Pi Sigma Alpha Undegraduate Journal of Politics

The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics (ISSN 1556-2034) is published bi-annually by the Nu Omega Chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha, Oakland University, Department of Political Science, 418 Varner Hall, Rochester, MI 48309-4488. The journal is funded by Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036, http://www.pisigmaalpha.org.

The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics was founded in the spring of 2001 by Delta Omega Chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha at Purdue University, under the name The American Undergraduate Journal of Politics and Government. With the sponsorship of Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, the name of the Journal was changed to The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics as of the Fall 2004 edition.

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The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics Fall 2013

Volume XIII

Number 2 Twenty-Sixth Edition

Jane Dixon Dana Parke Alyssa Clarke Evan Jones Dr. Laura Landolt Dr. Terri Towner

Outreach Editor Outreach Editor Content Editor Technology Editor Faculty Advisor Faculty Advisor

Editorial Board Amanda Benno Marc Dubuis Alexandra Julian Robert Larsen Drew Lewis

Khayriyyah Muhammad-Smith Matthew Quinn Alexandru Salar Scott White

Advisory Board Dr. Robert Alexander II Dr. Nicole Asmussen Dr. Cristian Cantir Dr. Matthew Dabros Dr. Natasha Duncan Dr. Alan Epstein Dr. Stephen J. Farnsworth Dr. John Klemanski Dr. Paulette Kurzer

Dr. Jonathan McKenzie Dr. Katsuo Nishikawa Dr. D’andra Orey Dr. Christine Pappas Dr. Mark P. Petracca Dr. Harry C. Strine IV Dr. Jo Reger Dr. Pete Trumbore Dr. Byungwon Woo

Editor’s Preface to the Fall Edition The Pi Sigma Alpha Journal of Undergraduate Politics would first and foremost like to acknowledge all those individuals and institutions which make the publication of this journal possible semester after semester and year after year. The journal has continued to grow in terms of submissions, quality, and prestige. Admissions to the Fall 2013 edition were both vast in number and constituted a diverse array of topics. We greatly appreciate all those who have submitted their work to the journal in hopes of being published. The articles published herein exemplify a high quality sample of the types of undergraduate research being conducted across the country.

Although the publication is a completely student-run endeavor, the efforts of the student Editorial Board are guided and supported by a number of individuals and institutions which we would like to thank. First, we would like to thank the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council and Executive Committee whose vision and financial support has maintained the quality and direction of the journal. Second, we would like to thank the faculty advisory board: the thorough and constructive reviews provided by the members of this board have ensured the articles published herein meet a consistent standard of quality. Finally, we extend tremendous thanks to Editorial Board Faculty Advisors Laura Landolt and Terri Towner, who have made the transition of the journal to its new home at Oakland University a smooth and overwhelming success.

The Editorial Board at Oakland University is thrilled to assume the publication of the journal and embraces the accompanying responsibilities with vigor and zeal.

While publishing this issue has truly been an exhausting learning experience at times, the Nu Omega Chapter and Oakland University are proud of the work this issue represents and look forward to the next three years.

Best, The Editors

Submission of Manuscripts The journal accepts manuscripts from undergraduates of any class and major.

Members of Pi Sigma Alpha are especially encouraged to enter their work. We strive to publish papers of the highest quality in all areas of political science. Generally, selected manuscripts have been well-written works with a fully developed thesis and strong argumentation stemming from original analysis. Authors may be asked to revise their work before being accepted for publication.

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Table of Contents Is Race the Case? How the Racial Views of the Tea Party Movement Influence Members’ Attitudes Concerning Policies that Benefit Immigrants

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Success with Separatism? Brittany, Corsica, and the Indivisible French Republic

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Amy Sentementes Texas Christian University

Kate Walker Samford University

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Is Race the Case? How the Racial Views of the Tea Party Movement Influence Members’ Attitudes Concerning Policies that Benefit Immigrants Amy Sentementes Texas Christian University

A contradiction exists between Tea Party members’ ideological principles and their preference for active government responses to increased immigration. While the Tea Party professes to favor stricter immigration policies as a means to promote economic prosperity, their opposition to a more lenient approach may arise as a byproduct of their racial views. This paper examines how Tea Partiers’ racial views influence their attitudes toward programs that benefit immigrants. The study utilizes a survey experiment to disentangle the ideological preferences of Tea Party members from prejudicial attitudes in order to determine which component contributes to their aversion toward these general social programs.

Survey data reveals that Tea Partiers exhibit disparate attitudes toward federal assistance when exposed to survey questions concerning immigrants of different races. The results indicate that Tea Party members possess an in-group bias, as they favor the provision of federal assistance programs directed toward immigrants of their racial in-group.

Introduction

After Barack Obama won the 2008 presidential election, a trifecta of disgruntled voters, powerful activists, and political pundits united to articulate their disapproval of the new president’s policies through the formation of the Tea Party Movement. While participants strove to emulate the Revolutionary War patriots who protested excessive British involvement in colonial affairs at the Boston Tea Party, the name of this new group does not refer to the aforementioned efforts of the Founders, but instead serves as a reminder of the need for fiscal responsibility. The “Tea” in this Tea Party stands for “Taxed Enough Already,” a catchy slogan that conveys members’ discontent with the then newly instated government programs enacted to ameliorate the effects of the 2008 recession. Libertarian rhetoric functioned as a dominant component of early Tea Party rallies, yet as the movement acquired additional conservative supporters, members allowed the group to occupy a place within the Republican Party and serve as a watch-dog to monitor Republican members

of Congress and encourage them to adhere to far-right ideological principles (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

While Republican Party voters possess similar political characteristics to Tea Party supporters, an important characteristic, pessimism toward the future of the nation, serves as a unifying view of the Tea Party Movement and causes this faction of the Republican Party to occupy a position on the right of the political spectrum. Tea Partiers fear the increasing role of the government and perceive those who receive federal assistance as lazy. Tea Partiers do, however, support increased government involvement with respect to immigration, as they view immigrants as a threat toward future American prosperity (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). A contradiction exists between Tea Partiers’ ideological principles and their preference for active government responses to increased immigration. While the Tea Party professes to favor stricter immigration policies as a means to promote economic prosperity, their hostility may have arisen as a byproduct of their racial views. This paper examines how Tea Partiers’ racial views influence their attitudes toward programs that benefit immigrants.

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This study utilizes a survey experiment to disentangle the ideological preferences of Tea Party members from prejudicial attitudes as a means of determining the extent to which racial aversion contributes to opposition to general social programs. After positioning this study within existing literature regarding this nascent faction of the Republican Party and their views on immigration and racial issues, an examination of the experimental survey data reveals that Tea Partiers exhibit disparate attitudes toward federal assistance when exposed to survey questions concerning immigrants of different races. The results indicate that Tea Party members possess an in-group bias, as they favor the provision of federal assistance programs directed toward immigrants of their racial in-group.

Due to the brief time the Tea Party Movement has occupied a place in the political sphere, political scientists, journalists, and other commentators have yet to reach a consensus concerning the effects of members’ attitudes and behavior on elections and the national agenda. Establishing a single set of characteristics that encompasses every member of the Tea Party Movement proves a difficult task, as heterogeneous groups who possess diverse social and political characteristics have gathered together under the Tea Party label to remonstrate the Obama Administration’s political agenda. The absence of a central Tea Party organization that monitors the movement’s activities and aggregates the issue stances of all elites and grassroots members also contributes to the complexity of developing a simple means of categorizing Tea Party supporters, aside from relying on self-identification (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Assessing the descriptive characteristics, ideological views, and racial resentment associated with the Tea Party Movement benefits this study, as these components contribute to members’ attitudes toward the government’s approach

to immigration.

Descriptive Characteristics of the Tea Party Movement

Although factions arose within the Tea Party Movement due to contentious debates concerning social issues, racial issues, and other non-economic controversies, Tea Party members exhibit similar demographic characteristics, particularly those that shape the group’s perception of fiscal issues and the proper role of government. After conducting a series of interviews with Tea Partiers in the Greater Boston area, Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson (2012) contend that white older males are more likely to identify with the concerns of this movement, as they comprise a majority of attendants at Tea Party rallies.

Polls and survey research also advance these claims, as “the 18 percent of Americans who identify themselves as Tea Party supporters tend to be Republican voters, white, male, married, and older than 45”.1 The olderthan-average age of grassroots members contributes to their outlook on younger generations. Tea Partiers believe their age reflects wisdom and experience, and express skepticism toward younger voters, questioning this population’s work ethic and ability to discern the effects of a more activist government (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

Along with similar descriptive characteristics, Tea Party members also possess a shared socioeconomic status, which also contributes to the group’s core values regarding government spending and taxation.

Grassroots members tend to earn a higher-than-average income with “20% of its membership making over $100,000 a year and over 50% of its membership mak1 Kate Zernike and Megan Thee-Brenan, “Poll Finds Tea Party Backers Wealthier and More Educated,” New York Times, 14 April, 2010.

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics ing over $50,000” (Elkins 2011, 8). Tea Partiers tend to be more educated than the average American as well.2 While the 2008 recession may not have harmed Tea Party members in the same manner it did lower income earners, its effects have inspired both long-term fears and short-term anger. Because the majority of Tea Partiers earn a comfortable living but do not fall in the highest echelon of income earners, they are likely to perceive the recession as more detrimental than their wealthier counterparts in the Republican Party.

Members were not immune to initial effects of the recession, yet their apocalyptic rhetoric suggests that long-term effects of the recession would threaten not only economic growth but also the economic structure celebrated by free-market capitalists.

Ideological Characteristics of the Tea Party Movement

While demographic homogeneity exists within the Tea Party, disagreements among members have arisen due to the ideological orientation of the movement. Because criticism of the government’s approach to fiscal issues served as the most salient issue for members during the nascent stages of the movement, voters with the aforementioned descriptive qualities coalesced in protest, regardless of their position on the ideological spectrum. Libertarians and conservatives alike invoked the rhetoric of the Founders and professed the need for accountability and a populist awakening to monitor the increasingly powerful government. These concerned voters implored for a more active and engaged citizenry (Delaune 2010). After Congress passed President Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in March 2010, the group augmented its outcry, rebuked this new ‘socialistic’ 2 Zernike and Thee-Brenan, “Poll Finds Tea Party Backers Wealthier and More Educated.”

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governmental provision, and vowed to halt its implementation in the 2010 midterm election (Abramowitz 2011; Katel 2010). A closer examination of the ideological disparities within the movement proves necessary when evaluating group attitudes, as Tea Party members with different ideological identities may approach the issue of federal support for immigrants in divergent ways.

Sippin’ the Libertarian Tea

An explanation of the characteristics unique to libertarian Tea Party members benefits this study, as libertarianism dominated the movement at its founding. While the relationship between conservative ideology and Tea Party support is statistically significant in Emily Elkins’ (2011) analysis, she asserts that a divide exists within the movement, as libertarians continue to participate. Because the Tea Party strives to reduce the size and scope of the government, these fiscally conservative, socially liberal members approve of the movement’s message and admire its commitment to instating a responsible, minimal government. Elkins explains that libertarian members possess slightly different descriptive characteristics than socially conservative members, as they tend to hold higher degrees, thus facilitating their ability to earn a higher-than-average income (2011). Libertarians are also more likely to inhabit the northern and western regions of the United States, a fact that may influence their feelings toward the federal government’s response to immigration (Elkins 2011).

Elkins explains that while libertarian Tea Partiers approve of conservative fiscal policies, the ways in which these members craft their issue stances establish a divide within overall movement attitudes (2011).

When responding to the question of whether or not

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the government should allow higher levels of immigration, Tea Party “libertarians were statistically identical to Democrats/Independents…while Tea Party conservatives were less likely than their non-Tea Party counterparts to agree” (Elkins 2011, 23). However, both libertarians and social conservatives oppose federal social programs, claiming that “government programs intended to help the poor inadvertently perpetuate poverty” (Elkins 2011, 17). Though libertarians observe federal economic intervention in a pessimistic manner, their lack of concern for increased immigration levels suggests that their opposition to social programs centers on purely fiscal rationale.

Teavangelicals: The Stronger Brew

The Tea Party energized complacent, malcontent voters prior to the 2010 midterm election. Yet when members endorsed socially conservative candidates, they alienated some of the movement’s original libertarian supporters. These socially conservative members argued that the government should maintain an orderly, traditional society in order to allow laissezfaire economic policies to thrive. The influence of the Tea Partiers whose religious and cultural views did not comport with their conservative peers waned, as some left the movement after social issues arrived on the agenda. These libertarian members did not wish to address religious concerns or polarizing social issues, as these concepts diluted the movement’s original message of fiscal responsibility (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). A thorough evaluation of the conservative Tea Party faction’s qualities will clearly reveal the disparities between it and the libertarian minority.

A new breed of Tea Partiers emerged as members incorporated social issues into their platforms, and socially conservative candidates endorsed and

embraced the movement. Evangelical Christians who supported the Tea Party, colloquially known as ‘Teavangelicals,’ appreciated the movement’s endorsement of moral-uprightness (Brody 2012). No longer did libertarian sentiment run rampant throughout local rallies and meetings. Gary Jacobson (2011) analyzed Stephen Ansolabehere’s 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study dataset, concluding that the Tea Party accounts for the far-right of the Republican Party due to its favorability toward both socially and fiscally conservative political views and policy proposals.3 Through comparison of means and comparison of proportions tests on survey data, Elkins (2011) explains that conservative ideology serves as the strongest predictor of Tea Party support. Abramowitz (2011) finds similar results employing logistic regression. While most Tea Partiers now identify as both fiscal and social conservatives, a majority of Tea Party groups continued to emphasize their libertarian orientation and incorporate libertarian rhetoric into their rallies and congressional campaigns (Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Elkins 2011).

Some Tea Party-backed candidates in the South did not hesitate to highlight their social conservatism, while others exposed the problems in the American political sphere from a purely fiscal perspective. This approach may allow the movement to establish a longterm position in the political sphere while pushing the Republican Party to the right in a pragmatic manner (Jacobson 2011).

Racial Views of the Tea Party Movement

Previous literature has discussed the definitive characteristics of the Tea Party Movement and identified the ideological disparities of the members.

3 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, http://projects. iq.harvard.edu/cces/data (accessed March 16, 2014).

Is Race The Case?

This study focuses on the racial views of this unique group. Elkins (2011) and Rae (2011) explain that the Tea Party not only attributes its pessimism concerning the future of the nation to President Obama’s policies, but also to President Bush’s policies. Obama’s election and proposed policies served as catalysts for the original establishment of the movement, yet these sources suggest that the Tea Party’s unfavorable view toward President Bush and his inability to adhere to conservative principles contribute to their skeptical views toward instating a hierarchical authority to monitor.

Tea Partiers prefer to maintain their ‘watchdog’ image by refusing to elect one official representative who may succumb to the corruption inherent in holding political office. Unlike mainstream Republican partisans, Tea Party voters view compromise as a failure, as they emphasize the need for supporters to act in a principled, disciplined manner rather than a pragmatic one (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

While Tea Party members attribute the dismal economic climate to elites from both major parties, their pessimism is not merely due to ideological purism and fiscal conservatism. Jacobson assesses Tea Party behavior prior to the midterm election, concluding that a “racial component of negative views of Obama [exists]…[yet] its magnitude is difficult to pin precisely” (2010, 9). Although Jacobson conducted his study relatively early in the movement’s existence, he incorporates ANES data from the 2008 presidential election, which suggests that racial attitudes dictated vote choice, as McCain won a majority of white votes and Obama clearly succeeded among minorities (2010).

Jacobson’s analysis initiates scholarly efforts to evaluate Tea Party perceptions of politics as a function of their racial attitudes.

Tea Party members intensified their opposition to Obama prior to the 2010 midterm elections, as they

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increased the extent to which they incorporated hostile, false rhetoric into their rallies. The literature suggests that endorsements from Tea Party organizations did not contribute to Republican victory in the 2010 midterms, yet the presence of the movement in the political sphere energized voters, as Tea Partiers framed this election as a referendum on Obama’s first two years in office (Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton 2011; Jacobson 2011). Instead of disagreeing substantively with Obama’s policies, Tea Party members communicated messages full of loaded words and false accusations such as the claim that President Obama was a “tyrant, Nazi, fascist, Communist, [and] socialist” simultaneously (Jacobson 2010, 2). Fox News, the source from which Tea Partiers learn a majority of political information and a significant player in the media portion of the Tea Party trifecta, perpetuated these concepts, as pundits continued to craft fallacies concerning the president and his policies (Berg 2011; Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

Observation alone reveals a racial element behind rhetoric and behavior of the Tea Party Movement, while empirical studies substantiate this claim.

Jacobson demonstrates, for instance, that racial views influenced support for the Tea Party in the 2010 midterm elections (2011). Elkins further expands on this idea, arguing that both libertarian and conservative Tea Partiers view American economic mobility optimistically, thus influencing their belief that economic problems associated with African Americans enjoyed an unnecessary amount of coverage in 2010 (2011).

Tea Party conservatives are more likely than their GOP counterparts to believe Obama’s policies favor minorities (Elkins 2011). While ideological conservatism served as the strongest predictor of Tea Party support, racial resentment and dislike for Obama also served as statistically significant predictors (Abramowitz 2011).

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Angie Maxwell and T. Wayne Parent (2012) explain that three racial attitudes—symbolic racism, racial stereotypes, and ethnocentrism—are present in the minds of Tea Partiers. Only ethnocentrism, the practice of casting out-groups as ‘others’ and inferior, proved statistically significant. However, all three components influence members’ hostility toward Obama.

Using an experimental manipulation of race, Kevin Arcenaux and Stephen P. Nicholson (2012) find that racial characteristics determine support for government. This study also concludes that Tea Partiers possess symbolic as opposed to traditional racist tendencies4. These sources suggest that Tea Party supporters may possess a racial in-group bias and exhibit hostile attitudes toward members of racial out-groups.

Tea Party Views on Race and Immigration

Although the Tea Party Movement strives to hold the Republican Party accountable to its message, members overwhelmingly support this major party, thus solidifying the movement’s place within, instead of outside, the GOP. While Tea Party-endorsed candidates intend to implement a tea-stained agenda into their legislative efforts, they must first achieve electoral victory. The act of running a successful campaign requires candidates to acknowledge public sentiment and respond accordingly. Thus, if their prospective constituencies do not perceive issues such as immigration or social programs as salient, Tea Party candidates could frame these issues in a way that combines them with 4 Sears and Henry (2003) explain that societal norms discourage overt expressions of racial prejudice, yet individuals who possess prejudiced views can profess opposition to social programs that benefit racial minorities or use negative stereotypes to claim that these groups violate their perception of traditional American values. The authors argue that symbolic racism may prove more problematic than traditional racism, as covert prejudice couched in ideological opposition remains socially acceptable.

other, more salient issues. These elites could engage in instrumental responsiveness to manipulate opinion and prompt concern for issues that otherwise would not have arrived on the campaign’s agenda (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).

The Resistance Axiom in John Zaller’s (1992) Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) Model explains that individuals will only resist information that contradicts previously held beliefs if they possess enough information to evaluate the relationship between the two messages. Elites exercise significant influence on this process, as they provide the information to individuals.

Edward J. Carmines and James A. Stimson chronicle how race previously served as an ‘issue evolution’ that prompted a partisan realignment (1989). The Tea Party Movement may play a similar role in reorientation of opinion on race, as they frame this issue by utilizing principled conservatism and libertarian rhetoric when discussing their opposition toward social programs that benefit minorities, immigrants, and low-income earners. By framing this aversion as a purely economic one, Tea Party elites can incorporate their negative racial views into the rhetoric that proved a significant factor in the 2008 election results (Kinder and DaleRiddle 2008). By citing only economic opposition to the expansion of social programs, Tea Partiers can covertly dispose of their racially-tinged image. This paper presents two hypotheses to explicate the racial characteristics associated with the Tea Party and how this element contributes to the group’s collective identity and issue positions.

Tea Partiers view racial minorities as members of an ‘out-group,’ one whose characteristics do not comport with their perception of societal norms.

Demographic homogeneity within the movement suggests that the white racial group serves as the ‘ingroup,’ the group to which Tea Partiers themselves belong. This deduction influences this study’s first hy-

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics pothesis: The In-Group Bias Hypothesis: Tea Party supporters are more likely to provide social programs to white immigrants than to immigrants of minority descent.

As discussed in the literature review, Tea Party members’ similar demographic and socioeconomic characteristics influence their political behavior (Elkins 2011). Supporters are proud of their adherence to the principle of individualism, arguing that this ideal contributes to American exceptionalism (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Tea Party rhetoric suggests that members disapprove of social welfare because this concept directly contradicts their prized individualism. While Tea Party members validate their negative stereotypes of welfare recipients by citing lack of effort, they do not vocalize explicit disapproval of these programs for recipients who possess similar demographic characteristics. Tea Party members support Social Security and Medicare, as they view these programs as a necessary provision to those who have worked hard and contributed positively to society (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). This hypothesis asserts that Tea Partiers will support the provision of social welfare programs to white immigrants in the same positive manner, as they possess positive stereotypes concerning the work ethic and moral values of members of their racial in-group.

Tea Partiers will provide these programs to white immigrants initially, as they view these immigrant groups as contributing members of society and future supporters of individualism and minimal government.5 5 Although individualism functions as a salient component of Tea Party identity, this principle receives greater praise from the movement’s libertarian subset. This paper tested another hypothesis that Tea Party supporters who possess a libertarian ideology were more likely than their socially conservative counterparts to oppose the provision of social programs for all immigrants, irrespective of race. However, an adequate level variation between these groups did not exist in the data, preventing me from effectively investigating this hypothesis.

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While the literature indicates that Tea Party supporters possess favorable attitudes toward programs that benefit members of their racial in-group, the racial element present in their vocal opposition to President Obama and his policies suggests that Tea Partiers may also exhibit racial out-group hostility. This paper investigates a second hypothesis to determine whether these negative attitudes exist and influence Tea Party supporters’ attitudes toward social programs presented to immigrants.

The Racial Hostility Hypothesis: Tea Party supporters are more likely than those who do not support the movement to oppose the provision of social programs to immigrants belonging to a racial minority group, i.e.

Asians, Latinos, etc.

This hypothesis strives to contribute to the discussion of how racial attitudes predict support for the Tea Party Movement by arguing that hostility toward racial out-groups influences members’ opposition to the administration of social programs to immigrants.

Fear of the unknown serves as a formidable adversary to tolerance between groups of diverse races and ethnicities. If an individual is unfamiliar with characteristics inherent in out-group cultures, he or she may perceive this new culture or quality as inferior (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Regardless of a person’s breadth of interactions with out-group members, he or she will not hesitate to categorize all out-group members with a quality that may only be present in one single person or a select few. People may rely on heuristics when constructing opinions toward out-groups, as they use these shortcuts or stereotypes to generalize across the population (Schudson 1998). Because American citizens often perceive immigrants as out-group members due to racial and religious characteristics, they also are likely to believe out-group individuals possess the

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negative characteristics associated with belonging to an out-group (Branton et al. 2001). Fear may cloud the judgments of citizens as they assess the capabilities of immigrant groups and their ability to function in society.

Stereotypes serve a leading role in the conception of opinions surrounding racial out-groups, and existing literature argues that Tea Partiers possess distinctly negative views toward racial minorities (Abramowitz 2011; Jacobson 2011; Maxwell and Parent 2012). Minority immigrant groups do not exhibit similar racial, religious, and cultural characteristics to the Tea Party Movement, as their minority status does not comport with the homogeneous white, male, Protestant, middle-income earner, older Tea Party population (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Tea Partiers will not openly admit that this disparity threatens their ability to view America’s future in an optimistic manner, yet their decision to advocate for increased government intervention to prevent immigration directly contradicts their principled conservative rhetoric concerning the costs associated with fiscal irresponsibility.

While individual Tea Partiers may not possess racial hostility toward immigrants, their economic argument proves ineffective in their quest to curb immigration. Tea Partiers do not compete directly with immigrants for jobs, nor does a critical mass of members inhabit areas with aggressive social welfare programs.

Due to the Tea Party’s collective demographic characteristics, the labor market competition hypothesis surrounding opposition to immigration does not prove salient for this movement (Hanson 2005). The literature, however, suggests that racial hostility is inherent in the minds of a majority of Tea Partiers (Abramowitz 2011); thus, an affective component may drive their opposition to immigration in general and their aversion to federal assistance to immigrants (O’Rourke and

Sinnott 2006).

Data and Methods

To test these hypotheses, this paper utilizes an experimental survey design. Students at Texas Christian University (TCU) served as the sample population, and all of the respondents completed the survey in a political science class. Respondents may thus possess similar characteristics as political science majors.

Although this distribution technique prevents the sample from achieving true ‘random status,’ assessing the effects of the experiment does not require a random sample of respondents. While the sample population may pose a problem for this study’s external validity, the sample population is quite ideal, as these students possess unique ideological characteristics that contribute to a more thorough review of Tea Party political behavior. Because a majority of TCU students possess conservative ideologies, this study will be able to identify a greater number of Tea Partiers among this oversample of conservatives. Students who completed this extensive survey perceive it as merely a public opinion questionnaire measuring their attitudes toward myriad political and social issues.

Eight versions of the survey instrument exist, six of which manipulate the race of the immigrant who receives an array of social programs including general services, food stamps, government health insurance, job training programs, subsidized housing, and free English immersion classes.6 These experimental conditions describe the immigrant as either white, Latino, or Asian. The remaining two versions serve as controls, 6 Four versions identify the immigrant as middle-class, and four identify the immigrant as poor, in order to assess whether variation exists concerning support for providing social services based on social class. This study combined the two social classes to maximize the number of Tea Party supporters in each condition that manipulated the race of the immigrant who received federal assistance.

Is Race The Case? as they do not specify the immigrant’s race. This study resembles a similar examination conducted by Stanley Feldman and Leonie Huddy (2005) that assessed whether conservatives object to race-conscious scholarship programs because of their ideological dispositions, or if their aversion is due to racial resentment.

Manipulating the race of the immigrant who receives federal support will reveal if Tea Party supporters possess a universal opposition to the provision of these social programs to immigrants, or if disparities exist based on the race of the immigrant who receives these forms of assistance.

Although this study examines the relationship between Tea Party supporters’ attitudes toward social programs that benefit immigrants and their racial views, this paper will also contribute to the literature concerning the identity and behavior of the Tea Party Movement in general. Because no consensus exists within the literature concerning the nuances of Tea Party characteristics, this survey contains alternative forms of questions that capture Tea Party support.

However, this survey employs responses to the question that provided the most variation between Tea Party supporters and respondents who did not support the movement.

To examine my hypothesis that Tea Party members are more likely to favor the provision of federal assistance to immigrants of their racial in-group and oppose granting these services to immigrants of minority out-groups, I first created a variable that measured respondents’ level of support for the Tea Party Movement. I operationalized this variable by using the responses to the second survey question that asks respondents “How strongly do you identify with the Tea Party?” Evaluating respondents’ Tea Party identity corresponds adequately with their levels of support for the group, as those who strongly identify with

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the movement’s concerns will be more likely to support the movement, and those who do not identify as Tea Partiers will not serve as strong supporters of the movement. The responses to this question also possess the highest level of variance among the questions that examined political behavior and attitudes concerning the Tea Party Movement. Employing responses to this question, I created the dichotomous variable “Tea Party Support.” Respondents who identified with the Tea Party “extremely strongly,” “very strongly,” and “somewhat strongly” received a new score of 1, indicating that they constitute Tea Party supporters. Respondents who answered “not at all” to the question of how strongly they identify with the Tea Party Movement received a score of 0 to indicate that they do not support the Tea Party Movement.

While the aggregate dataset contains an extensive amount of information regarding respondents’ attitudes toward various types of social programs, I only analyzed their levels of support for general social services for this research. I created the variable “Support for Social Programs” by utilizing responses to the following question: “Please state the extent to which you approve of providing general social services for [either] white, Latino, Asian, or unspecified [either] immigrants, in the United States legally, who are unable to make ends meet.” While I dichotomized the responses to craft a Tea Party support variable, this variable remains continuous. Respondents who answered they would “approve strongly” of providing general social services to immigrants of their respective racial manipulation received a score of 1 that indicated the highest level of support for the provision of social services to immigrants. Respondents who answered they would “approve somewhat” received a score of 2. Respondents who answered they would “neither approve nor disapprove” received a score of 3, which denotes a neutral

16 attitude. Respondents who answered they would “disapprove somewhat” received a score of 4. Those who claimed they would “disapprove strongly” received a score of 5, which indicates the strongest level of opposition.

To compare racial attitudes between Tea Party Republicans and Republicans who do not support the movement, I constructed an additional dichotomous variable “Tea Party Republican.” To create this variable, I coupled the results of the aforementioned dichotomous “Tea Party Support” variable with responses to the survey question that asks respondents: “Generally speaking do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?” If the respondent was both a Tea Party supporter (received a one in the “Tea Party Support” dichotomy) and checked either the “Strong Republican,” “Moderate Republican,” or “Independent but Lean Republican” response to this question, I then considered this respondent a “Tea Party Republican.” If the respondent received a zero in the “Tea Party Support” dichotomy and checked either the “Strong Republican,” “Moderate Republican,” or “Independent but Lean Republican,” then he or she received a score of zero in the new “Tea Party Republican” dichotomy, and I considered this person a Republican, but not a Tea Party Republican.

Results

After collecting 280 responses to the experimental survey, I entered the information from each survey into a dataset. Conducting an ANOVA allowed me to assess whether these relationships proved statistically significant, thus also indicating whether or not the experimental manipulation of the race across versions resulted in varied responses. The following analysis presents the results for the aforementioned

hypotheses. The in-group bias hypothesis serves as the fundamental contribution of the overall examination, as the results reveal that Tea Party members favor the provision of federal assistance to immigrants who are members of their racial in-group.

The In-Group Bias Hypothesis

This hypothesis suggests that Tea Partiers will be most supportive of the provision of social programs to white immigrants. I tested this hypothesis by conducting an analysis of variance between the “Tea Party Support” variable and the “Support for Social Programs” variable. The differences in means across the versions is statistically significant at the p<.10 level. Table 1 displays the relationship between these variables.

The statistically significant results in Table 1 (pg. 17) allow me to confirm that Tea Partiers do indeed favor their own racial in-group. Tea Partiers express the highest level of support for providing general social services to immigrants who belong to the white racial group, as they profess a 2.58 mean level of support. Only 11 out of the total 91 Tea Party Supporters do not identify as white; thus, these results suggest that an in-group bias exists. While respondents who do not support the Tea Party express a higher average level of support for the provision of these services to white immigrants than supporters of the Tea Party, their average support for this group, 2.29, does not constitute their highest level of support across versions.

While Table 1 shows that a statistically significant difference exists among Tea Party supporters’ average level of support for the provision of social services to immigrants of diverse racial groups, I examined these results further to evaluate how levels of support for these services vary between Republican Tea Party supporters and Republicans who do not support the Tea Party. The literature establishes a consensus that

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics

while Tea Partiers express concern with members of the ‘establishment’ within the Republican Party, they overwhelmingly vote for Republicans and serve as a faction within the GOP instead of a true third party group. The increased presence of social conservatives who supported Tea Party principles and entered the movement prior to the 2010 mid-terms further muddled the distinction between the Tea Party and the Republican Party (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012; Abramowitz, 2011; Elkins, 2011). Thus, this study further examines the racial attitudes of Tea Party supporters compared to Republicans who do not identify with the movement’s concerns.

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I constructed an ANOVA to discern whether the comparison of attitudes of Tea Party Republicans to those of Republicans who do not support the Tea Party are statistically significant. The ANOVA revealed that the differences in average support across the different versions are not statistically significant. However, further research is necessary to discern the differences in political behavior between the two groups, as the means, while similar, are not identical between the two groups. Table 2 presents the results of this analysis.

Although the results in Table 2 are not statistically significant, important and interesting differences exist between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republi-

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cans. Tea Party Republicans also grant their highest level of support for white immigrants, as this group received a mean value of 2.52, compared to the other groups who received an average support level of 3 or above. The 2.91 average level of support for these services to white immigrants among non-Tea Party Republicans also constitutes their highest average level of support. However, Republicans who do not support the Tea Party express a 2.92 average level of support for immigrants in general, which may suggest that the term ‘immigrant’ may not conjure as negative of an image in the minds of these respondents. The results in Table 2 reinforce the results present in Table 1, suggest-

ing that Tea Partiers possess a strong in-group bias.

The Racial Hostility Hypothesis

Previous studies reveal that conservatives may exhibit uniform opposition to social programs as a result of their ideological preferences. Feldman and Huddy concluded that this ‘principled conservatism’ hypothesis accurately reflected the results of their analysis regarding the provision of scholarships to racial minorities (2005). The aggregate total row in Table 1 may prove consistent with the principled conservatism literature, as the mean level of support for social programs among Tea Party supporters is 3.09, as opposed

Is Race The Case? to the 2.40 mean level of support among respondents who do not support the Tea Party Movement. However, the categorical breakdown of support present in Table 1 reveals that the results of this study deviate from previous findings, as Tea Party supporters exhibit disparate levels of support across the four versions of the survey. Observing the results by row indicates that Tea Party supporters possess higher levels of opposition to social programs compared to those who do not support the movement; yet focusing on the results under the Tea Party Supporters column proves necessary to examine this hypothesis.

Table 1 reveals that Tea Party supporters are more likely to oppose the provision of social services to Latino and Asian immigrants than to white immigrants. Tea Partiers’ mean level of support for the provision of general social services to Latino immigrants is 3.48 compared to non-Tea Party supporters, whose mean level of support is 2.28. Tea Partiers’ mean level of support for the provision of social services to Asian immigrants is 2.90 compared to non-Tea Partiers’ 2.60 average level of support. These results indicate that the principled conservatism hypothesis does not adequately explain the behavior of this group. While Tea Partiers profess to oppose federal programs due to their ideological views, this experiment exposes a flaw in the movement’s message. While Tea Partiers do possess higher levels of overall opposition to social programs than those who do not support the movement, Tea Partiers’ opposition fluctuates depending on recipients’ racial category.

An examination of the “control” row suggests that an especially interesting relationship exists between levels of support for social programs that benefit immigrants and Tea Party support. While this hypothesis expressly concerns Tea Partiers’ attitudes toward the provision of social programs to minority

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immigrants compared to white immigrants, a closer examination of their attitudes toward immigrants in general may offer speculative conclusions concerning their overall perception of social services. While Tea Partiers’ level of support for the provision of general services is lower for minorities than for white immigrants, their second highest level of opposition is for the control group that does not specify the race of the immigrant recipient. Tea Partiers’ profess a 3.38 mean level of support for granting these services to immigrants compared to non-Tea Partiers’ 2.42 mean level of support. The results in this row may indicate that the term ‘immigrant’ receives a negative connotation in the minds of respondents. It may also suggest that the respondent assumes the immigrant has traveled to the United States illegally.

The patterns in Table 2 suggest that stark differences do not exist between the opinions of Tea Party Republicans and Republicans who do not support the movement, which in turn may suggest that the political attitudes of members of the Tea Party Movement are no different than their Republican counterparts. Yet, a few distinctions between the two groups exist in Table 2, again suggesting that further research and more survey responses are necessary to offer solid conclusions.

Tea Party Republicans still profess their highest level of opposition to Latino immigrants with a 3.52 mean level of support compared to non-Tea Party Republicans’ 3.14 level of support. The difference in means between the two groups concerning the control group, 3.38 and 2.92 respectively, is also consistent with the statistically significant analysis above as it suggests the term ‘immigrant’ may prove negative in the minds of Tea Party Republicans.

Evaluating this hypothesis reveals interesting patterns in the data, yet the findings do not indicate the factors that drive the attitudinal disparities present

20 in Tea Party attitudes toward federal social services.

Further examination of these results prove necessary to determine whether or not negative racial stereotypes influence the fact that Tea Partiers favor supplying federal assistance to members of their racial in-group.

Without a direct measure of out-group attitudes, the study cannot conclude if negative racial attitudes influence varying levels of opposition.

Discussion and Conclusions

The above results indicate an in-group bias in the Tea Party Movement (Abramowitz 2011). While Tea Party supporters do not exhibit the traditional form of racism present in the South prior to the implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they do view minority groups as out-groups. They may employ stereotypes to evaluate the characteristics, behavior, and societal impact of members of these groups. The fact that Tea Party supporters may perceive racial out-groups as homogenous and rely on stereotypes to evaluate an individual member of a minority group constitutes a form of racism, one that is indeed more covert than that present in the pre-Civil Rights era, yet potentially more problematic.

While this study cannot attribute Tea Party opposition to federal social programs to membersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; racial views directly, members are more likely to support the provision of federal assistance to white immigrants, as these groups are members of most Tea Partiersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; own racial in-group. These results contribute to the literature concerning the Tea Party Movement, as they present evidence regarding another unique characteristic of supporters, favorability toward their own racial in-group. However, the experimental nature of this study serves as the reason behind the affirmation of the aforementioned hypothesis, while also revealing the

difficulty in obtaining substantive support for the racial in-group component in Tea Party opposition. Only through manipulation was I able to confirm that levels of support among Tea Partiers fluctuate, even though comparing the aggregate totals of Tea Partiers to nonTea Party supporters validates the principled conservatism hypothesis.

Because Tea Partiers are able to conceal their racial in-group preference behind their ideology, they may contribute to the reorientation in opinion formation regarding social welfare. Voters evaluate these programs based on their views toward the proper role of the federal government, as opposed to their views toward those who receive these programs. Those who possess hostile views toward minority races do not have to disclose these views, which are largely regarded as socially unacceptable. However, voters who are motivated by racist attitudes are able to exert a larger political influence than previously, as they can cite ideological preferences as the reason behind their welfare opposition. These hostile voters may exert a rightward pressure on the Republican Party, while simultaneously shifting the median voter to the right and influencing the Democrats to respond to this issue by adopting a more moderate stance in order to appeal to the maximum number of voters.

I plan to continue this research by further investigating Tea Partiersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; attitudes toward out-groups.

Additional analysis that incorporates explicit attitudes toward racial out-groups may reveal whether or not this group possesses negative stereotypes of minority immigrants. Examining the distinction between libertarian and socially conservative Tea Partiers will allow me to discern whether or not differences exist between Tea Party supporters and Republicans, or if Tea Partiers merely serve as staunch, efficacious Republican partisans with a strong collective identity. While a

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics more regionally diverse sample population would allow me to distinguish between libertarian and socially conservative Tea Partiers, it would also allow me to offer more definitive conclusions concerning my hypotheses.

I also plan to distribute the survey experiment to a broader, more diverse population. Because Texas and California serve as the states from which a majority of the sample population originates, the findings from the in-group bias hypothesis may be more pronounced. Because a large number of immigrants inhabit these two states, the sample population may be more exposed to these groups and thus more comfortable with them. A broader population may not interact with immigrants, which may prompt them to rely on stereotypes when evaluating individual recipients of social welfare. I also plan to evaluate the levels of support for diverse types of social services, as the survey contains information regarding responses to an array of social programs. It is possible that respondents’ level of support will increase if the immigrant receives a social program designed to improve his or her ability to function as a productive member of society, as they perceive their racial in-group to possess these qualities.

While the dataset contains responses to other questions concerning the political behavior of the Tea Party Movement, the results from this analysis contribute to existing literature concerning this movement and the behavior of extreme ideological factions. To ameliorate the effects of masking racial in-group bias behind ideological preferences, voters should monitor elite rhetoric and understand how groups like the Tea Party interact with the majority parties.

References Abramowitz, Alan. 2011. “Party Polarization and the Rise of the Tea Party Movement.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science

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Association, Seattle.

Arcenaux, Kevin, and Stephen P. Nicholson. 2012.

“Who Wants to Have a Tea Party? The Who, What, and Why of the Tea Party Movement.” PS: Political Science and Politics 45 (October): 700-710.

Berg, John C. 2011. “Why the Tea Party? The Challenge of Progressive Politics in the US.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle.

Bond, Jon R., Richard Fleisher, and Nathan Ilderton.

2011. “Was the Tea Party Responsible for the Republican Victory in the 2010 House Elections?”

Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle.

Brody, David. 2012. The Teavangelicals: The Inside Story of How the Evangelicals and the Tea Party are Taking Back America. Grand Rapids: Zondervan.

Carmines, Edward J. and James A. Stimson. 1989.

Race and the Transformation of American Politics.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Delaune, Timothy. 2010. “Diffuse Sovereignty in the Federalist Papers: A Schmittian Critique.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington.

Elkins, Emily E. 2011. “The Character and Economic Morality of the Tea Party Movement.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle.

Feldman, Stanley, and Leonie Huddy. 2005. “Racial Resentment and White Opposition to Race-Conscious Programs: Principles or Prejudice?” American Journal of Political Science 49 (1): 168-183.

Gilens, Martin. 1999. Why Americans Hate Welfare.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hanson, Gordon H. 2005. Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Finance and Political Opposition to Open Borders. Washington: Institute for International Economics.

Hetherington, Marc J. and Jonathan D. Weiler. 2009.

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Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. Skocpol, Theda, and Vanessa Williamson. 2012.

The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican New York: Cambridge University Press.

Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press.

Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro 2000.

Zaller, John R. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press. the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Jacobson, Gary C. 2010. “Barack Obama and the American Public: The First 18 Months.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington.

Jacobson, Gary C. 2011. “The President, the Tea Party, and Voting Behavior in 2010: Insights from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle.

Katel, Peter. 2010. “Tea Party Movement: Will Angry Conservatives Reshape the Republican Party?” CQ Researcher 20 (11): 241-264.

Kinder, Donald R. and Allison Dale-Riddle. 2008. The End of Race? Obama, 2008, and Racial Politics in America. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Maxwell, Angie, and T. Wayne Parent. 2012. “A ‘Subterranean Agenda’? Racial Attitudes, Presidential Evaluations and Tea Party Membership.” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans.

O’Rourke Kevin H., and Richard Sinnott. 2006. “The Determinants of Individual Attitudes towards Immigration.” European Journal of Political Economy 22 (4): 838-861.

Rae, Nicol C. 2011. “The Return of Conservative Populism: The Rise of the Tea Party and Its Impact on American Politics.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle.

Schudson, Michael. 1998. The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life. New York: The Free Press.

Sears, David O. and P.J. Henry. 2003. “The Origins of Symbolic Racism.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85:259-275.

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Success with Separatism? Brittany, Corsica, and the Indivisible French Republic Kate Walker Samford University

Separatist movements are one of the most common sources of conflict in today’s international system. Separatist movements have arisen in developing nations in Africa and Asia, as well as in older, established states of Western Europe—take for example the movements in Wales, Flanders, or Catalonia. This paper seeks to understand why some movements are successful and others are unsuccessful in their goal of ultimate independence and sovereignty, specifically in states with established democracies. While in the past the level of violence has been held as the determinant of the success of a separatist movement, this study argues that the reaction of the central government is ultimately the most important factor in determining a movement’s success or failure. The study examines the separatist movements in the French regions of Brittany and Corsica between World War II and the late 1980s, looking specifically at the central government’s response to increased separatist action and momentum. It concludes that small concessions on the part of the central government reduce the effectiveness of the separatist movement, and ultimately result in the movement’s failure.

Introduction A small boy chattered nervously in his native Breton tongue on his way to school for the first time. His uncle walked beside him completely silent.

As they approached the school building, the older man warned his nephew that once inside, he must never utter a word in Breton—French was the only acceptable language. When the astonished child asked why, his uncle’s only response was: “Because if you do, you will get the rod” (Reece 1977, 33). Once inside, the boy’s amazement continued. His teachers warned him that God was offended when he spoke Breton.

On the playground, he even saw a sign that read, “It is forbidden to spit and to speak Breton” (Reece 1977, 32).

Sixteen years later, the young boy—now known as Abbé Jean-Marie Perrot—became the founder

of the Bleun-Brug, a group aiming to separate the region of Brittany from the rest of France. Perrot never forgot the incident of his first day of school, and as a result he devoted his life to the creation of an independent Breton state. Years later, frustrated Breton students with experiences similar to Perrot’s would exclaim together, “First a Breton, then a Celt; never a Frenchman” (Foster 1980, 151).

It is precisely these sentiments that have fueled the separatist movements that have taken place throughout France—and throughout the world. According to the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (from Cunningham 2011), 148 separatist movements have occurred since the late 1940s, and in today’s international system, they are the most common source of conflict. Some separatist conflicts, like those in the former Yugoslavia, result in the creation of new

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nation-states. Other movements develop in states decades after it was established. This is most often the case in Western Europe, and France is no exception.

The stark contrast in the results of the various movements begs the question: Why are some separatist movements successful and others unsuccessful? France in particular poses unique questions for this study. The French Republic has survived a number of separatist movements. Alsace, Lorraine, Catalonia, Corsica, Brittany, and the Basque Country have all tried to gain independence, yet none have successfully obtained it.

This study then seeks to answer the question why has France maintained its sovereignty despite numerous separatist movements.

The literature concerning the success of separatist movements offers many different answers to this question, and the lack of consensus provokes more questions than are answered. The wide array of potential explanations for the success of a movement clouds the issue concerning the success of separatist movements. Explanations generally fall into three main categories: the movement’s level of violence, the amount of external support, and the state’s response.

This paper will focus on the state’s response to separatist movements.

In order to answer the questions regarding the success or failure of separatist movements, this study examines two regions of France: Brittany and Corsica.

Though separatist movements began in the two regions as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, this study will focus on the period between 1939 and 1980. The case study assesses periods of government concession and repression of separatist movements first within Brittany and then Corsica in order to determine the effect of both reactions on the separatist movements. It finds that concessions by the central government combined with a plan of decentralization

reduce the effectiveness and reach of the separatist movements, and ultimately contribute to their failure.

Section One examines the existing literature regarding separatist movements. Section Two presents the specific research questions this study aims to answer. Section Three analyzes periods of government repression and concession toward separatist groups, and examines the effects of both policies on the strength of the separatist movements. Finally Section Four presents the conclusions about the effects of government responses on separatist movements, and offers some broader implications for governments facing separatist conflicts.

Research Context There is often considerable overlap between the terms self-determination, autonomist movement, and separatist movement. Occasionally the terms are used interchangeably, but often they denote different types of movements. For the purpose of this study, let us rely primarily on the term separatist movement, which Raphael Zariski (1989, 255) defines as “a movement that has a clearly articulated goal of ultimate independence and sovereignty.”

In general, scholars agree on the characteristics and catalysts that ignite separatist movements. A group united by a common language, ethnicity, or religion experiences a negative stimulus, which inspires a push for independence from the central government (Zariski 1989). Anthony D. Smith (1979) also found regional underdevelopment, internal colonialism, and lack of political representation have also been found as catalysts for various separatist movements. After the inception of a movement, however, there is far less scholastic consensus regarding the reasons for its success or failure. The literature focuses on three

Success with Separatism? possible theories that affect the outcome of secessionist movements: the level of violence involved, the amount of external support, and the state’s response to the conflict.

Level of Violence One possible explanation for the success or failure of separatist movements is the level of violence involved. In his study on nationalism, Barry Posen (1993) researches the relationship between nationalist sentiments and violence. He found a positive correlation between the two, asserting that “nationalism increases the intensity of warfare, and specifically the ability of states to mobilize the creative energy and spirit of self-sacrifice to millions of soldiers” (Posen 1993,81). Therefore, it is logical that most nationalist, separatist movements resort to violence in some form, ranging from assassinations to bombings. Raphael Zariski (1989, 253) takes Posen’s assertion a step farther, claiming that “the readiness of an actor to resort to the use of violence to achieve proclaimed objectives, even when there are legal avenues available for pursuing these goals” is a common determinant in the success of an extremist movement. The more violent a movement is, or the more willing the actors are to resort to violence, the more successful a given movement will be. Zariski (1989, 263) further notes: “What discriminatory or violent behavior…seems to achieve is the planting of seeds of discontent and hostility that may come to fruition at some future date…. This [violence] opens the door for regime change (as in Spain) or for a thoroughgoing reconsideration of the constitution with a view to possible revision (as in Britain).” Therefore, violence serves not only as the means of achieving dominance in a given region, but also of asserting importance within the central government.

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Though applicable in many cases such as the Ulster movement in Ireland, the level of violence theory lacks explanatory power in several notable exceptions. Donald L. Horowitz (1985, 265) asserts, “despite all of these successes attributable to force, or the threat of it, it remains remarkable that only one country—Bangladesh—owes its independence to a war of secession fought since the Second World War.” The violence theory, then, cannot explain movements like the one in Czechoslovakia. In this case, the Czech nationalists and the Slovak nationalists mutually— and peacefully—agreed to split into separate nations, creating the modern Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Furthermore, the violence theory cannot explain the failure of the secessionist movement in the United States. If the theory held true, then the violence of the American Civil War should have lead to a separate confederation of southern states. The theory that the level of violence is related to the success of a separatist movement is therefore not completely consistent.

External Support

Further scholarship connects the amount of external support for a movement with its ultimate success. Proponents of this connection argue that the extra arms, money, and diplomatic support that stem from international involvement create opportunities for a movement’s success. As Horowitz (1985, 230) notes, “whether and when a secessionist movement will emerge is determined mainly by domestic politics, by the relations of groups and regions within the state.

Whether a secessionist movement will achieve its aims, however, is determined largely by international politics, by the balance of interests and forces that extend beyond the state.” Stephen Saideman builds on Horowitz’s argument that external aid influences separatist movements. Saideman (2002) found a

26 positive correlation between the strength of a state and the amount of international assistance given to minority movements, as outside states tend to support minority groups inside powerful countries in order to weaken potential adversaries.

The theory of external support, however, lacks complete explanatory power. Horowitz fails to consider that international involvement can work against separatist movements. External states can provide support for the central government against the movement in question, leading to a defeat of the separatist group. Saideman (2002, 46) briefly addresses this possibility, asserting, “ethnic ties work both ways—ties to the group or ties to the host state.”

Saideman’s study, however, solely considers the effects of external aid in favor of the minority movements, limiting the study’s usefulness.

State Response A third possible explanation involves the state structure and response of the central government in question. In his study of ethnic separation in Western Europe, Anthony Smith (1979, 35) found that “government policies…provide the main determinant of the specific direction of political action on the part of ethnic communities.” Much of the literature focuses on two types of government response—either concession or continual repression.

Zariski (1989) argues that small concessions on the part of the central government in the interest of peace lead to increased intensity—and a greater likelihood of ultimate success—on the part of the separatist group. The study asserts (Zariski 1989, 264): “if the government is forthcoming and yields ground to the minority group, the temptations offered by the unusual historical juncture and by the self-doubts expressed by the ruling elites may actually lead to a stepping up of

violent behavior on the part of the activist members of the minority group.” Government concession then, has been shown to fuel the separatist movement process.

Consider now the literature regarding the lack of government concession. Barbara Walter (2006) found that governments in countries with many ethnic minorities tend to oppose separatist groups in order to establish a tough reputation. The governments that did not accommodate one challenger were much less likely to face subsequent separatist movements in the future. In other words, according to Walter’s study (2006), separatist groups facing governments unwilling to compromise at all are much less likely to succeed, even through violent measures, than groups facing governments willing to compromise. Smith (2002) came to the opposite conclusion. He found that states employing neglectful or repressive policies toward ethnic separatist movements faced greater separatist actions. States employing more democratic or participatory policies toward separatist movements tended to decrease the influence of the movement.

There exists therefore a striking lack of consensus regarding the effect of a government’s response on separatist movements.

Overall, theories regarding the level of violence and external support have partial, but not extensive explanatory power. The literature regarding the relationship between the response of a government and the success of a separatist movement is not nearly as extensive or cohesive. While scholars generally agree that states themselves do affect a movement’s success, they disagree as to how. Thus further study is necessary to determine the effect the governments have on the separatist movements.

While previous studies focus on separatist groups across national borders, comparing movements in various countries, this study will focus specifically

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics on France. Unlike other studies, it will concentrate on the striking lack of successful separatist movements in France, and test the theory of state response to see what has affected the movements. This study will focus on the government’s response in regards to the separatist movement, with the aim of understanding how the response affects the momentum of a given moment, and why separatist movements began to disappear in France in the late 1980s.

Research Questions Though scholars generally agree as to what causes the rise of separatist movements, there is considerable discussion as to the factors that affect the success of a movement. Thus this study seeks to contribute to this debate by answering the question: “Why are some separatist movements successful and others unsuccessful?” More specifically, the study examines the results of separatist movements in France. Since World War II, the Bretons, the Corsicans, the Basques, the Catalans, the Alsatians and a myriad of other nationalist groups have initiated movements to gain independence. However, France has not lost territory to any of these movements. Why has France, then, in contrast to other nations, not experienced a successful separatist movement? How have the level of violence, external support, and government responses affected the movements? Do concessions on the part of the central government satiate movements and cause them to stall, or do concessions inspire greater demands? Why did the movements in France disappear by the early 1980s, when movements in other countries were emerging?

Methodology

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In order to answer these questions, this study will rely on a case study comparing the separatist movements in Brittany and Corsica. It is impossible to truly understand a separatist movement outside of its context, and it is especially difficult to ascertain differences in the process of the movements using statistics. According to John S. Odell (2001, 167), “a case study… always conveys a much fuller understanding of the instance studied, with richer evidence and reasoning about the process and context than is possible with statistical methods.”

Thus, the incorporation of the context and the ability to investigate into the specific details of separatist movements make a case study the best method of study.

More specifically, the study implements a controlled comparative case study of Brittany and Corsica. This study, what Stephen Van Evera and John Odell (2001) call a “method of difference” case study, applies to cases with different general characteristics and a similar outcome or study variable. In Brittany and Corsica, separatist movements have emerged, each of these with different characteristics. Nonetheless, both movements have failed. Examining the two movements with different characteristics, yet the same outcome will help explain the consistent failure of separatist movements in France.

Geographically, the regions are diverse.

Brittany is part of continental France located in the northwestern corner, while Corsica is an island in the Mediterranean Sea. The foundations of the movement in Brittany began before the first World War, however the movement in Corsica did not start to gain traction until 1976 (Sanchez 2008, 657). Additionally, the type and level of violence in the two areas differs: in Brittany, the violence was sporadic at best, and limited to public displays of force (Zariski 1989, 255).

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In Corsica, however, the liberation front was more consistently willing to resort to violent measures, and loss of life as a result of this violence was considerably more common (Sanchez 2008, 656). In regards to ethnic exclusion, the two regions also differ. Zariski (1989, 261) found that ethnic exclusiveness, or the “outright rejection of other ethnic groups…even as allies” is prevalent in the Corsican movement, as Corsican separatists have attempted to expel “continentals” from the island. The movement leaders in Brittany, in contrast, have been much more open to immigration and other ethnicities. Despite this myriad of differences, the state’s response has been the same: in both Brittany and Corsica, the central government made concessions to the separatists’ demands. Neither of the two movements has been successful in obtaining home rule outside of the French Government. Using a method of difference case study, therefore, will allow for the isolation of the state response variable to examine its affect on the success of separatist movements.

Case Study Brittany The origins of the separatist movement in Brittany stem from its isolation. Geographically the peninsula of Brittany lies in the northwest corner of France, with difficult access to other regions.

Culturally, the Bretons descend from the Celts—a tribe that migrated from the British Isles originally populated the peninsula, and traces of the Celtic origin remain prominent in Breton society (Reece 1977, 6).

After being annexed by France in 1532, the Breton people maintained their local culture, language, and traditions, culturally isolating themselves from the rest of the country. Against this backdrop of physical and cultural isolation, the separatist movement emerged in

Brittany. Various individuals and organizations began calling for Breton independence beginning as early as 1927, however it was not until World War II and the founding of the separatist party, the Parti National Breton, that the movement truly began to take root.

Just before the dawn of World War II, the two main leaders of the Breton separatist movement, Olier Mordrel and Fanche Debauvais fled to Germany.

The idea that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” prompted them to seek safety and support from the German leaders. In Berlin they drafted a manifesto called Diskleriadur (Déclaration) in which they called for Brittany’s complete separation from France in order to end the persecution of Breton patriots (Reece 1977, 150). While there, Mordrel and Debauvais discovered a cautious, but nonetheless willing ally. On May 10, 1940, the Germans, now in control of most of France, issued a decree that allowed Breton “autonomists” preferential treatment in all German camps (Reece 1977, 152).

With mild German support, Mordrel and Debauvais founded the Conseil National Breton (CNB). On November 20, 1940, Fanche Debauvais sent a letter from the Conseil National Breton to Monsieur le Maire, the head of the German occupation government. In it Debauvais (1940) says, “The third of July, a group of Breton patriots gathered at Pontivy and decided to resume action taken before the war, with the goal of returning to Brittany her rightful liberty. To give strength to this movement, we created the Breton National Counsel.” Such an organization was intended to eventually create the nucleus of an independent Breton state, and the German leader agreed to acknowledge its formation. The governmentsanctioned creation of the CNB represents the first of a few moderate concessions by the central authority.

The remainder of the November 20th, 1940 letter reveals what Debauvais perceived to be favor from the

Success with Separatism?

German government. He asserts: “The welcome that we have received from those among you that we have had the privilege of meeting has greatly strengthened the support that we find from you”. Therefore it becomes clear that the Breton separatist leaders had already solicited support and aid from the German leaders, and they were hopeful of receiving even more.

In the conclusion of the letter Debauvais (1940) boldly states, “We are certain that you will be good workers for the Breton renaissance, and that, in the Brittany of the future, you will continue to be one of the elements of her majesty and prosperity.” Thus, as of November of 1940, the Germans not only conceded the creation of a Breton National Counsel, but the leaders of the Counsel felt assured of German support for their separatist goals.

In addition to the creation of the CNB the Germans made several cultural concessions. As Jack Reece (1977, 160) points out, “Most [government officials] agreed that the most effective way of dealing with the Breton nationalist movement was to cut the ground from under it by eliminating the resentmentgenerated grievances that lay at the center”. Towards the end of 1940, the government formally authorized the Radio-Rennes-Bretagne to broadcast an hour of its political programming every week in the Breton language (Reece 1977, 158). By 1944, this allotment had increased to one hour every day devoted solely to Breton broadcasts (Reece 1977, 242). On March 19, 1941, the Education Ministry approved the teaching of Breton in primary and secondary schools, and it simultaneously lifted the existing ban on the use of Breton in public arenas. The following May, the German occupation government named Jean Quenette, a Breton separatist, as prefect for the Breton peninsula (Reece 1977, 161). Yann Fouéré (1942), a prominent Breton journalist and member of the separatist cause, hopefully proclaimed the nomination

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in an article: “Let us hope that he will apply a better policy, a different policy, than that of his predecessor.

We know that it is this task the government expects of him.” The separatists were thus hopeful of gaining a political voice through the prefect.

These few concessions in the political and cultural realm did much to pacify the tide of Breton separatist demands. A study (Frelaut 1988) found that during the German occupation, the separatist party, called the Parti National Breton (PNB), only had about 1,850 adherents at its strongest. Of these 1,850, approximately 300 were from outside of the Breton region. During the wartime occupation, militant separatist activists numbered only 300. Thus the numbers of strictly devoted Breton separatists decreased during the war. Furthermore, Yann Fouéré (1942) underscored the impotence of the Breton national movement in an Article from May 1944: “We are witnessing, then, four years after the armistice, an extremist Breton that seems however to have lost its life, that seems especially to have abandoned the doctrine of separatism.” Fouéré, writing for one of the most important Breton separatist journals, judged the movement to be all but dead. Thus, support for Breton separation from France diminished markedly from prewar periods in response to concessions made by the German government.

In 1944, as Allied Forces began to liberate France, the new French government began to systematically revoke the German concessions. As of June 6, 1944, the major Breton journals, including La Bretagne by Yann Fouéré (1944) lost print due to Allied invasion and hostility in France. On August 18, the French government formally dissolved the PNB, while suspending all Breton radio programming (Foster 1980, 146). Liberation officials began systematically arresting and trying Breton separatist leaders (Reece 1977, 168). By the end of 1945, the French government

30 had withdrawn almost all of the concessions made by the German government. General Charles de Gaulle cemented the anti-Breton sentiments in a conversation with a journalist in July of 1945. Frelaut (1988, 57) cites the journalist asking: “Do you think it possible to assimilate the Breton separatists, or do you judge them to be war criminals?” To which de Gaulle responded, “I do not know how [assimilation] is possible.” Thus, by the end of the Second World War, government favor had almost completely turned away from the Breton movement, and all progress made during the war was reversed.

Rather than discourage the Breton separatists, the repressive action taken by the French government served to strengthen the Breton movement. In the period following World War II a number of new Breton political parties emerged, new Breton cultural organizations developed, and popular support emerged for the Bretons from around the globe. For example, Yann Fouéré (1957) continued to publish articles from the safety of Ireland calling for a “necessary revolution”, and urging Bretons to remember that “nothing has been resolved”. From 1950 through 1959, most of the articles published by Fouéré focus on the “problem of Brittany”; during the period of concession and collaboration with the Germans, he published about numerous other topics, only occasionally commenting on the Breton separatist movement. As late as 1958, an organization called the Mouvement Pour L’Organisation de la Bretagne (MOB) developed, which was designed to safeguard the economic, cultural and political liberty of the region. (Fouéré 1957). The Union Démocratic Bretonne (UDB) came into existence in 1963 as a more conservative balance to the MOB, and the Front pour la Libération de Bretagne (the FLB) represented the extremists (Foster 1980, 148). Each of these groups called for Breton separation from

the French state, and took action accordingly. Now, instead of having to combat only one Breton separatist group (the PNB), the French government faced four.

Therefore, while the Breton movement began to die out during the period of government concessions, in the following period of repression it quickly sprang to life again in the form of intense political groups.

Between 1960 and 1961, most of the French colonies in Africa gained their independence, and ethnic groups within France aligned themselves with the colonial cause. The FLB joined the push toward decolonization, and began calling for the decolonization of Brittany (Reece 1977, 204). Linking the Breton movement to the anti-colonialism movement attracted global attention to the separatist movement. In doing so, the FLB effectively increased the ranks of Breton separatist organizations and increased momentum for those striving to create an independent state (Boomgaard 2008, 287). A 1968 FLB terrorist attack—and the subsequent trials—further cemented separatist popularity in the region. Soon, according to Boomgaard (2008) and Reece (1977) the movement included men and women, rich and poor, farmers, businessmen, and intellectuals alike. Thus, by the dawn of the 1970s, the Front de Libération Breton had successfully expanded the Breton separatist movement to include the region’s larger populace.

In the face of the growing popularity of Breton separatism, the French government began to once again grant concessions. One of the most important concessions had almost nothing to do with political aims: La Charte Culturelle Bretonne de 1977. Drafted in 1977 by French President Valéry Giscard d’Etaing, the Charter responded to the desire expressed by the Breton people for regional recognition and legitimacy.

One of the main provisions addressed the usage and teaching of the Breton language in schools. The

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics Charter (1977) legalized the use of Breton in primary schools, and established Breton as potential language of study in secondary school, as an alternative to English. Furthermore, the Charter provided for increased radio and television programming in the Breton language. Before the legislation only one ten minute radio broadcast existed in Breton; the Cultural Charter of 1977 increased the Breton-language airtime to two separate, daily broadcasts of three quarters of an hour each. On television, the Charter increased programming from one emission every fifteen days lasting only twenty minutes up to a weekly program lasting thirty minutes. Various other cultural concessions –including Breton research centers and chapels—find a home in the charter.

In contrast to the cultural concessions granted in the Charter, the political concessions were few.

The Charter created the Cultural Council of Brittany to oversee the administration of the document’s policies. Through the Charter (1977, Titre 1.1-1.2) the French government also granted to the Council the ability “on occasion to present suggestions to the Regional Assemblies suggestions for the political climate of Brittany”. In addition, the Charter allowed for the creation of an Interdepartmental Committee composed of representatives of the central government, regional prefects, and general representatives. This committee would in theory provide a greater political voice to the people.

Though the concessions to the Bretons were small, they effectively inhibited the separatist movement. After 1977, Foster (1988) found that political participation began to decrease, and membership in political parties began to plummet.

Today the movement has completely floundered, and talk of complete separation from France no longer spreads through the region. Scholars documenting

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the movement almost unanimously write about the separatist movement as a thing of the past. Though there exists a distinct Breton consciousness, even a pride in being Breton, this pride does not necessitate separation from France for most of the peninsula’s inhabitants. M. C. Boomgaard (2008, 293) underscores the death of the movement, claiming that “though [the minority radicals] may advocate regionalism, Breton militants can no longer afford to secede”.

Corsica

Annexed by France in 1769, the island of Corsica has always had difficulty defining itself as French. Located in the Mediterranean Sea, 175 miles away from the southernmost tip of France but a mere seventy miles from the coast of Italy, the island has strong Italian roots and connections. Natives speak a regional language, Corsican, instead of French, and Italian traditions and food permeate the island.

It is because of these differences that the separatist movement began on the island.

Direct opposition to the state of France was sporadic until the 1960s. The first separatist party, the Parti Corse Autonomiste, was founded in 1927, but the Italian occupation of the island during World War II stopped any kind of separatist movement. With the Allied liberation of France in 1944, Corsica was the first region to be completely freed from Axis control.

As a result, many Corsicans remained extremely loyal to the French state in the years immediately following the war. By the 1950s, however, the memories of the World War II liberation had faded, and French policies stressed the unimportance of the island to the mainland. For example, the Law Deioxenne of 1951 allowed various regional languages and dialects to be spoken in schools. Corsican, however, was noticeably

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omitted from the list of acceptable regional languages (Foster 1980, 125). Repeated instances of neglect provided fodder for the growth of Corsican separatist groups.

In 1960, Corsican students founded the Union Corse to express their dismay at the neglect of Corsica by the French government. By 1967 a new, more powerful separatist group took over the island: the Action Régionaliste Corse (ARC). Founded by brothers Max and Edmond Simeoni, the ARC advocated for Corsican home rule. Sanchez (2002, 657) cites the founders complaining: “All decisions are taken in Paris, none of our claims are taken into account. We have the most backward status in the Mediterranean.”

As time passed the ARC changed their name into Corsican—Azzione per Rinascita Corsa. The change in name signaled a more intense desire for a non-French Corsica. By the 1970s, the movement had extended to include not just students and radicals, but the larger Corsican population.

The growth in the number of separatist organizations and the surge in separatist momentum prompted concessions on the part of the central government. The most important of these concessions is the Schéma Général d’Amenagement de la France.

Instituted on October 19, 1972, by Valéry Giscard d’Etaing, the Schéma was the Republic of France’s direct response to the Corsican uprising. The goal of the Schéma (1972, 17) was to “reach a level of progress and to attain a controlled development that would not destroy the originality of the island. . . . with the end of safeguarding its identity, its way of life, even its very soul through a management strategy founded on the active cooperation of everyone.” The language alone pacified some separatists, as it acknowledged that there was a Corsican identity that was separate from the French identity. Furthermore, the existence

of the Schéma seemed to show the separatists that the Corsican identity was special and worth preserving.

The content of the Schéma d’Amenagement further placated the separatists. The document (1972) acknowledged various challenges the Corsicans faced, specifically economic problems, transportation issues, and immigration crises. The central government pledged to help Corsica develop its own industries and committed to improving Corsican farming.

Advancements in transportation to and from the mainland as well as on the island itself became a government priority. The Schéma also divided up Corsica into administrative areas to make local autonomy a more manageable goal. Overall, the government bestowed special notice and consideration to Corsica in the Schéma (1972, 58), pledging to make her “the land of the future.”

The promises set forth in the Schéma d’Amenagement initially pacified the Corsican separatist movement. In the elections following the Schéma, the separatist candidate only won 1,160 votes, of the 31, 527 that were cast. Foster (2008) emphasizes that the weak polling turnout constituted less than four percent of the island vote, putting the candidate at the bottom of the list of the six potential office holders.

Furthermore, as Patrick Hossay (2004, 410) points out, the movement was very much a movement on the periphery: the interior of the island remained largely divided in terms of separatist support. Therefore, in response to the concessions of the French central government, the Corsican separatist movement began dwindling in influence.

As time passed it became clear that French government was not going to follow up with all of the plans put forth in the Schéma d’Amenagement.

Corsican separatism once again began to flare its head—this time with increased physical violence.

Success with Separatism?

In 1975, separatist leader Edmond Simeoni and the Action Régionaliste Corse occupied wine cellars in Aléria in protest of Parisian economic repression. Six helicopters, four armored cars, and 500 riot police arrived on the scene to suppress the occupation.

During the operation two police officers died, and the police imprisoned many of the Corsican demonstrators. The following year, a series of “blue nights” disrupted the island. Extreme separatists targeted various cities around Corsica with explosives, and in the course of the year 600 to 700 explosions disturbed the island (Le Monde 1976). The terrorists generally targeted government offices or French owned businesses, choosing their targets to highlight the separation between France and Corsica. The neglect of the Corsicans by the French government was therefore beginning to affect the violence of the separatist movement.

Two more political parties emerged in 1976: the Union de la Peuple Corse (UPC), and the Front de la Liberation National de la Corse (FLNC). Both expressed an ultimate goal of “recognition of the national rights of Corsica, destruction of all the instruments of French colonialism, and the foundation of a popular democratic power”(Le Monde 1997).

The UPC in particular hosted summer conferences to extend separatist sentiments to the masses.

Foster (1980) found that in the summer of 1976, the conference boasted as many as 5,000 in attendance.

The surge in separatist momentum came to a head with the Bastelica-Fesch affair of 1980. In January, a clash between UPC members and anti-separatists escalated into five-day standoff. Demonstrations in favor of separatism broke out around the island, killing police officers and two protesters (Le Monde 2000). Forty-four organizations went on strike, and the separatists seemed to control the island.

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In the face of rising separatist momentum, the central government began to once again make concessions. Francois Mitterand won the 1980 presidential election, and subsequently acknowledged (Le Monde 1978) “the Corsican people [as a] small homeland in a great nation.” The most significant concession however, was the Statut Particulier de Corse, enacted in March of 1982. The Statut (1982) provided for the establishment of the Assemblée de la Corse (the Corsican Assembly) whose responsibilities included the “deliberation and instruction of the affairs of the region and the execution of small powers in the Corsican region.” The Statut assigned the Assembly power over various economic councils, government agencies, and special institutions, giving the Corsicans regional control over their island. Despite considerable regional autonomy, the Assembly remained definitively under the authority of the government in Paris (Statut Particulier de la Corse 1982). Tax-raising powers and final veto authority remained with the French Republic, and all actions taken by the Assembly were approved in Paris.

Perhaps one of the most significant portions of the Statut recognized a distinct Corsican people—a status not previously enjoyed by the islanders.

Within the legislation (1982, art. 1), the government recognized “a specificity in this region resulting, notably, from its geography and history”. Elsewhere in the Statut (1982, Préamble), Francois Mitterand and his Council of Ministers acknowledged the separatists as “the Corsican people, a component of the French people”. Therefore, with the enacting of the Statut Particulier of 1982, Corsican separatists received recognition by the French government, as well as political control of their island.

Immediately after the enactment of the Statut Particulier de Corse, the separatist movement began

34 to wane in influence. Hossay (2004) found that the legislation made it difficult for various separatist groups, each with their own following and ideas, to mobilize joint opinion against the French government.

His research (2004) on the election immediately following the creation of the Corsican Assembly revealed that the separatist candidate received less than thirteen percent of the vote. In general, Corsicans appreciated the special notice given to them by the French government, and as a result fewer supported the separatist cause. Two years later, in December of 1984, 25,000 Corsicans marched through the streets in favor of French unity. Their banners read: “No to Separatism, No to Terrorism” (Le Monde 1984). Other marches took place throughout the following year as more Corsicans voiced their solidarity and attachment to mainland France.

The anti-separatist sentiments seem to have persisted in Corsica. A referendum issued in Corsica in 2003 (Sanchez 2008) asked locals for their opinion about the future of the island. More specifically, the referendum asked Corsicans whether they would accept greater amounts of territorial independence in the form of a new executive body. The plurality of the island voters voted “No” on the referendum, rejecting the offer for further separation from the mainland of France. Former Interior Minister JeanPierre Chevenement (Guadichet 2003) reiterated the voting results, claiming that “most Corsicans want Corsica to remain French…. Even though the government, the autonomists, and the separatists preached for a ‘yes’ vote, the Corsican population said ‘no’ to excessive concessions”. Therefore, though the separatist movement remains alive in a small number of radicals and elites, the general population of Corsica does not share the separatist sentiments. As a result of the government’s concessions, the separatist movement

has lost its influence with the Corsican people.

Thus in both Brittany and in Corsica, separatist movements began to wane in the early 1980s. Why did both movements lose steam at roughly the same point in time, especially at a time when separatist movements in other countries were emerging? On March 2, 1982, the French government established the first law in a plan of décentralisation reforms. Nick Vlahos (2013, 6) cites one of the goals of the plan was to “revitalize the periphery politically, administratively, and economically, and make government more effective.” By 1986, there were 40 laws and 300 decrees addressing decentralization in France.

The decentralization plan distributed the powers traditionally held by the prefects to the regions and communes. This transfer allowed local governments to hold more decision making power (Vlahos 2013, 6).

The resulting structure endowed local politicians with greater responsibility, and it created more productive, well paying jobs on the periphery. In essence, the plan of decentralization placed a greater importance and emphasis on the periphery, eliminating the strength of or need for separatist movements.

The second phase of the plan was enacted years later, in establishing the départments. The individual départements possessed more control over economic planning in the region, education, health services, infrastructure, etc. (Vlahos 2013, 7). As a result, post-decentralization France has around 54, 000 sub-national public authorities. According to JeanClaude Thoenig (2005, 687-88), “not many other states possess such dense, creative, and diverse institutional landscape”. After these large-scale, consistent concessions of power toward the periphery, separatist movements in France began to disappear, as seen in Brittany and Corsica.

Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics Conclusion

Government concessions proved themselves to be an effective way of suppressing separatist movements within France. While in the 1960s the movements in Brittany and Corsica gained strength and influence, concessions by the central government diminished the success of the movements. Today, both regional movements have lost their appeal.

The study reveals a significant pattern in both Brittany and Corsica. The separatist movements began to rise in influence during periods of government repression. If the government imposed linguistic repression, revoked previous concessions, or failed to follow through with promises, the separatist movements gained more supporters, more organizational strength, and separatist violence increased. Years of separatist support were followed by periods of government concessions. Whether culturally or politically, the central government responded favorably to the demands of the separatist movements. Despite the differences in the concessions, any compromise by the central government resulted in a waning of separatist support. A decrease in the level of violence, the number of separatist organizations, and the electoral support for separatist candidates indicates that concessions are an effective way of minimizing the influence of separatist organization.

Therefore, based on the evidence in Brittany and Corsica, this study concludes that government concessions are an effective way of repressing separatist movements. Movements in states willing to make concessions are less likely to succeed than movements that face consistent repression. France in particular has effectively conceded in ways to prevent separatist groups from seceding from the Republic.

These findings both compliment and contradict

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the existing literature. The findings support Walter (2006) and Smithâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1979) theories about government repression. In both Brittany and Corsica, during the periods of government repression, separatist movements engaged in more violent behavior, and the influence of the movements spread. On the other hand, the findings in this study disprove Zariskiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1989) theory about concessions: instead of leading to increased demands by the separatists, the concessions pacified the separatists and ultimately prevented the movements from succeeding.

Furthermore, the study sheds light on a larger question surrounding the French separatist movements: Why did they suddenly cease in the mid 1980s? The concessions, combined with the plan of decentralization begun in 1982 contributed to the disappearance. The United Kingdom did not begin making significant steps toward decentralization until the late 1990s, while Spain began such a process in the early 1990s. Perhaps the relatively early move toward decentralization helped France quell its separatist movements.

Despite the significant conclusions and implications found in this case study, there are areas left for exploration. First, this study only considers two of the separatist movements within France. Further research considering the other significant separatists movements could solidify the findings of this study. If the movements in Alsace, Catalonia, and Lorraine fit the pattern found in this study, the conclusions made about the French governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s response to separatist movements would be stronger. Additional studies directly comparing the movements in France, Belgium, Britain and/or Spain would more accurately pinpoint the specific features that have allowed France to effectively quell its separatist movements. Perhaps the movements in France had less popular support than

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the movements in other states, or perhaps the French government presented more effective concessions. A more inclusive study would provide the answers to these queries.

Overall, this study finds that government concessions are an effective response to separatist movements. Rather than fueling further demands, concessions by the central government tend to pacify separatists, bringing greater peace and cooperation to areas of turmoil. The French government has consistently implemented effective concessions to the separatist movements, rightfully earning its name, “The Indivisible French Republic.”

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Conseils Générals de la France. 1977. La Charte Culturelle Bretonne. Paris, France.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. 2011. “Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?” American Political Science Review 105, no. 2: 275-297.

Debauvais, Fanche. Letter to Monsieur le Maire from the Conseil National Breton. 20 November 1940.

Esman, Milton J. 1977. Ethnic Conflict in the Western World. United Kingdom: Cornell University Press.

Foster, Charles R. 1980. Nations Without a State: Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe. New York: Praeger Publishing.

Fouéré, Yann. 1942. “À Nouveau Préfet, Nouvelle Politique”, La Bretagne. Brittany, France.

---. 1944. “Breizh Atao Reparait…,”La Bretagne.

Brittany, France.

---. 1957. “Pour Quoi et Comment? Livret en L’Avenir.

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---. June 1944. “Rupture des Communications Entre Rennes et Morlaix du Fait du Débarquement Allié en Normandie et des Hostilités se Déroulant en France” La Bretagne. Brittany, France.

Frelaut, Bernard. 1988. “Le Mouvement Nationaliste Breton Pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale.”

Historiens et Geographies 318, no. 78: 57-62.

Gaudichet, Nicholas. “France’s Sarkozy Warns Corsicans of Crackdown on “Mafia-Like” Dealings”.

Agence France Presse. International News. 30 October 2003.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict Berkley: University of California Press.

Hossay, Patrick. 2004. “Recognizing Corsica: The Drama of Recognition in Nationalist Mobilization.”

Ethnic and Racial Studies 27, no. 3: 403-430.

Odell, John S. 2001. “Case Study Methods in International Political Economy.” International Studies Perspectives 2: 161-176.

Posen, Barry R. 1993. “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power.” International Security 18, no. 2: 80-125.

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Success with Separatism?

Reece, Jack E. 1977. The Bretons Against France: Ethnic Minority Nationalism in Twentieth Century Brittany Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Saideman, Stephen M. 2002. “Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups.” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 1: 27-50.

Sanchez, Alejandro W. 2008. “Corsica: France’s Petite Security Problem.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 7: 655-664.

Smith, Anthony D. 1979. “Towards a Theory of Ethnic Separatism.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 2, no. 1: 21-38.

Thoenig, Jean-Claude. 2005. “Territorial Administration and Political Control: Decentralization in France.” Public Administration 83, no. 3: 685-708.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

Vlahos, Nick. 2013. “The Politics of Subnational Decentralization in France, Brazil, and Italy.” Journal of Public Deliberation. 9 no. 2. Accessed online March 23, 2014: http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol9/iss2/ art15.

Walter, Barbara F. 2006. “Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others.”

American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2: 313-330.

Zariski, Raphael. 1989. “Ethnic Extremism among Ethnoterritorial Minorities in Western Europe: Dimensions, Causes, and Institutional Responses” Comparative Politics 21, no. 3: 253-72.

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