Africana, 5, especial, 2011 by Prof. Everardo Magalhães

AFRICANA SPECIAL ISSUE: THE NIGER DELTA Volume 5, No. 1 Editor-in-Chief Managing Editor IT Consultant

A. Curtis Burton Christopher LaMonica Mariko Hemmingsen

Board Members: John Akokpari Lere Amusan Priya Chacko Mourtada Deme Ibaba Samuel Ibaba Christopher LaMonica Victoria Mason

Masse Ndiaye Stanley Naribo Ngoa J. Shola Omotola Karen Smith Kathryn Sturman Franรงoise Ugochukwu Douglas Yates

F R I C A N A

Boston University African Studies Center 232 Bay State Road Boston, MA 02210 U.S.A. Print: ISSN 2155-7829 On-line: ISSN 2155-7837 www.africanajournal.org

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Africana is printed by Country Press, Inc., Middleboro, MA USA www.countrypressinc.com COVER PHOTO: ÂŠ Paulhenk | Dreamstime.com Boy on a boat on the Niger river Photo taken on: November 17th, 2008

ÂŠ Africana. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. Disclaimer: The views expressed in the articles contained in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of anyone affiliated with Africana or of anyone at the African Studies Center at Boston University.

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CONTENTS v

To Our Readers and Supporters

From the Editors

Oil and Cultural Crisis: The Case of the Niger Delta, Nigeria S.O. Aghalino, PhD

Environmental Justice, Democracy and the Inevitability of Cultural Change in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis of the Niger Delta Dilemma Kelly Bryan Ovie Ejumudo, PhD

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Proliferation and Instability in the Niger Delta: An Analysis of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Process George I.J Obuoforibo, PhD

The Minorities and Resource Allocation in a Transitional State. The Nigeria Experience 1960-1999 Ekanade Olumide, PhD

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â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Agony in the Gardenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;: Incongruity of Governance and the Travails of Port Harcourt City, Niger Delta, Nigeria, 1912-2010 Akachi Odoemene, PhD

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The Nigerian Press, The Public Sphere And Sustainable Development: Engaging the Post Amnesty Deal in the Niger Delta Uzoechi Nwagbara

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Charting Pathways to Development in the Riverine Areas of the Niger Delta Region O.J. Offiong and Jude Cocodia

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Armed Militancy in the Niger Delta: Quintessential PlayOff of Sub-Regional Economic Disparities Franklins A. Sanubi, PhD

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Amnesty Programme and the Niger Delta: Overview of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Strategy for Sustainable Peace Atare Otite, PhD and Nathaniel Umukoro

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Amnesty and Peace-Building in the Niger Delta: Addressing the Frustration-Aggression Trap Ibaba Samuel Ibaba, PhD

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To Our Readers and Supporters During the month of February 2011 the Editorial Board of Africana was reconstituted. A number of former Board Members graciously stepped-down to welcome a new group and, beyond the full list of their names provided above, an overview of their professional affiliations and research interests is now posted at http://www.africanajournal.org, our new and improved web-page. As part of this process, the former Editorial Coordinator, Yilma Tafere Tasew, was formally replaced by A. Curtis Burton, who has a lifetime of experience and interest in literature, writing and editing. Suffice it to say here that the backgrounds, credentials and talents of our new Editorial Board are impressive by any standard. To all of those who supported Africana in the past, a sincere ‘thank you,’ and to all of the new members of our team, a warm ‘welcome.’ With this Special Issue we inaugurate a new and exciting era for Africana. We have the support of an incredibly talented group of dedicated scholars, who are involved in the peer review process and many other supportive roles that help to make an exciting journal like this one possible. In addition, we are greatly aided by the capable support of our IT Consultant, Mariko Hemmingsen. Together with A. Curtis Burton and Françoise Ugochukwu, Ms. Hemmingsen has developed a new web-page design (effective March 2011), which will undoubtedly provide even greater appeal and exposure to all future Africana publications. I am truly excited about the continued success of the journal and very much look forward to working with all of you. Christopher LaMonica Managing Editor, Africana Boston, MA U.S.A.

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From the Editors It is with great pleasure that we present to you this Special Issue of Africana. This compilation of scholarship on the Niger Delta Region (NDR) has been over a year in the making; it is very unique and very special. For starters, the contributors are almost exclusively from Nigeria and from the Niger Delta region, specifically. These are not the words of dispassionate scholars who work under a pretense of objectivity; each one of the contributors writes about this subject because they care deeply about the ongoing and seemingly endless plight of the NDR. Tragically, far too many in African/Africana studies scholarship are required to operate under a veil of objectivity, something that continues to dominate all of mainstream approaches to the social sciences. We fully understand and appreciate the push, some would say ‚need,‛ for ‚scientific‛ approaches to the study of all social woes and those very methodologies are employed here. All of the contributors to this Special Issue have included careful consideration of ideas and data from, for example, academia, governments, NGOs, international organizations, and others. But there is no pretense of having been offered a proverbial ‚hat‛ with random social science questions scribbled on little pieces of paper from which each contributor has chosen from. The very social science issues that all social scientists research and write about, and become ‚experts‛ in, are due to quite random and personal life circumstances. Most often we are touched by one or another aspect of human struggle – often our own – and delve into all forms of study with an innate human sense for what is right and what is wrong. The Call for scientific rationality and methodologies will sometimes downplay the aforementioned, somehow assuming and promoting

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the view that those human senses are inherently dangerous and therefore should not be a part of social science inquiry. We firmly believe that human sensitivity toward and empathy for our fellow man is tragically undervalued in the social sciences. Following in the logic of philosopher George Santayana, the late Edward Said, and Canadian critic John Ralston Saul, we believe that the lessons of the Enlightenment have been hijacked by a world of thinkers and practitioners who are, in their pursuit of rational scientific inquiry, neglecting that other important lesson of the Enlightenment: reasonable-ness, i.e. that each of us by virtue of being human has inalienable rights and, as such, must be included as a critical factor in all discussions of policy. Modes of rational scientific inquiry, now and in history, have all too often neglected that basic fact: each of us matters. It is perfectly understandable that many feel empowered by scientific methods and productive outcomes – to include those of the oil industries; indeed the entire world is being transformed as a result! But we cannot forget our common human-ness along the way; we cannot set aside enormous populations on this Earth and simply write them off as a cost of our rationalist scientific enterprise. Let us put this even more bluntly: Hitler and Stalin were similarly ‚justified‛ in their scientific pursuits of Nazism and Communism, respectively. We all know – all of us – that ‚breaking a few eggs to make an omelet,‛ as Stalin infamously put it, is wrong. Yet this is fundamentally the ‚logic‛ of far too many who are now engaged in African affairs. And so we remind our readers that that approach, so evident in a place like the Niger Delta Region, is wrong, inappropriate, and in the words of so many who inspired the Spirit of the Enlightenment: unreasonable. The test of reasonable-ness makes us think of things that are often listed as ‚costs‛ in an otherwise more practical or pragmatic mode: human lives, the quality of life, the environment, arts, cultures,

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identities, aesthetics, purpose and meaning. These need not be mere impediments to development, as they are so often portrayed; they must be carefully considered, particularly by those who currently hold the reins of power. Looking at tragedies in regions like the Niger Delta some simply throw their hands in the air and conclude that those industrial and governmental leaders, those policy-makers, will have to some day ‚answer to a higher power‛ for what they have done. To that we would add that there should always be a test of ‚reasonable-ness‛ on their minds and, if there continues to be evidence to the contrary, an increasingly aware Nigerian and international public will endeavor to hold them accountable for their wrongful actions. With that objective in mind, we firmly believe that this Special Issue could be one of the best sources currently available on the subject of the Niger Delta. The submissions that were ultimately selected by Africana’s Editorial Board address a range of timely themes related to the dramatic pace of change and challenge within the NDR. The first, entitled ‚Oil and Cultural Crisis: The Case of the Niger Delta,‛ by S.O. Aghalino, of the Department of History, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria, is a heart-wrenching discussion of the ongoing challenges that the petro-business has wrought on the region’s indigenous norms and cultures. Aghalino draws on the extant literature and local news sources to describe the horrors that have accompanied the oil industry’s impacts throughout the region: displacement of people, a rise in crime and prostitution, a rise of ethnic conflicts, and the steady decline of local chief authority. Understandably, Aghalino refers to this as a ‘cultural crisis’; all of it needs to be documented and heard. The next piece, entitled ‚Environmental Justice, Democracy and the Inevitability of Cultural Change in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis of the

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Niger Delta Dilemma,‛ by Kelly Bryan Ovie Ejumudo of the Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria, quickly demonstrates the range of thinking that takes place, within Nigeria, over these very issues. Here the term ‘cultural change’ is portrayed as inevitable but the author is similarly concerned with how effectively those in power – within what she terms ‘Nigeria’s pseudo democracy’ – will address the Niger Delta’s many challenges. She applies general principles of democracy and emerging concepts of ‘environmental justice’ to these problems and provides an important snapshot of where the region is right now – what she terms: shallow democratic institutions, weak culture, and environmental injustice. We follow this with a reminder of the life-and-death challenge of small and light arms proliferation in the region by George I.J. Obuoforibo. His article is entitled ‚Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Proliferation and Instability in the Niger Delta: An Analysis of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Process.‛ Obuoforibo is an academic that specializes in International Relations and Political and Administrative Studies in the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Port Harcourt in Rivers State, Nigeria. We are infinitely grateful to him for his contribution. As he rightly points out, the problem has been recognized internationally. Yet far too little has been done to address the problem: researchers note! This is followed by yet another aspect of the problem: the politics of revenue sharing. Ekanade Olumide, of the Department of History and International Relations at Redeemer’s University, Nigeria, has submitted an article entitled ‚Minorities and Resource Allocation in a Transitional State: The Nigeria Experience 1960-1999,‛ that highlights the politics of fiscal federalism in Nigeria and how it has adversely

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impacted the Niger Delta region. Providing key data on revenues from an historical perspective, he argues that the politics of revenue sharing has marginalized the interests of minorities in the region. Akachi Odoemene’s piece, entitled ‚Agony in the Garden: Incongruity of Governance and the Travails of Port Harcourt City, Niger Delta, Nigeria, 1912-2010,‛ reminds us that Port Harcourt, Nigeria’s Garden City, was a desirable home for all. In recent times, he argues, ‚it has been transformed into a city with a rough and tumble character.‛ He looks at the problem from an historian’s perspective, documents a range of comments made during the aforementioned transition and concludes, as so many others have, that oil is at the root of so many of the region’s problems. Readers beware: like Aghalino’s piece, Odoemene’s discussion of social violence and other problems in the region might well leave you, as it did us, wringing your hands in frustration. Uzoechi Nwagbara introduces yet another way of thinking of the region and that is from the perspective of the effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness of the Nigerian press. With the undoubted power of today’s media, in Nigeria as elsewhere, Nwagbara’s message is an important one: ‚In order to achieve peace and good governance in the region, serious grassroots and national information dissemination so as to guarantee objectivity and fairness in news reporting thereby impacting on the regime’s governance is required.‛ In his discussion, Nwagbara masterfully takes us to the ideas of Habermas on the crucial importance of having a ‘rational-critical debate’ in the ‘public sphere.’ Nwagbara’s ultimate concern and hope is for having Nigeria’s media support peace in the wake of the Amnesty deal brokered by President Yar’Adua.

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Still others, like O.J. Offiong (University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria) and Jude Cocodia (Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa State, Nigeria), look to the problem of ‘development’ in their piece entitled, ‚Charting Pathways to Development in the Riverine Areas of the Niger Delta Region.‛ They point to Ken Saro Wiwa’s comments that suggest ‚the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria is a paradox.‛ Indeed, the region has not fared well in terms of local development, while the holders of power (they focus mostly on the oil MNCs, whom they term as the ‚worse culprit of the quick money syndrome‛) have assuredly benefited handsomely. Their point is to emphasize the importance of improving local human resource development, something which has thus far eluded the leaders of oil MNCs, the Ministry of the Niger Delta, and the Niger Delta Development Commission. Our reading of this well-written piece leaves us with the impression that oil MNCs could really do more to make sure that, somehow, this is made to happen. Franklins A. Sanubi, of the Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria, has submitted a piece entitled ‚Armed Militancy in the Niger Delta: Quintessential Play-Off of SubRegional Economic Disparities.‛ In it he reiterates some of the messages mentioned earlier in this issue: sub-national marginalization of the region and the problem of growing economic disparities. But Sanubi suggests that the problem of armed militancy should not be over-simplified as being due to economic disparity alone; the problem is much more complex and leaves many within the region feeling fundamentally marginalized. He reminds us of this simple fact: ‚Three dominant ethnic groups – the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo – call the shots in Nigeria’s political determinism since independence and none of the major ethnic groups in the Niger Delta fall into these three.‛ Moreover, Sanubi carefully demonstrates that the federal government continues to enjoy the lion’s share of oil revenues.

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Sanubi concludes that Abuja’s meaningful inclusion of heretofore marginalized groups, and not cynical moves motivated by a continuation of the same, is the path to peace. Atare Otite and Nathaniel Umukoro, also of the Department of Political Science at Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria, return to the issue of Amnesty in a piece entitled ‚Amnesty Programme and the Niger Delta: Overview of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Strategy for Sustainable Peace.‛ In a careful presentation of the DDR and secondary data, Otite and Umukoro suggest that ‚sustainable peace can only be ensured if the root causes of violence in the Niger Delta are identified and ameliorated.‛ They rightly remind us of the simple if tragic fact that the people of the Niger Delta are deeply concerned about the problems of rising poverty, unemployment, social strife, and environmental decay and want to see these issues somehow, some way, improved. On this same subject we have included a piece by Ibaba Samuel Ibaba, who specializes in the Niger Delta conflict. Ibaba frames the issue in what he terms the ‚frustration-aggression trap‛ and highlights the challenges it poses to peace-building. Similar yet different, these two papers provide important insights into local academic thinking on the prospects for peace in the Niger Delta. The last contribution, entitled ‚External Challenges to Moving

Toward Sustainability in the Niger Delta Region: Why a Critical Assessment of the Classical Epistemologies and Developmental Assumptions of External Actors Matters,‛ comes to us from Africana’s Managing Editor, Christopher LaMonica, of the Department of Humanities, Government Section, United States Coast Guard Academy. LaMonica argues that most external actors are solely focused on changing the internal dynamics of Nigeria (e.g.

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internal corruption, the dominance of particular ethnic groups) and tend to ignore the broader, global picture. He argues that more emphasis should be placed on the lack of international responsibility for the current crisis in the NDR. External actors working for oil companies, international ‚watchdogs‛ like the International Energy Agency, and donor states, have only helped to create the crisis by focusing solely on their own respective interests. LaMonica argues that mutually beneficial results can be achieved if a longer-term and ultimately more sustainable perspective is employed. Achieving that aim will require a critical assessment, by all, of the ‚classic‛ assumptions that external actors make about commerce and development. In other words, the developmental problems of the NDR are largely rooted in the ‚waste land‛ assumptions that many external actors make when engaging stakeholders in an oil-rich state like Nigeria. As outside observers we are certain of one thing: the world needs to know more about the plight of the people of the Niger Delta. Hopefully this Special Issue will help to make that happen. As always, we thank you for your continued interest in Africana. A. Curtis Burton Editor-in-Chief, Africana Washington, D.C. U.SA

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Oil and Cultural Crisis: The Case of the Niger Delta Dr. S.O. Aghalino1 Key Terms: Nigeria, Niger Delta, oil industry, migration, petroleum, prostitution, spillage.

Introduction The Niger Delta is one of the ten most important wetland and coastal marine ecosystems in the world. It is home to some 31 million people. (Report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee, November 2008:102). The Niger Delta is also the location of massive oil and gas deposits, which have been exploited since 1956. Oil has generated an estimated $600 billion since the commercial exploitation of oil in Nigeria. Despite this, the majority of the people in the oil bearing enclave of the Niger Delta are conspicuously poor. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) describes the region as ‘suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure, and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor and endemic conflict’ (UNDP, 2006). What the UNDP failed to add is that the region is also embroiled in cultural crisis engendered by the activities of the oil majors. The Niger Delta remains one of the critical fault lines of Nigerian politics. Not only is it the region that holds Nigeria’s predominantly oil reserves and therefore, the national wealth, it has assumed a new geopolitical importance in the context of global oil politics. Like many oil producing countries, the region has not been spared the agony of recurring violent conflicts associated with the management of oil resources (Oyefusi, 2007).

S.O. Aghalino, PhD, is with the Department of History, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria. His e-mail is aghalinosamuel@yahoo.com 1

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Since the mid 1990s, there has been on-going violence and uprising in the Niger Delta region with a renewed call for self-determination and /or local control of oil resources. These conflicts, often attended by kidnapping of foreign oil workers for ransom, vandalization and sometimes blow-up of oil installations, have taken on a frightening dimension over the years. According to a report by Hamilton and others (2004), violence in the Niger Delta alone is estimated to have killed about 1000 persons a year between 1999 and 2004. This chapter focuses on one dimension of the crisis in the Niger Delta: the cultural crisis. Attempt is made to dissect and explicate the nature of the cultural crisis in the region. Conventional analysis of the crisis in the ND seems to down play the ancillary impact of the oil industry with a focus on the flora and the fauna. This, as it were must have blurred the intricacy of the issues in contention. Thus, a holistic assessment of the crisis must also take cognizance of the culture of the people that is constantly violated and has subsequently engendered a strange subculture detrimental to every life in the region. Our analysis charts the common ground of oil induced behavioral modification that seems to be impairing a hitherto tranquil and harmonious society. In this light, a concise discourse of the oil industry in the region is undertaken to lay a background to the cultural crisis in the area. This is done against the backdrop of an analysis of the precise causes of the social disequilibrium and the resultant break down of culture in the region. Petro-Business in the Niger Delta The Niger Delta region has been defined in terms of geology, geography and ethnography (Onokerhoraye, 2000). There is hardly any controversy over the geological, geographical and ethnographical description of the Niger Delta Region (NDR). With the ascendancy of crude oil, the NDR is synonymous, in the perception of many Nigerians, with oil provinces of the delta. The NDDC Act, 2000, and the OMPADEC Act of 1992 would seem to have accentuated this

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perception (Ekuerhare, 2006). The Niger Delta region has a population of 27 million, covering an area of 70,000 square kilometers, with 5,000 communities, 50 ethnic groups and 250 dialects. The region is not only rich in oil and gas but in other natural resources like timber and wild life. The significant feature of the Niger Delta is the general state of underdevelopment, not only by world standard but also in relation to many parts of the country. Currently, Nigeria is the eighth largest oilexporting country in the world with oil revenue accounting for about 80 % of total government revenue, 95 % of foreign exchange earnings, 40% contribution to GDP and about 4 % of employment. Nigeria is the largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, with about 32 per cent and 34.2 per cent of Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s oil and gas reserves respectively, the fifth largest exporting country in the OPEC and the fifth largest oil exporting country to the US (eia.doe.gov). Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s proven reserve are estimated to be 36 billion barrels while the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s natural gas reserves are even bigger, estimated at well over 100 trillion cubic feet (Tell, February 18, 2008:33 ).What to note is that the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is the goose that lays the golden egg as oil exploitation is concentrated in the region. So much wealth is derived from the bowel of the region yet, the scourge of poverty in the region is grim with people lacking basic human needs and the environment willfully and constantly degraded by oil companies (Dafinone David, 2008).When the World Bank carried a comprehensive study of the region in 1995, it arrived at the following conclusions: The Niger Delta is the least developed area of Nigeria. Per capital income was less than $280 per annum, with a high-rising population. Indices of development such as education, health, sanitation, job creation, water and other physical infrastructures, were far below acceptable standards. Environmental resources were gradually being degraded, and there was an extremely poor human capacity and basic skills. In the same vein the 2006 Niger

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Delta Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2006) arrived at the same bleak conclusion. This contrasts sharply with Qatar, a country of one million people, has the highest per capital income in the world, put at $80,000. (Tell, July 14, 2008:30). By the 1990s, these long years of neglect and deprivation, as well as failures of addressing the development challenges prevalent in the region, had created a volatile atmosphere where youths disrupted oil production activities at will and communities frequently engaged, with little provocation, in destructive inter and intra- community strife (Aghalino, 2010). In tandem with this social disequilibrium is a concomitant cultural crisis in the region which has denuded the societal umbilical cord and has also engendered a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;cash-and carryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; subculture.

Oil and Cultural Crisis in the Niger Delta Section 1 of the Cultural Policy for Nigeria (1998) defines culture as the totality of the technical products, philosophersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; world view, institutions and creative/artistic practices which a people fashion to cope with the challenges of living in their environment. It is these elements which distinguish one people from another (Darah, 1995). According to Taylor (1871), culture taken in its widest ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which included knowledge, art, morals, laws, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society (Fayeye, 2009). UNESCO, 2002) presents culture as distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs. Indeed, culture refers to a configuration of learned and shared patterns of behavior and of understanding concerning the meaning and value of things, ideas, emotions and actions. As noted by Darah (1995), the technical

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dimension of culture comprises the instruments and tools designed and produced to enable a people exploit the resources of their environment to satisfy their basic needs. There is a considerable corpus of literature on culture of the Niger Delta (Darah, 1995; Azaiki, 2003). It is to be noted that colonial rule and later Christianity had put tremendous pressure on all layers of society, leading to diminution of cultural identity and self esteem. Cash crop agriculture and the capitalist economy had introduced a modicum of social organization and behavior that relatively altered the traditional indigenous system. Yet it must be noted that at this stage, industrialization was low so rural solidarity, moral purity and social values were still intact. Before the incursion of the oil industry, there was relative stability in the demography and social relations of the communities. Most people had access to the basic things of life because oil-induced inflation had not set in. Communities in the region organized communal festivals whose program featured religious ceremonies, purification rites, the launch of new dance steps, masquerades and other artistic activities. These artistic institutions, as observed by Darah, helped to mobilize energy to reinforce social solidarity and to identify, train and promote talents in song composition, performance, and organization of events and the hosting of visitors. The idyllic society where culture moderated daily activities was to be completely shaken and devastated by the incursion of the oil industry. The link between unsustainable petroleum exploitation in the Niger Delta and the destruction of the indigenous homeland and culture of the people is undeniable. Traditional lands have been sacrificed on the altar of irresponsible oil policies. The point of interest is that the environmental degradation occasioned by oil pollution and gas flaring is instrumental to the cultural crisis in the region. It would

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appear a concise discussion of the cultural crisis in the Niger Delta cannot be adequately tackled without perfunctory references to land issues. Oil industry activities are largely predicated on their unrestrained access to land because they derive their oil from the earth crust. The oil-bearing enclave on the other hand, depends on land to grow their food, fish and hunt. Land is central to the social system of the people of the Niger Delta as well as other parts of Nigeria. In this respect, clashes between the people and oil firms are inevitable. The acquisition of land by the oil firms for pipelines rights of ways, flow lines, flow stations and gas flaring sites normally engender acrimony between oil firms and host communities. Shell, for example, has over 6,200 kilometers network of pipelines and flow stations spread over more than 31,000 square kilometers of the Niger Delta (Shell, 1995). One major feature of land in the Niger Delta is the predominance of pipelines that transverses footpaths, farmland and community ponds. These networks of pipelines disrupt foot communications and farming. They have also altered the pristine land tenure system of the people. Farmers could no longer engage in bush burning because of the presence of oil and gas pipelines, which are highly inflammable. From the face value, it would appear that "land take" by the oil firms is insignificant. Shell for example claims that it uses about 400 square kilometer of land, which is about 0.6 per cent of the entire land of the Niger Delta. Most of the land acquired by Shell is for long term use, such as well sites, offices, but some for the short term only, such as seismic lines. As at the end of 1998, there was a total of 1,513 well sites within the company's operations out of which a total of 906 contained producing wells (Shell, 1998). While the total land-take may appear small in general terms, the effect of the land acquired can be serious on individual land holding as well as the community in general depriving them means of subsistence. A tacit manifestation of the seriousness of the impact of land -take on the people of the Niger Delta is

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seen in the incessant land disputes and the consequent litigation between individuals, groups, communities and the oil firms. In most cases, these disputes are fuelled by the quantum of compensation paid to land owners as well as payments of compensations to the wrong families (Fekumo, 1990; Frynas, 1998; Aghalino, 2005). Arguably, land disputes may occur due to ethnic conflict, but in some areas, oil firms aggravate existing land disputes because of their ignorance of existing feuds. Closely related with the above, is the wanton degradation of the environment of the region and its attendant social and cultural impact. For the people of the Niger Delta, environmental quality and sustainability are fundamental to their well being and development. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), more than 60 per cent of the people in the region depend on the natural environment for their livelihood. According to a study carried out by a team of Nigerian and international environmental experts in 2006, the Niger Delta is ‘one of the most world’s most severely petroleum –impacted ecosystems’. It is reported that the damage from oil operations is chronic and cumulative, and has acted synergistically with other sources of environmental stress to result in severely impaired ecosystem and impoverished the livelihood and health of the regions impoverished residents (Amnesty International, 2009:14). As noted by Amnesty International, the people living in the Niger Delta have to drink, cook with, and wash in polluted water; they eat fish contaminated with oil and other toxins. The health of the environment and the lives of the people are intertwined with the health of the water system. The food, water and cultural identity of many local people are closely related to the delta ecosystem. More importantly perhaps is the fact that tens of thousands of families in the Niger Delta rely on fishing on inland rivers as well as offshore

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for both income and food. The activities of the oil companies have engendered land hunger and subsequently distorted the cultural practices of the people that are tied to their land. In the traditional Niger Delta setting, such as the Ogoni area, when a woman gets married, her husband is required to give her a piece of land to farm. The woman is expected to feed her family and grow for food for sale in order to buy other staples from the parcel of land. This tradition allowed the woman to enjoy a measure of economic independence. However, the constant land-take for oil activities, and the resultant pollution from the industry, has left women in the region with little or no means to feed or support their families in this otherwise symbiotic arrangement. Women have to go further away from home to find unpolluted land and water for their domestic chores (Diana). As is the case in most Nigerian communities, women play prominent role in the management of health of the household because as agents of fertility, they have specific knowledge of local medicines. Their knowledge of herbs, tree barks and other local cures were acquired during their â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;fatteningâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; room period. This starts after the birth of the first child and lasts for one year. During this period, she is not allowed out of the family compound. Besides being a time to rest, it is also a time of informal schooling when she learns how to look after her child and home. She is attended to by women from her family and older women in the community. As pressure grows on young women, forced to deal with shrinking agricultural resources, very little time is left for them to acquire the specialized health knowledge traditionally gained through a fattening room period. For those who still practice this tradition, it rarely exceeds two months after which they must return to farming (Diana).

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Lergborsi (2007) has shown that there is destruction and possible extinction of medicinal plants and herbs that are rooted in traditional medicine and spirituality of the people as a result of the incursion of the oil industry. The extinction is brought about by the fact that most of these herbs and plants are found in sacred groves, shrines and forests, which have fallen under direct destruction in the course of oil exploitation and the toxicity of oil pollution. Seismic workers, in the process of cutting lines, trees, shrines and groves are tampered with these pharmaceutical herbs. As the case may be, even ancestral ponds are desecrated while detonating explosives for seismic data acquisition. This is done with outright impunity as the people are hardly paid farm- gate compensation. As it were, under Nigerian Petroleum Law, juju shrines, sacred bushes and other venerated objects are classified under â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Fructus Naturaleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. Special permission is sought from the state authority before such objects could be destroyed (Etikerentse, 1985; Atsegbua, Akpotaire and Dimowo, 2003). Aside from the land question, there is also a moral issue in the analysis of the oil-induced cultural crisis in the Niger Delta. There is alarming evidence of a drop in morality in the region, which hitherto used various taboos to check social misbehaviour. It would appear there is a scandalous and promiscuous social concubineage between oil company workers and girls in the host communities. The influx of comparatively rich and almost "alien" workers from the affluent oil industry has escalated prostitution in previously "isolated" and stable communities. Others (Tell February 23, 1998, Anikpo, 1996; Aghalino, 2009; Ekine (1999) have confirmed that â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;prostitution is on the increase and that in the Niger Delta, many towns and villages have seen influx of male workers from other parts of Nigeria as well as a large expatriate community, and notes that the situation, together with poverty, illiteracy and

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lack of any alternatives has led many young girls into prostitution and are made to engage in bestiality by some expatriates (Adalikwu, 2007:164; Semenitari, 1998; Brisibi, 2001). More importantly perhaps is the fact that because men have migrated away in search of greener pastures, their wives become susceptible to the seduction of the oil men. When eventually they return to hear gory tales of the escapade of their wives, the men in return disown their wives and consequently swell the already large pool of ‘free women’ willing to engage in commercial sex. In fact, break down of marriages is a serious aspect of the cultural crisis in the Niger Delta. There is also an emerging army of ‘fatherless children ‘in the region. This is not unconnected with the high wave of prostitution enunciated above. As the young and impressionistic girls fall victims to the itinerant oil workers, they are made to bear the burden of caring for the children who unfortunately are rejected by the oil men. Indeed, it may not be out of place to stress that the children today are the arrow heads of the militants in the region. The argument may be made that the young girls are equally guilty since it takes two to tangle. But when one discovers the level of social awareness in the region, one would easily exonerate them. These are materially impoverished folks living far away from urban communities and hence ignorant of more dignifying means of livelihood after their farmland had been degraded by oil multinationals (Aghalino 1999). The teenage girls are attracted to the steady flow of cash from their transient lovers and subsequently ignore going to school as it is seen as time wasting. It is therefore explicable why the young girls are highly susceptible to the ‘oil men’ who can lure them with little sums of money but which unfortunately appear enormous in the eyes of the girls (Teilanye, 1997:25).

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A follow up to the wave of prostitution in the region is the prevalence of HIV and AIDS in the Niger Delta is among the highest in the country, higher than the average for Nigeria. The Niger Delta has an average prevalence rate of 5.3 per cent, compared to the national average of 5 per cent. The impact of HIV/AIDS has been particularly harsh in the region. It is well known that the disease wreaks greater havoc where there is poverty, social inequality and general political marginalization. The weakening of livelihood and the social fabric in areas prone to oil exploitation creates additional problems in terms of care and support (UNDP, 2006:316). Before the incursion of the oil industry, purity amongst women was highly revered and social miscreants were lampooned. But the break down of culture in the region has facilitated the wave of prostitution in the region. The oil industry in the Niger Delta has also engendered cultural conflict in another way. Migration into and out of the Niger Delta during the pre-colonial and colonial period were dictated by the need to farm, fish and trade (Otite, 1979; Aghalino 1996). The oil palm belt as it were, attracted people from the densely populated and agricultural land-lacking area of the core-east. The emergence of petroleum as a major resource in the region introduced a new dimension to earlier forms of migrations. Oil industry induced migrations involve young men and girls in search of greener pasture in the major urban areas of the Niger Delta (Legborsi, 2007: 11). Perhaps, it may be stressed that an urban-rural divide was already showing in the region by the time oil became a dominant feature of the Nigerian economy. The oil boom years sharpened it with a consequent decline in rural population. Migration out of the oilbearing enclave in the Niger Delta seem to be the major radical adaptable mechanism put in place by the people whose source of livelihood is threatened by oil spills and gas flaring. In point of fact,

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migrations in the Niger Delta are also informed by the wish to move elsewhere because of unbearable pollution of water ways and land as well as the inflationary trend institute by oil field workers. Others are searching for opportunities to re-establish trading activities as a result of the lost of their farmland to oil pollution. It seems that Nigeria's oil boom has turned the "Petroleum producing areas to centrifugal centers of oil doom where people leave rather than live in". (Adeniyi, et al.1983). It is easily conjectured that the rapid migratory wave to cities and oil enclave had denuded the population of the Niger Delta, dislocated the active stratum of society and had consequently disoriented social networks that previously sustained a virile cultural life style in the region (Darah, 1995). Decline in artistic and socio-cultural and religious performances illustrate the above development. Hitherto, the vibrancy in artistic life was a prominent feature of the Niger social outlook. An urban-rural was already showing in the Niger Delta by the time oil became a dominant feature of the economy. The oil boom years sharpened it .Rural-urban migrations intensified with a consequent decline in rural population. The sharp decrease in rural population caused a decline in the number and frequency of annual or seasonal performances and observance of important cultural ceremonies, especially festivals. The cultural space lost to traditional festivals is now filled largely by elaborate obituary ceremonies. In point of fact, burials of the aged were always elaborate in the region as the forum was used to reenact culture and tradition. What is new is the conduct of funeral in form of carnivals even for young people. This has engendered cultural crisis as these burials entails extravagant spending, especially the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;sprayingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; of currency notes on the children of the deceased. An adjunct to the above is that a majority of households in the region is now headed by women as a result of the migration of their

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husbands out of their villages. This is a clear distortion of the culture of the people which ensured that the man was the head of the home. The result is that the jobs of caring for the family now rest on the women (Okoko, 1998). The cultural crisis caused by this development can only be imagined when women now have to preside over family issues. The influx of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;strangerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; elements from other parts of the country and abroad has further diluted local cultures and safeguards. As for the environment and natural resources, this means that traditional arrangements for resource use and management have virtually broken down. Clan rulers, villagers elders and family heads can no longer be relied upon to enforce traditional practices, which have negative consequences for the environment(UNDP 2006:306). One characteristic of the migrants is that most of them are out in search of paid employment. This trend has engendered a subtle proletarianization of the labour force in the region. Proletarianization in this context is applied to mean a shift away from self-employment mainly in agriculture to wage labour. It also suggests that small holders are being pushed out of agriculture into wage labour; rather than being pulled by new employment opportunities (Jayaraman and Lanjonw, 1999). This new but flourishing trend in the region is probably a function of gross poverty in spite of the vast oil wealth in the region. Moffat and Linden (1995) have shown that the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in the region is below the national average of US$280. They assert that the high salary paid to oil workers cannot mitigate the stark poverty in this region, it can only exacerbate i t . Poverty in this region goes beyond the physical. It is also psychological as there is a total erosion of dignity and self-respect (Duning, 1990). The displacement of people and villages when oil spillages occur is another major cultural crisis occasioned by the oil industry. The

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point to note is that the link between unsustainable petroleum exploitation in the Niger Delta and the destruction of the indigenous homeland and culture is undeniable. Traditional land has been sacrificed at the altar of irresponsible oil practices. The displacement of Igolu village in Isokoland which result from the massive spillages in 1973 at Shell's location 13 and 18 had untold physical and psychological impact on the people. In the same vein, the September 1999 oil spillage disaster at Ekakpamre also in Delta state impacted negatively on the people. The spill not only destroyed rivers, wide expanse of agricultural land but also rendered the people homeless. In addition, the spill created a new surge of displaced person as well as environmental migrants. This surge was intensified with the Jesse fire disaster, which claimed almost a thousand lives (Oil Times, June 2001; The Punch, December 7, 1998).The displacement of people had its attendant problem of removing people from their land as the peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ways of life are tied to their land (Aghalino,2010). One other dimension to the cultural crisis in the region is youth unrest and the emergence of militant groups. These groups are increasingly challenging community leaders, who in the past were unquestionably followed. This has led to a loss of societal values and the loss of traditional structures of authority. In earlier times, youth were typically at the bottom of the hierarchy. Today however, traditional rulers and elders in the various communities have lost control over youths. They have worked out their own largely unsustainable ways of reaching and dealing with the oil companies, government at every levels, and national and international organizations (UNDP, 2006:306). Before the oil armada, the social value of labour and hard work was celebrated. People with unquestionable wealth were subjects of ribald songs and infamy. Today, the incursion of the oil industry has totally distorted the culture of hard work and quick

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wealth is the in-thing. The quest for quick money must be instrumental in the high wave of crime in the region. The cultural crisis in the Niger Delta is also found in the form of a resurgence of violent conflicts in the region. The region has witnessed a rash of violence within the past two decades. Between 1990 and 2004 alone, over 1000 cases of violent crises were reported resulting in more than 300,000 deaths. In the 2002 World Bank governance rankings, only 19 countries out of a total 179 ranked below Nigeria in terms of political stability and the absence of violence (AAPW, 2006:7). In an environment of insecurity, agitation, mistrust and even wealth distribution, criminal elements have become strong in the Niger Delta. These are armed, well organized and protected by powerful patrons. They steal sections of oil pipelines, well heads and vehicles, engage in illegal oil bunkering, attack small crafts on the rivers, intimidate communities and companies to extort money and protect their network (AAPW, 2006:22). The point to note is that the spread of Western ideals of capitalism, the quest for money, and immediate gratification has overshadowed the respect for traditional authority. Consequently, in view of the impact of oil exploration activities, the deep sense of community, morality, social cohesion and solidarity hitherto enjoyed by the people is being eroded, making it easy for families and communities that have co-existed peacefully before the commencement of oil business to come into conflict with each other over oil royalty and ownership of land. Internal divisions within communities also seem to have increased. These divisions are instigated by greed, a byâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;product of social disintegration. The observable internal divisions are most frequently between the youths and chiefs, between youths and the communitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; urban and local elites, between youths and professional claims agents and the community, as well as, between different youth

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groups. Interestingly, the youths play crucial role in the formation of factions. Thus, in most cases, the conflict is directed against the chiefs who are seen as the focal point of authority and patronage. Age grades were important institutions which helped to mobilize community energy and reinforce solidarity. The age grade also performed economic functions in the form of clearing bush paths as well as bailing of ponds. But with the advent of the oil industry, the pre-colonial and colonial functions of the age grades changed. Age grades are now used as forum for resisting the atrocious environmental regime of the oil firms. They galvanize themselves in presenting common front in the struggle for compensation from the oil firms .They organize and stage protests. In the extreme, they barricade flow stations, subtlety engage in the sabotage of oil installations and engage in outright kidnapping in order to obtain ransom. Discipline which was a hallmark of age grades when it was culturally regulated has now fizzled out. The result is frequent disruption to peaceful community life and disruption of oil industry activities. Before the advent of the oil industry, youths unquestionably followed the dictates of the elders (Aghalino, 1999). But with the realization of the wealth that could be from oil industry, traditional chiefs threw caution to the wind and began to assume the final point of authority and patronage by the oil industry. With time the youths discovered that they were colluding with contractors to falsely certify jobs completion in order to share a percentage of the contract sum to the detriment of their communities. The youth are becoming so vocal. The result is a complex and dynamic fragmentation of communities characterized by frequent power shifts. This makes it difficult to build relationship as well as negotiate compensations for land acquisition, damages and spills.

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Conclusion This paper has attempted to examine the cultural crisis induced by oil exploration and production in the Niger Delta. The point was adumbrated that it is conventional for scholars to view the crises in the Niger Delta from the binoculars of environmental deterioration occasioned by oil pollution and gas flaring without taking cognizance of the cultural crisis as these are intertwined. The environment of the people of the region cannot be divorced from their every activity which is embedded in their culture. Thus, the cultural crisis in the region is explicated by the break down of pristine ways of doing things and this is reflected in the violation of land rights, degradation of cultural artifacts such as shrine, groves and even burial sites. The cultural crisis in the region is acute as it affects women and their access to land, water and pharmaceutical product derived from land. More importantly perhaps is the wave of migration, resurgence of crime as attested to by youth militancy and disdain for constituted authority. There is structural and social dislocation of society as epitomized by high wave of prostitution, acceptance of spirit of rugged individualism and strained inter-group relations. Our point of departure is that although the federal government is making concerted effort to tame the Niger Delta crisis, this must be done from a holistic perspective by taking into consideration the cultural dimension of the crisis. This, in fact, entails social re-engineering and cultural re-orientation to integrate the people back to their society.

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References Academic Associates Peace Work, (2006). Oil Prospecting and Communal Crisis. Case Studies of Private Corporations’ Activities in the Niger Delta, Nigeria Adalikwu, J. 2007.Globalisation and the Uneven Application of International Regulatory Standard: the Case of Oil Exploration in Nigeria. PhD Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon. Adeniyi E. O. et al (1983) Environmental and Socio-economic Impacts of oil Spillage in the Petroleum Producing areas of Nigeria in proceedings of the 1983 international Seminar on the Petroleum Industry and the Nigerian Environment (Lagos: NNPC). Aghalino S. O. (1994) Isoko Under Colonial Rule 1896-1949 M.A. Thesis University of llorin. Aghalino, S.O. and B.M. Eyinla, 2009. ‘Oil Exploitation and Marine Pollution: Evidence for the Niger Delta, Nigeria’, Journal of Human Ecology, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp.177-182. Aghalino, S.O. (2000) British Colonial Politics and the Oil Palm Industry in the Niger Delta Region, 1900-1960, African Study Monographs 21(1). Aghalino, S.O. (2005). ‘Issues and Trend in the Payment of Compensation in the Oil Industry in Nigeria, 1969-1997’, Ibom Journal of History and International Studies, Vol., 12, No. 1, pp186-208 Aghalino, S.O. 2009. Oil Exploitation and the Accentuation of Intergroup Relations in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Journal of Human Ecology. Vol.28, No.3, pp.153-159. Aghalino, S.O. 2009. The Olusegun Obasanjo Administration and the Niger Delta 1999-2007. Studies of Tribes and Tribals Vol. 7, Number 1, pp.57-60. Aghalino, S.O. 2010.Resource Control and the Problem of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. In Adam Karap Chekpkwony & Peter M.J. Hess (ed.) Human Views on God. Variety Not Monotony. Essays in Honour of Ade P. Dopamu, Kenya: Moi University Press, Eldovet pp.263-271.

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Amnesty International, 2009. Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta. London: Amnesty International Amnesty International, Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta. London: Amnesty International, 2009. Anikpo, M. (1996) Dynamics of Socio-Cultural exchange in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities. The case of Izombe: In P.U. Onyige (Ed). Energy and Social Development in Nigeria. Lagos, Longman. Ashton; J.N. (1998) "The ERA Handbook of the Niger Delta. Benin City: Longman and ERA. Atsegbua, L., Akpotaire, V and Dimowo, F., (2003). Environmental Law in Nigeria: Theory and Practice. Lagos: Ababa Press. Atsegbua, L., V. Akpotaire and Dimowo, F. 2003. Environmental Law in Nigeria: Theory and Practice. Lagos: Ababa Press Ltd Azaiki, S. 2003. Inequities in Nigerian Politics. Yenagoa: Treasure Books Bourguignon, F. (1999) Crime. Violence and Inequitable Developments, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics Washington D.C. Brisibi, A.A. 2001. ‘African Tradition: The Identity of a People with special focus on globaliastion and its impact in the Niger Delta’. Paper written for Niger Delta Women for Justice and presented at the C.O.O.L Conference in Boston, USA, March Dafinone, D., ‘Supreme Court verdict on Resource Control: The Political Implication in http://www.ngrguardiannews.com Diana, W. The Role of Women in the Struggle for Environmental Justice in Ogoni. Delta News. Durning A.B (1990) "Ending Poverty" in Linda Starke (ed.), State of the World 1990: World Watch Institute Report on progress towards a Sustainable Society, London: N.N. Norton and Co. Ekine, S. 2000. Blood and Oil: Testimonies of Violence from Women of the Niger Delta. London: Centre for Democracy and Development Ekuerhare, B.U. ‘The Niger Delta Environment and its Implications for Development Policy Options in Nigeria’ In: Akpojotor, A.S. et.al (ed.,) Sustainable Environmental Peace and Security in the Niger Delta. Abraka: Delta State University. Etikerentse, G.E. 1985. Nigerian Petroleum Law. London: Macmillan

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Fayeye, J.O. 2009. The Place of Culture in Plural Societies; In Lasisi, R.O. and Fayeye, J.O. (ed.,) Leading Issues in General Studies. Ilorin: General Studies Division Fayeye, J.O. 2009. ‘The Place of Culture in Plural Societies’, In: Lasisi, R.O. and J.O. Fayeye, (eds.) Leading Issues in General Studies. Ilorin: General Studies Division Federal Republic of Nigeria (2000) Report of the special Committee on the Review of the Petroleum Supply and Distribution. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2008). Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta. Volume 1. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Cultural Policy. Available at http://www.wwcd.org/policy/clink/nigerai.html Fekumo, J.A (1990) Civil Liability for Damages Caused by Oil Pollution in Omotola, J.A. (ed.) Lagos: University of Lagos Press Fregene, P.A.A. 1997. Oil Exploration and Production Activities: The Socioeconomic and Environmental Problems in Warri Division-Itsekiri Homeland’. Paper presented at the seminar on oil and environment organized by Fredrich Ebert Foundation at Port Harcourt, 14 and 15 March. Frynas, J.G (1998). ‘Political instability and Business: Focus on Shell in Nigeria’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.19, No. 3, pp457-478 Hamilton, J., Stockman, L. Brown, M., Marshall, G., Muttit, G. and Rau, N. 2004. ‚The case for an Oil-free Future‛, www.nonewoil.org Jayaraman, R. and Lanjouw, P. (1999) The Evolution of Poverty and Inequality in Indian Villages, The World Bank Research Observer Vol. 14(1). Legborsi, S.P. 2007.The Adverse Impacts of Oil Pollution on the Environment and Wellbeing of a Local Indigenous Community: The Experience of the Ogoni people of Nigeria. Available at http://www.un.org/esg/socdev/unpfil/.../workshop_IPPE_Pyagbara. doc.Accessed 29/6/10. Moffat, D and Linden, O. (1995) Perception and Really: Assessing Priorities for sustainable Development in the Niger River. Delta, Ambio Vol. 24 (7-8). Oil Times, June 2001

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Okoko, E. C. (1098) "Migration Gender and Resources: a Study of Ibeno Community in South Eastern Nigeria, African Journal 01 Social and Policy Studies, Volume I No. I. Onokerhoraye, A.G. (2000). The Political Economy of the Niger Delta Region: A look at the future from the past and present’. Paper presented at the Seminar on Niger Delta and Nigerian Federalism Organised by Tos and Associates in Collaboration with the Office of the Governor of Delta State, on Thursday, 2-3 November, 2000, PTI, Effurun. Otite, O (1979) "Rural Migration as catalysts in Rural Development, the Urhobo in Ondo State, Africa, Vol. 49, No.3. Otite, O (1979) "Rural Migration as catalysts in Rural Development, the Urhobo in Ondo State, Africa, Vol. 49, No.3. Oyefusi, Aderoju, (and Oil-Dependence and Oil Conflict in Nigeria. Mimeo Shell (1995) People and the Environment: Annual Report Lagos: SPDC. Shell (1998) "People and the Environment: Annual Report Lagos: SPDC. Taylor, E.B. (1871). Cited in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/culture Teilanye, D. 1997. ‘Bayelsan Notes on Oil Pains’, The Guardian, Thursday, February 20. Tell, Lagos February 23, 1998. Tell, July 14, 2008 The Punch, December 7, 1998. UNDP, 2006. Niger Delta Human Development Report UNESCO (2007). UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. Available at http://www.unesco.org/educational/imld2002universaldecla.shtm

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Environmental Justice, Democracy and the Inevitability of Cultural Change in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis of the Niger Delta Dilemma Dr. Kelly Bryan Ovie Ejumudo2

Key Terms: Nigeria, Niger Delta, oil, environmental justice, democracy, land use.

Abstract Globally, environmental justice principles are in tandem with democratic ideals and practices. This is because environmental justice seeks to analyze and overcome the power structures that have the potency of thwarting and militating against the principles of fairness and equity which democracy both represents and enforces. In the Third World, poor and shallow democratic institutions and culture have engendered environmental injustice typified by imbalance between access to environmental costs (pollution, unemployment, social and economic dislocation and crime) and environmental benefits (food security, clean air and water, health care, educational opportunity, transportation facilities and gainful employment). In the Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Niger Delta region, environmental injustice that has almost assumed a crisis dimension is a product and a manifestation of the unsettled democracy and the stunted and stifled democratic institutions, especially as environmental policy decisions are a reflection of the political process. This paper therefore examines how Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s pseudo democracy has both occasioned and reinforced the prolonged and protracted environmental injustice that is yet plaguing the Niger Delta. The paper that relied on relevant secondary sources Kelly Bryan Ovie Ejumudo, Ph.D. is with the Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria. E-Mail: drkellypaulovieejumudo@yahoo.com. 2

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of data concluded with useful recommendations including the creation and entrenchment of ideal democratic institutions and values with cultural change as an imperative.

Introduction Environmental justice is an increasingly important element of policy making and it is fundamentally about equity and fairness toward the disadvantaged individuals, groups, communities, societies, institutions, regions and nations. Environmental justice offers the opportunity for merging two difficult agenda at both the national and international levels, by seeking to resolve the conflict between environmental and social goals and focusing on tackling environmental problems as part of the social exclusion agenda. There has been considerable progress on integrating the economic and social goals with far-reaching programme on social exclusion and neighborhood renewal, but there has been much less on integrating the environmental with the social; this is where environmental justice focus is both desirable and inevitable. Environmental justice principles and practices, therefore, require a focus on the needs of future generations, for environmental justice will not be pragmatic if this were achieved at the expense of people in future generations. This is essentially as a result of the fact that social and economic concerns and goals that fail to recognize and accommodate the critical environmental element and consideration will reduce the ability of the environment to provide non-substitutable resources and services (labeled critical natural capital by environmental economists). In the face of the recognized and acceptable efficacy of environmental justice principles and practices across communities, societies and nations, particularly in the third world, there is still massive environmental degradation such that the rural, urban and generally

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neglected areas have experienced large scale erosion and waterquality deterioration, deforestation, declining soil productivity and socio-economic dislocation. Worse still, majority of the people especially the youths have little or no access to the benefits derivable from production activities that should expectedly mitigate the negative effects and costs of the environmental degradation to which they have been perpetually subjected. As a consequence, they cannot lead a life that they value and cherish and their potentials are hardly actualizable and realizable. In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the costs of environmental pollution and degradation that is borne by the marginalized, oppressed and pauperized people as well as the benefits that should flow to them in the form of employment, skill acquisition programmes, educational scholarship schemes, provision of basic social amenities and other pro-poor life-enhancing programmes are heavily disproportional so much so, that the principles of fairness and equity that underlie or underpin environmental justice are impaired with one likely hazardous consequence, environmental crisis. Critical to the environmental injustice problem in the Niger Delta is the shallow, flawed, failed and pseudo democracy that is in practice in Nigeria. The justification for the above position is that true, consolidated and functional democracy presupposes an institutional and governance climate that encourages and upholds fundamental human rights, guarantees equity and fairness and promotes responsible, accountable and representative governance that are the heart of environmental justice. The creation and entrenchment of ideal democratic institutions and values, the expediency of environmental justice and the true recognition, acceptance and practicability of cultural re-orientation are therefore a desideratum.

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Environmental Justice: A Conceptual Understanding There is a growing evidence of the links between environmental problems and social injustices; environmental justice is the idea that brings them together. The term ‚environmental justice’’ otherwise called ‚environmental equity‛ has featured prominently in the environmental debate for over three decades, but it only surfaced in the legal parlance in the 1990’s ( Lazarus 2000:17). It focuses on the disproportionate sharing of environmental benefits and burdens between different states, institutions, organizations, groups and individuals. It is based upon the recognition that environmental costs and benefits are not in a fair and equitable manner and that traditional environmentalism has not been sufficiently concerned with very divergent local situations and the plight of minorities (Bullard 2000:45). The term is concerned mainly with the side effects of industrial activity, such as the citing of waste disposal facilities, the proximity of industrial pollution and workplace exposure to industrial toxins and in-house lead exposure, in particular for children (McDermott 2004:62) . Environmental justice seeks to redefine the traditional environmental movement by incorporating the concerns of minorities within environmental policy making thereby engendering environmental equality or equity (Torres 2000: 31). The main thrust of environmental justice is a shift in focus from the environment to the people, for it underscores the need for environmental protection not to be planned within a vacuum and for environmental goals to take into account social, political and economic realities. In a broad sense, environmental justice is about positive discrimination because it seeks to achieve a redistribution of the costs of environmental justice so as to lower the disproportionately high burden borne by some segments of society. In effect, it is shifting the focus of environmental protection towards taking into account the needs of the poorer sections of society that have suffered the

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environmental consequences of industrialization more than others (Gadgil and Guha 2004: 53) . It also addresses the extent of linkages between environmental and social injustice and asks whether it is practicable to tackle both social exclusion and environmental problems through integrated policies and development. It therefore follows that by looking at social justice issues through an environmental lens and simultaneously by analyzing environmental issues more clearly in terms of social justice, new and more effective ways of dealing with each can be developed. Environmental justice is equally the confluence of social and environmental concerns that deals with the inequitable environmental burden born by groups such as racial minorities, women and youths. It is a holistic effort to analyze and overcome the power structures that thwarts and militates against the principles of fairness and equity. This phenomenon views the environment as encapsulating where we live, work and play and seeks to redress the imbalances in the distribution of environmental benefits and costs. By implication, environmental justice seeks to achieve an accommodation or balance between access to environmental costs or burdens (pollution, unemployment, social and economic dislocation and crime) and environmental benefits (nutrients food, clean air, and water, health care, education, transportation and safe jobs). Environmental justice, which is not a panacea to all social problems, especially as environmental and social goals can be in conflict, has two fundamentally basic premises; first, that everyone should have the right and be able to live in a healthy environment, with access to enough environmental resources for a healthy life and second, that it is predominantly the poorest and least powerful people who are missing these conditions. These two premises connotes environmental rights and responsibilities that focus on the inevitability of ensuring that a healthy environment exists for both the present and future

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generations and that countries, organizations, institutions and individuals do not create environmental problems or distribute environmental resources in ways that damage other peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s health. Environmental justice is therefore a core element of and, as a consequence, it is critical to achieving social justice goals, particularly as it is concerned with ensuring the environment part of the social justice goal. The underlying causes of environmental injustices include institutionalized racism, the commodification of land, water, energy and air, unresponsive, unaccountable and repressive government policies and regulation and lack of or inadequate resources in communities or regions like the Niger Delta. Thus, environmental justice prevails when the environmental risks, costs and hazards or investments and benefits are equally distributed. It does not question the current path of development and its associated environmental foes, but seeks solutions in order to mitigate the problems caused by the current development process. Environmental justice principles are thus expected to serve as a guide for organizing, networking and relating to governmental and non-governmental organizations' demands. This implies that environmental policy decisions are a product of the political process (Field and Field 2006:18). Environmental justice affirms the sacredness of the earth, ecological unity and the interdependence of all species and the right of people to be free from ecological destructions and demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and justice for all peoples free from any form of discrimination or bias. It also emphasize the right to ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and renewable resources in the interest of a sustainable planet for humans and other living things and calls for universal protection from nuclear testing, extraction, production and disposal of toxic/hazardous wastes and poisons and nuclear testing that threaten the fundamental right to clean air, land,

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water and food. Environmental also seeks to promote the fundamental right of all people to political, economic, cultural and environmental self-determination and to participate as equal partners at every level of decision-making, including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and evaluation. It equally protects the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive full compensation and reparations for damage as well as quality health care and affirms the need for urban and rural environmental policies aimed at cleaning up and rebuilding cities and provide fair access for all to the full range of resources. Environmental justice similarly calls for the strict enforcement of principals of informed consent, opposes the destructive operations of transnational corporations and requires individuals to make personal and consumer choices to consume as little of the earthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s resources and to produce as little waste as possible and to make conscious decisions that will ensure the health of the natural world. The essence of environmental justice is the capacity of the earth to satisfy the intra and inter generational needs of society. Environmental justice is recognition that access to clean and healthy environment is a fundamental right of all human beings (Cunningham et al 2007:587). A long history of international law even argues that we all have an inalienable right to sustainable environment. The 1982 World Charter for nature, for example, asserts that manâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s needs can be met only by ensuring the proper functioning of natural systems and it is an essential human right to redress it when the human environment has suffered damage or degradation. (Cunningham 2007:541). The 1987 World Commission on environment and development went further in stating that all human beings have the fundamental right to an environment adequate for their health and well-being. In fact, of all the nations of the world, 109 now have constitutional provisions for protections of the environment

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and natural resources and 100 of them specifically recognize the right to a clean and healthy environment and the stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s obligation to prevent environmental harm (Cunningham et al 2007:542). Paying attention to environmental justice makes sense for two reasons: ethical and pragmatic. The ethical dimension concerns whether distribution of risks, benefits and costs is in accordance with the norms of social justice. The desire for just policies is therefore a conventional complement to the desire for efficient policies. The pragmatic dimension, on the other hand, emphasizes the relationship between the distributional burdens. Policies and programmes that are perceived as unfair will therefore stand little prospect of passage even if they enhance the prospects for efficiency and sustainability (Tietenberg 2005:501). The political conflicts in which many natural resource issues get embroiled are, as a consequence, often related to the fact that the groups who enjoy the benefits are not the same as those who bear the costs (Field 2005:145). These are matters of equity or fairness which is why they can become so controversial. Another important aspect of distributional fairness in resource programmes is how they impact people with different income levels. This is a major issue in the environmental justice.

Democracy: A Conceptual Discourse According to George Orwell (cited in Mahajan 2008: 793), democracy does not have an agreed definition and the attempt to provide one is resisted from all sides. Democracy could be defined as a high-flown name for something that does not exist. In a similar vein, Lucas (1976:29) opined that democracy is a noun but should be an adjective. It therefore implies that democracy is nothing but different doctrines in different peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s minds or perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of public affairs and it could be

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everybodyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s mistress. Burns (1935: 32) equally asserted that democracy is a word with many meanings and some emotional colour, for it is not an algebraic symbol, but a flag or the call of a trumpet for some; and for others an obsolete mythology which has undesirable connections with capitalism and imperialism, and to Finer (1949:15) democracy has come to mean different things, some very hostile to each other, that it needs careful analysis if misunderstanding and idle controversies are to be avoided. Attempting a comprehensive definition of democracy appears elusive and a mirage. This is because it is confounded by a wooliness of thought and usage that is characteristic of the social sciences (Ejumudo 2009:9). And as Eliot (1914:17) rightly posited, when a word acquires a universally sacred character as the word democracy has, one wonders whether it still means anything at all. Expanding the frontiers of the argument, De Jourenel (1949: 276) noted that all discussions about democracy, all arguments whether for it or against it, are stricken with intellectual futility because the thing at issue is indefinite. Therefore efforts by scholars and political theorists across age, discipline and society to define democracy have always founded on the rock of ambiguity and antinomy (Williams 1999: 65). The complexity in defining democracy may be due to the fact that political systems are in a continual state of evolution and ideas regarding what ought to be the scope of governmental intervention in the lives of individuals have also changed and are continually changing. No wonder, the complexity in providing a concise and precise definition of democracy is compounded by the fact that historically the concept itself has been a locus or terrain of prolonged intellectual and ideological contestations. Essentially, after centuries of intellectual speculations as to the origin and nature of democracy, the sad conclusion is that it is an ideal

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towards which many nations strive. By implication, the democratic ideal remains an ideal, a possible explanation for the necessity to see democracy as a continuum where democracies can be placed and gauged in accordance with the extent of their democratization or conformity with acceptable democratic norms and values. One may simply argue that any given nation, or a method or institution is democratic which means that it is in the process of achieving the ideal or that it adopts some principles or processes which may be called democratic (Ijomah 1988:65). In fact, as far back as 1849, Guizot (1949:11) observed that such is the power of the word ‚Democracy‛ that no government or party dares to raise its head or believes its own existence possible, if it does not bear that word inscribed on the burner. The difficulties of capturing the essence of democracy and of high listing its often contradictory activities made scholars researchers to resort to various devices and stratagems for coming to terms with the above reality (William 1999: 65-66). One of the most celebrated and an influential attempt in this direction is the concept of polyarchy formulated by Dahl (1971:39). He classified political regimes according to two criteria: the degree of contestation of political power and the extent of popular participation in such contestation. The twodimensional framework proposed by Dahl has become widely adopted by political scientists to measure the extent to which various states approximate the democratic ideal (Tremblay et al 2004). All the same, democracy that was derived from the Greek word ‘Demos’ meaning people and ‘Kratos’ implying rule or power refers to government or rule by the people or masses (Mbachu 1990: 13). It therefore follows that in a democracy, government should not only be responsible to the demos (people), political power should also emanate from the popular will of the people and the state should be guided by and bound by the same will. Diamond (1999:19) approached democracy as a developing process and added that

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consolidation is a critical step in building democracies. He further argued that the consolidation process involves three components namely: decentralization that enhances the efficiency, quality and legitimacy of democracy, political culture which is a precondition for democracy to take root, especially as democratic values, beliefs, attitudes, norms and means must be embodied in a democracy and the creation of a civil society that facilitates and enhances public participation in the democratic process and prevents abusive power from becoming concentrated at the centre of society. Democracy is a way of life that permits freedom to make choices pertaining to every area of human endeavour and safeguards the liberty of individuals and protects them against unnecessary constrains on their actions because it is a governance system based on popular will. At a more theoretical level, democracy is a political system in which the eligible people in any country participate actively not only in determining the kind of people that govern them, but also actually participate actively in shaping the policy output of the government (Mbachu 1990:197). Bryce (cited in Mahajan 2008: 794) equally asserted that democracy has been used ever since the time of Herodotus to denote that form of government in which the ruling power of a state is legally vested not in any particular class or classes, but in the members of the community as a whole, while Mahajan (2008: 794) stressed that democracy is not a particular kind of civilization, it is rather a civilized way of taking political action. A parsimonious definition of democracy that captured the important notion of the uncertainty of political competition is that of Przeworski (cited in Tremblay et al 2004: 335) who contended that democracy is quintessentially characterized by the fact that the winners of political competition do not have a guaranteed control over the power that they have won. In line with this perspective, democracy is an organized uncertainty. Democracy is, in fact, a political contrivance

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that is aimed at reconciling freedom with the need for law and its enforcement and it is a political method by which every citizen has the opportunity of participating through discussion in an attempt to reach voluntary agreement as to what shall be done for the good of the community as a whole. Mill (cited in Mahajan 2008: 794) also viewed democracy as that form of government in which the whole people or a numerous portion of them exercise the governing power through deputies periodically elected by themselves, while Seeley opined that democracy is a government in which everybody has a share. According to Hall (cited in Mahajan 2008: 794), democracy is that form of political organization in which public opinion has control and Mayo (cited in Mahajan 2008: 794) noted that democracy is one in which public policies are made on a majority basis by representatives subject to effective popular control at periodic elections which are conducted on the principle of political equality and under conditions of political freedom. Kpanneh (cited in Mbah 2003: 151) equally argued that democracy is a complex process of institution building, development of a liberal political culture and traditions, an uninhibited growth of free speech, an unfettered development of the press and respect for not only the rule, but the due process of the law. It can be safely stated therefore that democracy cannot exist in the absence of fundamental human rights, whether individually or collectively, which is in consonance with Nnoliâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (2003: 143) notion that democracy is a system of government usually involving freedom of the individual in many respects of political life, equality among citizens, justice in the relationship between the people and the government and the participation of the people in choosing those in government. In fact, democracy is one which makes government responsive and accountable and a form of government where the

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mass of the people posses the right to share in the exercise of sovereign power, maintain ultimate control over affairs and determine what kind of government machinery shall be set up. It is not only primarily a means through which different groups can attain their ends or seek the good of society; it is the good society itself in operation (Gauba 2007:22). Rather than a mode of governance, it represents a bold and rigorous attempt to conceptualize the democratic process as a function of several features that include freedom of speech and association, the supremacy of the will of the electorate, regular elections and accountability. These features constitute the clustering of practice and countries can be placed on the democracy continuum in line with the presence or absence of all or some of the features.

Environmental Justice and Democratic Ideals Democratic climate ensures the enhancement of the responsiveness, transparency and accountability of the state and the empowerment of the people (Ejumudo 2009:8). In the African continent, democratic experimentation has largely been an ongoing concern and process yet there have been frustrations and misused opportunities such that the democratization process has not been beneficial or, put more categorically; it has failed to satisfy the democratic yearnings and aspirations of the large majority of Africans. The temptation is therefore there to assert that the democratic process is at crossroads because despite the opportunity that abound for the continent to search for, experiment with and consolidate democracy through constitutional reforms, political engineering and transitional programmes, the democratic dream or actual democracy has proved elusive and, by implication, it has become an illusion (Ejumudo 2009:8).

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In the midst of the so-called variant of democracy in Africa, efforts at building a society that guarantees justice, human dignity and civil liberties which democracy represents have been constrained and the continent faces political, social and economic uncertainties, a situation that is compounded by governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s insensitivity to the fundamental problems of resource exploitation and distribution, environmental degradation, poverty and socio-economic dislocation, insecurity and the inadequate capacity to deliver democratic dividend. Democracy in most of Africa is therefore so fledgling and unsettled that environmental injustice which is an outgrowth of the fragile and failed democracy has become common place. Although democracy presupposes an institutional and governance climate that encourages and upholds environmental justice, democracy itself has to be entrenched and truly consolidated before it can play the envisaged facilitative role. In the face of the poor, shallow, fledgling and flawed nature of democracy in most of the third world, it is instructive to note that the basis for environmental justice is almost non-existent, especially as the actualization of true democracy is constrained and inhibited by sundry factors like colonial background that did not create the conditions that are germane for democratic experience, lack of genuine commitment in the neocolonial environment as evident in the fact that the political leadership is not favourably predisposed toward the consolidation and entrenchment of true democratic practice, past political history and legitimacy crisis as well as electoral fraud, corruption and dysfunctional political culture (Ejumudo 2009:14-15). In sum, functional democracy is a genial climate for the bedding, fruition and sustenance of environmental justice, while environmental justice is an indication of ideal and true democratic practice.

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Shallow Democratic Institutions, Weak Culture and Environmental Injustice in the Niger Delta Democracy provides core institutions and processes that support equity which is a sure antidote for environmental injustice in Nigeria. In most of Africa, although there have been various attempts and efforts at democratization and democratic consolidation, yet the claim to having a functional democracy that is founded on mass participation appears to be a sham and a ruse (Ejumudo 2009:16). This position derives from the fact that the developing process that critically builds up to consolidate democracies are largely constrained, stifled and stagnated to the extent that most democracies in Africa can be appropriately dubbed as shallow and flawed. Arguably, entrenching democratic values and institutions in transitional democracies is not an easy task, especially as democratic consolidation demands decentralization that potentially enhances the efficiency, quality and legitimacy of democracy as well as political culture that embody democratic values, beliefs, attitude and norms. In the absence of the above conditions, or put more emphatically, in the environment of failed democracy typified by shallow institutions, weak democratic culture, inequity in the distribution of costs and benefits, oppression and violence, environmental justice will be an illusion. In Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Niger Delta, the development dream remains a mirage and its future is threatened by environmental devastation and degradation, deteriorating economic conditions and socio-economic dislocation in spite of its huge resource base (Magbaggbeola 2003:32). In fact, the environmental injustice in the Niger Delta region is inextricably tied to the shallow and failed institutions, weak culture, inequity, marginalization, oppression and violence that characterize Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s flawed democracy. The multi-dimensional nature of the above injustice is evident in the legal, operational, infrastructural and fiscal aspects considered below:

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Legal/Constitutional: Legislation on petroleum predated exploration activities or efforts in Nigeria. The first piece of legislation was the Petroleum Ordinance of 1889 which was followed by the Mineral Regulation (Oil) Ordinance of 1907, both of which provided the basic legal framework for the development of petroleum and its natural resources (Omorogbe 2001:16). To a very significant degree, the nature of the colonial and post-colonial Nigerian state are largely structurally the same, for the broad spectrum of laws and accompanying actions of the Nigerian state on the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s oil industry have been no less an extension of the 1914 Mineral Act which vested all powers over resources (solid and liquid) on the state as Omoweh (2005:111-112) rightly articulated. For instance, the post-colonial state like its predecessor has the exclusive right to issue mineral prospecting and mining licenses and the sole power to collect royalties, rents and fees from the oil companies. Both the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Land Use Decree of 1978 are complementary and designed to strengthen the instrument of oppression, suppression, marginalization, dispossession, deprivation and disempowerment of the Niger Delta people by the state in collaboration with its allies, the multi-national oil corporations and local bourgeoisie, a clear manifestation of unadulterated environmental injustice (2008:51). This partly explains the logic behind the content of the Land Use Decree which also provided a buffer for the oil giants to be more reckless in their operations in the Niger Delta region. This may also be a part explanation for why Shell, for instance, can afford to flare gas on a daily basis since 1956 when it discovered oil in the Niger Delta and yet it is shielded by the state over litigation on land where oil is explored or produced (Omoweh 2005:115). Land protection in the light of sustainability was, as a result, and is still not of any interest to the state that gradually rendered the Niger Delta people into paupers through successive

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legislation including the petroleum and Land Use and squatters in their own land. Thus, the entire nature, structure and character of the shallow, fledgling and failed democracy in which the Niger Delta is embedded has seriously stifled its development or facilitated its underdevelopment with the legal and constitutional framework providing the foundation. Operational: The alliance of the Nigerian state with the oil giants and the domestic bourgeoisie has played a dominant role in the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta through their laws, policies, actions and operations. The legal/constitutional (foundational) dimension did not only create the environment which is up till today plaguing the Niger Delta region, it also set the stage for the operational menace in which the region has been engulfed. (Ejumudo 2008:53). This is because the activities of the oil conglomerates destroy the soil, water, vegetation and crops of the people. The environment is not only polluted and degraded, the costs in terms of the destruction of the economic base of the rural people who are denied their sources of livelihood defies any accurate statistical calculation and quantification. The level of environmental degradation in the region is manifest in the inability of the environmental resources, like the atmosphere, river, soil and vegetation to renew themselves naturally which invariably, incapacitates the people of the Niger Delta from regenerating themselves socio-economically. The mass of the people are thus pauperized through rural poverty that is foisted on them and they can be described as poor, malnourished, miserable, wretched, landless, neglected and virtually, vulnerable and denied the opportunity to lead a life that they value and to realize their potentials as human beings (UNDP 2005:1). Regrettably too, the alliance of the state, the oil giant and the petit bourgeoisie makes the oil companies, particularly Shell Petroleum

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Development Company (SPDC) arrogant, reckless and insensitive to the plight and the feelings of the devastated Niger Delta region and its impoverished people. In the mentality of Shell and the other oil giants, the region is a minefield that cannot be polluted, such that gas flaring, oil spillage and dumping of untreated wastes on lands/swamps and sea are considered as normal hazards that accompany oil exploration, exploitation, production, transportation and storage. In effect, the worsening social and economic well-being of the Niger Delta region is a product of the deliberate design and execution by the trio (the oil giants, the state and the petty bourgeoisie) in the unholy alliance (Ejumudo 2008:54) and patently a manifestation of hydra-headed environmental injustice. Studies have also shown that crude oil, when spilled on the environment pollutes it together with the land, and destroys the nitrogen cycle of the soil. It equally halts photosynthesis in plants and kills plankton, fishes and other aquatic organisms. Oloibiri, the first source of crude oil in Nigeria has, in fact, become the reference point for environmental degradation and neglect, for it was left wretched and was eventually wiped out of Shellâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s map of flow lines following the extinction of its well after 35 years of rapacious exploitation. This bitter experience depicts the nature of the underdevelopment to expect in the other areas of the Niger Delta. The operational dimension engendered and instigated largely by the foundational legal/constitutional dimension of the Niger Delta crisis has generated a lot of tension characterized by protests, militancy, youth restiveness, piracy, kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, illegal bunkering, violence and the like. State violence in the form of aggression against targeted groups has been the distinguishing mark of the responses and intervention tactics in conflict issues in the region, especially during the military dispensation (IDEA 146; Imobighe et al 2002:62). As a consequence, the democratic rights of the

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Niger Delta people to resource control, political participation, a clean environment and sustainable development are commonly sacrificed on the altar of the profit of the oil giants and the profligacy and corruption of the state and the domestic bourgeoisie. Thus, untold harm has been inflicted on the Niger Delta environment by petrobusiness and the Nigerian state has demonstrated its deliberate unwillingness and attendant gross incapability to intervene in order to protect and ensure the environmental quality of the region due to the strong and contrived alliance between the state, petro-business and the petit bourgeoisie. Fiscal: The structure of fiscal federalism focuses on two closely related issues viz: which level of government has authority to impose or administer what tax, and which government should administer or retain what proportion of the revenue actually realized from taxation. Fiscal federalism equally attempts to grapple with the twin concern of the socio-economic disparities among the component units of the federal system and the economic growth, stabilization and development of the whole federation (Oyovbaire 1985: 163). In Nigeria, the central problem has not been so much the allocation powers and jurisdiction over taxation as the allocation of distribution of the revenue derived from the different taxes between the various levels of government in the federation and by implication, the socioeconomic disparities and development. Fiscal federalism in Nigeria has been largely a product of three factors viz: the colonial heritage, military governance and oil revenue. The interaction of these three factors weakened fiscal cohesiveness in Nigeria (Osayimwese and Iyare 1991:89). Also, the structural and foundational defects of the Nigerian federal experiment compounded by the shallow and fledgling democratic environment does not only have the potency of making fiscal issues

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prone to crisis, it has actually contributed to the environmental injustice that the Niger Delta region has been subjected to. In the face of the numerous revenue allocation commissions and the plethora of formulas, the contentious and political nature of fiscal federalism and the concomitant revenue sharing palaver exhibit the hollowness of Nigeria’s democracy (Ejumudo 2009:18). Of all the burning issues in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism, the most controversial and apparent locus or terrain of contest is the derivation principle contention. This principle is the only one in the revenue sharing system that allows money to be appropriately returned back to the state or source and base of natural resources in line with globally acceptable environmental justice principles. No wonder, derivation principle has come to be equated with the consciousness and efforts at the actualization of resource control in Nigeria’s political terrain. Over the years, the controversy over the use of derivation principle centre on the infinitesimal and inconsequential value in the weighting system of the various revenue allocation efforts and formula (Ejumudo 2009:18). With the exception of the Nigerian first republic and the post-1999 democratic experience, derivation principle had attracted as little as one percent of the federation account. In fact, while the various minority groups have continually pressed for a fair and better deal or compensation in the revenue sharing arithmetic of Nigeria given the centrality of their states in the revenue generation calculation of the country, the Nigerian leadership, especially the military cabal, had coercively employed the apparatus of the state to effectively contain the opposition to the minorities to government’s imposition. They had also cosmetically and superficially tinkered with the issue that concerns the collective destiny of the mineral-bearing communities and states in the Niger Delta region as evident in the slow and tortuous journey that culminated in the progression from one percent to the present thirteen percent derivation formula.

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Against the background of the fifty percent derivation arrangement that previously favoured other regions in the entity called Nigeria, it is not hyperbolic to describe the gap as fiscal and environmental injustice, going by the level of environmental degradation and social dislocation that has become commonplace in the region. This may be a fruitful point to state in all certitude that the fiscal federalism endless problematic has a devastating political economy underlying force with environmental implications. It is instructive to note that the superimposition of the militaryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s unitary command structure on the pre-military federal system and the growth and centrality of oil revenue engendered a confused form of intergovernmental fiscal relations and substantial changes in the fiscal landscape to the detriment of the Niger Delta. Such struggles for the control of economic resources through the leveraged and instrumentality of politics portrays the failure of the Nigerian federal arrangement and the desirability of a limited tension-packed revenue generating and distribution approach to fiscal federalism which is critical to democratic sustenance and stability. Infrastructural: Environmental justice practices demand that the Niger Delta region as the treasure base of the Nigerian state should be compensated through infrastructural development. On the contrary, the region lacks basic social amenities and infrastructure, aside the shortage of skilled manpower and the socio-economic dislocation engendered principally by blocked access to the nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s wealth. This anomalous state of affairs was admitted by the Willinks Commission of 1958 in its recommendations to the then colonial government, shortly before Nigeria attained independence in 1960. The only remedy that the commission proffered to assuage the agitated people of the Niger Delta region was the creation of the Niger Delta Basic Development Authority (NDBDA) in 1959 to cater for the development needs and aspirations of the region. However, the

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impact of the NDBDA, which was supposedly an interventionist agency, was so infinitesimal and inconsequential that it can at best be described as an abysmal failure. Acting under the guise that it does not want to be reckoned with as insensitive to the yearnings and aspirations of the people of the richoil region, the Nigerian state began its own community based projects. Similar to those embarked upon by the oil giants, they did not address the environmental degradation and they did not seek to reverse the rural poverty which became the characteristic feature of the Niger Delta. The Presidential Task force (PTF) which the Babangida-led military administration established in 1988 also failed woefully to handle the complex ecological crisis and the deep-seated rural poverty in the oil areas. In 1992, the Babangida regime created the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) to replace the Presidential Task Force (PTF) which he had earlier established. Although the Commission was originally construed as a developmental strategy to cater for the needs of the oil-bearing communities, it became overtly clear that it was a political machinery designed to serve the purpose of the self-seeking military junta through the erection of a clientele of political supporters in the Niger Delta. The OMPADEC essentially deepened the misery of the people of the region given the political motive behind its creation and operations as mostly evident in the kind of projects that it embarked upon in the oil region and the manner it awarded the contracts (Omoweh 2006:246). The commission was not somewhat glaringly designed to fail, for it was interested in addressing the environmental concerns or injustice of the oil bearing communities, nor was it concerned about reversing the circle of poverty and neglect to which the people had been subjected.

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The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) established by the Obasanjo administration is not sufficiently different from the previous deliberately designed and failed efforts of the ill-fated state so-called interventionist development agencies because the thinking of the state and its allies in the exploitation and marginalization of the region had not altered. That the commission is another aloof government agency like its predecessors and a superficially refurbished cocoon for official corruption by the state and its cronies is evident, considering the fact that over ten years after its existence , the oil-rich region which is the treasure base of the nation fares relatively poor in every indicator of wellbeing. It is, in fact, evidently pellucid that the region is still locked up in and mired in poverty, unabated youth employment, lack of infrastructural development, dysfunctional educational system and environmental degradation and devastation that appears pervasive and unending. The Yar’adua administration with its sincerity and commitment posturing had promised a holistic to the Niger Delta environmental crisis and its consequential socio-economic dislocation and intends to actualize a Niger Delta Development Plan, yet he clearly stated that the Federal Government’s contributory share to the NDDC fund in the sum of Two Hundred and Twenty- Four Billion (224b) that was not paid by his predecessor’s administration had expired. On the whole, the infrastructural aspect of the Niger Delta environmental crisis, despite the recent creation of the Niger Delta Ministry by the Yar’adua administration, is such that one can safely summarize that there has been a superficial tinkering with the burning issues that concern the collective density of the Niger Delta people. The bottom line of this deliberate approach that reveals the insincerity, negligence and lack of commitment on the part of the state and its allies, is the demonstration of the hollowness of the mission and the deceit of the vision behind the cosmetic and dubious so- called development-based state intervention agencies.

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Concluding Remarks Functional democracy and environmental justice are inextricably linked together, because while democracy creates the conditions that are precedent to and the climate that is genial for the bedding, fruition and sustenance of environmental justice, environmental justice is not only an element and an integral part of democracy, it also facilitates its deepening and consolidation process. Given the failure of the Nigerian specie of democracy to produce the conditions that will guarantee the true ideals and practice of environmental justice, the expediency of functional democracy is arguably inevitable. This is particularly because equity is relevant and critical to environmental law policy making, whether in the area of distribution of benefits or the burdens created by environmental pollution. The fundamental issue is thus how a just society should distribute the various benefits (resources, opportunities and freedoms) it produces and the burdens (costs, risks and hazards). And since justice has to do with the very basic structure of society, it defines how the various rights, goods, social advantages and liberties are distributed and how equality and inequality are regulated. Environmental justice which includes within its purview the distributional implications of the environmental protection laws designed to redress the hazards that have their own distinct set of benefits and burdens is therefore a key dimension and an essential element of the broad spectrum of social justice that permeates the structure of the Nigerian society. This implies that the necessary condition for environmental justice principles and practices in Nigeria generally and the Niger Delta in particular, is functional democracy. Although democracy, in the face of its critical role in engineering and sustaining environmental justice, is not a sufficient condition, especially as there are intervening variables that are essential in actualizing the democracy/environmental nexus, the level of

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environmental injustice in the Niger Delta region is largely a product of the flawed and failed democracy and its concomitant shallow institutions in Nigeria. Engendering environmental justice through democratic governance and cultural change in Nigeria therefore requires policies and actions that treat people equitably and address the current persistent and historical injustices. After all, poverty, inequality and injustice currently exist in the region at levels that are undesirable. And poverty ordinarily bears an environmental dimension, since the poorest are those most likely to suffer from ecological degradation. However, although many anti-poverty policies will be environmentally benign and many pro-environment policies will reduce poverty, the link between environmental justice, functional democracy, cultural change and sustainability is by no means total and one-way dimensional. Thus, the construction and creation of a true federal arrangement that will facilitate environmental justice through cultural change is not only desirable and inevitable; it is, in actuality, a desideratum if the Niger Delta seeming unending crisis is to be tackled and resolved in a holistic, integrated and full blown fashion or manner.

References Bullard, R.D. (2000): Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots. London: Free Press. Burns, C.D. (1935): Democracy. London: Free Press. Cunningham, W. P., Cunningham, M.A. and Saigo, B.W. (2007): Environmental science: A Global Concern. Toronto: McGraw-Hill. Dahl, R. (1971): Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. De Jourenel, B. (1949): On Power and Democracy. New York: Viking Press. Diamond, L. (1999): Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

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Ejumudo, K. B. O. (2008): The Unending Niger Delta Crisis: An Ecological Perspective. Journal of Social Policy and Society, Vol. 3, No. 3, Ejumudo, K. B. O. (2009a): The Democracy and Development Nexus and the Intermediation Role of Development Communication in Africa. Journal of Business Administration and Management, Vol. 4, No. 3. Ejumudo, K.B.O. (2009b): A Critical Analysis of Fiscal Federalism Palaver as an Exposition of the Pseudo and Quasi Nature of Nigeria’s Federal Experiment. International Journal of Political Science and Public Administration. Vol. 2, No.1. Eliot, N. O. (1914): Democracy and its Controversy. New York: Penguin. Field, B.C. (2005): Natural Resources Economics: An Introduction. Toronto: McGraw-Hill. Finer, H. (1949): The Theory and Practice of Modern Government. London: Methuer and Co. Field and Field (2006): Environmental Justice: An introduction. Toronto: McGraw-Hill. Gauba, O.P. (2007): An lntroduction to Political Theory. Delhi: Macmillan. Gadgil, G. and Guha, R. (2004): ‚Ecological Conflicts and the Environmental Movement in India‛, in D. Ghai (ed.) Development and EnvironmentSustaining People and Nature. New Delhi: Macmillan. Guizot, O. (1949): Democracy and Claims to Democracy. University of Chicago Press. Ijomah, B. I. C. (1988): Afrocracy- Partyless Democracy: Basis for National Stability. Benin City: Idodo-Umeh Publishers. Imobighe et al (2002): Lazarus, R. (2000): Pursuing Environmental Justice: The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection. London: Macmillan Publishers. Lucas, J. R. (1976): Democracy and Participation: London: Penguin. Magbagbeola, O. (2002): ‚Environment Underdevelopment of the Niger Delta: An Eclectic View‛ in Orubu, C.O., Ogisi, D. O., and Okoh, R. (eds.) The Petroleum Industry, the Economy and the Niger Delta Environment, Warri: Joyco Press. Mahajan, V.D. (2008): Political Theory. New Delhi: S.Chand and Company. McDermott, C. J. (2004): ‚Balancing the Scales of Environmental Justice‛. FORDHAM, Vol. 6, No. 2.

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Mbah, P. (2003): Executive-Legislative Relations in Nigeria: The Presidency and the National Assembly (1999-2002). A PhD Seminar Paper, Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Mbachu, O. (1990): Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy: A Nigerian Perspective in Coexistence. Nnoli, O. (2003): Introduction to Politics. Enugu: Pan African Centre for Research on Peace and Conflict Resolution. Omorogbe (2001) Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria, Lagos, Malthouse Press. Omoweh, D. O. (2005) Shell Petroleum Development Company, the State and Underdevelopment Nigeria’s Niger Delta: A Study in Environmental Degradation, Africa World Press Inc. Oyovbaire, S.E. (1985) Federalism in Nigeria: A study in the Development of the Nigerian State, London: Macmillan Publishers Torres, G. (2000): Changing the Government Views: Environmental Justice. Journal of Environmental Science, Vol. 10, No. 3. Tremblay, R.C., Lecours, A., Nikolenye, C., Salloukh, B. and Scala, F. (2004): Mapping the Political Landscape: An introduction to Political Science. Toronto: Thomson Nelson. Tietenberg, T. (2005): Environment and Natural Resource Economics. London: Pearson Education. UNDP, (1980): World Development Report. Washington DC: United Nations. UNDP (2006): Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis. Human Development Report. New York, UNDP. Williams, A. (1999) ‚The Fictionalization of Democratic Struggle in Africa: The Nigerian Example in Governance and Democratization in Nigeria,‛ in D. Olowu, K. Soremekun and A. Williams (eds.) Governance and Democratization in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

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Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Proliferation and Instability in the Niger Delta: An Analysis of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Process Dr. George I.J Obuoforibo3 Key Terms: Nigeria, Niger Delta, SALW, DDR.

ABSTRACT The issue of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation has been given widespread international focus in the post cold war era. This is so because these weapons have become the primary tools of ethnic and internal conflicts in recent times. It has equally been observed that developing countries in the Third world, particularly in Africa are the most vulnerable. The African situation has to be understood from the context of the post independence political, economic and sociocultural setting. This period witnessed the existence of a highly factionalized and fictionalized society, weak structures, sectoral dislocation exacerbated by foreign domination and vulnerability to the vagaries of cold war rivalry between the super powers of which Nigeria where the Niger Delta Region is situated is not an exception. The backlash of this development was widespread national, ethnic and communal conflicts giving rising to the excessive militarization of the continent. Hence, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

George I.J Obuoforibo, PhD was born in 1954 in Ogu/Bolo Local Government Area. He is Senior Lecturer of International Relations, Political and Administrative Studies in the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Port Harcourt in Rivers State, Nigeria. His e-mail is obuoforibo@yahoo.co.uk 3

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becomes the basis for settling scores within national societies of African nations. As earlier stated the research of this paper is Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation in the Niger Delta: An Analysis of the (DDR) process. Our review of relevant literature on this research problem indicates the existence of a yawing gap that we feel a further research can help to fill. The objective of this paper is centered on the need to examine and analyze the extent to which the DDR process would help the existence of a lasting peace in the Niger Delta. As such the significance of this paper can hardly be overemphasized. This is based on the importance of the Niger Delta Region as the economic life wire of the Nigerian nation. We would resort to the usage of content analysis as the method of our source for data. It is our hypothetical stand in this paper that the (DDR) process would not ensure lasting peace in the Niger Delta, secondly that it is only a sufficient involvement of the local population and their buy in into the programme that would provide a lasting peace in the Niger Delta In this paper we have resorted to the usage of systems theory for our analysis. In a political system such as ours, we need to bear in mind the fact that when there is crisis in the Niger Delta, Gbokoharam or Jos the entire political system is affected in one way or the other. We have therefore analyzed the crisis of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the Niger Delta from that context. The paper is divided into six parts. The first part is the introduction which is followed by a look at some conceptual issues pertaining to (SALW). Thirdly, we look at the sources of these Arms and why these sources have become a bottomless pit. Fourthly, we have examined the origin of the usage of such arms in Africa and by extension the Niger Delta. Fifthly, we would analyze critically the DDR programme in the Niger Delta and the sixth is the conclusion.

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INTRODUCTION The issue of small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation has been given wide spread international focus in the post cold war era. This is because these weapons have become the primary tools of ethnic and internal conflicts in recent times. They have been the sources of violence, wars, conflicts and crimes. It has equally been observed that developing countries in the third world, particularly in Africa are the most vulnerable. The question is why are such conflicts persisting or why do they reoccur even after the end of such conflicts? Does it mean that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process has not been able to sufficiently address the problems that may have necessitated the occurrence of such conflicts? Answers to questions of these nature would go a long way in making us to understand the persistent instability in the Niger delta, made possible by small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation that has reached a crisis level, hence the topic of this paper small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation and instability in the Niger Delta, an analysis of the disarmament demobilization and reintegration process. The Niger Delta an oil rich region in Nigeria is characterized by the existence of wide spread poverty, squalor and environmental degradation due to long period of neglect and marginalization by successive regimes both civil and military. Several efforts have been made through representations of traditional rulers, opinion leaders and public spirited individuals on behalf of the people. These moves have been met by successive regimes with disdain and draconian brute force. The small Arms and Light Weapons crisis we are witnessing currently in the Niger Delta is necessitated by such brute force, as the people had no alternative than resorting to violence. Though some disarmament, demobilization and disintegration programme was carried out by President Olusegun Obasanjo, they

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could not provide lasting solution to the crisis due to lack of genuine interest on the part of government. The question is how genuine is the current disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme of Yar’Adua’s government in ensuring a lasting solution to the Niger Delta crisis by making sure that those factors that necessitated the crisis are taken care of once and for all? It is true that a lot has been written on the issue of small arms and light weapons proliferation and instability in the Niger Delta. But such writings have been focused largely on the aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The real issues that really necessitated the wide spread usage of such weapons have not been sufficiently addressed. For instance, Bekoe Dorina in his strategies for peace in the Niger Delta was of the view that previous attempts at disarmament, demobilization and integration (DDR) programmes did not succeed due to the absence of a coordinating body and employment opportunities. He went further to say that ‚there is the need for comprehensive approach that will address the incentives of groups to hold arms, implement best practices from successful programmes, invite international observers to monitor disarmament processes and ensure coordination between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts and also creating meaningful employment opportunities (Bekoe Dorina 2009, p.7). In as much as one appreciates Dorina’s views, it is our contention in this paper that such – views does not help to sufficiently address the problem of small Arms and Light weapons crisis in the Niger delta. This is predicated on the fact that, what is necessary at this point in time is the success of the post Amnesty peace building process. The concern of this paper therefore, is the extent to which the post amnesty peace building process can ensure the existence of a lasting peace considering the pernicious long term effects of the existence of small arms and light-weapons in a post conflict situation.

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The paper starts with an introduction which is followed by a look at some conceptual issues, the third is an examination of the causes of small arms and light weapons proliferation, the fourth part looked at the sources of these arms, the fifth part is an analysis of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, while the last is the conclusion.

CONCEPTUALIZING THE USAGE OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) PROLIFERATION In the prehistoric days man was said to be in a state of nature, a homo-sapien and life was brutish, nasty and based on the survival of the fittest. Over time, man became humane, civilized and started living a communal life based on societal norms and values which were considered sacred. Violation of societal norms and values is often met with the exercise of legitimate coercive authority of the state, to enforce compliance and obedience. As time went on state elites began to misuse the legitimate coercive authority to suppress and violate the rights of the people who in actual sense handed over this power to them. Thus power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The instruments of coercion used either legitimately or arbitrarily are the small arms and light weapons (SALW). Generally speaking, small arms are weapons designed for personal use, while light weapons are designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. Examples of small arms include revolvers and selfloading pistils, rifles, sub-machines guns, assault riffles and light machine guns. Light weapons include heavy machines guns, some types of grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns and portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems. They are widely durable, highly portable, easily concealed, and possess

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legitimate military, police and civilian users. Small arms and light weapons are used both by government forces (military and police) and non state actors (guerrillas, ethnic militias war lords, brigands and so on engaged in low intensity conflicts (Klare 2009, p.3. In an era of Oligarchic rule, who says power says Oligarchy. As posited by elitist theory, the elites a small category of well organized few knows the importance of power which when acquired is more often made arbitrary use of that is inimical and detrimental to the interests of the majority of the people. It is a known fact that the principles of national sovereignty set no boundaries to the violence in which domestic conflict can be conducted. When polarization occurs along communal cleavages, the conflict situation describes entire collectivities as enemies. Such confrontation is intense in its mobilization effect and swiftly escalates fears to a level where the very physical survival of a collectivity may appear to be at stake. Taking into consideration the extent to which Americanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s â&#x20AC;&#x161;Melting Pot theory was challenged, it is understandable why certain factors such as urbanization, industrialization and secularization can hardly work in multinational society, even if the total authority and coercive means available to the state were launched to a coherent strategy of assimilation (Young 1993. p.7). Again the American experience makes one to realize that the viability of the assimilation paradigm came under growing attack in the 1960s, as evidence began to accumulate that ethnicity was far more persistent that the melting pot theory would permit. For the fact that change and process are central we need to pay particular heed to the social vectors which alter identity patterns and to the political arenas which define their saliency (Young, 1993. p.11). In Africa and indeed Nigeria, the identity of circumstances, the fluidity of groups and pace of change offer a view of the entire range

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of human experience of cultural pluralism. Since sub-national cleavages will endure it must be endured. The American racial situation might serve as a useful example, poverty and being Black closely correlates; Black anger derives in part from the myriad social obstacles which have kept the bulk of the black population at the bottom end of the economic ladder (Young 1993 p. 40). Here in Nigeria, the people of Niger delta have right from the inception of the country as a sovereign nation been systematically and persistently marginalized, impoverished and dispossessed of their natural resources. One therefore agrees with Kegley in his assertion that, when valuable natural resources are discovered in a particular region of a country, the people living in such localities suddenly have economic incentives to secede violently if necessary. Conflict is also more likely in countries that depend heavily on natural resources as rebel groups can extort the gains from this trade to finance their operations (Kegley, 2007 p 23).

The situation in the Niger Delta can be seen from the above assertion. However, the point of difference is that Jasper Isaac Adaka Boroâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s attempt at secession in his 12 days revolution in 1967 was due to the long period of marginalization and neglect of the people of this area. It is also true that militant groups resorted to oil bunkering activities to finance their operations. Again the point of difference with Kegleyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s assertion is that they were doing it in collaboration and involvement of high level government officials. According to the United Nations, some 359 million people (of 578 million who belongs to groups that face some form of cultural exclusion) are disadvantaged or discriminated against relative to others in following their beliefs and frustration, anger often erupts in

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violence. (Kegley, 2007 p.42.3). When peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s expectations of what they deserve rise more rapidly than their material rewards, the probability of conflict grows. That of course applies to most of the countries in the global south, where the distribution of wealth and opportunities is highly unequal. This is the essence of relative deprivation as a cause of internal violence as people who feel they have been denied the resources they deserve are often inclined to use force in acts of rebellion (Kegley, 2007 p.428).

THE CAUSES OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) PROLIFERATION IN THE NIGER DELTA The root of the Niger delta crisis which reached an alarming proportion in recent times could be traced to the prevailing circumstances during the colonial era which were not taken care of as at the time of independence. In other words, these problems were carried over to the independence era and persisted over time. One such problem was the coming into existence of ethnic politics by virtue of the proliferation of ethnic identity groupings. These groups include the Ogbe Omo Oduduwa, Ibo cultural union and Jamiyar Arewa all of which later metamorphosed into political parties. This period constituted watershed in the annals of Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s political history. It was also an eye opener to the leaders of the Niger Delta. Reference to one or two of such issues might help to buttress our point. In order to establish their dominance at the centre, the major political parties, particularly those of the West and East led by Chief Awolowo and Dr. Azikiwe tried to balkanize the minorities in their regions. Any effort aimed at establishing their identity was crushed by the leadership of these parties. A case in point is the issue of representation at the 1956 London conference aimed at preparing the nation for independence.

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This issue was highly politicized by AG and NCNC in order to incorporate the minorities of these regions into themselves without representation and identity at the conference. This was strongly opposed by the leaders of the Niger Delta. Prominent among which was the Chief Harold Dappa Biriye’s led Rivers Chiefs and People’s Conference (RCPC) which dissociated itself from the position of the two parties. What the RCPC did was to fall back on the treaties signed by chiefs of Oil Rivers with Her Majesty’s government which were recognized by the colonial government as at that time. Another thorny issue is the problem of comey subsidy<..port dues collected by Ijo Chiefs and peoples from ships that berthed in Ijo territories in the Niger Delta. That Awolowo succeeded in doing that tend to encourage Azikiwe to do same in the East. This was strongly opposed by the Rivers congress led by Hon John A Nsirim as President and Chief Biriye as secretary. The rational behind Awolowo and Azikiwe’s actions was to have complete control over the minorities without any identity with a view to achieve their ambition of becoming either president or prime minister at the national level. Akobo’s position on this issue is instructive he said, that, ‚it must not be forgotten however that each of these three parties came to power at a time when their respective leaders appeared committed to the cultural, economic and political survival and supremacy of the three major tribal groups concerned to commit large resources of the people’s treasury to the creation of a qualitative and quantitative leadership of their various tribes‛. Again Ayotamuno’s view on this issue is in line with the assertion of Akobo when he said that, ‚In the case of Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the love of a huge population was a primary consideration. Dr. Azikiwe’s position was propelled by the desire to control the oil rich endowments of the Rivers province‛, for Awolowo Mazi S.G Ikoku an ideologue of AG’s views captures Awolowo’s position; ‚he was merely going through

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the motions that would help him put together the arithmetical problem of getting members to be the president. He was not doing it because he had sat down and believed in it. He was doing it as part of his political strategy to get into power‛. It is true that the Willink’s Commission was set up to address and take care of fears expressed by the minorities. But the Commission’s report only gave palliatives that did not address the problems of the Niger Delta. Rather it recommended the setting up of the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDDBA) which was just a mere symbolic representation of the governments’ intension to douse the tension that arose as a result of the agitations of the people. This was so mainly because of the collaborative complicity of both the colonial authorities and the leaders of the majority parties in Nigeria as at that time. Therefore the root cause of the instability in the Niger Delta could be traced to the time of colonial era when the structural imbalances that are bedeviling the nation and indeed the Niger Delta started. One would have thought that the political leaders may have learnt their lessons in the post independence era, by way of introducing measures through policies to take care of these problems once and for all, but the reverse was the case. Rather the leadership was unable to transform inherited structures to meet popular aspirations for security and peaceful transfer of power. Instead these institutions were grafted onto and grow apart from traditional structures, thus creating fatal fault lines in the architecture of the new state (Abdel p.4). To the extent that the minorities in the Niger Delta do not see themselves as stakeholders in the nation building project, the state in Nigeria has lacked popular legitimacy and remained a shell state. The preoccupation with assuring personal power and regime security blocked any moves towards democratic institution building. The state

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building project was effectively replaced by rent seeking arrangements, based on personal loyalty and the denial of security to the majority. This is why the French Africanist scholar J.F. Bayart objected to the use of such terminologies like prebendalism and beyond or in the final analysis patrimonialism or neo-patrimonial in describing the nature of the state in Africa, preferring instead to conceive of the state in Africa, as, ‚La politique du ventre-sheer Kleptocracy‛ glamorized and elevated as a system of government (Akindele Ace 2001, p.195). While the degree of prebendalism and beyond or patrimonialism and neo patrimonialism is relative from one state to another, the out comes are significant for all the states concerned. The control of the state becomes the foremost stake in national politics and to achieve this end every means is justified. According to Crawford Young, ‚Many of the civil wars in Africa such as Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda and Zaire which have become clear threat to security started as manifest group reaction to political exclusion and marginalization which the authoritarian State has entrenched‛ (Akindele and Ate. P. 195). In spite of the existence of this gloomy situation in the country generally, that of the minorities in the Niger Delta became worse due to the reactionary policies of the Eastern regional leadership which perceived the resistance of the Niger Delta people as an affront that need to be crushed at all cost. There was a systematic exclusion of the people in virtually all segments of Eastern Regional government. The frustration and anger this situation created culminated into the first attempt at succession and the usage of small arms in the 12 days revolution led by Jasper Isaac Adaka Boro in 1967. It is true that Gowon created 12 states in 1967 out of which was Rivers State, which tend to assuage the feeling of the people. But Gowon’s establishment

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of the petroleum Act in 1969 can be described as giving with one hand and taking back with another. As if that action of Gowon was not enough, Obasanjo’s military government introduced the land use decree in 1978, thereby dispossessing the people of their God given land and its natural resources. What came out of this development was collaboration between successive military governments and the oil multinational corporations in the systematic exploitation of the resources. The irony of the situation is the brazen manner in which the resources were exploited, without the slightest regard or resort to standard environmental practices. The result of this was the degradation of the environment which affected the ecosystem and the depletion of the flora and fauna which is the people’s source of livelihood. Chief Dappa Biriye’s views on this issue are important he said ‚The country’s gratitude to our loyalty was to exercise all offshore royalties from coastal states in the time of Gowon through the petroleum Act of 1969. That is a paradox of qualitative excellence and undermined by its very beneficiaries‛.

With this development what the people needed and requested for was the protection of their environment and the provision of basic amenities for their sustenance. This was met with brute force by successive military regimes. One of such brutal actions of government was the killing of Ken Sarowiwa and eight other Ogoni activists by Abachas military government. When people’s popular and legitimate aspiration for self actualization and preservation are met with brute force, the result is resistance at all costs regardless of what might be the likely consequences. It is in this context that one need to appreciate and understand the issue of small arms and light Weapons proliferation in the Niger Delta.

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However, the most recent violence in the Niger Delta grew out of the political campaign in 2003. As they competed for office, politicians in Rivers State, a focal point of violence in 2003 manipulated the Niger Delta Vigilantes led by Ateke Tom, and the Niger Delta Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Volunteer Force led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo. (Bekoe, 2009, p.5). Exacerbating rivalries, political candidates used these groups to advance their aspirations often rewarding gang members to commit acts of political violence and intimidation against their opponents. The conclusion of the 2003 elections did not end the violence. The Niger Delta Vigilantes and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force continued to fight each other through out 2004. The hostilities peaked when over 300 commanders of the Ijaw ethnic group announced that if the government did not change conditions in the Niger Delta, they would take action against both the government and the oil installations (Bekoe, 2009, p.5). This was the turning point when arms originally meant and used for political violence ended up being used as instruments of militancy for Niger Delta struggle. This development may well be an after thought or a face saving devise on the part of the so called militants when their services were no longer required by the politicians at the end of the elections. It need to be pointed out however, that this after thought or face saving devise would not have been possible if the prevailing circumstances in the Niger Delta where any thing to the contrary. In other words, if the government and the oil multinationals operating in the area had done what is expected, the loopholes that necessitated this turning point would not have arisen. Going by the pedigree of these youths who had no education or skill except gunmanship, taking advantage of the existing situation was necessary for their sustenance. According to The Hard Truth a militant who called himself marine Scorpion said, Our commanders and by extension our field officers were used in the 2003 elections. Shortly after we were abandoned. A man armed

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without a regular paying job, has to find way to make ends meet with the gun he was given in the first instance.(The Hard Truth, 2007, p.2).

SOURCES OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS The sources of SALW proliferation are many and varied. A major pipeline of SALW remains the stockpiles that were pumped into Africa in the 1970s and 1980s by the ex-soviet Union, the USA and their allies to fan proxy inter state wars. These left over weapons have found their way through clandestine networks, involving rogue arms brokers, private military companies, shady air lines companies and local smugglers to exacerbate on going conflicts and facilitate the commencement of new ones in the continent (Abdel Fatau, P. 2). What this has given rise to is that Africa has become the port of call for a huge labour pool of potential security entrepreneurs, mercenaries and arms merchants which have been created particularly in south Africa, Eastern and central Europe. Besides, these weapons industries have become the most important aspects of these countries economies in the post cold war era. These developments have made it possible for the process of production getting into private entrepreneurs. These multifaceted production centres involving both the state and private individuals, brought about the existence of surplus arms that eventually find their way into conflict zones, through rogue brokers thereby adding to the already, existing sizeable cold war stockpiles. Ultimately, the end point of these weapons is Africa where the rogue arms merchantsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; team up with the foreign extracting companies and the corrupt state elites to pacify violent resource enslaves for illegitimate exploitation of resources. It could therefore be said that the character of small arms and light weapons proliferation is not state centric. Thus the line between legal

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and illegal sources is blurred. This is applicable to both the external and the internal. External has to be understood within the context of what flows to Africa from Europe and other parts of the World and the clandestine networks of passage of arms from trouble areas to other parts of the continent that had relative peace and stability. For instance, most weapons that find their way into West Africa came from the conflict zones of the Great Lakes, the greater Horn into the Mano River Vertex (Abdel Fatau p.2). The existence of these sources not withstanding; there is the existence of emerging arms industries in countries such as Nigeria. While the existence of porous borders and lack of meantime domain awareness tend to accelerates external sources, poor remuneration results into low morale of the security personnel constitutes yet another illegal sources of arms transfer. The evidence of proliferation gives a cause for concern. Out of the 639 million SALW circulating globally, some estimated 7 million are in West Africa, and 77,000 small arms are in the hands of major West African insurgent groups (International Alert p. 10). What really gives a cause for concern is the fact that ethnic militia groups, private security companies, arms smugglers, criminal gangs, bandits, mercenaries and vigilante groups are playing more important role in the proliferation of SALW in West Africa. For instance, Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s estimated population of over 150 million is about half of the entire West African population estimated to more than 230 million people. At the 2001 UN Small Arms conference, the Nigerian Minister of Defense confirmed that Nigeria is home to a million of SALW estimated to be circulating in the West African sub-region. Nigeria is also the bridge to central Africa, a zone of conflict from where many weapons have been smuggled into West Africa using the Congo River as a vital water way. Another striking feature of the Small Arms proliferation in West Africa is its trans-national character involving

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the citizens of various member states in a collaborative criminal network (International Alert p.12).

AN ANALYSIS OF THE DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROCESS Disarmament has been an issue of great concern to the international community generally and individual nations as well in view of the carnage that is caused by small arms and light weapons. As such disarmament efforts are often made at the global, Regional, sub-regional and national levels. However, disarmament efforts have been affected already by certain factors. Much of the initiative to reduce and control small arms and light weapons has been left to the poor countries themselves, with little help from international governments or agencies. One of the causes behind the inaction of some of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s wealthiest states is domestic politics and economic self-interest. On the political front, not all governments in a position to donate funds towards small arms control recognize civilian ownership of arms as a problem. In terms of economic self interest, a number of governments are also reluctant to be involved in initiatives which seek to reduce armed violence by restraining local market in small arms. The value of the legal global trade in small arms is estimated at 4 billion us dollar per year. The estimated value of the illegal global trade in small arms is an additional 1 billion us dollars (file: IIE/Small Arms p.11-13). In 2001, the UN Conference on the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects was held in New York. Resulting from this conference was the programme of Action to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (Ebo, p.142). It is true that this normative document has emerged as the only consensus authoritative international statement

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of the nature of the problem and the proposed solution. It is a politically binding document which has become the central global instrument for preventing and reducing trafficking and proliferation of SALW. In as much as one appreciates this development, this programme of action focuses only in illegal trade in small arms despite the fact that most illegally sold arms initially came from legal sources. This is in addition to the fact that despite official proclamations to the contrary, various governments have undermined the efficacy of the moratorium by working against it. Thousands of weapons have been collected and destroyed by government agencies, but statistics are silent on how many weapons remains in illegal hands. We however, need to bear in mind the fact that in the after math of violent conflict large numbers of Small Arms and Light Weapons often remain in the hands of government forces, warring parties and civilians. The flow of illicit arms contributes to an atmosphere of insecurity which further increases the demand for arms. Excombatants and criminals also take advantage of the lack of effective and functional security institutions to perpetuate crime and revenge attacks. The result is a cycle of violence which is a direct legacy of conflict, which presents significant challenges for post conflict peace building (Ebo, p. 137). The removal of weapons from circulation is a necessary though not sufficient condition for successful post conflict peace building. From a peace building perspective, combating proliferation extends beyond the state which in post conflict context is hardly existent. The challenges of addressing proliferation after conflict is therefore one of governance rather than government, reflecting a multiplicity of actors levels and mechanisms. The challenges posed by small arms to peace building reflect and are complicated by fragmentation of political authority and the emergence of new actors in small arms issue (Ebo p. 138). The state

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has become an increasingly insufficient albeit crucial actor in addressing small arms proliferation, particularly after conflict when state capacity is weak. The fight against small arms proliferation has grown beyond the sole responsibility of government institutions, structures and processes, and the number and profile of non â&#x20AC;&#x201C; state actors involved in addressing what should be described as the small arms crisis has increased considerably in recent times (Ebo, p.142). That previous attempts or efforts geared towards disarmament, demobilization and reintegration did not work because so many factors were not taken into consideration. For instance, in September 2004, when the Niger delta crisis reached its peak certain measures aimed at disarmament, demobilization and reintegration were carried out by President Obasanjo and Governor Peter Odili. The Duo invited Ateke Tom and Alhaji Dokubo to Abuja where talks were held between the two warring factions. The outcome of the peace talks was the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the warring groups. Over 3000 weapons were handed over by the militants, which were publicly destroyed. The repented militants attended a thanks giving church service, asking God to forgive their sins. They openly embraced each other as a mark of new beginning not only for themselves, but for the entire society. Camps were opened for their training and at least 2000 youths were given technical skills even though they were not given jobs (Dorina, 2009 P.5). Even if they were given jobs, considering what they were gaining from oil bunkering activities, they would have still resorted to violence for the fact that government has really failed to address the factors that necessitated the violent struggle in the first place. The position of the Hard Truth on this issue is important, The public has been noted to have so much misgivings about this alleged sundering of arms by Ateke Tom and other major and

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deadly groups. And to confirm their fears, it appears a lot more effort needs to be put in as it were going by what is still obtainable in the society today. The public has argued that general insecurity still prevails. (The Hard Truth, August 5-11, 2004 p.4).

In view of the outcome of past efforts at disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the Niger Delta there is every need for government to change its tactics if the present exercise it to provide lasting peace and stability in the Niger Delta. Of great concern is the bureaucratic ineptitude and complicity of the military personnel of the Joint Task Force (JTF) in the disarmament exercise currently going on in the Niger Delta? Allegations of complicity were leveled at the (JTF) by the Director-General and Commandant of Nigerian Merchant Navy Sea Farers Maritime and Petroleum Security and Safety Corps, Commando Allen Benson Edema he said, Many people were feeding from the Niger Delta crisis, and do not want a resolution to it. He specifically fingered the Nigerian Navy and NIMASA which is under the Ministry of Transport as some of the organizations benefiting from illegal activities in the Niger Delta. But today based on the crisis in the Niger Delta which a lot of them have been involved in escalating it, they donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t want the President to find lasting solution because they all dine with the militants and are sponsoring them (The Hard Truth, June 18 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 24 2009 p.3).

Apart from their involvement in illegal activities in the Creeks such as oil bunkering and acting as conduit pipes for illegal transfer of arms across the region, they unleash terror and mayhem on innocent citizens of the area. To them everybody in the Niger Delta has to be treated either as a militant or a criminal in disguise. As such, fishermen, market women and people generally moving from either Port Harcourt or Yenagoa to their communities have to raise their hands several kilometers before getting to where this military

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occupation forces are stationed. The slightest provocation is met with brutality. The personal experiences of one or two persons can be used as concrete examples. For instance, Mr. Igoniderigha a sand dealer who was shot by an army officer of the (JTF) stationed at Chino DĂŠcor site Ovom Yenagoa for marching of ground fee is a case in point. That an able young man going about his daily bread is made disabled by a trigger happy soldier of the (JTF) is a clear testimony of what the people of the area are suffering in the so called disarmament exercise that is being carried out by government. (The Hard Truth, March 5-11, 2009, p.2). Again the experience of the President of Jaw Youths Congress (IYC) is worthy of note. Dr. Ekiyor the IYC President said he also suffered a similar faith. He was short by members of the (JTF) at about the same time Igoniderigha had his own experience. He said, he was not opposed to government carrying out its responsibility to secure lives and property; it should not be done through the use of force. This he believes hardens the recalcitrant as well as scares the trouble shooters thereby hampering government efforts at reaching out to people of the region. Now the IYC President is reluctant to go to the creeks for fear of what may be fall him on the way. And this has implications for peace and confidence building in the region. When the people in the creeks hear about these things they became recalcitrant to turning a new leaf. They will say if those of you who are telling us to shun violence cannot walk freely on the streets of Yenagoa and Port Harcourt and you are being harassed, somebody is slapping you, or shooting you, and then those of us in the Creeks cannot come to town we better stay back here with our guns and fight to death. (The Hard Truth, March 5-11 2009 p.2)

It is not surprising why many foreign governments and international agencies involved in aiding conflict prevention incorporate security

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sector reform in their dealings with societies in conflict, and for good reason. The enduring image of the military in the conscience of the ordinary people is one of brutality and impunity (Abdel Fatau, 2002, p. 248). The preconditions for sustainable security and peace in region remain the production and equitable distribution of public goods. In other words, government has to do everything possible to ensure that the factors that necessitated or brought about the crisis are taken care of and not the usage of brute military force. Tony Uranta, local facilitator of the commission of Nobel laureates to the Niger Delta and member of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta said One of the ways government can improve the quality of lives of the Niger Delta people is to withdraw the JTF back to the barracks as a standby force to be deployed only in an emergency. He added that this should go hand in hand with visible efforts on the part of the Federal Government to develop the Niger Delta Region. Whatever steps are taken, the parties involved should take into consideration the ordinary people in the region (The Hard Truth, March 5-11, 2009 page 3).

It is therefore our position in this paper, that unless and until post Amnesty peace building process is bought by the people of the area, thereby making them to be adequately involved by making necessary inputs with the conviction that the issues that gave rise to the crisis are addressed once and for all, it would amount to an exercise in futility. The relative peace that exists presently as a result of the Amnesty programme is an uneasy calm that may go the way of past exercises if what is expected is not done.

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CONCLUSION In the foregoing discussion we have been made to understand the fact that small arms and light Weapons proliferation in Niger Delta has been made possible due to long period of neglect and marginalization of the people of this oil rich region by successive governments in Nigeria. Representations to government made by traditional rulers and opinion leaders of the area to address these problems are often met by brute force on the part of a government. The frustration and anger of the people resulted into the first armed revolution and the attempt at secession in the 12 days revolution carried out by Jasper Isaac Adaka Boro in 1967. In spite of this development, successive governments in the country not only resorted to the neglect and marginalization, but also carried out state legislations that brought about enactments that completely dispossessed the people of their God given natural resources. The result was a joint exploitation of the people’s resources by the government and the multinational oil cooperation’s. The irony of the situation was the brazen manner in which these resources were exploited without the slightest regard to standard environmental practices required in the exploitation of such resources. The devastation of the environment affected the ecosystem and the depletion of the flora and fauna being the people’s main source of livelihood. Again the people’s demand for the protection of their environment and the provision of certain basic amenities was met with brute force as shown in the killing of Ken Sarowiwa and eight other Ogoni activists. The struggle to emancipate the people of the Niger Delta from what is currently being seen as internal colonization was hijacked by the youths who were armed by politicians in 2003 general elections. Be that as it may, if government had genuine interest to resolve the crisis once and for all we would not have found ourselves

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in the present level of small arms and light weapons crisis. The genuine interest and concern on the part of late President Musa Yarâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Adua, has brought in relative peace in the area, though an uneasy one. If the relative peace currently being experienced in the region is to be sustained the following steps are necessary. The operators of the SALW pipelines into the sub-region cash â&#x20AC;&#x201C; trapped rogue exporting states mainly from Eastern Europe and central Europe, clandestine western suppliers, brokers and private military entrepreneurs as well as the recyclers and transhippers within the sub-region itself must be exposed and sanctioned. There is a need to combine weapons elimination from society with effective measures to diffuse societal tensions. The long-term and sustainable path to addressing the small arms crisis lies in addressing those factors which drive the demand for small arms such as socio-economic and political exclusion. This would require rebuilding the nation so that all segments of society have a sense of ownership and belonging (Abdel Fatau, 2002:247). The problem of bureaucratic ineptitude has to be reduced to the barest minimum. The joint task force has to be removed and kept in their barracks only to be called in during emergency periods, government should involve all stakeholders i.e. traditional rulers, opinion leaders, youths, the operating companies etc so that the out come of the discussion is not just that of a government imposition but a buy in by people of the area. This is predicated on the fact that nobody seeks to destroy what he calls his own.

REFERENCES Abdel-Fatau, Musali; The Political Economy of Small Arms and Conflicts; International Alert, Security and Peace Building Programme, 346 Chapham Road, London SW99 AP, UK; Africa, Page 2.

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Abdel-Fatau, 2002, Page 247. Abdel-Fatau, 2002, Page 248. Akindele, R. A. and Ate, Bassey, E. (ed) Beyond Conflict Resolution; Managing African Security in the 21 st Century, NIIA Security Studies Series, 2001, Page 195. Akindele and Ate cited above page 195. Bekoe, Dorina; Strategies Peace in the Niger Delta, File://e:/us/peacebriefing 8/16/2009, Page 7. Bekoe, Dorina, cited above page 5. Ebo, Adedeji, Combating Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse after Conflict, Page 142. Ebo, Adedeji, cited above, Page 137. Ebo, Adedeji, cited above, Page 138. Ebo, Adedeji, cited above, Page 142. Ekekpe, Ambily, Minority Politics in Nigeria; The case of the South-South and the Middle Belt Regions, Kemuela Publications, 2007, Page 42. Etekpe, Ambily, Ayotamuno, Young M, Nwala, Ugwulor Eugene, Kariboro, Joseph. International Alert, Security and Peace Building Programme; Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Control (MISAC). Small Arms Control in West Africa. West African Series No. 1 (English Version), Page 10 International Alert, Security and Peace Building Programme cited above, Page 12.

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Jumbo, Martins C. (ed) Politics in Nigeria, Onyoma Research Publications, Port Harcourt, 2004, Page 55. Klare, Michael, Small Arms Proliferations and International Security, File://e:/pawss conflicttopicssmallarms.htm2009, Page 3. Kegley, Jr. Charles W; World Politics; Trend and Transformation, Thompson Wadsworth, 2007, Page 23. Musah, Abdel-Fatau, Small Arms, A Time Bomb Under West Africa’s Democratization Process, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Spring 22, Vol. IX, Issue I, Page 24. Small Arms: they cause 90% of Civilian Casualties, Global Issues, file://:e/smallarms2009, Page 11-13. The Hard Truth; A Port Harcourt based Weekly Newspaper, May 3-9, 2007, No. 17, Page 22. The Hard Truth, August 5 – 11 cited above, Page 4. The Hard Truth, June 18 – 24, 2009, cited above, Page 3. The Hard Truth, March 5 – 11, 2009, Page 2. The Hard Truth, March 5 – 11, 2009, Page 2. The Hard Truth, March 5 – 11, 2009, Page 3. Young, Crawford; The Politics of Cultural Pluralism; Heinemann Educational Books Nigeria Plc, Ibadan, 1993, Page 7. Young, Crawford cited above, Page 11. Young, Crawford cited above, Page 40.

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Minorities and Resource Allocation in a Transitional State: The Nigeria Experience 19601999 Dr. Ekanade Olumide4 Key Terms: Nigeria, Niger Delta, funding, strategies, higher education, military.

ABSTRACT So much has been written about the challenges in the Oil producing areas of Nigeria, however minimal effort has been made to historicize and interrogate the system of contribution and rewards in Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s fiscal federalism which is at the heart of the problem in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria. The problematic here is that in the practice of fiscal federalism in Nigeria, between 1960 and 1999 there was no proper correlation or relationship between funds and functions. The Nigerian constitution allocated functions while funds were allocated statutorily by the parliament which was structurally dominated by majority ethnic groups. What existed up till 2010 was an asymmetrical situation in which those who controlled the politics of the federation did not finance the federation and those who financed it had no political control over the federation and its resources. This study places in proper historical perspective the politicization of revenue allocation, the economic injustice, poverty and systematic disempowerment of the oil producing minority states within the context of Federal government control. It argues that the progressive denigration of the derivation principle by the gate keepers, the institutionalization of unjust revenue sharing principles and actual allocations which run contrary to the sacred principles and fine tenets Ekanade Olumide, PhD, is with the Department of History and International Relations at Redeemers University, Nigeria. E mail: orogidi@yahoo.com 4

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of federalism are at the core of the crisis between the Nigerian State and the oil producing minorities. The paper concludes with some policy recommendations which suggest that a way out of this quagmire is for the Nigerian state to embark on the fundamental restructuring and reinvention of the Nigerian state in order to guarantee equity, tranquility and social justice It is a federalism that has deprived the rights of the minorities. It is a federalism that appropriates and expropriates the wealth of the minorities without let or hindrance. It is a federalism that now stands on its head. It is a federalism that has grown so insensitive to the political and socio economic rights of the minorities so much so that all the political calculations therein are based on the need to sustain the tripodal hegemony of the three dominant ethnic groups. It is a federalism that has lost its soul Dr. Kimse Okoko (National Concord 29 May, 1992; 5).

INTRODUCTION This paper takes a cursory look at the system of contributions and rewards in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism with specific reference to the minorities of the Niger Delta. The work also places in a proper historical perspective, the economic injustice, poverty and disempowerment of the minorities within the context of Federal government control and the institution of unjust revenue sharing principles and actual allocations which run contrary to the sacred principles of federalism up to 1999.

THE NIGER DELTA REGION: FROM PALM OIL TO PETROLEUM The Niger Delta area of Nigeria occupies very roughly the area enclosed longitudes 50 and 60, 45’ East and latitudes 40 40’ and 60

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10’ North. It is populated by riverine peoples such as the Ijo, Itshekiri, Ogoni, Urhobo, Aboh, Andoni, Isoko and Ukwani. The distinguishing feature of the Delta is the dense mangrove vegetation through which meanders a network of creeks and the evergreen forest belt dominated by palm oil. Occupationally, they engaged in fishing, salt production, palm produce, farming and trading of these commodities amongst themselves (Ikime 1999, 56 -59). However as from the 1480’s, slaves became virile commodities in commercial transaction in the Delta region. (Ryder 1999, 236). However from the 19th century on, slave trade became spasmodic, as it was no longer vital to the British economy. By this period palm oil and kernels of the Niger Delta and its hinterland were required by British industries (Alagoa 1999, 249), to run their machines as a result of industrial revolution in Europe. Thus attention turned to this legitimate trade and in fact up to 1870, the East/Niger Delta was the principal oil river of the whole Niger Delta and accounted for over three quarters of the entire African export of palm oil to Europe (Alagoa 1999, 252). This trade in palm oil subsisted with domestic slavery in Niger Delta’s trading houses until the imposition of British rule on Nigeria (Crowder I978, 203) By 1914 British colonial legislation had granted the monopoly of oil concessions in Nigeria to British allied capital. Operating under this ordinance, Shell D’arcy Petroleum Development Company (later Shell B.P), an Anglo Dutch oil major, was granted an oil exploration license covering the entire mainland of Nigeria, an area of 367,000 square miles (Soremekun and Obi 1993, 216) Their activities paid off when in 1956 crude oil (petroleum) was discovered in the Oloibiri area of the Niger Delta (Okoh and Egbon 1999, 406). With this discovery, massive exploitation of crude oil began in earnest and persisted into independence 1960(The Niger Delta Question 2004, 8:14). These oil

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extraction activities led to ecological degradation in the Niger Delta Region and this affected agriculture, health and the region’s economic conditions. Incidentally, the collapse of global prices of cash crop exports on which the nation’s finances depended (Adedeji 1969, 143) coincided with the discovery of crude oil in Nigeria. Thus, the Federal government began to see oil prospects as the possible mainstay of Nigeria’s economy in the post independence period. An indication of the growing profile of oil in national revenue came in 1965 when the Federal Prime Minister in a statement to the chamber of commerce< spoke optimistically about the balance of payments impact that oil production would have in Nigeria. Politically, feelings about the exploitation of petroleum ran high and interest in controlling oil grew (Soremekun and Obi 1993, 217). With the notable impact of oil production on public finance the ethnic minorities from whose soil the oil was extracted were placed on a collision course against the ethnic majority groups who sought access to and control of the new wealth of the nation (Obi 2002, 105). It was in the light of the above scenario that Adaka Boro in late 1965 declared a rebellion against the Nigerian state (Dudley 1982, 321) in support of creation of the Niger Delta Republic. This act was the first expression of the dissatisfaction of the people of the Niger Delta with the control of oil resources (Saturday Tribune 14 February 2004: 5). Although the rebellion was quelled in twelve days, it was nevertheless an indication of later developments to expect.

DECIMATION OF THE DERIVATION PRINCIPLE. The Raisman-Tress Fiscal Commission in its report in 1958 had anticipated the role oil could play in the near future of Nigeria and opined that both the region in which oil was produced and the federal government should have a cut of the revenue arising from it:

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the latter because of its authority over mineral policy and probable involvement in funding of the oil industry. Besides, other regions should partake of oil revenues in the interest of balanced development of the regions. Thus, the approved sharing of formula was 50%, 20% and 30% for the mineral region, Federal government and distributable pool account (D.P.A) respectively. The principles for sharing the 30% that went into the DPA included need (determined by population) and national interest. At the end, the North, West and Eastern regions each had 40%, 24% and 31% respectively (Ehwarieme 1999, 63 - 64). It followed therefore that till 1965 when oil accounted for 8.4% of total Federal government revenue, 50% (Ehwarieme 1999, 59) of that oil revenue, rents and royalties both onshore and offshore devolved, (on the basis of derivation) back to the region from where the oil was extracted â&#x20AC;&#x201C; principally the Niger Delta area in the then Mid-West Region. In addition, up till 1966, all export duties on agricultural produce (from majority areas), the import duty on tobacco and motor fuel were returned to regions on the basis of derivation (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963, 65). From 1966 onwards when the military seized the reins of government, the successive military and civil regimes progressively denigrated the derivation principle. They diluted its dominance and brought up a number of new sharing principles as oil came to dominate government revenue as the major revenue and foreign exchange earner for the Federal government. We now turn to examine revenue distribution in the federal state under the military with specific reference to the minorities and the derivation principle. Federalism according to O.B.C Nwolise implies that resources in regions or states are controlled by the states and agreed quantum paid into the central pool (Nwolise, 2005, 116 ). However, the distribution of revenue in Nigeria from 1966 did not bear out this sacred tenet of

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federalism. Two reasons are responsible for this deviation. They are the fundamental shift in Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economy from agricultural cash crops (found in majority ethnic group areas) to crude oil (expropriated from minority areas) and the intervention of the military in the political space (The Guardian 14 May, 2002). When the agricultural sector predominated, the component regional governments retained the principal ratio of the revenue accruable to them from export of agricultural produce and only surrendered a fraction of it for the upkeep of the central government. The crude oil era which came to dominate Nigerian economy from 1966 to date was on the other hand marked by extreme concentration of fiscal resources in the hands of the Federal government, while the federating units were forced to depend on the central government for their financing. With the military coup of January 1966 and the counter coup of July 1966, the military government through General Yakubu Gowon restructured the federation into twelve states on May 27, 1967. The excuse was that the exercise was to provide a platform for selfassertion by previously suppressed groups (minorities) (Gowon and Effiong 2001, 13). This development increased the influence of the minorities in the Eastern Region (inhabitants of the Niger Delta) and they got a new state, Rivers State. This solution to their agitation for a separate state since the 1950s, however assumed that the problem was a political one. The belief by the minorities that creation of states translated to exclusive control of their oil and land to the exclusion of the majorities proved to be a fatally wrong assumption as subsequent developments after the civil war further reinforced their marginalization (The Niger Delta Question 2004, 8: 18 -19). Military Decrees as centralization apparatus After the creation of twelve states and given the notable impact of oil on public funds, General Yakubu Gowon decided to

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centralize revenue allocation in Nigeria. This it was believed would help fund the war effort as well as run the Nigerian economy (Sorenekun and Obi 1993, 219). The centralization of public revenues was actualized by decrees. The first in line was the Decree No. 27 of 1967, which empowered the central military government to make laws for the good governance of Nigeria and by extension, limited the powers of states, to residual matters (Eliagwu 1979, 170). This was followed by Decree No. 51 of 1969 which vested in the Federal military government the entire ownership and control of all petroleum (a) in, under or upon any land in Nigeria (b) under the territorial waters of Nigeria or (c) all land forming part of the continental shelf of Nigeria (The Guardian, 8 January 2001, 9). This decree has denied the minorities their rights to their land and resources derived there from. This practice contrasts with what obtains in federalist Canada and Australia. In Canada, in spite of the discovery of oil in Alberta Province, the federal government did not centralize the control of the resource (oil).In Australia as well federating units have rights over oil and gas resources within their borders while the federal government can only levy taxes on these natural resources. (Ekanade, 2010) Moreover it is important to point out that this petroleum decree had its precedence in the colonial ordinance on land and minerals promulgated in 1945 after the Second World War. The ordinance provided that: â&#x20AC;&#x161;The entire property and control of all minerals and mineral oil in, under or upon any land in Nigeria, and of all rivers, streams and water courses throughout Nigeria is and shall be vested in the crown (Omoruyi, The Guardian, 24 January 2001, 8.). The 1969 Decree took its cue from this colonial ordinance which had set the standard for the economic injustice and only had a provision that compensation should only be for economic crops destroyed in the process of exploratory activities (Omoruyi, 2001, 8). These ordinance and decree reflect the height of injustice to a geographical zone which

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produces resources that sustain the entire Nigerian state and at the same time bear the brunt of negative impact of exploratory activities in their region. Furthermore in 1971, following the recommendations of Dina Revenue Allocation Commission, the Federal military government through Decree No. 9 of 1971 assumed proprietorship of rents and royalties of all offshore oil revenues and reduced derivation to states of origin to 30% (Omoruyi 2001,8). The provision of this decree once and for all repealed a provision of the constitution of the first republic that ‚the continental shelf of a region should be deemed to be part of that region in the allocation of ½ of mining rents and royalties to the region of derivation. The exclusion of this particular constitutional provision from all of Nigeria’s post military constitutions (1979, 1989, 1995 and 1999) has undermined the claims of the oil producing states to offshore oil wealth (Suberu 2002, 151-152 ). Decree No 38 of 1971, a fallout of decree No 5 of 1967 also extended Nigeria’s territorial waters from 12 miles to 30 miles. This in effect made royalties accruing to the Federal government increase at the expense of the same oil producing communities (Nigerian Tribune, 20 June 1975:34; Osaghae 1988, 71) Obviously, what informed and reinforced this development were the unitary character of the military, the fact that oil wells were located in a few southern minority areas with little or no political influence, and also the fact that, throughout the late 1960s and 1970s in Nigeria, the derivation formula was stigmatized by many prominent public finance experts as the ‚devil of revenue sharing (Suberu 2002, 14). By 1975, Decree numbers 6 and 7 were introduced and had far more reaching effect on transfer of resources from states to the Federal government and in the redistribution of resources in a manner that increasingly made non oil producing states to depend and survive on the resources from oil rich states. In fact, the non oil producing states

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benefited more than oil rich states. This included reduction of the mining rents and royalties paid to the states of origin from 45% to 20% while the share of the D.P.A increased to 80%. Half of the 80% in the DPA was divided among states on equality basis and the other half on basis of statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; population (Ebajemito and Abudu 1999, 224; Dudley 1982, 260; Daily Times, 10 March 1975, 1) . By July 1975 a new regime of General Murtala Mohammed and Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo had taken over the reins of governance. Immediately afterwards the regime further divided the 12 states into 19 states which necessitated the adoption of another revenue allocation system to administer federal fund amongst the new units. This was how the Aboyade technical committee was set up in 1977 to look into the revenue distribution issue and make recommendations. The Aboyade committee reduced the mining rent and royalties paid to state of origin from 20% to 5% (Zuokumor 1985, 33) . In the place of derivation he recommended an adoption of principles that ensured equity and efficiency among states (Fajana 2001, 118). But Fajana Femi had argued that despite these recommendations and application of hitherto recommended principles, neither equity nor efficiency had been achieved in horizontal revenue sharing (Fajana 2001,121). All the same Aboyadeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s report and recommendations were rejected by the civilian regime that came into office on 1st October, 1979.

LAND USE DECREE OF 1978 The nearest piece of legislation in terms of total expropriation of offshore minerals was the Land Use Decree of 1978 promulgated by General Olusegun Obasanjo. The decree transferred ownership of land to government without compensation (Daily Times 31 March I978,1) as she held it in trust. According to the military government, the decree was a structural change to bring about desired goals of fast

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economic and social transformation (Daily Times 31 March 1978, 1). The implication of the decree was that by vesting all rights in the land in the state, through the decree, the Federal military government virtually arrogated to itself the ownership of all mineral resources in the oil mineral producing areas. According to Environmental Right Action, Niger Delta communities are most affected as government has awarded their lands through the instrumentation of land use decree to oil corporations such as Shell, Chevron, Agip and Elf. This has in turn alienated communities and raised tension and conflict (The Guardian 24 August 2005, 72). The Second republic and allocation to oil producing states The regime of Alhaji Shehu Shagari took the issue of revenue allocation seriously and set up the Pius Okigbo Commission in November 1979. The commission was asked to, in the words of Dudley, â&#x20AC;&#x161;give due regards to the principles of allocation, particularly those of derivation, population, equality of states, even development, equitable distribution and national interest. The commission in its recommendations proposed that, of the federally collected revenue, 53% should be retained by the Federal government, 30% to the states, 10% to the local governments (the new third tier of government introduced by the Murtala/Obasanjo regime), 7% to â&#x20AC;&#x161;special fundâ&#x20AC;&#x203A; from which approved sums would be made available to the oil producing states as compensation for ecological damage arising from oil exploration and production (Dudley 1982, 262). It is instructive to note that no amount was statutorily budgeted as derivation fund for oil producing areas. Prior to this period, the Ijaws had petitioned the Okigbo commission arguing that compensations to oil producing areas should come to the communities directly and not to states hosting the oil producing communities (Dudley 1982, 263).

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It was partly in response to these petitions by Ijaws that Okigbo recommended 3% (2% for special problems of mineral producing areas and 1% for other ecological problems) of Federally collected revenue to be kept for oil bearing communities or localities (not states) as special fund for dealing with ecological challenges 48(Dudley 1982, 262). It was in reaction to these recommendations however that Governors from oil producing states of Nigeria, Melford Okilo (Rivers State), Ambrose Alli (Bendel State) and Clement Isong of Cross River state submitted a report to the House of Representatives where they insisted on the rights of their states to derivation which was being mixed up with special fund and also asked that the special funds should not be paid into any part of their states i.e. oil producing communities but to states hosting the oil producing communities. To drive home their point, the governors cited the land use decree of 1978 to back up their claims for oil royalties, stating that ownership of land is vested in the Governor of the state who holds it in trust for the people (Dudley 1982, 263) Several individuals and state governments went to court over Pius Okigbo’s recommendations with Rivers and Bendel states’ suit as a test case in their demand for derivation (Sunday Times, 17 October 1993, 9). In it’s ruling of October 1981, the Supreme Court declared the revenue act of 1981 (the law backing Okigbo’s recommendations) unconstitutional, null and void (Punch 3 October 1981, 1-2).. By December 1981, President Shehu Shagari modified the Act and sent a new bill to the National Assembly taking into account the views of state governments and several stakeholders. The bill had a smooth sail through the two houses and was signed into law by Shagari and used to allocate revenues in 1982 and the remaining part of the second republic. Out of the 10% allocated to local governments, 2% was to be shared on the basis of derivation among the mineral producing states and 1.5% for the development of mineral producing areas to be

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administered directly by the federal government (Adebayo 1993, 173; Osakwe 1999, 528 - 52 9) .

THE SECOND MILITARY INTERREGNUM 1983-1999 General Muhammadu Buhari who came to power through a military coup dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;ĂŠtat on 31st December 1983, modified the 1981 revenue act by effecting two changes by Decree No. 36 of 1984. These changes significantly affected oil bearing communities, reducing special funds from 4.5% to 2.5% (Emenuga 1999, 87; Iniodu 1999, 295) . What the Buhari regime sought to do was resolve the administrative and legal impasse over disbursement of funds for mineral producing areas and general ecological problems by vesting the centre with the authority of administering both funds. More importantly, the Buhari regime in 1984 reinterpreted the 1981 Act to mean that the amount payable under the Act to mineral producing states and areas was to be 2% and not 1.5 % (Suberu 1993, 19; 45) of revenue derived from mineral production and in addition not of the total federation account which hitherto obtained (Suberu 2002, 15). This meant a further diminishing of the amount accruable to the oil producing states and communities. This policy remained in force until 1989, well into the middle of the General Ibrahim Babangida regime when the regime established the National Revenue Mobilization Allocation and fiscal Commission (NRMAFC) by Decree no. 49 of 1989. The commission was set up as a permanent body to take charge of revenue allocation issues in the Nigeria. In 1989 NRMAFC in its recommendation on allocation of federal revenues suggested that the derivation component be retained as 2% of the federation account and 1.5% of mineral revenue (not of total federation account) should be for the development of oil mineral producing areas. By 1990 the federal government approved a

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reduction of derivation to 1% and 1.5% for the development of oil mineral producing areas (Danjuma 1994, 100; Kayode 1999, 60; Okoh and Egbon 1993, 414) . The 1.5% of mineral revenue that went to oil mineral producing areas was increased to 3.0% in June 1992 apparently in response to the agitation and crisis in these areas. In fact, it is arguable that these agitations led to the establishment of Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 to manage this 3% mineral revenue and 1% derivation revenue from the federation account (Okoh and Egbon 1993, 414). This arrangement remained in force until 1999. It need be noted that the 3% for development of mineral producing areas had been grossly inadequate in tackling the multifarious ecological challenges in the Niger Delta. The 3% allocation coupled with the 1% derivation fund could not compensate for the permanent destruction brought on the region. By 1995, with the internationalization of the problems of the minorities by Dr. Ken Saro Wiwa, the derivation principle received national attention again. The National constitutional conference put in place by General Sani Abacha recommended 13% minimum percentage for derivation from the federation account (The Guardian 8 January 2001,8) and it was enshrined in the section 162 (2) of the 1999 constitution as follows: â&#x20AC;&#x161;The principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved formula as being not less than thirteen percent of the revenue accruing to the federation account directly from any natural resourcesâ&#x20AC;&#x203A;(The Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Federal Republic of Nigeria , 1999,66)

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The implementation of this 13% derivation principle became effective on the 1st of January 2000. It followed that constitutionally as at December 1999 only 1% of revenue accruing to the federation account directly from crude oil reverted to the region of origin on the basis of derivation principle. Quite evidently the derivation principle from a relative weight of 100% in 1946 (The Guardian 19 July 2005, 9) reduced drastically to a weight of 1% by the end of 1999. This reduction has been rather drastic and the brunt bearers are the Niger Delta peoples. An indication of this injustice is obvious by taking a cursory look at the data submitted to the National Political Reform Conference indicating contributions and rewards of the six geo-political zones of the Nigerian federation. Here the Niger Delta (South South) was the highest contributor to the federation account but what she got was not commensurate with her contribution (The Punch 12 July 2005, 14). The comparative revenue generation profile from the six geo-political zones of Nigeria is a demonstrative evidence of disequilibria between contribution and allocation in which the oil minority states and communities have been perpetual victims. The table below makes this obvious.

TABLE 1.0 CONTRIBUTIONS AND ALLOCATIONS TO ZONES (STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS) FROM FEDERATION ACCOUNT (JANUARY-APRIL 2005).

Zones

Amount received by % Contribution each zone (in billions) North Central N45.811 0.00 North East N46.213 0.00 North West N44.488 0.00 South East N33.476 2.75 South West N42.502 3.97 South South N145.171 91.54 Source: The Punch (Lagos), Tuesday July 12, 2005 p.14

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% Allocation 7.48 8.00 8.31 8.31 7.43 17.3

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Nonetheless, the central authority in the Nigerian state had always claimed to have formulated policies to take care of the peculiar challenges of the Niger Delta area. However, consequent upon the negative impact of exploration activities in the oil producing areas, much more serious attempts were made at tackling the problem, howbeit inadequately. At this juncture we turn to examine the intervention agencies set up by the various governments between 1961 and 1999.

THE INTERVENTION AGENCIES NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT BOARD Before crude oil became the mainstay of the Nigeria’s economy, the Sir Henry Willink Commission (appointed to look into the fears of the minorities) in 1958 had recognized the Delta region of the southern minority zone as ‚poor, backward and neglected‛ given its ecological state and to place on the concurrent list, a new subject which should be known as ‚The development of special areas‛ (Sir Henry Willink Report 1958, 94 – 95). This explained the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) which came into being by an Act of Parliament in 1961(Lawal 2004, 273; Nigerian Tribune 28, September, 2004, 31). This board was expected to act as a unique agency to develop the Delta area in terms of infrastructural development. However there were no clear cut responsibilities apportioned to the central and regional authorities, hence the board did not make any impact. Another reason for the board’s inefficiency was that the problems of the minorities at that period were overshadowed by the grim power struggle among the major ethnic groups (The Niger Delta Question 2004:8, 39). Moreover, the NDDB failed because the Federal government deviated from the prescribed composition of members of the board, which according to Diepreye Alamieseigha had no single representative from the Niger Delta area

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(The Nigerian Tribune 28 September, 2004, 31). In his submission he affirmed that the â&#x20AC;&#x161;ill conceived board did away with the aspirations of the people of the area which was vitally needed to make correct policy solutions to the problems of the areaâ&#x20AC;&#x203A; (The Nigerian Tribune 28 September, 2004, 31). No real concerted efforts were made to address the specific needs of the oil producing states and communities until 1992 when the Federal government (prompted by strong agitations by the oil producing communities) announced the revisions in fiscal and administrative arrangements for revenue sharing. First and foremost, statutory allocation to mineral producing areas was increased from 1.5% to 3% of federally collected mineral revenues. Secondly, a statutory commission was established to administer this allocation for the development of oil producing areas and it was known as Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). (The Guardian 7 June 1992, A10) The OMPADEC was set up in 1992 by General Ibrahim Babangida, ostensibly to pacify oil bearing communities after the Umuechein massacre (Amuwo 2001,24). OMPADEC in its first three years of operation, 1992-1995 received the sum of N11 billion under the chairmanship of Chief Albert Horsefall, for the execution of its projects. Albert Horsefall faulted this allocation positing that going by the 3% weight of derivation applied at that period, N12 billion ought to have accrued to OMPADEC and not N11 billion. Furthermore between 1995 and 1996 when Professor Eric Opia was chairman of OMPADEC, the commission received N2 billion. Thus between 1992 and 1996, the commission, cumulatively received from the federation account N13 billion based on derivation (The Guardian 8 January 2001,8).

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Moreover the upward review in statutory allocation to mineral producing areas and ecological fund through OMPADEC entailed a corresponding reduction by 1.5% and 1% respectively, of statutory allocations from the federation account to the Federal and state governments (Suberu 1996, 37). This is an aberration, as a portion of revenues derived from the oil producing areas ought to have been ploughed back into those communities and not the Federal government deducting funds from statutory grants of federal and state governments for the gratification of oil producing communities. This practice underscores the ambivalences, which had characterized the derivation principle. Moreso when you take into cognizance the fact that another Federal government intervention agency – Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) received from the same federation account the sum of N346 billion between 1994 and 1997 (The Guardian 8 January 2001,8;Odia Ofeimun 1999, 67), a far cry from OMPADEC’s N13 billion in four years, this picture did not portray equity. In fact the total amount that ought to have accrued to OMPADEC statutorily was N85,489.5 billion instead of N13,154.29 million (Odia Ofeimun 1999, 67). Interestingly most of PTF’s projects were concentrated in the North where their presence was felt physically in terms of infrastructural development against PTF’s scanty presence in the west and absence (of PTF) in the Eastern part of the Nigerian State (The News Magazine 5 April, 1999, 6). Although OMPADEC executed several projects during its years of existence, its performance was generally abysmal. The dismal performance can be attributed to the military government’s appointment of all the members of OMPADEC without, according the Niger Delta people, the right to select their representatives in a matter that directly concerned them (Egwaikhide and Aregbeyen 1993,110). Andrew Onokerhoraye also corroborated this fact with his assertion that members of these committees appointed to manage funds for the

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oil producing areas were not people who understood the peculiar problems, demands and needs of the oil producing communities (Onokerhoraye 1995,321) hence their inability to perform. OMPADEC under the military was transformed into a machinery of the presidency to settle critics (Tell Magazine 18 March 1996, 26). This argument coheres with M. Chris Alliâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s submission that government corruption crippled OMPADEC (Alli 2000, 255). In addition, contracts from OMPADEC were used to bribe those people who could cause breach of peace in the oil producing communities. Howbeit, people who were non-professional contractors (given the manner in which they executed the contracts) simply abandoned assigned projects after collecting mobilization fee (Tell Magazine 18 March 1996, 26). In the light of this, OMPADEC after seven years of existence (1993-1991) admittedly left a legacy of abandoned projects all over the Niger Delta area since there was little regard for accountability and transparency.

THE TRAVAILS OF OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES. The historical dynamics and use of derivation has not shown that the derivation principle was recommended to take account of the geographic spill over effects of production and consumption of the commodities on which the principles was based. Thus, the manipulation of derivation can hardly take into account problems of environmental pollution and ecological degradation (Egwaikhide and Aregbeyen 1993, 109). The environmental cost of exploring and exploiting petroleum resources are not recognized and charged for before revenues and profits are declared. Hence the oil companies get away with the environmental damage that their activities have foisted on the region. This shows that Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s accounting practice is highly defective (Financial Standard 4 July 2005, 12).

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In view of the enormity of challenges that faced and are still facing the oil producing communities, the 3% derivation fund was a drop in the ocean of myriad of problems that faced the oil producing communities. The derivation percentage of 3% was grossly inadequate (The Guardian 14 May 1993, 25). A clause in OMPADECâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s decree stipulated that projects from the fund including employment should be shared within the oil producing communities according to the percentage of their production quota. Ironically Olobiri where oil was first struck (where production has now ceased) would not benefit from the fund because there would be no percentage to base their production on (The Guardian 14 May 1993, 25). Sad enough these were communities where the high activity of oil exploration and expropriation had impacted negatively on their environment, their eco-system and their health. The following environmental table completes the story of the plight of the oil producing communities who are daily subjected to a life of misery owing to the dictates of a warped Federal system which the Nigeria state operates. TABLE 1.1. RANKING OF MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, SOCIAL ISSUES AND PRIORITIES Problem Type Natural environment

Development related

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Problem Subset Coastal/river bank erosion Flooding Sedimentation/silt Substance Exotice (water hyacinth) Land degradation/soil fertility loss Agricultural decline/shortened fallow Delta forest loss (mangroves) Bio-diversity depletion Fisheries decline Oil spillage Gas flaring

Priority Ranking Moderately high Moderate Low Low High High High High High High Moderate Moderate

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Problem Type

Problem Subset Priority Ranking Sewage and waste water High Other chemicals Moderate Socio-economic Poverty High problems Unemployment High Community-oil company conflict High Intercommunity conflict High Intercommunity conflict Moderate Conflicts over land High Inadequate compensation High Displacement Moderate Decay in societal values High Poor transportation/high cost of fuel High Housing pressure/infrastructure Decay/crime High Source: R.N. Egbon and P.C. Okoh, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Fiscal Federalism and Revenue Allocation in Fiscal Federalism and Nigerian Economic Development .Proceedings of N.E.S Conference Ibadan, 1999.

Thus the negative impact of oil exploration activities on the Niger Delta has been enormous. The most pervasive and recurrent one is oil spillage. This occurs at least four times in a week. Between 1979 and 1991 there were a total of 2,976 oil spills (The Guardian 25 July 1993, B5). As at October 1996, the World Bank also wrote that the Niger Delta was recording 500 spillages yearly (Daily Times 4 October 1996, 20). These spills relentlessly polluted the rivers and killed most of the fishes. For farmers, pipelines criss-crossed land in the Niger Delta and curtailed food production. The few crops that grow on the soil are either killed or stunted by poisonous gases that escape from gas flares. Quite obviously the noise from the exploration plants does not allow people in the Delta area to sleep well at night (The Guardian 25 July 1993, B5). The gases released into the atmosphere and the spilled oil caused cancer, decreased fertility, fever, cough, abdominal pain and diarrhea. In the survey he carried out in the Niger Delta region, about 85% of his respondents suffered a combination of these diseases

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(Okoh and Egbon 1993, 412). The World Bank had as far back as 1995 warned that, an urgent need exists to implement a mechanism to protect the life and health of the Niger Delta region’s inhabitants (Financial Standard 4 July 2005, 12). One reason for Federal government’s relative indifference and inability to enforce standards at the period has to do with the fact that she is a major stakeholder in some of the major multinational oil companies involved in oil spillage activities in the Niger Delta and invariably the government is involved in oil spillage. With regard to clearing up the mess of oil spillage, multinational oil companies posit that having paid their rents, their royalties and taxes to the federal government that also has controlling shares, they (oil companies) are absolved of the task of providing amenities and infrastructures in the oil producing areas (Eboe 1985, 122) in spite of the fact that Nigeria (according to Time Magazine) had earned at least 300 billion dollars from oil exports and 199.3 billion dollars between 1990 and 1993 (Owuga 1999,105). A clear picture appears with the Nigerian Guardian’s documentation of the Ogoni challenge when it wrote: ‚At the end of 1992, cumulative oil production from Ogoni was put at 634 million barrels valued at 5.2billion dollars. Of this, 15% was cost of production, 79% was paid to the federal government as taxes, i.e. equity crude and 6% left for the private partners including Shell Petroleum Development Corporation‛(The Guardian 1 June 2005,2).

All this transpired between 1958 and 1993 when Shell was forced to withdraw from Ogoniland. The Ogoni field in 1993 had a production potential of 28,000 barrels per day, about 3% of Shell Petroleum Development Corporation’s total crude oil production (The Guardian

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1 June 2005, 2). Yet Ogoni land suffered great neglect as attested to by Ken Saro Wiwa who pointed out that ‚You have taken away all these oil from the Ogoni people. You build dams in Hausaland, in Fulani country, you have provided for agriculture. What have you given Ogoni people? <Without oil, they will not have the dams that are making agriculture in the North possible‛ (Eliagwu 2001, 185). Despite all these cries of neglect the Federal government’s primary objective however had continued to be the profit motive, centering on how to expand oil production and earn more revenue (Okoh and Egbon 1993, 412). A further demonstration of government’s insensitivity to the effects of its fiscal policy is all the more obvious with a critical look at the average revenue of states and population figures between 1990 and 1996. Central Bank of Nigeria’s Annual report of 1996 and 1994 (CBN, 1996, 76-77: CBN 1994, 63) and Statistical bulletin 1996 (Statistical Bulletin, 1996, 7,:118) make this very glaring. The tables reveal that only Rivers State (a member of the Niger Delta) fell into the ranking of the ten highest mean statutory revenue allocation received by states in the Nigerian nation between 1990 and 1996. Even at that, Rivers state occupied the eighth position (with N848.6 million). The first seven states in descending order are as follows Kano (N3066.4m), Sokoto (N976.8 million), FCT, Abuja (N907.7million), Lagos (N904.9million), Bauchi (N891m), Oyo (N869m) and Bornu (N878m) . A look at the population figures on same table shows that the states with the three largest populations respectively are Lagos (5685.8m), Kano (5632.0m) and Sokoto (4392.4m). This reflects the centrality of the population factor as against derivation principle in the revenue allocation formula (Okoh and Egbon 1993, 414).

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AGITATION FOR INSTITUTION OF FAIR SHARE PRINCIPLE The agitation for a fair share of oil revenue accruable to the oil producing communities against the backdrop of adverse impact of exploration activities on their environment and people has been intensive. Four distinct phases had been identified as periods of agitation and resistance taking different forms. The first phase was from the late 1970s to mid 1980s characterized by the confidence (of oil producing communities) placed in the Judiciary and states. The dominant strategy was legal action and most of the time, court judgments favoured the communities. However, the government orders were fragrantly ignored and defied by the oil companies ( Zuokumor 1985 35; Ogbogbo 2004, 246 ). The oil producing communities ran out of patience and adopted a more action- oriented strategy which signified the second phase (mid 1980s – mid 1990s). In this second phase the deepening economic crisis occasioned by the introduction of SAP in 1986 largely radicalized the struggles of minorities in oil producing states for fair share of proceeds from oil (Obi 1998, 269). This involved peaceful demonstration, occupation of flow stations, disruption of workers from operating and demands for adequate compensation and provision of basic amenities. Confident of the support from the Nigerian government, oil companies employed the military, police and state security service, which the government put at their disposal (Ogbogbo 2004, 251) . This period was characterized by the inauguration of Major Paul Okutimo’s task force whose activities led to the killing of Ken Saro Wiwa. This led to the third stage of the phase of resistance. The strategy here was to respond combatively and more forcefully to the use of military men by oil companies against host communities. Thus, the host communities continued their forceful occupation and shutting down of flow stations, destruction of oil companies’ equipment, kidnap of oil workers, vessels and vehicles (Owuga 1999,114 – 115).

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The fourth phase was signaled on December 11, 1998 by a formal demand by the Ijaw Youth National Congress for self determination within the Nigerian state. In addition oil companies were given till December 30, 1998 to vacate the Niger Delta region. The Nigerian state responded with military force resulting in Yenogoa, Kewna and Odi Massacres. (Albert 2003:1, 7) It is quite instructive to note that it was Dr. Ken Saro Wiwa, a Nigerian minority rights activist from the Ogoni stock in Rivers state, who internationalized the plight of the minorities in oil producing communities of the Niger Delta. This ethnic stock (the Ogonis) had through their movement, (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People) (MOSOP) submitted the Ogoni Bill of Rights to the General Ibrahim Babangida administration in 1991. In it they demanded for self determination in all ramifications (The Guardian 8 June 1994, 9). That year, in essence, marked the beginning of a historical movement for self determination and agitation for ethnic autonomy in the Niger Delta, consequently defiant declarations by other ethnic groups in the Delta region followed suit (The Niger Delta Question 2004;8,12). This crusade continued to attract serious comments from within and outside the Nigerian federation. On the 30th of July 1992 the United Nations minorities subcommission provided a platform for the national minorities around the world, to articulate their plight before the world body. Ken Saro Wiwa represented the minorities from Niger Delta and presented a position paper and documentary film which showcased the dehumanized condition the Delta people lived in. Ken said â&#x20AC;&#x161;My Ogoni people are the object of genocide in which environmental degradation has been a lethal weapon in the war against themâ&#x20AC;&#x203A;. He stated further that< â&#x20AC;&#x161;only the international community, acting with compassion and a sense of responsibility to the human race, can avert

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a catastrophe which is about to overtake the Ogoni‛ (Daily Times 19 September 1992, 13). Ken Saro Wiwa’s celebrated presentation marked a turning point in state response to his person and in a larger context, minority agitation over oil matters. As a follow-up to the internationalization of their grievance, the Ogoni numbering over thirty thousand and ably led by Kobani in January 1993 closed down Shell flow stations. Their complaint was that Shell and Nigerian government degraded their environment (The Guardian 8 June 1994, 9). Subsequently Ken Saro Wiwa was in and out of government detention until his extra judicial murder in 1996. In fact Shell head quarters in London and The Hague monitored Ken’s activities so as to, in their words, ‚avoid unpleasant surprises‛ (Isumonah 1998, 244). Furthermore Shell admitted that it funded and armed Rivers State Internal Security Task Force and Ogoni’s neighbors against Ken Saro Wiwa and his Ogoni community (Isumonah 1998, 244). Moreover, in May, 1993 the Nigerian state too promulgated the Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree no. 13 of 1993. According to Justice Clement Akpambo, the then Justice Secretary in the defunct Interim National Government (ING), the decree was aimed at ‚<stopping the champions of state within states and those who must have printed cards and flags waiting to proclaim any state or republic‛ (The Guardian 24 June 1993, 3). In this regard and given the prevailing climate at the time, it is extremely difficult to accept the view that the decree was not specifically targeted at Ken Saro Wiwa and his Ogoni kinsmen. He was arrested on the basis of the provisions of the decree in same 1993. A gale of protests trailed his arrest nationally from Association of Nigerian Authors (Daily Times 23 April 1993, 3) to minority rights

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bodies (The Guardian 23 April 1993, 4) and the Print media (The Guardian 30 April 1993, 10) all asking for his release. The affair continued as earlier mentioned until his extra judicial murder in 1996. The whole campaign of the oil-producing communities was predicated on their perceived neglect by the state and federal governments on one hand and the oil companies on the other hand. Fifteen years after the demise of Ken Saro Wiwa, the crisis in the Niger Delta has not abated. Though the federal government has put in place a host of palliative measures including the Niger Delta Development commission (NDDC) to build infrastructure, and the Yarâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;adua amnesty programme for ex militants, the crises seem not to have abated considerably. Rather, it has assumed alarming proportions currently threatening the stability and viability of the Nigerian state. In the post 1999 period, a militant group known as Movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has become a thorn in the flesh of the successive civil regimes in post 1999 Nigeria engaging in acts of criminality. MEND has been linked to attacks on petroleum operations in Nigeria as part of the conflict in the Niger Delta, engaging in acts including sabotage, theft, property destruction, guerrilla warfare, outright serial killings and kidnap of expatriates (Wikipedia, 2011)

CONCLUSION In conclusion, this paper has chronicled the fate of oil producing communities in the Nigerian state pointing out the fact that they have been marginalized by majority ethnic groups and the military in terms of resource allocation. Through out this period corporate politics intersected with successive dictatorships - military and civil. Under these dictatorships the Nigerian government signed laws that appropriated oil resources and placed them under the

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control of multi nationals and the government. Asides this, a major revenue sharing principle, which would have enhanced the fortune of the oil producing communities stemming the ferment in the Delta region the derivation principle was weakened. The proportion of oil revenues allocated on a derivation basis progressively declined from 50% of mining rents and royalties in 1969, through 2% of the federation account in 1981 to only 1% of mineral revenues in the account during the period 1989 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 1999. This decline was systematic and the reasons are not far fetched. The denigration of the derivation formula was as a result of Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s shift from an agricultural export based economy which was concentrated in the regions (controlled by ethnic majorities) to an oil - induced economy that is concentrated in the minority region of the Niger Delta. There is also no gainsaying that majority ethnic groups who controlled political power have used federal might to invoke the principles of equality and population as the basis for sharing federal funds horizontally among states. This gives credence to Prof. J.A. Ayoadeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s assertion that if oil were to be found in any major ethnic region, the principles of equality and population would be discarded for derivation (Ayoade 2005). Thus, given the high premium placed on equality and population factor, part of the Nigerian federation has benefited and is still benefiting from the oil revenue gotten from the Niger Delta at the expense of oil producing states. Granted that the adoption of federalism is an acknowledgement of diverse interests that need to be accommodated, the Nigerian federal experience up till 1999 neglected the interest of its oil producing communities, which has in turn bred serious crisis of stability in the Nigerian state. As a solution to this festering crisis it is imperative for the Nigerian federal system to be dynamic, responsive and adaptive to the ever changing - Nigerian political and economic circumstances.

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By reinventing itself, Nigerian federalism will be able to effectively manage the present multiple disorders of lopsided fiscal and political relationship between the centre and the federating units.

NOTES 1.

In fact asides defying government orders, appeals pended in court for too long a time. C.B.N Ogbogbo had also pointed out that the dialogue approach was first adopted after the first oil spillage at Bomu in Ogoni, Rivers State. For details see C.B.N Ogbogbo, The Niger Delta and the Resource Control. Conflict 1960-1995‛. Ph. D Thesis, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, 2004, p. 246.

Ogbogbo, C.B.N again noted that Rukpokwo indigenes blocked routes within their communities that led to fifty shell oil wells. Egbema people seized Agip Oil installations at Ebocha and Obaburru where People destroyed Elf oil drilling equipments. For details see CBN Ogbogbo, ‚The Niger Delta and resource control conflict‛ A PhD Thesis, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, 2004, p. 251.

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Isumonah, Victor. 1998. ‚Oil and Minority Ethnic Nationalism in Nigeria – The case of Ogoni‛ Ph. D Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan. Kayode, M.O. 1993. ‚National Question and Revenue Allocation: An Articulation of some problems and issues‛, In Proceedings of the 1993 Annual conference, 43–60. Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society. Kunle Amuwo, Kunle.2001. ‚Transition as Democratic Regression‛, In Nigeria During The Abacha Years. (1995–1998) The Domestic and International Politics of Democratization , edited by K, Amuwo. D..C. Bach and Y. Lebeau, 1–56. Ibadan: Institut Francais de Recherche en Afrique. Lawal, Olakunle Abdul-Rasheed. 1991. ‚Britain and Decolonization in Nigeria 1945-1960‛, – Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ibadan, Ibadan. Lemmy, Owugah. 2000. ‚The Political Economy of Resistance‛, In The Report of the Conference on the Peoples of the Niger Delta and the 1999 constitution, edited by Ola, Dofie. 99 –110. Port Harcourt: A publication of the Environmental Right Action/Friends of the Earth. Mike, Crowder. 1978. ‚The story of Nigeria‛ , London: Faber and Faber. National Archives Ibadan .CE/W3. 1958. ‚Report of the Sir Henry Willinks Commission. Appointed to Enquire into the fears of minorities and the means of allaying them‛: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. National Archives Ibadan. 1963. A4/X1 ‚Allocation of Revenue: Mining Rents and Royalties‛ 1963.The constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria – 1963, Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information. Lagos, Part 2 No. 20, section 140.

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Nwolise, O.B.C. 2005. ‚How the military ruined Nigeria’s Federalism.‛ In Nigerian Federalism in Crisis: Critical perspectives and political options, Edited by E. Onwudiwe and R. Suberu 114-23.Ibadan: John Archers. Obi , Cyril.1998 , ‚The impact of oil on Nigeria’s revenue allocation system: Problems and prospects‛, In Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria, edited by K. Amuwo, et.al 261–275‛ Ibadan: Spectrum Books. – – – –. 2002. ‚Oil and Minority Question‛. In The National Question in Nigeria: Comparative Perspective, edited by A. Momoh, and S. Adejumobi, 105. Hampshire: Ashgate Publication. Odia, Ofeimun.2000. ‚The Niger Delta and the 1999 constitution‛ In The Report of the Conference on the Peoples of the Niger Delta and the 1999 constitution, edited by Ola, Dofie. 56–72 (Port Harcourt: A publication of the Environmental Right Action/Friends of the Earth. Ogbogbo, Christopher.2004. ‚The Niger Delta and the Resource Control. Conflict 1960-1995‛. Ph. D Thesis, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. Okoh, R. N. and P.C. Egbon, 1999. ‚Fiscal Federalism and Revenue Allocation‛. In Proceedings of the 1999 Annual Conference. 405-19. Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society. Olawale, Isaac A, ‚The Odi massacre of 1999 in the context of Graffiti left by the invading Nigerian Army‛. (Ibadan, University of Ibadan, Programme on ethnic and Federal Studies’ Monograph. Onokerhoraye, A.G. 1995. ‚Patterns of Development in Urhobo land, Nigeria. The Benin Social Science Series for Africa, University of Benin, Nigeria: Kraft Books.

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Osaghae, E. 1988. ‚Crippled Giant: Nigeria, Since Independence‛ London; and company.

Hurst

Osakwe, O. 1999. ‚Fiscal relations among the three tiers of government‛ In Proceedings of the 1999 Annual Conference. 528-529. Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society. Ryder, A.F.C. 1999. ‚Trans Atlantic Slave Trade‛, In Groundwork of Nigerian History, edited by Obaro, Ikime. 236-246. Ibadan: Heinemann Books. Soremekun, K. and C. Obi.1993. ‚Oil and the National Question.‛ In Proceedings of The 1993 Annual Conference, 216-217, Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society. Suberu, Rotimi .2002. ‚The civil war and reconstruction of Nigerian Federalism‛. In, The Nigerian civil war and its aftermath, edited by E. Osaghae, E. Onwudiwe and R. Suberu, 151-59 Ibadan: John Archers. – – – –. 1996. ‚Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria‛. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. – – – –.. 2001. ‚Public Policies and National Unity in Nigeria‛. Research Report No. 19. Ibadan, Development Policy Centre, Nigeria. – – – –. .2002. ‚The Politics of Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria,‛ Conference Proceeding at North Western University, Evanston Illinois, U.S.A.. The Niger Delta Question: ‚Background to Constitutional Reform‛; 2004 Programme on Ethnic and Federal studies’ Monograph. Ibadan. 8:14. Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movement_for_the_Emancipation_of_t he_Niger_Delta

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Zuokumor, Kate. 1985 â&#x20AC;&#x161;The oil industry and Ijaw politicsâ&#x20AC;&#x203A;. B.A. Dissertation, Department of History University of Ibadan, Nigeria. NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports for 1996 and 1994. Daily Times, Lagos. Financial Standard, Lagos National Concord, Lagos Newswatch Magazine, Lagos Nigerian Tribune, Ibadan Punch, Lagos Saturday Tribune, Ibadan Statistical Bulletin, 1996 Sunday Times, Lagos Tell Magazine, Lagos. The Guardian, Lagos The News Magazine, Lagos

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‘Agony in the Garden’: Incongruity of Governance and the Travails of Port Harcourt City, Niger Delta, Nigeria, 1912-2010 Dr. Akachi Odoemene5 Key Terms: Nigeria, Niger Delta, oil, failed governance, conflict, Port Harcourt city, environment, state-sponsored violence. Abstract Port Harcourt, Nigeria’s Garden city, was a desirable ‘home for all’ and worth its name. In recent times, however, it has been transformed into a city with a rough and tumble character. This paper anchors the issues and crosscutting issues of concern in the concrete experiences of Port Harcourt city. It highlights the transitions of the city to its present state (witnessing considerable tension and violence over the past fifteen years) noting failed governance, leadership crisis and the marginalization and suppression of the people as factors that accentuated its downturn. It explores the role of crude oil in shaping socio-economic and political framework of the city, and shows the linkage between its history and the threat it currently constitutes to peace and stability in the city. The paper argues that indeed, Port Harcourt harbours risks for continued violence and total disintegration, but also has the potential to create new civilizing arrangements and for sustainable democratic development. It

5Akachi

Odoemene, Ph.D. is an African Historian trained at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. He is a 2009 African Humanities Program (AHP) Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) and an Irmgard Coninx Stiftung sponsored Residential Fellow at the Social Science Research Centre, Berlin (WZB) in 2009. Dr. Odoemene currently lectures in the Department of History and International Relations, Redeemer’s University of Nigeria (RUN), Mowe, Ogun State, Nigeria. His areas of research interest include social and cultural history, youth and gender studies, peace and conflict studies, ethnic studies and urban studies. His E-mail: akaigolo@yahoo.com.

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concludes that where the social pendulum would swing necessarily depends on the handling of the city’s and its peoples’ affairs.

Introduction The concept of ‘garden’ presupposes a place of gentle progress and nurturing, freshness and peace, beauty and rest; a largely sustainable ‘green’ environment. The use of ‘Garden City’ as an alias in the description of Port Harcourt – due to the residents’ flair for nurturing flower gardens around their houses, a result of the influence of the early European settlers in the area (Ogionwo 1979) – shows the city’s stature in the past. This is in addition to the numerous opportunities available in the city for just anyone to make it in life there: very cosmopolitan environment and blessed with an array of economic concerns. At one moment, everything looked possible in this once adorable city; but suddenly, everything went wrong. Ghettos and slums started sprouting everywhere; organised crimes became the order of the day; fraud and stark violence took centre stage and the city started losing its serenity, greenness and greatness. In recent times, Port Harcourt city has been at the brink of total collapse. Port Harcourt is the deepwater port city-capital of Rivers state, Nigeria. It lies along the, 66 kilometers upstream from the Gulf of Guinea, about 40 feet above sea level and a very few degrees above the equator. It is located at the edge of the Niger Delta’s mangrove foreshore and swamplands (Wolpe 1974, p. 15). The largest and most significant urban center in the Niger Delta and an important industrial and commercial center in Nigeria, Port Harcourt city possesses two seaports (one of them Nigeria’s second largest), two airports (one international with a local wing and one for the Nigerian Air Force), two oil refineries, two universities, two sports stadia and a

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major railway terminus. With a population of about 2,820,200 (in 2007) (Ohiagbuchi 2007) and home to a number of Nigeria’s indigenous ethnic minorities, the metropolis covers an area of 180,000 hectares and comprises two local council areas – Obio/Akpor and Port Harcourt City Local Government Areas (LGAs) (Owei and Ikpoki 2006, p. 3). Port Harcourt city is one of Nigeria’s fastest growing cities, with the annual growth rate put at over 5% by the State Statistical Agency (Owei 2006, p. 3). This paper gives a synopsis of the travails of this city and highlights the roles of failed governance in the dynamics of Port Harcourt city’s historical sociology. It interrogates the decline of one of Nigeria’s most notable social spaces from a once glamorous urban milieu to a city of crime and despondency. It further shows the future possibilities of this current ramshackle city. The crisis is not solely or even largely about ‘crime’ narrowly construed, but about the unraveling of a socioeconomic and political order. Or more properly, it is about the legitimacy of a failed government, as Watts (2007) puts it. Port Harcourt’s historical experiences cannot, however, be fully understood unless it is placed on the larger canvas of the wider collapse of Nigeria’s oilrich Niger Delta region and its socio-economic quagmire. The Setting: Foundation and Development During the colonial period, the effective exploitation of the Udi (Enugu) coal fields required the development of a railway distribution network to a port for eventual transportation by sea to Lagos and exportation to Europe. The search for an ideal site – a ‚deep water near high ground, which shall be connected with the i mainland‛ – that would be suitable both as a seaport and as a railway terminus (primarily for the evacuation and export of mined coal and generally for trade promotion in the districts of southeastern Nigeria) led to the exploration of the Bonny River (an eastern distributary of

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the Niger River). A suitable site was eventually located at a natural harbour, village-community along the Bonny River in the Bight of Biafra, about 64 kilometres from the sea (Okoye 1996, p. 158). Originally known as Igwe-Ocha, its origins dated back to pre-colonial times and this natural harbour ‘was to become the economic raison d’être of one of Nigeria’s most important commercial and industrial centres’ (Wolpe 1974, p. 14). Founded in 1912, the Igwe-Ocha port and the city that eventually developed there due to migrations and enhanced economic activities therein were re-named Port Harcourt, after the then Secretary of State for the Colonies (1910-15), Lewis (Viscount) Harcourt (1863-1922). The then Governor of the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria, Frederick Lugard, in August 1913, in a letter addressed to Lewis Harcourt, notes thus: <I have the honour to enclose for your information charts of the estuaries and rivers in the neighbourhood of the proposed port and terminus of the Eastern Railway at Diobu or more correctly Iguocha<In the absence of any convenient local name, I would respectfully ask your permission to call this Port Harcourt, and I anticipate, that, in future, it will be one of the most important ports in the coast of West Africa<ii

And to this very amazing request, Lewis Harcourt had replied: ‘It gives me great pleasure to accede to your suggestion that my name should be associated with the new port’ (Abati 2007, p. 4). One disconcerting fact about this whole ‘renaming’ development and arrangement was the seeming inability, or maybe refusal, of Lugard to adopt a suitable local name for the ‘new port’ and the city that

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eventually developed there. Like he rightly mentioned in his letter, the proposed railway terminus was to be located at ‘Diobu’ or more correctly, ‘Iguocha’ (a corruption of Igwe-Ocha). One then wonders why and how these local names of the pre-1913 communities that existed there were unsuitable or not ‘convenient’ for the emerging city’s name. Or, why ‘there had been much controversy about what to call it,’ as Abati (2007, p. 3) notes. The choice of a name after Lewis Harcourt is arguably in line with the colonial ideology of viewing the colonized as dominated; thus, physical features within their domain could arbitrarily be re-named to suit the colonizers’, and/or supplanted with better, more ‘convenient’ and suitable names in their thinking. This has been a wide-spread experience all over sub-Sahara African colonial history. The combined stimulating effects of the colliery in Enugu, the sea port in Port Harcourt the railway linking both towns created vibrant socioeconomic scenarios in Port Harcourt, which also encouraged various European commercial concerns to establish branches in Port Harcourt. These industries – colliery, sea port and railway – were essentially colonial projects and were being developed immediately after the period when the northern and southern protectorates were being amalgamated into one entity called Nigeria. This meant that the colonialists necessarily employed peoples from all races and ethnic groups to work in these industries. The many job opportunities these establishments provided stimulated African migrant-labour from the local populations as well as other parts of the colonial territory, even beyond what is today Nigeria for wage-earning jobs and urban life (Dixon-Fyle 1989, p. 126-127). The economic activities associated with the establishment also resulted in high volumes of other uncontrolled migrations. All these gave a cosmopolitan atmosphere to the new town’s population.

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The railway and seaport, and the economic activities and attractions attached to these industries, however, provide only one part of the explanation for Port Harcourt’s socioeconomic and political significance in the country. Petroleum and natural gas round out the equation (Wolpe 1974, p. 22). Oil was found in the Niger Delta area in the mid 1950s. Soon after, Port Harcourt became the main operational base for multi-national petrobusinesses which refined crude oil both for local consumption and export. Indeed, Port Harcourt’s rapid growth and development was mainly tied to the effects of oil exploitation activities in the town. In other words, though there developed an industrial labour force due to the initial ‘foundation’ industries, petrobusiness activities led to an influx of expatriate multi-national corporations which activities aided tremendously in the radical transformation of the city (Ezedinma and Chukuezi 1999, p. 137). These heightened migrations, which were strongly stimulated, especially since the 1970s, by the ‘oil boom.’ Population wise, the growth of Port Harcourt has been quite remarkable, as the census figures show. Three years after its founding (1915), its population was about 5,000. Others include: 1921 – 7,185; 1931 – 15,201; 1944 – 30,200; 1946 – 34,000 (est.); 1952/3 – 79,634; 1963 – 179,563; 1971 – 213,443; 1973 – 231,632; (Anyanwu 1979, Ogionwo 1979, Izeogu 1989, p. 59), and in 1991 – 440,399 (Obinna et al 2010). Since the 2006 national census was fraught with serious controversy, and thus, is very unreliable, to have an insight into the 2009 population estimate of the city, Obinna et al (2010, p. 173) projects from the less controversial 1991 census figure. With an annual growth rate of 5.8% (as establishes by the National Population Commission), he affirms that the 2009 population figure of Port Harcourt in 2009 is projected to be 900,176 persons. This is, indeed, a phenomenal growth regime for Port Harcourt. For instance, the percentage change of

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90.1% between 1973 and 1991 represents an average annual growth rate of 5% (Obinna et al 2010, p. 173). The cosmopolitan nature of its population is also unrivalled. Right from the colonial era, apart from the Europeans there were, in the city, Africans representing a cross section of West Africa – Sierra Leoneans (or ‘Saro’ people), ‘Gold Coastians’ (now Ghanaians), Cameroonians, Gambians and Togolese. There were also an equally formidable cross section of the major ethnic groups of Nigeria – the Yourba, Igbo, Hausa, Ijo and Ibibio. There were also various Rivers nationalities like the Ogoni, Ikwerre, Abua, Engenni and so on (Paul-Worika 1979, p. 116). This trend did not change much even in the post-colonial period. For instance, by 1973, migrants to the city of Port Harcourt accounted for about 72% of its population. Out of these, 66% migrated from the diverse rural areas of Nigeria (Izeogu 1989). Its populations till date have maintained similar configurations (Okoye 1996). Apart from rapid population growth as a result of migration, Port Harcourt expanded physically at a fast rate too. This growth was, nonetheless, associated with uncontrolled urban development, especially in the rural – urban fringe to the north and the waterfronts to the south (Izeogu 1989, p. 60). The Mélange of Gold and Rust, Oil and Blood Port Harcourt city has had both sunny and stormy sides in almost a century history of existence. The city is not yet a hundred year old) Port Harcourt city has had an interesting and intriguing history – one of a mélange of gold and rust, and of oil and blood. Its proper take-off towards an urban development started in 1912, and its re-naming following closely afterwards. The first main activity of the colonial administrators there was the construction of a railway link to the Udi coalfields of what later became Enugu. Indeed, there is abundant evidence which suggests that coerced and forced labour of

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indigenous peoples was widely used on the Port Harcourt railway project which started in 1915. Wolpe (1974, p. 57) notes that this was even a constant source of irritation to the local colonial administrators, who expressed feelings of disapproval in different memoranda sent to the Port Harcourt District Office and to Provincial Commissioners. As a modern city, its development was made possible by the enactment in 1917 of the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance and the township Ordinance. The Public Lands Ordinance empowered the then Governor-General to acquire land from the indigenous populations compulsorily for public purposes. The lands so acquired became known as ‘Crown Lands’ and after political independence as ‘State Land.’ Under that Township Ordinance, Port Harcourt was classified as a Second Class township with the consequent provision of specific urban services and infrastructure (Owei 2006, p. 3). Its progress was steady and enormous until the civil war period when it became a theatre of war, which destroyed most of its beauty and infrastructure. But it quickly recovered from this setback, and arguably, the city stood out as Nigeria’s best planned city: its set-out, beauty, cleanliness and freshness were unrivalled in the immediate post-war era. Archibong (2004, p. 17) reports on its early allurements: Here, there and everywhere, the city looked planned and designed with aesthetics and sanitary considerations in mind. Apart from its famed nightlife, many parts of Port Harcourt had playgrounds; noise level was low, taps flowed with water and streetlights were taken for granted. Roads, especially in the ‘Township’ and Government Reservation Area (GRA) were in good shape. That is how Port Harcourt came to be foisted with the Garden City sobriquet.

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To live in Port Harcourt between the 1930s and 1980s (except for the period of the war) was desirable, cherished and, indeed, a privilege, as the city had the best of almost everything good: ‘It was a Garden where Nigerians of all groups came together and lived happily in search of peace and fortune<It was the city of lovely hotels, a multilingual, multicultural society where various influences coexisted in fine harmony<It was a thriving centre of commerce and culture’ (Abati 2007, p. 3). Its progress was gentle, gradual but steady until sometime in the early 1990s when the repercussions of dire governance started taking tolls on the city’s sociology and development. Of course, the problems of governance in Port Harcourt, nay the Niger Delta, are not divorceable from the general mis-governance which the Nigerian state has been witnessing. The only twists are that: the region is a very delicate one, produces oil which accounts for up to 95% of Nigeria’s export earnings and over 80% of its revenue (pumping about 2.5 million barrels of crude per day), devastated by environmental and ecological degradation due to oil exploitation, totally neglected by governments and petrobusinesses operating there and the least developed geo-political zone in Nigeria (Odoemene 2010). These were, indeed, a recipe for socio-political explosion. Conflict in the Niger Delta arose in the early 1990s due to tensions between the expatriate petrobusinesses and government on one side, and a number of the Niger Delta’s minority ethnic groups who felt they were being criminally exploited, on the other. Ethnic and political unrest has persisted, and has led to a crisis situation in Port Harcourt, where the politics of oil is hottest. This is all about the political economy of oil in the country, which has bred corruption and violence over the years. The wealth deposited underneath Niger Delta’s soil holds unprecedented promise for an ecologically delicate terrain as the delta. Under normal circumstances, the region should be

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one of the richest and best regions and places in terms of development. However, the reverse is the case. Despite earning huge profits for government and multi-national petrobusinesses, oil exploitation activities in the region have continuously robbed oiliii bearing communities of life and livelihood, and bringing them only hardships and blood. The region is, ironically, Nigeria’s poorest and least developed region. It is a typical paradoxical case of the geese that lays the golden egg but is starved, ill-treated and grossly oppressed. At this stage, a thematic insight into the city’s major problems would be desirable, as this would underline its main challenges for sustainable governance. Environmental Devastation Decades after the first gush of oil in the creekside village of Oloibiri, 80 kilometers west of Port Harcourt, was made in 1956, petrobusinesses have transformed this remote wetland into industrial wilderness. The imprint: 7,200 kilometers of pipelines, 159 oil fields, and 275 flow stations, with gas flares visible day and night from miles away (O’neill 2007). Leaks from pipelines and wells, the building of roads and canals, and decades of oil spills and acid rain from unabating gas flares have damaged the ecosystem. From a satellite-based study of the delta, it was found that between 1986 and 2003, more than 50,000 acres of mangroves disappeared from the coast, largely iv because of oil and gas exploration. Jimmy Adegoke notes that this ‘<is a significant amount given how valuable the mangrove ecosystem is.<the loss of one acre is too much. You’re wiping out the means for people to sustain themselves’ (Polgreen 2007). Furthermore, a 2006 UN report warns: ‘*T+he degree and rate of degradation are pushing the delta towards ecological disaster’ (Ohiagbuchi 2007, p. 9).

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Due to this dire ecological situation and high cost of living in Port Harcourt occasioned by the economics of oil exploration activities, people started drifting to the outskirts of the city to live and make a living. They started setting up shanty neighbourhoods/slums, especially along the river banks. These are locally called ‘Watersides’ and there are forty-seven waterfront shanty suburbs in Port Harcourt and the once adorable city was worse for it. Though the present Chief Rotimi Amaechi’s administration has destroyed the waterfront shanties, this has led to even more problems. For instance, there are no compensation and/or resettlement plans for the hundreds of thousands persons whose ‘homes’ were demolished. They have, thus, remained homeless and without sources of livelihood. Most of these displaced persons now squat at different corners of the city trying to eke out a living (Gusau 2010, p.15). Soon after the demolition of the waterfronts and the displacement of persons, residents of Port Harcourt witnessed a sharp increase in the incidences of crime in the city (Obed 2010, p.5). This is understandably not surprising. Gradually, the famed ‘Garden City’ degenerated into a ‘Garbage City’, and its marvelous flowers proved no better than wreaths. Describing this in a catchy poetic manner, Abati (2007, p. 4) notes that ‚Paradise is lost. The Garden has been defiled. It is desolate. Beauty has given way to ugliness.‛ Another observer notes thus: Dense, garbage-heaped slums stretch for miles. Choking black smoke from an open-air slaughterhouse rolls over housetops. Streets are cratered with potholes and ruts. Vicious gangs roam school grounds. Peddlers and beggars rush up to vehicles stalled in gas lines. This is Port Harcourt, Nigeria’s oil hub<smack-dab in the middle of oil reserves bigger than the United States’ and Mexico’s combined. Port Harcourt should gleam; instead, it rots (O’neill 2007, p. 2).

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Social Degradation and Abuse In addition to the ecological devastation that the delta faced, there was also a social degradation and abuse angles to their problems. Various acts meant to humiliate, degrade and abuses the peoples of the Niger Delta, including natives living in Port Harcourt, are rife among agents of both the petrobusinesses and the government. In a very celebrated case, scores of women were allegedly raped by a contingent of the Nigeria Mobile Police group and soldiers who invaded Choba town, an Ikwerre community in Port Harcourt city on 28 October 1999. These women, together with men from the community, were protesting against perceived long-standing unfulfilled promises by Wilbros, a US company in Port Harcourt (Amnesty International and, Ekine 2005, p. 75, IHRHL 2000). Wilbros officials, apparently appalled by this show, invited security forces who unleashed murder, destruction of property and rape on the people of the town. Some of these acts of rape of the Choba women, which were rampant occurrences, were captured on film by a journalist and even published in the Nigerian daily press (Ekine 2005, p. 75). Unfortunately, the Nigerian government refused to acknowledge the violations, especially the rape cases and refused to investigate too (IHRHL 2000, p. 23). There was also the issue of ‘pressurizing’ native young women into a life of prostitution. These accusations are especially made against oil workers – expatriate and otherwise – who allegedly enticed these young women with their stupendous wealth as against the abject poverty conditions that most indigenes of the city experience. In a few night clubs located within Port Harcourt many of these young women are made to perform nude dances and other acts which are seen as humiliating to the indigenes, as they are totally against their cultures and practices (Morka 2007, p. 4). Due to this abhorrent posture, Port Harcourt is not seen by outsiders as a ‘safe place’ for any decent

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young woman, as it is often considered a hunt for prostitutes and the easy virtue. In fact, single young women living in the town easily get stigmatized, even outside Port Harcourt, as ‘whores’ and ‘wild.’ This situation is painfully deplored by many native male youth living in the city (Morka 2007, p. 4). The grim socio-economic realities that confronted Port Harcourt’s indigenous residents were because of their political marginalization within the Nigerian project. Indeed, the various groups that make up the Niger Delta are all minorities in the country. And as such, no serious attention is paid to their yearnings in the country. Their ‘voice’ was not usually heard or even listened to, neither were their concerns taken on board when issues of national importance were being discussed (Odoemene 2009, p. 5). This marginalization also meant that ill treatments could be matted (sic) out on them at will by either security forces or expatriate staff of petrobusinesses, without any favourable responses from the State in their defense. Of course, in serious contention here (between them and the State, whose officials are usually from majority ethnic groups) is the control of the vital petroleum resources buried in the Niger Delta lands. This was the actual basis of their oppression and subjugation. Popular Resistance, Hostage-taking and Armed Robbery Exhausting all avenues to a ‘diplomatic solution’ to their many social, economic and political problems, and seeing no hope in sight in the face of political marginalization, economic strangulation, social slavery and possible extinction, the people of the Niger Delta began an agitation for self determination and ‘resource control.’ They were also not unaware of what reactions to expect from government officials and petrobusinesses over their agitations. With no concessions being made by their alleged oppressors, the stage was set for popular resistance and militancy in the region. According to a youth leader in

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Port Harcourt, ‚<the time for talking has passed. When the situation in the delta threatens to turn into another Middle East, then the world will finally intervene‛ (Ohiagbuchi 2007). In another explanation for this situation, another Port Harcourt-based Niger Delta youth opines: ‚The activities of these oil companies in collaboration with the state are threatening our environments and natural habitat. So the battle we v are wedging is the battle for our life.‛ These show the resolute spirit of the youth of the Niger Delta region in finding ‘a solution’ to their unacceptable situation. In a bid to realize their aims, many of the youth in the area formed themselves into ‘gangs’ and began to wreck havoc in different Niger Delta cities and towns. In all these, Port Harcourt has had the most shares for obvious reasons. It is the ‘oil headquarters’ of Nigeria and consequently has the largest concentration of oil firm’s expatriate workers. This makes them good targets for attacks that will send signals to their employers, the government and the West of the Niger Delta peoples’ frustrations. Pointedly, the violence that has rocked the city of Port Harcourt in recent years has been aimed mainly at foreign petrobusiness, their expatriate workers and the security operatives protecting them. Hundreds of kidnappings/hostage-taking by militants, pipeline bombings and attacks on flow stations have occurred in the past three years alone. And the number and severity of these attacks have been building. Commenting on these gangs and the severity of their actions in Port Harcourt city, Oruwari and Owei (2006, p. 6-7) opine: The gangs have become a security threat to oil workers as the involvement of the gangs in bunkering, extortions, kidnapping of expatriate oil workers and rivalry wars, along with the

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viciousness with which such acts are occurring, is both alarming and frightening. ...In Port Harcourt, cults and gangs exist from the street level to the neighbourhood level and even the ethnic militias whose bases are outside the city operate in Port Harcourt for specific violent activities. ...Whatever their background, urban gangs and their violent engagement against rival groups, innocent persons, and politically associated killings are a daily reality in Port Harcourt. No one is ignorant of the existence and activities of the gangs.

Dozens have been killed and many more wounded. In many cases, and unfortunately too, most of the dead have come from bystanders caught in crossfire. Arguably, one could perceive the magnitude of the gang problem in Port Harcourt if the one hundred and three (103) groups listed as banned organizations in the Rivers State Anti-cult Bill are taken into consideration. In any case, the banning of these groups has not been effective, neither has it stemmed down the tide of violence in the city. Oruwari and Owei (2006) report that the gangs are still around and operate in broad daylight, even in the presence of law enforcement agents. Further commenting on the grim situation in the city, Watts (2007) notes thus: Port Harcourt has become to all intents and purposes ungovernable: it is disorderly and lawless, and this lawlessness now extends from the waterside slums to the middle class Government Residential Area (GRA). In particular, organized robbery by wellorganized gangs of alienated and angry youth has exploded since the 1990s<

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Endemic robbery across the city is a reflection of the fact that criminals know full well that they will not be apprehended because the operations of so much of government are a fraud and a racket: the conduct of those in public office seems nothing more than organized crime itself. How else would any sensible person interpret the images in the mainstream press of high-ranking politicians cavorting with political thugs, warlords, and gang leaders? To put the matter differently, the proliferation of armed robbery is inseparable from the wider struggle for power in Rivers State in the wake of the massively corrupt elections (Watts 2007). State Violence and Militancy One major problem that the delta region has faced over time has been that of State violence, demonstrated in several forms: wanton killings, destruction of communities, military occupation, and sexual abuses by government security operatives. The hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and seven other of his Ogoni kinsmen in Port Harcourt was the height and the tempo has only fallen a bit. Again, such brazen State violence could be gleaned from State-sponsored â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;punitive expeditionsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; like the one at Odi town near Port Harcourt in 2000, during which thousands of people were killed, livestock, farms, public utilities and houses in the town were totally destroyed and set ablaze by the rampaging Nigerian Army. There are also cases of military occupation in many delta communities, whose penchant of abuses is very disturbing. The many violent inter- and intracommunal/ethnic conflicts, usually over the spoils of oil, are also another dimension to the Stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s violence and suppression. These conflicts are known to be sponsored by the State, pitching one community against the other, sometimes occurring among groups with no previous history of antagonism. Furthermore, other symptoms of such conflicts glaringly reveal the complicity of the State.

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Another angle to the State-sponsored violence in the Niger Delta is also seen in the use and manipulation of rival gangs, known locally as ‘cults.’ These cults have proven ties with political leaders in the delta region who use them during elections to intimidate opponents and rig votes (Polgreen 2007). The rivalry among these gangs for supremacy has brought so much violence to the city, as many of the city’s inhabitants are often cut in the cross-fire. Also, the implosion in Port Harcourt of these groups since after the end of the elections has been a source of deep concern to the city’s residents. They constitute the main bulk of the city’s feared ‘militants.’ Indeed, one cannot discuss the degeneration of Port Harcourt city, especially as it relates to this vexed issue of militancy without a mention of the person of Dr. Peter Odili, the erstwhile Governor of the state, and his contributions to the state of affairs in the city. Peter Odili, medical doctor and politician, is presumably one of Nigeria’s most corrupt politicians (Ghazvinian and). His corrupt practices were not limited to alleged gross financial imprudence that has impoverished Port Harcourt city and the region the more, but he is also linked to the emergence and institutionalization of militancy in the Niger Delta region. For instance, Alhaji Dokubo Asari, the leader of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and Ateke Tom, Asari’s former colleague and later, founder of the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), two of the most notorious militant groups in the Niger Delta region, owed their existence to Dr. Odili. Both Asari and Ateke have publicly attested to being recruited and armed by Dr. Odili to ensure victory for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), with him (Odili) as its governorship candidate in the 1999 elections, and Abiye Sekibo as the Secretary to the State Government (SSG) (Asuni 2009, Courson 2009). Through Sekibo’s coordination, Asari and his men helped to rig the vote for Dr. Odili and the PDP. These militants

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were not only handsomely paid, but government kept a blind eye to their illegal oil bunkering activities. By the end of 2003, the influence of the group had become enormous. After the 2003 elections, Odili fell out with Asari and his NDPVF group. Asari was dropped and his lieutenant, Ateke Tom, became Odili’s new bride. He established the NDV, a break-away faction of the NDPVF group, to keep Asari and his men in check (Odoemene 2011, 10). By August 2004, the NDPVF began clashing with NDV causing an unprecedented violence in the Port Harcourt city. Before the end of 2007, Ateke and his group had also fallen out with their political master, Dr. Peter Odili, thus making the scenario dangerously complex (Asuni 2009, Courson 2009, Ghazvinian nd). Moreover, from about 2007 there emerged on the scene a multiplicity of other militant groups, all fighting for their perceived ‘rights,’ both real and imagined. At various times some of these groups had clashes among themselves which resulted in many deaths, including those of innocent, law-abiding citizens. For instance, it was two major militant groups – the Bush Boys and the Greenlanders – purportedly had their leaders killed by Ateke and his men (Asuni 2009b, p. 12), occurrences that further charged the Port Harcourt polity. The inability of Dr. Odili and his associate, Abiye Sekibo, to contain the militia gangs became a bane of Port Harcourt city – the seat of power – due to their militancy and gangsterism. This was pertinently because Many militant groups were never disarmed after the elections were held, becoming in effect standing armies for their political patrons. But while the armed groups remained, their political allegiances constantly shifted. Sekibo found himself unable to reign in Ateke’s excesses, and the pair had a falling out during the 2007 election campaign when the

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latter blew up several police stations in Port Harcourt, freeing his supporters but injuring many bystanders. However, by 2008 it seemed that Ateke and Sekibo had settled their differences and were reportedly working together once more to destabilize the current governor in Rivers State, who had fallen out with them and his former godfather, Odili (Asuni 2009, pp. 13-14).

With the Odili example, many other powerful politicians in Rivers State, nay the Niger Delta, now make do with such militants for various nefarious purposes. Indeed, the various groups are irked by what seems like a fight from the government of Chief Rotimi Amaechi, Odili’s successor and former political ‘godson’, whom Odili’s militant groups also worked for during the various elections (Obiyo 2011, p. 8). It would be recalled that Chief Amaechi was the Speaker of the Rivers State House of Assembly throughout the eightyear period of Odili’s two-tern tenure as governor of the state, and allegedly worked hands in gloves with his political ‘godfather’. Watts (2007) contends that Chief Amaechi was ‚part and parcel of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) political machine that emerged under the previous governor, Peter Odili, an almost archetypical example of the new breed of ‚Godfathers‛ who wield*ed+ enormous power within a decentralized federal system.‛ Thus his recent moves at checking the militant groups are laughable and seem unserious to many. For instance, Chief Amaechi had, in 2008, ordered the people of Okrika to give information on one of their ‚sons,‛ Ateke Tom (Asuni 2009b, p. 13). Not surprising, no one from the community cooperated with such a directive because these politicians are never to be trusted and for fear of victimization (Obiyo 2011, p. 8-9). In all these, Port Harcourt city, the seat of government

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and power, and Niger Delta’s most significant urban social space, has been the main war theatre. Indeed, it has become worse for it. Abati (2007, p. 3) remarkably points out the implications of hobnobbing with these evil groups that has become part of Port Harcourt city and seem to have assumed permanence: <they are causing so much problem because they need to get even with the politicians who used them during the elections (2003, 2007), only to get into office and ignore them. They promise to kidnap both politicians and their relatives and make the area ungovernable<The hoodlums who are now kings of the territory acquired power and influence under the watch of political Godfathers who used them as political thugs and armed them with sophisticated weapons. The elections are over; the genie is out of the bottle; the boys with the arms and ammunition have found a new occupation in terrorism. And the matter is now beyond the Godfathers who dare not declare their association with ‚the boys‛ too openly. We are paying the price for bad leadership and bad politics.

Urban Ethnicity: The Indigene – Settler Dichotomy The colonial origins of ‘criminal’ ethnicity in Nigeria, nay vi Africa, have been well noted by several scholars. According to Nnoli (2003, p. 2-3), the colonialists ‚manipulated the ethnic consciousness that emerged from the violence of the colonial state. As a political line, the colonial policy of divide and rule first used ethnic and regional sectionalism to curb Nigerian nationalism and to maintain colonial power.‛ Thus, he considers the colonial urban setting as constituting ‚the cradle of contemporary ethnicity in Nigeria‛ as ‚it was there that what we refer to today as ethnic groups first acquired common consciousness‛ (Nnoli 1978, p. 35). But beyond the colonial conspiracy theory, one begins to wonder why even at the post colonial period the manifestations of such ethnicity become even more dangerous and

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destructive. Without a doubt, this ethnicity palaver is more fervently exhibited within the ‚indigene – settler dichotomy‛ framework. Though one can hardly find the word ‚indigene‛ in most dictionaries, it is a term so commonly and frequently used in Nigeria, so much so that even the average Nigerian has a clear idea of what it means. Or, at least, who is and who is not. The words ‚indigene‛ and ‚settler‛ are mutually definitive in the sense that one defines the other and vice versa (Odoemene 2008, p. 237). So, who is an indigene? The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report of 25 April 2006, aptly titled ‚They do not own this place,‛ defines ‚indigenes‛ as people ‚who can trace their ethnic and genealogical roots back to the community of people who originally settled there‛ (HRW 2005, p. 1). For our study here, however, an ‚indigene‛ could be seen as ‚a member of a group of people who are the first to have settled permanently in a particular area and who are often considered as ‘natives’. Such people have rights to lands, traditions and culture‛ (PSG 2004, p. 30, Odoemene 2008, p. 237). Therefore, anyone who does not fall within this category in a particular locale is considered a ‚settler‛, and thus, treated as such. Urban ethnicity in Port Harcourt, which is another fallout of bad leadership in the area, is easily manifested within this indigene – settler dichotomy. This has, unfortunately, developed into ‘xenophobic’ irritations and intolerance with hydra-headed consequences. The indigene – settler politics in Port Harcourt was so mainly because of the criminal neglect, cruel exploitation and environmental degradation that the Niger Delta region faced within the Nigerian project. There was also a palpable fear of domination of the minority groups of the Niger Delta by the major ethnic groups, especially the neighbouring ethnic Igbo (Paul-Worika 1979). In other words, the activism which the ‘youth-indigenes’ of Port Harcourt city

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pursued included not just the fight for resource control, but also the ‘sacking’ from the city of all persons who are not from the Niger Delta. Thus, ‘indigenes’ of Port Harcourt, over time, became very unreceptive to migrants, ‘non-indigenes’ or ‘settlers’ in the city, who they claim had dominated and oppressed them for so long. LeithRoss’ (1937, p. 247) observations, only 25 years after the founding of the city, are instructive as they underline, in some way, the predisposition of the city’s residents to such dichotomous politics and their ‘adjustments’ accordingly: ‚Port Harcourt is not, as might be expected, a melting pot where races and speeches, customs and character will fuse and mingle and out of which a new and stable people will emerge, but rather a railway platform with people coming and going. Each family part holding closely together, contemptuous and suspicious of the other‛

The insecurity and threats that these patterns of urban ethnic relations pose underlines one of the main bases for the existence, prominence vii and vibrancy of organized ethnic unions in the city. These are fashioned to deal with the vagaries of urban life and existence – guarantying adequate welfare and security – as it affects their members (Mabogunje 1976, Osaghae 1994). The existence of such unions is a consequence of the weakening of family roles, nuclear and/or extended, due to the exigencies of migration. Mabogunje (1976, p. 23), for instance, notes these unions as ‘<perhaps the most important social phenomenon in many African cities.’ This is deeply rooted in the kind of functions they performed, especially in providing security to the urban migrants, dubbed ‘settlers’, in Port Harcourt city.

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The ‘contemptuous and suspicious’ relations among Port Harcourt’s residents (Leith-Ross 1937) were also played out in the ‘Abandoned Property’ saga targeted against the ethnic Igbo population in Port Harcourt city. It was one very important by-product of the civil war and the post-war politics of animosity in Port Harcourt that needs some attention here. As the civil war ended, all landed properties of the ethnic Igbo in Port Harcourt and elsewhere were designated ‘Abandoned Property’ and confiscated by the government. Indeed, government promulgated the ‘Abandoned Property Decree’ of 1979 to back this unprecedented act, which was also supervised by government-appointed ‘Abandoned Properties Implementation viii Committee,’ which was headed by David Mark, the current president of Nigeria’s Senate, the upper legislative chamber. Through this act, the ethnic Igbo, upon losing the civil war, were also divested of thousands of such properties, which were treated as having been ‘captured’ as ‘war booty’ (Nwabueze 1985). These properties were later sold to members of other ethnic groups at ridiculously low prices. The heated court case on the issue came to a close sometime in 2002 when the Supreme Court ruled that such act was illegal and a violation of the rights of the Igbo citizens of the country. It ordered such property to be returned to their rightful owners. These were not returned till date. The ‘Abandoned Property’ issue is a rather distasteful one in the history of inter-ethnic relations in the city and has been one of the sources of tension between Port Harcourt city ‘indigenes’ and the ethnic Igbo, the largest group inhabiting the city. One other very interesting post-civil war urban development in Port Harcourt was the re-naming of most of its communities in an effort to deny their Igbo origins. This followed a wave of anti-Igbo sentiments among groups in the Port Harcourt axis that hitherto claimed to be subgroups of the Igbo. Thus, local communities originally known as

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Umuomasi, Umuokoroshe, Umueme, Umuola, Umuolumeni, Umuokoro and Umuomasi (which were typically Igbo names of these ix communities) had the letter ‘R’, which stood for ‘Rivers’ , prefixed to them. With this development, the communities came to be known as: Rumuomasi, Rumuokoroshe, Rumueme, Rumuola, Rumuolumeni, Rumuokoro and Rumuomasi respectively. This has remained till date and is a constant reminder of the inappropriateness of certain governance acts in the city.

Concluding Remarks In all, a critical examination of these problems would show that they were a reflection of a dilemma: failed governance. This has been almost totally motivated by corruption which is rooted in the oil of the delta region and its money. This is at the roots of Port Harcourt’s woes. Thus, it has been subverted by the very thing that gave it promise – oil. As (O’neill 2007, p. 1) notes: Oil fouls everything in southern Nigeria. It spills from the pipelines, poisoning soil and water. It stains the hands of politicians and generals, who siphon off its profits. It taints the ambitions of the young, who will try anything to scoop up a share of the liquid riches – fire a gun, sabotage a pipeline, kidnap a foreigner.

The cruelest twist is that half a century of oil extraction in the delta has failed to make the lives of the people better. Instead, they are poorer still, and hopeless. As O’neill (2007, p. 3) reports, a Chief from x Oloibiri had charged thus: ‘If we had never seen oil, we would have been better off.’

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What future, then, is there for Port Harcourt city, in the face of its glaring opportunities for positive transformation, and also the tendencies of complete disintegration? Indeed, the social pendulum in Port Harcourt has the potentials of swinging to any one of these options. Its eventual course would, however, be largely dependent on the approach to its problems. The continued neglect, alienation and the suppression of its vast peoples, ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ alike, by either the government or petrobusinesses, or both, could be a recipe for disaster. Its implications would be grave, especially as Port Harcourt’s significance both for the Niger Delta region and the Nigerian state is prominent. On the other hand, an honest appraisal of the crisis of governance in the city of Port Harcourt, and the sincerity of the State at ‘oiling the friction’ by quickly dealing with the diverse problems, could turn the city away from its destructive drift. It is only then that the potentials of the city to truly create new arrangements and human organizations through which a viable chance for all citizens to pursue their aspirations could be effectively realised. While one agrees that Port Harcourt, the Garden city, may not be horticultural green anymore (a situation it can also turn around if it’s administrators have the will), the city is still metaphorically ‘green’ in the context of the billions of dollars it spins, not only from petrobusinesses, but also from other numerous industrial, commercial and seaport activities therein. This offers the city a wonderful advantage for a total turn-around. One has to reiterate that for this to be possible, there has to be a credible government and leadership in the city, the Niger Delta and Nigeria as a whole. This must be the first step towards restoring the city on the part of sustainable development and progress. These hard facts must have to be borne in mind constantly, and consciously too.

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References Abati, R. 2007. Port Harcourt: A Paradise Lost [online]. Available from: http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/reuben-abati/portharcourt-a-paradise-lost/pdf.html [Assessed on 29 June 2008]. Amnesty International. nd. Nigeria: Rape – the Silent Weapon [online]. Available from: http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAFR440202006 &lang=e [Assessed on 20 September 2009]. Anyanwu, C.N. 1979. The growth of Port Harcourt, 1912-1960. In Ogionwo, W. (ed.) The city of Port Harcourt: A symposium on its growth and development. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books. Archibong, M. 2004. ‚Port Harcourt: Garden city with few flowers.‛ The Sun Newspaper, Thursday, 11 March. Asuni, J.B. 2009. ‚Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta.‛ Working Paper, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (September). Asuni, J.B. 2009. Blood Oil in the Niger Delta. USIP Special Report 229 (August). Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Courson, E. (2009). ‚Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND): Political Marginalization, Repression and Petro-insurgency in the Niger Delta.‛ Discussion Paper 47, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala. Dixon-Fyle, M. 1989. The Saro in the Political Life of Early Port Harcourt, 1913-49. The Journal of African History, 30 (1), 125–138. Dorothy, Q.T. and Regan E.R. 1994. Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of Impunity. SAIS Review, 14 (1) (Winter/Spring), 81–99.

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Ekine, S. 2005. Women’s Responses to State Violence in the Niger Delta. Feminist Africa, 10, 67–83. Ezedinma, C. and Chukuezi, C. 1999. A Comparative Analysis of Urban Agricultural Enterprises in Lagos and Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Environment & Urbanization, 11 (2), 135–144. Ghazvinian, J. (nd). ‚The Curse of Oil.‛ Available from: http://www.ijawland.com/The%20Curse%20of%20Oil%20by%20Joh n%20Ghazvinian.pdf. [Accessed 23 August 2008]. Gusau, I.U. 2010. Fresh battle on Port Harcourt’s Waterfronts. Weekly Trust Newspaper, Saturday, 06 November. IHRHL. 2000. Poverty in Wealth: Report on the People of the Niger Delta and the display of poverty in wealth. Port Harcourt: Institute of Humanitarian Rights and Humanitarian Law (IHRHL), (September) [online]. Available from: www.ihrhlng.org/poverty%20in%20wealth.doc [Assessed 23 June 2008]. Izeogu, C. V. 1985. Port Harcourt City Profile. Cities: International Quarterly on Urban Policy, 2 (1), 54–62. Leith-Ross, S. 1937. African Women: A Study of the Ibo of Nigeria. London: Faber. Lugard, F. 1913. Nigeria 183, CO. 583/4/Vol.3. Sir F. Lugard to the Rt. Hon. Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August, Public Records Office, London. Mabogunje, A.L. 1976. Cities and African development (Studies in the Development of African Resources 3). Ibadan: Oxford University Press. Morka, P. 2007. The wild and dark side of city life. Weekend Horizon Newspapers, Saturday, 24 March.

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Nnoli, O. 1978. Ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers. Nnoli, O. 2003. Ethnic violence in Nigeria: A historical perspective. Available from: http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/papers/nnoli_021003.pdf [Assessed 21 December 2006]. Nwabueze, B.O. 1985. The Igbos in the Context of Modern Government and Politics in Nigeria: A Call for Self-Examination and Self-Correction. Ahiajoku Lecture Series, Owerri: Ministry of Information and Culture. Obed, T.U. 2010. Port Harcourt’s Waterfronts: Issues arising. The Horn Newspaper, Wednesday, 24 November. Obinna, V.C.; Owei, O.B. and Okwakpam, I.O. 2010. Impacts of Urbanization on the Indigenous Enclaves of Port Harcourt and Concomitant Policy Measures. The Social Science 5 (3). Obiyo, M.K. 2011. On Rotimi Amaechi’s Stewardship in Rivers State, 19992010. Horizon Newspapers, Monday, 10 January. Odoemene, A. 2008. The Contexts of Colonialism and Ethnicity in Indigene – Settler Relations: Comparative Historical Evidence from Social (Dis)orders in two Nigerian Cities. In Zewde, Bahru (ed.) Society, State and Identity in African History. Addis Ababa: Association of African Historians and Forum for Social Studies. Odoemene, A. 2009. The Nigerian Military and Sexual Violence in Ogoniland of (Niger Delta) Nigeria, 1990-1999. Paper presented at an international conference on Rape in Wartime: A History to be Written, Institut Historique Allemand, Paris, France, 11th – 14th May. Odoemene, A. 2010. Social Consequences of Environmental Change in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. A paper for the 2010 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Theme: Social

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Dimensions of Environmental Change and Governance, Environmental Policy Research Centre, Freie Universität Berlin, 8th – 9th October. O’neill, T. 2007. Curse of Black Gold: Hope and Betrayal in the Niger Delta. National Geographic, (February), 88–117. Ogionwo, W. 1979. A social survey of Port Harcourt. Lagos: Heinemann Educational Books. Ohiagbuchi, J.C. 2007. Killing the Goose that lays the golden egg: The perils of the Niger Delta. Warri: Ohioma Publishers. Okoye, T.O. 1996. The city in Southeastern Nigeria. Onitsha: University Publishing Company. Owei, O.B. and Ikpoki, M. 2006. The growth of middle and high income informal settlements in Port Harcourt, the factors causing this trend and the challenges this poses for urban management. Paper presented at the 42nd ISoCaRP Congress, Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul; 14 – 19 September. Oruwari, Y. and Owei, O.B. 2006. Youth in urban violence in Nigeria: A case study of urban gangs from Port Harcourt. Niger Delta: Economies of Violence, Working Paper 14. Osaghae, E. 1994. Trends in migrant political organisation in Nigeria: The Igbo in Kano. Ibadan: IFRA. Paul-Worika, U.A. 1979. Cultural life in Port Harcourt after the Civil War. In Ogionwo, W. (ed.) The city of Port Harcourt: A symposium on its growth and development. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books. Plateau State Government (Nigeria). 2004. Plateau Resolves: Report of the Plateau Peace Conference, 2004 (Official Gazette). Jos: Government Printer.

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Polgreen, L. 2007. Nigerian gangs turn their guns on their own. International Herald Tribune, (Thursday, November 8) [online]. Available from: http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=8252160 [Assessed 2 December 2007]. Rowell, A., Marriott, J. and Stockman, L. 2005. The Next Gulf: London, Washington and oil conflict in Nigeria. London: Constable and Robinson. Watts, M. 2007. So Goes Port Harcourt< Political Violence and the Future of the Niger Delta. CSIS Africa Policy Forum (27th September) [online]. Available from: http://forums.csis.org/africa/?p=61 [Assessed 15 November 2007]. Wolpe, H. 1974. Urban politics in Nigeria – A study of Port Harcourt. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Notes i

C.S.C. 1/32, Nigeria Dispatch to C.O., 5 June, 1913. National Archives Enugu (NAE). ii

Nigeria 183, CO. 583/4/Vol. 3. Sir Frederick Lugard to the Rt. Hon. Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1913, Public Records Office, London. iii

This nomenclature is thought to be more suitable than the ‘oil-producing communities’ parlance which has become commonplace. iv

A Nigerian-born research scientist at the University of Missouri.

Personal Communication: Ohuabudu, Mike; 32 years, Unemployed Ikwerre Youth. Interviewed in Port Harcourt city on Saturday, 15 March 2008.

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For instance, see Boer, W. 2001. A perspective on the post-colonial roots of identity and conflicts in Nigeria. In Albert, I.O. (ed.) Building peace, advancing democracy: Experiences with third-party interventions in Nigeria’s conflicts. Ibadan: John Archers; Nnoli, O. 1978. Ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers; Nnoli, O. 2003. Ethnic violence in Nigeria: A historical perspective. Available from: http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/papers/nnoli_021003.pdf [Assessed 21 December 2006]; Odoemene, A. 2008. The Contexts of Colonialism and Ethnicity in Indigene – Settler Relations: Comparative Historical Evidence from Social (Dis)orders in two Nigerian Cities. In Zewde, Bahru (ed.) Society, State and Identity in African History. Addis Ababa: Association of African Historians and Forum for Social Studies. vii

For a discussion on the evolution of ‘Ethnic Unions’ and/or ‘Migrant Ethnic Empires’ in Nigeria, see: Osaghae 1994. viii

The decree provides that every such sale was deemed to have been lawful and valid, and was to have effect according to its tenor; the new ‘purchasers’ of the abandoned properties were free of all encumbrances, while the registrar of lands was directed, upon presentation to him of the instrument of sale duly signed by or on behalf of the Committee, to expunge from the register the names of the hitherto registered owners and to substitute same with that of the new purchasers. Failure by anyone to comply with these stipulations was made a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for one year without the option of a fine (Nwabueze 1985). ix

‚Rivers State‛ was the name of the wartime new state with headquarters at Port Harcourt, granted to the people of the area. This ‘statehood’ was primarily granted to weaken the Biafran side by giving semblance of ‘freedom’ to groups who had groaned under the Igbo influence. x

Oloibiri, a community near Port Harcourt city, is perhaps, a typical ‘natural museum’ of the neglect that the Niger Delta has endured over the years. It is the very first community where oil was found (1954) and exploited in the delta. Today, it is still a rural community lacking in almost all basic amenities

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â&#x20AC;&#x201C; power (electricity), water, accessible roads, health and educational facilities and proper sanitation.

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The Nigerian Press, the Public Sphere and Sustainable Development: Engaging the Post Amnesty Deal in the Niger Delta Uzoechi Nwagbara6 Key Terms: Nigeria, Niger Delta, media, Nigerian press, public sphere; Habermas; sustainable development; good governance. Abstract The coalescence of effective media and the public sphere is a synergy that brings about democracy, sustainable development and good governance. Irrespective of its shortcomings, the Nigerian media has been described as a bastion of peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s agitation, which impacts on the public sphere, a realm where private individuals meet to address societal questions with the state. This is the case with the Nigerian press, whose duties and ideals have been called to action in the wake of the amnesty deal in the Niger delta. In order to achieve peace and good governance in the region, serious grassroots and national information dissemination so as to guarantee objectivity and fairness in news reporting thereby impacting on the regimeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s mode of governance is required. Therefore, the partnership between the public sphere and media is essential in the post amnesty era for increased democratic experimentation and conflict resolution because it is a platform that can be used to inform and sensitize the people, as well as to influence the activities of government in the light of legitimate leadership in the public space.

Uzoechi Nwagbara is with the Department of Human Resource Management, Greenwich School of Management, UK. Email: uzoechin@yahoo.com 6

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Introduction ‘‘There can be no liberty for a community which lacks the means to detect lies.’’ Walter Lippmann ‘‘Without information there is no accountability. Information is power and the more people who possess it, the more power is distributed. The degree to which a media is independent is the degree to which it can perform an effective public watchdog function over the conduct of public affairs.‛ - Pope Jeremy

The contemporary Nigerian press is a child midwived by two significant events in the history of Nigeria’s journalism and media enterprise. These epoch-making journalistic events are the evangelical church project of 1847 in Calabar that gave birth to the first printing press in Nigeria pioneered by the famed missionary Hope Waddell and Reverend Townsend’s Iwe Irohin fun Awon Ara Egba Ati Yoruba which was established in Abeokuta in 1859. A flowering of the press began 17 years later on the heels of socio-political, cultural and economic activities characteristic of Nigeria’s emergent nation-state. This experience saw the emergence of The Lagos Times in 1880, which was edited by Andrew Thomas; The Lagos Observer followed in 1882, edited by Blackwell Benjamin; and The Mirror in 1887, which was started by Adolphous Mark. After the establishment of these projects came what could be described as indigenous journalistic efforts that were galvanised by nationalistic consciousness. Nationalistic sentiment and struggle for decolonisation found resonance in the establishment of some newspapers. The first one was The Nigerian Chronicle, which was set up by Johnson Brothers in 1908, while Kukoyi Ajasa inaugurated The Nigerian Pioneer that was bedeviled with Lugardist influence. Subsequently, in 1926, the Nigerian Printing and Publishing Company floated Nigerian Daily Times with its first editor as Ernest Ikoli; and in 1937, The West African Pilot was

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established by Nnamdi Azikiwe, among other similar journalistic (or media) projects that followed in the footsteps of this process. The Nigerian press is a concept that predates colonial state and has been characterised by diverse twists and chequered evolution that find expression in proscription of media outfits; incarceration, imprisonment and killing of pressmen; draconian media laws and act; politico-ideological oriented news reporting; and stringent legal requirement for establishing media outfits. The present media outlook in contemporary Nigeria is forged by the above antecedents. But irrespective of the chequered nature of the media in Nigeria, it is undoubtedly a palladium for contesting the public space with the ruling class that marginalises as well as oppresses the people. This pattern is instantiated in the way the media has been vibrant in Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s democratisation project, as well as its participation in moulding peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s thought, impacting public opinion and sensitisation of the populace (Omu 1978: 204). It is on this score that the major hypothesis of this paper is predicated: trying to locate the contributions the partnership between the media and the public sphere makes regarding good governance and sustainable development in the post amnesty deal in the Niger delta. At the moment, the realities unfolding in the region call for scholarly investigation. This paper is part of that exercise. In the struggle for democracy and expansion of the public sphere in Nigeria, the media has been immensely active in bringing these to fruition. In spite of the challenges and convulsions that beleaguer the Nigerian media, it has been a veritable platform for the dissemination of information, education of the citizenry, moulding of peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s thought and criticism of the state. It is in this light that it has been argued that

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The media being described as a watchdog is in recognition of its watchful and critical role against the bad practices of the government and private individuals< The media have been irrepressible in holding the citizenry, particularly the political leaders accountable in Nigeria. (Omoera 2010: 35-6)

It is under the same rubric that Matthew Hassan Kukah in his Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria (1999) noted that there is no contention that Nigerian media is a serious participant in the overall struggle to sustain democratic culture in Nigeria (1999: 287), as well as an instrument in ensuring the movement of people from the private to the public sphere. As evinced by Denis McQuail, which technically summarises the role of the media in sustaining and strengthening the fabric of the public space, the media have an obligation to the wider society in making sure news is truthful, objective, accurate, fair and relevant (2000: 150); it also has the capacity to broaden the confines of the public sphere. The public sphere is a space that serves as a counterpoise to the excesses of the state and the political class, whose stock in trade is to perennially marginalise and repress the people particularly in the Niger Delta, where the activities of the state and the multinationals have kept the inhabitants of this region of Nigeria in misery. Since the media is a major organ of the civil society, which espouses ‘‘an ethical ideal of the social order < that harmonises the conflicting demands of individual interests and social good’’ (Seligman 1992: 10), it goes therefore to mean that the media is undeniably in a soulful union with the public sphere that helps to shape public perception, public opinion and the process of dialogue in a society. Thus, Habermas’s theory of the public sphere ultimately calls for a recovery of increased public opinion as well as renaissance of rational-critical debate, which is a bastion of the media. As a consequence,

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The public sphere is dependent on the quantity of involvement and the quality (merits) of the discourse for its democratic relevance. It needs institutional bases such as the media< that enable people to be informed. (Lunat 2008: 3)

Here lies the fact that Habermasâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s contention in his seminal work, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962) is steeped in the Kantian formulation, which articulates the use of reason and criticism in public debate. The characterisation of the media as a conduit for critical rationality, objectivity, informed opinion and widened space, as well as an apparatus for governmental checks and balances make it the fourth estate of the realm as intimated by Edmund Burke. The activities of the media in the public sphere are very essential in the contemporary world of democracy, this is particularly so in the Niger delta region of Nigeria, which has been described as an enclave of youth militancy, and unmitigated violence on a large scale< The region has been the epicentre of conflicts between oil bearing/host communities and oil companies (mainly over land rights or compensation for ecological damage); between oil producing communities and the government (over increased access to oil wealth); and between and among ethnic groups (over claims to land ownership and sharing of amenities). (Ojakorotu 2006: 230).

With the above in mind, the place of the media regarding the protracted crises and conflicts in the Niger delta is cardinal; it is even more in this era of post amnesty deal. In the era of post amnesty deal, the media could help in widening the frontiers of the public sphere for good governance and development. The media can do this by legitimising, criticising and questioning the legitimacy as well as the operations of the parties (that is the federal government and the communities) involved in the peace process or amnesty deal.

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As one of the institutions of democracy and the public sphere, the media could aid in shaping the public sphere, a major source of public opinion needed to ‘‘legitimate authority in any functioning democracy’’ (Rutherford 2000: 18). Consequent upon this, Among the institutions that contribute to the make-up of a (sic) public sphere in society, the media perhaps perform the most critical function. In the transaction in the public sphere, the media are not a neutral participant or an impassioned chronicler. Instead, they are either a legitimiser of the status quo or an innovator of the existing social equilibrium. The conflict or collaboration of the media with forces that attempt to colonise the public sphere materialise in this context. (Panikkar 2004: 1)

Particularly, in the Niger delta, the media has enormous role to play in the wake of the demands of the amnesty deal. The place of the media in this regard has been captured clearly in a piece by Chigozi Ijeomah Eti titled ‘‘Objectivity and Balance in Conflict Reporting: Imperatives for the Niger Delta Press’’. As he argues, The press has been found to play a significant role in managing conflict situations in the society< and building confidence, hope and a sense of community and communality especially during or after conflict event, with particular reference to the Niger delta. (Eti 2009: 91)

The remit of this study will not permit an exhaustive analysis of the Niger delta’s ‘‘resource curse thesis’’ and political impasse, rather it will be exploring the ways and manner the dyadic relationship of the public sphere and the media can help in galvanising methods and approaches for dealing with conflicts amongst the Nigerian states, the multinationals and their host community as well as resolving

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communal violence so as to bring sustainable development in the region.

Theoretical Framework The theoretical framework of this study is based on Jurgen Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, a realm ‘‘made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state’’ (Habermas 1991: 176). Jurgen Habermas’s avant-garde work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (1962) has attracted extensive attention in debates regarding the correlation between the public and the private spheres and the public good. In the line of thought of the cultural theorist, Habermas, the book questions the status of public opinion in the exercise of representative democracy and good governance. Although, originally used to gauge the heartbeat of broadened public opinion as it affected the public sphere in Western Europe, the concept, the public sphere, has been appropriated by societies the world over to deal with their disparate situations regarding expanding debates that bring about democratic changes. For Hauser, the public sphere is ‘‘a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment’’ (1999:117). In the thinking of Nancy Fraser, it is basically ‘‘a site for the production and circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical of the state’’ (1990: 57). In addition, Asen in his ‘‘Toward a Normative Conception of Difference in Public Deliberation’’, considers it as ‘‘a realm of social life in which public opinion can be formed’’ (1999: 125). Habermas’s theorising here made a foray into using the public sphere, a correlate of mass media to engage with state’s excesses in the light of good governance and development. The

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Haberrmasian public sphere is correlative of the media. It needs the media, one of the agencies of the civil society to flourish and to impact on democracy in the final analysis. This is because the media and the public sphere are in an internecine interface. Thus, The public sphere is dependent on the quantity of involvement and the quality (merits) of the discourse for its democratic relevance. It needs institutional bases such as the media < that enable people to be informed about current events. (Lunat 2008: 3)

So, in view of the critical, informative and sensitising nature of the media to contribute to public discourse as well as to further educate the citizenry on how to offer reasoned opinions about the society and governance, it is a veritable tool for the widening of the public sphere. The ‘‘watchdog’’ function of the media makes it widely regarded as the fourth estate of the realm – one of the key organs of government in a democracy for free and fair society. This fact has been corroborated by J. B Thompson in his The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (1995) as he avers that one of the fulcrums of Habermas’s theorising of the public sphere, is the way he ‘‘treats the development of the media as an integral part in the formation of modern society’’ (1995: 7). This is crucial for the Niger delta sustainable development since the amnesty deal is a major step towards consolidating the ideals of democracy project in the Niger delta and Nigeria by extension. It is also worthy of note that the media was instrumental to Nigeria’s current status as a democratic society (even though more needs to be done in that light). For example, the expansion of the discursive realm, the public sphere, through the instrumentality of a virile media was instrumental in the emergence of Nigeria’s fourth republic, which saw the coming of Obasanjo administration – a march from militarism to democracy. In this connection therefore,

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The press, it has been argued, was in the forefront of the struggle for enthronement of democracy or better still, the return to civil rule (because not a few Nigerians believe we do have a democracy yet). Many in this group will point out that the press was also in the vanguard of the independence struggle. To them while other countries in Africa fought for their independence on the battlefield, that of Nigeria was fought for, and won on the pages of newspapers expending millions of words, instead of ammunitions, in the process. (Kalejaiye 2009: 75)

The Nigerian Press and the Public Sphere: Towards Conflict Resolution The press (or the media) â&#x20AC;&#x201C; which include print, broadcast and Internet media are channels for the dissemination of information, sensitisation and conscientisation of the people concerning equipping them with insights into the goings-on in their environment and around the world. This function is essentially the bedrock of media criticism. However, particularly in the wake of partisan journalism, sponsored news programmes, commercialised media enterprise, political reporting, and propagandistic reportage in operation in Nigeria, the press has taken a grotesque toga in the way and manner that it disseminates information. This has impacted considerably on the question of objectivity, truth and fairness regarding news content. This ethical aberration has posed serious contradiction to the pristine configuration of media or journalistic business. In instantiating this position, Omenugha and Oji assert that regarding News commercialisation practice in Nigeria, media industries adds to this contradiction and deception, creating a continuous dilemma for ethics and objectivity in journalism practice in Nigeria. (2009:13)

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It is in the light of the above statement that Abimbola Adesoji in his piece titled ‘‘Globalisation of the Media and the challenges of Democracy in Nigeria’’ remarked that ‘‘The response of the Nigerian press to the challenges of democratisation has not been adequate’’ (2006: 49). And interestingly, the expansion of the public sphere through the instrumentality of the media is cardinal in effecting good governance and democracy in the Niger delta and Nigeria by extension. Having said that, the place of the media in supporting structures for increased debate and widened public sphere, which guarantees the actualisation of democratisation project in contemporary Nigeria, as well as serves as a bridge to re-enforce conflict resolution in the wartorn and violence-prone Niger delta is crucial. In sync with this position, ‘‘the media is naturally attracted to conflict’’ (Owens-Ibie 2002: 32). Therefore an ‘‘understanding of the mass media’s role in shaping beliefs and behaviours, especially prejudiced beliefs and behaviours’’ (Paluck 2009: 574) is central in conflict resolution and management. In 1935, Gordon Allport, the father of modern psychological prejudice research published a treatise entitled The Psychology of Radio. This piece of research unveiled among other issues how people respond to prejudice, stereotype, and propaganda while listening to the radio – and other mediums. In contemporary Nigeria, media slant, conflict, prejudice and propaganda are major staples in her media practice. This is the case with the Niger delta. An understanding of conflict resolution/management as a corollary of media engagement or mediation is fundamental in peace and rebuilding process in the region. This is because the mass media is an instrument that could be utilised to shape belief, attitude, and perception among others. It is also a veritable instrument that could be used to advance objectivity

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and fairness. In order to bring good governance in the Niger delta, the Nigerian media should be in the vanguard of promoting the enabling environment that will translate the federal government’s promises regarding the amnesty deal, which was brokered by President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua with the warring militants in the region. The ability of the media to engender conflict resolution has been lauded: This cannot be less true of conflict in the Niger delta. In fact, the establishment of the regional press in the Niger delta may be part of society’s response to the nagging and protracted crises in the oil-rich area. < There is an emerging press system in the Niger delta that is domiciled in the area or elsewhere in the country, but is established to articulate the agitations of the Niger delta people. (Eti 2009: 92)

Ostensibly, conflict management and resolution has become a contentious topic in the re-making of modern Nigeria, particularly in the Niger delta. The media could be a tool for change, a transformation that could be expressed in the modified way the people and the major actors in the politics of the Niger delta crises see the issue of governance through the media’s involvement and expanded the public sphere. Modern wars and conflicts are fought as well as initiated on the screen, battlefield and the pages of newspapers. Media coverage of events in the Niger delta drew the attention of the world to the magnitude of injustice and oppression in the area. This is exemplified in the media’s internationalisation of the unjust execution of the Nigerian eco-activist and writer, Ken Saro-Wiwa including other Ogoni eight, which caused national and global frenzy. So in the post amnesty dispensation in the Niger delta, the role of the media in guaranteeing as well as sustaining developmental and restructuring programmes in this region is vital. This is because as the defunct

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militants, movement for the emancipation of the Niger delta (MEND) and other outfits surrendered their arms and ammunition following the amnesty deal, they are largely depending on institutions such as the media to sensitise the Nigerian government to the plights of the people regarding conforming to the demands of the deal. Therefore given the limitations of the efficacy of previous conflict resolution measures in Nigeria, the media should be adequately involved in the emancipation and renaissance of the Niger delta in this very instance. Put simply the active, virile presence of unbiased media coverage of the conjunctures in this region will drive home the core objectives behind the amnesty deal which are enshrined in ‘‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration’’ – DDR. It is the duty of the media to objectively disseminate information concerning the operations of the federal government and the multinationals in the region including how the erstwhile warring communities have kept faith with the emerging developments and rehabilitation programmes in the region. The ability of the media and widened public sphere to bring to the knowledge of the people and the multinationals concerning the impact of oil exploration on the environment of this region and its inhabitants as well as the letting the various actors keep faith with the amnesty deal process makes the various corporations concerned to live up to its billings. This action by the media will in the final analysis engender sense of corporate social responsibility, which has been defined as Intelligent and objective concern for the welfare of the Society that restrains individuals and corporate behaviour from ultimately destructive activities, no matter how immediately profitable, and leads in the direction of positive contributions to human betterment< .(Andrews 1991: 199)

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The activities of the media and public sphere in the above light will ultimately register a sense of transition from frontier mercantilism to restrained, sensitive mode of operation in the multinationals in the Niger delta, whose operations are the raison d'être for the conflicts in the region. Furthermore, the presence of a virile, responsible media practice is correlate of media social responsibility. Thus, a social responsible media galvanises actions towards corporate social responsibility. This practice is tantamount to ‘‘journalistic activism in challenging and changing oppressive structures’’ (Shah 1996: 145). A gagged media does not foster democracy, a harbinger of expanded public sphere, which brings about inputs from the people regarding how they want the society to move. As Chris Ogbondah observed, ‘‘a free press is an indispensable institution of a democratic society’’ (1997: 291), meaning that a society that allows free flow of information and ideas from the people that usually stem from expanded public sphere is democratic and developmental. It is in this direction that it has been noted that In modern practice, the concept of social responsibility informs us that the media should be responsible to the people in order to advance the cause of good governance. This technically means that the media should be a platform to advance the cause of humanity. It calls for socially relevant information to be disseminated and shared, thereby making available the stimulation of public dialogue on issues of concern to a democratic, populist Society. (Nwagbara 2008: 246)

As the media indulges in res publica or matters of legitimate public concern, it is engaging in conflict resolution as well as redefining the concept of politics and compelling the state in the Niger delta to justify its actions, which ideally should be in tandem with the amnesty deal blueprint.

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Another way the media and the public sphere could bring a wave of change characterised by less tension and peace in the Niger delta is by deflecting false information, slant and propaganda, a term which the media legend, Walter Lippmann calls the ‘‘picture in our heads’’ (1997: 95), an enemy of a conflict-free society. Propaganda is a hotbed of conflict, crisis and the like. Hence, a misinformed people will naturally get the wrong signal and thereby act in that light. The media could help foster that the right information and news are being filtered for public consumption in the region. The presence of a weak media in the region rather being a platform for healthy change and conflict resolution will be an avenue for sedation, a process the cements the pictures in our head as Lippmann indicates, thereby fuelling multilayered conflict and violence in the erstwhile combustible Niger delta environment. It has been noted that Africa (Nigeria or the Niger delta) is a theatre of war. And part of the conflicts in Nigeria is as a result of the hype, sensationalism, propaganda and skewed reportage that the media in this part of the world carries out. In consonance with this, Consistently, the news pages of virtually all Nigerian newspapers are daily littered with necrophilous, if not apocalyptic, fear-inducing, anxiety-promoting phrases which draw attention to the transitional nature of the Nigerian state and society. (Kehinde 2009: 126)

So, in order to reverse this obnoxious trend, the media, a correlate of the public sphere should be in vanguard. This is what the case should be in the post amnesty era in the Niger delta. In this age marked by increasingly desire for conflict resolution and peace sustainability, media practice should be in sync with the strategies to bring this to

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fruition. It has been asserted that ‘‘the media has become a crucial battlefield’’ (Shpiro 2002: 76) in man’s quest to triumph over conflict and its aftermath.

The (Niger Delta) Media and the ‘‘Essentially Contested Concepts’’: Sustaining Development in the Post Amnesty Deal Era In his piece, ‘‘The Nigerian Media: An Assessment of Its Role in Achieving Transparent and Accountable Government in the Fourth Republic’’, Mvendaga Jibo harps on the nature of the media to propel sustainable development: This development is consistent with the established position that the media helps to cause attitude change and, by so doing, ensures socio-economic transformation< In short the nature and the character of the media greatly impacts on the performance of the democratic/governance process and vice versa. (Jibo 2003: 181-2)

The nature of this sustainable development has been identified as gross behavioural change in a country’s mode of governance to take cognisance of the welfare of its populace, which is behind the philosophy of the amnesty deal. Thus, ‘‘sustainable development is the concept presently coined to describe the totality of the good life and overall welfare of the people in contradiction to mere economic growth, hitherto erroneously considered (sic) as development’’ (Owolabi and Olu-Owolabi 2009: 219). The phrase ‘‘essentially contested concepts’’ was first used by the British social theorist and philosopher Walter Bryce Gallie in 1956 to designate

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*<+ a concept that not only expresses a normative standard and Whose conceptions differ from one person to other, but whose Correct application is to create disagreement over its correct Application or, in other words, over what the concept itself is< (Besson 2004: 3)

This concept has been adopted in contemporary political theory in studies of institutions, such as democracy, freedom, justice, good governance, development and among other semantically contested terms in relation to human advancement in society. What makes such concepts indeterminate, problematic or imprecise is what Gallie himself identified as ‘‘< the puzzles and conflicts that frustrate much of our critical discussion’’ (1956: 1). In unraveling this ‘‘puzzle’’ that is humanity’s ‘‘yearning for more amplification and illumination (Omotola, 2007: 249) so as to unpack the ambivalence and problematic surrounding their relationship with nation-building and sustainable development, the media and expanded public sphere have a duty to uphold. Their duty is that of impacting the major apparatuses of government and the masses through criticism, dialogue and increased public opinion contribution in the act of government, which naturally brings about healthy governance and development. Also, the puzzle and conflict that characterise concepts, such as development, democracy and good governance, among others find resonance in what Shola Omotola has identified as ‘‘conceptual ambivalence’’ (2007: 249), which makes finding solution to the issue of ‘‘embattled trinity’’ (2007: 249) – good governance, democracy and development (2007: 247) with particular reference to Nigeria’s nationbuilding project and national re-engineering more complex. The term democracy is contemporarily enmeshed in definitional complexity. It essentially means different things to different societies. But no matter the confusion or ambivalence or ‘‘contest’’ (as Gallie opined) that

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bedevil it, democracy is encapsulated in this Lincolnian cliché: ‘‘the government of the people, by the people and for the people’’. In addition, part of the ambivalence adjoining democracy is what the famed Nigerian political economist, Claude Ake considers here: Democracy has been defined with a profusion of meaning that verge on anarchy, libraries of controversy exist on the concept, theory and meaning of the practice of democracy. And the confusion continuous to grow with the very attempt to bring clarity. (Nwabueze 1993: 10)

From the foregoing, the opinion by Omotola that the triumvirate: democracy, development and good governance are implicated in ‘‘embattled trinity’’, which Gallie adumbrated as ‘‘essentially contested concepts’’ can now be appreciated. The media have been variously described as agents for consolidation of democracies as well as conduits for ensuring integrative and developmental objectives in Nigeria. This is in view of the capacity of the media (essentially in democratic dispensations) to form a coalition with the masses in bringing the attention of the political class to developmental issues that impact on good governance and democracy. Accordingly, the mass media are participant in the overall efforts and strategies to evolve developmental and democratic modus vivendi in the political culture of Nigeria. This tendency has found expression in the nationalist temper of pre-independence Nigerian journalism, which largely culminated in Nigeria’s ‘‘flag independence’’ in 1960, pro-democracy movements that translated into the de-militarisation of Nigerian space and the present experimentation with democracy. It is under this rubric that The Nigerian press has lived up to expectation in spreading useful and developmental information to society. This accounts for the tons

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of news stories, editorials, commentaries, interviews and other information giving activities of the media in both the print and electronic media. The media have helped the Nigeria people to keep abreast of the developments in the political space of the country. (Omoera 2010: 34)

In contextualising the post amnesty deal, which took effect on the 4 th of October 2009 between the federal government of Nigeria and the Niger delta warring militants that warranted them to surrender their arms and ammunition after the protracted, fierce debates about resource control, environmental sustainability and socio-economic justice, the critical functions of the media are relevant. This is because communication is grossly crucial in maintaining peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s group formation, community and nationhood. The media reports the actions of the government as well as the activities of those who speak in favour of the government. It also criticises the policies and performance of the government by suggesting alternative courses of action. By so doing, the media impacts on the state of development in a society. As the media contributes in making the people make informed political decisions that relate to good governance and development, it thus makes the ideals of democracy feasible. This quality of the media is integral in changing the lives of the people towards desirable ideals as well as serving as the mouthpiece of the people on the issues that will transform their lives for the better. Thus, It is clear that, taken together, mass media technologies, institutions, professionals, norms and practices constitute one of the fundamental forces now shaping the lives of individuals and the fate of peoples and nations. To be sure, media influence < is significant, and increasingly so, and as a result the media constitute a major human resource whose potential to help prevent and moderate social

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violence begs to be discussed, evaluated, and, where appropriate, mobilised. (Manoff 1997: 2)

As the media brings the issues that shape human existence to the front burner, it will be contributing to sustainable human development and lasting peace in the Niger delta (Eti 2009: 100). In this vein, the media helps in galvanising sense of solidarity in times of conflict; it helps reciprocally hostile and incongruent entities find a common ground. In the post amnesty era, this duty is doubly relevant, hence, the media in this instance should serve as a platform for cohesion and trust in making sure the ideals of the amnesty is achieved. This can be achieved by dissemination of truth and politicsfree information that will enhance good governance and development in the region. It is to this end that the role of media will be contributory to Nigeria’s national peace and security as well as causative to ending sectional and ideologically oriented agenda in her body politic. This pattern is what Sydney Head calls ‘‘national pride and sense of communal identity’’ (1985: 301). This is what has been described as the media being able to create ‘‘< a sense of community, a sense of espirit-de-corps, a sense of shared identity (especially in suffering), a sense of shared purpose and shared identity’’ (Eti 2009: 100) in the Niger delta. As the Niger delta media and other media outfits in Nigeria engage in journalism that will bring lasting peace, sustainability, democracy and good governance in the Niger delta, they will be enhancing the core philosophy underpinning the amnesty deal that was brokered by President Yar’Adua. The Nigerian media’s effort in this perspective is encapsulated here:

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Peace journalism < has the characteristics and capabilities of encouraging constructive communication< Peace journalism, with its keen eye for causes and stimuli and with its commitment to a broader and fairer depiction can and should bring such unattended human needs to the fore and alleviates intractable conflicts. (Peleg 2006: 2)

Consequently, the combination of effective media and the public sphere will usher in peace journalism, a precondition for sustainability, development, democracy and wholesome governance in the Niger delta.

Conclusion It has been demonstrated in this paper that lasting peace, security, democracy, sustainable development and good governance are verged on robust combination of virile media and public sphere. This is rather redoubled in the post amnesty period in the Nigeria delta region of Nigeria, which before now was characterised by high level of restiveness, militancy, marginalisation, agitation and inept governance, all stemming from oil exploration by the multinationals in cahoots with the political operators in the region and Nigeria by extension. In a world brimming with ideology, events, incidents, information, politics and cultural disparities, determination of issues, opinions and editorials that will make it to the headlines is very complex. A form of media practice steeped in reconciling the contradictions in this region for the benefit of its inhabitants and Nigerians in general as well as the expansion of its public sphere is needed. An effective media framework plus widened public sphere will spawn the needed energy to effect change in the region in the wake of the amnesty deal.

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Omenugha, K. and Oji, Majority. ‘‘News Commercialisation, Ethics and Objectivity in Journalism Practice in Nigeria: Strange Bedfellows?’’. Estudos em Comunicacao, 3(2008): 13-28. Omoera, Osakue S. ‘‘The Import of the Media in an Emerging Democracy: an Evaluation of the Nigerian Situation’’. Journal of Social Science, 22.1 (2010): 33-38. Omotola, Shola J. ‘‘Democratisation, Good Governance and Development in Africa: The Nigerian Experience’’. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 9.4(2007):247-274. Owens-Ibie, N. ‘‘Socio-cultural Considerations in Conflict Reporting in Nigeria’’. Introduction to Conflict Reporting in Nigeria. Pate, U. A. (Ed). Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002. Owolabi Kolawale A. and Olu-Owolabi Fadeka E. ‘‘Corporate Social Responsibility and the Crisis of Development in Africa’’. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 10.4(2009):218-232. Paluck, Elizabeth L. ‘‘Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media: A Field Experiment in Rwanda’’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96.3(2009):574-587. Panikkar, K. ‘‘Media and the Public Sphere’’. The Hindu. http;//www.thehindu.com/2004/01/12/stories/2004011201571000.htm. Accesses on 14-03-2010. Peleg, Samuel. ‘‘Peace Journalism through the Lenses of Conflict Theory: Analysis and Practice’’. Conflict and Communication Online, 5.2(2006):1-17. Rutherford, Paul. Endless Propaganda: The Advertising of Public Goods. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.

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Seligman, Adam. The Idea of Civil Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. Shah, Hermant. ‘‘Modernisation, Marginalisation and Emancipation: Towards a Normative Model of Journalistic and National Development’’. Communication Theory, 6/2(1996):143-166. Shpiro, Shlomo. ‘‘Conflict Media Strategies and the Politics of Counterterrorism’’. Politics. 22.2(2002): 76-85. Thompson, John B. The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

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Charting Pathways to Development in the Riverine Areas of the Niger Delta Region Dr. O.J. Offiong and Jude Cocodia7

Key Terms: Nigeria, Niger Delta, development, human resources, modernization. ABSTRACT Development is a multi faceted concept that encompasses the physical as well as the mental. As such it is inappropriate to conceive of development only on infrastructural terms without reference to the socio-psychological and vice versa. This paper takes a look at the Niger Delta and argues that development in the region has been lopsided as emphasis has, more often than not, been on infrastructural or physical improvement. Thus this paper argues that the inability to make the aborigines of the Niger Delta relevant in society through relevant skills acquisition and adaptation to modernization after being displaced from their environments and livelihoods ought to be the focus of development in the region. Therefore, focus should be placed on human resource development of the Niger Delta people just as much as is on infrastructure. This paper then posits that to achieve this, there ought to be an increase in both formal and informal education to enhance the rural peoples ability to adapt to and be relevant in the changes of a modern world as well as curb the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;quick moneyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; mentality encouraged by politicians and Multi National Corporations (MNCs) which has been etched into the mindset of youths of the Niger Delta and thereby making them productively redundant. Dr. O.J. Offiong is with Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria. Jude Cocodia is with Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. 7

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INTRODUCTION The Niger Delta has been described as one of the world’s largest and Africa’s third largest drainage area. This flood plain is home to over seven million people, grouped into several nations or ethnic groups – the Ijaw, Urhobo, Itsekiri, Isoko, Efik, Etche, Ibibio, Andoni, Ikwere, Ogoni, Edo, and Kwale-Igbo. The bulk of these groups inhabit the heart of the delta which is spread over three states in present day Nigeria namely, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states. These states take up about 80% of the area. The Niger Delta has been a topic for intense debate since the 90s due to the local and international awareness created by Ken Saro Wiwa of the regions ‘cursed blessing’. In the words of Ibaba (2005:3): The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria is an odd paradox. Despite its evident and abundant resources which include the nations oil wealth, the area represents one of extreme poverty and underdevelopment. The Niger Delta is not only underdeveloped, but is also experiencing a crisis of developmental instability. Infrastructural development is very low, poverty level is about 80% and unemployment level ranks 70%. Access to basic social amenities is very limited. For example, over 80% of the coastal or riverine communities’ source water for drinking, cooking and other domestic uses come from rivers, streams and lakes that are equally used for disposing of human and other forms of waste. The upland communities largely drink from shallow wells that are contaminated. Indeed, the Niger Delta region falls below the national average, in all measures or indicators of development

More often than not, most literature on the Niger Delta place the blame of underdevelopment on the conspiracy between the MNCs who milk this region of its resources and the federal government who is the end beneficiary of this wanton exploitation. Most arguments

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here border on environmental degradation and conflict creation and exacerbation in the Niger Delta by the MNCs as well as policy insensitivity, social exclusion and infrastructural neglect on the part of the federal government. In a bid to correct this anomaly, private enterprises and government agencies operating in the area have been encouraged to live up to their corporate or role responsibilities. This clamour is justified when one considers, as noted by Watts and Okonta (2003) and Ikelegbe (2008) that â&#x20AC;&#x161;nobody should be under any illusion that the oil companies and the federal government are not the most important factors driving < under-development, poverty, marginalization, oppression, inequitable and unjust treatment, repression and violence in the region.â&#x20AC;&#x203A; Thus, it is only befitting that they play leading roles too in developing the area and peoples of the region. Assessing the success of their efforts in transforming the areas of the Niger Delta is not the focus of this paper, but rather what this paper attempts to address is the fit these developmental efforts (wherever they have been carried out) leave in their wake and the social displacements that ensues. The end result of this process is the high degree of unemployment, underemployment and restiveness being witnessed in the Delta as its aborigines, being ill-equipped to cope with the changes in their environment, vent their frustration on a system that has necessitated their social displacement. Consequently, this paper posits that for development in the Niger Delta to be meaningful and rub off positively its inhabitants, genuine efforts ought to be made by the responsible agencies to ensure the provision of formal and non-formal education which would enable absorption of and cushion the impact of the changes brought by physical development.

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OBJECTIVE OF STUDY Peoples of the core Niger Delta have for long complained about marginalization and neglect in the distribution and utilization of the country’s resources. The Izon, presumably believed to be Nigeria’s largest minority group and the largest of the ethnic groups in the Niger Delta claim to be the most affected. With the advent of development in the region in the wake of violent agitations by the people for a fair share of the nation’s proceeds from oil which is sourced from their grossly underdeveloped towns and villages and the effects of which impoverishes them even further, it becomes ironic and worrying to note that in new and budding Niger Delta towns such as Yenagoa, idleness among the indigenous workforce (youths) seems to be at its highest. The same also applies to many oil producing communities. The result of the refusal of the native youths to apply themselves to labour, is that, the provision of services becomes completely dominated by none indigenes. In view of this scenario, this paper aims at first identifying the reasons for this increase in human resource wastage amid increasing development programmes. The essence of this is to identify gaps in development strategies meant for the Niger Delta and consequently point decision makers in the right direction of situating development programmes within the context of the environment and its peoples.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS This paper is anchored on Human Capital theory which, as proposed by Gary Becker (cf. Lohrentz 2006), was the basis for many development efforts in the early 1990s in the United States. This theory is a combination of human resources management and workforce development theory. Human resources management is concerned with how people who work for an organization are managed bearing in mind

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these people have feelings, thoughts, needs and aspirations. This aspect of the Human Capital Theory proposes an approach that takes into account the needs of the organization (which in this paper is the state), and the needs of the people. It contends that individuals have their own needs and aspirations and as such emphasis should be on endeavours through which persons within the organization can improve themselves. Human capital theory therefore relates to every aspect of the way in which the organization/state interacts with its people through the provision of training, skills acquisition, attitudes and development opportunities. This connects with the problem of the Niger Delta areas as addressed in this paper where affected state governments look for ways to empower their citizens by bringing development to these long neglected areas and try to get them involved in skill acquisition programmes. Then, coping with the impact of these development strategies brings to the fore the relevance of the workforce development theory. The workforce development theory addresses the rational choices made by families and individuals as they grapple with the changes brought by development. The emphasis of the theory here is on poverty which according to Lohrentz (2006) â&#x20AC;&#x161;is the result of making bad personal decisions compounded by a geographic concentration of people all seeming to make the same bad decisions, just as their previous generations did. The intergenerational cycle creates an underclassâ&#x20AC;&#x203A;. While the poverty of majority of the communities of the Niger Delta may be attributed to the ignorance displayed by the previous generation on the ills of reckless oil exploration, the poverty still persists today despite increased awareness because the youths of the area still make wrong choices such as resorting to receiving paltry monthly stipends from oil companies instead of pressing for demands directed towards community development, environmental protection,

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education and all other demands that would improve the quality of life communally and individually.

DEVELOPMENT FROM A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE Okereke (1999:1) defines development as ‚the qualitative improvement in the living standard of members of the society.‛ and administration as ‚the role relationship that defines the intentions and programmes of government, the means available internally and externally to accomplish them; where, when and how they are to be accomplished; and who is to benefit from them.‛ He summarizes therefore that ‚development administration refers to all the activities of government and its agencies aimed at the attainment of higher levels of development.‛ (ibid:2) Ujo (in Okoli and Onah 2002:130) contends that development is ‚both a physical process and a state of mind. The transformation of institution is one aspect. The other aspect is that the thinking of the people must change.‛ Development, no matter the circumstance, refers to change, a change for the better. Ujo’s perception above implies that development can only be achieved when the mental accompanies the social, economic, environmental and infrastructural aspects of development. If a community experiences an economic and structural revolution, and the affected people are unable to adapt to the changes brought therein, then a fit occurs in the developmental process. In other words, these development gains would be lost if the peoples psyche are unable to adapt to these changes to ensure maximum utilization of these structures. This situation which is a recurrent trend in the Niger Delta justifies the application of the human resource management theory as the framework for this paper. For every development stride made, there ought to be a commensurate

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appreciation and adaptation on the part of the benefiting peoples otherwise the benefits of such development is lost all together. Thus, to speak of development at all, we have to examine the physical as well as the mental aspects. A close examination of happenings and development in the Niger Delta indicates that majority of development programmes are focused on tangible or material aspects of development such as roads, bridges, schools (without reference to the quality of education), hospitals and so on. This lopsided arrangement in development planning leaves the area grossly underdeveloped. Taking a cue from the argument above, of what use is a hospital when inhabitants of the community would not patronize it? The under-utilized, yet modern hospital at Okolobiri in Bayelsa state is a clear case in point. The majority of women in the area still give birth at home despite services at the hospital being provided for free. The essence of the argument here is to buttress the claim that for development to be effectively administered in the Niger Delta, extra attention ought to be paid to raising awareness and increasing adaptability through quality education with the aim of helping the aborigines make maximal use of the structural changes in their environment. It is for this reason Friedman (1967: 225) defines planning as ‚the guidance of change within a social system.‛ This is a most salient aspect of development in the Delta most especially when we consider the fact that the people in the region have been among the most educationally disadvantaged in Nigeria.

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AMONG THE ABORIGINES OF THE NIGER DELTA It is a widely held that the Niger Delta is one of Nigeria’s most educationally disadvantaged regions of which the Ijaws (Nigeria’s fourth largest ethnic group) have arguably been the worst hit. This state of affairs coupled with their crude agricultural methods

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amid environmental degradation has definitely aided the underdevelopment of the region. Again, as opined by Worgu (2000): Agriculture forms the most dominant economic activity in the Niger Delta. Federal Office of Statistics (F.O.S.) in 1985 stated that crop farming and fishing activities account for about 90% of all forms of activity in the area. They also estimated that about 50% - 68% of the active labour force is engaged in one form of agricultural activity or the other including fishing and farming. Agricultural technology has remained relatively unchanged over the years and over 90% of the farmers are subsistent farmers operating on traditional methods using basic tools<. The organic farming technique widely used in the Niger Delta is highly susceptible to environmental changes affecting the soil, water or deforestation because it is not technology inspired, but rather land and labour intensive. Oil extraction and production has led to adverse environmental impact on the soil, forest and water of the Niger Delta communities.

The utter neglect of the rural communities in the Niger Delta has led to a massive rural-urban drift occasioned not only by lack of basic amenities (healthy drinking water, electricity and medical care) and unemployment, but also by the destruction of their environment and livelihood from oil exploitation as well as the frequent inter and intra communal clashes witnessed in the region (most of which are also oil related). The outcome of the prevalence of these problems is the population explosion of the regions few urban centres. As Worgu (ibid) notes once again, â&#x20AC;&#x161;this has ultimately caused problems of environmental refugees. Some of the landless farmers migrate to other more fertile lands in other rural communities putting pressure on scarce fertile lands. While some of the displaced farmers out-migrate to the urban areas in search of other means of livelihood.â&#x20AC;&#x203A;

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This latter perception is buttressed by Okonta and Douglas (op.cit: 34) when they opine that, ‚The population of Port Harcourt and the other major towns is literally exploding. The ensuing scenario – urbanization without economic growth.‛ No doubt, the majority of these migrants are unschooled or uneducated, skilled in trade - such as boating, canoe making, thatch house building and fishing - that would not be beneficial to them in the city. Even when they possess more relevant skills, there is still some little difficulty in adapting to urban life. This problem is aptly conceived by Odediran (2004: 165) when he argues that Rapid industrialization and urbanization and population growth have hastened the degradation of the environment and the depletion of natural resources. But it is the development that we have practiced so far that has polluted the earth. In providing the desired quality of life for the privileged few, the process of development has caused a marked decline in the quality of life for the bulk of humanity.

The inability of development administrators to address this problem has contributed largely to the problems of youth restiveness and insecurity in the Niger Delta as a result of the high level of frustration felt due to being displaced from their environment and livelihood without being retrained to fit into modern society. This is aptly explained by Orakwe (in Ofuebe 2001: 92) when he says; ‚Mans happiness within his social setting is largely determined by the extent and intimacy of relationships and socialization effects. Without these relationships and adequate socialization, mans self worth and perception of himself and others become both ugly and oblique.‛ This psycho analysis aptly explains the aggression and anger that is prevalent in the Delta. Changing situations have made it increasingly difficult for Niger Deltans to relate with their environment thus

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making them feel misplaced in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s modern society. Even road construction in the Niger Delta have been known to obstruct flood time water ways which disrupts the economic and social life of the people and places them at the receiving end of modernization. This paper thus posits that we can only meaningfully talk of development in the Delta when the people are provided with the wherewithal and opportunities to adapt to change.

OTHER FACTORS MILITATING AGAINST DEVELOPMENT IN THE DELTA The paper has argued to present the lack of awareness on the need for retraining in relevant skills as a major problem of the Delta. Education, be it formal or informal (as in skills acquisition and adaptation), is a salient ingredient in helping the individual adapt to change. The lack of this constitutes a stumbling block to Niger Deltans, most especially the Ijaws. However, a recent phenomenon that has militated against human resource development in the Delta and made it more complex is the quick and free money syndrome. There is no gain denying that heinous crimes such as kidnapping and cultism have reached alarming proportions in the region. This is as a result of the quick money or fast track to wealth that is assured. As such, most youths are no longer disposed to making a living through hard work. Learning a skill or trade, becomes too tedious and education becomes too lengthy. Decent work does not pay well enough when kidnapping is likely to net a cash haul equivalent to a government employeeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s entire career earnings. Cultural values no longer hold and morals have been thrown overboard. This aptly explains why in budding Niger Delta towns like Yenagoa where there is surplus need for artisans of sorts, you seldom find male Ijaw youths learning new skills/trade. In Yenagoa for example, you rarely find native youths

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among drivers (automobile and motorcycles), automobile mechanics, vulcanizers, masons, carpenters, electricians, tailors, cobblers, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, plumbers etc, despite the increasing need for the services these craftsmen render. These services and the opportunities they provide get eventually occupied by non-natives who end up training more non-natives to fill these needs. This trend did not begin overnight. It is the result of a decade of transformation that has its origins in politics and oil exploration. For time and the objective of this paper, much would not be said about the former (politics). But suffice to say, Nigeria’s politics of godfatherism (client-patron politics) where contestants are not shy of the use of guns and thugs, has contributed its fair share to the problem being discussed. Since most Politicians in Nigeria measure their strength not by popular votes, but by the number of thugs or miscreants each has in his camp, a scenario that thuggery pays is created since these miscreants can eke a living from the remuneration they get from their political patrons. This accounts for the violent nature of Nigeria’s political landscape. Relating to political violence, Alanamu (2001: 79) observes, ‚the frequency and ferocity with which these violent clashes have occurred since the inception of the present democratic rule have made them one of the challenging monsters that need to be addressed.‛ Agreed that this trend pervades the whole country, the educationally disadvantaged nature of the riverine areas of the Niger Delta, makes the situation worse and human resource wastage grave. The worse culprit of the quick money syndrome however, are the oil MNCs in the Niger Delta. Prior to recent agitation by communities in the region to benefit from oil exploration within their borders, oil companies, where and when they are called to account for their

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actions, avoid corporate responsibility by bribing influential community members (youths and community heads). The reason is to get the communities to turn a blind eye to their unethical operations which allow for irresponsible profit maximization. From the perspective of these companies, it is much cheaper to settle individuals and communities than to clean up their mess and act responsibly. In consonance with this argument, Odogbor (in Orobator 2005: 112-113) stated thus: Most of the companies responsible for these acts of degradation are not always willing to attend to the plight of the communities. Because they think that the demands of the communities are outrageous, they are more amenable to assuaging a powerful and influential individual or group in the community (usually the youth) whose demands most often in monetary terms – they find bearable. This attitude promotes further agitations by other factions, and rivalry resulting in clashes of diverse magnitude.

Communities among numerous others that have suffered this fate include Okurekpo in Ethiope East Local Government Area, Evwreni in Ughelli South Local Government Area, both in Delta state and Nembe in Bayelsa State. Worse still is the fact that between 1996 till date, intra and inter communal clashes have arisen or been fuelled due to this practice. Notable among these conflicts are those of Igbogene community in Yenagoa LGA in 1996, Bassambari and Ogbolomabiri in Nembe LGA also in 1996 and Odioma community in Nembe LGA in 2005. (cf. Etekpe 2007:7-10). Okonta and Douglas (op.cit: 225) put it succinctly; ‚The real story: This is how a senior European Shell executive described SPDC’s development projects in the Niger Delta; I would go so far as to say we spent more money on bribes and corruption than on community development projects.‛

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With so much money been given by the oil companies to individuals and youth groups, it becomes understandable why opting for modern/relevant skills acquisition becomes a problem for the average Niger Deltan. Youths in many oil producing communities do nothing while they wait for the end of the month when they each collect what they term royalty usually between N20,000 - N40,000 (approximately $160 - $320) from the oil companies operating in their communities. And now that oil companies are being compelled to live up to their corporate responsibilities and seem no longer willing to support this easy and unproductive lifestyle, the culture of quick and easy money which they encouraged and which has been so inculcated in the Niger Delta youth now serves as the biggest obstacle to their development programmes as the youths have opted to force money from the oil companies by abducting their staff, and when these oil workers cannot be gotten, they opt for other well to do members of society who can afford paying huge ransoms. In all these, human resource development suffers as it remains relegated and stagnated, the damaging effects of oil exploration remain unattended to thus leaving most of these Niger Delta communities poor, primitive and further underdeveloped. The description above thus becomes an apt exemplification of the workforce development theory (also adopted as framework for this paper) which posits that collective poverty is the result of people within a geographic area all seeming to make the same bad decisions just as their previous generations did.

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ADAPTING TO MODERNIZATION AND THE NECESSITY OF EDUCATION As opined by Gant (1979: 75-76): The quality of the human resources applied to economic development has a direct relationship to the pace and level of that development. The quality of human resources is dependent upon education as well as upon health and upon the supporting environment. Physical capital would be wasted to the degree that productive skills are not applied to it <. The production of this skilled manpower is a function of education â&#x20AC;&#x201C; education in formal schools, on the job, and in non-formal but systemic programmes of information dissemination and skill improvement <. Other benefits to economic growth which can be attributed to significant proportions of literacy and schooling are the acquisition of attitudes which encourage and support the changes which precede and accompany development.

In line with this assertion, it is logical to affirm that the increasing gap between the development strategies of the Niger Delta (no matter how meagre) and the level of awareness and relevant skills acquisition to enable the people adapt to the changes therein, has further underdeveloped the inhabitants of the region. The increasing social fit has left the aborigines of the Niger Delta grappling for relevance and inclusion in a system most are not suited for. I find this scenario aptly depicted in the political satire/comic movie, The Gods Must Be Crazy. In this movie, a bottle (science and technology) finds its way into a primitive yet peaceful society of San Bushmen. The presence of the bottle (which signifies development) makes living easy as it becomes a handy tool for grinding and crushing. But just as it is useful, it becomes the centre of squabbles for the primitive and once peaceful community as every one wants use of it at the same time. A community that had grown so used to doing things together

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could not adapt to the pattern of taking things in turn. In the end, they had to get rid of the bottle to let peace return. The traditional inhabitants of the Niger Delta fall into the occupations of fishing, subsistence farming and canoe building. The viability and sustainability of these occupations amid the slowly increasing road network and extensive environmental pollution gets increasingly questionable with each passing decade. With the pollution of rivers and lands, surviving on fishing and farming is almost impossible. This is understood in view of the terrain which a World Bank Report in 1995 described as ‚vast interface between land and water.‛ (cf Ighodalo 2005: 321). Hence Briggs et al (cf Obi, 1997: 14) state; ‚we have widespread water pollution and soil pollution, contamination with oil spills become dangerous for farming, even where they continue to produce any significant yields.‛ So, in a changing Delta, what becomes the lot of the fishermen who have no fish to catch, farmers who have no land to farm on, or canoe carvers or boat men whose services are required less as time passes? These people along with those seeking ‘the better life’ head for the urban centres and eventually find themselves ill equipped and consequently misplaced in today’s modern society. (Agreed that many more communities still commute by water, but when we consider that just about a decade ago, communities such as Abonema, Buguma, Degema, Amassoma, Ogoibiri, Agudama-Ekpetiama, Trofani, Ikhibiri, Bomadi and most Isoko areas which could only be reached by water can now be reached by land, it would not take a seer to project into the future on the relevance of professions such as canoe building and boating)

MAKING DEVELOPMENT MEANINGFUL For development to be meaningful, it ought to be appreciated and utilized by the people for whom it is meant. Thus, for the

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fisherman whose rivers have been polluted, schooling him in the provision, maintenance and increased productivity of fish ponds, (whether natural or artificial) would definitely give him relevance in society. Even without formal education, retraining him in modern methods of production coupled with his basic traditional fishing knowledge and skills, would improve his haul of fish and make him a better fisherman. The same applies to land farmers where lands yet unpolluted could be put to maximal use through the use of fertilizers and modern methods of farming. Providing these facilities and teaching these skills creates for the beneficiaries not only the economic wherewithal to cope with todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s demands, but also provides a psychological cushion which arises from being a functional part of society. In doing this, development is brought to farmers and fishermen as they are kept abreast and involved in changing trends of productivity. The above applies also to handicraft. Canoe carvers, boat men and others whose profession infrastructural development may eventually make redundant, and who should be encouraged to unlearn old skills to acquire new ones which would make them fit into society. When, for example, a road hits a riverine community, a sizeable percentage of its boatmen and boat technicians could be encouraged into being automobile drivers and mechanics. The logic here is simple: with the coming of the road, fewer communities would be reached by water, thereby leading to a decline in water transportation. Thus, the informal or technical education provided here would allow for job fluidity which is essential for survival in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s modern world. But unfortunately, the majority of original inhabitants of the riverine communities of the Niger Delta have stuck to their traditional skills and methods of production. This explains why in a budding Niger Delta town like Yenagoa, it is difficult to find Ijaw youths being

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craftsmen, builders, drivers or artisans of sorts. These lines of trade have been taken over by non indigenes since the indigenes would rather stay idle than retrain into any of these relevant skills, no matter how high the demand for their services. Worse still, is the fact that there has been no serious effort on the part of the government, be it Federal, State or Local to embark on human development projects to address this trend. The Niger Delta Development Commission whose sole responsibility is the development of the Niger Delta has fared no better. A visit to its website (www.nddc.ng.org) reveals that the only human resource development programmes it undertakes are annual scholarships given to a few indigenes of oil producing communities to study in tertiary institutions. Rural youth empowerment programmes are conspicuously missing. The programme implementation of the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) unfortunately has followed this trend. This is evident from its mission statement and listed programmes which states thus; ‚In line with Mr. Presidents vision of Poverty Eradication, empowering the youth in the Niger Delta and the need to re-inject the resources derived from the oil producing communities with a view to addressing the problems existent in the area, the PTDF has been mandated to undertake some strategic projects/programmes in the oil producing states.‛ (cf, PTDF:2007). The so called strategic projects are; ‚Completion of the Federal Technical Institute, Bonny, Rivers State designed to train students in obtaining professional certificates in Gas, Petroleum and Environmental studies. Establishment of the Federal Polytechnics, Ekowe, Bayelsa State with specialization in Gas and Environmental studies; and Establishment of primary and secondary schools at Oporaza and Okeronkoko communities in Delta State.‛ (ibid) The claim of the PTDF goes further: ‚The PTDF in pursuance of its mandate to train Nigerians < has introduced local scholarship scheme. Under the pilot scheme, qualified Nigerians will be trained locally < at both undergraduate and master’s levels, effective from

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2007/2008.‛ As argued in this paper, where do the vast unschooled riverine rural inhabitants of the Niger Delta, who are most affected by oil exploitation and displaced by skewed development programmes, fit in? Ironically too, the PTDF has come under heavy criticism for the manner in which its scholarships were awarded. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) described as unfair the fourteen (14) slots allotted to the Niger Delta out of the PTDF’s long list of one thousand and two (1002) beneficiaries for its doctoral scholarship programme. As Onoyume notes, ‚MOSOP has expressed grave shock at the deliberate and insensitive exclusion of the Niger Delta from benefits accruable from the Petroleum Development Trust Fund (PTDF) as reflected in its short-listed candidates for overseas scholarship interview for Doctoral studies published in Thisday of June 13, 2008.‛ (Onoyume, 2008). The Shell Petroleum Development Company on the other hand has been a little more attentive to human development in the region. The SPDC, as part of its 2009 community development programmes in Bayelsa State, floated a vocational training scheme in which N53 million (approximately $300,000) was earmarked with 78 persons as beneficiaries. This it said, was its way of promoting self development and empowerment for indigenes of the delta. Vocations to be learnt include baking, computer and secretarial studies. The scheme also promises a further N34 million ($200,000) in starter packs and cash incentives which would be shared to the beneficiaries at the end of the training to enable them start off. (Radio Bayelsa News Report: 2009). Through these and more, the SPDC, has shown some degree of involvement in human capacity building in the Niger Delta. Despite these efforts by SPDC, it has been noted that these Youth Development Schemes have not achieved their objectives of employment generation and poverty reduction. Ibaba (2005:139) opines that ‚A performance review of the scheme blames this on a

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number of reasons, which include: faults in implementation strategy; < inadequate training; sharp practices by the operators of the scheme‛ among others. In view of these avoidable hitches which mar such schemes, Ake’s (2001:1) claim strikes home when he says, ‚the problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place.‛ Even when development is celebrated, it never goes beyond the provision of roads, schools, hospitals, electricity and water. Human resource development has seldom been on the agenda of the various tiers of government. This trend has underdeveloped the aborigines of the Delta much more than the lack of infrastructure. As such, the little institutions and infrastructures provided are either abused or misused, and underemployment and restiveness remain rife. It would therefore make more sense to have oil companies and government agencies to be sincerely involved in skills acquisition and human resource development programmes just as they are in the programmes relating to infrastructure. While this paper calls for the organizing of human development programmes for human development, it also recognizes the Nigerian factor (wanton corruption) and thus advocates that such programmes be undertaken with sincerity of purpose. The indigenes of Yenagoa would not forget in a hurry, the government’s hoax in the procurement of 96 brand new mini-van taxis in 2006 which it claimed was to empower youths of the area. No sooner had these taxis been distributed than only a handful could be found on the streets as government officials had hijacked the process and given the majority of these cars to their wards/kin who had not the intention of using these cars for the purposes they were meant. In the end, the exercise was a dismal failure and human resource development thus remained stagnant.

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CONCLUSION There has been so much emphasis on curbing the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta. Much of this emphasis borders on the provision of roads, hospitals, educational institutions, portable water, electricity, theatres and so forth. But little attention has been paid to underdevelopment from a socio-psychological perspective. This paper argues that for infrastructural development to be meaningful, emphasis ought to be paid to education, both formal and informal to help the aborigines of the Niger Delta adapt positively to the changes that ensue from physical development. While it would not be easy to alter the quick money culture which has been encouraged by politicians and oil companies, it is the position of this paper that relevant skills acquisition and adaptation ought to be commitedly implemented both in rural and urban areas so that the youths find relevance in society. The government both at federal and local levels has shown itself to be overtly unwilling to effectively address issues pertaining to the Niger Delta region. However, while not excusing or encouraging government irresponsibility, it is my contention that since these oil companies work in the remotest of communities, they stand a better chance of providing fastest the basic amenities to make life for these distant rural dwellers a little more comfortable and thereby reduce the allure of migrating to the townships where the meager facilities have already been over stretched and where these migrants end up being disillusioned and, more often than not, become threats to society. After the provision of basic facilities, next comes the effort at helping them make optimal use of their habitat, be relevant to society and keep abreast with the times through the acquisition of relevant skills and crafts. This becomes a vital step in human resource development in the Delta. It is a step which both the government and MNCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s in the

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Delta have the capital and wherewithal to achieve. The only problem here is the will. But the earlier they settle to achieve this, the better, lest communities and youth groups that are still accommodating of government policies and MNCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s operations become hostile and aggressive like their already restive brothers. If the MNCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s can begin this process of human resource development, it is only hoped that somewhere along the line, the various arms of government would genuinely follow. While the implementation of these conditions may not completely address the complex issues of human development and restiveness in Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Niger Delta, the intention of this research is to point stake holders in the right direction in the search for a solution to the stagnating of human resource development in the Niger Delta region. One of such stakeholders is the novel Ministry of the Niger Delta whose responsibility is the development of the Niger Delta, but whose creation met with so much skepticism since the Niger Delta Development Commission which is already saddled with the same responsibility, has arguably not succeeded despite being in existence for about a decade. The Niger Delta Ministry, in view of arguments presented here would go a long way in effectively tackling issues of restiveness and development in the region if only they would divert adequate attention and resources to human resource development programmes which would make the Niger Delta aborigines more self sufficient and deft to change.

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REFERENCES Ake, Claude (2001), Democracy and Development in Africa. Lagos: Spectrum Books Ltd. Alanamu, Ayinla S. ed (2003), Issues in Political Violence in Nigeria. Illorin: Hanson Printing Communication Resource Ltd. Ehwarieme, W. (2006). ‚Politics Among Minorities.‛ A Paper Presented at the Faculty of Social Sciences Seminar Series, Niger Delta University, June. Etekpe, Ambily. (2007). The Politics and Conflict Over Oil and Gas in the Niger Delta Region: The Bayelsa State Experience. Port Harcourt: TowerGate Resources. Friedman, John (1967), ‚A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behaviour.‛Administrative Science Quarterly, vol.122, 225-252. Gant, George F. (1979), Development Administration: Concepts, Goals, Methods. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin. Herbert, Simon (1957) Models of My Life. www.msu.edu/course/aec . Ibaba, S.I. (2005), Understanding the Niger Delta Crisis. Port Harcourt, Nigeria: Amethyst and Colleagues Publishers. Ibaba, S.I. (2006). ‚Aliens in Their Land: Reflections on Community Conflicts and Internal Displacements in Bayelsa State‛. Paper Presented at the Faculty of Social Sciences Seminar Series, Niger Delta University, July. Ikelegbe, Augustine (2008), Interrogating a Crisis of Corporate Governance and the Interface with Conflict: The Case of Multinational Oil Companies and the Conflicts in the Niger Delta, in International Conference on the The Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta.

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Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Nigeria. March 11-13. Ighodalo, Akhakpe (2005), Oil Pollution and Environmental Conflict in the Niger Delta Region: A Framework for Conflict Management in Hassan Saliu et al (eds.) Democracy and Development in Nigeria: Economic and Environmental Issues. Vol.2, (Concept Publications), 317339 Lohretnz, Tim (2006), ‚Human Capital Theory: Is Workforce Development Simply Workforce Development?‛ in Globalization: Low Wage Workers. July. Obi, C. (1997), Oil, Environmental Conflict and National Security in Nigeria: Reunification of the Ecology-Security Nexus for the Sub-Regional Peace. Programme in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security. (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, Chicago). Odediran, Oluwafemi (2004), ‚Human Development Deprivation: Water and Sanitation‛ in Onimode, Bade et al. African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century: Looking Back to Move Forward. London: Zed Books. Odogbor, Peter O. (2005), ‚Effects of Environmental Degradation and Cultural Heritage of the Niger Delta and the Implications on Sustainable Rural Development‛ in Orobator, Eke et al (eds.) Federal, State and Resource Control in Nigeria. Benin, Nigeria: F. Parker Publishing Company. Okaba, Benjamin. (2008), ‚Petrodollar, the Nigerian State and the Crises of Development in the Niger Delta Region: Trends, Challenges and the Way Forward‛, in International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta. Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Nigeria. March 11-13.

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Okereke, O.O. (2001), Development Administration in Nigeria: Issues and Strategies. 2nd ed Owerri, Nigeria: Concave Publishers Okoli, F.C. and Onah, F.O. (2002), Public Administration in Nigeria: Nature, Principles and Application. Enugu, Nigeria: John Jacobs Classic Publishers. Okoli, F.C. (2004), Theory and Practice of Public Organization: A Book of Readings. Enugu, Nigeria: John Jacobs Classic Publishers. Okonta, Ike and Douglas, Oronto (2001), Where Vultures Feast: 40 Years of Shell Exploration in the Niger Delta. Benin, Nigeria: Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth. Okowa, W.J. (2008), ‚Oil, the Nigerian State and the Development Possibilities of the Niger Delta.‛ A Paper Presented at the International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta. Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Nigeria, March 1113. Onoyume, Jimitota (2008), MOSOP Flays PTDF on Scholarship Scheme. www.vanguardngr.com, June 18. Orakwe, I.T.C. (2001), ‚Man in Society: A Conceptual Pedagogical Analysis of a Social Studies Programme‛ in Ofuebe, Chikelue ed. Dynamics of Social Studies. Lagos: New Generation Books. Pegg, Scott (1999), The Cost of Doing Business: Transnational Corporations and Violence in Nigeria. Belkint University, Turkey. Petroleum Technology Development Fund (2007), Special Programmes/Projects in the Niger Delta (www.ptdf.gov.ng). Radio Bayelsa News Report (2009) SPDC Spends N53 Million on Youth Empowerment, 14th May.

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Watts, M and Okonta, I. (2003) Petro Politics and Nigeria Democracyâ&#x20AC;&#x203A; Preface to Dimieari Von Kemedi (2003) Community Conflicts in the Niger Delta: Petro-weapon or Policy Failure? Berkeley Workshop on Environmental Politics Working Papers 03-12 Institute of International Studies University of California Berkeley. Worgu,

Stanley (2000), Hydrocarbon Exploitation, Environmental Degradation and Poverty in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. Lund University, LUMES Programme, Lund, Sweden.

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Armed Militancy in the Quintessential Play-Off of Economic Disparities

Niger Delta: Sub-Regional

Dr. Franklins A. Sanubi8 Key Terms: Nigeria, Niger Delta, economy, government, GDP, revenue distribution.

Abstract Sub-national economic disparities between the Northern and Southern Nigeria have continuously estranged policy makers in government from adopting purely technical strategies in dealing with the nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s chequered economy. This paper uses a structural functional theoretical framework to analyze the place of armed militancy in the Niger Delta as a response to growing inter-regional economic disparity and sub-national marginalization and explains why present institutional arrangement may falter in yielding the desired national results. It concludes with a suggestion of relevant policy suggestions for ensuring peace in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

A. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Quite often, armed militancy has been rationalized as an economic crime. In a developing country especially in an era of global economic recession, such rationalization would cohere with existing sociological explanations of deviant behaviour. Economic factors historically have occupied a dominant premise in the occurrence of conflicts as civil wars occur where rebel organizations are financially viable, (Collier & Hoeffler,1998); just as criminologists affirm that

Franklins A. Sanubi, PhD, is with the Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria. 8

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about eighty percent of social crimes are economic in motive (Bidinotto, 1995). However, far more than an expression of anguish over dwindling economic fortunes in an environment typified by growing variables of state failure - such as massive unemployment, poor governance, social and physical insecurity, corruption, executive lawlessness and impunity among others (Rothberg, 2004); armed militancy among youths in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is an epitome of a playoff between the â&#x20AC;&#x161;perceivedâ&#x20AC;&#x203A; owners and users of natural economic resources in their expression of a more profound variable â&#x20AC;&#x201C; sub-regional economic disparity - in the national political economy. Armed militancy in the Niger Delta therefore, by virtue of its geographic scope and operational targets, goes beyond the thesis of a mere struggle for economic survival in the midst of a general economic lack (though a necessary but not sufficient explanation) to a more complex political economy perception of marginalization and deliberate underdevelopment of the region.. The democratic tradition in Nigeria has suffered periodic stress, in its transition, from the pressure of ethnic politics. The different ethnic nationalities that were branded together for British administrative convenience have struggled, since independence in 1960, with the problem of political coexistence as one nation, thereby leading consequently to the emergence of two broad ideological factions: the nationalists and the ethno-politicians (Dinneya, 2006). In their struggle for political control, the nationalists believe that the colonial crafting of the Nigerian nation with its concomitant pluralism is in fact not a disadvantage at all but rather a healthy aid to democratic development while the ethno-politicians on the other hand hold that the Nigerian nation is artificial, very difficult to govern as one nation, and therefore unworkable as a true democracy.

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Nigeria is a country made up of regions with sharp economic contrasts on which a thirty-six (36)-state structure is currently built with a federal capital territory at its centre in Abuja. Four (4) typical geo-economic constituents can be deciphered namely; the Savannah north with typically agricultural production contribution to the national economy; the industrial south-west comprising a financial hub in Lagos (the nation’s former capital); the commercial south-east with epicenter at Onitsha; and the oil-bearing Niger Delta (otherwise referred to as the South-south) with two parallel nerve-centers at Port Harcourt and Warri. Although the nation was primarily agriculturebased at creation in 1914 and up to independence in 1960 the sharp economic contrast began to manifest in the late 1960s and early 1970s as the nation commenced the exploitation of its huge crude oil deposits (which had been discovered in the Niger Delta in 1957). This development created a new economic mindset among policy makers leading to the gradual transition of the economy from agriculturebase to industry-base (particularly the mining subsector). The relatively differing economic potential contributions of the North and South towards the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have created episodic changes in the nation’s quest for an enduring formula of revenue allocation. In fact, finding a suitable balance between the revenue-sharing interests of the oil producing Southsouth and the rest of the country remains an unresolved question in Nigeria’s political economy and one of the most fundamental of the many debates that are regular features of contemporary Nigerian society (Nwosu, 2009). Thus, while the national economy was agriculture–based in the preindependence period and the early years of political independence in the 1960s, revenue allocation was not much of a national issue of contention because the economic aspirations of the contributing regions were implicitly satisfied by the political structure at the time.

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As sectorial contributions tilted with time towards mining (and particularly oil) revenue allocation formula became a strong issue as it momentarily shifted from one principle to the other among population, derivation and needs. In the present disposition where the country’s economy is over 80 percent dependent on crude-oil exports as its major income earner (CBN, 2006), agitations for a firmer control of economic resources by the respective regions have generated a more strident call, especially by the Niger Delta people for a new national economic policy. The potency of the call for ‚resource control‛ by the people of the Niger Delta derives from their perception of marginalization by the less-economically endowed North which ironically has dominated the political (and hence the management and administrative) machinery of the nation since its political independence in 1960. Typically, the perception of resource ownership by the Niger Delta peoples stems from their realization of the long years of the Federal Government’s economic neglect of the region (which has literally become the ‚goose that laid the golden egg‛ for the Nigerian economy). The expectations of the Niger Delta people over the years is that the region will be adequately compensated for its crude-oil exploits by the provision of basic social infrastructure such as good road networks, public power supply networks, health facilities, schools, housing among others. There is a popular saying in the Niger Delta that ‚Warri is the oil field while Abuja is the oil city‛. This statement though pejorative and ordinary in the surface, depicts a very profound expression of the feeling of marginalization and denial among the Niger Delta people in relation to the attitude of the national managers of the country’s economy. To the Niger Delta people, a God-given economic endowment has been exploited and carted away for use in the development of the less-contributing northern region. Thus, while Warri lavishes away in

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underdevelopment, abject poverty, economic deprivation, mounting unemployment and crime, Abuja enjoys massive modernization in physical development and megalomaniac splendor at the expense of the former. The economic contribution of the Niger Delta region, which comprises six original states (from a geographic map-drawing perspective) namely Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo and Rivers and three additional states (from a political economy map-drawing perspective), namely Abia, Imo and Ondo, towards the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in terms of its crude oil earnings far surpasses the collective contributions of the other 27 states of the federation (CBN, 2006). This perception of the Niger Delta people, of a lopsided inter-regional contribution to the national economy especially against the backdrop of its negligible attention in the national development policy of the Nigerian federal government has whipped up enormous development-based sentiments among the ethnic politicians of the South especially in the Niger Delta who see the so-called ‚nationalists‛ policy makers at Abuja as simply agents of underdevelopment and misery. While the ‚nationalists‛ feel that the country can be managed in its economic and socio-cultural diversity, the minority southern ‚ethnic politicians‛ have over the years lost confidence in the workability of a Nigerian polity under these exploitative circumstances and have thus clamored for a re-definition of the national economic policy where complete fiscal federalism will be applicable in the country’s democratic governance. ‚Resource Control‛ as the agitation is being popularly known in the Niger Delta has become a launching platform for ethnic politicians and their ally (the militants) to express their dissatisfaction with the poor economic conditions of their regions especially against the backdrop of recent surging proceeds from the international crude

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oil market. There is therefore a playoff between the minority Niger Delta people whose attachment to the call for resource ownership conflicts with the majority nationalists’ belief that the diverse nationality can be managed. The armed militancy in the Niger Delta in recent time is only therefore a field of play for the expression of discontentment of the local people with the economic and political marginalization of the region by the majority nationalist politicians. While the armed militants use several strategies such as gunboats attack, siege and bombardment of oil installations, kidnapping and hostage taking of oil company workers and government officials and seizure (or sometimes destruction) of crude-carrying vessels and trucks among others, the federal government momentarily respond by embarking on what may be referred to as ‚cleansing‛ of militants’ hideouts and ‚headquarters‛, often without much success in reaching the militant targets. The government’s action (as in Ogoniland, 1995, Odi, 2000 and Gbaramatu, 2009) often result in the death of innocent and helpless residents and natives. The play-off is profound and impressionistic. Three dominant ethnic groups – the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo - call the shot in Nigeria’s political determinism since independence and none of the major ethnic groups in the Niger Delta fall into these three. There is therefore a scenario of the potentially-rich, ‚governed minority‛ paying the bills of the potentially-poor ‚governing majority‛. The disposition of the latter to continue to remain defiant, even to reason, about the cry of the former should not, under this circumstance become elusive to discern for, with the awareness of the wide economic disparities between the north and south, economic considerations underlie their policy choice in the same way as the sustenance of the Niger Delta crisis just as notes Collier (2000)

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...economic characteristics < are all significant and powerful predictors of civil war. Rebellions either have the objective of natural resource predation, or are critically dependent upon natural resource predation in order to pursue other objectives

The reality of the economic disparities between these regions has over the years created a profound interplay of political machinations by stakeholders having differing mindsets of which the armed militancy is only an expression.

B. THE NIGER DELTA REGION: AN ISSUE-FIELD FOR A POLITICAL ECONOMY PLAY-OFF. The Niger Delta is a densely populated region once known as the Oil Rivers because it was a major producer of palm oil. This region is on the Atlantic coast of Nigeria where the River Niger divides into many numerous tributaries. The region extends along the coast from the Benin River on the west to the Imo River on the east. There are several linguistic and cultural groups namely the Ijaws, Edos, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Yorubas Igbos, Efiks and Kalabaris. The Niger Delta as defined officially by the Nigerian government extends over about seventy thousand square kilometers and makes up 7.5 percent of Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s land mass. Some 20 million people (as per the 2006 national census figures) of more than 40 ethnic groups speaking some 250 dialects live in the region. Their means of livelihood is primarily based on fishing and farming. Nigeria is currently the second largest (with Algeria being slightly higher in the latest ranking) in oil production in Africa and the fifteenth in the world (Energy Information Administration, 2008). Some 2 million barrels a day are extracted in the Niger Delta. Since 1975, the region has accounted for over 95 percent of Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s export earnings. The region also accounts

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for 40% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 80% gross revenue for the country (CBN, 2006). With such a rich economic potential, the Niger Delta region paradoxically gets continuously enmeshed in perilous development challenges including, widespread poverty with about 70% of the population living on or below poverty line (FGN, 2006); a very low level of industrial development, high rate of unemployment involving a staggering number of school leavers most of whom are college (university) graduates; illiteracy; diseases, poor health and 20% child mortality rate which is amongst the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s highest; poor infrastructures; social restiveness and conflict among others. The environmental devastation associated with the industry and the accompanying lack of distribution of oil wealth has collectively provided a source of numerous environmental movements and interethnic conflicts in the region. The countless incidents of industrial emissions, gas flaring and other operational hazards such as oil spillage, fire outbreak, and gas leakage have, for instance contributed immensely to despoiling the environment culminating in the destruction of economic waters used by the local people for fishing and even sometimes drinking. This has drastically reduced aquatic life and destroyed flora and fauna in the region thus consolidating the region peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s poverty levels. The health implication of this development is profound as a government agency (FGN, 2006) even acknowledges: Water-related diseases represent at least 80 percent of all reported illnesses in the region. Malaria followed by other water-related diarrheal diseases such as dysentery, typhoid and cholera are the most common causes of morbidity at the various health establishments in the region< In addition, 30% of the region is located in brackish or

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saltwater ecosystems<the scourge of HIV/AIDS is also on the increase in the region.

Even a study of the region by the World Bank (1995) warned that â&#x20AC;&#x161;an urgent need exists to protect the life and health of the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s inhabitants and its ecological system from further deteriorationâ&#x20AC;&#x203A; There is the feeling among major stakeholders in the area that the underpinning philosophy in targeting these issues is that by equipping local peoples with appropriate knowledge, skills and abilities, their opportunities and intelligence are enhanced and choice making will be improved (Niger Delta Foundation, 2007). As the region contributing the highest share to the federal revenue (depicted by Table I), stakeholders in the Niger Delta have argued their case for resource control on the grounds of the continuing underdevelopment of the area by what they believe is a connivance of the federal government and oil multinational companies operating in the area. While ethnic cleavages are intense in the Niger Delta, its inhabitants are united by a sense of grievance about the exploitation and neglect of their region. The federal government virtually ignored the Niger Delta during the 1990s, leaving development in the hands of the oil companies in an era when corporate social responsibility meant little (Asuni, 2009). Environmental activism and militancy are a direct response to the impunity, human rights violations, and perceived neglect of the region by the Nigerian state on the one hand and through sustained environmental hazards imposed on local Niger Delta communities as a result of the oil production activities of multinational oil companies on the other (Ojakorotu, 2008) Typically, the revenue disposition of the oil and non-oil sectors of the Nigerian economy (and hence the South and North sub-regions respectively) can be analyzed.

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Table I ( 5-Year disposition of Oil and Non-Oil Sectors' Contribution to Gross Domestic Product 2002-2006) Years Row Labels A

Total revenue (N ‘Billion) Oil Revenue (N ‘Billion) % Contribu -tion to Total Revenue Non-Oil Revenue (N ‘Billion) % Contribu -tion to Total Revenue

5-Yr Total

5-Yr Growth

% Growth

5,965.1

19,740

4,233.3

244.55

4,762.4

5,287.6

16,710

4,056.7

329.57

85.6

85.8

88.6

84.65

17.5

24.61

500.8

565.7

785.1

677.5

3,030.1

176.5

35.23

19.4

14.4

14.2

11.4

15.35

(17.5)

-60.55

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1,731.8

2,575.1

3,920.5

5,547.5

1,230.9

2,074.3

3,354.8

71.1

80.6

501

28.9

Source: Author’s analysis based on data provided on Table B1.1, Public Finance Statistics, Bullion, Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja(2006) Vol. 17,Dec, Pp.91-92

Table I shows the 5-year disposition of oil and non-oil sectors’ contribution to Gross Domestic Product for the period 2002-06. As the figures on Row A depicts, the country’s total revenue grew steadily by a five-year 244.55 percent for the period under review (rising from N1, 731.80 billion in 2002 to N5, 966 billion in 2006). Out of this performance, the oil sector’s contribution to the total GDP as shown on Row C, alone accounts for 84.65 percent thus authenticating existing reports on the contribution of this sector to the Nigerian economy (Imobighe, et al, 2002, Ojameruaye, 2004, Nwosu, 2009). And this sector actually grew during the period under review by 17.5 percent. In the same period however, the non-oil sector contribution

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to the national revenue stood at 15.35% (from N501Billion in 2002 to N677.5 in 2006). This figure actually depicts a 17.5 percent fall in this sectorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s performance in 2006 as compared to 2002. The compelling implication here is that the economy continues to increase in its reliance on crude oil proceeds. Yet, at this forum, our concern lies not on the analysis of the respective contribution of the oil and non-oil sectors to the national revenue or the suitability of their economic mix (for such analysis interests the economist more than the political scientist) but significantly on a more sensitive issue on the revenue â&#x20AC;&#x201C; its distribution. This is because the civil conflicts are not emanating from the choice of economic mix of the sources of the national revenue (even though the present choice is not economically palatable), but from the nature of distribution of the revenue derived there from. Table II gives another 5-year disposition of revenue distribution to the three tiers of government during the period 2002-06. The distribution in comparison with the revenue proceeds (as shown on Rows A & B) is very instructive to the issue under consideration. Of the N19,740 Billion realized in the five year period (Row A, Table I) only N11,560.50 Billion(Row A, Table II) representing 58.56 percent was available for distribution, yet of this amount, the Federal Government also got N5,546.30 Billion representing almost half (48 percent) of the sharable revenue while the rest went to the states. The implication is that the Federal Government alone retained about 75 percent (that is N13, 627.6 Billion). A yearly examination of the sharable revenue from Table II also shows that the revenue distribution to the three tiers of Government (as a percentage of total revenue) have been effectively falling from 97.75 percent in 2002 to 49.69 percent in 2006.

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Table II (5-Year Disposition of Revenue Distribution to the Three Tiers of Government 2002-2006) Years Row Lbels A

B C

D E

F G

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

5-Year Total

5-Yr Growth

% Grwth

1,692.8

1,821

2,438.8

2,643.7

2,964.2

11,560.5

1,271.4

75.11

97.75

70.72

62.21

47.66

49.69

58.56

(48.06)

-49.16

859

917.1

1,147.9

1,237.2

1,385.1

5,546.3

526.1

61.25

50.7

50.4

47.1

46.8

46.7

48.

(4.02)

-7.92

398.8

419.8

582.2

627.5

703.

2,731.3

304.2

76.28

23.6

23.1

23.9

23.7

23.6

0.16

0.67

333.9

346.9

448.9

483.8

542.

2,155.5

208.1

62.32

19.7

19.

18.4

18.3

18.6

(1.44)

-7.3

(N ‘B) 0.0 137. 259.9 295.3 333.4 1,025.6 333.4 As % of Total Distrib 0.0 7.5 10.7 11.2 11.2 8.9 11.25 Source: Author’s analysis based on data provided on Table B1.1, Public Finance Statistics, Bullion, Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja (2006) Vol. 17,Dec Pp.91-92

243.36

Total Distrib (N ‘B) As % of Total Revenue Federal Govrnmnt (N ‘B) As % of Total Distrib State Govrnmnts (N ‘B) As % of Total Distrib. Local Govrnmnts (N ‘B) As % of Total Distrib. Derivation 13% - Oil Producing states

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A chart analysis of Table II makes the situation more explicit thus:

Percentage Distribution of revenue to the three tiers of govt. (2002-2006)

Percentage Share

60 Federal government

50 40

State Government

Local government

20 13% derivation to Oil Producing states

10 0 2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Years Source: Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s analysis based on data provided on Table B1.1, Public Finance Statistics, Bullion, Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja Pp.91-92.

Mining is the 39th exclusive legislative item in the Nigerian federal schedule of legislative powers as recognized by the 1999 constitution (FGN, 2008); and therefore all oil proceeds go to a federation account before they are distributed according to some federally determined principles. This puts the states (and of course the local governments councils) under a great degree of financial subservience to the federal government. Yet, of the 25 percent sharable revenue available to the states and local government (N5, 912.4 Billion), only N1, 025.60 representing 17.34 percent apparently went to oil-producing states as derivation fund. This figure is actually 8.9 percent of the total sharable revenue (Row J,

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Table II). Of the N2, 155.50 Billion made available to local governments for the period under review only a meager proportion (the sharing process notwithstanding) would actually go to the Niger Delta States because the nine (9) states making up the Niger Delta region comprise of a total of 184 local government units out of a national total of 774 recognized by the 1999 constitution of the federal government. This represents a 23.7 percent of the total number of local councils in the federation. The analysis of the local council is significant because the higher the number of council units, the higher the cumulative revenue receipts accruing to the respective states having such number of councils. This is why the creation of the local government units itself generates a lot of tension (Ukiwo, 2006); for it represents another area of expression of marginalization by the majority ruling ethnic groups over the minority south-south people. By the last exercise of local government creation in 1991 several Northern states got upwards of 33 local government units (such as Katsina State with 34 and Kano State with as much as 44) far above those of the states in the south. Some debatable criteria (such as land mass, population and geographic spread) were provided as excuse for the seemingly lopsided local government council creation by the then Military government of Ibrahim Babangida. This has been seen by the minority peoples as an apparent design to increase the revenue sharing potentials of the respective states of the north in the federal revenue allocation scheme thus making the northern states to regain the revenue lost to derivation. The same countenance of discontentment among the Southern peoples greeted the several exercises of Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; creation in the country which resulted in a numerical tilting in favour of the less contributing Northern region such that the number of states created from this region always exceeds the number from the south. The political and economic objective of this recurring phenomenon in statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; creation

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exercises can be easily deciphered. The foregoing shows very clearly that there is an apparent template of sub-national economic disparity between the North and the South regarding their relative contributions to the national revenue on which a strong perception of marginalization and underdevelopment by the Niger Delta peoples is being built.

C. ARMED MILITANCY IN THE NIGER DELTA AS A FUNCTIONAL TOOL FOR THE EXPRESSION OF DISCONTENTMENT: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The place of militancy in the whole gamut of the Niger Delta crises especially in furthering the political economic aspirations of its people can be explained within the context of the structural functional framework. Structural Functionalism is a broad perspective in social science which addresses social structure in terms of the functions of its constituent elements namely norms, customs, traditions and institutions. These aspects of society (the structures) according to Herbert Spencer are regarded as ‚organs‛ that work towards the proper functioning of the ‚body‛ as a whole (Parsons, 1961). Structural functionalism adopts the positivist school of sociological thought as stressed by Auguste Comte in his emphasis on ‚social cohesion‛ especially after the experience of the French revolution during which the society was ravaged by fragmentation and discord. The framework of structural functionalism informed Emile Durkheim’s theory of ‚organic solidarity‛ in his quest for social fact (Fish, 2005). Within a larger context of the Niger Delta crises especially in relation to the objective of the civil protests, the militant ‚organ‛ appears to be a welcome instrument of enforcement of the desires of the local peoples over and against the collusive attitude of both the federal

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government and the several multinational companies operating in the area. Thus, the militant groups who may have been motivated initially by pure economic drives especially in drawing attention of the federal government towards their pitiable unemployment situation and poor physical development in the area, found a congruence of objective with some of the local political stalwarts who quickly recognized this militancy as a â&#x20AC;&#x161;functional recourseâ&#x20AC;&#x203A; and the militants as a useful ally in the prosecution of a unified course with the federal government. Militant activism in the area though criminal in orientation and outlook becomes a necessary field of play between parties that have contrasting politico-economic aspirations in the present federal structure in Nigeria. The apparent congruence of objective between the militants and the Niger Delta political stalwarts is evidenced by the regular meetings of militant leaders with, and proven display of loyalty to, these political and ethnic leaders of thought in the region. Furthermore, when the federal government instituted an amnesty policy in June 2009 and attempted to deal directly with leaders of the various militant groups, these political and ethnic leaders of thought vehemently challenged the procedure and warned against its futility if they (the political leaders of thought) were sidelined in the negotiations. All these point to an imminent fact that the armed militant groups were not only being encouraged but also being funded by some of these political and ethnic leaders of thought. Armed militancy is therefore a structural functional organ of the Niger Delta protests.

D. NATURE OF ARMED MILITANCY IN THE NIGER DELTA The struggle for resource control can be significantly traced back to the formation of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), an

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Ijaw group formed by Isaac Adoka Boro and which he declared a Republic in 1966. This was followed by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) by Ken Saro Wiwa that raised issue of environmental pollution caused by oil companies and highlighted the lack of representation of the Niger Delta people especially the Ogonis and published an Ogoni Bill of Rights in 1990; and also the 'Mujahid' Dokubo – Asari Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). All these different military groups have faced different resistance from the federal and state governments. These groups and other minor ones did not just come up; they started due to the neglect that has over the years faced the states (Asiwe, 2009). The recent phase of the Niger Delta crisis emerged from a piecemeal discontent of the local peoples with the federal government’s age-long neglect of the region and ignited by a local ethnic crisis in 1996 (Imobighe, 2002); between two minority tribes, the Ijaw and the Itsekiri over a disputed relocation of a newly created Warri-Southwest local government headquarters by the federal government. The Niger Delta Crisis which gave rise to the militancy in the region has for almost two decades now impacted serious reverses on the political economy of the nation. The reverses range from stoppage of oil exploitation activities, intermittent closure of oil wells by major oil companies operating in the area (such as Shell, Chevron, Pan Ocean, Total), blowing up of oil terminals and installations to kidnapping and hostage taking of foreign staff of these oil companies in return for ransom payments amongst other activities. There were incidents in which kidnapped victims were murdered before negotiations and ransom payments were effected. The effects have been very profound: a lull in the nation’s oil production and hence in its oil revenues; and an unprecedented rise in regional insecurity in the Niger Delta with accompanying surge in nationalistic groups in the area purportedly fighting for the rights of the local people in their

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protests against the federal government development efforts in the region. Even criminal gangs have capitalized on the general tension and fear imposed by these militant activities to unleash further terror on the people through armed robbery, burglary and other vices. It has become very difficult to decipher genuine protests from criminal activities in the region especially in metropolises like Port Harcourt, Warri, Yenagoa and Asaba (where several bomb explosions have occurred in recent time). The growing insecurity in the area have further impacted on the economic lives of the local people as company workers stayed back at home for several months (with the temporary workers among them otherwise known as contract staff being frictionally unemployed); domestic production of food plummeting due to fear of insecurity on the farmlands leading to a surge in prices, growing cost of living; and mounting social vices. With sharp vagaries in the international prices of crude oil (the country’s major export earner) at the heart of a global economic meltdown continuing with a malnourished national power supply, the economic and social life of the nation let alone the Niger Delta region goes beyond the mere description of a misery or ‚melancholy‛. The organic stress created by the troubled Niger Delta subsystem into the general national economic and political economic system in the wake of a federal government’s declaration of an amnesty programme for militants defies category and literal definition.

E. FAILURE OF EXISTING POLICIES Emanating partly from the seemingly disparate economic strengths between the north and south, the colonial government had instituted a Minority Commission of enquiry headed by Sir Henry Willink in the country prior to the granting of independence to the nationalists in 1960. This was with a view to establishing and particularly allaying the fears of the minorities in the prospective

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independent nation-state, at least to be sure that they are not handing over a government to strange bedfellows. That may be regarded as the first governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s apprehension of the issue of minority rights, albeit political though, at this time (Abbide, 2006). Following from this action and accentuated by the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities in the Niger Delta (precisely at Oloibiri, in 1957) the national policy makers at independence realized how fragile the federationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s stability will be and thus very early in its tenure addressed the issue of revenue allocation as a means of securing national economic consensus. But the several attempts to define a workable revenue allocation for the country have so far yielded marginal, if any consensus. The country has tried several principles using at any given time, a combination of them including derivation, population, needs, federal-character, even-development, balancedfederation and penultimacy among others but there hardly had been any time the revenue allocation satisfies the political and economic desires of the various regions in the country. Revenue allocation therefore remains a failed policy in this regard. Beside the failure of the revenue allocation formula were mounting tension emanating from growing protests movements in the region which also dates back to the early post independence period and the federal government has been apprehensive of these developments inspiring it to adopt some policy measures of placation in the area. One of such was the establishment of the moribund Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1960 with a mandate to provide basic social development in the region. The commission operated for about seven (7) years achieving basically nothing before going down due to the military coup of 1966 and the outbreak of the civil war in 1967. The federal government then used the available revenue from oil production in the region to fund its post-war 3Râ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation) programme in different parts of

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the country. Even with the quadrupling of the international oil prices in 1973 and the subsequent windfalls in oil export proceeds, there was no deliberate attempt to use the oil wealth to address the issue of poverty and the developmental needs of the region (Ojameruaye, 2004). The collective failure of both the NDDB and another experimental agency - the River Basin Development Authority (RBDA) established in 1970 - increased the local peoplesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; consciousness of the unserious posture of the federal government towards the development of the region and in response, the military government of Ibrahim Babangida created yet another development agency called the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1991 with operating headquarters in Port Harcourt, in the heart of the Niger Delta. Like its predecessor, the OMPADEC which operated between 1992 and 1995 did not impact any positively on the people and the region. It abandoned many projects and accrued huge debts most of which were dubious and fraudulent. The OMPADEC lacked focus amidst irregularities of funding, official profligacy, corruption, excessive political interference, lack of transparency and accountability. The commission was to receive a statutory 3% of the federation account but it hardly got a single percent of its yearly mandate throughout its four year lifetime. Within, the commission never had any regard for due process in the determination and award of its contracts and never sought the choice of the people in the determination of prospective development projects. There was little, if any, of poverty reduction and the vast majority of the poor people were sidelined in its activities and the economic situation of the local people worsened. This increased the degree of restiveness and discontent in the area reached alarming proportion in 1998 when the latest spark of the Niger Delta crises was presented in the Ijaw/Itsekiri ethnic conflicts (Imobighe et al, 2002, Ojameruaye, 2004). Consequently, one of the first actions of former President Olusegun Obasanjo taken on assumption of office in May

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1999 was to send a bill to the national assembly for the establishment of another interventionist agency called the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The euphoria, as a roaring flame, which greeted its establishment and inauguration in 2001 soon died down as a cold impotent ash (Achebe, 1960) after barely two years of its operation when the initial funding intensity gradually waned. The main task of the NDDC at its establishment was to complete some of the abandoned and uncompleted projects of its predecessor, OMPADEC and necessarily embark on some new ones including, preparing a detailed master plan for the development of the Niger Delta region. By 2003, it appeared the NDDC had achieved some good start as its Chairman, Albert K. Horsefall told a meeting in June 2003, of local stakeholders in the region known as Traditional Rulers of Oil Mineral Producing Communities of Nigeria (TROMPCON) of the modest achievement of NDDC including its application of the 47Billion naira receipts from all its sources to an estimated 700 contract awards of which 258 had been completed as at the time of that meeting and the successful execution of 40 roads projects, 90 water projects, 129 electrification projects, 47 shore protection/jetty projects, 50 health centers, 205 new block of sixschool classrooms each, among others (Ojameruaye,2004). These figures though show some impressive record but hardly indicate the impact the commission had had on the lives of the people especially in poverty reduction perspective as the depth and severity of poverty in the oil producing communities continues to manifest. While not ignoring the fact that the NDDC (through its contract awards and employment of local contractors and some natives into its staff positions which has, in a positive way, negligibly impacted on the economic and social lives of the people) has ignited some level of â&#x20AC;&#x161;consciousness and responsibilityâ&#x20AC;&#x203A; on the part of the federal government towards the plight of the local people, the internal issues of corruption and accountability, tepid funding and insider-politics in the

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determination of prospective projects leave serious matters for concern. Beside, there are evidences that even those federal institutions which are created and located in the region in response to the yearnings of the local people do not have Niger Delta indigenes in their core leadership positions. For instance, in the Federal University of Petroleum Resources, established by the Olusegun Obasanjoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s administration in 2007 and located in Ugbomro-Effurun in Delta State, all top positions including that of the Vice-Chancellor who is the chief executive, are at present being held by non-Deltans. This has made the employment of qualified local indigenes as lecturers and even the admission of local candidates as students in this institution very restricted to the fury of the local people. The three dominant ethnic groups have often monopolized federal institutions and establishments under the guise that as a federal institution any qualified individual from any part of the country could hold positions. The commission today is virtually a mere image of itself as an instrument of government policy as its roles are being gradually shifted to a newly-created Ministry of the Niger Delta (MND). As the armed militancy intensified, the federal government also tried, though unsuccessfully, some military reprisals at the militant targets bombarding communities harboring these militants. The latest policy is the implementation of an Amnesty policy which sees key federal government officials meeting regularly and making negotiations with militants at choicely exclusive venues within the government house. Though it may seem premature to assert for now, the Amnesty policy of the federal government is yet to yield any significant impact apart from some success recorded in the retrieval of some arms and ammunitions from the erstwhile militants and the organization of on-going training programs which will lead to their successful rehabilitation. By the failure of existing policies and uncertain future of current solutions, the lingering Niger Delta

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developmental question is far from being answered as Abidde (2006); in quoting an editorial of the Nigerian Guardian of Monday, August 28, 2006 asserts: The Niger Delta crisis is without doubt the most potent expression of failure of the Nigerian state< of our inability to resolve the crisis of nationhood that has held the country down since independence four decades ago. The regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s crisis has become the sore of the nation, a cancer that may erode the fragile bonds that hold the poly-ethnic nation together<

The failure of the responses of government may be adduced among others, to its lack of vision and planning, improper development strategies and policies and poor implementation focus (Urien, 2009).

F. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS In the foregoing discussion, we have attempted to establish that a relationship exists between the relative economic disparities of the North and South Nigeria and the emergence of armed militancy in the Niger Delta. Armed militant groups may have been motivated initially by economic factors such as rising unemployment, poor infrastructure, social and physical insecurity, poor governance and corruption but their activities found ample coherence with the political economic aspirations of the Niger Delta peoples within the context of their perception of economic and political marginalization and underdevelopment. By an informal (or formal) integration of purposes, political stakeholders in the Niger Delta region have found themselves working in alliance with the militant groups in which criminality could no longer be separated from genuine social protests and agitations.

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In a multiethnic polity like Nigeria where the bond of national integration is hinged on a fragile and unstable consensus among component groups of the federation, perception of economic disparity between these groups provides a potent cause for prospective conflict. We submit that economic disparity among peoples is therefore a strong territorial cause of civil conflicts among groups in Africa. African states, especially those running federal systems must adopt universal standards of achieving acceptable balance in the sharing of political and economic powers between the tiers of government in each federation. The adoption of workable fiscal federal systems patterned along that of the United States where each component state has relatively complete control over its economic resources without the central governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s intrusion may satisfy the divergent economic interests of the disparate groups in the respective African State. The resurgence and concentration of armed militant groups in the Niger Delta relative to other parts of the country further cements the hypothesis that economic variables account significantly for the occurrence of civil conflicts in the African region. As for efforts in trying to secure a peaceful environment in the Niger Delta region, besides rethinking about the potency of the call for resource control, the federal government must redefine it development strategies for the region and make adequate consultations with the local stakeholders in the determination of these strategies (Nwosu, 2006). The long list of failed interventionist agencies in the Niger Delta region only suggests that mere creation of unworkable federal agencies will not abate the crisis as the level of awareness of the people have been adequately simulated by the series of environmental protest movements and militant activism in the past decade. These

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institutional responses must, as a matter of purpose, and as Omotola (2007) observes, be closely linked with grassroots organizations, particularly community-development associations and related ruralempowerment nongovernmental organizations, with adequate frameworks for monitoring and evaluation.

The government amnesty programme must be consciously implemented with the Niger Delta development focus in mind while the erstwhile militants are being rehabilitated. Cynical implementation on the part of the government whereby it defaults in transforming the Niger Delta area through relevant and tangible development efforts would be dangerous. Abbide (2009) had warned the policy makers at Abuja that â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;if not properly done and if there are whiffs of ulterior motives, what the government may get, in the end, will be a bad and useless peace. If Abuja wants to know what a bad and useless peace is, they should ask Tel Avivâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;.

REFERENCES: Abbide,

O.S. (2006) The Niger Delta today, retrieved 12/07/2009 http://www.ijawland.com/The%20Niger%20Delta%20Today%20by% 20Sabella%20Abidde.pdf ___________ (2009) The Niger Delta amnesty programme<What next? Village square, retrieved 12/01/2009 at http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com.html Achebe, C. (1960) No longer at ease, London, Heinemann Educational Books. Asiwe, E. (2009) The Niger Delta region, Anatomy of a crisis, Nigeria News | Tue, October 6, retrieved http://www.modernghana.com/GhanaHome/

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Asuni, J. B.(2009) Understanding the armed groups of the Niger Delta, Working paper of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), New York September. Bidinotto, J.R. (1995) The â&#x20AC;&#x161;root causesâ&#x20AC;&#x203A; of crime, The Freeman, Ideas on Liberty Foundation for Economic Education, 45(6). Central Bank of Nigeria (2006) Statistical Bulletin, 17 December, Abuja, Pp.8099 Collier, P. (2000) The economic causes of civil conflicts, Working papers of the Global Policy Forum, Diamonds, June, Pp. 934-942 Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (1998) On the economic causes of civil war, Oxford Economic Papers, 50, 563-73. Dinneya, G. (2006) Political economy of democratization in Nigeria. Lagos: Concept Publication Limited, P.39. Energy Information Administration, (2008) Country energy profiles, US Energy Information Administration, (EIA), Independent Statistics and Analysis, December, retrieved 12/24/2009 @ http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm Federal Government of Nigeria (2006) Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan, Port Harcourt, p.91. Federal Government of Nigeria (2008) 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & fundamental rights (enforcement procedure) rules 2008.Abuja: Federal Government Press, p.170. Fish, J.S. (2005) Defending the Durkheimian Tradition. Religion, Emotion and Morality Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Imobighe, J. A. (2002) Warri crisis in historical and contemporary perspectives, In J.A.Imobighe, C.O.Bassey & J.B.Asuni (Eds.) Conflict and instability in the Niger Delta, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, pp.36-51. Niger Delta Foundation (2009) Niger Delta region, Retrieved from the web on 12/4/2009 @ http://www.nigerdeltafoundation.org/nigerdeltaregion.html. Nwosu, O. R. (2009) Opening up the Nigerian eastern economic corridor, Greenbelt, Maryland, U.SA. Retrieved 12/4/2009 http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/oarticles/opening_up_the_nigeri an_eastern_.htm

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Ojakorotu, V. (2009) Militancy and oil violence in the Niger Delta Journal of Energy Security, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Washington: 98, August, 349. Ojameruaye, E. (2004). Lessons from the Chadian model for the distribution of oil wealth in Nigeria, Urhobo Historical Society. Retrieved from the web on 12/04/2009 @ www.waado.org/Environmental/Remediation. Omotola, J.S. (2007) From the OMPADEC to the NDDC: An Assessment of state responses to environmental insecurity in the Niger Delta, Nigeria Africa Today, Indiana University Press, (54)1,Fall,pp.73-89. Parsons, T., (1961) Theories of Society: foundations of modern sociological theory, New York: Free Press. Rothberg, R.L. (2004) The failure and collapse of nation states: Breakdown, prevention and repair, In Robert L. Rothberg (Ed.) When states fail: Causes and consequences, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Ukiwo, U, (2006) Creation of local government areas and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria: The case of Warri, Delta State, Paper presented at the CRISE West Africa Workshop, Accra Ghana: March, 23-25. Urien, J. O. (2009) Militancy in the Niger Delta: Its relationship to national development, Unpublished MSc Political Science Dissertation, Delta State University, Abraka, P.121. World Bank (1995) as cited in FGN (2006) p.103

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Amnesty Programme and the Niger Delta: Overview of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Strategy for Sustainable Peace Dr. Atare Otite and Nathaniel Umukoro9 Key Terms: Nigeria, Niger Delta, DDR, amnesty programme, development.

Abstract The Niger Delta – the geographical heart of oil production in Nigeria has been a breeding ground for militants and ‚impoverished ethnic groups‛ for some years now. This is because the discovery of oil and its exploitation has ushered in a miserable, undisciplined, decrepit, and corrupt form of ‘petro-capitalism’ which produces conflict accelerating factors. Devastated by the ecological costs of oil spillage and the highest gas flaring rates in the world, the Niger Delta has become a centre of violence. In an attempt to solve the Niger Delta crisis, the Federal Government recently introduced the policy of amnesty to militants as the solution to the Niger Delta Crisis. The amnesty programme has been acclaimed by some persons to be a success. Consequently this paper makes a careful study of the amnesty Programme which is basically a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) Strategy for Sustainable Peace. With the aid of secondary data and content analysis, the paper argues that sustainable peace can only be ensured if the root causes of violence in the Niger Delta are identified and ameliorated. In the course of the study, it was discovered that ecological devastation and Dr. Atare Otite and Nathaniel Umukoro are with the Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences at Delta State University in Abraka, Nigeria. Dr. Otite’s e-mail is atareotite@yahoo.com; Mr. Umukoro’s is numukoro@yahoo.co.uk. 9

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short-changing of the people of the Niger Delta, in terms of infrastructural development, was among the reasons that led to the people of the region picking up arms in the area. The paper recommends, among other things, the need to ensure environmental protection and the diversification of the economy.

Introduction The Niger Delta, an area of dense mangrove rainforest in the southern tip of Nigeria, has been a centre of violent conflicts for some years now. The Nigerian government like a doctor has over 50 years tried to solve the problem in the region. During the colonial era the Willinks Commission was set up following the agitation by the minorities over what they saw as imbalance in the political and economic structure of Nigeria. In 1962, the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) was set up to serve in advisory capacity and provide government with information that would lead to the alleviation of the plight of the area in conjunction with the Development Act of 1961. The NDDB’s reports were never made public; they died with the First Republic when the military took over power in 1966. Between 1960’s and late 1980’s, nothing significant was done to solve the environmental and developmental problems of the Niger Delta. In 1989, the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida, in an attempt to assuage the people of the Niger Delta, set up the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) but failed to actualize its objectives due to wastefulness and corruption. During the Obasanjo’s administration the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established in 2000 with the sole mandate of developing the oil-rich Niger-Delta region of southern Nigeria. Like OMPADEC a magnifying lens is required to see its performance. This has made the Federal Government to create a new ministry called Ministry of Niger Delta in 2008, to address the

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Niger Delta issue. In spite of the presence of these institutions, militant activities, violence and rebellion which portray a looming civil war have been the order of the day in the region. This has resulted in the military approach to ensuring peace in the area, using the Joint Task Force. The military approach has not been successful in bringing peace to the area. In pursuit of the Seven Point Agenda, the Federal Government inaugurated a technical committee headed by Ledum Mitee on September 8, 2008 to distill the various reports, suggestions and recommendations on the Niger Delta from the Willinks Commission Report of 1958 to the present and give a summary of the recommendations necessary for government action. The committee was also expected to present a detailed short, medium and long term solution to the problems in the Niger Delta and make any other recommendations that will help to achieve sustainable development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta region. On December 1, 2008, the report was submitted to President Yarâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Adua and he assured that the crisis in the littoral region of Nigeria would have a final resolution. Following the report of this committee, the Federal Government is presently pursuing the policy of amnesty to militants as the solution to the Niger Delta Crisis. Since the efforts of the federal government and multinational corporations to get the Niger Delta out of the shackles of underdevelopment, violence and rebellion have been a mirage it becomes pertinent that a closer attention be given to the root causes of the problem. The paper makes an overview of the amnesty programme and argues the solution to the root causes of the Niger Delta problem goes beyond amnesty.

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Philosophical Bases of the Amnesty Programme The Amnesty programme which is one of the recommendations of the 2008 Mittee Committee report is based on the need to achieve sustainable development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta region. This sentiment was expressed by the Chairman of the Amnesty Implementation Panel, General Godwin Abbe (Rtd), that â&#x20AC;&#x161;the goal of the amnesty programme is to achieve peace, reconciliation, reintegration, healing and sustainable developmentâ&#x20AC;&#x203A; (The News, 2009). This is because the people of the Niger Delta have suffered various forms of hardships and injustice over the years resulting in violence and the destruction of lives and properties. Amoda (2009) espoused the view that the amnesty approach to security, politics and conflicts is a legal approach and asserts that amnesty is a general pardon of offence by government, a deliberate overlooking of offenses against a government. To pardon is to release the criminally-culpable from the just punishment of the law; it is to cancel or not to exact punishment due for an offence. Thus, the relationship assumed by government between it and the Niger Delta militants is juridical; the militants are pardoned instead of being punished. Based on this conception, the amnesty programme is conceived out of the need to prevent insurgents who ought to have been punished for engaging in criminal activities from facing the wrath of the law in other to foster peace and progress. In other words, the amnesty programme is explicit or implicit acceptance by the government that militant activities in the Niger Delta is the product of neglect and underdevelopment which can be attributed to corruption and lack of political will. The amnesty programme is based on the understanding that violent conflict can easily develop if large numbers of people become convinced that taking up arms is not only legitimate but may perhaps be the only way to secure the necessities of life. In other words, they feel that they

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are in an unjust situation and must therefore decide to rectify it (Smith, 2002). This contention is buttressed by President Yar'Adua's statement in his 2009 Independence Day broadcast that 'with a view to engendering lasting peace in the area, we proclaimed a general amnesty and granted unconditional pardon to all those who had taken up arms as a way of drawing attention to the plight of the people of the Niger Delta. He further stated that 'on this day and in the spirit of rededication, we renew our commitment to confronting the challenges of critical infrastructure in the Niger Delta, food security, security of lives and property, human capital development, land tenure and wealth creation' (The Guardian, 2009). The amnesty programme therefore is not a solution to the Niger Delta crisis but a means for ensuring ceasefire in order to correct the wrongs of the past (Umukoro, 2010).

Overview of the Amnesty Programme The activities of Militants have made peace to elude Nigeria especially the Niger Delta area for a long time. On June 25, 2009 the amnesty for militants operating in the Niger Delta was announced by Nigeria's President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua with the condition that the militants will renounce militancy within 60 days. He granted the amnesty in accordance with section 175 of the 1999 Constitution which provides that the President may grant any person concerned with or convicted of any offence created by an Act of the National Assembly a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions. A presidential panel on amnesty and disarmament of militants in the Niger Delta was then set up to manage the process. The militants were expected to demobilize and their arms surrendered at designated centres to pave way for rehabilitation and reintegration. The amnesty initiative started on August 6, 2009 and ended on

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October 4, 2009. The Federal government declared amnesty for all militants with a view to disarming and rehabilitating them. The amnesty programme is part of the federal government's strategies to end the violence in the oil region, which has hampered oil production, the nation's main foreign exchange earner. The last notable militant to surrender emotionally was Government Ekpemupolo popularly known as Tompolo, who publicly accepted the amnesty with over 3000 militants under his command. Thousands of people gathered in Oporoza and Warri to witness the disarmament ceremony. Tompolo was short of words during most of the handover, able to say only "all is well, all is well" to the crowd before bursting into tears. "We came because we want peace," said Chief Andrew Anegba, who was among the thousands gathered in Warri to greet Tompolo before the ceremony. "The last militant groups are giving up arms, and that means peace is coming back," said Anegba, a traditional Ijaw ethnic community leader from Ogbe-Ijoh, close to where security forces used helicopters and gunboats to attack Tompolo’s camps in May 2009 (Amoda, 2009). President Yar’Adua’s amnesty offer is the most concerted effort so far to bring peace to the Delta. Unrest in the region has prevented Nigeria, which vies with Angola as Africa’s biggest oil producer, from pumping much above two-thirds of its production capacity. It also costs the country $1 billion a month in lost revenues, according to the Central Bank, and has helped to push up global energy prices (Tell, 2009). The most important question is: Can amnesty to militants bring about sustainable peace to the Niger Delta? This question becomes pertinent because the line between militancy and crime is blurred. Some militants have grown rich from a trade in stolen crude oil and extortion, with hundreds of expatriates and wealthy Nigerians

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kidnapped for ransom over the past three years. Skeptics say that, even if commanders disarm, there is little hope to stop fighters from finding new leaders and resuming attacks. Some residents fear they will return to the creeks unless those who hand over their weapons can quickly find work.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) The amnesty programme is basically DDR oriented. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants are the first step in the transition from war to peace. However, DDR is much more complicated in a post-conflict environment, when different fighting groups are divided by animosities and face a real security dilemma as they give up their weapons, when civil society structures have crumbled, and when the economy is stagnant. DDR supports the transition from war to peace by ensuring a safe environment, transferring ex-combatants back to civilian life, and enabling people to earn livelihoods through peaceful means instead of war (Wikipedia Encyclopedia, 2009). DDR is an applied strategy for executing successful peacekeeping operations, and is generally the strategy employed by all UN Peacekeeping Operations. Disarmament is the first phase of DDR, and logically precedes demobilization and reintegration. However, it is often a long-term process. It entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents (weapons, ammunition, etc.); Disarmament is important not only for the material improvement of security conditions, but also for its psychological impact. There are added psychological benefits when ex-combatants physically disable their own weapons, and are led in doing so by their commanders, immediately upon entering the disarmament site. The process symbolically underscores the transition from military to civilian life.

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Additionally, public destruction of weapons is an important tool in sensitizing the population and promoting the DDR program (Massimo, 2003). Demobilization entails the disbanding of armed groups. Demobilization includes assembly of ex-combatants, orientation programs, and transportation to the communities of destination. These movements of large groups of people should be timed to coincide with phases of civilian life that facilitate reintegration, such as crop and school cycles. According to Massimo (2003) demobilization requires: a.

Assembly of ex-combatants: This helps ensure their participation in the DDR program, through their disarmament, registration, and access to DDR benefits in the form of goods and services. When ex-combatants are assembled, they are first registered and then receive civilian identification cards, which allow the holders to participate in the DDR program and receive benefits. Encampments are not intended to host ex-combatants for a long time, but adequate facilities, food supplies, and medical assistance are important to maintain discipline and security. In addition, encampments' infrastructure should be built to meet not only the needs of ex-combatants, but also of the many dependents who may follow them.

Orientation of ex-combatants: This is essential in establishing and reinforcing ex-combatants' beliefs that the DDR program offers viable alternatives to conflict as a livelihood: Pre-discharge orientation has important practical and psychological functions. Practically, it provides ex-combatants and their dependents with basic information about the DDR program. Psychologically, it

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empowers DDR beneficiaries as free citizens, by addressing their needs and doubts and asking for their interactive participation. The pre-discharge orientation typically focuses on the DDR program, the implementing agencies, the rights and obligations of participants, and how they can access the program's benefits. General information is also offered about reintegration into civilian life, such as health issues, education and employment opportunities, and access to land and credit. Post-discharge orientation caters to more specific needs, in the context of the community of resettlement. Post-discharge orientation is the first step in the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. It provides information about the place of relocation, economic opportunities, and relevant local institutions and social networks, including religious groups, NGOs, veterans' associations, farmers' associations, women's groups, and others. After ex-combatants have been demobilized, their effective and sustainable reintegration into civilian life is necessary to prevent a new escalation of the conflict. Reintegration describes the process of reintegrating former combatants into civil society, ensuring against the possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict (Wikipedia Encyclopedia, 2009). In the short term, ex-combatants who do not find peaceful ways of making a living are likely to return to conflict. In the longer term, disaffected veterans can play an important role in destabilizing the social order and polarizing the political debate, becoming easy targets of populist, reactionary, and extremist movements. Massimo (2003) argues that reintegration includes: ď&#x201A;§

Reinsertion: This addresses the most immediate needs of excombatants. Reinsertion assistance consists of short-term relief interventions, which provide a safety net for demobilized ex-combatants. Assistance may include housing,

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medical care, food, and elementary education for children. The distribution of cash allowances has proven to be the most effective and efficient way to provide reinsertion assistance. Cash payments are preferred over in-kind assistance because of reduced transaction costs, easier and more transparent accounting, and because cash payments can adapt more closely to the specific needs of beneficiaries. Additionally, cash allowances have the positive psychological effect of empowering ex-combatants to take charge of their lives. However, cash payments present two dilemmas: they can give the negative impression of being "cash for weapons," and they can be easily lost or misused for consumption and pleasure. A common solution to this problem is to distribute allowances neither in advance, nor at the time of disarmament, but instead after arrival at the community of destination, in separate installments, and accompanied by post-discharge counseling. ď&#x201A;§

Economic Integration: This is the final requirement for a DDR program to be successful and sustainable in the long term. The goal of economic reintegration efforts is to provide excombatants with financial independence through employment. Different initiatives should cater to the special needs of disabled veterans who cannot reintegrate into the labor force, for rural settlers, and for urban settlers. Common economic integration programs include education and professional training, public employment, encouragement of private initiative through skills development and micro credit support, and access to land.

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Goals of DDR The goals of DDR can be classified into two, namely: 1.

Short-term goals: The immediate goal is the restoration of security and stability, through the disarmament of warring parties. Demobilization of armed groups is another fundamental step in the improvement of security conditions at the end of an armed conflict. Progressive disarmament reduces the mistrust that fuels a security dilemma between the fighting factions, allows aid workers to intervene more effectively, and allows peaceful social and economic activities to resume.

Long-term goals: The final goal of DDR is the sustained social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into a peaceful society. However, DDR programs are not comprehensive development projects; they are temporary measures to facilitate the transition from war to peace. If a DDR program is to be sustainable and successful in the long term, it must be integrated with and supported by interventions for post-conflict reconstruction and social and economic development (Massimo, 2003).

The Amnesty Programme and Structural Violence in the Niger Delta There is no doubt that the post amnesty period will be more challenging than the amnesty period. This is because the restoration of positive peace in the Niger Delta or the evoking of a civil war depends on the events of the post amnesty period. Positive peace can only be ensured if there is a well articulated plan for addressing the root causes of underdevelopment and sources of structural violence in the

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Niger Delta. The expression structural violence is often used to describe forms of institutionalized social injustice. According to Galtung (1969) structural violence refers to â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;a form of violence which corresponds with the systematic ways in which a given social structure or social institution kills people slowly by preventing them from meeting their basic needsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. Hunger and poverty are two prime examples of what is described as "structural violence," that is, physical and psychological harm that results from exploitive and unjust social, political and economic systems. Failure to sincerely and successfully implement policies that can address the problem of structural violence in the Niger Delta could rubbish the relative peace now prevailing in the region. In addition, failure to avoid anything that is capable of eroding the trust and confidence the ex-militants have in the federal government pertaining to the amnesty deal could lead to further insurgency (Umukoro, 2010). Since positive peace and its sustenance in the Niger Delta is hinged on understanding and addressing the root causes of underdevelopment and violence in the region, a careful diagnosis of the causes of underdevelopment and violence in the area is important.

The Amnesty Programme and the DDR Strategies for Peace in the Niger Delta The success of the amnesty programme and the DDR strategies for peace in the Niger Delta depends on finding lasting solutions to the root causes of violence in the area. A proper diagnosis of the causes of conflict in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria requires a tripartite dissection of conflict. These are: structural background conditions of conflict, conflict accelerating factors and the triggers. The structural background conditions of conflict at best only point to the existence of conflict potential but cannot explain the actual occurrence of a given conflict. They include; differences in ethnic

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groups, languages, religion and culture. They require other factors or force to activate them in order for an actual conflict to break out. These factors are the conflict accelerating factors. They include pressures of democratization, rising cases of unemployment, rising poverty, marginalization (perceived or actual), the demands for empowerment, stress and strains of environmental cum human insecurity. The combined effects of the structural background conditions of conflict and the conflict accelerating factors produce alarming social and ethnic tensions and conflicts (Adekanye, 1999). Wealth creation in a monocultural manner without development has made the Niger Delta a harbor of conflict accelerating factors which are igniting from time to time. Firstly, rising cases of unemployment is a cause for concern in the area. Enahoro (2003:14) commenting on this situation states that a lot of youths including university graduates have resorted to bike riding (Okada) to make ends meet. The rising cases of unemployment in the area breeds rising poverty. According to UNDP Human Development Report (2009) â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;the number of poor people in Nigeria remains high. The total poverty head count rose from 27.2 per cent in 1980 to 65.6 per cent in 1996, an annual average increase of 8.83 per cent in the 16-year period. However, between 1996 and 2004, population in the core poor category rose from 6.2 to 29.3 per cent before declining to 22.0 per cent in 2004â&#x20AC;&#x2122;. The report also shows that over 50 per cent of the total population is officially poor. This indicates that the Niger Delta region is suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor and contributes to endemic conflict. Secondly, environmental degradation cum human insecurity is another conflict accelerating factor in the area that requires careful attention. The problem of environmental cum human insecurity is

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basically due to the activities of multinational oil companies. The exploration, refining and transportation of petroleum result in social and ecological disturbance. These include explosions from seismic surveys, pollution from pipeline leaks, blowouts, drilling fluids and refinery effluents as well as land alienation and widespread destruction of the natural terrain from construction activities (Hutchful, 1985). The activities of oil companies have contributed to the marginalization of the peasantry in oil producing areas and threaten its conditions and existence. Oil exploration and exploitation have permanently alienated large tracts of land and accentuated land insecurity (Aluko, 1999). Pollution of terrestrial, atmospheric and marine environments is another aspect of environmental degradation. The dangers of pollution in this area is accentuated by three factors; an extensive coastline dominated by mangrove swamps, large numbers of offshore rigs and oil port facilities. These offshore activities pose particular danger to the sensitive mangrove ecology (Ake, 1985; Agbese, 1993; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Ojo, 2002; Uduaghan, 2008). Oil industry pollution arises from variety of sources. The first is crude oil from pipeline leaks, failure of equipment or tank overflow from excessive pressure, failure along pump manifolds, blow out of oil wells and sabotage to well heads and flow lines (Awobayo, 1981). Additionally, drilling mud and cuttings and gas flaring operations are also sources of environmental pollution (Hutchful, 1985). Undoubtedly, these conditions are causes for concern to the people of the Niger Delta area. Their aspiration is to have these problems ameliorated. That is why the people continually make claims on the

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government and oil companies. Such claims have been in the form of demands for compensations, increased revenue allocation to oil producing states, provision of adequate social and economic infrastructure, creating more job opportunities for the youths and the demand for resource control (Onduku, 2001; Saro-wiwa, 1993). The slow response of the political system to meet most of the demands of the people can be related to the contradictions of the country’s corrupt economy. The problems of rising poverty, unemployment and environmental decay with no real solution in sight have sown the seed of frustration in the minds of many. This makes them susceptible to aggression and militant activities. The quest for political redeemers or messiahs is also related to the ubiquity of violence during periods of election. In a nutshell, it is generally comprehended that the recurring crisis in the Niger Delta region is the product of the deep-seated sense of neglect and marginalization by the government and oil companies in supporting critical human development and provision of basic social amenities (Aboribo, and Umukoro, 2008). The situation in the Niger Delta is indeed a paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty. In spite of the oil wealth, the Niger Delta still remains one of the least developed parts of Nigeria. Outside the major urban areas, the level of infrastructural development and the provision of social amenities such as electricity, health care and education are very poor. The state of infrastructure in the Niger Delta made the World Bank to warn in 1995 that ‘an urgent need exists to implement mechanism to protect the life and health of the region’s inhabitants and its ecological systems from further deterioration’ (World Bank, 1995). Fourteen years after this warning the Niger Delta still suffers from infrastructural decay and underdevelopment (The News, 2009).

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Even though the activities of oil companies affect the health of the people in the rural areas, health facilities and personnel are concentrated in the cities and the quality of health care delivery is poor because of inadequate facilities and personnel. The people of the Niger Delta still suffer from debilitating diseases such as malaria, diarrhea and yellow fever (NDES, 1995). As a result of oil activities and migration, infrastructure has come under pressure in the cities, impacting heavily on the quality of life. Electricity supply has degenerated to the lowest ebb. In an attempt to solve these problems series of reports and recommendations have been made by different committees, commissions and conferences. Huge financial resources have also been wasted in handling the Niger Delta problem without significant achievement basically because of corruption (Umukoro, 2008). In recent times, especially before the amnesty programme, too much emphasis has been placed on coercive force with which to cow the militants in search for peace. This has not yielded positive results.

Conclusion There is an urgent need for decisive action to be taken to solve the developmental problems in the Niger Delta area since it is the root cause or justification of militant activities and violent conflicts in the area. Eradication of corruption and social peace building are the keys to ensuring sustainable development in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria. The relative peace experienced in the Niger Delta area as a result of the amnesty programme has major impacts on the Nigerian economy and the potentials for the generation of adequate revenue for development. The first major impact is that oil production has increased. This means increase in government's revenue and enhanced foreign exchange earnings. Benefits will also be realized in the gas sector, particularly in the area of gas supply to power plants for internal use. This will help to boost electricity supply which has

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become a major problem in recent times. These gains should be effectively harnessed for the sustainable development of Nigeria including the Niger Delta. Recommendations: - There should be rapid development of the Niger Delta region through the provision of infrastructural facilities. It is time to adopt the simple method used for the rapid development of Abuja in developing the Niger Delta. -

Strict environmental standards for air, land and water pollution should be enforced. The environmental protection agency should be strengthened for this task. Market based instruments like pollution taxes and effluent charges should be utilized. Revenue obtained from pollution taxes should be plough back into developmental projects or used to compensate inhabitants of the Niger Delta who have suffered as a result of environmental damage. An attempt should be made to mainstream environmental concerns in national economic policies. This will promote visibility and sustainability of environmental policies.

The Nigerian economy should be diversified in order to reduce dependence on the petroleum sector.

References Aboribo, R.O. and Umukoro N. (2008) â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Conflict of Globalization and the Globalization of Niger Delta Conflictâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in Nigerian Sociological Review, Vol. 8 Ake, C. (1985) Political Economy of Nigeria, Lagos: Longman

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Adekanye, J. (1999)‘Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Systems’ in Wohlgemnth L. Common Security and Civil Society in Africa (ed), Oslo: Peace Research Institute Agbese, D. (1993) ‘The Curse of Oil’, Newswatch, Vol.17, No.4. January 25 Aluko, M.A.O. (1999) ‘Social Dimensions and Consequences of Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: Suggestions for the next Millennium’ in Osuntokun, A. Environmental Problems of the Niger Delta, Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation Amoda, J.M. (2009) ‘Nigeria: Amnesty Approach to Niger Delta Crisis’ Vanguard Newspaper Awobayo, S.A. (1981) An Analysis of Oil Spill incidence\in Nigeria: 1976-1980, Warri: Petroleum Training Institute Enahoro, E. (2003) ‘Riots in Warri’ in the Nigerian Observer, Vol. 9, No. 9 Galtung, J. (1969) "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 Human Rights Watch (1999) The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities, New York: Human Rights Watch Human Rights Watch (2002) The Niger Delta: No Democracy Dividend, New York: Human Rights Watch Human Rights Watch (2005) Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State, Human Rights Watch Hutchful, E. (1985) ‘Oil Companies and Environmental Pollution’ in Ake, C. Political Economy of Africa (ed), Lagos: Longman

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Ibeanu, Okechukwu, 2002, ‚Democracy, Environment and Security in Nigeria: Reflections on Environment and Governance in the Post Military Era‛, Annuals of the Social Science Academy of Nigeria, 14 & 15th December. Massimo, F. (2003) "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of ExCombatants." Beyond Intractability. (Eds.) Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/demobilization/ Niger Delta Environmental Survey Report (1995). Nkoro, E. (2005) Conflict in the Niger Delta: the Way Forward. SearchWarp.com Nwabueze, B. (2008) ‘The Patriots Warns on Federal Governments threat of War in the Niger Delta’, Vanguard, July 10 Ogidan, A (2007) ‚Why Oil Prices Are Rising‛ from Nigeria Guardian Newspaper, on line http://www.ngrguardiannews.com, July 12, 2007 Ojie, A.E. (2007) Hostage-Taking and the prospect of Peace Building in the Niger Delta, in Nigerian Sociological Review, Vol. 2, No. 1. Ojo, O.J.B (2002) The Niger Delta: Managing Resources and Conflict, Ibadan: Development Policy Centre. Onduku, A. (2001) Environmental Conflicts: the case of the Niger Delta, Warri: Urhobo Historical Society. Okoko, Kimse, 1998, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) – Host Community Relations Study (Unpublished). Olagbaiye, Tunde, 1990, Statutory Regulations of the Environment: An Appraisal of the Lagos Environmental Sanitation Edict, 1985, in J. A.

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Omotola, Environmental Laws in Nigeria, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. Osoba, S.O. (2000) ‘Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives,’ in Rwekaza Mukandala (ed), Harare: AAPS Books Pepple, A. (2007) ‚Niger Delta: Government Must Dump Past Deceptive Tactics‛, from Nigeria Guardian Newspaper, on line http://www.guardiannewsngr.com, accessed July 06. Repetto, R. (1989) "Balance-Sheet Erosion -- How to Account for the Loss of Natural Resources," International Environmental Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2 Rummel R.J. (1984) Understanding Conflict and War (Vol. 4), New York: Sage Publications Salau, A. J., 1993, Environmental Crisis and Development in Nigeria, Inaugural Lecture, University of Port Harcourt, Choba, Nigeria. Saro-wiwa, K. (1993) ‘These we demand’ Newswatch, Vol.17, No.4, January 25. Shakleman, J. (2006) ‚Oil Profits and Peace: Does Business have a Role in Peacemaking?‛ United States Institute of Peace. Smith, D (1997). The State of War and Peace Atlas, London & New York, NY: Penguin Books. Smith, D. (2002) Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict, Berghof: Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Steven, M. S. (2003). Economics: Principles in action. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. Tell (2009), November 2.

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The Guardian (2009), October 2. The News (2009), July 6. Torulagha, P.S. (2007) ‚The Niger Delta, Oil and Western Strategic Interests: The Need for Understanding‛, http://unitedijawstates.com, accessed June 28, 2007. Uduaghan E.E. (2008) How Oil Firms Investors can Secure their Investments in the Niger Delta, Vanguard Newspaper, June 6. Ukaogo, V. (1999) ‘Transnational Business Ethics, Government Policies and the Crises of Pollution and underdevelopment in Niger Delta’ Cited in Ojo, O.J.B (2002) The Niger Delta: Managing Resources and Conflict, Ibadan: Development Policy Centre. Ukeje, C. (2001) ‘Youths, Violence and the Colapse of Public Order in the Niger Delta of Nigeria’ in African Development, Vol. XXVI No. 1 and 2. Umukoro, N. (2008) ‚Corruption and Militant Group in the Delta State of Nigeria: Implication on Multinational Corporations‛. A Paper Presented at the International Conference on Institutions, Culture and Corruption in Africa, Organised by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) at the United Nations Conference Centre, Addis Abba, Ethiopia, October 13-15. Umukoro, N. (2010) ‘Beyond Amnesty: Curbing the Looming Civil War and Environmental Scarcity in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, A Paper Presented at the International Conference on the Territorial Origins of African Civil Conflicts, Organized by Ohio State University, USA and the University of Kwazulu Natal, South Africa in Pietermarizburg, South Africa, January 29th and 30th 2010.

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Welch, D (1993) Justice and the Genesis of War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yusuf, H.O. (2008). â&#x20AC;&#x203A;Oil on Troubled Waters-Multinational Corporations and Realizing Human Rights in the Developing World with Particular Reference to Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x203A; African Human Rights Law Journal 8.1 Wikipedia Encyclopedia, (2009). http://en.wikipedia.org .

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Amnesty and Peace-Building in the Niger Delta: Addressing the Frustration-Aggression Trap Dr. Ibaba Samuel Ibaba10 Key Terms: Niger Delta; Amnesty; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR); Frustration-Aggression Trap

Abstract This paper interrogated the Nigerian Government amnesty program, intended to resolve the Niger Delta conflict. The objective was to address the frustration-aggression trap and highlight the challenges it poses to peace-building. To achieve this, the paper was divided into five sections, including the introduction. The first section after the introduction examined theoretical issues of interest and describes frustration-aggression trap as a condition where individuals or groups cannot get out of frustration because their environment and policies of government reinforces the blockage of goal attainment or ignores it. The second located the context of oil related conflict in the Niger Delta, while the third, which analyzed the challenges posed to the amnesty program by the frustration-aggression trap, focused on oil induced environmental degradation and corruption in governance as elements of the trap, which has created conditions for violence, and noted that if not addressed, it can trigger the recurrence of violence in the region. The fourth section concluded the study and noted environmental protection through the strengthening and enforcement of environmental laws as one option to deal with the problem. Further, it suggested bringing the fight against corruption into peaceIbaba Samuel Ibaba, PhD, is affiliated to the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Nigeria where he lectures Political Science and engages in research focused on conflict analysis, peace building and development. He can be contacted via E-mail: eminoaibaba@yahoo.com or through P.O. BOX 1529, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. 10

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building in the region, alongside the institutionalization of democratic governance as the most likely means to escape the frustrationaggression trap and ensure the success of the amnesty program.

Introduction Agitations in Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Niger Delta dates back to the colonial era when the fear of domination and neglect by the major ethnic groups in the country, triggered demands for state creation, seen by people of the Niger Delta as a guarantee for development and a shield from ethnicity-based political domination. The colonial government established the Willink Commission to inquire into these fears and demands, but the Commission refused the request for state creation which it considered inappropriate. However, having recognized the lack of development as the key reason for the agitations, it recommended the declaration of the region as a special area of development, and the establishment of a board to plan its development (Willink Commission Report, 1958:94-95). The Nigerian government responded to this recommendation and established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1961, but the development plight of the region was not addressed as vindicated by the 1966 Major Isaac Adaka Boro led rebellion which cited development neglect, arising largely from ethnicity-based political domination as the reason for the rebellion which sought to create a Niger Delta Republic. The revolt which commenced on February 23, 1966 lasted till March 6th of the same year, when leaders of the rebellion were taken into custody by federal troops (Tebekaemi, 1982). At this point, the violence was not directly linked to oil, probably because it was not yet the economic pivot of the country. But things took a different turn when in the 1970s, oil-related conflicts erupted. First as community agitations against Transnational Oil Companies

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(TOCs) for neglect of corporate social responsibility, environmental degradation, and payment of compensation for damages to property caused by oil exploration and production activities, turned to conflict between the communities and security operatives such as the police and the army. This later turned to insurgency against the state, as militia groups emerged to engage security operatives in armed struggle, just as they made political demands on the Nigerian government (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye & Okhomina, 2007; Watts, 2007). The insurgency phase of the violence has attracted concerns which pertains mainly to its impact on global and national energy security, Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s national security and economic development and stability, and security in the Gulf of Guinea. The most manifest impact of this phase of the violence was the drastic cut in oil production and by extension oil revenues. For example, the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s oil production is noted to have dropped from 2.6 million barrels per day in 2005, to 1.3 million barrels per day in June 2009 (Obi, 2010:220). This, in addition to the threats to national security forced the Nigerian government to proclaim amnesty for militia combatants as a means to ensure peace. Since the introduction of the amnesty program in August 2009, concerns have been raised on its capacity to end violence in the region. Whereas the failure of the amnesty program to follow conventional Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) procedure which requires negotiations and establishment of a framework of implementation has been noted as major defect of the program (Ikelegbe, 2010; Davidheiser & Kialee, 2010; Adeyemo & Olu-Adeyemi 2010), the consensus is that addressing the fundamentals which underlie the transformation of the Niger Delta conflict is crucial to peace-building.

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The proliferations of arms, the violent responses of the state and TOCs, and the non-resolution of the fundamental issues which motivate the conflict have been highlighted as major reasons for conflict transformation. The analysis of the transition of the conflict from protests to insurgency has however under indicated the frustration-aggression trap. The objective of this paper is to fill this gap. It argues that although the amnesty program has restored peace as evidenced by the cessation of attacks on oil installations and kidnapping of oil company personnel, violence will most likely reoccur if the frustration-aggression trap is not addressed. The issues for analysis include: What are the elements of the frustrationaggression trap? How has the trap contributed to conflict transformation in the Niger Delta? What challenges does the frustration-aggression trap pose to the amnesty program and peacebuilding in the region? The remaining part of the paper proceeds in four sections. The first examines theoretical issues in amnesty, peace-building and the frustration-aggression trap, while the second locates the context of oilrelated violence in the Niger Delta. The third section discusses the challenges posed to the amnesty program and peace-building by the frustration-aggression trap. The fourth section concludes the study with suggestions on the way forward. Frustration-Aggression Trap, Amnesty and Peace-Building: Issues in Theory This section provides a theoretical guide to the issues of interest. Divided into three areas, the first reflects on the frustrationaggression explanation of violence, and locates how the frustrationaggression trap arises from it. The second discusses the amnesty program and links it to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). It highlights the issue of context and explains

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the peculiarities of the Niger Delta amnesty program. The third explains peace-building and links it to the amnesty program. (a) Frustration –Aggression Trap The frustration-aggression explanation of conflict, pioneered by John Dollard, Leonard Doob, Neal Miller, O.H Mowrer, and Robert Sears in 1939 ( Berkowitz, 1989) has been used as one of the dominant explanations of violence in the Niger Delta. But the analysis has not highlighted the dimension of being trapped in frustration-aggression. This theory explains conflict from a psychological perspective, and blames conflict on the inhibition or blockage of goal attainment. Faleti (2006: 47) explains this with the ‚want-get-ratio‛, ‚expected need satisfaction‛ and ‚actual need satisfaction‛. The explanation is that the gap between what people feel they want or deserve and what they actually get sets in frustration that culminates into aggression and violence. The disappointment arising from not getting what an individual wants or deserves, and the impact this brings to bear on him, triggers frustration and aggression. Although frustration does not always lead to violence due to intervening variables such as the fear of sanctions, the linkage cannot be disputed (Berkowitz, 1989). The targets of violence in this context are the individual, institution or organization, perceived to be the cause of deprivation, or those related to it (Faleti 2006: 47). Theories of aggression have supported this by noting that aggression occurs as an innate response to frustration, although the theories also acknowledge that it can be instigated by instinct or learned. It however clarifies that frustration-aggression is more systematically developed and has empirical backing (Gurr, 1968). But is frustration-aggression a passing or permanent phase? Can frustration be endured to prevent aggression? Are there conditions where people cannot get out of frustration and by extension

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aggression? Frustration can be circumstantial or permanent if not resolved. Indeed, psychologists attributes conflict to frustration arising from unresolved challenges or obstacles, suggesting that conflicts would always occur as long as such challenges are not resolved (Anikpo, 1998). Frustrations can remain unattended to by policies which fail to address the causes, or just because attempts are not made to resolve the issues. The point is that where an individual or a group of people lack the capacity to escape frustration on their own, and government policies fail to assist them to do so or reinforces their frustration, such individuals or groups will most likely remain in permanent frustration. Frustration-aggression trap thus refers to a condition where individuals or groups cannot get out of frustration because their environment and policies of government reinforces the blockage or inhibition of goal attainment, or ignores it. The implication is conflict transformation from one phase or stage to another, as the people respond to changing situations of frustration in society. The Niger Delta conflict was triggered by several factors that are linked to the inhibition of goal attainment- centralized federalism and inequity distribution of oil arising from ethnicity-based political domination and neglect of the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s development; oil induced environmental degradation and the resultant occupational displacement, lose of income and increased poverty; corruption in governance and poor service delivery; and the neglect of corporate social responsibility by TOCs and their refusal to pay or payment of inadequate compensation for damages to properties caused by oil production activities. The frustrations arising from these triggered the conflict, and the non-resolution of these challenges motivated the transformation of the conflict. Importantly, present policies are not addressing these issues, in particular, oil induce environmental degradation and its socio-economic consequences, and corruption in

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governance and the resultant deprivation of the people. Because these challenges inhibit goal attainment, they provide objective realities for a vicious circle of conflict, as the reinforcement of frustration always motivates aggression. Addressing the frustrationaggression trap is thus a core requirement for peace-building in the Niger Delta. (b) The Amnesty Program (AP) and DDR DDR has become a major strategy for the resolution of conflict and management of post-conflict situations for over two decades now. Widely utilized by the United Nations and similar organizations, its preference in conflict resolution appears to be linked to its acceptance as an effective tool for achieving sustainable peace. The Nigerian government adopted the amnesty program in this contest. However, the program has been questioned by some scholars who argue that, by its conception and operation, the amnesty program does not conform to DDR in its fundamentals. According to Davidheiser and Nyiayaana (2010:1): A DDR program is typically adopted as a means of transition from conflict to peace since its function is to remove one or more of the disputing parties from the scene. Accordingly, peace negotiations generally include DDR clauses, yet in peacebuilding theory, a DDR program is only expected to comprise the preliminary phases of a much broader process of addressing root causes that initially motivated the combatants. By failing to include the latter, the Amnesty Program does not conform to this model.

The lack of negotiations between the government and combatants is identified here as a major flaw which dissociates the amnesty program from DDR. But Ikelegbe (2010) list other defects such as the absence of cease fire and cessation of hostilities before the

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proclamation of the amnesty program, and the lack of gestures such as the release of detained combatants and those on trial, and the noninvolvement of international organizations as evidences why the program deviates from DDR. It is true that these are essential components of DDR, but their absence in the amnesty program is not enough to dismiss it as non-DDR compliant, as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are core policies of the amnesty program. Negotiation and cease fire for example, are processes which lead to DDR, and to insist that there must be negotiation between the government and combatants will be ignoring context, and thus missing out the point. This is also true of international support that may not be necessary always. The essence of negotiation is to establish a framework for conflict resolution, which is expected to address the root causes of the conflict and a determination of how to resolve them. In the Niger Delta Context where these were already known and established, pre-DDR negotiations with combatants can be overlooked. Further, the violence was championed by a welter of groups (Watts, 2007), and thus, negotiations with combatants could have been disorderly. The individual acceptance of the amnesty by militia leaders, the feelings of betrayal by others and the separate meetings between militia groups and the late President Umaru Musa Yarâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;adua after they have accepted the amnesty vindicate this point. At another level of analysis, there is no single path to DDR, as it can be secured in three ways. First, DDR can be secured through negotiated settlement between parties in conflict with support from a third party. Second, it can be established by one party after defeating others, and third, DDR can be the result of peace agreements midwifed through international intervention (UN Report on DDR, 2007). Thus the insistence that the amnesty program deviates from

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conventional procedures for the establishment of DDR, simply because it did not follow the path of conflicting parties negotiating to secure DDR ignores context, and again misses the point. That the amnesty program satisfies the core phases and goals of DDR is not in doubt, as it adopted the DDR phases and processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, highlighted in Table 1. Table 1: The Phases and Processes of DDR Phase Disarmament (Removing the weapons) Demobilization (Discharging combatants from their units)

Reintegration (The socio-economic process of becoming a civilian)

Processes Collection and documentation of arms and ammunitions from combatants and development of arms management program Discharge of active combatants from armed groups and the provision of reinsertion (transitional assistance) in the form of allowances to cover basic needs, short-term education, training and employment. Status change process from combatant to civilians

Source: Joab-Peterside, 2010:74-75

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia groups in the Niger Delta was a policy recommended by the Niger Delta Technical Committee ( NDTC), a committee established in 2008 by the Nigerian government to determine appropriate peace-building strategies in the region. The 40 member committee, made of scholars and opinion leaders from the region made wide consultations with

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stake holders, including the combatants before making its recommendations. The policy recommendations on DDR states in part that: 

Federal government should establish a credible and authoritative DDR institution and process including international negotiators to plan, implement, and oversee the DDR programs at regional, state, and local government levels



Grant amnesty to all Niger Delta militants willing and ready to participate in the DDR program



Work out long-term strategies of human capacity development and reintegration for ex-militants



Exclude from amnesty and criminalize the activities of those militants not committed to the DDR process and unwilling to surrender to arms (NDTC, 2008: 66)

Further, specific tasks were assigned to the states and local governments, communities, militia groups and security operatives in order to ensure the success of the program. In particular, state governments1 were required to support the rebuilding of communities destroyed by military invasion, and establish youth development centers and community demobilization and reintegration committees to enhance reintegration and capacity building. State governments were also required to provide social amenities such as health centers Federating units in Nigeria are called States, and there are 36 of such states and 774 local government councils. 1

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and schools at the site of former militant camps (NDTC, 2008: 67). The amnesty program was therefore not imposed by the federal government, neither is it a beneficent gift to Niger Delta militias, nor is it an instrument of political patronage or primitive accumulation of wealth as argued by Davidheiser and Nyiayaana ( 2010) and JoabPeterside ( 2010). The amnesty program was proclaimed on June 25, 2009, and militias were given a 60 day period (August 3 to October 4, 2009) to accept the offer. Arms collection centers and withholding camps were created across the region. At the end of the period, over 20,000 militias disarmed and surrendered thousands of arms ammunitions, and other weapons of war ranging from rocket launchers, KK 47 Rifles, pump action guns, machine guns and gun boats (Okogun & Okeneye, 2009: 1-2; Joab-Peterside, 2010: 85-98). The program has since moved on to the rehabilitation and reintegration phase. First, the militias were sent for non-violence training, to ensure behavior modification and equip them with strategies for peaceful resolution of conflicts. Thereafter, they have been sent for training in their chosen areas of economic empowerment, including vocational skills acquisition and entrepreneurship training. While some are trained within the country, others were sent to South Africa and Ghana. The federal government has also stepped up efforts in providing social infrastructure, although the noticeable project in this area thus far, is the accelerated construction of the East-West road2

The East-West Road is the major road that connects the Niger Delta states. Importantly too, it is the major link between the Niger Delta and other parts of Nigeria. This makes it an important road for communication and the 2

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It is discernible from the above that the amnesty program has the essential features of DDR. The report of the NDTC which was based on wide consultation with stake holders, and the consultations and negotiations between opinion and political leaders of the Niger Delta and the militia groups which preceded the commencement of the amnesty program can be termed in context as Pre-DDR negotiations. Importantly also, militia leaders who accepted the amnesty held meetings with the late president of the country, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’adua, ‚to clear doubts, build trust, express demands, make guarantees, and clarify intentions‛ (Ikelegbe, 2010:11).The disarmament and demobilization of militias, the sub-sequent closure of their camps, and the on-going rehabilitation and reintegration process are also indications of the DDR strategy for peace-building. Thus far, the program has restored peace; the militias have left the creeks, attacks on oil infrastructure and oil company personnel have stopped, and oil production has been restored to normal level of about 2.3 million barrels per day (AIT, 2010). The possible recurrence of violence is however a major concern. (c) Conflict and Peace-Building Conflict necessitates peace-building, which seeks to secure peace through conflict prevention, resolution and management (World Bank, 2006; Ibeanu, 2006; Francis, 2006; Best, 2007). This is however enhanced by knowledge of the motives for conflict and peculiarities of particular conflict systems (Bassey, 2002). Conflict prevention requires the identification and containment of possible conflict drivers before they trigger conflicts. In contrast, conflict resolution intervenes to change or facilitate the course of a conflict. This is also seen as part of evacuation of petroleum products from the Niger Delta to other areas in Nigeria.

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conflict management which establishes institutional and regulative procedures to deal with conflicts when they occur (Otite, 2001: 6 & 10). But, Best (2006:94), separates conflict resolution from conflict management, and describes conflict resolution as the termination of conflict through the provision of constructive solutions to the causal factors of conflict, and modification of behavior from violent to peaceful coexistence among previously hostile adversaries. The point on behavior modification highlights one link between conflict resolution and DDRs reintegration phase that seeks to give excombatants a new orientation in collective existence. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on negotiation by DDR links it to mediation, one of the three dominant approaches to conflict resolution. Table 2 compares mediation with adjudication and arbitration, the other two dominant methods of conflict resolution, and gives an indication of why mediation is preferable to the other two. Although the outcome of intervention in mediation is not binding, the participation of all disputants, pragmatic outcome, and win-win posture establishes trust among adversaries, guarantees consensus on the framework for the resolution of conflict, and secures commitment from all parties. This makes it suitable for the resolution of armed conflicts such as the Niger Delta crisis.

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Table 2: Adjudication, Arbitration and Mediation: A Comparison

Staring points Decision making authority Outcome of intervention Focus of intervention Number of outcome Number of parties required for occurrence of intervention Parties influence over identified third party

Types of Intervention Adjudication Arbitration Judge Arbiter

Mediation Disputants

Binding

Non binding

Law based outcome

Win-lose

One

All

Management and pragmatic outcome Win-Win (Compromise) All

Yes

Source: Adapted from Kleiboer (1998), cited by Godongs (2006: 132)

But how does DDR contribute to peace-building? Demobilization and reintegration reduces the risk of returning to violence, as it removes arms from combatants and gives them a new orientation, such as the resolution of conflict through peaceful means as against the use of violence (Humpreys and Weinsten, 2007). The disarmament and reintegration program of the amnesty program captures this and thus makes it a useful program for peace-building in the Niger Delta. Niger Delta: The Context of Oil-Related Violence The description of the Niger Delta has elicited two broad view points; one that describes it as a geographic entity, and the other

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which sees it as an oil producing region. Whereas the geographic definition lists 6 states (Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers) as the component states of the region, Abia, Imo and Ondo states are included in the conception of the Niger Delta as an oil producing region. However, this later view, widely described as the political definition of the Niger Delta, is the accepted definition in policy circles (Etekpe, 2007; Tamuno, 2008; Omotola, 2010). Located in the southern part of Nigeria, the region is home to Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. Oil is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, and between 1960 and 2006 for example, the country generated about $500 billion as oil revenue (Nafziger, 2008:153-154). Presently, the country also earns about $4 from natural gas exports (Obi a, 2010:104) Despite these huge revenues derived from oil and gas, produced majorly in the Niger Delta, the region remains one of the most impoverished parts of Nigeria ( Obib, 2010:221). This paradox, largely blamed on ethnicity-based political domination, the country’s centralized federalism and inequitable distribution of the oil wealth, oil induced environmental degradation and the dislocation of local economies, and corruption in governance and the resultant deprivation (Naanen, 1995; UNDP, 2006; Ibaba, 2009) triggered conflicts which began as community agitations against oil companies in the 1970s and burst into full blown insurgency in 2005 ( Watts, 2007; Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye & Okhomina, 2007). The interface between the conflict and oil can be discerned from Table 3 which provides insight into Nigerias’ crude oil export. The information shows that the country’s crude oil export rose sharply in the 1970s, a period that coincided with community agitations against the TOCs. It also indicates that the 1990s up to the 2000 years recorded large volume of oil export. Significantly, this period witnessed rapid transformation of the conflict. Indeed, the year 2005, which witnessed

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the emergence of the armed insurgency, recorded the highest volume of oil sales. Table 3: Volume of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria

Year 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

Vol. of Prod. In mbpd. 1.9 4.1 6.4 16.4 24.6 27.9 44.0 99.4 152.4 116.6

Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977

Vol. of Prod. In mbpd. 51.9 196.3 395.8 558.7 655.3 719.4 823.3 660.1 758.1 766.1

Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

Vol. of Prod. In mbpd. 696.3 845.5 760.1 525.5 470.6 450.9 507.5 547.1 535.9 482.9

Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Vol. of Prod. In mbpd. 529.0 626.7 660.6 689.9 711.3 695.4 696.2 715.4 681.9 855.0

Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Vol. of Prod. In mbpd. 806.4 774.7 828.3 859.6 725.9 844.1 900.0 923.5 814.0 880.0

Source: Tell, 2008: 28

Conflicts between the oil producing communities and the TOCs robed off on inter-community and intra-community conflicts which became worse with competition over benefits of the oil industry such as employment, location of project, award of contracts, naming of oil facilities such well sites, flow stations and manifolds. Further, the use of security operatives (in particular the anti-riot police squad or Mobile Police and the Army) by TOCs to protect their facilities and the suppression of protests by communities pitched the communities against the security operatives in the 1980s, setting the stage for violent confrontation between the communities and security agencies.

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Table 4 provides insight into actors of the conflict, to enhance understanding of the context of violence. Table 4: Actors in Niger Delta Conflicts S/No. Types of Conflict 1 Intra-community conflict:

Actors in Conflict/Mode of Aggression Community factions: (A) Urban Elites against Local Elites Urban Elites: Hijack of community resources; disregard for local elites. Local Elites: Incite youths and chiefs against the urban elites. (B) Youths against Elites Youths: Destruction of properties owned by the elites; harassment of relations. Elites: Fractionalization of youth Bodies through partisan support and patronage. Attack on rival groups. (C) Youths against Youths (D) Youths against Community Youths: Over throw of community leadership and usurpation of power. Community: Inequity distribution of resources leading to the short changing of youths (E) Claims Agents against Community Claims Agents: Short changing of community members Community: Refusal to pay agreed fees; double dealing.

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Actors in Conflict/Mode of Aggression (F) Youths against Chiefs Youths: Dethronement of chiefs; attack on chiefs. Chiefs: Fractionalization of Youth Bodies through partisan support and patronage kidnapping; encroachment on land and fishing grounds; attack on community members(s). Youths, chiefs and elites Community: Attack on oil installations/ equipment; work stoppages; seizure of property, kidnapping of workers

Inter â&#x20AC;&#x201C; community conflicts

Community against oil company

Youths, chiefs, elites, oil MNCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s and security operatives Oil Company: Fractionalization of community leaders; refusal to pay compensation; breach of MOU; payment of inadequate compensation.

Community against state

Community youths and security operatives Community: Disruption of oil production; attack on security operatives State: Attack by security operatives; neglect and deprivation.

Inter-ethnic

Intra-militia/cult/ confraternity groups Inter-militia/cult/ confraternity groups

Youths, elites and chiefs Encroachment of land; domination and exclusion. Youths Inequality in resource distribution; Youths Encroachment on area of control or oil theft zone

Source: Ibaba & Ikelegbe, 2009: 7

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The emergence of youth groups and the radicalization of same marked a major turning point of the conflict, as militia groups emerged to confront the state and the security operatives. Groups such as Niger Delta Volunteers (NDV), Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) which emerged with the goal to provide a common platform for all militia groups in the region, confronted the military and attacked oil infrastructure and oil company personnel. The oil industry and the national economy became the victims. Obi b (2010:220) capture the implications thus: Between late 2005 and mid-2009, attacks against oil installations forced the shutdown of between 25% and 40% of Nigerianâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s oil production and exports, leading to substantial loss of revenues and profits by the state-oil multinationals alliance. These militia attacks (in addition to oil theft) have largely accounted for a drop in oil production from about 2.6 million barrels in 2005 to 1.3 million barrels in June 2009. The resultant loss of revenue is estimated in billions of Dollars. The transformation of initially uncoordinated, non-violent protests into a full-blown pan-Delta insurgency and the attendant insecurity in the region has continued to occupy the attention of strategic and policy analysts and oil multinationals, whose multibillion dollar investments are at grave risks. Also at stake are the energy security and strategic interests of oil-dependent Western powers, which back the oil multinationals and rely on oil imports from the Niger Delta.

Other source indicates that oil production dropped to about 700,000(AIT, 2010).This endangered the national economy which depends on oil, and the economies of other countries which depend on Nigerian oil. This, the kidnapping of oil company personnel, the instability, and threat to national security occasioned by the proliferation and stockpiling of arms and ammunitions by the militia

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groups necessitated the amnesty program. Before the amnesty program, a number of interventions have been made by the Nigerian government and the TOCs. The oil companies responded to community protests with community development projects, by providing basic social amenities such as clean water, health facilities, school buildings, and the provision of scholarships and training of youths to acquire vocational skills. The government intervened in development engineering through the establishment of ministerial and extra-ministerial agencies, such as the Presidential Committee on the disbursement of the 1.5 percent oil derivation fund, the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). Further, the government increased the oil derivation fund to oil producing states from 3 percent to 13 percent. However, these attempts failed to address the frustrations which drive conflict in the region thus setting in the transformation of the conflict from one phase to another. The amnesty program, the latest attempt to resolve the conflict faces the challenge of the unresolved frustrations. The next section examines this.

Frustration-Aggression Trap and Challenges to the Amnesty Program This section argues that due ineffective policies which fail to address fundamental causal factors which link the blockage of attainment to frustration, the people of the Niger Delta are unable to come out of frustration, thus creating a circle of aggression which instigates violence in the area. This, the paper contends, is a threat to the amnesty program. The analysis will be limited to oil induced environmental degradation and corruption in governance and the resultant deprivation of the people, a choice informed by the neglect of these two key issues in the peace-building process.

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(a) Oil induced Environmental Degradation Two consequences of the oil industry in the Niger Delta are oil spills and gas flare, which have caused severe damage to the environment and livelihoods of the people. Available data indicates that the country recorded a total of 9,107 oil spills between 1976 and 2005 alone (Nwilo and Badejo, 2008:1222). Between 2003 and 2007, the Shell Petroleum Development Company alone recorded 1,243 oil spills (SPDC, 2008). These incidents resulted in the spilling of oil into the environment, with the attendant damage to the ecosystem. Between 1976 and 2005 for instance, a total of 3,121,909.8 barrels of oil was spilt into the environment (Nwilo and Badejo, 2008: 122. 2). Significantly, about 70 percent of spilt oil in the region is not recovered. Gas flare is also noted to have caused severe environmental problems. Nigeria flares 20 billion out of the global 150 cubic feet of gas that is flared annually (Uzoma, 2008:29).Oil spills destroy economic trees and crops within 2.1/4 kilometers (Adeyemo, 2008: 62). Gas flares also have similar effects. For example, studies have shown that crop yield reduces by 45 percent and 10 pecent 600 meters and one kilometer respectively from flares site (Adeyemo, 2002: 69). Meanwhile, there are about 275 flow stations where gas is flared in the region. Oil spills and gas flares have impacted on the local economies largely based on farming and fishing; leading to occupational displacement/disorientation, and forced migration (UNDP, 2006; Opukri & Ibaba, 2008). The point is that the local farmer and fisherman/woman experience no improvement in his/her condition of living, no matter how hard the individual works. Expected crop yield at harvest for example, is not realized, and hopes of earning higher incomes have been dashed. Remaining in poverty no matter how hard an individual works is certainly a source frustration which creates conditions for violence. But, current policies are not addressing the issues of environmental

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degradation related to oil industry activities. Government and oil company intervention in the development of the region has only targeted infrastructure and educational development. Attempts to deal with environmental issues have not yielded results as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) which was given this mandate has abandoned it. The state governments in the region have also neglected the environment in their development policies, while federal agencies are too distant to make any meaningful impact. Worse, alternative means of livelihood have not been provided. Similarly, the problems of agricultural development, including the lack of farm inputs such as improved seedlings and fertilizer, storage facilities, transportation and communications, small farm sizes, and modern equipments/expertise, have not been addressed. Because the solutions to these problems are beyond the capacity of the people, the neglect by the government and TOCs means that they remain with the problems and the frustrations which results from them. Significantly, oil induced environmental degradation impacts mainly on the rural areas where majority of the citizens live. Thus the aggravation of poverty, one consequence of the degradation affects a large proportion of the population, including the youths who lead the violence. Whereas the neglect of the environment has contributed to population displacement and rural-urban migration, the urban migrants cannot find work or other means of livelihood, due to the crisis plaguing the national economy, lack of credit facilities, and poor infrastructures, particularly the lack of electricity or power. Thus frustrations deepen, and support conditions for violence. This has the potential to breed new militias or reactivate dormant ones. (b) Corruption in Governance This section highlights the interface between corruption in governance, the resultant deprivation, and conflict. Essentially,

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corruption in governance occurs as stealing of public funds through the inflation of project costs; payments for fictitious projects and workers (ghost project and workers); outright stealing of funds; inflated travel expenses, salaries and allowances; among others. The examples cited below demonstrate the different faces of corruption in the region. In 2005, the Opobo/Nkoro local government council in Rivers State budgeted a total sum of $6.92million, out of which the capital allocation to education and health sectors were $170,000 and $23,000 respectively. Similarly for recurrent expenditure, the salaries for â&#x20AC;&#x161;protocol officersâ&#x20AC;&#x203A; were $247,846 as against that for workers in the health sector which was $215,040. Significantly, the travel budget of the Chairman was $53,800. In 2006, the Rivers State government set aside the sum of $23,725,000 out of its total budget of $1.3billion to fund travels by the Governor and $10 million for catering services and souvenirs as gifts for guest of the government, but allocated $20,000,000 to its sustainable development program (HRW, 2007:37-38 & 77-78). Also in Bayelsa State, the 2008 budget of the state government allocated 45.6% of the total overhead costs and 7.6% of total budget as the overhead cost for running the offices of the governor and his deputy. Significantly, agriculture, education, health and water supply were allocated 3%, 8.1%, 8.1% and 3.6% respectively (Bayesla state Budget, 2008). Other figures for 2008 indicate that, Akwa-Ibom State allocated 23.2% of its budget to Government House, and 12% and 3.5% to education and health respectively. Delta State budgeted 5.8% for Government House, 2.5% for education and 2.6% for the health sector, while Rivers State allocated 6.2% to Government House, 6.4% to education, and 4.1% to health (Niger Delta Standard, 209:28). The allocations to Government House is spent on security vote, travels, gifts and souvenirs, entertainment, purchase of news papers and magazines, drugs, among others. This is also applicable to the

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national level where the Central Bank Governor alleged in 2010 that the National Assembly alone gulped 25% of federal government overhead budget for 2010. The implication of this pattern of expenditure is twofold. First, it encourages corruption, as demonstrated by the many allegations of corruption against past and present public office holders by the two prominent anti graft agencies in the country; the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC). Attempts have been made to deal with this problem, and perhaps the most celebrated was the 2005 arrest in London, of former Bayelsa State Governor, Chief D.S.P Alamieyeseigha for money laundering and related practices involving hundreds of millions of United States Dollars. Chief Alamieyeseigha, who was alleged to have escaped from London, was later convicted by a Nigerian High Court in 2007. Other examples include the conviction of former Edo State Governor, Chief Lucky Igbinedion for misappropriation of State funds. Former Delta State Governor, Chief James Ibori, is facing similar charges. The conviction of Chief Olabode George, a chieftain of the ruling Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Democratic Party and its former deputy national chairman for the South-West zone3 (PDP) is also a case in point. Although information on the actual sum of money stolen by public office holders in the country is sketchy, one estimate put it about $380 Nigeria is divided into six geo-political zones comprising five to seven states: South-West ( Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Ekiti and Oyo States); SouthEast ( Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Abia and Imo States); South-South ( Bayelsa, Akwa-Ibom, Delta, Edo, Croos River and Rivers States); North â&#x20AC;&#x201C;West ( Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara States.); NorthEast ( Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe States); and NorthCentral ( Benue, Kogi, Kewara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau and the Federal Capital Territory-Abuja) 3

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billion between 1960 and 1999 (HRW, 2007:16). It has also been estimated that $14 billion was stolen in 2003 alone (Ejibunu, 2007: 18), while about $12 billion oil wind fall monies are alleged to have disappeared between 1958 and 1993(HRW, 2007:16). This leads us to the second point. Due to corruption, only a small fraction of budgeted funds trickle down to the poor. This deprives the people adequate funds for infrastructure development and provision of social amenities and services. The socio-demographic data of the Niger Delta indicates low life expectancy, high maternal and infant deaths, and limited access to education, health and clean water, among others. It is imperative to note that state agencies such as the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission ( OMPADEC), and the Niger Delta Development Commission ( NDDC), established by the Nigerian Government to intervene in the development of the region have been also noted for corruption( Omotola, 2010), which undermined their mandate to ameliorate the development plight which underlies the violence. Similarly, corruption has been identified as one of the reasons responsible for the failure of TOCs community development programs to impact significantly on the living standards of the people (Okoko, 1998; Ibaba, 2005).Here, the frustrations which have resulted in agitations, protests and insurgency, is linked to the poor state of infrastructure and quality of living in the region, despite the huge oil revenue generated by the country 4, the billions of United

It has been reported that Nigeria has earned over $600 billion from oil exports in the last 50 years (EFCC, 2010). Despite this, the country generates just about 3000 megawatts of electricity for a population of over 150 million. None of its over a 100 universities is ranked among the best 5000 universities in the world, while only five of its universities are among the best 100 universities in Africa. Road infrastructure is very poor, the health sector is in a 4

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States Dollars which have accrued from the Federation Account 5 to the Niger Delta States through the 13% derivation fund and statutory allocations, in the face of conspicuous life styles of corrupt public office holders and the obviously high living standards of oil company personnel. This is heightened by the inability of the people to vote bad or ineffective governments out of office. Although the amnesty program has not resolved these frustrations which created the conditions for violence, the militias it removed from the creeks, and the hopes it brings to the entire population has subdued open aggression. Whether this would last without the resolution of the frustrations is however doubtful.

sorry state, while the public school system at the primary and post-primary levels are in comatose. 5 In Nigeria, national revenue is collected and paid into a common purse called the Federation Account. On a monthly basis, revenue is shared from this account on the basis of population, social development factor, equality of states, land mass/ territory and derivation. Derivation takes 13% of allocation and goes to the oil mineral producing states and local governments in the Niger Delta as oil derivation fund. The remainder is shared as statutory revenue among the federal government, the 36 states and Abuja, the federal capital territory, and the 774 local government councils. Available data indicates that the Niger Delta States have received huge revenues since 2000 due to the increase in the oil derivation fund from 3% to 13% in 2000. For example in the first 11 months of 2008, the Niger Delta States received $4 billion out of a total of $11 billion allocated to the 36 states of the federation ( monthly figures collected from www.fmf.gov.ng, and then added up to give annual total)

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Escaping the Frustration-Aggression Trap: Concluding Remarks The conditions for violence in the Niger Delta are pervasive, and the amnesty program which removed militias from the creeks can be likened to an inchoate operation for removing a cancerous part of a body without containing its further spread or re-emergence. The pertinent questions that come to mind include: Does the surrender of arms and renunciation of violence by militias bring the frustration of the entire population to an end? Are the militias the only deprived and aggrieved Niger Deltaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s? Is the amnesty program and the attention given to the ex-combatants not reinforcing the frustrations of those who did not take up arms against the Nigerian State? My answer to the first two questions is no, but the answer to the third question is in the affirmative. This brings us to the point that violence could recur in the region if the frustrations which support insurgency are not resolved. Resolving these frustrations is therefore a requirement for peace-building in the region. Escaping the frustration-aggression trap is predicated on addressing the lack of development, the most fundamental cause of the violence. In the context of the analysis of this paper, dealing with oil induced environmental degradation and corruption in governance are the two key issues. Lubeck, Watts and Lipschutz (2007) have linked the security of the Niger Delta to the consolidation of democracy through free and fair elections; improved health care, education and living standards; and the integration of the people into the oil wealth to ensure they derive maximum benefits. This underscores the position of this paper. Ending oil based environmental degradation is a sure way to improve living standards, and empower local people through their fishing and farming based occupations, to have adequate access to health and educational services and facilities. To achieve this, environmental laws which are presently weak and suffer poor enforcement will need to be strengthened and enforced adequately.

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Oil spillages are industry based and also caused by sabotage. The regulatory bodies in the country such as the Directorate of Petroleum Resources (DPR) have a crucial role to play. One major cause of lawlessness in Nigeria is the culture of impunity. Thus enforcement of environment laws and placement of adequate sanctions on TOCs is a sure way to elicit compliance and thus protect the environment. Sabotage spills can be contained by responding to the development challenges of the people, in addition to enforcing the relevant laws dealing with sabotage as an economic crime. This will address the causes of sabotage as engagement strategy of protesting communities and groups, and as a form of business involving a network of community youths and leaders, contractors to TOCs and officials of TOCs and oil theft syndicates. Related to this is the need to pursue the gas flare out policy of the government with uncommon commitment. The development of gas utilization infrastructure will create conditions to support the TOCs to end gas flaring. The completion of the West Africa and Trans-Sahara gas projects6, gas related power generation projects in the country can be considered in this regard. This suggests that the resolution of the frustrationaggression trap, and by extension the Niger Delta conflict, requires an integrated and holistic approach. The amnesty program is defective in this regard, as it has isolated the ex-combatants for attention, while neglecting other segments of the population. Further, the rehabilitation program is disconnected from the national economy

The West African gas project is expected to convey about 450 cubic meters of gas to Ghana, Togo and Benin Republic Annually on completion (Nigeria, Country Briefs, 2009). Similarly, the Trans-Sahara gas projected is expected to supply about 20 billion cubic meters of gas per annum to Europe by 2016 when completed ( Afrik-News, 2010) 6

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that has a limited capacity to either employ people with skills or provide support to entrepreneurs. Addressing the issue of corruption in governance is however a requirement for effective environmental protection, as corruption has been identified as one of the reasons for the poor enforcement of environment protection laws. Bringing the fight against corruption into peace-building is a sure way to deal with the frustrations arising from corruption in governance and poor service delivery. Democratic consolidation as emphasized by Lubeck, Watts and Lipschutz (2007) is appropriate here due to the associated accountability and transparency. Although it is has also been noted that corruption weakens democracy (HRW, 2007), and thus appear to create a dilemma, democracy is a sure way to fight corruption given its participatory nature and the freedoms it guarantees. Civil society can take advantage of this to secure democracy, fight corruption and build peace in the Niger Delta. It can achieve these by protecting the freedoms of citizens, observing and monitoring the activities of government, and political socialization of citizens (World Bank, 2006). In all however, behavior modification by political leaders and common citizens is a critical requirement. References Adeyemo, A.M., (2002), The Oil Industry, Extra-Ministerial Institutions and Sustainable Agricultural Development: A Case STUDY OF Okrika LGA (Local Government Area) in Rivers State, Nigerian Journal of Oil and Politics, Vo.2, No.1,pp.60-78. Adeyemo, A.M (2008), Environmental Policy Failure in Nigeria and the Tragedy of Underdevelopment of Niger Delta Region, Inaugural Lecture No. 63, University of Port Harcourt.

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Adeyemo, D, and Olu–Adeyemi, L, (2010) ‚Amnesty in a Vacuum: The Unending Insurgency in the Niger Delta of Nigeria‛, in Ojarokotu, V & Gilbert, L.D. (eds), Checkmating the Resurgence of Violence in the Niger Delta, Johannesburg. Africa Independent Television (AIT) ( 2010), One Year After Amnesty, Special Features program sponsored by the Amnesty Implementation Program committee, November 5, 2010, 9:00am Afrik-News, July 12, 2010, www.afrik-news.com/article/16513.html Aham, U (2008), Oil and Development: More Money, More Problems, Tell, February, 18, 2008. Anikpo, Mark (1998), Community Conflicts in East Niger Delta: A Cultural Matrix, Pan African Social Science Review, No. 3,pp.1-16. Bayesa State of Nigeria, 2008 Budget, Budget and Control Department, Ministry of Finance and Budget, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State. Bassey, C.O. (2002), Framework for the Conflict Transformation Project in Warri, in Imobighe, J.A, Bassey C.O., & Asoni J. B. (eds) Conflict and Instability in the Niger Delta: The Warri Case, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria. Berkowitz, L. (1989), Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis: Examination and Reformulation, Psychological Bulletin, Vol.106, No. 1, pp. 59-73. Best, S.G. (2007), Conflict and Peace Building in Plateau State Nigeria, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria. Davideheiser, M. and Kialee, N. (2010), Demobilization or Remobilization? The Amnesty Program and the Search for Peace in the Niger Delta, paper presented at the International Conference on Natural Resource, Security and Development in the Niger Delta, Organized by the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, in Collaboration with the Centre for Applied Environmental Research, Department of Geosciences, University of Missouri Kansas City, USA, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria, March 8-11, 2010. EFCC (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission)( 2011), The Eagle, EFCC Public Enlightenment Program, Channels Television, March 5, 2011. Etekpe, A. (2007), Politics of Resource Allocation and Control in Nigeria, Harey Publications Co., Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

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Ejibunu, H.T (2007), Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Niger Delta: Root Causes of Peacelessnes, EPU (European University Center for Peace Studies, Austria), Research Papers, Issue No. 7. Faleti, S. A. (2006), Theories of Social Conflict, in Best, S.G ( eds), Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria, pp.35-60. Francis, D. J. (2006), Peace and Conflict Studies: An African Overview of Basic Concepts in Best, S.G. (eds), Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader, Spectrum. Godongs, S. (2006), The Methods of Conflict Resolution and Transformation, in Best, S.G ( eds), Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria, pp. 93-115. Gurr, Ted, ( 1968), Psychological Factors in Civil Violence, World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp.245-278. HRW ( Human Rights Watch)( 2007), Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria, Report, Volume 19, No. 2 ( A). Humphreys, M. Weinstein, J.M. (2007) Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51 No 4, pp. 531-567. Ibaba, S.I. (2005), Understanding the Niger Delta Crisis, Amethyst and Colleagues Publishers, Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Ibaba, S.I. (2009), Civil Society Organizations, Democracy and Peace Building in the Niger Delta, International Journal of Nigerian Studies and Development, Vol. 15, 32-49. Ibaba, S.I. and Ikelebge, (2009) A. Militias and Pirates in the Niger Delta, Paper Presented at Institute of Security Studies (ISS) South African, Workshop on Militia and Rebel Movements â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Human Insecurity and State Crisis in Africa, Pretoria, South Africa, April 20-21, 2009. Ibeanu, O. (2006), Conceptualizing Peace, in Best, S.g. (ed) Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria, pp.3-14. Ikelegbe, A, 2010, Resolving the Niger Delta Conflict: A Critical and Comparative Analysis of The Amnesty and Post Amnesty Challenges, paper presented at the International Conference on Natural Resource, Security and Development in the Niger Delta, Organized by

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the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, in Collaboration with the Centre for Applied Environmental Research, Department of Geosciences, University of Missouri Kansas City, USA, March 8-11, 2010, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Joab-Peterside, S. ( 2010), State and Fallacy of Rehabilitation of ‚Repentant Militants‛ in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Analysis of First Phase of the Federal Government’s Amnesty Program, Pan African Social Science Review, No.11, pp.69-0-110. Lubeck, P.M, Watts, M.J. & Lipschutz, R. (2007), Convergent Interest: US Energy Security and the ‚Securing‛ of Nigerian Democracy, International Policy Report, Center for International Policy, Washington, D C. Naanen, Ben (1995), Oil Producing Minorities and the Restructuring of Nigerian Federalism: The Case of the Ogoni, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol.33, No.1, pp.46-78. Nafziger, E. W. (2008), Nigerian’s Economic Development and Niger Delta Grievances, paper presented at the International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, March 11-13 2008, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Niger Delta Standard, May 19, 2009. Niger Delta Technical Committee (2008), Report of the Committee Established by the Nigerian Government to Review the Recommendations of the Reports of Previous Commissions ad Committees and Determine Appropriate Policy Options for the Resolution of the Niger Delta Crisis, November, 2008 Nigeria, Country Analysis Briefs, 2009, www.eia.de.gov Nwilo, P.C & Badejo, O.T. Impacts and Management of Oil Spill in Nigerian Coastal Environment, Conference Proceedings, International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, Organized by the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, in Collaboration with the Centre for Applied Environmental Research, Department of Geosciences, University of Missouri Kansas City, USA, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria, March 11-13, 2008, p.1217-1232

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Obi, C. I. Structuring Transnational Spaces of Identity, Rights and Power in the Niger Delta, Globalizations, 2010, Vol.6, (4), 467-481 Ologun S. & Okeneye S. (2009), Amnesty to Cost N10 billion, The Nation, October 9, 2009, pp.1-2 Obia, Cyril Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-related Conflict, Africa Development, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2, 2009, pp. 103–128 Obib, Cyril, Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Niger Delta, Canadian Journal of Development Studies 30, nos. 1–2 (2010): 219–236. Okoko, Kimse ( 1998), SPDC ( Shell Petroleum Development Company)Community Relations Study ( Unpublished), Submitted to the SPDC Western Operations, Warri, Nigeria Omotola, J.S. (2010), ‚Liberation Movements‛ and Rising Violence in the Niger Delta: The New Contentious Site of Oil and Environmental Politics, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp.36-5. Opukri, C.O & Ibaba S. Ibaba, ‚Oil Induced Environmental Degradation and Internal Population Displacement in Nigeria’s Niger Delta‛ in Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 10, No. 1, spring 2008, PP.173-193. Osaghae, E, Ikelegbe, A, Olarinmoye, O & Okhomina, S. Youth Militias, Self Determination and Resource Control Struggles in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria. Research Report, Consortium for Development Partnership Module 5, 2007. Otite, O. (2001), On Conflicts, Their Transformation, and Management, in Otite, o. & Albert A.O (eds), Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria, pp.1-33 Tamuno, T.T. (2008), The Geographic Niger Delta, Conference Proceedings, International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, Organized by the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, in Collaboration with the Centre for Applied Environmental Research, Department of Geosciences, University of Missouri Kansas City, USA, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria, March 1113, 2008,pp.916-930

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Tebekaemi, T. (1982), The Twelve-Day Revolution by Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, Idodo Umeh Publishers, Benin City, Nigeria. The Willink Commission Report (1958), Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London. The United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, Final Report on the Second International Conference on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Stability in Africa,Kinshasa, Democratic Republic Of Congo, 12 - 14 June 2007. United Nations Development Program– UNDP (2006), Niger Delta Human Development Report, Abuja, Nigeria. Uzoma, M.R., (2008), Gas Flaring in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry, Port Harcourt Petroleum Review, Vol.1, No.1. Watts, M.J. (2007) Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Violence? Conflict and Violence in the Niger Delta, in Review of African Political Economy, No.114, 637-660. World Bank (2006), Civil Society and Peace building: Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors, Report No. 36445 – GLB, December, 2006.

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External Challenges to Moving Toward Sustainability in the Niger Delta Region: Why a Critical Assessment of the Classical Epistemologies and Developmental Assumptions of External Actors Matters Dr. Christopher LaMonica11 Key Terms: Niger Delta, Nigeria, sustainability, development, Western epistemology, Cold War ideology.

Abstract For centuries the Western classics of the social sciences have helped to justify the decisions of business entrepreneurs and development practitioners in developing country contexts like Nigeria. These classical lessons are not devoid of merit but tend to promote a very one-sided pro-entrepreneur approach to development that systematically marginalizes the concerns of exploited regions of the world, like the Niger Delta Region (NDR). Instead of accepting responsibility for the turmoil that external actors have caused within the NDR, the institutional norm in both the international oil industry and the international ‚development industry‛ is to squarely point fingers at Nigeria’s internal shortcomings, as if all of these growing problems are due to Nigerian failings and solely for Nigerians to 11

Christopher LaMonica, PhD, is an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics with the Humanities Department, Government Section, of the United States Coast Guard Academy, New London, CT, USA. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Coast Guard or United State Coast Guard Academy. Please do feel free to contact the author directly with any comments or questions about the contents of this paper: Christopher.LaMonica@uscga.edu.

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resolve. This ‚blame the victim‛ attitude, prevalent among so many external actors, needs to change for it completely ignores external actor responsibility, allowing external stakeholders to continue as before with impunity. Here it is argued that the problem has its roots in the firmly embedded lessons of the classics that continue to have an impact on the self-assured mindsets of many external actors. The time has come for all of us to be less ideological and more frank about who is keeping the NDR’s gas flares alit and who has benefited, so disproportionately, from the ongoing expansion of the oil industry throughout the region; only then, it is argued, can a discussion on the improvements to, and sustainability of, NDR’s local and coastal governance begin. Improved NDR governance will, in turn, lead to improved trade prospects for all of Nigeria and the entire Gulf of Guinea region.

The Problem Today there can be little doubt that the Niger Delta Region (NDR) is under tremendous developmental strain; to include environmental degradation, relocation of peoples, affronts to cultural ways of life, and a sudden rise of violent conflict. NDR’s immiseration truly began, as so many people from the region have commented, with the lighting of the oil company’s first gas flares in 1958; since then, the gas flares have been continuously burning. And since that time external actors, colluding with Nigerian politicians, have been vigorously pursuing crude oil exploration and extraction with virtual impunity. In recent years Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), formally established in 2003, has duly filed charges of bribery and conspiracy against individuals (a list of ‚Most Wanted‛ is regularly posted on their web-page) and international oil companies

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but with little success. 1 The list of ongoing high-profile cases is impressive but, along the way, charges are also being dropped in exchange for payments of negotiated fines, often settled outside of Nigeria. In early December 2010, for example, BBC news headlines read ‚Nigeria Files Charges Against Cheney‛ in a Halliburton bribery scheme. Before the month was over we heard, via the Pan-African News Wire: ‚The EFCC announced that charges against Dick Cheney and Halliburton/KBR were being dropped in exchange for payment of $250 million in fines to the Nigerian government.‛ 2 Just weeks earlier, The Times of Nigeria reported that other firms, associated with the bribery scandal, had also agreed to pay fines (in the U.S.), including Panalpina, Royal Dutch Shell and five oil-service companies, totaling $236.5 million.3 Most would view payment of these fines as clear victories for the EFCC, and improvements over previous patterns of oil company exploitation of the NDR, but these fines represent little more than a speed bump for these multi-billion dollar conglomerates, little more than a cost of doing business in Nigeria. Oil companies will therefore continue as before; moreover these fines cannot possibly address, in any meaningful way, the environmental, cultural, and social damage that these oil companies, in collusion with Nigerian politicians, have wrought over the past few decades.

Major oil companies include, e.g., Royal Dutch Shell, Halliburton and its subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root. See: http://www.efccnigeria.org/ (Accessed February 2011). 2 BBC on-line, Dec. 7, 2010, ‚Nigeria Files Charges Against Cheney,‛ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11943192 (Accessed February 2011). 3 Cited in Wall Street Journal, ‚Commentary and news about money laundering, bribery, terrorism finance and sanctions,‛ Nov. 4, 2010. Posted at: http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2010/11/06/panalpina-settlements-announcedwith-236-5-million-in-penalties/ (Accessed February 2011).

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The fundamental reason why these and other oil company crimes were allowed to occur is that Nigerian institutions – civil, state, and other – are not able to ward-off these ‚joint venture‛ (oil companies colluding with Nigerian politicians) abuses of power. The same kind of institutional weakness that leads to those and other forms of corruption is, ironically, again found when the Nigerian state attempts to enforce punishment. Knowing that local enforcement is virtually impossible, the EFCC is left negotiating for and taking anything it can get its hand on. From beginning to end, then, one sees a pattern of abusing the privilege of power and of taking advantage of Nigeria’s low institutional capacity. Of course, similar forms of corruption and enforcement challenges have been experienced elsewhere in the world. However, when one considers the now global pattern of avoiding jail time through payment of fines or other, with virtually no institutional change, Nigeria certainly appears to be one of the world’s worst. Joshua E. Keating of Foreign Affairs does not mince his words when he describes circumstances there: Nigeria’s oil sector is plagued by corruption and willful ignorance... One watchdog group put the discrepancies in the Nigeria Central Bank’s oil earnings figures at [only] around $155 million for 2005. With Western oil majors heavily invested in the Niger Delta, there’s suspicion that those companies are extracting more than they’re reporting.4

According to some observers, the result in developing country contexts like Nigeria is that valuable resources like oil have become a

Joshua E. Keating, ‚The List, Known Unknowns: Nigeria’s Oil,‛ Foreign Policy, July/Aug. 2010, p. 19.

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‚natural resource curse.‛ The concept, first noted in the 1980s, is quite simple: a small number of local elites, working with external entrepreneurs, manage to tap into and disproportionately benefit from the profits that result from natural resource extraction. Accordingly, receipts from the sale of valuable resources – like oil – that states like Nigeria have are squandered with no visible improvement in economic development. In the Nigerian context, since 1958, $billions of oil revenues have been misused or have disappeared entirely. Moreover, the global demand for oil tends to impact foreign exchange rates, thereby squeezing out the competitiveness of other traditional exports such as agriculture and manufactured goods.5 Before the 1950s, a great many agricultural and other products were exported from Nigeria’s ports; today 85% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings come from oil and gas. Nigeria has therefore followed in the developing state pattern of having a ‚mono-crop‛ economy that caters to the needs of external actors and resists economic diversity. In addition to the many adverse consequences of having foreign oil interests dictate Nigeria’s developmental future, then, is the added danger of having the entire economy dependent on the sometimes volatile world price of oil. An oft-cited and influential 1997 study on the ‚natural resource curse,‛ by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, considers data from eight ‚slow-growing oil-exporting‛ states.6 What they find

This phenomenon is commonly referred to as ‚Dutch Disease,‛ a term coined by The Economist in 1977. 6 Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, ‚Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,‛ Harvard Institute for International Development Working Paper (November 1997) updated; originally published as NBER Working Paper No. 5398 (October 1995). For a decidedly less technical discussion of the problem on the Nigeria Delta specifically, see ‚Curse of the

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‚surprising‛ in their findings is that natural resource abundance can actually lead to lower rates of economic growth than those experienced by states with fewer natural resources. The presumption of most like-minded economists, who adhere to the doctrine of comparative advantage, is that having something to offer global markets would naturally lead to local economic growth via international trade.7 In their study they refer to the unfortunate phenomenon of being endowed with a valuable commodity like oil, yet remaining undeveloped, as an ‚oddity‛ and accordingly present this as a ‚conceptual puzzle‛ to be investigated.8 In retrospect the only surprise, really, is that developmental economists like Sachs and Warner have paid so little attention to: 1) previous literature on capitalist exploitation and 2) the glaringly obvious lack of local institutional capacity to provide better security to ward-off that form of capitalist exploitation. To this day they systematically ignore inconvenient realities that continue to degrade vast regions of the world, like the Niger Delta, and assume economic growth inevitably ‚lifts all boats.‛ Both matters are considered below, in a slightly unorthodox way. Through a consideration of the classics of political and economic theory in mainstream Western education , I argue that many of the

Black Gold: Hope and Betrayal in the Niger Delta,‛ National Geographic Magazine, (February 2007), available on-line at: http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2007/02/nigerian-oil/oneill-text (Accessed February 2011). 7 The doctrine of comparative advantage is normally identified as one of the ‚theoretical foundations of international political economy‛ in textbooks on the subject. See, e.g., Frederic Pearson and Simon Payaslian, International Political Economy, (McGraw-Hill, 1999), Part I. 8 Sachs and Warner (1997).

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scientific assumptions that are made by many external actors lead to the outright avoidance of patently obvious problems – like those experienced in the Niger Delta Region. Much of this, I argue, is due to the lingering effects of inherently uncritical Cold War ideology that was largely informed by Western epistemological assumptions. Today the result is a culture of myopic self-righteousness that continues largely unabated and systematically marginalizes the concerns of immiserated masses in places like the NDR.

“Classic” Critiques on the Abuse of Power No one on this Earth enjoys being a victim of the abuse of power, whether it be political, economic, or social. Evidence of this can be found, not only in the Western classics, but in many forms of human expression: in the traditional ‚check-and-balance‛ norms found throughout Africa in the pre-colonial era; in the moral lessons of indigenous folklore; and in the written classics found in every corner of the Ancient World. In the Ancient Egyptian Instruction of Ptah-hotep we read, for example: One punishes the transgressor of laws, Though the greedy overlooks this; Baseness may seize riches, Yet crime never lands its wares, In the end it is justice that lasts<9

Daniel Bonavac and Stephen Phillips, eds., Understanding Non-Western Philosophy, (Mayfield Publishing, 1993), p. 2.

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Even the earliest known texts, in other words, acknowledge the existence of human selfishness and greed, and argue that something ought to be done to check those types of behavior. Within the West, eminent scholars of Ancient Thought such as Max Müller, Karl Jaspers, Karen Armstrong, and Joseph Campbell have all argued that the logical basis for our earliest mythical tales, religions and philosophies was to have people think more critically about the recurring norms of selfishness, greed and the abuse of power. 10 The ‚Axial Age‛ (800-200 B.C.), as Jaspers terms it, witnessed philosophical and religious responses to human vice and violence that still reverberate to this day. 11 So, again, these are all long-standing human concerns. As we can see in the quote above, and in countless other ways, we certainly find them expressed in Ancient Africa. Jaspers’ point is that these recurring concerns are not only religious, they are also expressly human. And while not everyone in today’s world is convinced of the merit of secular thought, we could all agree that these are all clear expressions of ‚democratic‛ sentiment that aim to ward-off the potential abuse of power. As the late Kim Dae Jung of South Korea has argued, one also finds these democratic ideals expressed in the classics of Ancient Asia, that is, they are far from being the sole province of Western thinkers. ‚Long before Locke,‛ Kim tells us, the Asian classics had democratic

See, e.g., Karen Armstrong, The Great Transformation: The World in the Times of Buddha, Socrates, Confucius and Jeremiah, (London: Atlantic Books, 2006); Joseph Campbell’s 4-vol. series The Masks of God; and Jon R. Stone, ed., The Essential Max Müller: On Language, Mythology, and Religion (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 11 A term that is similarly employed by Armstrong (2006), in her comparative survey of religion.

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philosophies as sophisticated and profound as those of the West. 12 That said, most of us are taught that there is a long-standing Western monopoly on democratic thinking. Put simply, that is not the case. Democratic elections – the sine qua non of ‚democracy, according to Joseph Schumpeter – may well be an Ancient Greek invention but democratic sentiments, I submit, are part of being human. Moreover, democratic elections, while meritorious, have now proven, time and again, to be procedural and certainly not a guarantor of democratic substance.13 Another problem one quickly encounters in an investigation of these ideas, when applied to the Nigerian context, is that they describe an earlier, pre-colonial and, one could argue, pre-globalized time. Western classics were written at the dawn of capitalist globalization, when developmental challenges did not include the potentially dramatic impact of a click of a mouse that could impact the welfare of entire states.14 Yet, in the pursuit of modern ideas on checking the abuse of power, one is inevitably drawn into Western sources for ‚answers‛; ergo the ongoing need to consider those classics. And, when discussing developmental circumstances in formerly colonized Africa, a thorough consideration of these classical ideas does matter as they often spurred the colonizer and entrepreneur to action.

Kim Dae Jung, ‚Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values,‛ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6 (November/December 1994). 13 As argued by Fareed Zakaria, ‚The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,‛ Foreign Affairs (1997) and, subsequently, by Christopher LaMonica, ‚The Politics of Strengthening Local Government Institutions in Zambia,‛ Doctoral Dissertation, Boston University (December 2000) and in Christopher LaMonica, Local Government Matters: The Case of Zambia, (Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010). 14 See: George Soros, ‚Capitalism’s Last Chance?‛ Foreign Policy (1998-99).

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Post-colonial theorist Edward Said is perhaps best-known for suggesting that a consideration of Western classics is crucial for understanding what is so firmly embedded in the mindsets of so many engaged in industrially developed (OECD) state relations with the ‚developing world‛ today. Said does not mince his words when he writes: The nations of contemporary Asia, Latin America, and Africa are politically independent but in many ways are as dominated and dependent as they were when ruled directly by European powers.15

Adding to Said’s argument (and he is certainly not alone in expressing the aforementioned sentiment), the late Nigerian scholar Claude Ake has convincingly argued in his seminal book, Social Science As Imperialism, that many Western mindsets, ‚informed‛ by the social science classics in their formal education and other, continue to have an important impact on the shape of developmental politics. 16 Similar sentiments have been expressed on the African continent by, notably, Egyptian scholar Samir Amin. In Empire of Chaos Amin suggests that, up to now, Western powers have not been interested in promoting democracy per se but in maintaining a global order that: <reserves them the right to exploit all riches of the planet for their own profit< If this order can be better served by a ‘democracy,’ they are all for it, but they never hesitate to install a dictator if this better serves their needs.17

Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (1993), p. 19. Claude Ake, Social Science As Imperialism, (University of Ibadan, 1979). 17 Samir Amin, Empire of Chaos (1992), pp. 99-100. See also: Samir Amin, Eurocentrism (1989). 16

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When considering the dismal state of affairs in the NDR, it is hard not to conclude that the epistemological and developmental politics battles, of which Ake and Amin speak, may be lost. But there are reasons for hope. Since these authors’ aforementioned publications there has been a groundswell of support, found throughout the world, for the view that does there exist a profound gap in global scholarship that systematically marginalizes the post-colonial ‚non-West‛ and/or ‚subaltern‛ conditions and views. 18 Of course there is still much work to do: Western-based philosophies, so readily found throughout the world, still dominate and, in many ways, are perceived as the language of power. Unless and until that Foucauldian problem is adequately addressed, the self-righteous attitudes of those involved in all forms of developmental politics will continue to foment the recurring patterns of Nigerian politics that consistently marginalize the needs of the NDR. What, then, are those external actors thinking? What are the concerns of Ake, expressed in his 1979 book, that still have an impact to this day? For starters, among external actors, there is an underlying conviction, informed by the classics and confirmed by scientific certitude, that leads to a preference for clarity over the more nuanced explanations as to why things might be going wrong in places like the NDR. Conviction and clarity were, of course, hallmarks of the colonial era but, for many, they remained in a very ideological form, throughout the Cold War. And although the Cold War is now over, these ideological sentiments of absolute certainty linger. At a most basic level there remains methodological resistance, for example, to the 18

See, e.g., Ranajit Guha, Subaltern Studies, Vols. 1-X, (Oxford University Press, 2010); Robbie Shilliam, ed., International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity, (Routledge, 2011).

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intertwining of the political and the economic which, for many external actors, has a whiff of Marxist logic. It was Marx, after all, who famously argued that differences of material wealth – or class – translated into rifts in politics. And one still finds the development practitioner’s kneejerk reaction is to reject economic explanations of Africa’s political problems. Economic growth requires, as liberal economists like Sachs would have it, the identification of a state’s comparative advantage, that is, there are economic laws that resolve economic problems. Similarly, drawing on the lessons of Western political theory, the mainstream development practitioner assumes that all democratic theories have, as part of their virtue, clarity, viz: political solutions to political problems. The influential political realist Hans Morgenthau suggests, for example, that ‚intellectually *he+ maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs.‛19 Now it must be acknowledged that not all development practitioners necessarily agree with Morgenthau’s ‚autonomy of the political sphere‛ argument. But it cannot be denied that the Cartesian-like compartmentalization of developmental problems is very prevalent in both Western education and developmental politics. Within the social sciences one sees a very strong tendency toward compartmentalization of the studies of, e.g., anthropology, history, politics, economics, psychology, and so on. And, the corollary to that is found in the organizational structure of virtually all modern 19

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th Ed. Rev., (Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 12. Morgenthau continues: ‚<the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with certain rules; the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles.‛

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universities (modeled after the Western) and, in turn, donor state missions in Nigeria, according to which ‚strategic objectives‛ are pursued according to one or another area of concern: business development, democratic governance, public health, and so on. Although there is undoubted strength through such clarity, and to all scientific methodologies, we must also recognize the inherent weakness of approaching complex problems using such myopic methods. In short, by focusing on the success of one area of policy, other vitally linked areas of development run the risk of being marginalized. This (Cartesian) dilemma, of not thinking holistically in favor of the success of one or another developmental endeavor (e.g. oil exploration over all else), has deep intellectual roots as can be seen in the classics that inform developmental thinking and policy, starting with Adam Smith. Smith, of course, is regularly cited for his influential ideas on liberalized markets and, to this day, many of those insights do undoubtedly have great merit: globally, wealth has expanded dramatically over the past few hundred years as a direct result of commerce and trade.20 Neglected in the discussion, however, is the one-sided nature of the capitalist venture, as espoused by Smith himself, that also continues to hold sway to this day. Yes, as any liberal economist will argue, there are ‚positive-sum‛ gains to be had through market exchange but the impacts are not only and always positive. In this regard, a critical reading of Smith’s classic The Wealth of Nations (1776) is vitally important. Smith writes, for example, in the

As but a few minutes with the impressive presentation of growth statistics, through human history, will show, at: http://gapminder.org.

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interest of the colonizer and according to which the merit of ‚free‛ commerce is expressed in an entirely one-sided way: Every colonist gets more land than he can possibly cultivate. He has no rent, and scarce any taxes to pay< Waste lands of the greatest natural fertility, are to be had for a trifle. 21

Those comments are, in fact, very telling as they demonstrate the ongoing assumptions that many entrepreneurs make when it comes to engaging those same ‚waste land‛ regions of the world. Theoretically, of course, there are ‚trickle-down‛ benefits to even the (formerly) colonized regions of the world as global wealth expands. But what is seemingly lost in the discussion is the impact of these new processes on all that is local. Moreover, if the ‚colony‛ is to develop in any meaningful fashion, it is to take place in a spirit of self-reliance, pride and thrift, as if there was never a down-side to this transformative process.22 These selfassured entrepreneurial sentiments are also found consistently in the Western classics. John Locke, for example, writes with great confidence and conviction about nature’s abundance and how ‚mixing‛ one’s labor with it thereby creates private property.23 Presumably the labor of indigenous people that, frankly, had been going on for millennia – and, ergo, in the mind of the colonizer should translate to local ownership! – does not count in the colonizer’s calculation of entrepreneurial ‚freedom.‛ In other words, that labor only counts when it serves the interests of the colonizer; otherwise the

Adam Smith, The Weath of Nations (1776), (The Modern Library, 1937), p. 532. Emphasis mine. 22 Ake (1979) emphasizes this very point. 23 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (1690).

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colonizer either calculates that labor as a net ‚zero‛ or is entirely ambivalent about it. Edward Said has written very eloquently on the policy impacts of colonial ‚knowledge‛ based on the popular European literary classics, like Rudyard Kipling’s ‚White Man’s Burden.‛ Therefore, I will not belabor the point further, except to say: that dialogue, framed as one ‚between‛ Westerners and non-Westerners (like Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Chinua Achebe, Ngugi wa Thiongo, Wole Soyinka) has been altered dramatically in recent decades. Said’s thoughtprovoking suggestion, that the literary classics led to ill-informed ‚textual children‛ (like Napoleon) who then ventured into the ‚rest‛ of the world, while likely accurate, described a different, more isolated time. In his 1992 Introduction to Culture and Imperialism he acknowledges that this is, in fact, the case: The world has changed since Conrad and Dickens in ways that have surprised, and often alarmed, metropolitan Europeans and Americans, who now confront large nonwhite immigrant populations in their midst, and face an impressive roster of newly empowered voices asking for their narratives to be heard.24

And so the dialogue has become more integrated, with new sensitivities being expressed, yet there remain a good many classical assumptions that remain firmly embedded in the mindsets of many.

Edward Said, Imperialism and Culture (1993), p. xx. Said’s tone is of course cynical but his comments do, nevertheless, describe important and ongoing changes in the dynamics between the West and the ‚Rest.‛

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Again, a critical discussion of those assumptions can reveal patently obvious problems. In retrospect, for example, it should be very clear that the European classics of political and economic liberalism (read ‘freedom’) focused on domestic solutions to problems that were virtually absent of any dramatic global influences. Yet today, when contemplating the developmental challenges of the ‚non-West,‛ the dominant focus of Westerners (Europeans and Americans) remains on the internal, i.e. domestic, change. The simple but systematically overlooked fact is that in Western developmental history there was no real need to fear the dramatic flows of capital that would take place with the click of a mouse! So today we must remind each other that the Western classics have a very strong tendency to favor short-term and domestic solutions to possible abuses of power. This is not to say that the ‚solutions‛ provided are devoid of merit but they are of limited relevance to many of today’s developing sate challenges. We must therefore reconsider those solutions, seek out their wisdom and applicability to modern concerns, and critically assess their developmental impacts. The logic of Locke, of course, is regularly emphasized in today’s Anglo-American (and former British colonies’) politics and, like Smith, that logic emphasizes the need to grab land and to ‚privatize‛ property so that those ‚scarce resources‛ can be used more ‚efficiently.‛ And this remains a foundational tenet of any capitalist enterprise. Rousseau’s classic, The Social Contract, is much more popular in French and Continental European contexts and, in turn, developmental dialogues with their respective former colonies. If one is to believe the philosophical divide between the European Continent and Anglo/America, there could well be differences of domestic

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cultures and political ‚solutions.‛25 But again all of these classic texts are filled with surprises if one is to read them carefully. Notably, as a growing number of post-colonial writers have emphasized, these Enlightenment thinkers’ comments on race look odd to the modern 21st-century reader. 26 Moreover, though radical for their time, they were far from being protagonists of some form of liberal hedonism; their carefully crafted texts never argued for unrestricted individual freedoms, as some libertarians and neoliberal ideologues might argue today, but for various forms of liberal ‚social contract.‛ 27 Rousseau’s argument for ‚shared liberty,‛ for example, emphasized the notion of citizen responsibility, that is, the citoyen (citizen) was not only responsible for himself but encumbered with civil responsibilities to the rest of society. The opening line of his Social Contract (1762) is regularly cited in this regard: ‚Man is born free yet everywhere is in chains.‛28 In other words, even these famous proponents of democratic liberalism understood that there were purposeful constraints on unbounded freedoms; to argue otherwise, in their

Even a cursory look at the British and French classics demonstrates an ongoing inclination to ‚side‛ with respective ‚national‛ authors. Whereas the British might emphasize Locke, Smith and Burke in their own texts (and thereby their formerly colonized states, like the U.S. and Nigeria), the French tend to emphasize the role of Jean Bodin, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Baron de Montesquieu. See surveys of classics in British, American and former British colony (Nigerian) textbooks versus French, e.g., Philippe Nemo, Histoire des idées politiques, (Presses Universitaires de France, 2002). 26 A subject that has rightly captured the attention of, e.g., Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, ed., Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005) and Andrew Valls, ed., Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, (Cornell University Press, 2005). 27 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690). 28 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762).

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view, was improper, irresponsible and immoral. Neoliberal policies would have us think otherwise. In many ways the European Enlightenment writers were after what all of the aforementioned ancient classics of the world have argued, from Ptah-hotep forward: the social need to act with ‚class,‛ not in the way Marx would have portrayed it, in terms of rich/poor, but in terms of doing the ‚right‛ thing. And doing the right thing, even if the perspective was more domestic than globally focused, meant acting in terms of more than only self-interest, that is, to keep in mind the interests of a wider community of citizens as well.29 Although idealistic writers like Immanuel Kant might be criticized, by some, for trying to ‚prove‛ the existence of such principles, we have countless written classics from all over the world that have spelled-out what we need to know. Yet another Anglo-writer on the matter is John Stuart Mill, who famously argued in his seminal work, On Liberty (1859), the obvious< that ‚no person is an entirely isolated being<‛ 30 Speaking of public officials, in particular, Mill argued: Whenever< there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is 29

A similar argument was made by Nnimmo Bassey, Director of Environmental Rights Action in Benin: ‚Royal Dutch Shell is more than a colonial force in Nigeria. A colonial force exhibits some measure of concern for the territory over which it lords. This is not the case with this mogul, which goes for crude oil in the most crude manner possible.‛ Opening lines of foreword in Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas in Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights and Oil in the Niger Delta (Verso, 2003). 30 John Stewart Mill, On Liberty (1859), David Spitz, ed., (W.W. Norton & Co., 1975), p. 74.

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taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law.31

Again, in states like Nigeria that were formerly British colonies, a consideration of these British classics is crucial. Not only are many British norms firmly embedded in neocolonial Nigerian politics, with the concomitant expectations of those who govern, but British-based and Western-trained NGOs, businesses, aid agencies (e.g. DFID) are regular participants in modern Nigerian politics. How early American politicians employed those European ideas (termed by many as American Political Thought) is briefly discussed below. One classic American contribution to the realm of ideas on democratic freedom, and what could potentially go wrong with it, is offered by James Madison, contributor to The Federalist Papers (1789). Citing this founding text, generations of American students are taught that the best way to ward-off the potential abuse of power is to establish ‚checks-and-balances‛ within one’s governing institutions – an idea that was allegedly ‚borrowed‛ from French philosopher Baron de Montesquieu. In Federalist No. 51, notably, it is argued that a ‚selfappointed authority‛ is at best ‚but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major as the rightful interests of the minor party.‛ 32 ‚Another democratic method,‛ argues Madison, ‚will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States.‛33 Many Americans idealize this ‚unique‛ method of political organization and this logic is readily found in their approaches to political challenges elsewhere.

Ibid, p. 76. James Madison, Federalist No. 51, in The Federalist Papers (1789), (Mentor Books, 1999), p. 292. 33 Ibid. 32

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Granted, the ‚checks‛ on potential abuses of power within all democratic states are certainly imperfect, as anyone involved in democratic politics would attest! Horrified by that ‚reality‛ of political conflict, many are soon averse to such solutions. That struggle, however, is part-and-parcel of all democratic politics or what political scientist Samuel P. Huntington refers to as the democratic ‚promise of disharmony.‛34 Drawing on Ancient Greek ideals as others do, Huntington argues that democratic politics should allow for the free-and-open debates of ideas; only then, goes the argument, does freedom exist! And, methodologically too, this is crucial, for only through the process of free-and-open debate can policy be expected to improve over time. That political arrangement, he argues, often referred to as pluralism – allowing disagreement without resorting to violence – is similarly, and classically, argued in the founding democratic texts. The key, submits Huntington, is to have political fora and institutions that can manage those differences of opinion. In this discussion one is often reminded that it was notably Voltaire who, in his defense of liberalism (by which he meant civil liberties, freedom of religion and even free-trade), famously argued that ‚I may not agree with what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say it.‛ Although these liberal ideas are mythologized and all-too-often misinterpreted for political gain, they are undoubtedly crucial lessons of democratic history. And they are regularly cited in American contexts. Importantly they are also clear, if philosophical, indications 34

Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, (Harvard University Press, 1983). In Huntington’s view, contending democratic ideals (e.g. equality, democracy, freedom) would naturally lead to a continual political struggle that is not to be feared but truly demonstrative of ‚freedom‛ in practice.

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of early concerns regarding the potential abuse of power, from a domestic perspective – a ‚logic‛ that is being carried-over into developmental dialogues in states like Nigeria. By contrast, many post-independence African intellectuals looked ‚outward‛ in their own discussions of circumstances at home due to the continent’s colonial legacy. 35 In other words, the domestic solutions that Western classics proffered did not necessarily convince, as Ake’s 1979 work, and those of so many others, clearly demonstrate.36 But many African manipulators of power, at independence and to this day, have also looked ‚outward‛ in their quest for self-aggrandizement. And that fact cannot be neglected by all those who are now involved in developmental dialogues. On the one hand, then, we have those who understandably express concern for the ongoing colonial legacy while, on the other hand, there are those who simultaneously continue to take full advantage of neo-colonial circumstances. We must be careful, therefore, not to over-simplify the problem as simply an epistemological battle between one side and another; moreover, as discussed, the lines (if they ever existed) are forever blurring as new forms of dialogue take place and new allegiances of thought emerge. Although patterns of thought are discernable, many Western (citizen) Africanists would be in full agreement with many African (citizen) observers, just as a

See, e.g., Kwame Nkrumah’s works including Towards Colonial Freedom (1973) and Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (1969), Tom Mboya, Freedom and After, (André Deutsch Ltd., 1963); and generally Gideon-Cyrus Mutiso and S.W. Rohio, eds., Readings in African Political Thought, (Heinemann, 1975). 36 Ake, cited supra.

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number of Western capitalists are clearly in full allegiance with nondemocratic power-seeking Africans. It is the discourses of power then, as Antonio Gramsci might have argued, that need to be challenged. And we find these in academia, heralding the language of power, just as we find them in the oil industry and in politics. In fact, while the Western classics remain influential to many external actors’ mindsets, virtually any Western textbook on African politics, specifically, will readily emphasize the continent’s ‚colonial legacy‛ and, upon reflection, the emphasis on external influences on African development is now part-and-parcel of the entire subject. Claude Ake was right to say that social science has been imperialistic; what still needs to be achieved is the forging of critically-minded alliances or of a viable ‚counter hegemony‛ as Gramsci would have it. In the post-cold war era these alliances will not be ideologically based; in fact their purpose should be to counter remaining ideological clarity in the world. Admittedly, a Western-centric solution to this problem will be challenging in many ways as it would be in direct contrast with the aforementioned lessons of the founding democratic classics which, as we said, emphasize the importance of internal (domestic) solutions to the potential abuse of power. Within the West, as elsewhere, there remains a Foucauldian problem that needs to be challenged; one of the best ways of addressing the problem may be to forge global alliances, which include Western participants, with critical and informed subaltern voices. As stated, the founding of North American and European democracies did not take place with anywhere near as much external influence and pressure as African states have endured. But this fact can be readily shared and openly discussed in ways that demonstrate mutual understanding of the problem and a mutual concern for solutions. Of course, this still

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needs to be said to a good number of development practitioners who seem to emphasize only internal African state reform, thereby (conveniently) neglecting the dramatic, adverse, and patently obvious impacts of external actors, such as the international oil industry. Moreover, today many in the ‚development industry‛ are epistemologically ‚products of the Cold War‛ or what Edward Said has referred to as that era’s ‚textual children,‛ in that they summarily reject critiques of capitalism and all-too-often refuse to recognize the overlap of political matters with so many other areas of sustainable development inquiry, such as the economic, social, cultural, or environmental. It is therefore crucial that we all acknowledge the lingering effects of Cold War ideology in all developmental dialogues. In our post-Cold War world many developmental gurus remain ‚certain‛ of two things: 1) ‚Marxism is dead‛ and 2) developmental aid is ‚bad.‛37 And again, the pursuit of developmental problems takes place in an atmosphere of self-assured scientific certainty. In a real but tragic way the pursuit of development in Africa continues to be a kind of experiment that economist Jeffrey Sachs has suggested takes place in sweeping waves that come largely from outside forces: Africa is constantly berated for its poor politics and bad economic ideas, though much of the mischief has come from the outside. In the 1960s, the fad at the World Bank and among many donors was "development planning". In the 1970s, this gave way to "basic needs", a doctrine which led the World Bank to back the socialist strategies of soon-to-bebankrupt Tanzania and other non-market economies. In the 1980s, "basic needs" was supplanted by "structural 37

Dimbasa Moyo is probably the best-known modern critic of aid in Africa contexts. See her book, Dead Aid: Why aid is not working and why there is a better way for Africa, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), discussed infra.

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adjustment" which rightly focused on markets but neglected to set priorities in reform. In the ensuing frustration, the focus in the 1990s shifted to "good governance"<38

Throughout the Cold War, and to this day, African state development has taken place in an atmosphere of raging debates as to which approach is best. Based on Huntington’s ideal of celebrating the freeand-open debate of (Western democratic) ideas, we can understand why this is the case: methodologically, this should eventually lead to better ideas and policies. But to date those debates have been dominated by the prevailing thoughts of external actors. And as that scientific process or debate rages on, one can only wonder in the interim: at what human cost? In many ways, from the colonial era to present, external actors have been very consistent in their policies towards Africa in at least three ways. First, foreign state policies have always emphasized the pursuit of national interest. Of course, this was the case during the colonial and imperial eras but still remains the case to this day, as most recently demonstrated by France’s intervention in both the Ivory Coast and Libya, i.e. colonial ties remain strong. Second, external actors’ economic policies have been consistently ‚justified‛ by the pursuit of profit – a tricky matter that often overlaps with the priorities of the state. Third, development policies toward Africa have consistently emphasized the internal change of African states. This latter point is crucially significant as it remains the fall-back position of so many external actors and can be demonstrated as follows:

Jeffrey Sachs, ‚Growth in Africa: It Can Be Done,‛ The Economist, (June 29, 1996), p. 19.

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Table 1 Internal vs. External Focus on Reasons for Developmental Woes FOCUS

Political Orientation

Developmental Agenda

INTERNAL (pushed for by Western/ External Participants) Left Right (Liberal) (Conservative)

EXTERNAL (emphasis of many Local/ Internal Participants) Left Right (Marxist(Local Leninist) Beneficiaries)

Civil Society

Leadership

Colonialism

Power

Community

Governance

Capitalist Exploitation

JointVentures

Education

Policy

Cold War

Non-Demo. Government

Empowerment

Corruption

International Finance

Multinational Corporations

As stated, the overarching focus of development experts is on internal (domestic) change but, even among those who get involved in developmental work there are differences of political orientation. ‚Bleeding heart‛ liberals, and/or leftists, from industrially developed states, have a strong tendency to work on African development projects that involve local people (‚low politics‛), whether that is via working for the US Peace Corps, an NGO, or other; by contrast, political conservatives tend to work with elites or leaders on matters of ‚high politics.‛ In both instances, the emphasis is on organizational change within African states, i.e. they are busy trying to recreate, in African contexts, what they are most familiar with back home. The problem with these two (Western participant) approaches is that neither really addresses the potential failings of what might be going

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on outside of African states to alter an entrenched developmental reality. Of course a consideration of the external impacts on African states would imply a failing of external actors (something external actors have difficulty admitting) and, perhaps understandably, most tend to focus on the places where developmental failings are most physically apparent. The point is that the reasons provided for developmental failings are internal to Africa and scarcely, if ever, contemplate change of external actor norms. Moreover, for practically-oriented capitalists and development professionals, contemplation of a global ‚system‛ of some kind is far too nebulous; all the more reason to focus on what they can physically see in front of them: the lack of ‚development.‛ In the end much of this debate naturally follows the flows of available resources and while one might find developmental work that falls under either of these internal columns above, there are few Westernfinanced jobs that pay for a critical analysis of the external issues listed above – other than perhaps teaching! Again, much of this has to do with the lingering effects of the cold war whereby terms like ‚imperialism‛ and the like are summarily rejected. If anything, the portrayal of African perspectives in Western classrooms and policyvenues is as either lacking opportunity (and therefore in need of internal change for ‚development‛) or Marxist-Leninist (and therefore worthy of discrediting).39 One finds, therefore, that even most scholarship on African development, after making a quick nod to the aforementioned colonial legacy, is targeted on internal change, which 39

See: Christopher LaMonica, ‚Africa in International Relations Theory: Addressing the Quandary of Africa’s Ongoing Marginalization Within the Discipline,‛ in Reframing Contemporary Africa: Politics, Culture, and Society in the Global Era, (CQ Press, 2010).

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is viewed as the more pragmatic and ‚responsible‛ path to pursue. Accordingly, if there is an abuse of power in Nigerian contexts, it is something that is best resolved from within, as had allegedly occurred in Western state history. Yet it is also important to recognize local forms of conservatism, i.e. beneficiaries of the status quo, who might ‚justify‛ their own behaviors in terms of self-interest and power. The elites of Abuja, for example, are only too well aware of the corrupt nature of the external, yet readily take advantage of this (neo-colonial) ‚system.‛ In other words, they act in terms of self-interest – described as a virtue in many classic Western texts – and view the internal development priorities of external actors, and their scholarship, as little more than a small nuisance.

The Cold War Generation: Still in Charge? Today we have an entire generation of development experts who, having been educated in the ideological environment of the Cold War, ignore what they now perceive as critiques of Western perspectives on ‚freedom.‛ As a matter of course we find summary dismissals of the critiques of free-market ‚solutions‛ as being ‚not serious,‛ ‚devoid of ideas,‛ etc. 40 Several best-selling authors have 40

Like comments were regularly made by my own supervisors and colleagues (not all) at USAID, HIID and the OECD. A careful listen to Jeffrey Sachs’ responses to critiques of his ideas or work through the years reveals the same in, e.g., WBUR-Boston interviews, and other – notably the retort that a critic’s point of view is ‚devoid of ideas.‛ Even critics of Sachs’ neo-liberal ‚solutions‛ admit that he has started to alter his own neoclassical economic views to accommodate ‚critical‛ ideas. A leftist journal, reviewing Sachs’ best-selling End of Poverty (2005), argued for example, ‚As the 1990s progressed Sachs became more prominent as a critic of development orthodoxy, arguing against the IMF's austere prescriptions after the 1997 Asian crisis, and pressing for debt relief for the poorest countries.‛ Book

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now argued against the rationalist neo-liberal approach of developmental gurus, like Jeffrey Sachs, but, to date, seem to have very little practical policy impact. Their concerns are many but the overarching truth of a highly inefficient aid industry that seems to perpetuate the existence of their own work, to include that of wellintentioned NGOs, is increasingly visible and clear to a growing number.41 International aid of all kinds, to include humanitarian aid, has all too often found itself in a serious quandary, a ‚moral hazard‛ whereby ‚to help is to hurt,‛ unintentionally making matters worse than they were prior.42 The tragedy of continuing along these lines includes, of course, a human cost – this is not a simple matter of pursuing economic growth to ‚lift all boats‛< lives are being lost along the way; hence the argument that neo-liberal market solutions are seemingly ‚rational‛ but certainly not ‚reasonable.‛ Moreover, the current developmental path seems to neglect the all-important identification of an end-game: long-term, locally-supported, and sustainable governing institutions. Granted, it may be a long time before we get there, but let us be clear: the end-game should include a ‚withering away‛ (to use Marx’s term) Review, ‚The Long Strange Career of Jeffrey Sachs,‛ Left Business Observer, No. 111 (August 2005) posted at: http://www.leftbusinessobserver.com/Sachs.html (Accessed February 2011); See also: ‚The End of Poverty? Think Again,‛ DVD documentary, 2010. Available at: http://www.CinemaLibreStudio.com. 41 Consider the ongoing controversies surrounding, e.g., Graham Hancock, The Lords of Poverty: Power, Prestige, and Corruption in the International Aid Business, (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994); Michael Maren, The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of International Aid and International Charity, (Free Press, 1997); and John Perkins, Confessions of an Economic Hit Man, (Berrett-Koehler, 2004). 42 On the dangers of humanitarian aid, specifically, see: Fionna Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, (Cornell University Press, 2002).

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of the ‚development industry,‛ to include the NGO, and certainly not the democratic state! That is, these organizations should serve a functional purpose: to weather crises, certainly, but also, over the longer-term, to support the formation of new, locally-defined, civil society institutions. In her provocative best-seller, Dead Aid (2009), Moyo asks us the seemingly unthinkable: ‚What do you think Africans would do if aid were stopped?‛ She responds: Too many African countries have already hit rock bottom – ungoverned, poverty-stricken, and lagging further and further behind the rest of the world each day; there is nowhere further down to go.43

In her book Moyo spells-out the patently obvious: in today’s globalizing world, there are ‚winning globalizers‛ (who increase trade and, in return, economic growth), ‚non-globalizers‛ (who eschew trade and have, unsurprisingly, little economic growth), and ‚losing globalizers‛ (who have increased trade but have no associated growth). ‚Tragically,‛ she argues, ‚many African countries fall into this third group.‛ 44 Just like the developmental gurus of the world, Moyo knows that active participation in world trade is the path to developmental success, and she rightly points to two glaring 21 stcentury realities: 1) ongoing governmental subsidies within the West, notably in agriculture, that are a completely hypocritical stance from the ‚lessons‛ of neoclassical economics that are being ‚taught‛ through developmental consultation, imposed via IMF/World Bank

Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is A Better Way for Africa, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), p. 144. 44 Ibid, p. 114.

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conditionality, or other; and 2) China’s rapidly growing trade portfolio with Africa, now growing at an estimated $100 billion per year. Moyo reminds us that the dollar-value of trade with China, alone, consistently exceeds the roughly $40 billion per year of total OECD aid to Africa; ‚by 2015,‛ she tells us, ‚that would be $500 billion of trade income – 50 percent of the trillion dollars of aid that has made its way to Africa in the past sixty years.‛ 45 One need not be an economist to see that this kind of trade pressure from (ironically?) China is causing dramatic alterations to the African developmental landscape. What does this say, then, of our Cold War developmental gurus? Certainly, at a minimum, it is high-time for them to reconsider their lecture and research notes! The observations of Moyo are, in fact, a developmental reality that has long persisted in developing country contexts like Nigeria: in an atmosphere of severely crippled governing institutions, central government politicians have consistently abused their political power for personal gain while vast regions of the country, like the NDR, deteriorate. Moyo’s unfortunate label of ‚losing globalizer‛ is pertinent for it aptly, if bluntly, describes the ‚resource curse‛ phenomenon which later captured the imagination of free-market economic modelers, like Sachs and Warner, but it also captures the observations of earlier critics of global capitalist ventures, like Marx and Lenin. And, to get to a less ideological place, this needs to be said. In fact, Moyo follows the professional standard of today, which is to avoid any reference to these earlier critiques of capitalist exploitation. But again, if we want to move beyond the ideological stance of today’s neoliberal managers of development, we need to pay attention to the obvious that, frankly, previous critics had pointed out long ago. This will be a difficult process for many, as it will entail a 45

Ibid.

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certain measure of ‚swallowing one’s pride‛ which is, proverbially speaking, never easy. Please understand: the motivation for speaking of these critiques is not ideological; the point is that classic commentaries on the potential abuse of power should be considered, from all sides, if a sustainable solution to Nigeria’s developmental woes is ever to be found. Not surprisingly, the aforementioned Sachs and Warner study on the ‚natural resource curse‛ makes no reference to the works of Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin, nor of neo-colonial critics like Kwame Nkrumah. This is quite unfortunate as all three had commented on this very ‚conceptual puzzle‛ many years earlier; the problem, really, from the perspective of many establishment scholars like Sachs, is that their observations were critical of capitalism and therefore nary worth the bother. The essential point here is that much of the systematic rejection of any consideration of views from the ‚other side‛ is a reflection of a bygone Cold War era, that happens to coincide with the formative years of so many of today’s academics and world leaders. But we are now in a post-Cold War world and there is a large consensus about how liberalized markets can help to achieve economic growth. As the world becomes a smaller place, we all get a clearer view of the basis for the ‚complaints‛ as liberalization takes place. With the Cold War now over, it is important for those who are interested in development to consider those now classic descriptions of capitalist exploitation, or economic parasitism; today, they should no longer be considered the voice of an ideological divide but of another set of reactions to the encroachment of capitalist modernization. Today, the ‚other side‛ is the underbelly of global markets and something that can no longer be swept under the rug.

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In fact, in recent years we have seen that slowly, begrudgingly, the developed world is taking notice of the not-so-pretty side of global capitalism in various corners of the Earth. The Bush Administration’s 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy declared, for example: ‚A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable.‛46 And we can be quite certain that the author(s) of that text would not deem such statements as ‚Marxist‛! Yet that sentiment was repeatedly expressed by Marx and has inspired countless many, to this day, to sympathize with these kinds of dramatic statistics on global wealth; it is this basic fact and not the ‚solution‛ of Communism that needs to be acknowledged in a post-Cold War world. Moreover, the traditionally provocative notion that differences of material wealth (as might be investigated in the realm of economics, ergo by Marx) has political ramifications is now quite mainstream in our modern age, despite what political realists like Morgenthau might have wished. That there can be no clear isolation of political concerns from other social concerns, like disparities of wealth, has been expressed, for example, by the former US National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice. Again, it is doubtful that Rice, who famously has an oil tanker named after her, would declare herself a Marxist! Yet, in fact, Rice was among the first Republican leaders to declare, like Marx, that disparities of wealth could lead to security concerns. In her discussion of the 2002 Bali bombing that targeted wealthy Westerners she declared, for example, ‚Economics and security are inextricably linked.‛47 Just a few years later the same can be said of the comments 46

‚The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,‛ September 2002, available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf 47 CNN quotes Rice as saying: ‚Economics and security are inextricably linked. You only have to look at what happened in a place like Bali when you

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of countless conservative and other Western politicians, who regularly comment on the political significance, and security implications, of disparities of wealth. Following in that pattern, this argument can also be found in the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy of the Obama Administration: The growth of emerging economies in recent decades has lifted people out of poverty and forged a more interconnected and vibrant global economy. But development has been uneven, progress is fragile, and too many of the world’s people still live without the benefits that development affords. While some countries are growing, many lag behind – mired in insecurity, constrained by poor governance, or overly dependent on commodity prices. But sustained economic progress requires faster, sustainable, and more inclusive development.48

Again, we see a slow but certain acknowledgment of severe developmental problems alongside an otherwise ‚vibrant global economy.‛ Of course, for decades the United States minimized the importance of ‚development aid‛ vis-à-vis other OECD states, as a quick breakdown of Official Development Assistance (ODA) demonstrates:

had the terrorist attack there.‛ ‚Bush in Japan on Six Nation Asia Tour,‛ CNN.com, October 17, 2003. See also Rice’s comments at ‚Bush Departs for Asian Tour,‛ Cox News Service, October 14, 2003. (Originally accessed in October 2003.) 48 ‚The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,‛ May 2010, p. 33.

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Table 2 Official Development Assistance (ODA) of the U.S. as a % of GNP vs. selected OECD states 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Belgium 0.88 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.36 Denmark 0.09 0.38 0.74 0.94 1.06 France 1.38 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.32 Germany 0.31 0.32 0.44 0.42 0.27 Netherlands 0.31 0.63 0.97 0.92 0.84 Norway 0.11 0.33 0.87 1.17 0.80 Sweden 0.05 0.37 0.78 0.91 0.80 United Kingdom 0.56 0.37 0.35 0.27 0.32 United States 0.53 0.31 0.27 0.21 0.10

2009 0.55 0.88 0.47 0.35 0.82 1.06 1.12 0.52 0.21

Source: Theodore Cohn, Global Political Economy, 3rd Ed. (2005), p. 366; http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/30/44285539.gif (Accessed February 2011).

Moreover, ODA has traditionally followed a pattern of following the national interests of OECD states that has systematically bypassed all of sub-Saharan Africa for decades; a snapshot of the top ten recipients of aid in 1995 and 2000 follows: Table 3 Top Recipients of OECD ODA as a % of GNP 1995 2000 1. China Indonesia 2. Indonesia China 3. Poland Russia 4. Egypt Egypt 5. India India 6. Israel Israel 7. Russia Vietnam 8. Philippines Israel 9. Thailand Philippines 10. Bangladesh Bangladesh Source: Theodore Cohn, Global Political Economy, 3rd Ed. (2005), p. 367.

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Up through to the end of the 20 th-century, sub-Saharan Africa was seemingly not a priority, but in the 21 st-century, the patterns of ODA are changing. A careful consideration of ODA flows of recent years demonstrates interesting trends that are very much in line with the security concerns expressed by both the Bush and Obama Administrations: 1) the inclusion of OECD government spending in war zones as ODA; and 2) a growing interest in conflict-ridden zones of sub-Saharan Africa: Table 4 Top Ten Recipients of US (only) ODA 2008-2009 average 1 Afghanistan 2 Iraq 3 Sudan 4 Ethiopia 5 Palestinian Adm. Areas 6 Columbia 7 Egypt 8 Kenya 9 Pakistan 10 South Africa Source: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/30/44285539.gif (Accessed February 2011)

In recent years then, the US has made dramatic changes to its aid policy and ODA statistics. During the cold war aid might have been politically justified by national interest and defeating Communism; today aid is targeted toward areas of broader security concern. Moreover, assistance to areas where the US has been engaged in war

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now counts in the calculation of ODA statistics. 49 Far from countering this trend, other OECD states have similarly restructured their aid portfolios and now count that assistance in their ODA statistics.50 Recent trends of US ODA are perfectly in line with the State Department’s newly declared foreign policy strategy, sometimes summarized as ‚3D Security,‛ that emphasizes the links between Development, Diplomacy, and Defense. 51 This step, of formally declaring ‚development‛ as part of a foreign policy strategy alongside other, more traditional, bases for pursuing US national interest, is a departure from the previously established pattern of underplaying global developmental concerns. Moreover, the plight of many subSaharan states is now on the US foreign policy ‚radar screen‛ – with the 2008 establishment of the new Africa Command (AFRICOM) some would say, cynically, literally and otherwise. With the cold war over, this could translate to a new era of substantive dialogue on development in previously marginalized areas. What the Obama Administration’s new strategy and Africa Command demonstrate then is a growing recognition of the links between development and security. The previous Cold War era had allowed the US and other Western states to strategically support nondemocratic regimes, ironically (many would say) in the name of ‚security,‛ while simultaneously – hypocritically some would now

This is likely due to the increased use of extra-military contractors that are not counted as direct military expenditure. 50 As a brief visit to http://www.oecd.org will attest. 51 Hillary Clinton, ‚Remarks on Development in the 21 st-Century‛ made to the Center for Global Development, Washington, D.C., January 6, 2010. Text available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/134838.htm (Accessed February 2011).

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say – supporting democracy in principle. Today’s emerging consensus is that localized destitution is a concern to all; ‚democracy,‛ in the form of democratic elections, will often mean little and it is ‚security‛ that still remains the trump card in policy circles. Pundits will always have different ways to interpret the Bush Doctrine but, for certain, what that era did demonstrate was a new concern for security at home based on things gone wrong elsewhere; Obama’s Administration has followed in that pattern but has boldly (provocatively in domestic political circles) used the term ‚development‛ in its new foreign policy strategy. This could be the start of a more productive era of development, albeit one that remains publicly based on ‚security at home.‛ Underlying that change is the ongoing challenge of trying to shake-off the still ideological ‚understandings‛ of development that prevailed in a Cold War ‚order‛ and this will require vigilance. As we have seen, new sensitivities have already been expressed in mainstream US politics (Bush, Rice, Obama) and in the more recent works of establishment development gurus (Sachs), but there is assuredly an urgent need to press on. In this small world of ours, capitalist ventures that treat all that is local as an inconvenient nuisance or as another ‚waste land‛ to simply exploit must come to a conclusive end; NDR’s local sustainability, Nigeria’s national sustainability, and international sustainability require that to happen.

Conclusion Responsibility for the ongoing plight of the entire Niger Delta Region extends well beyond Nigeria’s borders. External actors have dramatically impacted the patterns of Nigerian development and politicking and they, as we all know, have largely marginalized the

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interests of the NDR. Today too many Africanists are too quick to ‚explain away‛ the region’s problems solely in terms of tribal identities but that ethnic focus speaks only to the superficial surface of Nigerian political behavior while systematically ignoring some of the underlying reasons why local politicians and others resort to tribalism. Throughout history men all over the world have used tribalism as a means for achieving the end of maintaining power. There are solutions and the Western classics do not necessarily have a monopoly on what those solutions are. Indeed, the best ways to ward-off the abuses of power are democratic but let us not forget that external actors have heretofore destroyed indigenous checks-andbalances and, of course, much else. Moreover, the democratic challenges a developing West might have had pale in comparison to what developing states like Nigeria now face; globally significant and dramatic flows of capital, peoples, and resources now impact Nigeria in countless ways that, tragically, the world is just beginning to understand. Hopefully the world’s mutual interest in security and development, as described here, will soon lead to a better developmental reality for the people of the NDR and all of Nigeria. Here it is argued that much can be achieved through global alliances of critically informed scholars and practitioners who, in the end, can have a substantive impact on the actions of those involved in all forms of development activity. And, when it comes to the ‚resource curse‛ phenomenon described by Sachs and Warner, and later popularized by Thomas L. Friedman, there is good news: Economists C.N. Brunnschweiler and E.H. Bulte published a 2008 article in Science with opposite conclusions: The last word in the resource curse debate is far from having been spoken; but economic advisors should be aware that natural resources do not necessarily spell doom for

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development. Instead, their exploitation can be a valuable part of a sustainable development strategy.52

Of course they are right. Unlike the Sachs and Warner study, their data consider a broader spectrum of resource-rich countries; since then, a good many experts have compared African crises, and the Nigerian case specifically, with resource-rich countries that are faring much better. Countries in the North Sea region, notably Norway, have now managed to hold on to a very sizable – $300 billion, expected to grow to $900 billion in a decade – portion of their oil and gas revenues.53 Yet critics remain. John Ghazvinian, author of Untapped: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil (2007), investigates the prospect of employing a Norwegian model in African contexts and concludes that the challenges in oil-rich nations like Nigeria are simply too vast. His words are blunt and even offensive: ‚People in the Niger Delta live almost as if it’s the Stone Age. They live in stick huts on little islands in the mangrove swamps< Nearby, you will have these multibillion oil facilities, with executives being dropped in by helicopter.‛ 54 Yet Ghazvinian is describing a developmental reality that Moyo similarly describes: impoverishment, social and environmental degradation, alongside clear evidence of vast wealth. Cynical and depressing, for certain, but literature of the kind is encouraging in the sense that it is

C.N. Brunnschweiler and E.H. Bulte, ‚Linking Natural Resources to Slow Growth and More Conflict,‛ Science, Vol. 320 (2 May 2008): 616-617. 53 Dubbed the ‚future generations fund.‛ See: ‚’The Resource Curse’: Why Africa’s Oil Riches Don’t Trickle Down to Africans,‛ Knowledge@Wharton, October 31, 2007. Full text at: http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1830. 54 John Ghazhvinian, cited in ibid.

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helping us all to better understand and to work together to seek sustainable solutions.55 Decidedly more measured tones are employed by Michael L. Ross of the University of California, Los Angeles, who writes regularly on the problems of the NDR: Between 1970 and 1999, the Nigerian petroleum industry generated about $231 billion in rents, or $1900 for every man, woman, and child. Yet from 1970 to 1999 Nigeria’s real income per capita fell from $264 to $250 a year.56

Writers like Ross feel obligated to research such statistics if only to ask this simple question: ‚Why has Nigeria’s remarkable oil wealth done so little to raise incomes and alleviate poverty?‛ 57 The answers are becoming quite obvious but Ross is undoubtedly aware of the ideological stance of those involved in development and, of course, the self-righteous stance of so many in the oil industry. He is therefore compelled to go through the bother of citing statistics. But he does, eventually, get to the heart of the matter as he assuredly aims to do. In a more recent publication, Ross concludes that the oil industry: Often wreaks havoc on a country’s economy and politics, helps fund insurgents, and aggravates ethnic grievances. 55

The same could be said of coverage in popular journals, like National Geographic (Feb. 2007) and popular films like ‚Black Gold-Niger Delta,‛ although such projects inevitably have at least some errors. 56 Michael L. Ross, ‚Nigeria’s Oil Sector and the Poor,‛ Study prepared for the UK DFID, May 23, 2003. Posted at: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/NigeriaOil.pdf. 57 Ibid.

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And with oil ever more in demand, the problems it spawns are likely to spread further.58

He knows that the developmental problems of Nigeria are not only internal; they can only be understood as being in full collusion and cooperation with external actors. The Nigerian government does have deeply entrenched problems of corruption but they have always relied on external support for sustenance. Historian Basil Davidson has argued that, as a result, the vast majority of Nigerian citizens now do all in their power to avoid the ‚state.‛59 Another writer on the subject is Africanist Doug Yates, whose portrayal of the French oil interests in francophone Africa can easily be transferred to circumstances in Nigeria. 60 The problems that Davidson and Yates identify have deep historical roots: the mistrust of government goes back to the colonial era, certainly, and continues into present circumstances. Their essential point is that the ‚state‛ had always catered to the needs of external actors; moreover, the ‚state‛ has historically been viewed by locals as a ‚resource‛ for the few and, to this day, latching onto the resources of the state becomes a kind of lifestyle for some. In this kind of environment, entrepreneurial skill is quickly replaced by clientelism, as so many Africanists have pointed out.61 Nigeria’s developmental problems are, therefore, multidimensional and require firm acknowledgment of the 58

Michael L. Ross, ‚Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict,‛ Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008. 59 Basil Davidson, Modern Africa: A Social and Political History, 3rd Ed., (Longman, 1994). 60 Douglas A. Yates, The French Oil Industry: And the Corps des Mines in Africa, (Africa World Press, 2009). 61 See, e.g., Carlene J. Edie, Politics in Africa: A New Beginning? (Wadsworth, 2003), pp. 76-78.

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many factors that have led to present circumstances. If we are to listen to the views of Davidson and Yates, this would require, at a minimum: 1) correcting the historical mistrust of Nigerian civil servants and government, writ large, through better integration and formal, recognized presence of local authorities; 2) challenging Nigeria’s Rentier State norms that include colluding with oil industries to create ‚joint ventures‛ that are inherently corrupt and only empower the few, with virtually no benefits to the Nigerian masses; and 3) the fundamental reform of developmental partnerships with donor states that would lead to a renewed focus on the longer-term goal of strengthened local and coastal governing bodies. All of this can be achieved in partnership with external actors; but, as discussed above, that can only be realized if external actors speak frankly about the one-sided assumptions they have been making about free-market capitalism. Absent this, Nigeria’s seemingly all pervasive culture of governmental impunity will only continue to thrive as the global appetite for oil grows. What is lacking in the Sachs and Warner study, and so many others devoted to the ‘challenge’ of sustainable development in Nigeria, is the link to security and it is there, perhaps more than with trade, that mutually beneficial solutions are to be found. If security is our primary form of mutual interest, then a thorough consideration of the ‘development-security nexus’ in the NDR is required for Nigeria’s coastal development to occur.62 It is only when local and coastal governance in the NDR is improved that development in the NDR and all of Nigeria can be expected to take off. 62

A similar argument is made by Lars Buur, Steffen Jensen and Finn Stepputat, eds., The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Securitization in Southern Africa, (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007).

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For now much of the developmental discussion is blocked in the largely ideological discussions of a previous Cold War era, a hallmark of which has included ideological certainty. Today’s developmental leaders are products of that era; moreover they are informed by the classics of Western development that have ‚waste land‛ and other assumptions about the then colonized areas of the world, like Nigeria. All of this needs to be carefully and critically considered by all involved in developmental politics if the mutually beneficial aim of improved governance and sustainability in the NDR is ever to be achieved. Beyond that important epistemological challenge, clarity on the following, by all stakeholders, would greatly improve the region’s developmental prospects:

The State Matters The Nigerian State was created by external actors who were interested in Nigeria as a resource; in their minds Nigeria was little more than a waste land waiting to be exploited for their own benefit. Understandably, post-independence, many Nigerians have similarly looked to their own state as a ‚resource‛; in many ways, those in Nigerian government have simply followed in the footsteps of what was a wellestablished colonial pattern. If latching-on to that corrupt resource is not a possibility, the ‚state‛ has become, for the Nigerian majority, something to avoid. Today external actors know this and, following lockstep with their colonial predecessors and the lessons of the aforementioned classics, are generally couching their dialogue with the Nigerian government in terms of (ideological) efficiency. Economists like Sachs have become famous for providing that kind of

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‚advice.‛ But today, the merit of the free movement of economic resources is well understood by a growing community of politicians and policymakers of all kinds. The ongoing push for providing lessons of free-market economics are therefore of little help and have, in fact, resulted in a backlash of many who correctly argue that the free-market is not the be-all and end-all of Nigeria’s developmental woes. Economic growth is obviously very important and helpful but catering to that only, as miraculous and impressive as it can be, can lead to a substantial degradation of other things that matter: environmental sustainability, a sense of community, and the quality of human life, to name a few. It should therefore be understandable, to all, why it is that there are growing concerns regarding the ideological nature of freemarket capitalism – what many in the region refer to as ‚neoliberalism.‛ We all need to move beyond the ideological approach to development that speaks only to the ‚efficiency‛ priorities of the market. The realization of democratic state goals, such as security, equity, fairness, and justice, are also important to all human societies and are required for secure and sustainable circumstances to be realized in the NDR. In short, the state matters and while strengthening Nigerian ‚civil society‛ will help to check the potential abuses of political power, external actors can also do their part by checking their own participation in Nigerian corruption. As discussed in this article, the world is now better informed than ever and watching the corrupt behaviours of all involved. Nigeria’s democratic goals will not be achieved overnight; they are the ever-adjusting results of pluralistic political processes. But democratic success will also require external vigilance and support.

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Less Ideology Will Help Critiques from the ‘other side’ of the Cold War debate, often attributed to followers of Marx, Lenin, Nkrumah, and others were not devoid of merit, although their methods and ‘solutions’ were often flawed. In retrospect, we can hopefully appreciate – all of us – the historical concerns of these earlier observers of industrial capitalism that emphasized, among other things, the seemingly systematic exploitation of the weak. Yes, many of their followers’ approaches to the problem of industrial exploitation was brutally ideological and undoubtedly led to untold human suffering, corruption, and delayed development of all kinds. But, in our pursuit of economic growth, let us not make that same ideological mistake. When one sees the suffering of so many in the NDR, combined with the intimate involvement of extra-Nigerian capitalist interests, it is hard not to reach a similar conclusion: here, as has happened in history, we have a story of capitalist exploitation. Here, as has happened in history, we have abuses of power. And if we listen carefully to the lessons of the Enlightenment, their arguments were not only about science but about valuing human life. Politicians, stakeholders and development practitioners have to be honest about the ongoing local appeal of that kind of (now ‚classic‛ Marxist-Leninist) logic; and the very visible exploitative results of pursuing unhindered capitalism on the ground. Today a systematic rejection of the basis for the argument that highlights industrial exploitation, and of the NDR’s tragic facts, while continuing along the current developmental path, can only be attributed to the ideological rejection of Communism during a previous Cold War era. This position does not condone Communism in any way but does help us all to understand crucially significant differences of

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perspective. Only if we can move beyond ideology can we begin to engage in a meaningful dialogue over the crucial role of local and coastal governance in the NDR. And that discussion will hopefully lead to the empowerment of local governing institutions and, in turn, improved security for the region. 3.

Development Requires Security As such, the developmental challenges of the twenty-first century will require closer attention to the connections between security and development, particularly in regions where trade and commerce are lagging. Developmental economists, like Sachs, are right to emphasize the centrality of trade to developmental prospects.63 But that trade can only take place in a safer environment than what the NDR currently has to offer. Twenty-first century solutions to the developmental problems of the NDR, and of Nigeria more generally, are to be found in an improved and enhanced role for the local and coastal portions of the Nigerian state. And the time seems right: Western leadership seems to be convinced of the need for security, particularly where destitution exists, and to engage in more effective, mutually beneficial, forms of developmental aid. Put simply, those goals cannot be achieved if external oil interests are allowed to continue colluding with Nigerian elites in the form of â&#x20AC;&#x161;joint ventures.â&#x20AC;&#x203A; Today, in Nigeria at least, everyone knows this; it is high time for all external actors to take note.

Sachs (2005); Sachs, Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet, (Penguin Press, 2008)

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External Actor Responsibility Thus far, donor states and other developmental actors have emphasized the importance of Nigeria’s internal change. Upon reflection, the justifications for that approach make some sense as most external actors sincerely believe in the ideas of their founding democratic texts and expect developing states to follow suit. But Western democratic states did not develop in the smaller globalized world of today; to apply those lessons to developing states is therefore not reasonable. In many ways, then, this article has considered the obvious: much of the responsibility for Nigeria’s current developmental woes lies squarely on the shoulders of those outside of Nigeria who have benefited so disproportionately from oil and other forms of capitalist ventures. It is therefore external actors who need to think critically about their own developmental methods and logic, so often informed by the classics of Western education, that continue to treat regions like the NDR as a ‚waste land‛ rather than a participating partner.

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