WASHINGTON WATCH Ruth Melkonian-Hoover and Dennis R. Hoover
Lessons from the Coup in Honduras This summer most analysts of Latin American affairs praised the Obama administration’s quick response to the Honduran military’s ouster of President Manuel Zelaya. The US did not hesitate to label the ouster a coup (unofficially) and to call for Zelaya’s return.These acts of verbal diplomacy were seen by most analysts as simple and appropriate steps to take, for the US cannot be seen to be explicitly supporting military coups that damage the cause of democracy in Latin America. Decisions about other steps the US administration should take, however, have been anything but simple. As one senior US official put it, “This is an extremely difficult and delicate situation.” Indeed, the early pattern of US responses collectively suggested a priority on pragmatic preservation of flexibility, not aggressive use of US foreign policy tools to promote democracy. Early in the crisis, the US continued to label the event an unofficial coup, because an official coup would have required some cutoffs of aid that the US did not immediately want to impose. The US also had not rescinded Honduran trade preferences, nor had it recalled its ambassador (as had many Latin American and European nations). All these (non)actions gave the US greater maneuverability in addressing a complicated situation. Latin America has a painful history of military interference in governance (e.g., on behalf of economic elites concerned with labor agitation and national expropriations). However, in spite of widespread international condemnation of the coup, for many in Honduras the ouster of Zelaya did not comprise a clear case of unwarranted military intervention.These Hondurans
point to Zelaya’s abuses of power as troubling signs of a different problem that has long plagued Latin American governance — presidential usurpations and abuses of power. For instance, prior to his ouster Zelaya appeared to be engaged in unconstitutional angling to stay in power beyond the legal term limit, in defiance of legislative and judicial rulings. He had also fired a military chief who refused to help administer an illegal referendum to enable constitutional reforms on several issues, including presidential terms. In fact, many Honduran legislators urged the military to step in, and the Supreme Court also supported the military’s action, which it saw as an appropriate defense of democracy. Popular protestors supportive of the ouster defended it as a needed maintenance of the rule of law. In April President Obama pledged to break from the US history of blunt domination of Latin America and would instead behave more as a partner in the region.The initial reaction of the US to events in Honduras this summer could be read as confirming this pledge, as it came alongside others (the UN, the OAS, Honduras’ neighbors) in quickly criticizing the military. We should acknowledge this as smart diplomacy, but at the same time we should not be under any illusions that the US is a player like any other. The US has a history of neocolonial involvement in the region, provides substantial aid to Honduras, serves as Honduras’ primary trade partner, and engages in joint military drug interdiction efforts with Honduras. The US is one of the only players that has major sway with both the military and the executive. This is not to suggest that the US should engage in any overt or covert manipulation of Latin American affairs (as it has been known to do in the past and as Venezuela continues to do in the present). However, it should support— firmly, transparently, and consistently— free and fair governance. The US was PRISM 2009
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right to criticize the recent military coup, as only democratically and legally legitimate means should be used to deal with executive abuses and conflicts between branches of government. However, when we take a broader view, the US can also be criticized for not doing more diplomatically to help persuade the military against the coup, and indeed for not making greater investments long ago in Honduras’ democratic consolidation. As well, the US will be criticized postcoup if it does not use its power and influence to help ensure a bloodless resolution. The US is right to speak against hyper-militarism and overreliance on nonelected officials when conflicts involving elected officials emerge. But the US should also be unafraid to speak publicly against hyper-presidentialism — against caudillo (strongman) behavior by executives any time democratic limits on power become inconvenient. The inability of some executives to share power with parallel institutions, the frequency with which they resort to dubious forms of populist politics, and their circumvention of other powerholders via extraconstitutional means has been a barrier to democratization in the region for some time. American Christians should advocate for a foreign policy approach in the region that is not silent about military or executive overreach but critiques all abuses of power in the name of justice. Pinochet is not the model for Latin America, but neither is Chávez. The US should focus its efforts on the smart and strategic use of its foreign policy tools, primarily its soft power, to support sustainable economic development and democratic governance under rule of law in Latin America. ★ Ruth Melkonian-Hoover is assistant professor of political science at Gordon College. Dennis R. Hoover is editor of the Review of Faith & International Affairs.