34 minute read
ISE REVIEW
ISE returned to London on 27 and 28 of September, CTB shares a review including some insightful pieces from some of the speakers
ANOTHER SUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY EXPO
Thousands of security professionals, representing more than 70 countries, descended on London from 27-28 September as International Security Expo returned to showcase the very latest technological innovations to protect people, businesses, critical national infrastructure and nations.
With more than 300 companies demonstrating thousands of the most cuttingedge products and solutions, attendees were provided with an unmissable opportunity to gain in-person demonstrations and insights, helping them understand how technology can meet current and future challenges.
While the show floor played host to the latest product innovations, this year’s hotly anticipated conference programme saw record crowds gather to hear from industry leaders. Three streams ran over the course of the two days including the Global Counter Terror & Serious and Organised Crime Summit, International Security Conference, and International Risk & Resilience Conference.
In the Global Counter Terror & Serious and Organised Crime Summit, Tom Tugendhat MP, newly appointed minister of state for security, joined attendees to deliver a short address. He recognised the importance of transparency and freedom for long-lasting democracy and reflected on the success of Operation London Bridge and the seamless delivery of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II’s funeral. He acknowledged the remarkable example it set for global collaboration and how continued collaboration would be key for success.
Sharing unique insights into the collective efforts behind Operation London Bridge, Matt Twist, assistant commissioner, Counter Terror Police UK spoke about the breadth of the operation from the integrated counter-terror package to the ‘biggest ever deployment’ of law enforcement and supporting government agencies. He also revealed the Counter UAV response investigated 80 flights – four of which subsequently face prosecution for their intended actions.
Among the other topics to take the spotlight in the Summit, the ‘chronic and corrosive threat’ of serious and organised crime (SOC) was addressed by Matt Horne, deputy director of investigations at the National Crime Agency. He detailed the alarming scale and complexity of the evolving threat, costing more than £37 billion every year. He revealed that SOC rates were climbing, exceeding pre-pandemic levels with many offenders increasingly taking advantage of technology, which saw a huge uprise in adoption over the course of the pandemic. Describing it as a ‘technological arms race with criminals’, he stressed the importance of updating legislation, collaborating with industry and academia, and adopting ‘innovative protection and protective measures’.
One of the other topics dominating the agenda was the pending Protect Duty legislation. Among the speakers joining to discuss this monumental legislation was Shaun Hipgrave director Protect and Prepare – Homeland Security Group (HSG), UK Government Home Office. He reminded attendees that terrorism doesn’t abide by conventional boundaries and stressed the importance of an adaptable, whole community approach. He reflected on the progress made to date on the Protect Duty legislation, citing it as a “once in a generation opportunity” and suggested that a change of culture was required for security precautions to be normalised.
Speaking about the 2022 International Security Expo, Rachael Shattock, Event Director, said: “It has been a monumental two days at Olympia, London welcoming a host of leading security professionals as they do business, network and source the products and solutions to keep people and businesses safe. We were delighted to welcome Tom Tugendhat MP in his first UK trade appearance to meet attendees and gain insights into this wonderfully diverse and innovative industry. Our thanks go to all the participating government departments and agencies, exhibiting companies, Advisory Council members and of course, our visitors. It’s wonderful to see the industry come together to network, source the latest technologies, and learn from such inspiring minds. We can’t wait to return in 2023 to do it all again.” L International Security Expo returns to Olympia, London from 26-27 September 2023.
FURTHER INFORMATION wwww.internationalsecurityexpo.com/ pr-ryi-2023
Anna-Liisa Tampuu and Lisa Reilly (MSyl), co-chairs of the SI Inclusive Security SIG discuss diversity in the security sector
BUILDING RESILIENCE AND INNOVATION THROUGH AN INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO SECURITY
How does inclusion impact resilience and support innovation within the security sector, a vital industry providing fundamental services to protect societies in an ever-changing risk landscape? To understand the dynamic threats of tomorrow, diversity and inclusion are crucial factors to consider when designing risk management strategies, as well as building the capacity to adapt, grow and innovate.
To truly understand the risks and threats of modern societies, the talent pool should reflect the society it serves. Diversity of thought is essential to equip the security sector to face the challenges of the future.
BEYOND THE BUSINESS CASE FOR DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION
In the past decade, there has been increased understanding of the business case for diversity, recognising how diversity and inclusion are enhancing business operations and driving growth. An article “How Diversity Can Drive Innovation” published in the Harvard Business Review, highlights research that provides evidence on how diversity unlocks innovation and drives market growth.
Diversity is a concept that can be understood in various ways. Interestingly, the article makes a distinction between two kinds of diversity: “Inherent diversity involves traits you are born with, such as gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. Acquired diversity involves traits you gain from experience”.
It would be interesting to consider whether staff who remain within an organisation (or even a single sector) for an extended period of time, find their acquired diversity traits come together creating a more homogenous group than originally formed?
However, diversity, in itself, is not enough. To drive change we need to create a psychologically and physically safe working environment that fosters equity and inclusion. There are many examples of companies that push for diversity hires who are then surprised when these staff do not stay. Hiring is only the first step, an inspirational leader is one who creates a team that thrives, whatever the inherent and acquired traits of the individuals.
IN A SECTOR THAT IS PREDOMINANTLY MALE, IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT EVENTS ON INCLUSION TEND TO BE ATTENDED BY MORE WOMEN THAN MEN
BUILDING RESILIENCE - WHO IS INCLUSION FOR?
And as the voice for greater diversity is raised so is the backlash. This is disappointing as we do need everybody in the discussion. We do not want to sideline those already in the sector – there is so much we can and must learn from past experience and current solutions.
White men, if you are feeling excluded – restructure your frame of reference – everyone is part of the inclusive sector that is sought. When you look at someone you don’t know their religion, do they have a neurodiversity, perhaps a medical condition or dependents for whom they are the primary carer. What experience do they have? Maybe they spend their free time deep-sea diving or grew up in Africa? These traits, as much as someone’s ethnicity and gender, define who they are and what they can bring to a diverse and inclusive team.
As a sector we often talk about the importance of resilience, but what does this mean for individuals and teams as well as the organisation? Do we have the psychological safe space needed for staff to bring their ‘whole self’ to work? It is recognized that mental health issues are so often ignored, the British Culture is one where speaking out about problems is seen as an unacceptable weakness, particularly for men; and, in our sector which is dominated by men, the traditional culture of ‘be strong’ does not encourage mental well-being and resilience.
So, don’t be afraid of the conversation on diversity, inclusion and equity – embrace it, it is for everyone.
HOW DOES DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION CONNECT TO RISK?
When considering diversity and inclusion, the conversation does not often involve looking at diversity through the risk lens (For example GISF. (2018) Managing the Security of Aid Workers with Diverse Profiles. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)). However, the security industry needs to recognise that inclusion and diversity have a vital role to play in risk mitigation and resilience.
The Deloitte Review “The diversity and inclusion revolution: Eight powerful truths” highlights that diversity of thinking enables groups to spot risks, reducing these by up to 30 per cent, E
as well as being a source for creativity, enhancing innovation by about 20 per cent. It adds that diversity of thinking smooths the implementation of decisions by creating trust and buy-in. The article emphasises that highperforming teams are both cognitively and demographically diverse.
The Review argues that “By cognitive diversity, we are referring to educational and functional diversity, as well as diversity in the mental framework that people use to solve problems. A complex problem typically requires input from six different mental frameworks or “approaches”; evidence, options, outcomes, people, process, and risk.” The authors reason that no one is equally good at all six and that is why complementary team members are required. The article refers to Bourke’s “Which Two Heads Are Better Than One”, giving an example of how cognitive diversity has an impact: “For example, racial diversity stimulates curiosity, and gender balance facilitates conversational turn-taking”.
The security sector deals with risks and threats on a daily basis. The societies it serves are diverse and ever-changing, demanding a response that requires a cognitively diverse team that can address complex problems and build inclusive risk mitigation strategies on the best possible foundation. This foundation needs to be capable and flexible, made up of diverse and inclusive teams that can spot the risks that future threat actors will present. The sector needs to be mindful of groupthink and homogeneity of thought if it wants to stay ahead of developing threats.
DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION SURVEYS AND GROWTH OF DE&I FOCUSED INITIATIVES
The security sector has been seeing a growing number of DE&I focused initiatives, however without baseline data it can be difficult to present compelling arguments for change.
In 2021, the Security Institute’s Inclusive Security Special Interest Group (IS SIG) launched an Inclusion and Diversity survey, aiming to gather data to understand the security sector’s workforce in greater detail.
The survey received a total of 760 respondents, with 72 per cent members of the Security Institute (SI).
Unsurprisingly, with the majority of respondents coming from within the SI, the majority were older and in more senior positions. This highlights the need to bring more junior and younger staff in the sector into the ‘professional space’, encouraging career development and staff retention. It may also be possible that a younger cadre of respondents would demonstrate greater diversity than found in this survey.
While anecdotally it is known that the number of women in the security sector is below the national average, the actual figures were quite shocking. With only 22 per cent of respondents identifying as women in comparison with the 2021 UK census figure of 51 per cent in the general population. The sector scored better on other traits such as ethnicity, 83 per cent identifying as white in the sector vs 85 per cent in the general population and for those identifying as LGBTQ+ 9 per cent vs 4 per cent. Disability was another area where the security sector scored badly, with only 12 per cent of respondents identifying as having a disability in comparison to 19 per cent in the broader community. 36 per cent of all respondents identified some form of barrier or disadvantage during their career, by far the most significant cause identified was gender.
There were a minority of white men who felt discriminated against because of their traits. The survey analysis highlights the difference between positive discrimination, which is mostly illegal under the Equalities Act 2010 and fosters the idea of unfair ‘diversity hires’, and the importance of developing more inclusive hiring approaches to encourage non-traditional applicants. For example, in our modern virtual based context, do working hours need to be 9.00-5.00 in an office? A requirement which effectively excludes many women with young children.
TOWARDS RESILIENT, INCLUSIVE AND INNOVATIVE SECURITY
How can the sector build resilience from within as well as attract and retain talent to foster innovation? A good first step is understanding that having
cognitive diversity, and teams with different inherent and acquired diversity traits, supports building resilience and reducing risk. The diversity of viewpoints and backgrounds can help the sector tackle the ever-evolving threats.
There is also no meaningful merit in diversity without inclusion and equity. Providing a psychologically and physically safe space for all individuals creates an environment where people are not scared to present their ideas, are free from prejudice and discrimination, feel listened to and safe to step out of their comfort zone. Inclusion must start with inclusive leadership and management. In the book “Great Ted Talks: Innovation” (Hughes, N., C. (2021) Great TED Talks: Innovation. London: Portico), Kristian Ribberstrom is highlighted: “Ribberstorm believes that we have an opportunity for groundbreaking innovation when we tear down silos, cross boundaries, and purposefully learn from the unfamiliar, unknown and unexpected.”
Inclusive security is for everyone to create and benefit from, and there are steps that we can take individually, as organisations and collectively within the industry. We can have courage to ask questions, practice active listening, be allies to our colleagues, nurture the talent of tomorrow and share best practices and new ideas within the industry. We must work collectively to ensure that diversity and inclusion initiatives are not just for minority groups to champion and guard against these conversations staying in separate silos. Collaborations between different organisations should become force multipliers working towards a common goal.
Change takes time. However, if we contribute to building an inclusive sector that values the diversity of ideas and backgrounds, we also build resilience from within and strengthen the services to protect the society the sector serves. Moreover, in an environment where new ideas have a safe space to be nurtured, innovation will follow. As highlighted earlier, there is evidence that teams which are cognitively diverse, bring dynamic problem-solving skills that are essential for effective risk management.
Inclusive security will equip the security sector with innovative tools and services to face the new challenges of the future with confidence. L
Ellie Rice, security lead at the Defence and Security Accelerator, details why innovation should be at the forefront of national security for the UK and the importance of reaching out to a broad range of innovators to achieve this
INNOVATION TO KEEP THE NATION SAFE
The first duty of government is to keep citizens safe and the country secure. The evolving nature of the terrorist threat means that those working in the security services, law enforcement and wider government to deliver this duty need to embrace innovation to stay ahead of those wishing to do us harm.
The opportunities presented by science and technology are broad and growing but our adversaries are taking the same opportunities to fulfil their aims. The increasing accessibility of advanced technologies, such as cloudenabled artificial intelligence and machine learning, and end-to-end encryption, lowers the barrier to entry for those who seek to infringe upon our democracy and way of life. Layered on top of this is the potential future impact of next generation technologies, such as synthetic biology.
Beyond terrorism, the return of great power competition and the race to develop vaccines against COVID-19 demonstrate the need for innovation as critical to the UK’s national security. So it is only by embracing innovation and leveraging new technology and novel ways of doing things that the UK can continue to keep citizens safe and the country secure. But while it is one thing to embrace this mind-set and understand that innovation can help the UK stay ahead of security threats, it is another to find and access the ideas and the innovators that will help us achieve this.
The Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) was set up to help address this need and is a key pillar of the UK’s effort to tackle security challenges by helping government stakeholders identify and access innovative technology and approaches. DASA’s role is to find and fund exploitable innovation projects, working with those in the security services and across wider government to support the generation of new capabilities.
The Integrated Review, published in March 2021, not only states innovation
is important – it says it is essential to success for national security and that government agencies need to work collaboratively in order to avoid duplication of effort. When it comes to innovation, DASA is an enabler for this, sharing the fruits of security innovation across government and its agencies.
In 2021, DASA developed the Security Rapid Impact Innovations Open Call with the Home Office, Department for Transport and other government security stakeholders, specifically to find ideas that enhance our understanding of threats to UK security and safety, enable threat prevention, or enhance the threat response. This £20m initiative runs until March 2024 and enables government to work in partnership with the private sector and academia to find novel ideas that meet a security sector challenge, and offers competitive funding to support the development of the best ideas.
DIVERSITY
Innovation by its very nature requires diversity of thought, so it is only by accessing a wide range of innovators that security agencies can find the best solutions and gain access to new ideas. DASA understands that diversity and inclusion is a capability multiplier for innovation – we need to be able to draw upon the talents of as wide a pool of individuals as possible to help keep the UK secure – and we have the capability to do this.
DASA has an Outreach Team of Innovation Partners, who are located across the economic regions of the UK, enabling us to interact with and tap into local ecosystems. This ensures that innovators – including those who may have not worked with government or the security sector before – are aware of how to access UK innovation support, can understand national security challenges and identify which innovation projects might align with security requirements.
For established suppliers and those new to government, working with DASA represents an attractive opportunity. DASA provides full funding of innovation projects and straightforward contracting mechanisms and innovators retain full ownership of background and foreground IP.
DASA’s security team works closely with both innovators and security stakeholders across the public and private sector to help inform innovation projects – ensuring that end-user needs are considered early in the product development lifecycle. This co-creation approach supports the delivery of results that are fit-forpurpose and able to integrate with other government-operated systems - enabling the best innovations to protect our people and prosperity and future-proof the supply chain.
This is all backed up by a range of post-contract services to support commercialisation, scale-up and routes to market. We believe that building the business behind the innovation is also critical to ensuring a sustainable security innovation ecosystem. Many small businesses lack follow-on funding and require guidance on the commercial aspects of their ambitions, not just technical guidance and operational insight from users.
MENTORING
DASA’s Access to Mentoring and Finance team help innovators who wish to grow their businesses through mentorship, links to business networks and access to investors, such as venture capitalists and angel investors, to help raise capital. Many innovators funded through DASA are small or micro enterprises, so the business mentoring programme offered by the DASA Access to Mentoring and Finance team is invaluable in helping small organisations think about how they can scale up.
Innovative ideas are all around us, but we need to find and harness the best of these and realise their benefits. Innovation is critical to tackling threats to the defence and security of the UK and ensuring a safer future for us all. DASA is a key route to achieving this. L
FURTHER INFORMATION
Contact DASA if you have an innovative idea for an inconfidence discussion with your local Innovation Partner. If you are in government, please get in touch to work with DASA to identify relevant innovation projects and help us to assess proposals, ensuring that we choose the most impactful innovation projects.
Following his appearance at ISE, Philip Grindell, threat intelligence specialist, CEO and founder, Defuse® talks about tackling the threat from lone actors
TACKLING LONE ACTORS WITH BEHAVIOURAL THREAT INDICATORS
In 2007, research suggested that people who pursue public figures pose a greater risk of death or serious injury to their targets than do terrorist groups or criminals.
Much has changed since then. Whilst the threat from terrorism is as prominent as ever, it is less focused on ‘terrorist groups’ such as the IRA and even AQ, with the primary focus now on lone actors.
When I was tasked with setting up and running the investigative unit to protect UK MPs after the assassination of Jo Cox MP, one of my key tasks was to prevent the next attack. To do so, I researched how public figures were targeted and attacked.
Much of the research base that I introduced into our processes emanated from the US Secret Service’s Exceptional Case Study Research Project (ECSP) and
was subsequently advanced by some of the most well-recognised thought leaders. That research was based on various behavioural and linguistic warning behaviours that may be associated with a physical threat. The indicators were prevalent in cases of people fixated on public figures. It is unlikely that all of these indicators will be seen in a single case, with some being more commonly observed than others.
I assessed these indicators against the attacks on UK MPs attacked since 2000, identifying a clear pattern. What was clear was that ‘Lone Actors’ could also be considered fixated individuals and mirrored many of the behaviours of stalkers and those researched by the ECSP when targeting the prominent, powerful or wealthy.
This is witnessed as a ‘pathological fixation’ which effectively means that these people are focussed on a person or issue from the minute they wake up to when they go to bed. This fixation can be evidenced by any behaviour that indicates an increasing preoccupation with the target individual or issue, such as talking of nothing else and a deteriorating social or occupational functioning.
One evening in 2017 I was passed a note with five lines on it. It recorded a third-hand threat directed at Rosie Cooper MP. Based on the behavioural and linguistic indicators I was now familiar with, I assessed that threat to be genuine, which I then communicated to the head of national CT. Their investigation successfully prevented the attack on Ms. Cooper resulting in a life sentence for the National Action member Jack Renshaw.
One of the key elements of this methodology is that such individuals don’t snap, they plan and prepare and often follow a process, referred to as ‘The Pathway of Targeted or Intended Violence’.
This process is initiated by a grievance which may be personal or ideological. Once they decide that the grievance cannot be resolved, they develop violent ideation, which means that they believe that the only way to solve their grievance is through violence. This is where they form the intent necessary for any threat to be genuine.
Research tells us that those who make directly communicated threats, such as death threats, rarely pose a genuine threat. Dr Reid Meloy, one of the world’s preeminent experts stated on Defuse’s podcast, The Online Bodyguard, that a directly communicated threat resulted in violence in less that five per cent of cases.
However, ‘last resort’ or ‘end of tether’ language may be an indication that a person of concern was escalating along ‘The Pathway’. This may be evidenced by such phrases as “You leave me no other choice” or “I have no other option”. This may be a sign of distress or desperation and can be an indicator of time imperative of an impending attack. In the case of Renshaw’s threat, it was evidenced when his plan included him describing his desire to martyr himself by ‘suicide by cop’. Another example concerns Khalid Masood who attacked Parliament and murdered my colleague, Keith Palmer. A few days before the attack and after many years of being estranged from his family, Masood visited his parents one last time. He left that last meeting, telling his mother, “They will say I am a terrorist – but I am not.”
Another commonly witnessed indicator is termed ‘identification’. A common factor witnessed in lone actors is their associating themselves with a terrorist group, such as ISIS. Very often there is no evidence of any such association, however the group will often corroborate this as it supports their cause. This is to identify oneself as an agent to advance a particular cause or belief. It has also been described as pseudo commando or warrior mentality. This is evidenced by the person identifying with the military or law enforcement or studying and copying previous assassins. A good example of this is Anders Breivik who dressed up in uniforms.
Another example is the possession of the book, Catcher in the Rye. After Chapman murdered John Lennon, he remained at the scene reading The Catcher in the Rye until he was arrested by the police. Hinckley also had a copy when he attempted to assassinate Reagan, as did Robert Bardo who stalked and murdered Rebecca Schaeffer.
Very often when law enforcement is researching a potential person of concern, they look at their previous convictions or arrests. Often dismissed are unrelated or random acts that don’t immediately appear to be relevant. This can be an indicator of novel aggression. This is best described an act of violence or aggressive behaviour via which the subject is testing their ability to act in such a way. It is usually not directly related to the ‘pathway’ on which they are travelling and can be totally out of character.
On October 22, 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau murdered a Canadian soldier and injured three others. He then attacked the Canadian Parliament and was killed by law enforcement. In December 2011, he walked into the Police Station and confessed to an armed robbery he committed a decade earlier; no such recorded crime existed. The next night, he attempted to rob a McDonald’s restaurant with a pencil, then waited for the police to arrive, possibly testing their response and to gain an understanding of the processes.
Any surveillance or research may also identify a sudden burst of activity, known as energy burst. This is a key indicator that the intention is escalating and can occur in the hours, days or weeks before the actual event. It is characterised by an increase in pre-attack activity and can be signs of final preparations, purchasing equipment or conducting hostile reconnaissance or internet activity. A decrease in their usual social media activity may also be an indicator, a sign of them further preparing.
Prior to Choudhary attacking Stephen Timms MP, she demonstrated such behaviour by taking a bus to the bank. She paid off her student loan and closed her account and sorted her financial affairs. She also purchased knives for her attack. Her rationale was because she didn’t want the state to have any hold over her family after her attack. She was preparing for the end.
As has been described, some of the indicators may be contrary to common sense and all too often direct threats are seen as a sign of a genuine threat resulting is assets being wasted such as additional security measures or close protection being deployed. They will always need to be taken seriously, but with the recognition that they are a low probability indicator.
The lesson is that fixated people, stalkers and lone actors follow a process and they can be identified by behavioural and linguistic indicators. Without knowledge of these indicators, the best researchers will either miss or misinterpret them..L
FURTHER INFORMATION
For further details email Defuse® at enqs@defuseglobal.com
Following her talk at ISE, Debbie Rafferty, counter terrorism consultant and PhD student, Abertay University (Dundee), talks about terrorist financing
UNDERSTANDING TERRORIST FINANCING
There is one inexorable circumstance which relates to terrorism, the prerequisite for financing and the proviso of a continuous stream of substantial funds (Yousif, 2009). From a structural viewpoint, terrorist organisations ought to be contrasted to major corporations. Therefore, in this context, it is useful to deliberate a terrorist organisation as a business and evaluate the success, or otherwise, of the approaches adopted to secure funding (investment). Further, against this backdrop, terrorist groups require a paradigm to plan how revenue can be generated and sustained (Byrne, 2012). Consequently, terrorist organisations must continuously generate funds to cover expenses in order to sustain their operations. From an organisational perspective, terrorist organizations should be likened to major corporations and cash inflow is the lifeblood (Bush, 2001) of any terrorist or establishment, to survive and develop (Schneider, 2017). In this context, how an organisation makes revenue and how it incurs cost, is central to the organisation’s efficiency and effectiveness and is influenced by many factors. Consequently, these units must continuously generate funds and distribute sufficient money in order to sustain operations (Jamwal, 2007). Vittori, (2011, p.15) describes these as “Life’s necessities”. Therefore, a terrorist organisation requires extensive capital, and a balanced revenue of funds from the point of origin to the point of distribution. Deprived of cash, terrorists are confronted with risk that could result in the demise of the group.
DIVERSE STRATEGIES
To begin, terrorists utilise diverse strategies to acquire funds and there are innumerable often untraceable variations (Neumann, 2018). To complicate matters, there are clear links between terrorist groups and organised crime, the connection between these entities is primarily driven by financial profit and gain (Stanojoska, 2011). Much like a corporation, a terrorist organisation must establish reliable funding streams that adequately meet and ideally surpass fixed and variable costs. Therefore, in general, terrorist organisations must expedite the acquisition of aforesaid funds at a relentless pace and central to this are sources of reliable funds. Hence, terrorists use extensive methods to move money within and between organisations, including the financial sector and the transfer of cash by carriers, and goods through commerce (Lormel, 2018). Charitable trusts and payment systems have been used to conceal the terrorist movement of funds. The flexibility and resourcefulness exhibited by terrorist organisations means global finance and processes are at risk to illegal activities (Financial Action Task Force, 2018). Some terrorist organisations have started using organised crime conduits, therefore the links between transnational (Sedgwick, 2007), organised crime (TOC) and foreign terrorist organisations (FTO), are tangible, as are the escalating alliances between them. The need for finance of the terrorist goals means terrorist organisations continue to involve criminal business. Theorists like Makarenko, have referred to this phenomenon as “the crime-terror nexus.” (Makarenko, 2000 p. 259). Further, the imperative to raise finance has given birth to many hybrid funding strategies, on a local, national or global scale. Capital and the terrorist mission and support can be expensive and the variety of money-making schemes have become essential elements of the terrorist fund-raising repertoire (Abuza, 2003). Each component of the terrorist funding sequence (raise, move, store and spend) avails a means to strive
to understand the complicated and elaborate process of terrorist financing.
TRACING FUNDS
In an ideal world, it should be uncomplicated to trace funds from origin to the end user. Unfortunately, the myriad of financial sources, methods of movement and access points make identifying and tracing terrorist financing extremely difficult (Tavares, 2004; Indridason, 2008; Gross et.al. 2016) and laborious, given the seemingly infinite funding variations (Von Lampe, 2014). In general, it is problematic to ascertain trends in money laundering and terrorist financing (FATF-GAFI, 2005). Moreover, corrupt money is netted through various criminal activities, like drug, weapon and human trafficking. Baker (2005) estimates the illegal money to range between US$ 1.0 and 1.6 trillion a year. Further, the IMF calculates that the total sum of corrupt finance through the fiscal system is between 500 billion USD and 1,500 billion USD a year, which amounts to 3 per cent and 5 per cent of the aggregate world product, however this is an estimate. A broad sweep reveals that organisational revenue streams include, however are not confined to, revenue from business activity; locally raised revenue; and revenue from conventional terrorist financing. In general, funds are either generated through internal sources, taxation of people, enterprises and transport routes; income from kidnap and ransom; and profits from trade. Also, external funding is given by donors supportive to the cause (zakat) (as cited in Benda-Beckmann, Franz von, 2007), often affluent followers, Gulf state countries called the Golden Chain (1989) or affiliates of the movement. Each terrorist organisation accesses finance using unique methods, often there are similarities, however significant differences are present. In reviewing the aforesaid, it is sensible to understand the philosophy which motivates these violent organisations, this provides a lens to examine the innumerable sources of funding in respect of terrorist organisations.
Hezbollah, as an example, receives money from Emdad committee for Islamic Charity, Hezbollah Central Press Office, Al Jarha Association, and Jihad Al Binaa Developmental Association, while a second exemplar, Boko Haram accepts funds from foreign Islamic charities (UK and Saudi Arabia) (Agbiboa, 2013). Although it is difficult to identify the main characteristics in Boko Haram’s funding and the group has a decidedly differentiated financing strategy, often opportunistic and impromptu micro fundraising operations (Appendix 3) support many of its operations by lawless activity, including bank theft, abductions
The Processes of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism
Money Laundering Financing of Terrorism
Cash from Criminal Act $$$$$
$$$$$
Legitimate Asset or Cash from Criminal Act
Placement
Cash is deposited into accounts
Bank
Bank Security Firm
Bank Placement
Asset deposited into the financial system
Layering
Funds moved to other institutions to obscure origin
Insurance Company Non-Bank Financial Institution Layering
Funds moved to other institutions to obscure origin
Integration
Funds used to acquire legitimate assets
Legitimate Asset or Distribution
Integration Funds distributed to fund terrorist activities
(Chibok girls, 2014) assassinations for hire, smuggling, livestock theft and extortion (Home Office, 2019).
INTERCONNECTIONS
There appear to be interconnections between transnational organised crime and transnational terrorism, ‘legitimate’ businesses, levying taxes, trafficking (drugs, goods and humans), flora and fauna poaching, forced donations, counterfeit, and misappropriation of humanitarian subsidises and commercial profits (Rose, 2018). A significant difference between the groups can be found when they have the ability to “live off the land” (Zenn and Cristiani, 2016). These “shell states” (Napoleoni, 2005, p. 65) are exploited allowing a capitalizing on the impoverished and fragile areas like the north of Nigeria in order to extract money from civilians.
Money laundering is a source of funding employed by many terrorist organisations. Non-conventional money transferring systems like Hawala system/transactions allow funds to be transferred without actual currency movement (Razavy, 2005; Perkel, 2004), defined as ‘underground banking’ (Bunt, 2007). Levitt and Jacobson (2008) illuminate bankrolling as a product of glocalisation, globalisation and scientific developments, which have permitted terrorist groups to solicit, deposit, reassign, and disseminate funds for operations. Trilateral drug trafficking in Latin America, Africa and Europe accounts for over 2 billion US dollars annually. The channels include, mass cash running operations and Lebanese exchange firms. Originating in South Asia, access to the system is worldwide, this makes it popular with groups like Hezbollah, who launder narcotics proceeds via the Halawi Exchange Co. (Halawi) (FAFT Report, 2013).
Actions including re-routing benevolent donations, the manipulation of non-governmental establishments (NGOs), participation in illegitimate activities and smuggled goods bring about large dividends. Finally, terrorist groups operate in a complicated global arena and data discloses the intricate and international trade and finance routes, illegal and legal. Astute sponsors are adept at using a variety of processes to perform transactions, regardless of location, so as to hide the source of the funds received. This highlights the reliance of these groups on not only criminal proceeds, but also revenue from proxy sources and funding campaigns. Finally, the fundraising apparatus of both organisations is intricate and obscure, as are the elusive militants themselves. L
FURTHER INFORMATION
For a full list of sources, please see here
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Keeping in touch Your support makes a life-changing difference to people in crisis. We write to our supporters to update you about the work of the British Red Cross, and how you can help and donate in other ways. You can change the way we contact you at any time by visiting redcross.org.uk/keepingintouch or calling Freephone 0800 2800 491. Privacy statement The British Red Cross is committed to privacy and will use personal data for the purpose it was collected or other legitimate purposes we tell you about: for example, to provide goods, services or information you have requested or to administer donations or services we provide. We may also analyse data we collect to better understand the people who support us or those who use or deliver our services. Sometimes this means us combining that data with information from reliable public sources. Our research allows us to tailor communications and services in a more focused and cost-effective way, as well as better meeting your needs and the needs of others like you. However, we will never do this in a way that intrudes on personal privacy and will not use your data for a purpose that confl icts with previously expressed privacy preferences. For full details about how we use personal data, our legal basis for doing so and your privacy rights, please see our privacy notice online at redcross.org.uk/privacy. The DEC Ukraine Humanitarian Appeal will support people in areas currently affected and those potentially affected in the future by the crisis. In the unlikely event that we raise more money than can be reasonably and effi ciently spent, any surplus funds will be used to help us prepare for and respond to other humanitarian disasters anywhere in the world. For more information visit https://donate. redcross.org.uk/appeal/disaster-fund * Texts cost £10 +1 standard message (we receive 100%). For full T&Cs visit redcross.org.uk/mobile, must be 16+. The British Red Cross Society, incorporated by Royal Charter 1908, is a charity registered in England and Wales (220949), Scotland (SC037738), Isle of Man (0752) and Jersey (430).
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