States can build claimant state capacity for environmental enforcement by:

• Enhancing maritime domain awareness through data sharing and personnel training;

• Assisting vessel monitoring system implementation in the Philippines;

• Deploying unmanned surface vessels in the South China Sea;

• Forward deploying additional U.S. Coast Guard cutters to Guam;

• Negotiating shiprider agreements with South China Sea claimants;

• Funding helicopter acquisition for the Philippine Coast Guard; and

• Subsidizing dedicated Philippine Coast Guard shipyard and port facilities.

To supplement these environmental capacity-building efforts, the United States can increase regional cooperation on environmental management by:

• Providing technical training on fish stock assessments to Southeast Asian states;

• Increasing port state measures cooperation with Malaysia and Taiwan;

• Increasing funding for United Nations trainings on environmental agreement implementation; and

• Supporting Southeast Asian humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts.

In the context of simmering tensions between claimant states, a responsible management framework provides a feasible avenue by which the United States can advance its interests in the South China Sea. While an environmental approach alone cannot eliminate coordination problems in the region, these efforts can pave the way for cooperation between the United States and claimants on environmental challenges in the short term and on security issues in the long term.

II. Background A. Defining the Problem

The South China Sea has long been the site of competing territorial assertions, starting with Spanish colonizers staking claim to Scarborough Shoal in the early nineteenth century.1 Geopolitical tensions have ebbed and flowed as states have sought to passively control waters, rocks, reefs, and shoals throughout the 1.4 million square mile region.2 The last two decades, however, have been characterized by markedly elevated geostrategic and economic competition.

China’s industrial-scale illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and artificial island-building activities have undermined previously uncontested economic access by regional and international players. Destruction of the marine environment caused by rampant IUU fishing and dredging from China’s island-building activities has damaged the region’s fish stocks. Since 2000, catch rates have declined by 70 percent and large fish stocks have shrunk by 90 percent.3 China continues to increase its regional presence, contributing to a growing imbalance of power between its forces and those of other claimant states, which include Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.4 Despite mounting pressure from China, these states face barriers to cooperation around protecting their maritime rights.

While the United States takes no position on most sovereignty questions in the South China Sea, U.S. policymakers have acknowledged that the growing power imbalance threatens regional stability and U.S. interests in Asia.5 Looking ahead, the United States should adopt a strategy to meaningfully protect its interests in the South China Sea without triggering unwanted escalation.

Photo Credit: Luke Maier

B. U.S. National Interests

Broadly defined, the national interest of the United States is to provide physical security and promote economic prosperity for all Americans. To further these aims, the principal goal of American grand strategy in the Indo-Pacific has been to promote a free and open region.6 The United States seeks to uphold international law and preserve freedom of navigation in the South China Sea to ensure continued access to commerce and trade in the Indo-Pacific. Faced with China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea, U.S. foreign policy seeks to preserve peace in Asia while denying China’s aspirations for regional hegemony.

The contours of America’s current strategy took shape in 2011 with U.S. President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia”7 and crystalized under the Donald Trump administration’s more hardline stance against China.8 During the Obama and Trump years, the United States increased freedom of navigation operations, ramped up diplomatic pressure on China, and pursued targeted sanctions against Chinese companies involved in land reclamation projects in the South China Sea.9 Since assuming office in 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden has continued these policies by exerting pressure on Beijing while also calling for settlement of all maritime disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.10

Building on the efforts of his predecessors, Biden has placed a premium on promoting international cooperation in the South China Sea in support of three interlocking aims. First, the administration seeks to shape the regional maritime environment by promoting cooperation among Asian countries.11

Second, the Biden team aims to strengthen the rules-based order in littoral Asia. Finally, Washington seeks to counter Beijing’s expansionism in the Pacific.12 Nonetheless, this approach is hindered by China’s economic leverage over its neighbors, marginal rates of return on increased military cooperation efforts, and long-standing grievances between South China Sea claimants that often preclude collaboration.13

To optimize the administration’s approach to the South China Sea, the United States should explore lesspoliticized avenues like transnational environmental management to enhance cooperation in Southeast Asia. While environmental collaboration will not be a panacea for collective action problems in the South China Sea, it does provide a unique opportunity to strengthen international norms and solidarity in a region where environmental issues have grown increasingly salient.14

Beijing’s ambivalence toward environmental leadership and Washington’s recent emphasis on climate action present a window of opportunity for enhancing cooperation through a finelytailored environmental strategy.

Specifically, an environmental strategy can: (1) build claimant states’ capacity to enforce existing environmental regulations within their waters; and (2) increase cooperation among claimant states.

Through this approach, the United States can promote international rule of law and bolster the ability of Southeast Asian nations to respond to increasingly aggressive Chinese actions in the South China Sea. The recommendations described in this report are designed to support these two objectives, which will further the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy’s aim to foster a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”15 Ongoing efforts in the security domain will remain necessary to counter Chinese coercion in the South China Sea. In the short term, however, widespread cooperation is more feasible in the less-controversial environmental domain.

Source: Department of State, Limits of the Sea #150

C. Environmental Dynamics

South China Sea fisheries are at risk of collapse.16 Overfishing, IUU fishing, and other destructive practices are causing fish stocks to decline. Pollution from increasingly-urbanized coastal areas exacerbates this trend by introducing toxic substances that harm the marine ecosystem, particularly fish breeding grounds.17 Climate change is further disrupting fisheries globally by increasing sea temperatures and ocean acidity.18 The expansion and creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea through dredging of sand and coral from the seafloor for use as landfill19 has destroyed coral reefs and marine ecosystems.20 China’s island building activities—and associated damage to coral reefs and the fish that rely on them for food—far exceeds that of other countries.21

Likewise, though all South China Sea claimant states engage in IUU fishing, China is the largest contributor to fishery depletion in the region. China’s highly modern fishing fleet is significantly larger than those of other claimants.22 China thus captures more fish than any other claimant, significantly raising its relative ecological footprint in the South China Sea.23 Beijing prioritizes its fishing fleet as a means to expand its influence globally, with some fishing vessels in the South China Sea also

serving security and military purposes as part of its maritime militia.24

Environmental degradation in the South China Sea directly and indirectly harms millions of people, from the approximately 3.7 million fishers in Southeast Asia to those around the world who depend on the region’s fish for nutrition.25 The South China Sea provides 12 percent of the global fish catch, and 77 percent of people in Southeast Asia depend on ocean fisheries as their main source of protein.26

Beyond its environmental and economic effects, fish stock depletion exacerbates geopolitical tensions. As fish stocks dwindle, competition over fishing areas becomes more intense, leading fishers to venture further from their country’s coast to catch the same quantity of fish. Disputes in the South China Sea arise frequently in response to fishing by one country’s vessels in disputed waters or in another’s exclusive economic zone. In these cases, claimants sometimes intimidate or harass foreign ships.27

III. An Environmental Strategy to Achieve U.S. Goals in the Indo-Pacific

To make progress on current strategic challenges in the South China Sea, the United States should employ an environmental strategy to build claimants’ capacity to manage their own waters and increase cooperation among them. This strategy can kickstart progress toward the broader U.S. goal of strengthening the rules-based order, the rule of law, and international cooperation in the region.

Furthermore, such efforts would protect the environment, improve local fishers’ economic conditions, and ease tensions among states by reducing competition over scarce resources. Regional cooperation may also weaken China’s influence and hamper its environmentally damaging activities by unifying other claimants in the development of a common solution. Finally, environmental management provides a feasible context for deepened cooperation between the United States and Southeast Asian nations, increasing the likelihood of cooperation in other areas in the future.

U.S. goals regarding environmental management in the South China Sea align with the White House’s IndoPacific Strategy;28 the Memorandum on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Associated Labor Abuses;29 and the National 5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.30 This set of strategies delineates specific environment-related activities that the U.S. government wishes to pursue in the Indo-Pacific. However, these documents lack an organizing principle that coherently unifies environmental activities in support of the United States’ desired end-state for the South China Sea.

We propose that the U.S. government adopt ‘responsible management’ as the organizing principle for environmental initiatives in the South China Sea. A credible, widely embraced environmental management paradigm, responsible management will further the principles that undergird U.S. security goals in the South China Sea.

Photo Credit: Luke Maier

Articulating a Responsible Management Strategy

In its public messaging, the United States should frame its overarching vision for the South China Sea as responsible management by claimant states. To date, U.S. strategic documents have lacked a clear vision for the United States’ goals and objectives in the South China Sea. This has rendered the desired U.S. end state ambiguous for both claimant states and U.S. government agencies. Summarizing the U.S. vision for the South China Sea as responsible management would help unify lines of effort for the region and enable Washington to convey its interests in a way that avoids provocative language and is difficult for China or others to publicly dispute.

Responsible management concisely encapsulates U.S. national interests in the region. Specifically, it refers to strengthening the rule of law, accountability, international cooperation, and respect for established norms such as the maritime boundary and dispute resolution frameworks in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In addition to promoting values conducive to U.S. interests in the region, a focus on whether states’ actions are responsible implicitly rebukes China’s pattern of irresponsible behavior. Such behavior includes China’s shirking of the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling on the Philippines’ case against China and its use of irregular forces known as the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia to harass vessels from other claimant states in the area.

The U.S. government should promote this message in its public statements and through partners, including journalists, environmentfocused nongovernmental organizations, and the scientific community. Responsible management has become a prevailing paradigm in international environmental policy and law. Stakeholders are therefore more likely to independently echo U.S. messaging that contains this language.

An environmental management approach will not be without its challenges. China will undoubtedly view greater U.S. activity in the region as inimical to its interests, and is well-equipped to undermine these initiatives given that it has the largest naval presence in the region and largest commercial fishing fleet in the world. However, leveraging environmental management to build claimant state capacity and foster cooperation between them and the United States offers a relatively non-escalatory means to counter continued Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.

Our recommendations seek to help the United States empower claimant states rather than act on their behalf, which will reduce Chinese perceptions of U.S. interference in the region.

China will likely also see joint efforts to improve environmental management as more benign than alternative U.S. policy options.

Political barriers within partner states to the advancement of environmental initiatives will also persist, as will the conflicting territorial claims that have hampered cooperation between claimants in the region. However, U.S. assistance in reducing financial and technical barriers to better environmental management will help claimant states overcome lingering political challenges to environmentrelated initiatives. And despite conflicting territorial claims, capacity building and improved environmental management cooperation will strengthen future regional responses to Chinese aggression by building trust, shared norms, and institutional mechanisms for coordination.

Photo Credit: Luke Maier

A. Recommendations to Build Claimant State Capacity

Effective enforcement of any law requires that enforcement agencies be able to identify suspected violations, monitor suspects until an enforcement decision is made, and interdict the suspected party. As the United States seeks to facilitate improved environmental management in the South China Sea, it should build capacity bilaterally to enable partner countries to better enforce their maritime laws.

The Philippines is an ideal partner for initial U.S. bilateral law enforcement support efforts in the region. While it is a treaty ally central to U.S. strategic interests with existing frameworks for bilateral assistance, the Philippines suffers from a dramatic imbalance between its need for maritime security and its capacity to provide it. The Philippines has begun to build out its maritime security capacity over the past decade with help from partner countries, including the United States and Japan. However, it still requires maritime domain awareness and enforcement capacity improvements to meet the challenges of policing both foreign and domestic vessels in its 874,064 square mile exclusive economic zone.31

The United States supports Philippine maritime domain awareness through training and data sharing, though these efforts should be expanded. Like other claimant states, the Philippines’ remote sensing coverage is incomplete due to insufficient resources and trained personnel.

Each remote sensing technology has blind spots; effective maritime domain awareness requires integration of data from an array of different sources. For example, coastal and/or satellitebased synthetic aperture radar can be used to observe a vessel that has chosen not to broadcast its identity and location through its automatic identification system32 or vessel monitoring system.33 Such vessels may be attempting to avoid detection, but effective maritime domain awareness can enable authorities to track their activity.34

Like other South China Sea states, the Philippines lacks the capability to leverage these technologies synergistically. The Philippines’ maritime domain awareness relies heavily on coastal radar, which covers only a few high-traffic areas. Furthermore, although the Philippines requires vessel monitoring systems on all fishing vessels 30 GT and above35 and provides subsidized trackers, the state has struggled with implementation.

Many Philippines-flagged vessels still do not use vessel monitoring systems because of a lack of enforcement, and these vessels go undetected as a result. To remedy such gaps, the United States provides partner countries with SeaVision, a maritime application hosted by the U.S. Department of Transportation that combines partners’ data streams with other unclassified information, such as synthetic aperture radar, to create a real-time visualization tool.36 The United States also trains partner country personnel such as coast guards in maintaining and interpreting remote sensing technologies through the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative37 and provides other technical capabilities through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and other agencies. However, limited remote sensing infrastructure, primarily hardware and diversified input sources, and a dearth of skilled technical prowess continue to hamper partner countries’ maritime domain awareness coverage.

The Philippine Coast Guard has grown significantly in enforcement capacity since its founding in 2007,38 but requires additional equipment, maintenance capacity, and training to achieve robust and sustainable enforcement. In recent years, approximately 60 Philippine Coast Guard sailors per year have trained in the United States39 and the U.S. Coast Guard has conducted multiple combined exercises with the Philippine Coast Guard. The United States has also assisted the Philippine Coast Guard by developing an outboard motor maintenance training facility40 and by transferring equipment. These efforts have greatly increased the Philippine Coast Guard’s capabilities, but additional highpriority technologies for maritime domain awareness, U.S. Coast Guard presence and support, acquisition assistance, and infrastructure subsidization can ensure that these capabilities are translated into sustainable enforcement outcomes.

Photo Credit: Luke Maier

RECOMMENDATION 1

Enhance maritime domain awareness through data sharing and personnel training

The United States should work to improve partner countries’ maritime domain awareness by enhancing data sharing and personnel training through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative. Composed of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, the Quad already shares some maritime domain awareness data with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The Quad should expand its data sharing program to include Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Additionally, the Quad can address specific data gaps by expanding the pool of electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar that it shares with partner countries to include commercially-sourced data.41

Finally, under the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative, the United States should expand technical training for partner countries’ law enforcement personnel on data processing and using and maintaining sensing technology systems.

The Philippine Coast Guard is an example of a partner whose current capabilities rely heavily on U.S. assistance but requires additional training and data sources to become independently effective.

RECOMMENDATION 2

Assist vessel monitoring system implementation in the Philippines

The United States should assist the Philippines in increasing its vessel monitoring system coverage. These systems enable law enforcement to monitor vessels and identify illegal activity. However, compliance with the Philippine law mandating use of vessel monitoring systems is low. There is not yet an effective system to incentivize uptake of vessel monitoring systems, or enforce their use, and government officials have not prioritized implementation of the relevant regulation.

In coordination with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Coast Guard should share with the Philippines best practices learned from U.S. implementation of its own vessel monitoring system and from partner countries such as Thailand, which has mandated such systems for all fishing vessels. It should also encourage Philippine partners to prioritize vessel monitoring system implementation by emphasizing associated maritime domain awareness benefits.

Photo Credit: Sgt. Brandon Murphy

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command

U.S. 5th Fleet

RECOMMENDATION 3

Deploy unmanned surface vessels in the South China Sea

The United States should deploy unmanned surface vessels, which are an emerging technology that can cost-effectively extend partner countries’ maritime domain awareness and environmental monitoring range. Unmanned surface vessels such as commercially-available Saildrones can collect maritime domain awareness and ocean mapping data at lower costs than manned data collection systems. Unmanned surface vessels can also be fitted with a range of sensors to collect other data, such as water quality indicators. These vessels’ autonomy and low cost makes them scalable and therefore a promising tool for expanding data collection. The United States should recreate the success of Navy Task Force 59, which successfully deployed Saildrones in the Gulf of Aqaba,42 to help IndoPacific partner countries monitor their exclusive economic zones. Singapore, where the Joint-Task Force INDOPACOM operates a logistics hub, could be one location from which to operate these systems.

RECOMMENDATION 4

Forward deploy additional U.S. Coast Guard cutters to Guam

The U.S. Coast Guard’s presence in the Indo-Pacific should be increased in accordance with the Indo-Pacific Strategy, National Security Strategy, and National Defense Strategy. The Coast Guard’s current Indo-Pacific presence consists of three fast response cutters positioned in Guam and rotational deployments of a single Legend-class national security cutter from home ports in the United States.

In contrast, the U.S. Coast Guard’s Patrol Forces Southwest Asia based in Bahrain currently has five vessels permanently available, which are primarily used to patrol the much smaller waters of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.43 This regional disparity undercuts the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which explicitly calls for “expanding U.S. Coast Guard presence, training, and advising” in the region.44 The National Security Strategy45 and National Defense Strategy46 also make clear the prioritization of the IndoPacific over the Middle East for U.S. national security.

The U.S. Coast Guard should therefore station two to three additional cutters in Guam, ideally medium-endurance cutters like the Reliance-, Famous-, and the forthcoming Heritage-class (offshore patrol cutters) to make operations in and around the South China Sea easier to sustain given its distance from Guam.

First deployments of the offshore patrol cutter program, expected to deliver its first vessel in early 2023,47 could be to Guam, while deployments around North and South America could be postponed to a later date. The United States could consider positioning these cutters closer to the South China Sea by deploying them to an agreeable partner nation like Singapore that has sufficient supporting infrastructure.

A more robust presence would enable additional training and exercises with partner nations that would improve their enforcement capacity over time.

RECOMMENDATION 5

Negotiate shiprider agreements with South China Sea claimants

To empower its regional partners to enforce environmental laws and ensure broader maritime security, the United States should negotiate bilateral shiprider agreements with nations in the South China Sea, such as the Philippines. With additional assets in the region, the U.S. Coast Guard would be better positioned to directly support partner nation maritime security forces. However, the Coast Guard’s ability to interdict and board foreign vessels outside U.S. waters depends on bilateral agreements with partner countries.48 Shiprider agreements with South China Sea nations would allow U.S. Coast Guard cutters with partner maritime law enforcement officers on board to interdict vessels violating environmental and fisheries law within those nations’ exclusive economic zones.

The U.S. Interagency Working Group’s National 5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing prioritizes the pursuit of such agreements with Tier 1 (which includes South China Sea nations) and Tier 2 regions.49

However, over 50 nations across four regions sit within Tier 1. The Philippines and other South China Sea claimants should be prioritized, as the United States would substantially benefit from increased flexibility in the region for the U.S. Coast Guard. Because negotiation of shiprider agreements can be difficult and time consuming, temporary diplomatic agreements could be used to secure similar operational authorities as a confidence building measure or as needed for pressing scenarios. While such a legal framework would lay the groundwork for the U.S. Coast Guard to assist the Philippine Coast Guard in future scenarios within their exclusive economic zone, shiprider operations could be focused outside the South China Sea so that U.S. Coast Guard cutters do not interact with Chinese vessels in disputed waters. With U.S. Coast Guard assistance in enforcing illegal fishing provisions in other parts of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, the Philippine Coast Guard could then dedicate more of its fleet to South China Sea operations and enforcement.

RECOMMENDATION 6

Fund helicopter acquisition for the Philippine Coast Guard

The United States should subsidize expansion of the Philippine Coast Guard’s H145 helicopter fleet and supporting activities like maintenance and pilot training. Expanding the aerial capacity of the Philippine Coast Guard would greatly improve its ability to monitor large swathes of Philippine waters and identify illegal fishing offenders for maritime interdiction.

The Philippine Coast Guard acquired two Teresa Magbanua-class patrol vessels from Japan in 2022. Although these vessels are equipped with a helipad and hangar,50 the Philippine Coast Guard has few operational helicopters.51 Over the past several years, it has sought to procure lightto-medium sized helicopters, but has only been able to acquire two Airbus H145 helicopters52 despite a stated desire for up to seven.53

The U.S. Foreign Military Financing program can only be used to subsidize the purchase of defense articles built in the United States,54 and the helicopters purchased by the Philippine Coast Guard thus far have been produced by Airbus’ facilities in Germany. However, Airbus has a subsidiary in the United States that produces H145 helicopters,55 providing an avenue for Foreign Military Finance assistance in supplementing the Philippine Coast Guard’s aerial capacity.

RECOMMENDATION 7

Subsidize dedicated Philippine Coast Guard shipyard and port facilities

Though the Philippine Coast Guard has undergone rapid growth in recent years as partner countries have allocated resources and ships to improve its maritime security, Philippine coastal infrastructure has not kept pace with this growth. The Philippine Coast Guard lacks a dedicated shipyard and port space to properly maintain and moor its growing fleet.56 The United States should subsidize the construction of this infrastructure to ensure the long-term sustainability of Philippine Coast Guard operations and environmental enforcement capacity. This infrastructure could also be negotiated to serve as a forward operating and logistical base for the U.S. Coast Guard. Because the currently deployed U.S. fast response cutters have limited ability to sustain long-term and long-range operations given the 1,000+ nautical mile journey from Guam,57 a forward logistical hub would greatly expand the time they could spend patrolling Philippine waters with ship riders.

Section 333 programs and the IndoPacific Maritime Security Initiative both have provisions that allow use of funding up to $1.5 million for “small-scale construction”,58 but this authority is likely insufficient to support the necessary infrastructure improvements. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency may be an alternative source of support for larger projects like the shipyard, as it has aided the construction of other facilities in the Philippines that have been turned over to the Philippine government.59

Supporting Southeast Asian Humanitarian

Natural disasters compound the environmental degradation caused by overfishing.60 The United States can demonstrate that it is acting in good faith to protect the marine environment by bolstering Southeast Asia’s capacity to collectively mitigate naturally induced harm to the environment through disaster response mechanisms. Stronger humanitarian assistance and disaster response coordination can also help facilitate greater trust and shared understanding among claimant states—an important U.S. objective in the South China Sea.

Over the last two decades, the Indo-Pacific has experienced more mega-disasters than any other region.61 Cataclysmic events like the Indian Ocean tsunami, Cyclone Nargis, and Typhoon Rai have exacted astronomical costs on Asian countries in terms of human life, environmental harm, and economic damage. According to the United Nations’ Economic and Social Commission for Asia, natural disasters and climateinduced hazards alone account for over $86.5 billion in annual economic losses.62 Mega-disasters can also have a tremendous toll on the marine environment, with debris generated by storm surges, tsunamis, landslides, and flooding capable of decimating littoral ecosystems.63 Southeast Asia’s experience with natural disasters, which are expected to intensify in the coming decades due to climate change, has opened the door for expanded multilateral cooperation.64

Disaster management presents an opportunity for both regional collaboration and engagement with extra-regional partners, especially where geopolitics and bureaucratic inertia slow cooperation in other fora.65 Humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts have broad appeal in the world’s most natural disasterprone territory, and cooperative efforts can build solidarity across claimant states in the face of collective risks.66 Regional disaster management planning can also build confidence among claimant states that their neighbors are reliable partners.

Southeast Asian countries identified their priorities for future coordination efforts in the 2021 ASEAN Disaster Resilience Outlook report. In particular, the report calls for increased partnerships on data protection and governance in disaster management, use of artificial intelligence to inform decision-making, and efforts to combat disinformation in emergency response.67

Assistance and Disaster Response Efforts

The report also calls for ASEAN to develop an implementation plan for climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction; the United States should stand ready to support the implementation plan once available. Furthermore, the United States should continue to provide financial support to the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response Centre while ensuring that additional support provided through subject matter expert exchanges and capacity-building programs aligns with the priorities identified in the outlook report.

By aiding regionally-identified humanitarian assistance and disaster response priorities through ASEAN’s Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response Centre, the United States can ensure that claimant states have the capabilities they need to coordinate efficiently when disaster strikes.68 This will not only improve claimant states’ ability to protect the marine environment, but also facilitate greater connections among them.

Finally, the United States can support ASEAN’s disaster response goals by enhancing small-scale humanitarian assistance and disaster response readiness exercises like the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Exercise (ARDEX). Under the One ASEAN, One Response charter, a legal agreement that compels member states to pool resources to address disasters,69 ASEAN has designated the ASEAN Military Ready Group to formalize standard operating procedures for humanitarian assistance and disaster response, enhance interoperability, and consolidate resource allocation in the event of a disaster.70 The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command could use its comparative advantages in logistics to help the Military Ready Group improve readiness exercises. For example, by employing U.S. airlift and naval vessels to test ASEAN’s Disaster Emergency Logistics System, which consists of stockpile relief warehouses in Southeast Asia, the United States could employ its logistical capabilities to support Southeast Asian humanitarian assistance and disaster response objectives.71 The United States could coordinate this support alongside its Quad partners by leveraging the newly signed Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the IndoPacific.72 These efforts could enhance regional collaboration without setting off the insecurity spirals that normally preclude collective security initiatives in Southeast Asian waters.

B. Recommendations to Increase Regional Cooperation

Many aspects of environmental management transcend international borders and therefore require multilateral policy solutions. For example, fish often migrate across national jurisdictions, creating a need for streamlined fisheries policy among neighboring states. Likewise, the seafood supply chain is international in nature: vessels with one country’s flag often land their catch in other countries’ ports, creating a need for standardized port controls.

U.S. support for environmental management in the South China Sea has yet to address some pressing gaps in existing multilateral policies, including a lack of standardized stock assessment methodology among claimant states, weaknesses in regional port state controls — especially in Malaysia and Taiwan, and a need for better implementation of international environmental agreements. In the South China Sea, international cooperation is not just needed for environmental management, but can also build trust between claimant states and create norms and institutions that will encourage future collaboration.

The United States has taken some steps to bolster regional cooperation for fisheries management in the South China Sea. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and NOAA work closely with the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), an autonomous inter-governmental body comprised of 11 countries that aims to ensure the sustainability of fisheries and aquaculture in Southeast Asia.73 In partnership with SEAFDEC, USAID’s Sustainable Fish Asia project aims to improve management of marine biodiversity and fisheries resources in the Indo-Pacific region.74

NOAA supports these efforts through its Office of Coastal Management, which provides training and technical input to SEAFDEC’s Training Division.75

NOAA’s Northwest Fisheries Science Center also trains scientists, resource managers, and decision makers across the region to apply data collected from electronic catch documentation and traceability programs, and to develop harvest strategies where data and other management resources are limited.

U.S. support to date, however, has lacked a focus on regional cohesion for stock assessments. Stock assessments entail the collection, analysis, and reporting of fish demographic information to assess changes in fish stocks and predict future trends in stock abundance. Stock assessments provide scientific evidence to justify changes in fisheries management, and have become an important tool for understanding how fish stocks might evolve due to climate change.

Standardized measurement methods are necessary for accurate comparisons across national jurisdictions, especially for fish stocks that cross national boundaries. In 2022, the Philippines led the launch of the first Common Fisheries Resource Analysis with China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.76 Regional scientists came together to share stock assessment data for skipjack tuna and analyze the health of the stock in the South China Sea, but the lack of standardized stock assessment methodology across the region posed a challenge to this analysis.

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (PSMA) represents another important multilateral effort to address environmental issues in the South China Sea. This international agreement seeks to prevent IUU fishing through the adoption and implementation of effective port state measures that bar illegally harvested fish from entering the ports they must transit through to be sold. These measures are requirements established by port states that foreign fishing vessels must comply with to use the state’s ports. Widespread implementation is needed to ensure that vessels carrying illegally harvested fish cannot simply enter a nearby port of convenience with ineffective measures.

As a PSMA signatory and leader on sustainable management, the United States supports other countries’ abilities to implement the agreement. Under the U.S. National 5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, the United States aims to assist priority flag states and regions, including Southeast Asia, in adopting and implementing the PSMA. The strategy also commits NOAA to support legal and operational capacity building training in partner countries, including in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, to help them better implement the PSMA.

Despite the PSMA’s benefits for deterring illegal fishing, adoption in the Indo-Pacific region remains uneven. Though China would ideally be a party to the PSMA given that it has the largest global commercial fishing fleet in the world, it has not adopted the agreement. Of the other South China Sea claimants, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have adopted the PSMA. Brunei and Malaysia are not yet signatories. Malaysia has the larger fishing fleet and seafood industry of the two, and it is already required to implement some of the same port state controls mandated by the PSMA due to its membership in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission.

Political and technical capacity constraints, however, have kept Malaysia from adopting the agreement. Finally, Taiwan cannot be a party to the agreement due to its diplomatic status, but it has worked to improve its port state measures. Still, NOAA’s identification of Taiwan as a priority offender of IUU fishing suggests a need for improved port controls.77

Difficulties associated with the implementation of international agreements pose a third major challenge to international cooperation on environmental management. Many international agreements and treaties under the United Nations are relevant to maritime environmental protection in the South China Sea, including the PSMA, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, many countries in Southeast Asia lack legal expertise and government employees with the knowledge and ability to enforce existing treaty regimes. This problem is especially acute for smaller, developing countries. Measures that reduce these difficulties and facilitate the implementation of international agreements can both lead to better environmental management and enhance cooperation among claimant states.

RECOMMENDATION 8

Provide technical training on fish stock assessments to Southeast Asian states

The United States should provide fish stock assessment training to Southeast Asian states through existing partnerships to help standardize assessment methodology.

In 2021 and 2022, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and SEAFDEC co-organized stock assessment training workshops that focused on assessment principles, interpretation of assessment results, and science based management. These trainings, however, omitted specifics on how to conduct standardized stock assessments.78 To fill this gap, USAID and NOAA should integrate stock assessment training into their existing partnership with SEAFDEC. As a leader on best practices for fisheries science and research, NOAA should adapt its existing stock assessment training program for American fisheries managers to suit SEAFDEC’s needs. 79The training should strive to standardize assessment methodology across SEAFDEC.

Improved and standardized stock assessments across SEAFDEC would allow South China Sea claimant states to better manage their waters through more accurate fish stock data. Standardized stock assessment methodology would further provide a strong foundation for future joint environmental management between U.S. allies and partners in the region, as standardization is essential for joint stock assessments.

For long-term management of fish stocks in the South China Sea, China and Taiwan should also join their neighbors in standardizing stock assessment methods. However, the existing relationship between the United States and SEAFDEC through USAID and NOAA provides an actionable opportunity to begin standardization.

RECOMMENDATION 9

Increase port state measures cooperation with Malaysia and Taiwan

The United States should provide funding for electronic infrastructure to support Malaysia’s adoption of the PSMA and technical training to strengthen port state controls in Taiwan. Stronger port state measures will enhance not just the ability of Malaysia and Taiwan to manage their waters, but also the ability of all regional states to prevent illegally caught seafood from entering the supply chain.

Challenges to Malaysia’s adoption of the PSMA include: (1) outdated or incomplete port and information system infrastructure, encompassing electronic databases for electronic catch document schemes and catch records; (2) insufficient budget for electronic infrastructure; (3) a need to amend and update existing regulations and fisheries acts; and (4) a need to establish agreement across relevant government agencies.80

The United States is well placed to help lower the burden of PSMA adoption for Malaysia through provision of infrastructure resources. The U.S. Interagency Working Group should commit funding for electronic infrastructure for port state measures in Malaysia, and NOAA and USAID should guide how this funding is spent.

Malaysia is not the only claimant in need of stronger port state measures. Researchers in Taiwan have also identified a need for improved training for Taiwanese port state control officers due to a lack of on-board working experience and insufficient understanding of international conventions.81

Taiwan’s inability to sign on to the PSMA bars it from non-profit, U.S. government, and other resources that are intended to strengthen PSMA implementation. However, NOAA’s Office of Law Enforcement can and should offer Taiwanese control officers technical assistance training on port state controls in line with the PSMA.82

Training would cover best practices for port state measures and familiarize Taiwanese officials with PSMA standards. NOAA’s training educates personnel about relevant regional fishery management organization measures, provides instruction on screening of suspicious vessels prior to port entry, and trains participants on thorough vessel inspections, offload monitoring, gear checking, and verification of permits. The training would help Taiwan keep IUU caught fish out of its ports, supporting management of surrounding waters.

RECOMMENDATION 10

Increase funding for United Nations trainings on environmental agreement implementation

The United States should encourage the United Nations General Assembly or other interested parties to support increased training of claimant states on implementation of existing multilateral environmental agreements.

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research offers an online, self-paced, four-part course on International Environmental Law to improve the legal literacy of lawyers and policymakers, and to build local ability to implement multilateral environmental agreements, including those relevant to the South China Sea.83 Price and language, however, present access challenges. The training costs $800 per person, which approximately equals the median monthly income of a Filipino worker.84 It is also currently offered only in English.

For the next budgetary cycle, Washington should seek to expand the training institute’s annual budget and to earmark as little as $24,000 of those funds to cover training for ten individuals each from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.85

The high cost of overfishing more than justifies this investment. If the U.S. representative at the training institute meets resistance, the European Union could present an attractive option for supplementary funding in this area. The United Nations General Assembly, relevant bodies in the international community, or the United States should also fund translation of the course in Vietnamese and Indonesian.

While many lawyers in the Philippines and Malaysia already speak English, translation of the course into Vietnamese and Indonesian would make it more accessible to lawyers from those countries. Legal education alone will not solve implementation challenges in the South China Sea, especially in cases where litigation is used aggressively as “lawfare.” However, increasing the baseline of shared knowledge across the region will make it easier for countries to cooperate and communicate on multilateral environmental treaties and multi-jurisdiction cases.

IV. Conclusion

Increasingly aggressive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea calls for a coherent U.S. strategy to meaningfully protect U.S. interests in the region without triggering unwanted escalation. This report proposes that the United States adopt an environmental management approach to promote U.S. interests in the region. By leveraging responsible environmental management to: (1) build claimant state capacity to enforce existing environmental regulations within their territorial waters, and (2) increase cooperation among claimant states in Southeast Asia, the United States can bolster international law and safeguard freedom of navigation throughout the Indo-Pacific.

An environmental approach alone cannot overcome collective action problems and longstanding barriers to cooperation among U.S. allies and partners in Southeast Asia. However, in the context of simmering tensions between claimant states, environmental management provides a less controversial avenue for fostering cooperation among Southeast Asian nations. These efforts can advance the U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific in the short term, while paving the way for increased U.S. security cooperation with regional allies and partners in the long term.

Authors

Allison Blauvelt

Allison worked at Deloitte Financial Advisory services, where she conducted commercial intelligence analysis. She has a B.A. in International Studies from American University and is an MPA candidate at Princeton.

Matthew Fiorelli

Matt is an active duty Army officer and most recently commanded an Attack Aviation Company at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. As an MPA candidate at Princeton, his studies focus on American government and American foreign policy.

Alisa Laufer

Alisa has worked in support of the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Senate, and several NGOs and think tanks. She is currently an MPA candidate at Princeton, where she studies international relations with a focus on the evolving nature of conflict.

Jacobo

McGuire

Jacobo worked with the Millennium Challenge Corporation and Peace Corps before beginning his Princeton MPA. His studies at Princeton focus on technology policy and international development.

Wyatt Suling

Wyatt previously served in the Missouri Attorney General’s Office, where he helped lead its sexual assault kit reform initiative. He holds a B.S. in economics and a B.A. in policy studies from Syracuse University and studies defense policy and strategy at Princeton University.

Samantha Emmert

Sam worked at Global Fishing Watch, a nonprofit that utilizes satellite data and machine learning to improve ocean management, and Oceana, an ocean conservation advocacy organization. She studied biology at Duke University and is an MPA candidate at Princeton.

Benjamin Jebb

Ben is an active duty Army officer who led a Special Forces Detachment at Fort Lewis, Washington before starting graduate school. He is currently an MPA candidate at Princeton, where he studies international relations with a focus on Asia.

Luke Maier

Luke is a graduate student at Princeton University focusing on international relations and economics. Prior to coming to Princeton, Luke studied grand strategy and environmental science at Duke University.

Jennifer Shore

Jennifer is an MPA candidate studying international relations at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs. She was previously a fellow at the White House National Economic Council during the Obama administration.

Ellen Swicord

Ellen is an MPA candidate at Princeton University studying international relations. She previously was Research Associate for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She holds a B.A. in political science from the University of Chicago

Endnotes

1 Gregory Poling, On Dangerous Ground (Oxford University Press, 2022), p. 12.

2 Encyclopedia Britannica, South China Sea, https://www.britannica.com/place/South-China-Sea/.

3 Kent Harrington, “Commentary: South China Sea may run out of fish at this rate of overfishing,” Channel News Asia, February 5, 2022, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/south-china-sea-china-environmental-ecological-damage-coral-reefs-overfishing-international-law-2469871/.

4 Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker, “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,” May 4, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea/.

5 U.S. Embassy in Laos, “Statement by Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” July 21, 2020, https://la.usembassy.gov/statement-by-secretary-michael-r-pompeo-u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/.

6 The White House, “2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf/.

7 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, “The American Pivot to Asia,” Brookings, July 28, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/.

8 FPRI: Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, “From Pivot to Defiance: American Policy Shift in the South China Sea,” August 31, 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/08/from-pivot-to-defiance-american-policy-shift-inthe-south-china-sea/.

9 Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Esper: U.S. Will ‘Keep up the Pace’ of South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Operations,” USNI News, July 22, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/07/21/secdef-esper-u-s-will-keep-up-the-pace-of-south-china-seafreedom-of Navigation-operations/.

10

11

The White House, “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” May 24, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/.

Ian Johnson, “Biden’s Grand China Strategy: Eloquent but Inadequate,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 27, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/biden-china-blinken-speech-policy-grand-strategy/.

12 Jon Bateman, “Biden Is Now All-in on Taking out China,” Analysis Section, Foreign Policy, October 12, 2022, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/12/biden-china-semiconductor-chips-exports-decouple/.

13 Victor Cha, Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture, Asia Policy, 2011, p. 34.

14 ISEAS, “Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2021 Survey Report,” Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme at ISEAS, November 14, 2022, p. 12, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/.

15 The White House, “2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf/.

16 Sumaila Rashid et. al., “Sink or Swim: The Future of Fisheries in the East and South China Seas,” ADM Capital Foundation, 2021, https://www.admcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Sink-or-Swim-Full-Report_171121.pdf/.

17 Ibid.

18

Pratnashree Basu, “In Deep Water: Current Threats to the Marine Ecology of the South China Sea,” Observer Research Foundation, March 8, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/in-deep-water-current-threats-to-the-marine-ecology-of-the-south-china-sea/.

19 Reuters Staff, “China ‘Seriously Concerned’ by Philippine’s Building in South China Sea,” Reuters, March 27, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-southchinasea-philippines/china-seriously-concerned-by-philippinesbuilding-in-south-china-sea-idUSKBN0MN0SL20150327/.

20

John McManus, “Offshore Coral Reef Damage, Overfishing, and Paths to Peace in the South China Sea,” International Journal of Marine Coastal Law 32 (2017); Ben Dolven et. al., “Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options,” Congressional Research Service, June 18, 2015, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R44072.pdf/.

21 Ben Dolven et. al., “Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options,” Congressional Research Service, June 18, 2015, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R44072.pdf/.

22 Pratnashree Basu, “In Deep Water: Current Threats to the Marine Ecology of the South China Sea,” Observer Research Foundation, March 8, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/in-deep-water-current-threats-to-the-marine-ecology-of-the-south-china-sea/.

23 Ibid.

24 Gregory Poling, “Illuminating the South China Sea’s Dark Fishing Fleets,” CSIS, January 9, 2019, https://ocean.csis.org/ spotlights/illuminating-the-south-china-seas-dark-fishing-fleets/.

25 Ibid.

26 Hongzhou Zhang, “Fisheries Cooperation in the South China Sea: Evaluating the Options,” Marine Policy 89: 67-76, doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2017.12.014/.

27 Keith Johnson and Dan De Luce, “Fishing Disputes Could Spark South China Sea Crisis,” Foreign Policy Magazine, April 7, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/fishing-disputes-could-spark-a-south-china-sea-crisis/; Elena Bernini, “Chinese Kidnapping of Vietnamese Fishermen in the South China Sea: A Primary Source Analysis,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, September 14, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/chinese-kidnapping-primary-source/.

28 The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf/.

29 The White House, Memorandum on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Associated Labor Abuses, June 27, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/06/27/memorandumon-combating-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-and-associated-labor-abuses/.

U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing, “National 5–Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, 2022-2026,” https://media.fisheries.noaa.gov/2022-10/2022_NationalStrategyReport_USIWGonIUUfishing.pdf/.

31 The Sea Around Us, “Catches by Taxon in the Waters of the Philippines,” Sea Around Us, November 19, 2022, http://www. seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez/608?chart=catch-chart&dimension=taxon&measure=tonnage&limit=10/.

32 AIS is a tracking system that broadcasts vessels’ identity, location, and heading. It is mandated by the International Maritime Organization for ships over 300 tons and on international voyages. Source: International Maritime Organization, “Automatic Identification System,” https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Pages/AIS.aspx/.

33 VMS is a technology similar to AIS mandated by some national governments to complement AIS. Source: Gregory Poling, “From Orbit to Ocean: Fixing Southeast Asia’s Remote Sensing Blind Spots,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 74, No. 1, Art. 8, 2021; Oceana, “Vessel Monitoring Technology Can Save Fishers’ Lives, Make Fisheries Transparent,” September 22, 2017, https://ph.oceana.org/press-releases/vessel-monitoring-technology-can-save-fishers-lives-make-fisheries/.

34 Ibid.

35 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Fisheries Administrative Order No. 266 Series of 2020 promulgating the Rules and Regulations on the Implementation of Vessel Monitoring Measures (VMM) and Electronic Reporting System (ERS) for Commercial Philippine Flagged Fishing Vessels Amending Fisheries Administrative Order No. 260 Series oF 2018,” https://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC201655/.

36 United States Department of Transportation, “SeaVision: A web-based maritime situational awareness tool,” https://info. seavision.volpe.dot.gov/.

37 U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Section 1263 Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), https://www. dsca.mil/section-1263-indo-pacific-maritime-security-initiative-msi/.

38 Aaron Lariosa, “Philippine Coast Guard Fleet Celebrates 15th Founding Anniversary Amid Modernization and Expansion Efforts,” Overt Defense, August 30, 2022, https://www.overtdefense.com/2022/08/30/philippine-coast-guard-fleet-celebrates-15th-founding-anniversary-amid-modernization-and-expansion-efforts/.

39 Jay Tristan Tarriela, “What Is the US Coast Guard’s Role in the Indo-Pacific Strategy?,” The Diplomat, June 21, 2019, https:// thediplomat.com/2019/06/what-is-the-us-coast-guards-role-in-the-indo-pacific-strategy/.

40 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S., Philippines Unveil New Coast Guard Maritime Training Facility,” February 10, 2019, https://ph.usembassy.gov/u-s-philippines-unveil-new-coast-guard-maritime-training-facility/.

41 Gregory Poling, “From Orbit to Ocean: Fixing Southeast Asia’s Remote Sensing Blind Spots,” Naval War College Review 74, no. 1, Article 8 (2021).

42 Audrey Decker, “Navy’s Task Force 59 Launches Saildrone USV,” Inside Defense, December 13, 2021, https://insidedefense.com/insider/navys-task-force-59-launches-saildrone-usv/.

43 United States Coast Guard Atlantic Area, “Patrol Forces Southwest Asia (PATFORSWA),” November 12, 2022, https://www. atlanticarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Area-Units/PATFORSWA/.

44 The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.

45 The White House, “Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy,” October 12, 2022, https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/12/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-national-security-strategy/.

46 U.S. Department of Defense, “National Defense Strategy,” October 27, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3201683/department-of-defense-releases-its-2022-strategic-reviews-national-defense-stra/ https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defense.gov%2FNews%2FReleases%2FRelease%2FArticle%2F3201683%2Fdepartment-of-defe nse-releases-its-2022-strategic-reviews-national-defense-stra%2F/.

47 Mikayla Easley, “Coast Guard Cutter Program Treading Water,” National Defense, August 12, 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/8/12/coast-guard-cutter-program-treading-water/.

48 LT. CMDR Warren Wright, “Shiprider Program,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, November 22, 2022, https://ipdefenseforum. com/2020/01/shiprider-program/.

49 U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing, “National 5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategy 2022-2026,” October 19, 2022, https://www.noaa.gov/news-release/new-us-strategy-forcombating-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing/.

50 Baird Maritime, “VESSEL REVIEW | Teresa Magbanua – New Class of 97m Multi-Role Vessels for Philippine Coast Guard,” Baird Maritime, May 30, 2022, https://www.bairdmaritime.com/work-boat-world/maritime-security-world/non-naval/ vessel-review-teresa-magbanua-new-class-of-97m-multi-role-vessels-for-philippine-coast-guard/.

51 Jay Tristan Tarriela, “What the Philippine Coast Guard Now Needs,” BusinessWorld Online, March 3, 2019, https://www. bworldonline.com/editors-picks/2019/03/03/217486/what-the-philippine-coast-guard-now-needs/.

52 David Oliver, “Philippine Coast Guard Commissions Second H145 Helicopter,” Asian Military Review, October 28, 2020, https://asianmilitaryreview.com/2020/10/philippine-coast-guard-commissions-second-h145-helicopter/.

53 Republic of the Philippines Department of Transportation, “Proposed Acquisition of Seven Maritime Disaster Response Helicopters,” PCG - Foreign Assisted Projects, November 14, 2022, https://dotr.gov.ph/maritime-sector/pcg/67-maritimesector/3146-pcg-foreign-assisted-projects.html/.

54 U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Security Cooperation Programs, Fiscal Year 2022,” November 12, 2022.

55 Airbus U.S., “H145,” August 3, 2021, https://us.airbus.com/en/helicopters/products-and-services/civil-helicopters/h145/.

56 Jay Tristan Tarriela, “What the Philippine Coast Guard Now Needs,” BusinessWorld Online, March 3, 2019, https://www. bworldonline.com/editors-picks/2019/03/03/217486/what-the-philippine-coast-guard-now-needs/.

U.S. Coast Guard, “Fast Response Cutters,” November 19, 2022, https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/ Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Surface-Programs/Fast-Response-Cutters/.

58 10 U.S.C. § 301(8).

59 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Transfers Custody of New Joint Maritime Law Enforcement Training Center,” November 15, 2022, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1272201/ustransfers-custody-of-new-joint-maritime-law-enforcement-training-center/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pacom. mil%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F1272201%2Fus-transfers-custody-of-new-jointmaritime-law-enforcement-training-center%2F/.

60 Thayalan Goal and Venkatachalam Anbumozhi, “Effects of Disasters and Climate Change on Fisheries Sectors and Implications for ASEAN Food Security,” Towards a Resilient ASEAN Volume 1: Disasters, Climate Change, and Food Security: Supporting ASEAN Resilience, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, December 2019, p. 162, https://www.eria.org/uploads/media/Books/2019-Towards-a-Resilient-ASEAN-Vol1/Towards-aResilient-ASEAN-Vol-1.pdf/.

61 Asian Development Bank, “Six Ways Southeast Asia Strengthened Disaster Risk Management,” May 6, 2021, https://www.adb.org/news/features/six-ways-southeast-asia-strengthened-disaster-risk-management/.

62 The United Nations Economic and Social Commission on Asia and the Pacific, “The Disaster Riskscape Across South-East Asia,” Asia-Pacific Disaster Report, 2020, p. 3, https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/IDD-APDRSubreport-SEA.pdf/.

63 NOAA, “How Do Natural Disasters Contribute to the Marine Debris Problem?,” March 3, 2015, https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/disaster-debris.html/.

64 Stacey White, “Asia’s Response to Climate Change and Natural Disasters: Implications for an Evolving Regional Architecture,” CSIS Asian Regionalism Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2010, p. 64, https://www.csis.org/analysis/indigenous-defense-industries-gulf%2C%20https%3A/csis-website-prod. s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/200424_Indigenous_0.pdf/.

65 Meghan Sullivan, “Bolstering Regional Approaches to Disaster Management for the Future in Southeast Asia,” New Perspectives on Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 9, 2022, https://www.csis.org/ blogs/new-perspectives-asia/bolstering-regional-approaches-disaster-management-future-southeast-asia/.

66 Gregory Coutaz, “Disaster Management in the South China Sea: A Chance for Peace and Cooperation,” pp. 117–34, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62828-8_6/.

67 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN Disaster Resilience Outlook Report: Preparing for a Future Beyond 2025,” October 2021, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ASEAN-Disaster-Resilience-OutlookPreparing-for-the-Future-Beyond-2021-FINAL.pdf, 97-99.

68 We discuss humanitarian assistance and disaster response in the broader context of ASEAN given that the preponderance of disaster response coordination in the region already happens through existing ASEAN structures. The authors assess that it is more valuable to build solidarity among claimant states though these existing structures rather than create new and potentially duplicative coordination efforts among claimant states only.

69 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN to Improve Synergies for One ASEAN One Response,” March 28, 2018, https://asean.org/asean-to-improve-synergies-for-one-asean-one-response/.

70 Deon Canyon, Elizabeth Kunce, and Benjamin Ryan, “Structuring ASEAN Military Involvement in Disaster Management and the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group,” Security Nexus Perspectives, The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, May 2020, p. 1, https://dkiapcss.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/brochure-2022. pdf/.

71 Deon Canyon, Elizabeth Kunce, and Benjamin Ryan, “Structuring ASEAN Military Involvement in Disaster Management and the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group,” Security Nexus Perspectives, The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, May 2020, p. 4, https://dkiapcss.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/brochure-2022. pdf/.

72 United States Department of State, “Guidelines for Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific,” https://www.state.gov/guidelines-for-quad-partnership-on-humanitarianassistance-and-disaster-relief-hadr-in-the-indo-pacific/.

73 The 11 SEAFDEC member countries are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

74 USAID, “Sustainable Fish Asia Local Capacity Development,” https://www.usaid.gov/asia-regional/fact-sheets/ sustainable-fish-asia-local-capacity-development/.

75 USAID, “USAID and NOASS Support for Sustainable Fisheries in the Asia Pacific Region,” https://www.usaid.gov/ asia-regional/fact-sheets/usaid-and-noaa-support-sustainable-fisheries-asia-pacific-region/.

76 Jeremy Prince et. al., “The CFRA: A Joint Assessment of South China Sea Skipjack Tuna Stocks,” 2022, http://www. rimf.org.vn/baibaocn/chitiet/a-joint-assessment-of-south-china-sea-skipjack-tuna-stocks/.

77 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), “NOAA takes strong stand against IUU fishing and harmful fishing practices,” https://www.noaa.gov/news-release/noaa-takes-strong-stand-against-iuu-fishingand-harmful-fishing-practices/.

78 Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), “SEAFDEC, FAO successfully co-host the second training course for advanced stock assessment,” http://www.seafdec.org/seafdec-fao-successfully-co-host-thesecond-training-course-for-advanced-stock-assessment/.

79 NOAA, “Stock Assessment Training Program,” https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/population-assessments/ stock-assessment-training-program/.

Poungthong Onoora, “Addressing the legislative gaps in the implementation of port state measures: Southeast Asian perspective,” Fish for the People 16, no. 1, 2018, pp. 5-20.

81 Ibid.

82 Rong-Her Chiu, Chien-Chung Yuan, and Kee-Kuo Chen, “The implementation of port state control in Taiwan,” Journal of Marine Science and Technology 16, no. 3 (2008): 6.

83 United Nations Institute for Training and Research, “International Environmental Law - Self-paced track - 2023 - Q,” Full Catalog, November 21, 2022, https://event.unitar.org/full-catalog/international-environmental-law-selfpaced-track-2023-q1/.

84 48,200 pesos, or about USD 829.

85 The budget is currently USD 72,495 million. See “Programme Budget for the Biennium 2022-2023,” UNITAR/ BT/62/2, United Nations Institute for Training and Research, November 22, 2022, https://unitar.org/sites/default/ files/media/publication/doc/BOT-Adopted-ProgBudget-Biennium22-23_1.pdf/.