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URBAN SECURITY
Christian Schneider, Hostile Vehicle Mitigation advisor gives a brief introduction and summary of the HVM measures applied in Berlin following HVM attacks in 2016 and 2022
Barely five years after the despicable attack on the Berlin Christmas market in 2016, another rampage occurred in June 2022, only a few metres away from the first attack site. This makes the German capital, after London, the second Western city to have suffered two vehicle ram attacks at almost the same location. This article is intended to give a brief summary of the two incidents and to show what measures have been taken in the meantime to protect the public there from further attacks.
A golden zigzag line made of brass is embedded in the pavement of the busy Breitscheidplatz. This line was created as a memorial in remembrance of the terrorist Vehicle as Weapon (VAW) attack that took place here on 19 December 2016, killing 13 people and seriously injuring another 67. At the time, an Islamist rammed a stolen 40-tonne articulated lorry into the packed Christmas market.
The gold-coloured monument that is now embedded in the ground of Breitscheidplatz not only commemorates the victims of the attack, but also stands for the mental rift that has been running through German society since the attack. It symbolises a turning point in the threat of terrorism in Germany. Unlike in the UK, the US and France, a terrorist attack on soft targets carried out by a heavy lorry had not been seen in Germany until December 2016. It was only afterwards, however, that attacks using this modus operandi began to accumulate on a significant scale.
The latest Vehicle Ram attack took place on 8 June 2022, in the immediate vicinity of the symbolic Breitscheidplatz. Here, the perpetrator drove his car onto the pavement of the neighbouring Tauentzien Street in order to deliberately drive into the pupils of a school class and then ran over passers-by. In doing so, the perpetrator even manoeuvred in reverse gear in order to hit even more people. At the end of his drive, he tried to run over tourists sitting in a street café and finally drove into a E
perfumery, where his vehicle then got stuck. The perpetrator killed a teacher and injured 32 other people. However, the second crime scene was not yet part of the Breitscheidplatz Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) Scheme, which is why the protective measures set up at Breitscheidplatz could not have any effect here.
Both attacks have in common that they killed and injured unprotected pedestrians in Publicly Accessible Locations (PAL).
However, they differ significantly in the way they were carried out, because while the Islamist attacker of 2016 drove his lorry at high speed and in a straight line into a densely packed group of people enjoying themselves at the Christmas market, the perpetrator of 2022, however, first drove slowly onto the pavement of the attack site and then zigzagged in a very targeted manner to run over his victims.
But why are more and more perpetrators using vehicles as weapons? Terrorist organisations have answered this question themselves by calling ramming vehicles the “ultimate mowing machine” (The Ultimate Mowing Machine. (2010, 10). Inspire Magazine (02), pp. 53-54.).
The reasons for this are both obvious and pragmatic from the perpetrators’ point of view, because the use of a vehicle as a weapon unfortunately causes a large number of victims, but requires neither special planning nor competence, nor does it carry the risk of being discovered early by the security authorities. Added to this is the incredible momentum and penetrating power of vehicles. Truly effective measures against VAWattacks are therefore reliable, physical barriers serving as the “last line of defence” against the immense force of the approaching vehicle. It should be noted, however, that the approach to protecting soft targets/PALs from ram attacks differs significantly from that of protecting hard targets/buildings and infrastructure. This is because while penetration of the vehicles is in the foreground for hard target protection in order to bring Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices into the target, the consideration of lethal dispersion, however, is the
main parameter for the protection of people at soft targets on PALs.
My task as Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Advisor (HVMA) and planner of the security measures at Berlin’s Breitscheidplatz was therefore to develop, together with the Berlin police, several standard-compliant HVM Schemes in accordance with the relevant ISO IWA 14, which not only protect the people there from intruding vehicles, but in particular also keep out deadly dispersion that is being caused when a vehicle crashes into a vehicle security barrier (VSB). This task was not easy to accomplish, especially considering that the location of Breidscheidplatz allows heavy goods vehicles to approach at a tremendous impact energy of up to 7,400kJ (Equals a PAS68 or ISO IWA 14 Performance Rating of V/30000[N3G]/80/90). Furthermore, the special architecture of Breitscheidplatz had to be taken into account, which should not be disturbed by the appearance of the VSBs later on. In addition, the existing underground tunnels and diverse underground facilities had to be taken into account in the planning.
Furthermore, future issues of climate change, urbanisation and the traffic turnaround also played a decisive role in the conceptual design of the HVM-Scheme.
Here follows a brief summary of the project parameters for “Berlin Breitscheidplatz”; the task was to lockout the hostiles without locking-in the public; the location is a memorial of national importance and a worldrenowned symbol for Germany; the location is insular in between two sixlane main roads, with two particular attack boosting approach routes and a large number of stakeholders are involved. Furthermore, there are 4 HVM schemes (temporary, semi-permanent, permanent), more than 40 potential trajectories and more than 1,200 vehicle dynamics assessments (VDA). The potential kinetic impact energy is up to 7,400 kJ. Finally, the HVM scheme and subsequent application shall be fully compliant with ISO IWA 14 and all VSBs used shall be ISO IWA 14-1 / PAS68 crash test approved.
IMPLEMENTATION
With a timespan of several years and implementation in different construction phases, we have developed a total of four special schemes to protect the Breitscheidplatz site against Vehicle Ram Attacks by means of portable and stationary barriers. Each of these schemes has a slightly different task. The first scheme uses portable high-performance barriers to protect different areas of Breitscheidplatz quickly and flexibly. Later, these will be gradually replaced by stationary barriers. Finally, a concept of stationary perimeter barriers and upstream portable barriers provides the highest level of protection for very special situations and occasions.
LEARNINGS
Several learnings resulted from the process. The application of ISO IWA 14-2 was an excellent guide to lead through the HVM planning and application process (ISO IWA 14-2 will soon be superseded by its successor norm ISO 22343-2.) The CPNI’s “Catalogue of Impact Tested Vehicle Security Barriers” provided the decisive and impartial overview of suitable VSBs. It was found that early focus on certain types of barriers without having carried out the appropriate VDAs beforehand will lead to poor decisions, and impartial project management is essential to facilitate interdependent HVM tasks. It was also learnt that dispersion is most important when protecting PALs but is often underestimated and that portable barriers and deflecting measures significantly reduce dispersion. Finally, early PR for temporary measures is important to gain positive public opinion and visible HVM measures have a positive impact on public perception of security (SchipperKruse, D. (2020). Wahrnehmung von Zufahrtsschutzmaßnahmen und erkennbare Effekte auf das Sicherheitsempfinden. Berlin: Berlin School of Economics and Law.).
Summing up the Berlin Breitscheidplatz HVM, one can say the project has generated positive feedback and great public interest not only in Berlin itself but in other German-speaking countries too. Since then, many other projects have benefited from the learnings gained and thus have contributed to the public security. L
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Driven by the terrible Vehicle Ram Attacks of Nice and Berlin, Christian Schneider founded the INIBSP “Initiative Breitscheidplatz” in 2017 as a non-profit expert forum aiming to provide relevant HVM know-how to decision makers in Germany.
Since then, his enterprise has developed into the leading consultancy on the topic in German-speaking countries. Together with international experts and local authorities, he developed and implemented numerous HVM schemes for the protection of entire city centres, airports, critical infrastructures, stadiums and public spaces. Schneider also is member of HVM standards and norms committees, and author of multiple articles on the topic of HVM.
