Africana, 3, dec 2009

Africana: A Journal of Ideas on Africa and the African Diaspora Volume 3, Number 1

2009

Editorial Coordinator

Mr Yilma Tafere Tasew

Editor-in-Chief

Dr Christopher LaMonica

Board Members

Mr Thomas Banda Dr Margaret Clark Dr Ramon Das Dr Mourtada Deme Dr Marron Maddox Dr Victoria Mason

IT Consultant

Ms Mariko Hemmingsen AFRICANA Victoria University of Wellington P.O. Box 600 Wellington 6140 New Zealand Phone: +64 (4) 463-5760 Fax: +64 (4) 463-5414 www.africanajournal.org

Š Africana: A Journal of Ideas on Africa and the African Diaspora. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher.

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CONTENTS:

Introductory Note Christopher LaMonica Yilma Tafere Tasew 5

Attractions and Limitations of Liberal Democracy in Africa J. Shola Omotola

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Cultivating cultural change through cinema; Youssef Chahine and the creation of national identity in Nasser’s Egypt Barrie Wharton

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Growing Civic Awareness - Symptomatic Rehearsal of True Democratic Dividend: Lessons from Nigeria’s General Elections of 2007 Franklins A. Sanubi

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The Niger Delta in Nigerian Nation-Building, 19602005 John H. Enemugwem

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Some Ethical Challenges in Media Advertising in SubSaharan Africa: A Zimbabwean Case Study Fainos Mangena

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE As several have astutely noted, publication and release of the December 2009 issue of Africana was delayed by several long weeks. This was due to the relocation of our journal from Victoria University of Wellington, in New Zealand (with Massey University Printers), to the African Studies Center, at Boston University, 232 Bay State Road, Boston, Massachusetts, in the United States. http://www.bu.edu/africa/ It is our firm belief that formal affiliation with this long-established and well respected institution, dedicated to the study of Africa, can only help the global recognition of our journal and our mission. As such, future editions of Africana will include formal references to and coordinates of our new home, as well as a newly established ISSN. Being based in the relatively neutral state of New Zealand did have its advantages and the growing number of African refugees within that state made dialogue of African issues particularly appealing and interesting. Our Board continues to include participants from New Zealand and Australia. But we have also taken on board a scholar of islamophobia, North African & Middle Eastern Politics from Lancaster University in the U.K., Dr Victoria Mason, and an Africanist scholar from the University of Cergy-Pantoise in Paris, France, Dr Douglas Yates.

As stated on our web-page http://www.africanjournal.org our hope is to extend the dialogue on Africa and the African Diaspora among interested parties throughout the world.

It is an atmosphere of some excitement but with the knowledge that much work remains to be done that we present the December 2009 issue.

In the months leading up to its publication we received an ever-growing number of Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 1

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contributions and, again, we must remind contributors and readers of the rigorous peer review system that we feel obliged to maintain. That said we start the issue with a particularly well-researched contribution from J. Shola Omotola, a PhD graduate of the University of Ibadan, who now teaches political science at Redeemer’s University in Nigeria. Readers will note that Dr Omotola is a prolific writer on the matter of ‘liberal democracy’ and the policy challenges underlying democratization in African contexts. Here, Omotola jumps right into the fray of scholarly dialogue on the issue and interestingly points out the ways that the term ‘liberal democracy,’ and other related terms, have been used as justification for policy action.

His concern is that the term ‘liberal democracy’ might not be as ‘universal’ as many of its proponents continue to claim. Instead, Western – mainly U.S. – objectives are prioritized as the political realities of Africa continue to be largely ignored. We would like to thank Dr Omotola for his timely and thoughtful contribution.

The second contribution, from Dr Barrie Wharton of the University of Limerick, Ireland, is especially unique as it weaves together ideas from literary scholarship and from popular film from Egypt. Although we recognize the difficulty that some might have in following the characters, plots and themes from Egyptian film, we do appreciate the creative spirit that Wharton has used in approaching his subject of study: the promotion of an Egyptian national identity through popular film under Nasser.

This is followed by another timely piece on the notion of ‘democratic dividend’ by Franklins A. Sanubi, a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Delta State University in Abraka, Nigeria. Sanubi challenges the popular understanding Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 2

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among the Nigerian electorate that politicians should be elected solely on the basis of commitments to the provision of public services (e.g. roads, health care facilities and education). Within a democratic context, politicians also play an important role at promoting ‘civic awareness,’ which is instrumental to the proper functioning of a democratic state. With references to the state of literature on the subject, Dr Sanubi cleverly uses data from the Nigerian elections of 2007 to make his case. It is compelling and we thank Dr Sanubi for his contribution.

The fourth article, by John H. Enemugwem, Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, is entitled “The Niger Delta in Nigerian Nation-Building, 1960-2005.” Dr Enemugwen’s aim is to demonstrate the crucial historical role that the peoples of the Niger Delta played in the creation of the modern Nigerian state. As is so often the case in discussions of history, the involvement of certain peoples in particularly important national moments is not always as adequately documented as it should be; we wish Dr Enemugwem well in his efforts to document the accomplishments of the peoples of the Nigeria Delta and thank him for his contribution to our journal.

Finally, Fainos Manenga, a journalist and a Senior Lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe’s Department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy, considers some of the ethical issues tied to advertising in sub-Saharan Africa and in Zimbabwe in particular. He reminds us of the potential conflicts of interest between multinational businesses and the public at large. As is the case with other contributions to this issue, Dr Manenga’s topic is timely and especially wellVol. 3, No. 1 2009 3

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argued. To him and to all of those who have made this December 2009 issue possible our sincere thanks.

Christopher LaMonica Yilma Tafere Tasew December 2009

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Attractions and Limitations of Liberal Democracy in Africa 1

J. Shola Omotola

Abstract Democracy is today one of the most popular concepts not only in academic circles, but also in governmental as well as non‐governmental domains. The New World (Dis)Order has made its liberal version to acquire a fairly standardized and universal connotation to the neglect of J. Shola Omotola, currently completing a PhD in Political Science at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, teaches political science at Redeemer’s University, Redemption City, Nigeria. His research interests are in comparative African democratization, oil and environmental politics and identity politics, on which he has published in reputable national and international journals, including Representation, Africa Today, African and Asian Studies, Africa Insight and South African Journal of International Affairs, among others. His latest work, “ ‘Garrison’ Democracy in Nigeria: The 2007 General Elections and the Prospects of Democratic Consolidation” appeared in Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 47, 2(2009): 194‐220. He is also completing a book length manuscript tentatively titled Trapped in Transition: Nigeria’s First Democratic Decade, 1999‐2009 to be published by the Canadian based publisher, Africa Reads.

Email: sholaomotola@yahoo.com

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contextual variables that may impact on it for good or ill.

This paper questions the universalistic conception of liberal democracy as one, whose character is fairly standardized, arguing that such a conception represents a major disservice to democratization in Africa.

Consequently, liberal democracy has not only become subjective, but also theoretically ambivalent and analytically vacuous. Its dispositions as a ʺcelebrityʺ in its own right, tend to propel undemocratic forces to pretend as democrats to avoid coveting international resentment. For this reason, the concept of liberal democracy can be indicted of complicity in the level of autocrats in civilian garbs across the globe particularly in Africa. In its present form and character, the concept of democracy does very little or nothing to illuminate our understanding of contemporary politics particularly in the African context. Its main attraction seems the advancement of Western interest especially the USA in the consolidation of its Cold War victory, and that of opportunistic African leaders in their quest for power and accumulation of private capital. Critical questions pertaining to its contexts of origin and metamorphosis must, therefore, be interrogated if the concept would ever be useful both theoretically and analytically.

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Introduction The talk of democracy is very influential. Indeed, democracy is today probably one of the most popular concepts not only in academic circles but also in governmental as well as civil society domains. While it has a long history in political theory, the use of the concept of democracy does not belong to the category of concepts defined in universalistic terms, whose character is fairly standardized within the context of its origin.

But, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent emergency of a New World Order has, hypocritically indifferent to the contexts of its origin and metamorphosis as it were, tends to make democracy acquire a fairly acceptable, standardized and universal connotation, to the neglect of contextual variables that may impact on it for good or ill. Consequently, democracy as a concept has not only become subjective, difficult as it is to operationalize (measure), but also theoretically ambivalent and analytically vacuous. As the “hottest” bride in town, with its celebratory disposition as a ʺcelebrityʺ in its own right, it often propels ʺundemocraticʺ forces to pretend as democrats to avoid coveting international resentment. In this sense, the concept of democracy can be indicted of complicity in the level of autocrats in civilian garbs across the globe particularly in Africa. The universalistic conception of democracy as one, whose character is fairly standardized, therefore, represents a major disservice to the concept.

This paper attempts a critical evaluation of the attractions and limitations of liberal democracy in Africa. The Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 7

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paper’s analysis is underpinned by the central question: what is the concept of liberal democracy good for? The main purpose of the paper is to explore this question in the light of inherent and apparent contradictions in the emerging standardized conception of liberal democracy (see Saul, 1997a: 219‐236; 1997b: 339‐353; Shivji, 1991; Robinson, 1996; Ake 1995 etc). But, if democracy is a concept whose values are standardized, why is it so markedly different in its level of development across time and space? What sort of difference do we refer to, and how does it impact on the usefulness of the concept today particularly in Africa? These questions are, no doubt, central to the substantive question of the study, either of which cannot be satisfactorily answered without a good knowledge of the meaning of the concept of democracy, showing its metamorphosis.

The first substantive section of the paper addresses the meaning, origin and growth of democracy. The next section conceptualizes democracy particularly its liberal version as an ideology. The last major section evaluates the concept of liberal democracy to ascertain its attractions and limitations in the global and African contexts.

Democracy: Its Meaning, Origin and Growth Democracy has been a concept of intense study. The resultant body of literature is equally very extensive.

However despite the mass knowledge that has been accumulated over the years, there is little appreciation of the fact that its conception as an inevitable phenomenon whose values are not only standardized but also universal is not only Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 8

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theoretically faulty, but also practically unsupported by reality. The global outlook of democracy that has emerged is therefore pretentious and runs contrary to the logic of the argument of this paper.

What then is democracy? This is certainly a difficult question to answer. Yet it is pivotal to the distillation of our central question. Let us begin with a general definition.

Democracy is a system of government usually involving freedom of the individuals in various aspects of political life, equality among citizens, justice in the relations between the people and the government and the participation of the people in choosing those in government (Nnoli, 2003: 143). This is in line with the ʺcommon good and the will of the peopleʺ thesis of democracy. As Schumpeter (1950: 250‐283; 1967: 153‐188) democracy entails that ʺinstitutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions, which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals, who are to assemble in order to carryout its willʺ.

The second side of democracy, according to Schumpeter (1950; cf Quinton 1967: 173), emphasizes the centrality of competition to the emergence of political leadership. In this sense democracy is an ʺinstitutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the peopleʹs voteʺ.

What these general conceptions suggest is that democracy as a system of government stresses the sovereignty of the people (see Zack – William, 2001:213‐214; Osaghae, Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 9

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1994). It is also reminiscent of Robert Dahlʹs ʺtwo dimensions of democracyʺ (Dahl, 2000:35 – 40). The first dimension sees democracy as ʺan ideal, goal, aim, or standard, one that is perhaps unachievable but nonetheless highly relevant not only for classifying and judging political systems but also for fashioning strategies of democratization, designing appropriate political institutions, and so onʺ. An ideal democracy is therefore coterminous with ʺa political system that might be designed for members of an association who were willing to treat one another, for political purposes, as political equalsʺ (Dahl, 2000: 37). Such a system requires certain criteria for effective functioning. This include a set of fundamental human right of citizens, democratic political institution to boost citizensʹ participation in electing representative, to freedom of expression, inquiry, discussion and so on. One important thing is that these rights and opportunities must not just exist as merely abstract moral obligations, but must be ʺenforceable and enforced by law and practiceʺ (Dahl, 1989: 106 – 131; 1999: 35‐43, 83 – 99; 2000: 37‐ 38).

This takes us to the second dimension of democracy. It has to do with democracy in practice, as opposed to it theory.

This becomes the more pertinent because, as Dahl (2000: 38) has also pointed out, ʺhaving rights and opportunities is not strictly equivalent to using themʺ. The mere fact that democratic society concede certain rights, for example to vote and be voted for, to their citizens, does not imply that all qualified citizens will participate in these activities. In reality, there is ample evidence to support this position. For example, Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 10

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empirical studies have shown that citizens do not put much value on actual participation themselves in political life, as exemplified by the experience of European Community as a whole. There, it was found out that ʺaverage over the entire period 1973 – 92ʺ, ʺ17 percent said they discussed politics frequently, and 34 percent said they never do soʺ (Topf, 1995: 61; cf Dahl, 2000:39).

Lamentable this seeming contradiction marks a major problematic about the concept of democracy, which may not be unconnected with its context of origin. Within the context of the Greek City State to which democracy owes it origin as an ideal and a practice, it was for a very long time confined to the borders of Athens. This was at a time when Athens was sustained by the labour of its slaves, who incidentally were in overwhelming majority relative to the free citizens. It would therefore be catastrophic to allow for egalitarianism in the decision making process. This is because such would have enabled the slaves to predominate over their economically superior master but with limited number (see Nnoli, 2003:146).

Hence the Athenian democracy excluded the slaves, as ʺequality, freedom and justice values were to be confined to free citizensʺ. Democracy therefore, within the context of its origin in Athens during the Greek era, was an exclusionary phenomenon, where women and slaves were deprived of any political rights (El‐Din, 2003: 5). In fact, it was such that in another Greek State, Sparta to be specific, which existed about the same time as Athens, the issue of egalitarianism in decision making even among the so called free citizens was absent.

This was due to the threats of revolution from the slaves to Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 11

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upturn the table against the citizens. This led to the emergence of a strong military machine to thwart such a revolution. It was also necessary to be able to crush it if it materialized. Under such a circumstance, as Nnoli (2003:146) has rightly observed, ʺsome, if not most, of the citizens necessarily lose their freedom ʺ and ʺSparta was reputed as a military dictatorship or oligarchy.ʺ

Following the dialecticism that characterizes the history of human society, from the slave through the feudal to the capitalist epoch, nowhere has egalitarianism, fairness and justice have ever prevailed. The ascendancy of bourgeois democracy following the industrial revolution in Europe and the subsequent colonization of colonies particularly in Africa attest to this (El‐Din, 2003: 6). But following the marginalization of the bourgeois by the nobility in the decision making process, their focus shifted from securing favourable conditions of international trade to that of removing the priviledges of the nobility at the political and economic realms so that they could assert their growing influence in society.

Thus such concepts as freedom, equality and justice were conceptualized as inherent to man, sanctioned by arguments of natural law, and found expression in doctrines of natural and human rights (Nnoli, 2003:148).

During the Cold War, the concept of democracy became a part of the propaganda arsenal of both ends of the ideological spectrum – the West led by the United States of America (USA) and the East led by the Soviet Union. Why the former champion a kind of democracy built on liberal philosophy of individual freedom and equality the latter Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 12

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emphasizes what it called socialist democracy where the state calls the shot. Following this classification, the USA reportedly worked assiduously to overthrow the democratically elected working class government of Salvador Allende of Chile in 1973, and supported all forms of anti – democratic regimes in the name of fighting communism (see Nnoli, 2003: 149). The Cold War era also witness the rise of what was called African socialism in Africa as champion by African leaders such as Kwame Nkuruma of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and so on. Thus the concept of democracy assumed some ideological underpinnings that were inimical to theory building and the universalization of knowledge on democracy.

With the end of the Cold War in favour of the West, there has been the ascendancy of liberal democracy on a universal scale, with no competing values (see Fukuyama, 1991). It values include pluralism and multi‐party system, including free and fair competitive politics; popular participation; the rule of law, respect for human rights, and equality of access to all citizens and groups to the state power and resources; gender balance; and constitutionalism, among others (see Osaghea, 1999: 7; Ayoade, 1998: 1‐8). The universalization of this values, with little or no contest from any quarters, would appear to be of a moderating influence on ʺthe clash of civilizationsʺ as espoused by one of the most articulate, influential and original thinker and writer of our time, Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1996). But, this may not be so, if we interrogate further the concept of liberal democracy as an ideological category, which may still possibly Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 13

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recede with time, like all other previous waves of democracy (see Huntington, 1991), considering the level of criticism that has attended it.

Liberal Democracy as Ideology Our understanding of democracy in its current form and character will be enriched if we treat it (liberal democracy) as an ideology. This requires that we first of all have a working definition of what an ideology is all about, as well as its defining character. Basically, an ideology is ʺa systematized and interconnected set of ideas about the socio‐economic and political organization as a wholeʺ (see Lane 1962; cf Nnoli, 2003: 178). Essentially, it serves to provide collective legitimization of governmental actions and/or inactions, as well as a basis for popular mobilization in support of such actions. Characteristically, an ideology often tends to arise in conditions of crisis, is exclusive, absolute and universal; and in the extreme, may be personalized and turn into a sacred belief similar to religious beliefs (Nnoli, 2003: 177 – 183).

If we situate liberal democracy within the context of the foregoing description, one finds that it is largely an ideological phenomenon. For example, the rise of liberal democracy on a universal scale was as a result of the crisis and contradiction of the Cold War era, for the battle of dominance between the West and the East. And since its victory at the end of the Cold War, its waves have continued to spread in an unprecedented manner, such that no region, not even the once impregnable Eastern Europe, is free from its hegemonic penetration. It was so much that the ascendancy of liberal Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 14

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democracy, following the end of the Cold War, has been labeled as ʺthe end of historyʺ, portraying it as ʺthe final form of governmentʺ (Fukuyama, 1991). It has therefore become hegemonic and universal, and fast assuming the status of a ʺglobal religionʺ for the mobilization of citizens internally, as well as citizens and states, in addition to other actors at the international level. This is exemplified by the fact that donor states and institution have now come to link their development assistance/aid to democratization. The same condition has equally been set for any form of concession on the Third World quest and clamour for debt forgiveness/cancellation (see Diamond, 2001; Baylies, 1995: 321‐337; Allen, 1997: 329‐337).

Generally the hegemony of liberal democracy has not been without criticisms. As far back as 1984 when the Cold War was still alive, Barber (1984: 4; cf Saul, 1997a: 230) has forcefully argued that:

We suffer, in the face of our eraʹs manifold crisis, not from too much but from too little democracy… from the time of Toqueville, it has been said that an excess of democracy can undo liberal institutions. I will try to show that an excess liberalism has undone liberal institutions. For what little democracy we have had… been repeatedly compromised by the liberal institutions with which it has been underguided and the liberal philosophy from which its theory and practice has been derived… Liberal democracy is … a ʹthinʹ theory of democracy, one whose democratic values are prudential… means exclusively individualistic and private ends. From these precarious foundations, no firm theory of Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 15

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citizenship, participation, public good or civic virtue can be expected to arise.

Earlier, Huntington (1975; cf Barber, 1984: 95 and Saul, 1997b: 341) has argued that the problems of governance in the United States then stemmed from an ʺexcess of democracyʺ.

For him ʺthe effective operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and non‐ involvement on the part of some individuals and groupsʺ.

Still in the same tradition, Manfred Bienefeld powerfully argues:

Unfortunately genuine democracy is hard to reconciled neoliberalismʹs mystical belief in the magic of disembodied markets, it fierce hostility to the notion of state and society as organic entities capable of defining and pursuing a common interest and its insistence on pervasive deregulation. Under such conditions, the state loses the capacity to manage the economies in accordance with democratically determined social, ethical or political priorities. Only the shallowest and most meaningless democracy will survive in a ʹcowboy capitalismʹ where property rights became virtually absolute because states and electorates are disempowered by the mobility of capital … (Bienefeld, 1995: 17; cf Saul, 1997b: 343).

While these assertions may be general, the African condition is certainly more pathetic. For example, even in the face of glaring possibilities of pervasion and abuse, Africans had had to continue to support the struggle for democracy the Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 16

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continent as a ʺsecond independenceʺ movement. Their hopes of material improvement and political empowerment were recklessly shattered because of the divorce between public policies and social needs. Even where the two converges, poor implementation due to massive cronyism has always been a clog in the wheel. The result is the general atmosphere of democratization of disempowerment prevalent in Africa. As Claude Ake has poignantly pointed out:

Democracy is been interpreted and supported in ways that defeat these aspirations and manifest no sensitivity to the social conditions of the ordinary people of Africa. Generally the political elites who support democratization are those with no access to power, and they invariably have no feeling for democratic values. They support democratization largely as a strategy of power… the people can (only) choose between oppressors and by the appearance of choice legitimize what is really their disempowerment (Ake, 1995: 39 – 40; cf Saul, 1997b: 349).

African resignation to fate is understandable. It was due to their helplessness. For, as Miliband (1994: 190 – 191) has observed, virtually all ʺgovernment in the ʹThird Worldʹ have accepted the hegemonic role of the West and adapted their economic and social policies to it. The price for not doing so is beyond their capacity and their will.ʺ Perhaps, this helplessness explains the fragility of democracy and development across the continent. This is a semblance of what John Saul (1997b: 339 –353) refer to as the ʺfear of being condemned as old fashionedʺ, which has made Africa to Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 17

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follow the path of liberal, at the expense of people/popular democracy. Despite it inherent tendencies towards popular disempowerment, liberal democracy has continued to gain popularity and recognition as the final form of government the world over.

Even as scholars continue to talk about too much or too little of democracy, there is yet the problem of measurement.

Onyeoziri(1989: 80) has pointed out, to say that a political system is democratizing is a theoretical statement. This is because at the level of phenomenal reality, we cannot physically point at the political system and say, ʺthis is democratization going on.ʺ Measurement therefore bridges the gap between a theoretical concept and observational reality. To adequately measure democracy however requires a multiple indicator approach that will capture the entire domains and dimensions of democracy. While such dimensions have engaged scholarly attention (for example, Bollen, 1990; Cutright, 1963: 253‐264; Dinneya, 2003: 137‐177), the problem is still far from being over. It should be noted that these dimensions are institutional, processoral and behavioural, and any good measure must capture all these dimensions. The breakdown of these would include element such as participation, competitiveness, inclusiveness, openness, civil liberty, level of toleration of political opposition, succession credibility, legitimacy standing of government, independence of electoral bodies, mass media and judiciary, quality of governance, level of democratic dividend and the general environment of politics. Again there

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is also the problem of how to assign numerals to, and scale these indices.

Yet, every country of the world today claims to be democratic, even if its democratic credential is not beyond the level of teleguided elections, with little or no chances of leadership alternation, as has mostly been the case in Africa (see Jinadu, 1997; Bratton, 1998; Adejumobi, 2000; Omotola, 2004a). In most cases, this has been partly responsible for the high level of legitimacy deficit among African governments (see Omotola, 2004b) with the protection offered by such façade election it is therefore not difficult to come across several leaders especially in Africa who, except for the simple fact that they assumed office through the ballot of the box, whose results were at best suspect and questionable, are by all standard autocratic in their style of governance. Basic human rights as simple as that of freedom of expression, right to vote and be voted for and the like are not only being violated with impunity, the economic rights of the people particularly the peasants have been effectively mortgaged through the elevation of the capitalist component of liberal democracy to a dizzying height. This is usually done through economic reform agenda built on chronic opportunism and political patronage that made the accumulation of private capital dependent on the state, to the disempowerment of the masses (see Omotola, 2005; 2004c). The argument that democracy is a precondition for development therefore stands defected at least in the African context (see Ake, 1996; 1995; 1994).

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Flowing from the foregoing, liberal democracy can be described as an ideological category, which despite its contradiction and criticisms, has continued to enjoy universal practice. It has continued to be a rallying point within the context of socio‐political and economic mobilization at all levels of governance. Yet there is more to it than meet the eyes. This questions the very usefulness of democracy as a concept.

Attractions and Limitations of Liberal Democracy What then is the concept of democracy good for with reference to Africa? From the preceding analysis, democracy as a concept can be said to serve two useful purposes and interests. First is that of the developed democracies and advanced economies of the West particularly the USA, which emerged as the victor from the Cold War. To consolidate its victory, the USA has to strengthen its values especially liberal democracy that constituted one of the core issues of the Cold War. This was necessary to prevent any possible reversal and by extension erosion of its pyrrhic victory. Democracy is therefore a useful concept for the preservation of Western (American) hegemony across the world. This hegemony is mostly demonstrated through the so‐called democracy aid industry, through which liberal values such as elections and election monitoring are emphasized (Omotola, 2009; 2006; Carothers, 2009).

Second, liberal democracy is also useful for the African countries not only because it has become one of the major conditions for development assistance by donor states and Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 20

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agencies, but also because it serves the interest of African leaders in their quest for power and accumulation of private capital. In order to achieve both development assistance and accumulation of private capital at a minimum cost, the surest bet is for African leaders to be seen as being ʺdemocracy compliantʺ, no matter how pretentious such may be. The most prevalent example of this tendency in Africa relates to the conduct of ritualistic elections, just to fulfill all righteousness, without meeting internationally acceptable standards of democratic elections (Omotola, 2009; 2008; Roth, 2009). These standards can be measured in terms of popular competition, participation and legitimacy (Lindberg, 2004). Assessed against these indices, African elections are far from being democratic. With the notable exception of Ghana, Botwana and South Africa (Gyimah‐Boadi, 2009), African elections are nothing more than the fading shadows of democracy often adopted by autocrats to masquerade as democrats (Roth, 2009; Adejumobi, 2000).

Beyond these, liberal democracy is completely emptied of any meaningful relevance. It is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for development especially in Third World countries in general and Africa in particular. This is because, as Allen etal (1992: 10; cf Saul, 1997b: 348) have pointed out, ʺmuch more commonly, democracy serves as a system through which class domination and various forms of systemic inequalities are perpetuated and legitimized.ʺ In Africa, for example, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s through the 90s represented an example of World Bank and IMF dysfunctional policy prescriptions for Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 21

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Africa. As the SAPs turned out, it further pushed Africa down the margin towards total collapse. These manifested in the form of political, economic and social dislocations, including rising unemployment, urban unrest, poverty, inflation and general decline in the standard of living of Africans. the end result was the excruciating debt burden it inflicted on most African economies and the widening of the developmental gap between Africa and the developed economies (Omotola and Saliu, 2009; Omotola and Enejo, 2009).

Democracy is also both an exclusionary and elitist phenomenon, which marginalizes, nay excludes the masses especially at the economic realm. This is best exemplified by rising official corruption, increasing inequalities between the rich and the poor, and the privatisation of the privatisation process, or what Omotola (2005) calls ‘deregulation of disempowerment’, etc. In fact, democracy, be it liberal or not, is not a necessary attribute of human life because it has not existed from time immemorial. Its origin and growth were embedded in a Western historical context, grounded on the economic and social development of Western societies and to that extent entrenched in capitalist theories (see El‐Din, 2003: 6; Nnoli, 2003: 146 – 149). The fact that it has passed through many waves whereby its contents vary from one epoch to the other, having been known in the Athenian city states system only to disappear and reemerged in a different shape after the industrial revolution (El‐Din 2003; Huntington, 1991) is an eloquent testimony. The Cold War was to later have profound impact on its definition from ones spectrum of the ideological continuum to the other, in addition to its transformed Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 22

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meaning and virtues in post‐Cold War order. Today, main emphasis is placed on elections and related institutional parameters, without adequate attention to more substantive issues of human well‐being and development. This trend, in a sense, reflects what Carothers (2009) calls the political approach to democracy assistance at the expense of the developmental approach. Although he did not call for the abrogation of the political approach, Carothers seems to privildge the developmental approach over the political approach, but calls for a careful merger of the two in a mutually reinforcing manner.

In the final analysis, therefore, the attempt to portray liberal democracy as a universal and inevitable phenomenon, whose character is fairly standardized and perhaps a necessarily attribute of human life is largely unfounded. This development negates the fact and lesson of history. The messianic connotation attributed to it as a precondition for development assistance and by extension development, has not only made it subjective, but also contributed to the high level of autocrats in civilian garbs across the globe especially in Africa. Conceptually, therefore, democracy is analytically vacuous and theoretically ambivalent, difficult as it were to adequately define and measure. In its present form and character, the concept of democracy does very little or nothing to illuminate our understanding of contemporary politics particularly in the Third World. Critical questions pertaining to its contexts of origin and metamorphosis must therefore be raised if the concept would ever be useful both theoretically and practically.

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Conclusion What I have done in this paper is to interrogate the usefulness and otherwise of the concept of liberal democracy in the African context. It would seem, as suggested by the preceding analyses, that the universalistic conception of liberal democracy as one with a fairly standardized values and possibly inevitable to human existence, is not supported by the fact of history and a body of empirical evidence and well‐ constructed theory. Rather, it is merely an ideological category, whose character and form have been everything but constant under its various waves over the years. Thus apart from its usefulness in advancing the interest of the West in propagation of its values, and that of it dependant for foreign aid of various kinds from the Third World, the concept of democracy, to all intents and purposes, serve little or no useful purposes. Indeed, it is a major source of disservice particularly to the developing countries, which pathetically have had to live with it due to their helplessness. With democracy as the only game in town, what these countries need to do is to situate their democratization process within their particularistic and systemic contexts to accommodate their political culture. But as a concept, it is too ideologically laden, analytically vacuous and theoretically ambivalent to illuminate our understanding of contemporary politics in the Third World and beyond.

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References Adejumobi. S. (2000) ʺ Elections in Africa: A fading shadow of Democracyʺ, International Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 59‐75.

Ake C. (1996) Democracy and Development, New York: Brooking Institute.

Ake, C. (1995) ʺThe New World Order: A view from Africaʺ, in hans‐ Henrik, H. and George S. (eds) Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War, Boulder: Westview Press, pp 30 – 48.

Ake, C. (1994) Democratization of Disempowerment in Africa, Cass Monograph Series, No. 1.

Allen, C. (1997) ʺWho Needs Civil Society? ʺReview of African Political Economy, (ROAPE), No. 73, p 329 – 337.

Allen, C. et al (1992) ʺ Surviving Democracy?ʺ ROAPE, No. 54.

Ayoade, J.A.A. (2000) ʺWhat is Democracy?ʺ in Ayoade J.A.A. (ed.)

Democracy: Its Meaning and values, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers Ltd. Pp 1 – 9.

Barber,, B. (1984) Strong Democracy: participatory politics for a New Age, Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Bienefeld, M. (1995) ʺStructural Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy in Southern Africaʺ, in Moore D.B and Gerald, J.S. (eds.)

Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and popular perspectives, London: Macmillan.

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Bollen, K. (1990) ʺPolitical Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Trapsʺ Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 25 (1), pp. 7 – 24.

Bratton, M. (1998) ʺ Second Elections in Africaʺ, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9 (3), pp: 51 –66.

Carothers, T. (2009) “Democracy Assistance: Political Versus Developmental?”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 5‐ 19.

Cutright, P. (1963) ʺNational Political Development: Measurement and Analysisʺ, American Sociological Review Vol. 28 (2), pp. 253 – 264.

Dahl, R.A. (2000) ʺA Democracy Paradox?ʺ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115 (1), pp 35 – 40.

Dahl, R.A. (1999) On Democracy, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl R.A (1989) Democracy and its Critics, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Diamond, L. (2001) ʺInternational Relations: Debt for Democracyʺ, http://www.hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/011/diamond.html, Retrieved 18 March, 2005.

Dunneya, G.E. s(2003) ʺ Constructing a Cardinal Measure of Democratic Development in a Transition Polity: The Nigerian Exampleʺ, Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 29 (1 & 2), pp.

137 – 177.

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El‐Din, I.N. (2003) ʺIn Criticism of the Western Mind and Practices: Towards a New Vision for African Development, African Perspective, Vol. 4 (15).

Fukuyama F. (1991) The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Freedom Press.

Gyimah‐Boadi, E. (2009) “Another Step Forward for Ghana”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 138‐ 152.

Huntington, S.P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster.

Huntington S.P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Jinadu, A. (1997) ʺMatters Arising: African Elections and the problem of Electoral Administrationsʺ, African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2 (1), pp 1‐11.

Lane, R. (192) Political Ideology, New York: Free Press.

Milliband, R. (1994) Socialism for a Sceptical Age, London: Verso.

Nnoli, O. (2003) Introduction to Politics, Revised Second Edition, Enugu: PACREP.

Omotola, J. S. (2009) “ ‘Garrison’ Democracy in Nigeria: The 2007 General Elections and the Prospects of Democratic Consolidation”, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 194‐220.

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Omotola, J. S. and K. E. Enejo (2009) “Globalization, World Trade Organization and the Challenges of Sustainable Development in Africa”, Journal of Development Alternatives in Africa, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 520‐538.

Omotola, J. S. and H. A. Saliu (2009), “Foreign Aid, Debt Relief and Africa’s Development: Problems and Prospects”, South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp.87‐102.

Omotola, J. S. (2008) “Political Globalisation and Citizinship: New Sources of Security Threats in Africa”, Journal of African Law, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 268‐283.

Omotola, J. S. (2006) “The Limits of Election Monitoring: Nigeria’s 2003 General Elections”, Representation, Vol. 42, No.2, pp. 157‐167.

Omotola, J.S (2005) ʺGlobalzing in Poverty: Deregulation of Disempowerment in Nigeriaʺ, Mimeo, Department of Political Science, Kogi State University, Anyigba, Nigeria.

Omotola, J.S. (2004a) ʺThe 2003 Nigeriaʹs Second Election: Some commentsʺ, Political Science Review, Vol. 3 (1 & 2), pp. 126 – 138.

Omotola, J.S. (2004b) ʺExplaining Succession and Legitimacy Crisis in Africa: Colonialism Revisitedʺ, Research for Development, Vol. 20. (1 & 2).

Omotola, J.S. (2004c) ʺEconomic Reform and Sustainable Development: The Tragedy of Nigeriaʹs Simultaneous Transitionʺ, in Fadeyi,African Perspective on Globalization and Sustainable Development, Lagos: Faculty of Social Sciences, Lagos State University.

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Osaghae, E.E. (1999) ʺDemocratization in Sub‐Saharan Africa: Fautering Prospects,New Hopesʺ, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 17 (1),. pp. 2‐ 20.

Osaghae, E.E. (1994) ʺTowards Sustaining Democratic Stability in Africa: The Moral Imperativesʺ, in Omoruyi, O. etal (eds.)

Democratization in Africa: African Perspective, Vol. 1, Benin City: Hima and Hima.

Onyeoziri, F. (1989) ʺOperationalizing Demoocratization: A Multi – Dimensional and Configurative Approachʺ, proceeding of the 16th National Conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association; pp. 80 – 93.

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Robinson, W.L. (1996) Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Saul, J.S. (1997a) ʺLiberal Democracy Vs. Popular Democracy in Southern Africaʺ, ROAPE; No. 72 pp. 219 – 236.

Saul, J.S. (1997b) ʺFor Fear of Being Condemned as Old Fashioned: Liberal Democracy Vs. Popular Democracy in Sub‐Saharan Africaʺ, ROAPE, No. 73 pp. 339 – 353.

Schumpeter J. (1950) Capitalism Socialism and Democracy, London: Allen and Unwin.

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Schumpeter, J. (1967) ʺTwo Concepts of Democracyʺ in Quinton, A (ed.) Political Philosophy, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 153 – 188.

Shivji I. (1991) State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy, Harare: SAPES.

Topf, R. (1995) ʺBeyond Electoral Participationʺ, in Hans‐Dieter, K. and Dieter Fuchs (eds.) Citizen and State, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 52‐79

E‐mail: sholaomotola@yahoo.com Department of Political Science and Public Administration.

Redeemer’s University, Redemption City, Mowe, Ogun State, Nigeria.

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Cultivating cultural change through cinema; Youssef Chahine and the creation of national identity in Nasser’s Egypt Barrie Wharton2

Egypt has long been considered by most commentators as the birthplace of Arab cinema and many of the seminal milestones in Arab cinematic history such as the shooting of the first full‐ length feature film, Layla (1928)3 took place along the banks of the Nile. The golden era of Egyptian cinema began in the late

2

Dr Barrie Wharton, from the University of Limerick, Ireland, is currently a Visiting Fellow at the National Centre for Research on Europe at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. He has lectured widely throughout Europe ( Portugal, Greece, etc) and the Islamic world (Egypt, Iran, etc) and he has published widely in refereed journals throughout Europe, the Middle East and North America. He is a regular contributor to the international press and media on questions relating to Europe and Islam.

3 During the article, all films will be referred to in the first instance in italics by their Arabic title in an English alphabet form followed by an English translation and the year of film release. Subsequent referrals to the same film will be in italics but in English translation form only. In the filmography at the end of the article, all films are referenced in their Arabic language version in English alphabet form followed by an English translation and year of release. All translations are in standard Egyptian Arabic. Any Arabic terms used in article are highlighted in italics and bold script.

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1940’s and continued through the 1950’s and early 1960’s, an era which coincided with the coming to power of Col. Nasser after the Free Officers Revolution of 1952 and the subsequent establishment of Egypt as the cultural fulcrum of the new emerging pan‐Arab doctrine. During this period which ended with the death of Nasser in 1970, Egyptian cinema moved from being a simple entertainment tool for the masses to a role as an instrument of socio‐cultural change. As such, Egyptian cinema became almost a blueprint for the new Nasserist societal vision and the cinema screen brought this vision to a population where high rates of illiteracy hampered written efforts.

Although much more famous internationally for his post‐Nasser work, one of the foremost directors of this period was the recently deceased Egyptian director, Youssef Chahine and this neglected period of his career may in fact prove to be his most important legacy. This neglect is perhaps understandable as Nasser’s sudden and premature death in 1970 led to a rapid demise in what had become perceived as Nasserist cultural policy and in a rapidly changing Egypt, both cultural commentators and Chahine himself shied away from the discussion of his role in what had been perhaps the most important project of national identity creation in modern Egyptian history.

Indeed, when one analyzes the considerable literature available on culture, and more specifically on cinema, in Nasserist Egypt, there seems to exist an almost avowed and deliberate playing down of Chahine’s role in Nasserism. On the contrary, there has been a vast range of academic studies Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 32

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on the role in Nasserist Egypt of his contemporary and sometime collaborator, Naguib Mahfouz4 while the influence on Nasserism of the legendary singer and actress, Um Kolsoum has also been widely documented.5 There are various reasons for this academic obfuscation of the relationship between Chahine and Nasser but foremost amongst them is undoubtedly the contemporary academic obsession with Chahine as an anti‐establishment maverick director whose themes of cosmopolitanism, liberalism and homosexuality mark him out as an anti‐regime figure in Arab society. This obsession was exacerbated by his attack on Islamic fundamentalism in Heya Fawda..?/Chaos (2007) and increasingly, one sees Chanhine posthumously lauded in an erroneous manner as a “Western” director . Admittedly, the aforementioned themes do exist in his most famous work in the West, his Alexandrian quartet, Iskandariyah... lih? /Alexandria…Why ?(1978), Hadduta Misriyah /An Egyptian Tale (1982), Iskandariyah Kaman wa Kaman/Alexandria Again and Again (1989) and Iskandariyah‐New York/Alexandria‐New York (2004) but they do not predominate in these films and play no part in much of his work. In fact, closer examination of Mahfouz won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1988 and this spawned a huge wave of research on his work with the bulk of it concentrating on his work during the Nasserist perios when he wrote his classic Cairo Trilogy and perhaps his best‐known work, Midaq Alley.

5 Indeed, the Institut de Monde Arabe in Paris dedicated a full exhibition in 2008 to Um Kolsoum with much of the exhibition concentrating on her relationship with Nasser and Nasserism.

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Chahine’s complete oeuvre reveals a cinematic master who was far more a poet of marginalization and social inequity than a chronicler of dilettante life in modern Egypt and it is noteworthy that by the time Chahine released the first of this mainly autobiographical quartet of films which is often cited as spanning his career, he had already directed twenty‐eight films and as this article will argue, his most significant cinematic work, albeit not his most celebrated, was already behind him.

In particular, this article will concentrate on three of Chahine’s films which were produced during the Nasserist era and which had in different ways, a profound effect on a national culture and identity which was still in the throes of formation. The first is the seminal Bab al‐Hadid/Cairo Main Station (1958), a film which recreates and distills the upheaval of Col. Nasser’s new Egypt through a series of interwoven and fraught personal relationships in the symbolic location of the country’s largest train station. Second is Al Nasser Salah Ad‐Din /Saladin (1963), the quintessential Arab epic of the Crusades and a thinly‐veiled allegory of the expected triumph of pan‐ Arab nationalism, a paean to the moral certainty of the new regime and almost a hymn to Nasser himself. Finally, this article will examine the daring and ground‐breaking Al‐ Ard/The Land (1969), Chahine’s sadly neglected neo‐realist tour de force which captured the soul of rural Egypt and still stands today as one of the most powerful testaments to social injustice in the annals of world cinema.

To understand the problematic position with the work of Chahine and its role and influence in Nasserist Egypt, one Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 34

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must look primarily at the reception which has been afforded to pan‐Arabist and Nasserist‐era cinema and intellectuals in the post‐1970 period. First and foremost, one must mention that the legacy of this period has been primarily associated with Col. Qaddafi in Libya, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and to a lesser extent, Hafez al‐Assad in Syria, the late father of the current Syrian president. The association between Nasserism and these authoritarian and dictatorial figures has done much to discredit Nasserism as an innovative cultural project and by extension, those that were heavily involved in its creation.

Some such as Naguib Mahfouz, the winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1988, managed successfully to re‐ invent themselves in a new post‐Nasserist Egyptian cultural environment without having to overtly disassociate themselves from or deny their past. Others such as Abderrahman Cherkaoui, who had worked with Chahine and Mahfouz on the script of Saladin, were not as successful and found themselves intellectually marooned in President Sadat’s new infitah capitalist society6 where they were tainted, albeit often wrongly with the stigma of servants of the Soviet Union and intellectually demeaned and debased as mere reactionary mouthpieces of the culturally redundant Nasserist ideology of pan‐Arabism.

Infitah or open door policy was a policy initiated by Sadat which was originally economic but quickly had wide‐ranging socio‐cultural and political ramifications. It involved the opening up of Egyptian society to capitalism and the rejection of Nasser’s socialism. It brought Egypt closer to the United States and away from the Soviet sphere of influence.

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Youssef Chahine circumvented this danger when after a three year hiatus from feature films after Nasser’s death, he released El Ousfour/The Sparrow (1972), a film which clearly points the finger of blame for the calamitous defeat of Egypt at the hands of Israel in the Six Days War of 1967 at the Nasserist political establishment. Indeed, the film was so provocative in its attack on state corruption that Nasser’s successor, Sadat had it banned for two years after its release. However, the film was successful for Chahine as an individual in that he managed to clearly draw a line in the cultural quicksand between his Nasserist past and his future career and as such, The Sparrow becomes a watershed not only in Chahine’s career but also in the trajectory of Egyptian film as its release marks the end of Nasser’s pan‐Arabist cinematic dream as a new generation of Arab directors and producers followed Chahine’s lead and moved towards more introspective, microcosmic visions of their societies in stark contrast with the avowed pan‐national didactic nature and universality of theme and structure which had characterized Arab cinema in the Nasserist era. Highly ironically, The Sparrow was itself an Arab co‐production between Egypt and Algeria but such co‐ productions would be few and far between in the following decades.

However, it is Chahine’s pre‐The Sparrow work which is of principal concern to this article and despite its powerful condemnation of Nasserism, the reality is that Chahine’s career was forged in and helped to forge Nasserist culture and by logical extension, contemporary Egyptian identity. It may have been possible to detach and remove the stigma and yoke Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 36

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of Nasserism from Chahine after 1970 but it will never be possible to remove Chahine from Nasserism.

Born in 1926 in Alexandria into a Christian family, Chahine attended the prestigious and elitist Victoria College from where he progressed to Pasadena Film School in California. As such, Chahine was not a member of the different opposition political groups such as Young Egypt or the Muslim Brotherhood7 but to suggest that he was ambivalent to or ignorant of the great political change that was on the horizon in early 1950’s Egypt would be foolish.

His first three feature films were shot when Egypt was still under British colonial rule but his career really took off after the Free Officers Revolution of 1952 which brought Col. Nasser to power with his accompanying vision of a new Egyptian culture and society. This vision called for a total bouleversement of the hitherto existent class and societal structure through a socialist programme of nationalization and education for the masses in order to create a new, more just society.

Nasser’s utopian vision involved the formation of a new national identity and culture and emissaries were enlisted throughout the respective spheres of Egyptian cultural production and entrusted with the dissemination of the new Nasserist creed. Cinema was one of the principal spheres and from the early days of the revolution onwards, Egyptian Young Egypt was a neo‐fascist group with sympathies towards Nazi Germany while the Muslim Brotherhood which still exists today sought to islamicize Egyptian society and was the breeding ground for many offshoot Islamic radical groupings.

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cinema enjoyed huge government subsidies and production support as long of course as it served the aims of the revolution. Chahine was one of the first directors to benefit from this support and early films such as Sira` Fi al‐Wadi /Struggle in the Valley/The Blazing Sun (1954), in which Chahine discovery, Omar Sharif enjoyed his first main role and Sira` fi el‐Minaa /Dark Waters, Struggle in the Port (1956) stand the test of time as almost propaganda documents of early Nasserist doctrine.

However, it was Cairo Main Station (1958) which would cement Chahine’s reputation as Nasserism’s greatest director and bring his work and by extension, Nasserism to a wider Arab and international audience. Cairo Main Station is a complex and above all, visually rich film, a veritable feast for the eyes. Its frequent long shots echo the influence of Italian neo‐realism as the principal characters are juxtaposed against the tumult and chaos of the real railway station of the title.

Such contrasts mirror the cultural upheaval and radical change which characterized early Nasserist Egypt and perhaps the most moving scenes are occasional ones of complete silence which contrast starkly with the usual incessant noise of the station. One of the most striking and famous images from the film is the shot of the giant statue of Ramses II which stands outside the station with the masses swarming around it and the impact of this shot, which represents the creation of a society of the masses, a dominant theme in pan‐Arabist ideology, remains as powerful and effective today as when the film was first released.

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Cairo Main Station is the story of a simple‐minded man, Qenawi, a disabled newspaper seller in the railway station, a rural peasant cast adrift in the new metropolis. Chahine himself plays the role of Qenawi and despite his privileged upbringing, he imbues his character with an ibn‐al‐balad8 quality which endears him to the audience who identify with his character from the very beginning. Qenawi cuts pictures of women from magazines for the station hut he lives in but the real object of his sexual desire or more correctly, frustration is Hanouma, the beautiful lemonade seller, played by the popular Egyptian actress, Hind Rostom. However, Hanouma is engaged to the handsome Abou Serib, a station porter and trade union organizer, played by Farid Chawqi.

Hanouma playfully but innocently flirts with Qenawi and the confusion this provokes unleashes a wave of tragic violence. This violence results in the death of an innocent girl whom Qenawi kills during a rage in a case of mistaken identity as he attempts to kill Hanouma who has resisted his advances and when he attempts to kill her again, this act inevitably leads to Qenawi being taken away to a lunatic asylum. This allegory for the consequences of the inability to accept and embrace change in Nasser’s Egypt was shocking for Egyptian audiences and after its release, it was shelved for almost twenty years in Egypt but it had succeeded in breaking ibn‐al‐balad, literally a son of the neighbourhood, is one of the greatest compliments one can pay to an Egyptian. In dialect, it varies from area to area but in Irish English, the term “salt of the earth” would be used. The term is used to describe somebody who embodies inherent decency, a type of everyman.

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new ground in Egyptian cinema and its positive portrayal of a “fallen” woman as a heroine was the first time the issue of gender inequality had really been portrayed on the Egyptian cinema screen.

The power of Cairo Main Station is its ability to portray complex political, social and cultural issues in a simple yet always didactic manner. For this purpose, Chahine employs all the classic stereotypes of Egyptian society in the familiar setting of the Cairo railway station, a location familiar with almost all of Egyptian society. Sounds of people greeting and parting, eating and drinking, buying and selling permeate the film and almost lull the audience into a sense of ease and familiarity which makes the end all the more shocking.

Parallel stories permeate the film as we see a selection of vignettes of a changing Egypt which reinforce the film’s message. Porters try to set up a trade union while a feminist gives a speech. A family of rural peasants wander through the station completely lost and adrift akin to aliens in a brave new world while two young lovers arrange a secret rendezvous.

Above all, we see the repeating vignette of the uprooted and isolated Qenawi, an existential loner and silent voyeur, emasculated and doomed by his social condition.

A tale of failed socio‐economic determinism and socio‐ cultural fatalism, Cairo Main Station is a cry for change in Egypt for only radical change can alter the destinies of the protagonists. The final scene in the film, when Qenawi is taken away in a straitjacket through the teeming crowds after he has been persuaded to dress up for a wedding which will never take place, is almost overly melodramatic but indeed, highly Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 40

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emotive and it quickly became seen as a leitmotif for the programme of social justice and reforms which Nasser sought.

If Cairo Main Station linked Chahine to the new Nasserist creed, he became interminable intertwined with its fortunes through Saladin (1963). Ostensibly, a historical epic charting the twelfth‐century defence of Jerusalem by the Arab hero, Saladin against the Christian crusaders, the film is a thinly‐veiled allegory for the yearned for triumph of the pan‐ Arab nationalist ideology of Nasser.

Scripted by Naguib Mahfouz and Abderrahman Cherkaoui, the film was originally titled El Nasser; Saladin but to avoid accusations of overt propaganda, the title is usually shortened. However, the inferred parallel between Saladin and Nasser is glaringly obvious. Saladin is a paragon of peace and religious tolerance, an educated ruler who gives clandestine medical assistance to Richard the Lionheart and guarantees religious freedom for all. A three hour epic, Saladin remains one of the few authentic post‐colonial cultural productions which attest to the glory of ancient Egypt. Indeed, the film is often as cited as the great historical epic of Egyptian cinema with Saladin, the Sultan of Egypt and Syria uniting Arabs across Western Asia and North Africa in order to ward off the Christian crusaders and its appearance in the wake of the Suez crisis was widely interpreted as echoing Nasser’s contemporary harnessing of Arab society against the Zionist enemy.

Chahine never discussed at length Saladin in later years but its interpretation and appropriation of Egyptian history for propaganda purposes cannot be denied. Saladin had already Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 41

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been the protagonist of an Egyptian film by the Lama brothers in 1941 but in colonial times, he had been reduced to a mere action hero in an adventure. Yet, Chahine’s production, in which he appears himself, brings Saladin to a new plane as a symbol of justice and chivalry with the omnipresent slogan of unity resonating throughout the film, striking a direct chord with contemporary Nasserist ideology of the time.

Arab identity is constantly placed above religious affiliation and the character of the Christian, ‘Issa al‐‘Awam is pivotal with his depiction as Saladin’s closest confidante. The film is of course, historically inaccurate and the Kurdish origins of Saladin are never mentioned nor is his predisposition to violence. On the contrary, he is presented in a purely positive manner as befitted the Nasserist discourse on the portrayal of Nasser and as such, one encounters a cinematic work which over thirty five years later, still holds it own alongside the oeuvre of other eminent propaganda directors such as Riefenstahl or Sáenz de Heredia9.

Interestingly, Nasser is said to have resented his portrayal on the screen in such a magnified and deified manner yet, such assertions only give rise to further myths such as that of Nasser as a reluctant and benevolent dictator.10 See Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1935), the film of the 1934 Nazi party rally at Nuremberg and José Luis Sáenz de Heredia’s Raza (1941), a propaganda homage to General Franco’s victory in the Spanish Civil War. 10 This myth of Nasser as a reluctant and benevolent dictator was widely propagated and official pictures of Nasser with children and in civilian dress still predominate.

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Chahine’s final great work of the Nasserist period was The Land (1969), another ground‐breaking work of social realism in the style of Cairo Main Station. Adapted from the 1952 novel of the same title by Abderrahman al‐Cherkaoui, one of his collaborators on Saladin, The Land is a harsh epic about the power of feudalism in rural Egypt as it chronicles the struggle of a group of peasants against the oppression of the local landowner.

In a marked departure from other social realist epics of the post‐war period, The Land shows how political oppression does not necessarily lead to a sense of solidarity amongst the disinherited and as such, the film presents a pessimistic and almost nihilistic view of Egypt on the eve of Nasser’s death, a view which stands in stark contrast to that of Cherkaoui, the author of the original book who was an uncompromising old‐ school Marxist. A politically committed film against the backdrop of a love story and inter‐generational conflicts, it contains numerous memorable vignettes of the social realist genre but its ambivalent ending is disturbing and echoes the vacuum which defeat in the 1967 war and the consequential failure of Nasserist ideology wrought.11

In The Land, one sees the real daily life of the Egyptian peasant. Their accents and clothes are real. One sees their work through the seasons, the sweltering days and cool

The film has strong echoes of early Italian neo‐realism and in particular films such as Vittorio de Sica’s The Bicycle Thieves (1948) and Umberto D (1952).

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nights. For the first time on cinema screens, one sees their cows and chickens co‐habiting with them, their dignity in poverty, their superstitious nature but most of all, their quasi‐ religious attachment to their plot of land. The Nasserist motif of solidarity in community is present throughout but throughout the film, a current of pessimism exists about the prospects for real social change, mirroring the pervading social attitudes of the time as the power of Nasserism was on the wane.

What is really memorable in The Land is the feast of Bertolucci‐like archetypal images which stand as almost a collage to the principal tenets of Nasserist ideology. The most striking is perhaps the long tracking shot of the film’s last scene where the aging villager who has stood up to the tyrannical landlord is brutally punished. His feet are bound with his body tied to the legs of a horse which is ridden by the village sheriff. With his clothes ripped apart and his body bleeding, he is dragged along but continues to clutch at the soil. On analysis of this highly emotive scene, one may question whether he is clutching the soil, refusing to let go, to abandon his land, his home or whether it is the earth that is clutching him.

Whichever way one interprets this deliberately ambivalent ending, one cannot deny that The Land is an immensely powerful and moving film, almost a prelude to the huge funeral of the charismatic Nasser which would take place little over a year later. Moreover, it was the first time the Egyptian peasant, the cornerstone of the nation, had been portrayed on the screen in a realistic fashion and as such, the Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 44

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film fulfilled its Nasserist role of empowering the hitherto silent peasantry with an authentic voice and presence in Egyptian culture.

Yet, despite the obvious social and political content of these three films alongside most of his work, many of the obituaries and tributes on Chahine’s recent death concentrated on his status as a “liberal”, westernized director who opposed the conservative and traditional values of his Egyptian homeland. Such a concentration, albeit erroneous, is principally due to the aforementioned semi‐autobiographical Alexandria quartet, Alexandria…Why? (1978), An Egyptian Tale (1982), Alexandria Again and Again (1990) and Alexandria‐New York (2004), a series of films which have been popular in arthouse cinemas and film clubs worldwide over the last twenty years and which have come to embody Chahine for many critics and commentators.

In Alexandria….Why ?, a patriotic Egyptian soldier kidnaps a British soldier but begins a homosexual relationship with him and then falls in love with his victim whereas in An Egyptian Story, the young protagonist from Alexandria… Why ? is seen at an older age undergoing a crisis of conscience as he awaits heart surgery. Alexandria Again and Again sees Yehia, the original protagonist and Chahine’s alter ego as a successful director who joins an actors’ strike and daydreams about Amir, a handsome young actor whose career he has launched.

However, he then meets the beautiful Nadia and falls in love with her. The quartet ends with the melancholic Alexandria‐ New York which brings Yehia back to America where he

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discovers a lost son but mourns the loss of American innocence and values.

Although successful internationally with the creation of a cinematic portrayal of Alexandria reminiscent of Woody Allen’s homages to New York, one could argue that the quartet is far from being Chahine’s best work and undoubtedly, it is not the most representative of his real talent.

Admittedly, the Alexandria quartet is more accessible than some of his complex earlier work and his participation as a co‐ director in the portmanteau post September 11th production 11ʹ09ʺ01 Eleven Minutes, Nine Seconds, One Image (2002) has only helped to cement this false image of Youssef Chahine in cinematic circles as an ultra‐liberal and westernized Arab director.

However, the truth is that the films of the Alexandria quartet may be amongst the blandest and least meaningful of Chahine’s work. They may appear more polished than The Land or Cairo Main Station but this polish diminishes much of the potency of a director whose real talent lay in his ability to shock and disturb audiences. Chahine’s body of work until the mid 1970’s implicitly embraced the fusion of history and politics with the omnipresence of a strong social conscience and in the tradition of Italian neo‐realism or the French new wave, such films sought to overtly influence and direct socio‐ cultural change. The pre‐quartet Chahine was in the true sense of the word, a revolutionary director and for much of his cinematic life, he worked towards the goals of Nasser’s revolution. As such, one sees the innovative treatment of characters from humble and destitute areas combined with Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 46

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non‐linear plots, a mixture of sociology, psychology and remarkable cinematic individuality in the treatment of subject matter and in technique. With a range in styles and cinematic language from neo‐realism to the surreal to blatant melodrama, Chahine spanned cinematic movements but his engagement was ever‐present and although he would often flirt within the same film with myriad styles and genres, he remained faithful to his preoccupation with the destruction of class distinctions, the question of gender equality and the definition of a new Egypt.

This crucial social committment of Chahine is key to his relationship with the Nasserist regime and it is not until The Sparrow (1972) that he really criticizes it but one must remember that by then, Nasser was dead and the pan‐Arab dream was over. Perhaps tellingly, Chahine squarely lays the blame at corruption in the Nasserist administration for the calamitous defeat by Israel in the Six‐Day war rather than directly at Nasser. In the last scene before the film ends with Cheikh Imam’s haunting theme tune, Nasser announces defeat in the war and his offer of resignation but Chahine’s protagonist, Bahiyya, celebrated in Imam’s song, runs into the street, followed by a growing crowd, shouting, “No, we must fight, we will not accept defeat”.

A pioneer of social realism in the Arab world, Chahine’s work was not only confined to Egyptian themes in this realm of social awareness. In Djamila Bouhired/Djamila, the Algerian (1958), he portrays the Algerian anti‐colonial struggle in a biopic which documents the heroism of the resistance fighter, Djamila Bouhired and his subsequent trial. As such, Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 47

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Chahine’s work alongside contemporaries such as the Algerian Mohammed Bouamari or the Syrian, Nabil Maleh, can be seen as sowing the seeds for the birth of New Arab Cinema in the 1980’s and 1990’s which would become chiefly characterized by its strong commitment to and espousal of the Palestinian cause.

What is important to note here is that Chahine was never vehemently anti‐Israeli and indeed, his positive portrayal of the Jewish community and legacy in Alexandria in Alexandria…Why ? aroused the wrath of many anti‐Israeli hardliners in the Arab world. Yet, he was always a brave and open critic of social inequality and here, he would hypothetically stand ideologically with a Palestinian population. Not simply a mere anti‐colonial or Arab nationalist director, Chahine was brave enough to turn the mirror of criticism upon his own society as in Cairo Main Station or The Land while continuing to point to unjust global systems which were to blame for the fundamental problems in the Arab world.

An avowed secularist, Chahine was appalled by the rise of religious fundamentalism, both Christian and Muslim alike, in his beloved Egypt. This was something he shared closely with Nasser and his rejection of what he saw as forces of ignorance was still openly apparent in his latter films such as El‐Massir/Destiny (1997) and his final film, Chaos (2007). This almost rabid opposition to religious extremism and social conservatism is often wrongly interpreted as the characteristic of a pro‐Western director when in fact, it may on reflection be a natural reaction of angry nostalgia by an artist who was Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 48

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culturally and ideologically formed and moulded in the fires of Nasserist revolutionary rhetoric.

Youssef Chahine’s death in July, 2008 left Egyptian cinema without its colossus but Egypt also lost its eyes, its ears and most importantly, its conscience. Chahine will be remembered for taking on fundamentalism in the contemporary era but he had taken on the yoke of imperialism almost fifty years before with his vision for a new Egypt which he would tragically never see. This eventual failure of Nasserism to realize the project of a new just Egyptian society, based on principles of secularism, tolerance and equality is a historical reality with myriad cause factors but this doesn’t denigrate or diminish in any way the fundamental role of Youssef Chahine in this social, cultural and political project for almost twenty years.

The failure of Nasserism may account for the introspective nature of much of Chahine’s later and ironically, more commercially successful work but his most enduring legacy may be his status as a cinematic conscience for a nation and this was never clearer than in works such as Cairo Main Station, Saladin and The Land.

Chahine, like Nasser, knew that Egypt had to face her memory and by extension, her fears before she could embrace her hopes and her future. Their dreams for the cultural production of a new Egyptian would never come to fruition and would remain a utopian dream, tarnished by political

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oppression.12 Yet, as Nasserist ideology fades into history in a contemporary climate of increasing religious radicalism, the “Nasserist” films of Youssef Chahine such as Cairo Main Station and The Land remain as powerful celluloid advertisements for and testaments to one of the potentially most powerful socio‐cultural ideologies of the last century.

Successive Egyptian heads of state have gone to great lengths to cast off and exorcize the legacy of Nasserism as a socio‐ cultural beacon from contemporary Egyptian society but their efforts will have been in vain as long as the cinema of Chahine survives.

Filmography Baba Amin (Papa Amin) ‐ 1950 Ibn al‐Nil (Nile Boy) – 1951 El Mohareg el Kebyr (The Great Clown) ‐ 1952 Saydat al Ketaar (Lady on the Train) ‐ 1953 Nisaa bila Regal (Women without Men) ‐ 1953 Sira` Fi al‐Wadi (Struggle in the Valley/The Blazing Sun) ‐ 1954 Shaitan al Sahraa (The Desert Devil) ‐ 1954

Nasser was particularly harsh in his political oppression of Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

12

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Sira` fi el‐Minaa (Dark Waters, Struggle in the Port) ‐ 1956 Waddaʹtu Hobbaka (Farewell to Your Love) ‐ 1957 Enta Habiby (Youʹre My Love) ‐ 1957 Bab al‐Hadid (Cairo Main Station) ‐ 1958 Djamila Bouhired (Jamila, the Algerian) ‐ 1958 Hobb lel Abad (Forever Yours) ‐ 1959 Bein Edeik (In Your Hands) ‐ 1960 Nidaa al Oushaak (A Loverʹs Call) ‐ 1960 Rajul fe Haiaty (A Man in My Life) ‐ 1961 Al Nasser Salah Ad‐Din (Saladin) ‐ 1963 Fagr Youm Gedeed (Dawn of a New Day) ‐ 1964 ʹBiyaa El Khawatemʹ (The Ring Salesman) ‐ 1965 Rimal min Thahab (Golden Sands) ‐ 1966 Eid al Mairun (The Feast of Mairun) ‐ 1967 Al Nas wal Nil (Those People of the Nile) ‐ 1968 Al‐Ard (The Land) ‐ 1969

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Al‐Ekhtyiar (The Choice) ‐ ‫ا‬1970 Salwa al Fatah al Saghira allaty Tokalem el Abkar (Salwa the Little Girl who Talks to Cows) ‐ 1972 El Ousfour (The Sparrow) ‐ 1972 Intilak (Forward We Go) ‐ 1973 Awdet el Ebn el Dal (Return of The Prodigal Son) ‐ 1976 Iskandariyah... lih? (Alexandria... Why?) ‐ 1978 Hadduta Misriyah (An Egyptian Tale) ‐ 1982 Wadaan Bonabart (Adieu Bonaparte) ‐ 1985 Al‐Yawm al‐Sadis (The Sixth Day) ‐ 1986 Iskandariyah Kaman wa Kaman (Alexandria Again and Again) ‐ 1989 El Kahera Menawara be Ahlaha (Cairo as told by Chahine) ‐ 1991 Al‐Mohagir (The Emigrant) ‐ 1994 Al‐Massir (The Destiny) ‐ 1997 Kolaha Khatwa (Itʹs Only a Step) ‐ 1998 Al‐Akhar (The Other) ‐ 1999

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Sokoot Hansawwar (Silence, Weʹre Rolling) ‐ 2001 11ʹ09ʺ01 Eleven Minutes, Nine Seconds, One Image ‐ 2002 Iskandariyah‐New York (Alexandria‐New York) ‐ 2004 Heya Fawda..? (Is This Chaos..?) – 2007

Select Bibliography

Abou Shadi, Aly. A Chronology of the Egyptian cinema, 1896‐1994.

Cairo, al‐Majlis al‐Aʹla lil‐Thaqafah, 1998.

Al‐Obaidi, Jabbar A. “Egyptian Film: Gender And Class Violence Three Cycles.” International Journal of Instructional Media, 27.3 (2000) 261‐275.

Armbrust, Walter. “Islamists in Egyptian Cinema.” American Anthropologist, 104.3 (2002) 922‐932.

Armbrust, Walter. “New Cinema, Commercial Cinema, and the Modernist Tradition in Egypt.”Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics. 15.1 (1995) 81‐129.

Baker, Raymond. “Combative Cultural Politics: Film Art and Political Spaces in Egypt.” Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics. 15.6 (1995) 179‐98.

Beattie, Kirk J.. Egypt during the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics and Civil Society. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

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Daney, Serge and Toubiana, Serge. “Alexandrie, parce que.”Cahiers du Cinéma. 431.1 (1990) 44‐52.

Darwish, Mustafa. Dream makers on the Nile: a portrait of Egyptian cinema. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1998.

Gaffney, Jane. “The Egyptian Cinema: Industry And Art In A Changing Society.” Arab Studies Quarterly. 9.1 (1987) 53‐73.

Gordon, Joel. “Days of Anxiety/Days of Sadat: Impersonating Egyptʹs Flawed Hero on the Egyptian Screen.” Journal of Film & Video. 54.2 (2002) 27‐42.

Gonul Donmez, Colin. The cinema of North Africa and the Middle East.

New York: Wallflower Press, 2007.

Jankowski, James. Egypt; a short history. Oxford: Oneworld, 2000.

Jousse, T. “Entretien avec Youssef Chahine.” Cahiers du Cinema. 517.1 (1997) 35‐39.

Kehr, Dave “The waters of Alexandria: the films of Youssef Chahine.” Film Comment 32.6 (1998) 23‐28.

Khan, Mohamed. An introduction to the Egyptian cinema. London, Informatics, 1969.

Khatib, Lina. “Nationalism and Otherness: The representation of Islamic fundamentalism in Egyptian cinema.” European Journal of Cultural Studies.9.1 (2006) 63‐80.

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Kiernan, Maureen. “Cultural Hegemony and National Film Language: Youssef Chahine.” Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics. 15.1 (1995)130‐52.

Klawans, Stuart. “Nine views in a looking glass: Film trilogies by Chahine, Gitai, and Kiarostami.” Parnassus: Poetry in Review. 25.1 (2000) 231‐234.

Le Péron, Serge and Daney, Serge. “Le syndrôme Alexandrie./ Entretien avec Youssef Chahine.” Cahiers du Cinéma. 310.1 (1980)18‐ 25

Malkmus, Lizbeth. “The ʹNewʹ Egyptian Cinema: Adapting Genre Conventions to a Changing Society.” Cineaste. 16.3 (1988)30‐33.

Massad, Joseph. “Art and politics in the cinema of Youssef Chahine.”

Journal of Palestine Studies 28.2 (1999) 77‐78.

Reynaud, Bérénice. “Everywhere desire‐a profile of the works of Egyptian film director Youssef Chahine.” Sight and Sound. 7.8 (1997) 20‐23.

Samak, Qussai. “The Politics of Egyptian Cinema.” MERIP Reports.

56.1 (1977) 12‐15.

Vatkiotis. P.J. Nasser and his Generation. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978.

Woodward, Peter. Nasser. London: Longman, 1992.

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Growing Civic Awareness - Symptomatic Rehearsal of True Democratic Dividend: Lessons from Nigeria’s General Elections of 2007 Franklins A. Sanubi13

ABSTRACT The concept of democratic dividend is a peculiar one among Nigerian politicians whereby political office holders believe that their call to service is occasioned by the need to garner as much of political goods to their electors as possible from the “national cake”. Therefore, there is a popular conception (or perhaps misconception) among the local people that democratically elected public officers are only relevant in as much as they can secure and “graciously” give more of these public goods to them in the respective constituencies for their immediate and long term enjoyments. In this article, Dr. Sanubi, using events at the 2007 state and federal elections as data framework, believes that more than just securing political goods such as roads, health care facilities and education, the awakening of the local people to a civic awareness and responsibility in a growing democracy in which the people are in the driving seat of the determination of political progress in their own state is a more enduring dividend of democracy.

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Franklins A. Sanubi, Ph.D., is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Delta State University in Abraka, Nigeria.

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INTRODUCTION Political apathy, which is the inverse of an active political participation in a democracy, may perhaps be one of the strongest retardations to the development of modern democratic culture in contemporary Nigeria. More than just dispatching election monitors (international observers) during national election periods, if there were any agenda of international concern on Nigeria in the furtherance of the development of a healthy democratic practice in this phenomenally sprawling and fledgling democracy in the entire African continent, the issue of stimulating political awareness (otherwise known as Civic Political Education) among the local people should take precedence. In a society historically shaped in monarchism, authoritarianism, and in fact, where the civil population had over the years lived in perpetual awe of state police and other instruments of political subjugation particularly as expressed in the long years of military domination in domestic governance, the introduction of popular rule (or democracy) is undoubtedly a long and arduous investment to undertake.

The Relevance of Civic Awareness in Democracy Democracy thrives in a politically conscious society where the people (whose popular decision is often expressed at public elections and other democratic forums) are not only aware of their civic rights including those relating to the determination of who takes the government seat of the state at a given time but also have the freedom to exercise those rights. In the Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 57

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advanced democracies, dwindling civic awareness which can easily be implied by an observation of declining voters’ participation at elections usually provide a course for concern to policy makers. For instance, the US Senate in September 2004 resolved, that the Senate‐‐

(1) recognizes and supports all efforts to promote greater civic awareness among the people of the United States, including civic awareness programs such as candidate forums and voter registration drives; and

(2) encourages local communities and elected officials at all levels of government to promote greater awareness among the electorate of civic responsibility and the importance of participating in these elections.

Representative Ralph Hall (R‐TX) at the House session on October 7, 2004 expressed similar view in a proposed resolution that “the percentage of Americans registered to vote unfortunately has declined in recent years…there is no better time to make citizens more aware of one of the greatest privileges we have as Americans – the right to vote.” (108th Congress, 2d Session, S. Res. 434). An effective political awareness programme or the presence of numerous civic awareness organizations and advocacy groups at the federal, state and local level actively promote voter registration and voter participation. In fact, civic awareness helps to stimulate what Thomas Ehrlich (2000) calls a vibrant civic engagement.

Civic engagement is crucial if the people in a democracy are to be seen as responsible for their own societal political progress.

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The American Democracy Project (ADP), (an initiative of 219 AASCU campuses that seeks to create an intellectual and experiential understanding of civic engagement for undergraduates enrolled at institutions that are members of AASCU) defined the goal of the project as the production of “graduates who understand and are committed to engaging in meaningful actions as citizens in a democracy”. According to Ehrlich (2000), Civic engagement means:

working to make a difference in the civic life of our communities and developing the combination of knowledge, skills, values and motivation to make that difference. It means promoting the quality of life in a community, through both political and non‐political processes … a morally and civically responsible individual recognizes himself or herself as a member of a larger social fabric and therefore considers social problems to be at least partly his or her own; such an individual is willing to see the moral and civic dimensions of issues, to make and justify informed moral and civic judgments, and to take action when appropriate.

Political awareness from the foregoing therefore, not only encourages civic engagement but also provides among others, the knowledge that no one person or group of persons can subdue the “popular will of the people”. This is what political scientists call the sovereignty of the state. In defending the sovereignty of the state, the civil population is availed a lot of instruments of check on the exercise of state power by those currently “managing” it. Such instruments include elections, the courts, public opinion, civil/mass actions (as in public Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 59

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demonstrations, press condemnations) among others. Election as an instrument of check on political power can be seen from various perspectives namely; as an enthronement process as in general elections, a dethronement process as in recall, and even a confidence vote as in plebiscites and referenda. In such a traditionally authoritarian society where the people had lived in political apathy especially to elections and other modern procedures of democratic determination, a critical requirement for building a virile democracy is the promotion of a healthy civic education among the people.

Out of Nigeria’s forty‐seven years of independence, only seventeen comes under what may be regarded as “attempts” to practice some form of modern democracy. And with three of such attempts namely 1960‐1966, 1979‐1983,1993‐ 1995 failing to entrench a sustainable democratic culture, and a fourth attempt being currently under test of survival, there are undoubtedly great imperatives to identify those factors, which impede the sustenance of democracy in Nigeria. Civic Education is a panacea to political apathy if the citizens need to understand that their political destiny is in their hands.

With lessons drawn from the conduct of the 2007 general elections by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), we presently explicate herein how the current practice of democracy in Nigeria has yielded (perhaps unexpected) benefits in form of the creation of a strong civic awareness among the Nigerian electors.

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Defining the Dividend of Democracy in Nigeria Except for the international reader who may erroneously see it from the traditionally‐business point of view of corporate investment in stocks, the phrase “dividend of democracy” is a peculiar terminology in Nigeria which means something that is quite a departure from stock trading. In recent time, politicians in Nigeria have expropriated the term “dividend” to imply “payment of one’s own share of the national cake” as a result of participating in the democratic governance in the country at whatever level. It depicts, quite unfortunately however, some far‐reaching negative philosophy of political participation in the country ‐ an avenue for wealth creation and not necessarily as a call to serve. In fact, for most political office holders, “service” is only a medium of self‐ aggrandizement and the building of personal economic base for one’s life expectancy. If anything, “good service” is accidental. In other words, if in the process of a public service, a political office holder (such as a council/county chairman, a governor, a senator, a minister or even a president) finds himself providing some political goods such as good governance, roads, health, education etc, the local people can most often perceive it as window‐dressing for personal enrichment. In fact, some political office holders have indicated, by their personal attitudes, that the provision of such social goods to the people is a privilege and not a right.

In this reasoning therefore, whenever political office holders use the word “dividends of democracy” they are seemingly telling their audience about the amount of social goods they are able to garner and “graciously” provide for their electors Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 61

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such as the amount of schools built with public funds, hospitals or infirmaries equipped or staffed, kilometers of roads constructed and or amount of student bursary payments made while in office. Because of this perception, it is often very easy to picture an average politician in Nigeria as being overtly corrupt. This also makes it difficult to identify who among these political officers is actually called out for service to their motherland. But has the seventeen years of democratic “experiment” in Nigeria yielded any sustainable dividends to the Nigerian elector than mere provision of rudimentary basic social goods as roads, water and education, if any?

Beyond these, we believe that one fundamental “latent” dividend which we may classify as an “unexpected benefit” of the country’s transition to democratic governance, is the growing spate of civic awareness among the Nigerian electors as “manifested” in the recent (2007) state and federal elections in Nigeria. The creation of a strong political education is regarded here as “unexpected benefit” because those whose political activities indirectly yielded this benefit may not have envisaged it. Some so‐called political “stalwarts” had wished that the local people in their community would perpetually remained uneducated and subservient to their (stalwarts’) domineering political magnanimity and the people’s continuing economic and social dependence.

The Political “Dividends” of the 2007 Elections?

The 2007 state and federal elections in Nigeria has become a topical issue, albeit in the international political platform, for policy makers to chew upon. The election represented in many Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 62

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respects, a grievous backslide in Nigeria’s political image and national integrity. It was an election that would already have aroused a popular pessimism by neighbouring and foreign “erstwhile hopeful” friends of the nation, beside its enemies, on the ability of the nation to function, even if less actively, in the contemporary millennial global political and economic settings. It was an election that cast serious innuendoes on the nation’s aspiration to a regional power, let alone an international player in world politics. For a nation that once sought a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (Osagie,2005) the 2007 state and federal elections exposed the nations’ faltering electoral process, which has provided a new alibi to call for the total restructuring of the whole electoral system. Right from the time of its appointment by the executive arm of the government, up to its commencement of preparations for this election, the electoral authority, INEC demonstrated ineptitude and incapability to deliver its assignment thereby portending failure. The process began with the registration of about sixty million eligible voters representing 40.09percent of an estimated 140million national population (as per the figures of the 2006 national population census released by the National Population Commission in early February 2007). Earlier in 2006, there had been discussion and some acceptance of a possible electronic voting during the final elections in 2007. This inspired the electoral body to register “eligible” voters through a photographic procedure whereby voter’s personal and forensic data are embossed in the voter’s registration card apparently to act as check against multiple voting during the Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 63

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election. The photographic process of registration was undoubtedly a more expensive venture compared to the manual registration hitherto used in previous elections. To a great extent, there seemed to be a popular acceptance of this process at least as some measure of advancement of the electoral system. Suddenly however, the final voting was no longer to be the electronic type as the electoral authority had argued that there was insufficient time available to it to test run and perfect the electronic system which, it was already working towards. Thus with the hope of electronic voting jettisoned, INEC was constrained to relapse into the usual manual voting in a peculiar Nigerian system called Open‐ Secret ballot (a system whereby a voter secretly thumb‐prints against the candidate of his/her choice and comes to cast it into a transparent ballot box kept on an open place where everyone around the polling station can see). The elections into seats in Nigeria’s thirty‐six state assemblies and as governors were conducted on Saturday April 14 2007 throughout the country while that into the presidency and the bicameral national assembly (Senate and House of Representatives) were conducted a week later on Saturday, 21 April 2007.There were a total of 120,000 polling stations nationwide each containing a segment of the 60 million registered voters’ names. The final conduct of election and the aftermath was quintessentially deplorable as demonstrated by various observers. Two views from credible international monitors amongst a flood of other observers are incisively summative of the 2007 elections.

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Firstly, the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU‐EOM) faulted the conduct of the general elections saying:

the election fell far short of basic international and regional standards for democratic election.

The Election, according to the mission, was “marred by poor organization, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities and significant evidence of fraud, particularly during the result collation process”. EU‐EOM also listed “voter disfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal condition for contestants and numerous incidents of violence as other major features of the elections” concluding;

as a result the elections have not lived up to the hopes and expectations of the Nigeria people and the process cannot be considered to have been credible.

The observation that polling started late throughout the country due to the late arrival of materials and INEC officials while voting was not conducted at all in many areas, was characteristic. The EU‐EOM observers also reported that at least 200 people, including candidates and policemen were killed in election‐related incidents, adding that thugs were widely used to create a significant degree of fear and intimidation. It regretted that, “INEC, which was financially dependent on the executive, did not prepare well for the election and does experience widespread lack of confidence Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 65

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among election stakeholders in relation to its capacity and impartiality”, noting that ”the quality of final voter register was poor and included under aged voters, double entries, missing and blurred pictures of voters”. The EU‐EOM fearing probable mass reprisals quickly urged aggrieved candidates and political parties to demonstrates calm and explore the legal mechanism to seek redress and called on the relevant authorities to investigate allegations of irregularities. It equally called for an immediate action to establish what it called “a truly independent and capable election administration”. For the confidence of voters to be restored, the mission called for the demonstration of political will by the federal and state governments to end the practice of hiring thugs to perpetuate electoral violence (Vanguard:2007) The second credible international observer at the election that we shall consider here is the National Democratic Institute (NDI), which described the election as a “failed process”. Ms Madeleine Albright, the leader of the international election observer team, described the election as a failure stating, “in many places and in a number of ways, the electoral process failed the Nigerian people. The cumulative effect of the serious problems the delegation witnessed substantially compromised the integrity of the electoral process…the polls were flawed by several shortcomings, including unprecedented delays, early close or failed opening of the polls, which served as a “fundamental barrier to popular political participation and most likely, disenfranchised many prospective voters”. Other flaws observed included ballot snatching and stuffing, supply of Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 66

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inadequate polling materials, underage voting, lack of secrecy, unverifiable electoral documents and involvement of security agents in manipulating the electoral process among other flaws which, Albright believes has further “eroded citizens’ confidence in the electoral system” while the 2007 polls represents a “step backward in the conduct of elections in Nigeria”, But the striking part of the NDI’s report is the one relating to the judiciary, legislature, civil society and vibrant media which it believes gave rise to hope.(NDI: 2007). The report commended the “disciplined posture” of the electorate before and during the elections, adding that aggrieved parties should seek redress through “peaceful and constitutional means” before May 29. The group proffered a five‐point solution to the pitfalls recorded, including early preparations, effective and credible judiciary, expeditious prosecution of poll cases and respect for the rule of law. It stressed that the INEC must ensure speedy correction of the identified “technical failings” before future elections are held.

Beside these observations, there were a flood of domestic protests (with attendant demonstrations by various segments of the society including women) coming from aggrieved parties, among which were the nation’s foremost labour unions, the Nigerian Labour Congress and the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria which even stressed that the “new president will lack legitimacy” (NLC,2007) and a greater part of the electorate majority of who expressed complete disenfranchisement during the elections.

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Civic Awareness in the 2007 Elections – A Truer Democratic Dividend Civic response to the 2007 state and federal elections in Nigeria showed that, by and large, the citizenry is growing tremendously in civic awareness. There has not been any election in Nigeria with such a massive civic engagement as reflected in the year’s voter’s turnout in its history of elections depicting a burning desire and hope by the electorate that its mandate is reflected in the enthronement process of new state and national leaders. Whether or not, this desire was fulfilled in the 2007 state and federal election remains a crucial matter of concern for democratic watchers of Nigeria. Yet, for once in its history of elections in Nigeria, the electorate was able to discern between credible and incredible candidates. It was an election in which money factor (especially as a bait on voters) was very minimal, if not completely absent. If anything, money politics was practiced at the middle and upper levels of the political class. Massive domestic media coverage of elections, especially by privately owned organizations) was unprecedented. Perhaps the many years of social and political anguish and countryside economic poverty have whipped up the political consciousness of the people to determine its destiny by the ballot. Another striking element of the civic awareness in the 2007 elections was the emergence of informal political organizations popularly known (especially in the Niger Delta regions) as Political forums. During the three years preceding the conduct of the 2007 state and federal elections, some of the key players in the domestic politics of the local communities, especially those who participated in Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 68

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securing some dividends of democracy for their local people, with an intention to use them as platforms for prosecuting further political ambitions, have mobilized their community members into forming strong political associations where the political stakes and other objectives of the respective communities are articulated and projected. By the eve of the 2007 elections, there were countless numbers of political forums. In fact, each local community has a political forum named after the community under which the political aspirants from the community launch their political campaigns. The Urhobo Political Forum in the Niger Delta for instance became the forerunner of the establishment of a plethora of political forums among the Urhobo ethnic communities including Uvwie Political forum, Udu Political Forum, Oghara Political Forum amongst others. This development is also characteristic of other regions in the country not just the Niger Delta alone.

Conclusion The enormous political awareness demonstrated in the 2007 state and federal elections show that despite its present inability to enforce its will on the current awful election process, in no distant future, election fraudsters would be completely overwhelmed by an overriding will of the people to enforce it choice of candidates at public elections in Nigeria.

A highly civically aware society would constraint election manipulators to apply the rules of the political game at public elections. Public elections in such a state would be meaningful and truly representative of the people’s choice at elections and Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 69

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prevent the glaring practice of political disenfranchisement and denial prevalent in the current dispensation in Nigeria. By that time, there will be no need for external assistance in determining credibility in elections in the country because the people can then enforce their popular will on the state whenever any anomalies were observed, even in the face of threats and intimidation from statutory authorities. Civic awareness therefore is the major instrument required in attaining a sustainable democracy in Nigeria. This to us is a symptomatic rehearsal of a better democratic dividend, which the 2007 state and federal elections have bequeathed to the teeming population of helpless Nigerians in their quest for a better democratic culture.

References American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU)(2006) American Democracy Project ADP @ http://www.aascu.org/programs/adp/

American Congress (2004) (108th Congress,2d Session, S. Res. 434)Washington D.C.

Ehrlich, T.(2000) (ed.)Civic Responsibility and Higher Education, American Council on Education/Oryx Press(Preface, page vi) and (Introduction, page xxvi).

NDI( 2007) Interim report of the National Democratic Institute on the 2007 Nigerian general elections.

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Nigerian Labour Congress (2007),New President will lack legitimacy, Vanguard, Tuesday, 24 April,Vanguard Media Limited, Apapa, Lagos, P.7

Osagie, E. (2005), Repatriation of Nigeria’s financial assets held abroad by Nigerian officials for national development. Paper presented at a one‐day Workshop on National Awareness on the UN Reforms, Benin City,June 22, The Presidency/Faculty of Social Sciences University of Benin.

Vanguard (2007) The election was a failure, The Daily Vanguard, Vanguard Media Limited: Apapa, Lagos Tuesday, 24 April, P.5

Franklins A. Sanubi, Ph. D Department of Political Science, Delta State University, P.M.B.1, Abraka, Nigeria E‐Mail: Sanubi@yahoo.co.uk Telephone: 234‐80‐34089467

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The Niger Delta in Nigerian Nation-Building, 1960-2005 John H. Enemugwem14

Keywords Civil‐war, governance, legislating, science, states‐creation, technology.

Abstract This work highlights the various methods employed by the Niger Delta peoples in nation‐building. In the First Republic they propounded the twelve states structure of the Nigerian Federation. Then in the civil war period, between 1967 and 1970, they were the cornerstone of the victory of the Federal Troops as well as saving lives in the defunct Republic of Biafra. Their activities in the post‐war years were towards the rehabilitation and reconstruction programme of the Federal Government of Nigeria. This gave them the opportunity to establish many things including the Rivers State Secretariat, gas turbine, Sea School, the pioneer University of Science and

Dr John H. Enemugwem is Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

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Technology in Nigeria and free education. These contributions are indelible and yearn for historical documentation.

Introduction Okilo (1992:1) defines nation‐building as the process of developing a country in a way that would satisfy the needs and aspirations of the nationals. The good activities in this regard usually bring great changes not only in something new but also what can move the country forward. According to Carr (1952), without nation‐building inculcating a new order, a set of values in the economic, political and social life of the inhabitants of a country, the sovereignty of that nation would not be realized. Hence, every nation that wants to maintain its sovereignty needs active nation‐builders. And so is Nigeria whose nation‐builders from the Niger Delta joined others from other parts of the country to contribute towards the existence of this largest black nation in the world.

The Niger Delta people were in the art of nation‐ building for over forty years, 1960‐2005. Their motivation stemmed from their forebears that occupy nine‐tenth of the Nigerian coastline. Because they were exposed to international commerce with Europeans, they contributed to the political foundation of Nigeria from 1830 to 1960. This includes their active participation in the independence movement during the colonial period, 1900‐1960. As soon as independence was achieved in 1960, they and others were in the task of nation‐ building which only few aspects of their contributions are documented in this work.

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The First Republic and the Twelve States Structure of Nigeria, 1960‐1967 The post‐colonial period started in 1960 and witnessed the Niger Delta revolutionaries in nation‐building. They were not contented with the refusal of the Imperial Government to create more States in colonial Nigeria. After Eyo Ita’s campaign for ethnical states during the Macpherson Constitutional Conference before 1951 and that of Biriye in the 1957 London Conference, they saw the independence period of the First Republic of Nigeria, 1960‐1967, as an opportunity to continue their agitation for it. Hence, an Ijo NCNC member of the Federal House of Representatives for Opobo‐South, Chief U. O. Ekeneokot of Obolo (Andoni), raised a motion for the creation of more states in the Nigerian Federation with emphasis on a future Rivers State. Although it was carefully noted, it did not receive the immediate approval of the NCNC‐ NPC coalition government (Amini‐Philips, 2005: 147‐150).

In 1966, the Rivers Leaders of Thought delegated Dr. Isaac John Fiberesima (1906‐1986) of Okrika whose position as the pioneer medical doctor in Okrika advanced the study of medicine in the Niger Delta, Chiefs Harold Dappa‐Biriye, Wenike Briggs and Dr. W. T. Wakama to the Eastern Nigerian Consultative Assembly at Enugu. The research of Daminabo (2006) showed that the issue discussed also bordered on the creation of Rivers State. They furthered their demand into the military regime in 1967 when Chiefs Harold Dappa‐Biriye of Bonny and Zumoh Efeke of Amassoma launched a campaign in Northern Nigeria for the division of the country into twelve states structure. Opara (1997:36‐37) documented the support of Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 74

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the Northern Nigerian politicians. The suggested formula of these Niger Delta men, six states each in the North and South, was the policy adopted by the Federal Military Government headed by General Yakubu Gowon in creating the twelve states structure of the Nigeria Federation in May 1967.

Saro‐Wiwa (1989: 257‐266) stated that the memorandum which created the enabling environment for the Nigerian Government to create more states in 1967 was prepared on 10 September 1966 and signed by the Niger Delta Ijo and their neighbours. In the Niger Delta delegation to the Federal Government for this feat were Chief Harold J. R. Dappa‐Biriye, Messrs. Emmanuel J. A. Oriji and Wenike Opurum Briggs. The signatories for the creation of Rivers State were S. N. Dikibo (Chairman), Dr. Isaac J. M Fiberesima (Degema Division), Barrister Nwobidike Nwanodi (Ahoada and Port Harcourt Divisions), Barrister Robert P. G. Okara (Brass Division) and Mr. Graham B. C. Otoko of Obolo (Andoni) signed for (Opobo Division).

It became one of the major causes of the Nigerian civil war when some groups in the eastern part of Nigeria disagreed with this novel structure of the federation. The bone of contention was the creation of Rivers State which goes with Port Harcourt, the petroleum city of Nigeria, as the state capital. In order to redeem it the architects of the defunct Republic of Biafra saw civil war as imminent. This enlisted the reaction of some Niger Delta revolutionaries whom proved their mettle in the battle field.

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The Nigerian Civil War and the Niger Delta Contributions, 1967‐1970 During the Nigerian civil war the contributions of Harold Jeneibiwari Rowland Dappa‐Biriye (1920‐2005) formerly Wilcox of Bonny had remained prominent. Etekpe (2004) demonstrated Biriye as a brain behind the victory of the Federal troops in the civil war. He toured abroad and won the British and Russian support for Nigeria. To this end, an Ijo man, General George Kurubo of Bonny, was appointed Nigeria’s ambassador to the USSR to deepen the Russian commitment to Nigeria. In the same year, 1967, Dappa‐Biriye was appointed a member of Nigeria’s delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. This enabled the U.N. to mediate in the Arab‐Israeli conflict through the passing of Resolution 242 of the United Nations Organisation.

In addition, his Chairmanship of the National Council for Arts and Culture in Nigeria, 1975‐1978, would be remembered for two things. First is the World Festival of Arts and Culture for Blacks (FESTAC) that took place in Nigeria in 1977. Second, he used the opportunity of the post‐colonial Nigeria to cement the unity of the Negro world.

Within this independence period, the Ijo also produced the pioneer revolutionaries that advanced the political development of Nigeria. Their feats were eloquent during the years. Prominent amongst them were Isaac Adaka Boro, Samuel Owonaru, Nottingham Dick, George Amangala, Boardman Nyananyo, Sylvanus J. S. Cookey and Geoffrey L. Uzono. They symbolized Ijo struggle for self‐determination on the one hand and Ijo supreme sacrifice and commitment for Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 76

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the unity of Nigeria. Indeed their collective and individual activities are vital in history. It is a common knowledge that their salvaging roles in the liberation of the Niger Delta region during the civil war brought the Federal troops to victory.

Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro (1938‐1968) was the icon of the struggle. Prior to his revolutionary martyrdom, he had identified the problems of his Ijo ethnicity and that of Nigeria.

Boro was the first Nigerian to undertake an armed struggle against the Nigerian State. It was to illuminate and demonstrate to the world the exploitation and oppression of the Ijo. In the course of it, he and some of his Niger Delta Volunteer Force of 159 men were arrested, charged for treason, sentenced to death and later commuted to life imprisonment (Tebekaemi, 1982). The threats of Ojukwu’s rebellion to undermine the indivisibility of Nigeria forced Gowon’s administration of Nigeria to pardon and enlist them into the Nigerian Armed Forces. Hence, they justified the Federal confidence in the Ijo and reinstated the unity of Nigeria.

Although Boro died in the struggle of defending the Nigerian Federation, he was not alone. He enjoyed the tremendous support of his contemporaries like Nyananyo.

According to Nyananyo (2006: 1‐2), Boardman Nyananyo (1932‐1967) was named Esinkuma, meaning, “fear not”. From his early education at Mamfe in Cameroon and at the Kalabari National College Buguma, he displayed much brilliance in mathematics that his peers nicknamed him “Boardman”. After his Senior Cambridge Examinations that he passed in flying colours, Esinkuma was offered scholarship

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distinguished himself and completed his programme in record time with Master of Arts degree in Mathematics and Diploma in Education. This distinctive achievement endeared St. Andrews to offer him a job that he did for three years.

Boardman returned to contribute to the development of Nigeria, in 1963. He taught Mathematics at Priscilla Memorial Secondary School (PMSS) Oguta and Federal Government College Warri.

It was at Warri that he and his friend, George Amangala left and enlisted in the Nigerian Army. Their enlistment sensitized the Ijo youth who went through the creeks to Lagos. As a result, the famous Bonny Camp Training Centre was established in Victoria Island for the military training of volunteers from Ijo land. The aftermath is that they contributed to the success of the Federal troops with their rich knowledge of the Niger Delta terrain. The quintet, Nyananyo, Amangala, Boro, Owonaru and Dick who were commissioned officers in the Third Marine Commando had a fulfilled mission of landing in Bonny in July 1967 and liberate all Ijo land before December 1967 (Awoala 1983).

However, the contributions of Nyananyo can rarely be forgotten. This gallant Army Major used his mathematical training to estimate the enemy positions. Nyananyo (2006:2‐4) revealed that whenever the secessionists shell, he will ascertain the position from whence the shell came and encourage the Federal troops to set their equipment to the required distance. By this method of Nyananyo, the enemy was always wiped out. Unfortunately and except Owonaru, he and his above named friends were killed during “mopping Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 78

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up” operations in Bonny in December 1967 and late 1968. In 1982, the Shehu Shagari administration of Nigeria awarded Nyananyo the posthumous national award of the Member of the Order of the Niger (MON). This was in recognition of his gallant soldiering, brilliance and contributions to the victory of the Federal troops in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967‐1970.

Coming to the role of Cookey during the war period, Anokari (1984: 37‐38) posits that he was the Provincial Administrator of Opobo Province and Commissioner for Special Duties in the defunct Republic of Biafra. His primary responsibility was to negotiate for assistance from the foreign relief agencies. As a result, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Council of Churches (WCC) and Caritas International were sending relief supplies to Biafra. It is also to the credit of Cookey that he undertook negotiations with Presidents Houphouet‐Biogny of Ivory Coast, Albert Bongo of Gabon and Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, among others to recognize and support this defunct republic. Their assistance ranges from medical facilities and drugs to the evacuation of the sick children from the war affected areas to these countries for treatment. Some were sent to Sao Tome.

After receiving medical attention, they were sent to school there until the end of hostilities when it was imminent for them to return to Nigeria and witness Two gentlemen were working closely with Cookey in the Opobo provincial office. They were the Provincial Secretary, Mr. Chukujiekwu from the present day Enugu State, and the Intelligent Officer, Mr. Geoffrey Lysias Uzono of Obolo (Andoni) in the Niger Delta. Before Opobo fell to the Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 79

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Federal Troops in 1968, these two gentlemen protected the interest of the Andoni and Ibani Ijo groups against molestations by the secessionist forces for supporting the federal cause. According to Uzono (1987:1‐2), in addition they championed a massive educational advancement campaigns that finally put these groups in the front burner of their regional politics and gave them a voice in the post‐war Nigerian nation‐building. Both Uzono and Chukujiekwu were motivated on the fact that a nation, community and family are recognized by its qualitative elements in nation‐building and not by its number of human beings.

The Niger Delta in the Post‐War Nation‐Building, 1970‐ 2005 In the post‐war years, 1970‐2005, Nigeria was not without the nation building of the Niger Delta revolutionaries since many of them were governors, legislators and paramount rulers. At this period were Alfred Papapreye Diette‐Spiff who was a naval officer, later Military Governor of Rivers State in the post‐war years and monarch of Twon‐Brass and Chief Melford Obiene Okilo. Others were Chief Ada George, His Royal Majesty King Owen Sylvanus Ukafia‐Ede VI and Chief Richard Aiyetowonwo Jolowo. While there were many of them, this paper could only take this number because of the economy of pagination. Some of them started their roles during the Nigerian civil war.

First among these equals is King Alfred Papapreye Diette‐Spiff (1942‐ ) who played several roles as a statesman, distinguished seaman, ex‐naval commander and currently the Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 80

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paramount ruler of Twon (Brass) in Bayelsa State. According to Ayotamuno (2006:12), Spiff initiated the training of divers as a specialized unit to meet the critical operational needs of the Nigerian Navy which he was a naval officer. A good number of top naval officers benefited from this legacy and grew to command ships while some became Chief of Staff Nigerian Navy at various times. In later years when Spiff became the first Military Governor of Rivers State, 1967‐1975, he replicated this fact by establishing the Nigerian Sea School, Isaka, for the training of seamen. He also set up the Rivers State Diving School under the then Ministry of Works and Transport.

Motivated by his flare for special boat operations in patrols and intelligence, Spiff was instrumental for the creation of an Amphibious Brigade in the Nigerian Army. He seconded some men to train as amphibious personnel. This feat endeared the Army High Command to see the need for an amphibious operation and establish it without delay. Being the first Military Governor, Commander A. P. Diette‐Spiff carried out two feats that moved Rivers State forward. He implemented the Federal Government’s policy of resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction in the Rivers State. Second, the Rivers State secretariat and other infrastructures built by his administration put the State on the fast lane of development (Daminabo 2006).

Following the trend was Chief Melford Obiene Okilo, a career politician and first civilian Governor of Rivers State, 1979‐1983. Oral history stated that after his birth in Amakalakala‐Ogbia, and training in various institutions, he Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 81

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taught briefly before wining parliamentary elections in 1959 into the Federal House of Representatives under the ticket of the Niger Delta Congress (NDC). This minority opposition party in the defunct Eastern Nigeria was founded and led by Chief Harold Dappa‐Biriye. It is instructive to note that the alliance between the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) facilitated Okilo’s appointment as Parliamentary Secretary to the then Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Tafawa Balewa. As a result, he is known to have played a leading role in the national development of Nigeria. He was committed to the unity of his country when he won the 1959 election as the only southerner in alliance with the NPC. Prior to this time, southerners and northerners were craving for the split of Nigeria but his election shows that they were in need of each other (Awoala 2003).

In the post independence Nigeria, Okilo doggedly contributed to the fight for the restoration of fiscal federalism during the Second Republic. Particularly along with Professor Ambrose Alli, Second Republican Governor of the Bendel State, they instituted a legal action against the Federal Government and restored revenue allocation formula by derivation in Nigeria. Chief Melford Okilo as Governor of Rivers State, 1979‐1983 assuaged the feeling of neglect, deprivation, backwardness and poverty that characterized the Ijo peoples and pioneered some schemes aimed at facilitating development in the Niger Delta area. These include the establishment of the first independent electricity power plant in the southern part of the country, the Imiringi gas turbine Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 82

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that is now supplying electric power to the present Bayelsa State. Others are his aggressive policy of canalization, flooding and erosion control complemented with the establishment of an Institute of Flood and Erosion Control and the establishment of the first Nigerian University of Science and Technology as a foundation towards technological advancement of the country (Daminabo 2006).

In the Third Republic of Nigeria, the contributions of Chief Rufus Ada George were imminent. According to Ayotamuno in a personal communication, Chief Ada George of Okrika (1940‐ ), a professional accountant, became Secretary to the Government of Rivers State in the Second Republic. By 1991, he was elected Executive Governor of Rivers State in the Third Republic that was suddenly terminated in 1993. His twenty months administration sponsored the Rivers Chiefs and Peoples Conference (RCPC) to the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1993. The outcome of it led to the establishment of the Rivers State Environmental Protection Agency (RSEPA) that provided the framework and personnel for the subsequent creation of the Ministry of Environment in Rivers State. He identified and opened up new roads as a veritable strategy for expanding Port Harcourt to meet the population influx.

Of importance to the Ijo in the new millennium are the struggles of His Royal Majesty King Owen Sylvanus Ukafia‐ Ede VI (1933‐ ) of Obolo (Andoni) towards the political development of Nigeria. Ukafia‐Ede VI, Paramount Ruler of Eastern Obolo Local Government Area, Akwa Ibom State, was trained at the Nigerian Institute of Journalism, Lagos. Jeffreys Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 83

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(2006) aptly stated that after distinguishing himself in investigative journalism, advanced reporting, press law, he served many media houses between 1952 and 1980 before he retired as a news editor. Ukafia‐Ede was reputed in practical journalism and accurate reporting. He used his position in the Nigerian Chronicle, Calabar, to mould some young journalists into geniuses. Amongst them were Ray Ekpu, now proprietor of Newswatch Weekly Magazine; Nick Fadugba, editor of a London based magazine; Nnamso Umoren, Patrick and Kate Okon who ended up as permanent secretaries as well as Clement Ebri that latter became Governor of Cross River State in the Second Republic.

Ukafia’s role in the Nigerian Civil War between 1967 and 1970 was immense. As a tall gentleman with strong disposition, respectability and integrity, he steered Eastern Obolo affairs during this period and was a force in the eastern fringe of the Niger Delta. His journalism contributed to the victory of the Federal Troops. He also went on an enlightenment campaign of the neighbouring villages where the Eastern Obolo refugees had sojourned and persuaded them to return to their homes. Then, Eastern Obolo (Andoni) was deserted owing to the death of 105 indigenes during the liberation of the area by the Federal Troops on Sunday 31 March 1968. Ukafia‐Ede also reactivated the daily market, educational institutions with free education and the Eastern Obolo Clan Council of Chiefs. He had so much influence and respect that put Eastern Obolo in the front burner of the Niger Delta. Eastern Obolo owes its existence to this singular effort (Abia 2003:3).

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As soon as he retired from active journalism in 1980, he ascended the most ancient Eastern Obolo throne with innovations. As such, King Ukafia‐Ede VI is the first Andoni monarch to work‐up his throne from third class to first class institution. He was recognized by the Government of Cross River State as the Village Head of Okoroete Town in 1981 and Clan Head of Eastern Obolo (Andoni) in 1987. In 1987, Akwa Ibom State was created with Eastern Obolo (Andoni) as a part.

He used the opportunity to crave for the creation of Eastern Obolo Local Government Council that materialized in 1996 before he was elevated to Paramount Ruler of Eastern Obolo Local Government Area by the Military Administrator of Akwa Ibom State, Group Captain John Ebiye in 1999 (Ukafia 2004).

This pioneer first class monarch in Obolo (Andoni) was the Chairman of the Akwa Ibom State Council of Chiefs and Traditional Rulers between 2003 and 2004. While in this position, Ukafia‐Ede’s innovations were the one thousand naira (N1, 000.00) Nigerian currency note issued in 2005 in honour of late Dr. Clement Isong, a former Governor of the Central Bank. This came up in his welcome address to President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria during the latter’s visit to Akwa Ibom State in August 2004. Second, he used the same welcome address to prevent Obasanjo’s administration from transferring some oil wells in the Niger Delta to neighbouring States. With these in view, the dynamism of King Ukafia‐Ede VI from journalist to traditional ruler contributed to the development of Nigeria (Ukafia 2004).

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Another Nigerian patriot from Ijo extraction is Chief Richard Aiyetowonwo Jolowo (1960‐2004) of Ajakpa in Arogbo, Ese‐Odo Local Government Area of Ondo State. He read Law at the University of Lagos and graduated with L.L.M. in 1973. Personal communications with Dr. Z. B. Agbede revealed that within his period in the university, he represented Nigerian students in the Conference of National Affairs in Texas, USA in 1969. After graduation, Jolowo became a Member of the Ondo State House of Assembly in 1979 and rose to the position of Speaker from 1981 to 1983.

According to Agbede (2004), Chief Richard Jolowo headed the National Poverty Eradication Programme in Ondo State between 2001 and 2003 and the State Christian Pilgrims Welfare Board until his death in 2004. He built the road linking Oroto and Ajapa and the Ajapa Basic Health Centre.

He also contributed enormously to the establishment of Okhubama High School, Ajapa; Community Grammar School, Biogbini; Eliki Model College, Addoseimo; Arogbo Grammar School and St. Arenitan Memorial High School. Ijaw language that is now taught in primary schools in Ondo State as well as broadcasting it in the Ondo State radio is his making. The demand and creation of Ese‐Odo Local Government Council is also entirely his effort.

Conclusion Going by the forgone analysis, the Niger Delta revolutionaries were in the Nigerian nation‐building between 1960 and 2005.

Within this period their efforts in the realization of the creation of twelve states in the Nigerian Federation was laudable.

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Thereafter, they went into other aspects of nation building alongside with other Nigerians and played a leading role that ensured the victory of the Federal Troops in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967‐1970. In the post‐war period, 1970‐2005, they are known to have established the first university of science and technology in the country.

Bibliography Abia, Prince (2003). “Citation of His Royal Highness King Owen Sylvanus Ukafia‐Ede VI, Paramount Ruler of Eastern Obolo LGA, Akwa Ibom State,” (Uyo: MSS, 2003).

Agbede, Z. B. (2004). “Chief Richard Aiyetowonwo Jolowo (1960‐ 2004),” (Arogbo: MSS, 2004).

Amini‐Philips, Isaac (2005). A Synopsis of the Founding Fathers of Old Rivers State, (Port Harcourt: The Blueprint, 2005).

Anokari, Nimbari B. (1984). “A Profile of Professor Sylvanus Cookey,” The Pytons Eye: A Journal of the History Students Association, University of Port Harcourt. No.2 (1983/1984).

Asiegbu, J. U. J. (1984). Nigeria and Its British Invaders, 1851‐1920: A Thematic Documentary History, (New York: NOK, 1984).

Awoala, E. B. A. P. (1983). Culture of a People, (Port Harcourt: MSS, 1983).

Ayotamuno, Young (2006). “The Contributions of King Alfred Diette‐Spiff, Chief Melford Okilo, Chief Rufus Ada George and Dr. Diepreye Alamieyesiegha in National Development,” (Port Harcourt: MSS,2006). _________ (2006). “Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, Samuel Owonaru, Dick Nottingham and Captain Amangala, (Port Harcourt: MSS, 2006).

Carr, E. H. (1962).Studies in Revolution (London: O. U. P. 1962).

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Coleman, James S. (1986). Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Benin City: Winston & Broburg, 1986).

Daminabo, Opubo (2006). “Chief (Dr.) Isaac John Fiberesima of Okrika”, (Port Harcourt: MSS, 2006).

Enemugwem, J. H. (2008). “The Ijo in the Political Foundation of Nigeria, 1830‐1960,” (Port Harcourt: MSS, 2008).

Etekpe, Ambily et. al. (eds.) 2004. Harold Dappa‐Biriye: His Contributions to Politics in Nigeria, (Port Harcourt: Onyoma Publications, 2004) Jeffreys, J. O. (2005). “The Role of King Ukafia Ede VI in National Development,” (Unpublished BA Project, University of Port Harcourt, 2007).

Nyananyo, B. L. (2006). “Major Boardman Harab Esinkuma Awo Nyananyo,” (Port‐Harcourt: MSS, 2006).

Okilo, M. O. (1992). Art of Government and the Okilo Administration, (Port Harcourt: The Author, 1992).

Owonaro, S. K. (1949).The History of Ijo (Ijaw) and Her Neighbours, (Yaba: The Author, 1949).

Saro‐Wiwa, Ken (1989). On a Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War, (Port Harcourt: Saros, 1989).

Sklar, Richard L. (1963). Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation (New York: A. Knopf, 1963).

Tamuno, T. N. & Alagoa, E. J. (ed.) 1980. Eminent Nigerians of the Rivers State, (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980).

Tebekaemi, Tony (1982). The Twelve‐Day Revolution, (Benin‐City: The Author, 1982).

Ukafia‐Ede VI, O. S. (2004).“ Welcome Address to His Excellency Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria, On the Occasion of His Official Visit to Akwa Ibom State, August 2004,” (Uyo: MSS, 2004).

Uzono, G. L. to John Enemugwem, 2 June, 1987.

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Biographical Note John Horace Enemugwem read history at the University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria, under N. C. Ejituwu and specialized in African history and Oral historiography. He has taught African history and historiography at his Alma Mater for fifteen years and is currently a Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of History and Diplomatic Studies. Dr. Enemugwem is one of the joint editors of the book, History Concourse 2005: The Life and Work of E. J. Alagoa, (Port Harcourt: Onyoma Publications, 2005) and has published chapters in books and articles in national and international learned journals.

Email: j_enemugwem @ yahoo.com

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Some Ethical Challenges in Media Advertising in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Zimbabwean Case Study Dr. Fainos Mangena15

Abstract The media have, since the turn of the 20th century, occupied a unique and strategic position in Sub‐Saharan Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular. Unlike most other businesses, the media have acquired most profits not directly from the public readership but indirectly through advertising. Due to the influx of multi‐national corporations (MNCs) in Sub‐Saharan Africa, the media have become very useful in advertising and marketing products from these large corporates. Through media advertising, these large corporates have managed to beat competition and remain in business. This article however, brings to the fore some of the ethical challenges that confront media and corporate advertising in sub‐Saharan Africa. In this article, I argue that the media need to strike a balance between corporate advertising and information dissemination if it is to serve its main function of educating, informing and entertaining its consumers, who are the public.

Dr. Fainos Mangena is a Journalist and a Senior Lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe’s department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy.

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Keywords: Advertising, media ethics, morality, multi‐ national corporations, sensationalism.

Introduction Media ethics have always clashed with business values (particularly the profit motive) to the extent that advertisements have been given prominence over and above media content. This development has been predominant in sub‐Saharan Africa due to the influx of outside companies advertising their products. This does not mean that advertising is predominant in sub‐Saharan Africa alone as it is a global phenomenon but it is the manner in which the media have somehow relegated the media’s ethical role to inform, educate and entertain which is of concern to me in this article.

Most of these companies are multi nationals with their headquarters in England, Germany, France, Japan and the United States of America. The space allotted for news items has always been determined by the amount of space required for advertising thereby giving news and entertainment second priority. This has had negative ethical implications and the thesis advanced in this presentation is that there is need to balance the script if media consumers, that is, readers and viewers are not going to be disadvantaged.

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In this paper I argue that media organizations need to find other means of generating income rather than solely relying on advertising. The paper draws closer home and tries to look at the media in Zimbabwe and the ethical issues therein in the light of the pre eminence of advertising in both the print and the electronic media. The paper begins by defining key terms such as ethics, media, media ethics, advertising and multi‐national corporations (MNCs). In the last section of this article, I consider the critical role that media ethics plays in the inculcation of societal norms and values and how advertising has, to some extent, become an obstacle to that role.

Defining media ethics and advertising It will probably be over‐generalizing to define media ethics before defining ethics and morality especially in a paper of this nature where clarity in argumentation is key. To this end, the word ethics is derived from the Greek word ethos, meaning custom, usage or character (Day, 2003: 2). For the Greeks, ethics referred to the study of what is good both for the individual and for society (Patterson, 1998:3). The Greeks were concerned with the individual virtues of courage, justice, temperance and wisdom as well as societal virtues such as freedom (1998:3).

Two thousand years later, ethics have come to mean learning to make rational choices between what is good and bad, what is morally justifiable action and what is not… Rationality is the key word here, for the Greeks believed and modern philosophers affirm that people should be able to justify their ethical decisions to others. When one justifies his or her ethical decision, he or she does so by way of reason. Ethics Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 92

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take us out of the world of “this is the way I do it” or “this is the way it’s always been done” into the realm of “this is what I should do” or “this is the action that can be rationally justified.” Ethics in this sense have the same meaning as “ought talk” (1998: 2).

The word moral, on the other hand, is derived from the Latin mos, moris meaning (among other things) “way of life” or “conduct” (Day, 2003: 2). Thus, morality refers to those social rules and principles that guide and regulate human conduct. It will, however, be wrong to define ethics and morality from a Western perspective without also considering African notions or definitions of the same concept(s). From an African view point, as K Ndeti puts it, the terms morality and ethics denote the rules, traditions, taboos and principles used in a given society to guide and regulate behaviour (Kaba and Rayapen, 1990: 33).

The question which follows logically from the above definition is: Who originates these rules, traditions and taboos? It would seem several sources are responsible. First, Africa’s concept of being is deeply rooted in ontology, that is, within the African being, there is an intrinsic cognition of right and wrong (1990: 33). Second, the rules, traditions and taboos of a society are ascribed, that is, they are picked up at birth and children grow up with them and they manifest themselves through formal instruction or teaching (Mangena, 2007: 129). In this article I consider both Western and African ethical perspectives in order to accommodate every reader who comes across this Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 93

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work and also in the spirit of the envisaged and growing call for a global ethic that will resonate with the demands of the global village. But four crucial questions remain even after succinctly defining morality and ethics: How can media ethics be defined? Should we seek for a common ground? Should we go by the Western view point? What about the African view point?

Whatever perspective one will take will still lead to the same conclusion that in every work our journalists and media organizations do, they should be guided by ethical principles of the media, be they Western or African. Media here refers to those devices through which both audio and visual messages are transmitted to the mass audience. This can be done through radio, television, newspapers, magazines, business journals, movies and computer networks known today as the internet (Baran, 2002:6). For Baran, the words media and mass media can be used interchangeably to refer to the communication industries themselves (2006: 6). Basically, there are two types of media namely, the print and the electronic media. The print media include; newspapers, magazines, business journals, books and pamphlets inter alia.

The electronic media include; the television, radio, video, the internet and the cable network among others.

With this clear cut distinction between ethics, morality and media, it is crucial, therefore, to define media ethics as that branch of ethics which deals with the particular ethical principles and/or standards of the media. It is critical to note Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 94

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that everything that a journalist does has ethical dimensions, to a lesser or greater degree because, ‘…everything a journalist writes or omits has an influence to people, good or bad’ (Retief, 2002: 4). Media ethics also looks at ethical dilemmas and other such questions of mass media. Some of the dilemmas in the media are; is it ethical to give priority to advertising at the expense of news and entertainment? Is it ethical to fabricate stories in order to lure the readership? Is it ethical for a journalist to dig deeper into the private life of a celebrity including his dark side of life? Media ethics also consider questions of media content, media censorship and media bias as found in both the print and electronic media.

Media ethics give prominence to the cardinal virtues of truthfulness, honesty, accuracy, fairness, objectivity and consistence at the expense of vices such as deception and lying. But what is the place of advertising in media ethics? In order to properly capture or understand the relationship between media ethics and advertising, it will be crucial to define advertising itself.

Advertising Etymologically, the word advertising is derived from the French word avertir, which means bringing something deliberately to someone’s notice (Domatob et al, 1987: 282). Its major purpose is to establish an awareness of, create favourable attitude to and stimulate demand for a product, idea or service among potential consumers (1987: 282). When applied to the mass media, advertising relates to any paid message that appears in the mass media for the purpose of Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 95

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selling, informing or persuading people about particular products, services or beliefs (1987: 282). But what is advertising in the eyes of newspaper and television managers and executives? Of what value is it to their existence? As Conrad Fink remarks, ‘advertising’s defenders –newspaper and television executives among them – naturally regard advertising as a form of communication that permits consumers to make intelligent choices by providing them with valuable information on products and services’ (Fink, 1988: 123). In sub‐Saharan Africa, most advertising is done by Multi‐National Corporations (MNCs) who have sound financial bases as compared to local conglomerates. By way of definition, Multi‐National Corporations are multi product firms most of whose shares are owned by a few people in one country and whose manufacturing and sales are fragmented into many partial subsidiary operations across a linked system straddling many countries (Domatob et al, 1987: 282).

Nearly all their revenue comes from their overseas branches.

Half of these MNCs have their headquarters in the USA, while the rest are based in West Germany, Japan, the UK, Italy, France and Holland. Their main aims are to maximize profits and to accumulate more in the hands of these conglomerates.

Sub‐Saharan Africa’s participation in the international production process is minimal. Most importantly, all crucial decisions on policing, innovation, profit level, new investments and location are not taken locally in Africa but at the distant head offices in New York, Tokyo, Bonn, Paris, London and Amsterdam (1987: 282). In the next section, I Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 96

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consider the impact of sensationalism and advertising in sub‐ Saharan Africa with a view to see how these two concepts sometimes clash with readers’ values and expectations.

Sensationalism and advertising in sub‐Saharan Africa When applied to the media, the marketing concept holds that all departments, including news must contribute to the financial well being of the organization. Thus, news executives are expected to package their news and information to attract a target audience and to exploit the economic potential of the market place (Day, 2003: 248).

In sub‐Saharan Africa, media organizations have also packaged their news items and information to attract public readership and to exploit the economic potential of the market.

To add spice to their news, some media organizations have resorted to sensationalism to attract the public readership.

Sensationalism involves over‐exaggerating stories or coming up with juicy headlines to court the readership. In Zimbabwe, this practice has been rampant in the public and private media where stories have been cooked up to hook the readers into buying the newspapers in this competitive environment. In the run up to the 2002 presidential elections, The Daily News (now defunct) alleged that a Guruve woman had been beheaded by some youth linked to the ruling ZANU PF but it was later discovered empirically that no such thing had happened and the editor of the newspaper was asked to retract the story. This is one case among many where Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 97

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sensationalism has been used as s marketing tool to woo the readers and viewers in the case of the electronic media.

Sensationalism has set its deep roots, particularly, in third world countries because of the growing need by media organizations to beat competition when it comes to the dissemination of media messages to the consumers.

But as fate would have it, sensationalism now seems to be a decrepit concept as it has since been overtaken by such concepts as censorship, agenda setting and gate keeping especially in the western media. Sensationalism is a gross violation of the journalistic imperative, which stipulates that the media’s ethical role is to educate, inform and entertain the public and to tell the truth always. The ethics of journalism suffer when media organizations deliberately try to treat the media consumers as uncritical recipients of media messages without considering their axiological nature as moral agents.

Not only has the media resorted to sensationalism as a marketing strategy in sub‐Saharan Africa. Advertising has also taken precedence over media content to the extent that even space in the newspapers is determined by the space allotted for advertising.

There has also been an increase in soft news decked in feature stories as well as supplements known as advertorials actually paid for by advertisers but cloaked in the respectability of media content (Day, 2003:251). The electronic variation of the advertorial is the infomercial. Well, this is a normal practice the world over but in Africa, it is more pronounced and it Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 98

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impacts negatively on the ethics of journalism, which calls for objectivity, balance and fairness when writing news. The position of this paper is that, it is very difficult to adhere to these virtues of journalism if there is not enough space allotted for news because the whole space is eaten up by the advert.

The economic pressures exerted by the influence of advertising are quite apparent to say the least. Sometimes, these adverts carry messages considered immoral from an African point of view. In Zimbabwe there are those adverts on condoms which describe men who use condoms as smart guys, but which are seen by the custodians of African value systems, that is, chiefs and other traditional leaders as promoting sexual immorality instead of abstinence in this day and age of HIV and AIDS. But because these media organizations survive on advertising, they have no choice except to bend the ethical stipulations and give prominence to business values. By and large, the quality of commercial material determines the amount of space or time remaining for non‐advertising content; that is, news and entertainment.

Newspaper editors are obliged to arrange their editorial content in the space remaining after the advertising department lays out its adverts on the pages (2003: 253). As Fink succinctly captures it in apparent reference to media and advertising in America:

Media managers today must perform efficiently and profitably in their business responsibilities or soon be unemployed. The “rising tide of shareholder Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 99

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expectation” and other imperatives of successful business leadership force many newspapers and television managers to put profit first; everything else is second – sometimes including ethical, socially responsible journalism. Exceptions are those lucky managers whose organizations are enlightened (and profitable) enough to follow good, sound journalism as a route to financial success. But even they must keep their business priorities straight (Fink, 1988: 139).

This argument might appear to be applicable only to American business enterprises but it also applies to Africa, in general and Zimbabwe, in particular. In television news, producers have to slot their stories around commercials so that there is a limit on the amount of time devoted to each package (Day, 2003: 253). Even entertainment is more often interrupted by commercial breaks or spot announcements. The Zimbabwe Television (ZTV) has commercial breaks mostly during prime time viewing and programmes often affected include; Ezomgidho, a musical programme held every Thursday from 18:30 to 19:30 pm, This is Football, a football talk show and phone‐in programme held every Wednesday at 10 pm and many other programmes such as Face the Nation and Mai Chisamba Show.

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of MNCs and because of the need to “develop” these nations reeling in abject poverty. The MNCs have the money and the host nations must provide the labour force and the medium of communicating those commercial products to the people. This gives rise to the dependatio syndrome, which in turn relegates ethical issues in the media to the dustbin of history. The next section looks at the influx of MNCs in sub‐Saharan Africa, ethical implications for the mass media and the way forward.

The Influx of MNCs in the media and ethical implications for sub‐Saharan Africa As Richard J Barnet et al (1980:126) argue, MNCs dominate advertising in sub‐Saharan Africa. These corporations with vast resources at their disposal flood sub‐Saharan Africa radios and newspapers with their messages (1980: 126). In sub‐ Saharan Africa, strategic advertising space on newspapers and peak radio listening and television viewing periods are monopolized by products like Coca‐Cola, Tobacco, Beer and other consumables (Yermoshkin, 1984). In Kenya and most of Francophone Africa, MNCs finance over 80% of most of the adverts on radio and television (Yermokshin, 1984).

The same also applies to Zimbabwe and other Anglophone states. Notwithstanding the economic slide that Zimbabwe has been plunged into in recent years and the relocation of MNCs to better economies such as South Africa, Zimbabwe has experienced a rise in the advertising of alcoholic beverages by the remaining MNCs such as Coca‐cola Africa and Delta Beverages advertising castle larger. It’s not only beer that has Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 101

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topped the list of advertising in sub‐Saharan Africa.

Cigarettes have also had a fair share of advertising with brands such as Pacific storm topping the list of advertised cigarettes particularly in Zimbabwe.

The ethical challenges of advertising in Zimbabwe There is no doubt that advertising creates awareness as to what goods and services are available and how consumers can access them. There is no doubt, too, that advertising brings lots and lots of benefits to host nations and these benefits include employment particularly in advertising agencies.

Those who have supported the idea of MNCs advertising in less developed regions of Africa have also supported the above view. For them, advertising raises people’s living standards by encouraging sales of mass produced goods thus, stimulating production and creating employment and prosperity (Domatob, 1987: 283).

Zimbabwe has also seen a lot of advertising agencies advertising consumables such as food, motor vehicles and other services. The Gary Thompson and Associates (GTA) is one such advertising agency that has taken Zimbabwe newspapers and television advertising by storm. Coming hard on the heels of a nation that has been hit by a shortage of advertising agency due to economic recession, GTA has opened a new chapter in Zimbabwe’s advertising history. The advertising company is in partnership with companies such as Cairns foods, National foods, African twist and Jaggers, advertising their products through the television question and Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 102

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answer programme called Money or the Box (M.O.B) held every Monday at 7pm. The advertising company has also joined hands with the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) to advertise and promote music talent among the youths in Zimbabwe through what has come to be called The CBZ A Academy a music competition held annually in Zimbabwe.

Chris Doghudje sums up some of the positive benefits of advertising by MNCs as follows:

It is now a fact universally acknowledged that the most powerful means by which the availability of goods and services can be known is advertising. This is why advertising is embraced by capitalist countries. But not every body is aware that advertising is also the most powerful means for the selling of ideas, of policies and of government. Too, often advertising is seen as no more than a selling tool to be used by businessmen. But governments, charitable organizations and political parties all need advertising for the promotion of their ideas, policies and worthwhile causes (Doghudje, 1987: 2)

In a way, it is perfectly true that consumer goods have brought some comfort and pleasure to black Africans, and in a few cases, have alleviated want and hardship. This is quite ethical. According to the McBride report, advertising promotes desirable social aims, like savings and investments.

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patterns of expenditure. Small scale “classified” advertising which in the aggregate fills as much space in some newspapers is a useful form of communication about the employment market, between local small businesses and their customers and between individuals and their various needs.

Just flipping through or perusing the classified section of The Herald, The Sunday Mail, The Chronicle, The Sunday News, The Daily mirror or The Sunday Mirror (now defunct), one notices the advertising of luxury goods such as phones, cars, situations vacancies (jobs), houses for sale, building material and other consumables. But this is as far as business values are concerned.

Advertising raises serious ethical questions. First, it promotes consumerism ‐ a way of life centred on consumption and assigning consumption the priority in the set of human values, which leads to the championing of a production rather than a consumption ethos (Domatob, 1987: 286). Second, much as advertising is overwhelmingly directed towards the selling of goods and services, which can be valued in monetary terms, it tends to promote attitudes and life styles, which extol acquisition and consumption at the expense of other values (1987: 286). As Fink sums it up, ‘advertising creates unnecessary materialistic consumer desires psychological in origin and it is thus manipulative and wasteful’ (Fink, 1988: 124). Third, advertising permits large, financially strong firms to dominate an industry because only they can afford the high cost of advertising with small firms thus effectively barred

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from an influential role, the oligopolistic few can raise prices at will (1988: 124).

Not only that, advertising by MNCs mostly produce unnecessary overpriced and sometimes harmful goods such as alcoholic spirits in the category of breakers international, Skippers and other alcoholic beverages together with tobacco which, when advertised in both the print and the electronic media, are accompanied by a warning message, Alcohol may be hazardous to health if consumed to excess. Not for sale to people under the age of 18 or Tobacco causes cancer. Isn’t this a moral contradiction? For instance, on their front pages, American newspapers report the latest study linking use of tobacco to cancer.

On their editorial pages, they (American newspapers) sound the alarm, calling for massive research into cancer and its causes. Throughout their pages American newspapers publish advertisements for tobacco products including cigarettes, which…are a deadly product (Fink, 1988: 132). It is, however, encouraging to note that calls for tobacco ban have, of late, been intensifying in America. But when MNCs in sub‐Saharan Africa intensify their advertising, are they saying Africans are resistant to cancer? Or is this some form of a racial prank, salient kind of?

These adverts have negative implications as they may lead to both physiological and psychological reparcations. Social vices such as violence may also result from the consumption of Vol. 3, No. 1 2009 105

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these products and yet a lot of time and space is devoted for their advertising at the expense of real news or entertainment value. Quality news and entertainment value are not given more prominence as more space is allotted to advertising material. I will continue to reiterate that this has serious ethical implications.

The Way forward

1. A media ethics regulatory board needs to be established to provide checks and balances on what should be advertised in terms of the quality and quantity of material to be advertised. Morally offensive material such as those involving the use of condoms must not be allowed in our newspaper pages and television screens as these promote sexual immorality and other such vices.

2. Media organizations need to find other means of generating income rather than only through advertising. They should always aim at improving the quality of the news that they disseminate to the public so as to generate national interest and hence maximize on profit through sales.

3. Virtues of truthfulness, accuracy, fairness, objectivity and honesty must be cultivated and vices such as lying and deception must be avoided, as these will create disinterest among the readers.

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Conclusion The project of zeroing into media’s ethical responsibilities and the profit motive was preceded by the semantic discourse of media, media ethics and advertising. Issues to do with media ownership and control were also considered to provide background information to the research. The work then looked at the place of sensationalism and advertising in the media. The work maintained that advertising had serious ethical implications, particularly, in Zimbabwe and that there was need to look for other alternatives sources of income which would not take away the media’s ethical role to inform, educate and entertain.

Bibliography

Baran, S.J. (2002) Introduction to Mass Communication, Media Literacy and Culture (New York, McGraw Hill and Companies).

Barnet, R. J. (1980) Global Reach: The power of the Multinational Corporation (New York, Simon and Schuster).

Day, A. L. (2003) Ethics in Media Communications: Cases and controversies (Melbourne, Thomson Wards worth).

Doghudje, Chris (1987) Policy guidelines for the development and regulation of the advertising industry in Algeria (A paper presented at the National communication policy conference at the administrative staff college of Nigeria, Lagos).

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Domatob, K. J, et al. (1987) Africa Media Monograph Series No. 4: Mass Media and the African Society (Nairobi, African Council on Communication Education).

Fink, C.C. (1988) Media Ethics in the Newsroom and Beyond (New York,McGraw‐Hill Series in Mass Communication).

Kaba, B. D, and Rayapen, L. (1990) Relevant Education for Africa (Yaounde, PWPA Books).

Mangena, Fainos (2007) Confounding Forces in the Eradication of Moral Poverty in Higher Learning Institutions of Southern Africa: A Case of the University of Zimbabwe Students, Zimbabwe Journal of Educational Research, 19(2), p. 127‐137.

Patterson, P. (1998) Media Ethics: Issues and Cases (New York, McGraw‐Hill Companies).

Retief, J. (2002) Media Ethics: An Introduction to Responsible Journalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press).

Yermoshkin, N. (1984) Spiritual Neo‐Colonialism (Moscow, Progress Publishers).

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Biographical Note Dr. Fainos Mangena is a Journalist and a Senior Lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe’s department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy. He is currently a Post Doctoral Research Fellow at the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa (CLEA), University of Fort Hare and a member of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa (PSSA). He has written a number of articles related to Moral Education, Media Ethics and Democracy in Zimbabwe and his most recent publication is ‘Platonic Justice and Zimbabwe’s eight dark years of political polarization: Is Merit‐based democracy tenable?’

He can be contacted at the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa (CLEA), University of Fort Hare, Private Bag X1314, King Williams Town Rd, Alice 5700, South Africa. Tel: +27 (0) 40 602 2687. Cell: 0027732403069. E‐Mail: fmangena@ufh.ac.za or fbvuma@yahoo.com

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