The Observer XIV.I - Summer in Review 2017

Summer In Review

THE OBSERVER

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XIV.I

Ta b l e o f C o n t e n t s

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Kenya Electrion Nicole Toole

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Data Privacy and Domestic Security Jacob D’Souza

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Opioid Crisis Alex Bernst

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ISIS in the Philippines Emily Robertson

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Conflicts in Cote D’Ivoire and Cocoa Kristen Johnson

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South African Election Ben Dinsdale

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Climate Change and Food Security Monique Sereneo

20 Operation Medusa & Defence Minister Mae-Lin DeLange 22 Macron and France Stephanie Repic 24 Hunting Economy in South Africa Josh Finkelstein

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27 International Relations Ryan Anderson

THE OBSERVER

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Venice Bianale and Nationalism in Art Rebecca Frost

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Possible Impeachment in Brazil Sean Stead-Fecser

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Venezuela in Crisis Sinead O’Hara

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Toronto Real Estate Gavrilo Randjelouc

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Myanmar Democratization Haleigh Johns

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Human Rights in American Policy Harrison Giovannetti

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Canada and Peacekeeping Jacob Aheam

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Trudeau and Trump Cameron Rowe

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South Korean Election Gillian Moir

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Special Section: Media Dialogue Patrick Hoy

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

Welcome to our Annual Summer in Review

Kelley Humber Editor-In-Chief

Dear Readers,

A most sincere welcome to the first issue of Volume XIV. In our annual “Summer in Review” issue we explore the major events and news stories of the past summer. The Observer has seen many changes this summer. The Observer team consists of new and old staff writers, an expanded editorial team, a refurbished website, a new Artistic Layout Editor, and a new online component that provides timely news content and analysis for our readers.

In this issue you will find a plethora of articles on recent and upcoming elections; including Gillian Moir covering the South Korean election, Stephanie Repic discussing the repercussions of the French election, Nicole Toole discussing the ethnic divisions in Kenyan elections, Ben Dinsdale covering the South African election, and Sean Stead-Fecser looks at the political corruption in Brazil that may result in the second presidential impeachment in two years. Other writers look at more broad examples of political upheaval such as Emily Robertson exploring recent violence in the Philippines, Sinead O’Hara covering the deterioration of stability in Venezuela, Haleigh Johns discusses the ongoing road to democratization in Myanmar, and Jacob D’Souza looks at security questions in the wake of the Manchester attacks.

Several writers look at the intersections between environment, industry, and the economy. These include Josh Finkelstein who surveys debates in the hunting economy of Southern Africa, Kristen Johnson considers conflict in Cote D’Ivoire and its strong connection to their cocoa-dependent economy, and Monique Sereneo explores the necessity of considering climate change and food security as inter-related issues in Africa and globally. Adding a more cultural look at politics is Rebecca Frost’s article on the Venice Biennale.

More regionally focused articles include Gavrilo Randjelouc’s discussion of the Toronto real estate, Jacob Aheam’s look at Canadian peacekeeping, Mae-Lin DeLange’s article on the Canadian defence minister,Alex Bernst’s discussion of the North American opioid crisis. Cameron Rowe of University of Toronto adds to this with his discussion of the Trump-Trudeau relationship. Harrison Giovannetti rounds off this topic with a look at American foreign policy ethos of the past and present. Towards the end of this issue you will also find an interesting discussion by Ryan Anderson of the academic field of international relations, and in our special “Media Dialogue” section Patrick Hoy responds to an article written in the Washington Post about the historicism of the ‘Trump Doctrine’. Overall, I hope that our readers find this issue a thought-provoking read on the swirling tides of summer 2017.

Sincerely,

Editor-in-Chief Kelley Humber

Political Studies 18’ SUMMER 2017

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OUR TEAM The views expressed by the authors are their own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial board or the Queen’s International Affairs Association

Kelley Humber Editor-in-Cheif

Nicole Toole Editor-in-Cheif

Monique Sereneo Assistant Editor

Kayla Rolland Assistant Editor

Jacob D’Souza Assistant Editor

Josh Finkelstein Assistant Editor

Haleigh Johns Assistant Editor

THE OBSERVER

Charlotte Smith Assistant Layout Editor

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Rebecca Frost Writer

Kristen Johnson Writer

Mae-Line Delange Writer

Gavrilo Randjelovic Writer

Eliot Berman Writer

Emily Robertson Writer

Jacob Ahearn Writer

Gillian Moir Writer

Matt McGregor Writer

Ben Dinsdale Writer

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Harrison Giovannetti Writer

Sean Stead-Fecser Writer

Sinead O’Hara Writer

Alexander Bernst Writer

Stephanie Repic Writer

Patrick Hoy Writer

Ryan Anderson Writer

THE OBSERVER

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The Ethnic Divisions of Kenyan Elections

By: Nicole Toole

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enyan based conflict is mainly attributed to the states numerous ethnic communities. The states ethnic conflicts have historically heightened during presidential election periods.

The upcoming election in August 2017 has many concerned for repeated violence.

Kenya’s population is 42.7 million people, with nearly 42 ethnic groups. The state ranked 146 on the Human Development Index in 2016, placing below Nepal and Myanmar; and on the Corruption Index Kenya was ranked 145 with a score of 23/100, tying with Madagascar.

Kenya’s first democratic election was held in 1992, with 5-year terms. In 2010, the constitution was changed upon 20 years of discussion and the horrific violence of the 2007 election.

The constitutional change reduced presidential powers, divided the national legislature into two – senate and governors, and divide the 8 provinces into 47 counties.

Upon the release of the December 2007 election results, the state became engulfed in violence. The brutality was triggered by suspected election fraud. The conflict killed 1,100 and displaced 650,000 citizens.

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The modification enables greater representation of ethnicities in the bicameral legislature, and ability for local governors to address the unique needs of their county. These amendments were made in hopes of preventing such tragedies from occurring in the future. The constitutional changes were first applied in the 2013 election, and the election peacefully occurred.

The 2017 election will not only determine the states president; citizens will additionally vote on governors, senators, and local governments. The significance of the election questions whether it will be carried out with similar grace as in 2013.

A party leader has called for the assassination of an opponent and counties have sustained a resurgence of ethnic conflict.

In mid-2016, upon the early stages of the campaigning process, President Uhuru Kenyatta called for the assassination of opposition leader Ralia Odinga from the National Super Alliance (NASA).

Moreover, NASA alledeges the president has links to the Dubi-based orgnaizaion that is re7

-sponsible for paper ballots. Controversies have arisen that this correlation may allow for Kenyatta to rig the election in his favour – granting him a second term - Kenyatta to rig the election in his favour – granting him a second term.

The High Court ruled the company may still print ballots for the parliamentary and county elections, however, the provider of the presidential ballots should be revisited. Kenyatta responded to this announcement by warning the courts and not to assist the opposition party.

Consulting firm KPMG recently audited the Kenya election system removing 80,000 ghost voters, and suspects up to one million more should be removed.

Eligible voters have risen by 36 percent, and youth have played a primary role in this election. With rampant unemployment and absence of quality education, there is potential for the demographic to stray from ethnic divides to unite in ensure these problems are effectively addressed.

However, the numerous competing ethnicities have led to violence and killing of opposing communities in a search of power. Historically, citizens of one ethnicity attempt to eliminate rival communities to eradicate the competition.

Kenya’s National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), which was founded upon the 2007 election violence, stated the country has witnessed “widening ethnic and political polarization and increased use of inflammatory language”.

THE OBSERVER

Furthermore, the NCIC has identified 20 of 47 counties as potential venues for violence.

Presently, Baringo and Laikipia counties are enduring ethnic-based violence. Human Rights Watch has urged Kenyan authorities to investigate the violence, and ensure law enforcement are in full operation, to ensure the polling stations are accessible and safe to protect the electoral process.

The violence in the region includes the death of three political figures, raids on villages, clashes with military and police, and the killing of livestock.

The prosecutor’s office released a statement of proactive measures to ensure a “secure environment for a free, fair and peaceful election”.

These measures include a team of 135 prosecutors on standby to confront hate speech and incitement to violence cases, and increased police presence.

The outcome of the August 2017 election will set the tone for future Kenya elections. If the process carries out peacefully, it may set a precedent for continued peaceful electoral periods and strives towards greater democracy. However, if the election follows suit of the previous continue political and ethnically fueled violence would be expected in future years, and additional measures will be required to help eradicate the on-going ethnic conflicts and ensure ethnic communities are fairly represented.

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It’s Time to Treat Data Privacy Like All Other Personal Liberties

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By: Jacob D’Souza

n estimated 450 people have been killed by terror attacks since 2014 in Europe.

These attacks have been a mixture of co-ordinated assaults planned by foreign extremist groups, and ‘lone wolf’ attackers who were radicalized online but acted without direct instructions.

The threat that Europe faces from these attacks is greater in severity, larger in scope, and more dangerous in nature than anything since the Second World War. The key to countering it lies in preventing attacks before they occur and therefore greater monitoring of the cyber world.

The widespread adaptation of end-to-end encryption technology has presented a major challenge for intelligence agencies. Major messaging services, such as iMessages, WhatsApp, and Telegram, scramble user’s messages once they are sent from one device to another. The encryption is designed to be unbreakable- so much so that even the developers of such apps themselves are unable to access messages sent on their own platform.

End-to-end encryption was developed in response to the Snowden revelations about widespread surveillance of communications by the United States National Security Agency. Technology companies wanted to assure customers that their communications would not be compromised under any circumstance.

However, encryption technology has been exploited by extremists. Under the invisibility cloak of encrypted messaging, radicalized individuals are able to share extremist views in group chats that can include up to 200 people. They can receive orders from handlers overseas. They can communicate with accomplices before, during and after an attack; all without detection by authorities. In the 2017 Westminster bridge attack, the Paris attack of 2015, and many others, authorities have determined in the subsequent investigations that encrypted messaging was used by the attackers, without being able to access what was said.

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The threat of extremist-inspired, especially Islamic extremism, violence overseas will linger far beyond the destruction of such groups in Iraq and Syria. European countries have responded to the threat by increasing physical security such as police presence.

In Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom military personals have been deployed to augment the existing police presence. However, physical security is reactive; police and soldiers are there to react to premediated attacks, via neutralize the threat.

Additional measures should be taken to further prevent attacks prior to being carried out, establishing a proactive methodology rather than reactive. Laws must be changed to give intelligence agencies greater power to access the communications of citizens within their countries.

Former United States President Barack Obama remarked in 2013 during the NSA revelations that “it’s important to recognize that you can’t have 100 percent security and also then have 100 percent privacy…we’re going to have to make some choices as a society.” Obama’s point is a valid one.

Rather than looking at data privacy as being inviolable, states need to treat it like all other rights- subject to restriction. For example, while an individual may be protected against an unreasonable search and seizure, if a judge grants a warrant, that right can be violated by law enforcement for the purpose of maintaining the greater good of society.

In a similar manner, having their person and belongings searched is something that all air travellers consent to as well as those crossing international boundaries. Society has accepted these exceptions to basic rights in exchange for greater safety. The same trust must be placed with intelligence agencies, who are society’s best hope for foiling attacks before they occur.

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LOSING GROUND:

NORTH AMERICA’S OPIATE ADDICTION By: Alexander Bernst

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n 2015, overdose deaths in the United States related to prescription pain relievers and heroin combined reached 33,091. That’s more than 90 every single day. The numbers are expected to have increased in 2016 and again in 2017 as new substances, such as fentanyl and its variations, enter the market. The current opioid epidemic, although acute, is aggravated by many of the historic problems that have plagued North American society.

In the 1970s and 1980s, physicians and nurses were having difficulty treating pain associated with cancer and other serious diseases. Professionals were wary about prescribing opioid painkillers, as they knew the addictive properties could be just as detrimental to patients’ health as pain.

But opinions shifted. Purdue pharmaceuticals released the drug OxyContin in 1996. They marketed aggressively to doctors, who began prescribing the drug liberally. OxyContin and other new drugs were supposedly non-addictive.

They were slow-release drugs, meaning the pills dissolved over several hours. Making it so that patients did not get a sudden rush of effects from the drug, and thus preventing a high.

People using the drugs over an extended period of time often became physically dependent

on it, and many users who were physically dependent often became addicted. As doctors continued to prescribe the medication without consideration for its long-term effects, that number grew. People would engage in dangerous behaviour, often hurting themselves so they could be prescribed more drugs.

Doctors are in a difficult position. Opioids are still the most effective treatment for pain, and alternative treatments usually take longer, are more expensive, and are not covered by patients’ health insurance. Nowadays, physicians are being asked to begin with much smaller doses and increase them slowly.

However, a decade of overuse has had its effects. Many people were dependent and addicted to opioids and, with their legal supply restricted or cut off completely, turned to more serious drugs, like heroin and synthetic opioids, or illegal sources for the same pills.

Until around 2010, the rise in opioid deaths was driven by the abuse of legitimate painkillers.

Lately, heroin and synthetic opioids have become bigger threats. In 2015, nearly as many Americans were killed by opioids as were killed by guns or car crashes. These deaths are highest in the midwestern and northeastern United States.

Unlike other street-drug deaths, these are primarily middle-aged white men in rural areas.

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Heroin is cheaper and easier to obtain than the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act OxyContin, and fentanyl is cheaper still. As of of 2016. The purpose of the law is to increase the recent, it is fentanyl that has become the pro- number and availability of prevention and treatblem. The drug is normally 50 to 100 times more ment programs across the country. In February powerful than morphine, but some versions can congress introduced a new bill, the Opioid be 10,000 times as powerful. Three milligrams of Abused Prevention and Treatment Act of 2017. fentanyl is enough to kill the average man.

Among other things, it requires the Government The presence of the drug has grown exponen- Accountability Office to review federal opioid tially in the United States. From less than 2000 abuse activities and make recommendations to law enforcement encounters in 2013 to almost reduce abuse and overdoses.

14,000 in 2015.

However, the United States’ response has not Like Canada, the U.S. gets most of its fentanyl all been positive. Maryland, Florida, and Arizona from China. Producers there range in the size of have declared public health emergencies to ditheir operations. The fentanyl sold in North Ame- rect more resources towards treatment of those rica could have been produced using a high effected. But the Trump administration proposed school chemistry kit or in a warehouse. The drug a 95% cut to the budget of the Office of Natiois disguised in nondescript packaging or as a dif- nal Drug Control Policy, and should the Ameriferent drug. Its potency allows it to be sold in very can Health Care Act pass, many people eligible small quantities, which raises little to no suspicion to receive addiction recovery treatment under when it crosses borders.

Medicaid may lose those According to the DEA, services.

The presence of the drug many Chinese laboratoTime will tell how the ries producing fentanyl has grown exponentially in U.S. continues to address also produce legitimate its opioid problems, and the United States.

From less chemicals for purchase the role politics will play.

by North American com- than 2000 law enforcement Attorney General Jeff Sespanies. This means that sions plans on reinvigoencounters in 2013 to almost labs responsible for the rating the war on drugs, production of fentanyl potentially hindering any 14,000 in 2015. also run legitimate busiprogress the country has nesses. made thus far.

On March 1st of this year, China banned the Historically, these laws have disproportionateproduction of four variations of fentanyl, which is ly affected minorities. Black and Latino commusupposed to slow its growth in the United States nities have faced more charges under drug use and Canada. However, Mexico has always impor- laws than white communities, despite less reported drug ingredients from China, and synthetic ted use. opioid production is expected to increase as The rise in opioid use in white communities has production shifts across the Pacific. Additionally, sparked an increase in aid, rather than incarceraChina’s ban may not carry as much weight as it tion. Increased media attention to the increase seems. Drug producer Dharma Chemicals struck in deaths has lead to a call for increased funding fentanyl from its catalogue, but a Globe & Mail and progressive rehabilitation programs. Those journalist reached out asking about the drug and working with minority communities say they are was told it was still in stock. Clandestine labs were struggling to get the resources they need. There also in operation before the ban, selling their is a striking difference in how the war on opioids products on dark web e-commerce websites. and the war on street drugs is waged. This difThe American government has not been com- ference seems to reinforce the racial divide and placent with the rise in opioid abuse. In February complicate the relationship between lawmakers, of 2016, then-president Barack Obama propo- doctors, drug dealers, and users. sed $1.1 billion in funding to combat the epidemic. And on July 22nd of 2016, congress passed SUMMER 2017

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Prachatai via Flickr.

The Fight Against ISIS in the Philippines:

DID PRESIDENT DUTERTE GO TOO FAR? By: Emily Robertson

On Tuesday May 23rd Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte imposed martial law on Mindanao Island where ISIS affiliated terrorist groups and other rebels have taken over Marawi city. Duterte has said that martial law on Mindanao island could be spread across the Philippines while the army fights Islamic militants. Will Duterte create security or destroy democracy?

THE OBSERVER

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W hen Duterte imposed 60 days of martial law on the island he declared that he would “not

hesitate to do anything and everything to protect and preserve the Filipino nation.” While this may sound comforting to some, it has stirred a lot of concern among human rights activists.

Even before his recent actions, Duterte has been known for being a controversial leader when it comes to crime and punishment. The United Nations, the Roman Catholic Church, the European Union and the United States have argued that his policies as president represent severe human rights abuses. This fear among the international community has been heightened as Duterte considers not only extending the martial law beyond the island to include the entire country but also considers extending the duration that the martial law will be implemented for.

Martial law is declared by the head of state when there is a state of emergency such as violent civil unrest or a major natural disaster. This imposition of martial law accompanies curfews, the suspension of civil rights and the application of military law to the justice system.

The reintroduction of martial law in the Philippines seems like a historical relapse of previous dictatorships and human rights abuses in the country. This was most notable under President Ferdinand Marcos in 1972 who declared martial law on the country to prevent riots and protests surrounding a communist revolution. Marcos ended up creating a military dictatorship by maintaining martial law for nine years. This ended free and fair elections, denied individuals their civil rights and allowed for human rights abuses to happen as security forces abused their own authority. Since Marcos, the Philippine constitution has amended the laws surrounding martial law, however, Duterte seems to be following his predecessor’s lead. Amid the escalation of conflicts in Mindanao and recent violent clashes in Marawi City, which were committed by the ISIS-affiliated Maute group, Duterte declared Mindanao and nearby islands under martial law. The foreign secretary, Alan Peter Cayetano, explained that the step was taken with “the safety, the lives and the prosperity of people of Mindanao” in mind.

Terrorism is a growing problem in the southern SUMMER 2017

Philippines. Specifically, Marawi city on the Mindanao Island, which has become a safe haven for ISIS affiliated groups. This recent attack has led to 103 deaths, many more injured and thousands fleeing their homes and hoping to escape the violence. The current upheaval began as a result of a failed government sanctioned military operation which was aimed at targeting Isnilon Hapilon, who is recognized by the Philippine’s military as the Islamic State (IS) chief for the Southeast Asia region. In reaction, Hapilon sought reinforcements from members of the Maute group, a local Islamist militant organization that has pledged allegiance to ISIS. The Maute group has successfully created absolute destruction in the southern island in the Philippines by setting fire to buildings and churches, taking hostages, and killing civilians. They represent a very clear threat to the state and many in the region fear for their survival. It was in this context that Duterte took action by sending the military to fight these infidels and declaring martial law in the region. The government sees this event as not only civil unrest but as an invasion of foreign terrorists as these ISIS-affiliated groups have created their own self-declared Asian caliphate.

In this state of emergency, it is impossible to label either side as the “good guys”. While the Maute group have undoubtedly increased the level of danger in the region, President Duterte has sparked fears about the end of democracy under his rule because he plans on suspending elections and to take forceful military measures to ensure security threats are properly taken care of.

With the Islamic State expanding its ‘war theater’ to Southeast Asia, it is likely that this escalation of violence will only continue. In which case, martial law is likely to be maintained for at least the medium term.

Extreme measures, such as implementing martial law are often judged in hindsight by measuring whether the short and long term objectives were met. However, if Duterte’s hope in executing martial law is to vindicate terrorism in his country, it is unlikely that this military control over the region will be lifted anytime soon. The question remains, is Duterte replaying history or is he doing what the country needs to get rid of this security risk?

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The Bitter Side of Cocoa: The Impact of Cocoa in Cote D’Ivoire Mutiny By: Kristen Johnson

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niversally beloved, chocolate has rapidly become a staple of many diets around the world. It is certainly difficult to fathom, thus, that such a sweet treat could also have a deeply bitter background. This is no better evident than in the cocoa-producing nation of Cote D’Ivoire, where global demand for the delicacy directly impacts the economic and political well-being of the entire country.

A prominent issue associated with chocolate production is the reliance of many countries on slave labour to harvest sufficient cocoa and keep pace with increasing global demand.

To combat this, organizations like “Slave Free Chocolate” have sought to expose employers of slavery, and steer consumers away from unethical products.

Beyond slavery, there is another fundamental issue that is slightly less obvious. As with almost any country that relies on a small number of agricultural products, the economy of Cote D’Ivoire is susceptible to large fluctuations. The wide-ranging impacts on the country of this volatility were best seen this spring, in the midst of a downturn in cocoa revenue.

On May 12th, over eight thousand Ivorian soldiers went on strike, taking to the streets to demand bonuses promised by the government in January. President Alassane Ouattara had pledged an extra twelve million Communaute Financiere Africaine (CFA) over twelve months to military personnel, with the first payment of five million CFA to be paid the beginning of May. This was in response to a previous strike in January, centred around low wages and a lack of benefits being offered to military personnel.

THE OBSERVER

Before the first five million CFA could be paid to the soldiers though, the price of cocoa on the global stock exchange declined. With cocoa beans and related products making up over forty percent of the country’s GDP, this hit was catastrophic to the country’s internal revenue. The falling price of cocoa left Cote D’Ivoire in a tight bind- forced to decide between paying its soldiers or investing in infrastructure.

Deciding to favour development over payouts, the government announced their intentions to postpone the soldiers’ payouts until more funds were made available. This had the clear implication that they were waiting for the price of cocoa to once again rise.

Such a redaction did not bode well with the soldiers, eventually leading to a third of the military taking to the streets in protest, blockading roads in major cities across the country.

The mutiny, which lasted a full four days, was dominated by the mutineers. Over the course of the weekend, the militants captured Cote D’Ivoire’s second largest city, Bouake, while also leaving many other cities in chaos. The country’s economy, already fragile from the falling price of cocoa, was further debilitated as many of the cities occupied by the mutineers were either involved in the production, shipping or trading of cocoa.

Cocoa first became a vital component of the Ivorian economy during the 1960’s. President Felix Houphouet-Boigny had consolidated and centralized power in the government through the formation of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire. With this power, he designed the country to appeal directly to international 14

following the “American Development Model” and promoting cheap labour and tax exemptions. Over the course of a decade, the nation quickly became one of the world’s top cocoa producers. For nearly two decades, Cote D’Ivoire experienced fast economic growth and development, and Houphouet-Boigny’s policies appeared to be leading the country towards success.

Sadly the “Ivorian Miracle”, as it had been called, did not last long. A small dip in the price of cocoa in 1978 caused an economic disturbance that created instability at all levels of society. This was a preview of a long history of the country’s success being directly tied to, and in many cases mirroring, the success of cocoa as a whole.

Since then, Cote D’Ivoire has been unable to continue its success, exacerbated by a decade-long civil war, sparked in 2001 by then-President Laurent Gbagbo’s unwillingness to step away from power after an election in 2000. The brutal conflict eventually concluded when current President Alassane Ouattara was placed in office by the military in 2011.

Both the May mutiny and the 1978 collapse showcase the instability and vulnerability that results from government managed economies that rely upon a small number of agricultural products. In the 1960’s, Cote D’Ivoire established its “cocoa first” agenda, employing

about forty percent of the population in the cocoa industry and producing approximately forty percent of the world’s entire cocoa.

As seen, though, there are many issues with relying solely on agricultural products, including yield uncertainty due to crop diseases (like black pod disease- to which cocoa trees are incredibly susceptible).

Not only does cocoa play a major role in dictating the success of Cote D’Ivoire, the country also actively controls the success of cocoa. When news of the mutiny was broadcasted globally the price of cocoa sky rocketed, as investors sought to buy as much cocoa as they could.

This potential loss of vital government revenue was the strong arm that the mutineers needed to bring the government back to the negotiating table. The mutineers ultimately made out well, with the government promising seven million CFA bonuses, five million CFA to be paid upfront with an additional two million CFA to be paid by the end of the month to each soldier.

With cocoa prices expected to drop once again, it will be interesting to follow the country as it seeks to grow its economy, and diversify beyond cocoa. If Cote D’Ivoire is unable to expand its economic resource base, then it is likely that events such as the May mutiny will occur again.

the price of cocoa sky rocketed

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The Need for Balance in South Africa By: Ben Dinsdale

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ince Jacob Zuma assumed the South African Presidency in 2009, the country’s economy has progressively declined. Zuma’s administration has heightened government corruption, disinvested in the public, and has the International Monetary Fund warning of instability.

Along with frustrations of the current economic situation, South Africans have become concerned with President Zuma’s misuse of state money.

There are two predominant situations that arose vast controversies; the use of taxpayer’s money to renovate a personal property and skepticism of briery.

President Zuma completed a $23 million USD renovation on his personal home in his native city of Nkandla. The renovations entailed a new cattle and chicken enclosure, swimming pool, and amphitheatre. The funds for this project originated from taxpayer’s money.

Nkandla is one of the state’s poorest regions with a 90 per cent unemployment. The choice to use funds to renovate a homestead rather than invest in the population and poverty reduction lead to great upheaval. In 2016, South Africa Constitutional Court ordered President Zuma to return some of the $23 million spent on the renovation of his homestead.

One of the more recent controversy involves one of the state’s elite family – the Guptas. This wealthy family has a vast array of businesses that span several industries. The family is valued at over a billion USD dollars and has strong ties to Zuma and his government.

In early 2017 one of South Africa’s leading media outlets, the Sunday Times, reported the family purchased a $25 million USD house for President Zuma. The house is located in one of the wealthiest neighbourhoods of Dubai, Emirates Hills.

However, these claims have not been confirmed by the president’s office, and are speculation based off of leaked emails.

President Zuma’s relationship with the Gupta family has been of great concern to the South African public for several years. Concerns mounted upon reports the family exerted influence over the president’s cabinet choices.

The Guptas have been beneficiaries of several government contracts, and in return, members of the Zuma family have been given prominent jobs in the Gupta organization. The family has allegedly been granted many questionable favours, including police transportation and diplomatic passports. Moreover, the Gupta’s employee two of Zuma’s 22 children and paid for another child’s wedding.

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However, while Zuma’s popularity has deteriorated, majority of South African continue to support the ANC.

The lack of actions against Zuma and his administration may be attributed to the absence of opposition.

In the most recent 2014 presidential election, Zuma won 62.5% of the popular vote and the ANC hold 249 of the 400 seats in the National Assembly. The vast margins were not unique to the election. Since 1994, when the first open election was held, the ANC have continuously won leadership with a large majority.

The two largest opposition parties of the ANC are the ‘Democratic Alliance’ and ‘Economic Freedom Party’.

The next South African presidential election is scheduled for 2019. It would be advised for Zuma to step-down as the ANC leader or removed by the party. ANC should seek a new leader that follow suit to the newly elected French President, Emmanuel Macron.. In order to restore the legitimacy of the South African goverment and the ANC party, the ANC needs an accountable leader that priortitizes investing in the population and restore the states economic prosperity

Another solution may be the ‘Democratic Alliance’ and ‘Economic Freedom Party’ merge to aim for executive. This may be difficult and require accommodations and negotiations to determine a uniform platform between the parties.

Hoping for a leader to step forward to resolve the numerous challenges state and economy are enduring is incredibly optimistic.

However, the citizen of South Africa are eager for a transformation. The 2019 election will be a vital election in defining the economic course for the country. If the state continues to experience a declining economy they made be stripped of their BRICS status – a grouping of emerging economies. However, if the state elects a president that aims to restore the countries prosperity, the state could be set up for continued growth.

The election will be one to monitor as South Africa is a regional powerhouse, and hold sway over various states.

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Double Negatives:

African Food Security in a Melting World

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By: Monique Sereneo

ith food insecurity in Africa already a sizable issue, climate change has become another factor to consider. When academics, sycophantic politicians, and the average citizen argued the importance of reducing global inequalities, no one intended for it to become ironic. Nevertheless, in a twisted parody of this idealistic notion, climate change has ensured equality in the sense that everyone must deal with its repercussions. With 2016 ranking as the warmest year on record and Arctic sea ice decreasing at a rate of 13.3% per decade, the effects are not particularly avoidable. Inequality is still rampant, of course. Widespread hunger and poverty continue to be two of the largest global issues. Yet when the consequences of climate change meet systemic inequalities, certain countries are left more vulnerable. It’s hard to focus on agricultural productivity in Nigeria, for instance, when rising sea levels are flooding the nation’s cropland.

Subsequent reactions to flooded cropland or its alternative, dwindling rainfall, often categorize the issue as one of food security or as an issue of climate change. This sort of categorization, however, is precisely the problem.

THE OBSERVER

Where the two matters should be treated as one in the same, partial solutions are given.

Nigeria employs two-thirds of its labour force in its agricultural industry. Yet for the past 20 years, value-added per capita in agriculture within the African country has risen by less than 1% annually. Crop production has failed to respond to population growth leading to increased food imports and declining national food self-sufficiency. Already faced with an ineffective farming system, climate change only worsens the situation.

The evidence lies in the croplands. Nigeria experiences seasonal rain from May to September but the effects have been exacerbated by the 3.4 mm that sea levels are rising each year. As excess salt water destroys arable coastal land, livestock and farming equipment are also becoming destroyed. At the rate that disease, water contamination, and the cost of farming activity are increasing, crop production is predicted to decrease by 10-25%. This figure is concerning for a country of small-scale producers that is simultaneously one of the world’s largest rice producers and one of its largest rice importers.

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It is worth noting that Ricardian theory would argue that rice importation in Nigeria is not necessarily negative. The country would be better suited to export goods for which it has a comparative advantage – namely, oil – and import anything else. The same argument has been made for Botswana. The middle income African country imports 90% of its food – a figure that has steadily increased as the impacts of climate change leaves farmers more vulnerable. While there is value in the concept of comparative advantage, both countries also face a food insecure reality that is worsened by the failing agricultural sectors. In Botswana’s capital city of Gaborone, a 2015 survey identified 76% of households in rural areas as moderately to severely food insecure. Nigeria faces a similar sobering statistic with a 2016 Food Security and Vulnerability survey revealing a 34% deficit in the country’s food needs.

It might make little sense to support agricultural industries that are plagued with pre-existing issues even without the current effects of climate change. In Botswana’s case, a history of colonialism and political economic factors have contributed to the vulnerability of small-scale farmers. It’s true that masking the effects of climate change and a deteriorating agricultural sector with increased importation has a marginal impact on an economy. However, citizens are left susceptible to volatile market prices while national food self-sufficiency remains stagnant. Particularly in the case of Nigeria and Botswana, it is more advantageous to invest in effective small-scale farming initiatives rather than eliminate a key livelihood and food source for the country.

Ultimately, the problem lies in the fact that food security and climate change are being treated as separate issues. If Nigeria and Botswana are of any indication, not only are food security and climate change part of the same issue but they both factor into an increasingly larger problem for which solutions are severely lacking. While the Paris Agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was a promising statement that vocalised the need for a global response, it was simply that – a statement. Amid scientists’ SUMMER 2017

pleas to reduce carbon emissions and land degradation, policy responses are made in the form of vague promises and generous ambiguities. As far as food security is concerned, struggling countries are merely presented with a “one size fits all” model for economic growth that may or may not work for the given context.

In a world of policy deficiencies, solutions are needed and they must be both specific and multifaceted. Given the destructive impacts of a 2 °C rise in the global average temperature from pre-industrial levels, there is a place for policies that promote prevention.

However, this place also necessitates action to mitigate current effects and a hardline approach towards potentially harmful but lucrative projects. For countries left susceptible to climate change, it is a matter of resilience and innovation in a changing planet.

Where small-scale farming countries are involved, recommendations to modernize practices and increase agricultural productivity in Nigeria and Botswana are often based on previous success stories. These suggestions fail to be implemented without the necessary government support and the willingness of communities to adopt the proposed adaptive measures. Such is unsurprising. Effective international support requires an understanding of marginalization and food insecurity in a country, and of how climate change fits into this context. Change, as potentially beneficial as it may be, must happen on the terms of a nation’s people.

Although answers are currently lacking, the world has certainly taken notice. The African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC) and the African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) have taken the lead by hosting a session on “How taking into account climate change can help Africa to pursue better trade policies, with a focus on food security” during the 20th Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis in early June 2017. It may be idealistic to hope for an effective and timely solution, but for those living in countries that are affected, it is more a matter of need than hope.

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THE BEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD EMBELLISHMENT The Best Defence is a Good By: Mae-Lin Delange Embellishment By: Mae-Lin DeLange

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t the moment, there exists a growing controversy over Canada’s Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan and Prime Minister Trudeau’s response to calls for the minister’s resignation. These claims have arisen as a result of an exaggerated statement made by the defence minister that he was the ‘architect’ of Operation Medusa.

The major military assault occurred in 2006 and is described by Sajjan as being one of the biggest operations since the Korean War that Canada has led. However, further research indicates that Sajjan was responsible for being a liaison between Canadian commanders and two local Afghan leaders, as well as for sending information, rather than being an instrumental individual in the overall process. Nevertheless, in a speech made in India, the minister claimed that he had heightened degrees of responsibility during this operation than what is recorded, and has since both retracted this claim and apologized for his statement.

As a result, both NDP and Conservative party leaders have made arguments for his resignation, with interim Conservative Leader Rona Ambrose accusing Sajjan of ‘stolen valour’, referring to the concept of taking credit for the actions of another. Ambrose further argued that Trudeau should not allow the minister to remain in his position, as Sajjan has dishonoured both himself and the Canadian military. In response, Trudeau emphasizes that he continues to have full confidence in the minister and that, when mistakes are made, Canadians expect apologies and the acknowledgement of that mistake.

The Prime Minister is referring to the minister of defence’s apologies for his infraction, but he remains hesitant over the decision to allow him to remain in office. Specifically, NDP Leader Tom Mulcair says that apologies are not enough, as Sajjan’s actions are “not something you apologize for” rather they are something that requires one to resign.

At this same meeting in the House of Commons, the Minister of Defence issued yet another apology, stating that while he “was not here to make excuses” he was still ‘owning’ his mistake, learning from it and that he would seek to be a better person as a result.

Sajjan’s actions can be compared to a scandal concerning retired Dutch politician, former Deputy Defence Minister Jack de Vries. As the political advisor of Dutch Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkende, de Vries received calls for his resignation SUMMER 2017

upon his involvement in a sex scandal. Although he was a member of a Christian party that emphasizes family values, he nevertheless admitted to having an affair with a junior member of his staff, leading to a separation from his wife and his relocation to a military barracks. Arguments were made that de Vries had lost credibility amongst the military, in addition to the fact that his affair was in violation of the defence ministry’s code of behaviour, which states that relationships at work must be declared.

Further concerns regarding the minister’s increased susceptibility to blackmail by foreign powers led former Labour Minister Bram Peper to call for de Vries to retire as his actions were deemed to be a security risk to the Dutch state. As a result of these contributing factors, de Vries resigned and agreed to no longer play an active role in politics in the near future.

The similarities between de Vries and Sajjan’s situations are evident. These are two high power individuals who work in national defence and ought to be viewed as respected and trustworthy in order to garner the support of the national military. Both infractions resulted in implications of national concern, imposing on de Vries and Sajjan’s ability to facilitate a relationship of trust between themselves and the military. However, the difference appears to be that Prime Minister Trudeau and the Liberal party is presenting a unified front to defend their cabinet member, relying on Canadian stereotypes to preserve Sajjan’s position and reputation in the government.

As such, Sajjan currently remains the Canadian Minister of National Defence, which has its own implications for Canada’s military. It is curious to see how this situation will unfold and whether Sajjan will remain the defence minister, or if he will end up resigning out of his own free will or inspired by others. Trudeau’s decision to forgive Sajjan’s actions may have set a precedent for dealing with similar situations.

The question is, what will this mean for Canada’s military? This leniency may have far reaching impacts as to how Canada is perceived as a nation on an international stage. Will other leaders view Trudeau’s response as passive, and how will this impact their view of the Canadian military or Canada as a country? Moving forward, it will be interesting to see further developments regarding Sajjan’s role in Canadian politics.

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From Euroscepticism to Pulse of Europe: Macron and Re-Shaping the European Union

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By: Stephanie Repic

he end of 2016 and beginning of 2017 have been ridden with global shock and upset, but the events of summer 2017 anticipate a positive end to the year. The summer began with the world’s focus shifting to France due to the presidential election beginning in early spring and ending mid-summer. Controversies developed surrounding the two unlikely front-runners Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen. Despite Macron’s victory, he still has a long way to go with the French legislative election. His presidency depends on this portion of the election as it will act as the first concrete step contributing to his long-reaching changes for France.

On April 23rd, 2017 the French Presidential Election was held. In the first round no candidate was elected so a second round was automatically held between two candidates; Emmanuel Macron of En Marche! And Marine Le Pen of the National Front (FN). Macron was the left-centrist representative and Le Pen represented the far right of France - many dubbing her the “Trump of France.” On May 7th Emmanuel Macron won the election over right-wing candidate Le Pen. This was the first time since 2002 that a National Front candidate made it to the second round of elections.

Before Macron’s victory, the shock of Le Pen’s advancement in the campaign caused similar reactions to the success of Donald Trump in the United States Presidential election. The relief across France was tangible when Macron won 66% of votes over Le Pen. Macron took to office on May 14th his policy ambitions are delayed until the legislative elections are held to assemble the government in June.

Macron’s policies are heavily vested in labour relations and the success and unity of Europe as a whole. Economic and EU reform is a top priority in France which is something that Germany has long demanded as well. Germany, led by Angela Merkel, has been urging countries to maintain European unity since policy divisions with the U.S. and Brexit. She has been critical of the lack of economic cohesion in the Eurozone and supports Macron’s suggestions of a common finance minister for the Eurozone and a euro budget. Merkel and Macron are on the same page when it comes to maintaining European unity and working together to achieve greater progress within Europe as a whole.

Macron’s victory demonstrates how last summer’s shock of Brexit and the growing response of Euroscepticism has fortunately shif-

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ted with a year’s time, and various international events and movements. The rejection of the European Union began with Brexit, further impacting fellow European countries’ choice to remain members of the EU or to leave the institution altogether. In the past year, EU supporters have never been more crucial. They have emerged proudly and made their voices heard with grassroots civilian-led movements like “Pulse of Europe.” The movement’s founder, Daniel Röder, stresses the importance of “pro-European signal” from the heart of major European cities and societies. Pulse of Europe focuses on highlighting the common value that most Europeans believe in - the fundamental purpose of the European Union.

Rallies in Germany, France, and the Netherlands have been successful in gathering crowds to display the rejection of nationalist tendencies, and candidates such as Marine Le Pen. By process of elimination and nowhere else to go, French voters turned to Emmanuel Macron.

Macron’s plan to rebuild France’s European presence and the EU in general is contingent upon maintaining positive relations with French civil society and international confederates. The sheer novelty of his campaign succeeds at upholding interest and support from the French public.

Support from the public arose in the first place as a rejection of Le Pen’s nationalist right-wing views and acceptance of centrist plans.

Although rejecting Le Pen does not necessarily result in support for all of Macron’s policies but it does produce a pro-EU outlook on France’s behalf as 66% of voters supported Macron in fear of Le Pen’s potential victory.

Challenges arise for Macron’s plans because of France’s divided society. The mere social state of France embodies a severely divided country – without addressing and remedying this issue, larger problems may not be tackled. Without doing so, civilians are much less likely to get on board with Macron’s more obscure, politically left-wing ideas.

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Without the trust and support of the people Macron’s leadership will not last as his parliamentary spots may not result in a majority government. In order to achieve this, he must continue to accommodate groups like Pulse of Europe to gather a base of firm supporters and attend to the needs of various demographics and political groups in France. His current focus remains on the economic stability of the Eurozone and relationships with neighboring EU trading partners – such as unifying budgets and selecting a common Eurozone finance minister.

Lorie Shaull via Flickr If Macron’s government only look to the economic reforms of the country and neglect the divide that predominantly stems from religion, culture, and nationality his presidency will be shorter than he thought. The re-shaping of the European Union will re-establish a united front in Europe but this will only be made possible in France if public support continues for Macron resulting in his majority government.

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GOODWILL HUNTING? COMPARING CONSERVATION STRATEGIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA By: Josh Finkestein

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wo recent incidents have brought international attention to the African trophy hunting industry. In May, South African guide Theunis Botha was killed in Hwange, Zimbabwe, when an elephant charged at the group he was leading and collapsed onto him. Just one month earlier, the DNA of another South African hunter, Scott van Zyl, was found inside of three crocodiles nearby to where he had earlier disappeared while on a trip along the border between the two countries.

For those interested in shooting big game on the continent, fees will often exceed $50 000 US dollars. The cost is prohibitive for many living in the countries in which the animals reside, especially for residents of the rural areas overlapping with the wildlife habitat where the level of development is often lower than in cities. For this reason, American tourists make up the majority of trophy hunters in Africa, including Minnesota dentist Walter Palmer, who rose to infamy in 2015 after shooting the well-known lion, Cecil, in the same Zimbabwean park in which Theunis Botha was killed.

Cecil the Lion’s death catapulted the debate over big game trophy hunting into the sphere of mainstream news outlets and popular culture.

Many celebrities voiced their opposition to the practice, with some calling for the Minnesotan hunter’s arrest (while importing an animal carcass from a hunting safari is protected by law in the United States, the legality of the method in which Cecil was killed was called into question, leading to an investigation). Broadly, the conflict centres around determining the most efficient way for Southern African countries to protect both the animals and the people living in rural areas, while also taking advantage of their biodiversity as a revenue-generating resource.

Between the twenty-three sub-Saharan countries in which trophy hunting is permitted, it is estimated that $201 million US dollars were brought in by approximately 18,500 hunters (in 2006).

This revenue generated is the key argument of those who support game hunting practices. The fees charged to hunters are directly reinvested in conservation, and improving the living conditions of the people who concede land to hunting concessions (areas to which hunters SUMMER 2017

are confined). Opponents claim, however, that in countries where government corruption often stands as a barrier to growth, like Zimbabwe, the money destined for conservation authorities and residents rarely reaches its intended recipients.

Moreover, across the six most popular countries for trophy hunting, in which 150 million people reside, only 15 000 jobs are directly involved with the practice.

Additional support stems from the financial incentive provided to locals in helping to preserve the land on which animals graze, along with the lives of the animals as well. Population growth has expanded the area devoted to agriculture, which is unsuitable for wildlife both because of the loss of habitat, and their encroachment upon crops and herds for which they can be culled. Trophy hunting fees raise land values, creating greater economic incentive for leaving land unworked. Additionally, areas suitable for hunting do not always meet the standards of photo tourism –a non-lethal alternative more widely supported that generates greater revenue, albeit with far less efficiency per tourist.

The positive potential of hunting tourism is best seen in Namibia, where elephant populations have increased since the management of undeveloped lands was given to local communities in 1996. Many areas now work with hunting operators, who have in turn brought in $70 million US dollars over two decades, and provided funds for residents and conservation authorities, while incentivizing conservation for everyone involved.

Though much of the profit goes towards other aspects of travel (including flights, food etc.), a larger portion of the money remains with local operators when compared to photo tourism, which often involves North American agents.

Conversely, Botswana placed a moratorium on all hunting within its borders at the start of 2014. The country has recently risen to prominence as a photo safari tourism destination, with over 200 million pounds entering the country in 2013 alone. Now a leader in conservation, President Ian Khama hoped to prevent any compounding of previous biodiversity loss to urbanization and illegal poaching- in which Botswana already excelled in preventing. However, it should be noted that poaching in the country has increased 25

since the ban’s implementation, and many local San people initially opposed the outlawing of what also included their traditional food sources.

In South Africa, where safari operations play a smaller role in a burgeoning tourism industry, hunting opportunities are provided by private landowners, who develop and maintain their own populations of wildlife that are separate from public conservation authorities. This method greatly incentivizes increasing species numbers, though the humaneness of the treatment of big game is frequently questioned. South Africa is unique in the region, as many of those buying licenses to hunt are from the country, and pay smaller fees that better match the local demand. Zimbabwe utilizes a similar system to its southern neighbour, with photo tourism and hunting concessions often bordering one another. This played a significant role in the killing of Cecil- the lion allegedly being lured across a railway delineating the border between protected land and hunting concessions.

Ultimately, the goal of any strategy must be to protect the incredible wildlife currently at risk in Southern Africa, while also making certain to provide for the population sharing living spaces with the game. As international attention can often lend greater attention to the animals in these remote areas than the people, trophy hunting could act as a sustainable solution for both.

However, when corruption amongst hunters and permit providers negates these benefits, the death of big game is always in vain.

If this is indeed the case, promoting trophy hunting becomes simple exploitation by wealthy individuals from the developed world, and causes damage of the same sort as poaching. Proper legislation, along with awareness on the part of tourists is required to make certain that this activity benefits those most reliant and attached to the areas involved- both the people and the animals.

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WEIGHING THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS By: Ryan Anderson

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ince emerging as a recognised academic discipline nearly one century ago, there has been no shortage of debate between prominent political science scholars and influential policymakers regarding the role that international relations (IR) research plays outside of the ivory tower. Mainly, many academics, having spent their careers studying, researching, and writing extensively about a topic, hope to see their work eventually impact important policy decisions. Despite this, policymakers and government officials outside of academia often struggle to find relevant applications for the largely theoretical ideas proposed in these works. As a result, a large gap remains between scholarly research and real-world policymaking in IR. As political scientist Joseph S. Nye said: “The walls surrounding the ivory tower never seemed so high”.

This divide questions the true importance of IR research. Despite many legitimate criticisms, however, several practical benefits can be drawn from the study of international relations as an academic discipline.

The first and arguably most important advantage of IR is the value of the core knowledge that scholars in the field have contributed towards throughout its lifespan. In studying how states interact, scholars have been able to critically analyse past events and their outcomes.

This- when done properly- improves future real-world policies.

To illustrate this point, consider Sean Yom’s recently published book, From Resilience to Revolution. Yom concluded that increased intervention (i.e. helping to subdue political opponents) by foreign actors, seeking to prop up autocratic rulers throughout the Middle East (including Kuwait, Jordan, and Iran), the less durable their regimes become over time. As such, the author argues that if national governments want to support certain authoritarian rulers or regimes in a region, instead of continuing a policy of support and intervention, the best way to ensure the re SUMMER 2017

gime’s survival is instead by cutting their support towards them.

In present times, when the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East is ambiguous and arcane at best (evident in Donald Trump’s latest visit to the region), arguments like this that are heavily supported by historical and methodologically sound evidence hold remarkable policy significance. Even if policymakers agree with these claims, studying and researching IR has provided scholars with several educated advantages that they can use to help advise and positively shape real-life matters. This includes, in this case, the ability to propose a variety of different policy solutions while also outlining their potential implications or consequences.

Additionally, IR scholars are capable critics and evaluators of current policy decisions. In actively commenting on current affairs, they can provide their students, and the general population, with thoughtful, well-researched perspectives that provide a platform for an individual to develop their own opinion. While very few ultimately read academic publications, there exists several other platforms such as political magazines (i.e. Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, The Atlantic etc.) that often have dedicated channels or columns to international relations that everyone can have access to.

In other words, a public consciousness for IR has created a forum for both academics and everyday citizens to be critique, and improve, their own government’s policy decisions, or those of other countries.

As an extension to this, a diverse assortment of topics, perspectives, and theories have more recently emerged throughout the discipline. They have collectively challenged conventional ideals, and contribute to a more inclusive knowledge base. Not only can the study of IR be broken up into regions of the world (i.e. Middle East, Latin America, South Asia etc.), the range of subjects now includes: war and conflict, democracy promotion, foreign and economic aid, humani27

tarian intervention, international organisations, and many more. New theories, like feminism or postcolonialism, have not only sparked dialogue amongst leading scholars, but they have also and many more. New theories, like feminism or postcolonialism, have not only sparked dialogue amongst leading scholars, but they have also given more coverage to previously underreported issues.

The discipline is certainly not flawless, however, and many problems have gone unnoticed, including in classrooms. Included amongst this is of course the earlier mentioned;

gap between academia and policymaking that seems to be continuously widening each year in fact, a 2011 survey found that eighty-five percent of scholars believe that this is the case.

Even though certain studies are not written with intentions to influence real-world policy debates, sixty percent of American international relations scholars still wish to “make their research more relevant to policy practitioners.”

Although the second most notable disadvantage of international relations is a rather recent one, it also happens to be the most troubling. Considering the amount of literature that already exists regarding the gender gap in the discipline – be it women in tenure track positions, gender differences in salary, or publication and journal rates, it is undeniable that there has existed a concerning gender problem within the field for several years now.

To make matters worse, a new gendered pattern in international relations academia has been identified – women scholars are systematically cited less than men in publications. One study found, after coding three thousand articles on twenty-six different substantive and demographic variables, “a research article written by a woman and published in any of the top journals will still receive significantly fewer citations than if that same article had been written by a man”.

These findings have also been tested and

further supported- with another study concluding that “<10% of all bibliography entries in articles written by men contain any reference to work by women in IR”. As such, it can be concluded that there is a substantial gender disadvantage against women in the study of international relations as a discipline. This is especially problematic for the field, as it has the potential to severely diminish the benefits of IR being used as a tool to inform policy debates considering lack of gender representation in academic literature.

Nevertheless, despite the significance of these two disadvantages, there are certainly ways that they can be resolved. On the sizable gap between the worlds of academia and policymaking, all is not lost. For instance, some scholars advocate that if academics focus on policy-relevant subjects, offer nuanced arguments that do not include complex jargon, and develop personal relationships with policymakers and those in government positions, this gap can indeed be bridged, or at least significantly shortened.

The second disadvantage of gendered issues in the field is more difficult to solve; though, it is not an impossible task. Rather than providing a solution that simply calls on men to cite women more in their articles (as this is not only counterproductive to the problem, but also is highly infeasible),

the most viable remedy to this issue is for scholars to continue acknowledging these discrepancies within their discipline and to promote female scholars so that others will realise that the status-quo cannot continue.

By doing this, not only does the gender disadvantage have a better chance of being resolved in the long-term, but creating an open dialogue about the issues may lead to solving others that have not yet been recognised in the field.

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THE CANAL’S UNDERCURRENTS:

THE SUBTLE POLITICS OF THE 57TH VENICE BIENNALE By: Rebecca Frost

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very two years, the Venice Biennale, often referred to as “the Olympics of the art world”, draws approximately 500,000 visitors from around the globe for a display of some of the world’s best contemporary art. Following 2015’s politically charged exhibition, this year’s curator, Christine Marcel, has decided to steer the main exhibition away from politics. Her goal is to celebrate art for its own sake and deemphasize politics. Despite the lack of direct influence wielded

by Marcel over the national pavilions, the avoidance of direct political subject matter has been a trend throughout the festival. However, in the absence of explicit political statements, explorations of conflicts and narratives that lie beneath the surface of politics have emerged.

South Korea’s pavilion demonstrates this subtle political dimension of artistic expression. Both artists chosen to represent South Korea, Cody SUMMER 2017

Choi and Lee Wan, have steered clear of direct political references due to the recently ousted regime’s rather unpleasant habit of blacklisting artists. Instead, their show, Counterbalance: The Stone and the Mountain, examines themes related to Korean national identity – a theme fraught with political implications, though none specific enough to bring repercussions on the exhibition. Choi and Wan chose to explore Korean society’s relationship to globalization, economic restructuring, and democratic reform. While their work is not an endorsement of any political movement or figure, it can be seen as at least a partial reflection of the political consciousness that resulted in Moon Jae-in’s landslide victory in the presidential election that took in May. For instance, one of Choi’s pieces, Proper Time, consists of 600 clocks, each set to represent the amount of time different members of South Korea society would need to work to afford a 29

good meal. His work shines a light on the rising inequality in the country; an issue South Koreans had on their minds when they headed to the polls earlier this year –and one that Mr. Moon promised to address. One of Wan’s works, The Life of Mr. K, follows the life of late journalist Kim Ki Moon (1936-2011) in an effort to document Korea’s journey through Japanese colonialism, the Korean War, dictatorship in the 1960s and 70s, as well as its recent spurt of economic growth and path towards democracy. The Korea that Wan portrays is a strong nation emerging from its former entanglements to strive for a just, democratic society. This narrative of South Korea mirrors the life of Moon Jae-in.

Mr. Moon, the son of North Korean refugees, is a distinguished human rights lawyer who was once imprisoned by dictator Park Chung-hee (Park Geun-hye’s father) for participating in an-

that “look as though they would kill you if they hit you, but turn out to be virtually weightless”.

They dwarf the viewer and make them feel powerless with their looming stature, only for the viewer to come to realize the sculptures’ hollowness. Despite the apparent harmlessness of Barrow’s forms, the sense of bodily fragility they evoke in the viewer can be thought to be similar to the sense of national fragility that is thought to have driven the Brexit vote. This isn’t by accident; in an interview with the Financial Times, Barrow said that the fragility of British national identity was on her mind during the creation of Folly. According to Barrow, “making art is an inherently political act. It wrestles with fear and emotion…”. Fear and emotion often dominate the political landscape and the exploration of them brings Barrow’s art into the political realm The Canadian pavilion, which features the work

ti-government activism. The history of Korea that Wan’s work told aligns with Mr. Moon’s personal history – which seems to have been appealing to many South Koreans. How people imagine their country’s history and how they understand the way they fit into broader socio-economic trends is a central element of politics. By engaging with contemporary issues like income inequality and by examining Korea’s historical trajectory, Wan and Choi touched on central aspects of Korean’s political climate without ever mentioning a particular figure, party, or movement.

The work of Phydilla Barrow, the artist representing Britain this year, engages with themes deeply intertwined with British political culture –although you would never know it from the British Council’s description of her work. Her creation, titled Folly, consists of towering, oversized sculptures made of junk-like materials

Geoffrey Farmer, takes a more deliberate approach to politicising the a-political. Farmer’s work explores the sudden death of his grandfather and the healing process that followed within his own family. His installation, titled A way out of the mirror, is an exploration of national identity, grief and intergenerational trauma. He says he is acutely aware that his time at the Biennale coincides with the Canada 150 celebrations. As Farmer explained in an interview with The Globe and Mail, “…I am looking at my own story, but I believe it is the role of the artist to make it significant beyond the personal”. An immediately noticeable aspect of the piece is the fact that Farmer has torn apart much of the pavilion – a fantasy of many artists who have exhibited at the pavilion. The Canadian pavilion, built in 1958, is often described as being dwarfed by the neighbouring German and British pavilions, and as

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being generally unsuitable for exhibiting art. It As Amah-Rose McKnight-Abrams wrote for CNN, also has a central teepee shape, the inclusion of the Biennale represents a unique challenge for which Farmer views as complicated due to the artists to simultaneously represent their nations genocide experienced by Indigenous Canadi- with pride, while finding ways of critiquing them. ans. Farmer has ripped off the façade to allow Artists, even if they don’t expressly critique the fountains that, in words politics of their home naof the pavilion’s curator tions, have the ability to Kitty Scott, “translate a hold their homelands acsurfeit of emotion and countable for the more Artists, even if they don’t discharge it in spurts and diffuse elements of their expressly critique the poldrips as tears, ejaculate political psyches. Examitics of their home nations, and sweat”. Some critics, ination of the human soincluding Sarah Angel for ciety and emotions can have the ability to hold their Maclean’s Magazine, have never truly exist sepahomelands accountable for described Farmer’s derately from the political the more diffuse elements of construction of the paviltrends they exert their inion as a realization of the fluence upon. In this way, their political psyches “zeitgeist of our nation, Marcel’s goal to celebrate openness and welcome”, art for its own sake isn’t even in the shadow of entirely congruent with more imposing neighbours; although Farmer’s her goal of steering clear of political themes. intent seems to be to rip open the building to al- Art exists to explore something within a culture low the emotion that goes with reconciliation flow or within an individual; politics exists to exerthrough. Regardless of how individual Canadians cise individual and cultural wills. The alignment relate the piece to their own national identity, the of the purposes of both art and politics make art piece serves an examination of the soul-searching for its own sake political in one way or another. that Canada must do as it marks the last 150 years.

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Corruption in Brazilian Politics By: Sean Stead-Fecser

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ichel Temer is currently under pressure to resign from his presidency in Brazil after his recent political corruption scandal. An audio recording leak allegedly has Temer saying that he authorised payments to silence a testimony by Eduardo Cunha in Brazil’s biggest corruption investigation within the government.

Cunha, a previous speaker of the lower house of the Brazilian Congress, is in prison on accounts of taking millions of dollars in bribes in the political corruption scandal with the state oil company, Petrobras. Cunha has said that he has compromising information on several senior politicians in the Brazilian government, as he was once a senior member of Temer’s party. A third of the members in Temer’s cabinet have already been caught up in investigations regarding bribery for a political favour.

Opposing parties and the public of Brazil have been calling for Temer’s resignation from office.

Temer refuses to resign. He has acknowledged the legitimacy of the tape but denies any wrongdoing.

The tapes of Temer allegedly confessing to buying Cunha’s silence was -according to O Globo, a Brazilian media outlet- a conversation secretTHE OBSERVER

ly recorded by a Joesley Batista, chairman of the world’s largest meat processing company, JBS.

Temer claimed in his address “I never authorised any payment for someone to be silent. I did not buy anyone’s silence”. He does not deny that the conversation took place, but that he has never payed hush money. There is an ongoing investigation being made to see whether Temer did payout Cunha, and about the legitimacy of the tape.

Brazil has had trouble with political corruption in the past, including last year when former President Dilma Rousseff was impeached. Temer was Rousseff’s Vice President and took over office when she was impeached. Rousseff was involved in a trial where she was accused of breaking budgetary laws by manipulating budget accounts.

She was involved in “creative accounting”, meaning that she and her government enhanced the government surplus by moving loans from banks to the treasury which gave the appearance that the government accounts were improving.

Rousseff and Temer, who are a part of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (translating into ‘Workers Party’) or PT party, were also shrouded in the “Car wash” Petrobras scandal. Petrobras is an oil company and also happen to be one of Latin America’s biggest companies. The PT 32

party appointed their own candidates to Petrobras’s highest executive positions. They secretly diverted funds valued at up to 3 per cent of their contracts to the PT party, which ended up being worth billions of dollars once Petrobras discovered the biggest offshore oil find in years.

The PT party are suspected of using the funds from Petrobras to fund election campaigns, and ultimately keep their party in power in Brazil.

Corruption in Brazilian politics has taken its toll on the economy. The unemployment rate currently sits at 13.6%, and among youth it’s at 20%.

Their GDP is only expected to rise 0.3% this term.

Brazil once had a booming economy, rising an average of 5% per year, and in 2012 surpassing the economy of the UK. Their economy has been in decline since 2013, and they are now entering another recession.

Obviously, Brazil has not prospered off a politically corrupt government.

Temer’s approval rating is in the single digits. It seems citizens of Brazil are fed up with corruption in their politics.

crimes; serious charges like bribery, electoral fraud, illegal deforestation, kidnapping and homicide. Corruption runs deep in Brazilian politics so impeaching their President might not have an effect on the larger scale of their government.

While Temer is shielded from impeachment by the ruling coalition’s large majority in Congress, there is intense pressure for him to step down. The electoral court is due to rule on campaign violations in 2014, which could force a re-run. There have already been two congressmen who have submitted impeachment motions in the lower house.

If Temer were to step down or be removed from office, the nextin-line would be the leader of the lower house, Rodrigo Maia.

Maia is facing his own federal graft investigation. There are also moves to counteract the corruption-tainted legislature by elevating the chief justice, Carmem Lucia, to the presidency, or holding new elections entirely.

Lucia is not involved in the “Car Wash” scandal much like the rest of congress.

It is good to see the Brazilian government and people taking steps to condemn corruption in their politics. They are fed up with dirty politicians and demand justice for their actions. They do not want to see their country continue to decline, so it is time they have politicians who will act for the good of their country and not themselves.

Impeaching Temer or demanding his resignation is a step in the right direction to show the government that they will no longer allow corruption in their politics. Especially after the impeachment of former President Rousseff, the Brazilian people need to take a stand against Temer to prove that they have no mercy for corrupt politicians. Brazilian people deserve politicians who will serve their country, and that doesn’t include Temer.

The unemployment rate currently sits at 13.6%, and among youth it’s at 20%. Their GDP is only expected to rise 0.3% this term

So where to go from here?

Would impeaching Temer pave the way for a corruption free Brazilian government? It seems the Brazilian public wants an impeachment as there have been several protests against the current state of Brazilian politics with the slogan “Fora Temer” which translates to “Temer out”. Former president Rousseff was also impeached last year so the idea is not so farfetched.

Whether an impeachment would have an effect on the rest of Brazilian politicians is another thing entirely. Brazil has 594 people in their congress and there are 352 people in congress who have criminal accusations made against them.

60% of the people in Brazilian congress that have criminal accusations are accused of a range of SUMMER 2017

33

HUNGRY FOR DEMOCRACY:

VENEZUELAN CRISIS By: Sinead O’Hara

I

n Venezuela, citizens do not have the luxury of being disengaged in politics. Everyone is forced to take a side, even forced into siding with the United Socialist Party for access to groceries. Venezuela’s economic and political crisis has led to a country-wide food and resource shortage, in which malnutrition is a problem experienced frequently among all. Everyone is suffering in the country’s current economic climate.

Combined with Venezuela’s political turmoil, the country has fallen into a detrimental state steadily over the past 15 years.

Given the high inflation rates, economic growth has only been declining. This is making it incredibly hard for Venezuelans to generate an income, and even with that income little can be bought. High levels of inflation largely stem from the flourishing domestic black market, which has crippled the legal market. Inflation rates have reached a high of 800% in the past year. The black market is controlling the food entering the country through the military, as well as controlling the Venezuelan bolivar. These economic circumstances make it incredibly hard for Venezuelans to earn an income, meaning the opportunity for economic growth has halted. Former President Hugo Chavez constructed a socialist experiment that is dependent on the high price of oil, and with Venezuela having the largest proven oil reserves in the world it made sense. It was when the price of oil shot down by 50% in one year, through 2014 and 2015, that severe issues arose. The country’s economy crashed which resulted in a huge increase in prices and large cuts in social programs

Going back to the beginning of Chavez government, with the economy thriving and the price of oil high, he was able to establish social programs called “missions” which helped reduce poverty substantially. The government, although problematic, was functioning. President Chavez was focused on taking Venezuela in a similar direction as Cuba with Fidel Castro, a friend of Chavez. Some Venezuelans were concerned with his radical agenda, over the years a strong opposition grew, called by Chavez, escuálidos “scrawny ones”. Chavez’s primary goals were narrowing in on a centralized economy, nationalizing key industries, and improving social programs. Under the Chavez government, democracy was slowly lost. This is increasingly obvious under the current President, Nicholas Maduro.

The Maduro government began in March of 2013 after Chavez’s death. The beginning of his term was followed by the quick decline in oil prices, and things steadily worsened. Maduro has taken to blaming the United States for Venezuela’s crisis, claiming that the economic crisis is due to a US-backed capitalist conspiracy.

Maduro’s presidency is being called into question, largely by the opposition. The opposition movement is growing, due to the increasingly dire situation Venezuela is in. The country has become quite divided, some believe Maduro is the solution and others believe his ousting is.

With the military’s authoritarian response to protestors, the political crisis is growing more dangerous. Working towards Maduro’s oust is the opposition’s major goal, the end result in hoping for a democratic election.

Inflation rates have reached a high of 800% in the past year

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Riots in the country’s capital, Caracas, are worsening every day. On the brink of starvation and placing themselves in great danger, members of the opposition are fighting hard for Venezuelans right to freedom and democracy. With the military’s aggressive response, many are getting jailed, injured, and even killed. However, in order for a presidential impeachment to occur, the referendum would need to be approved by almost 7.6 million votes.

The food shortage is what makes Venezuelas crisis even more daunting. Food and other resources are running short for everyone and the weight of those problems are showing scary repercussions. Today, even citizens with money can’t access necessities, and those who can travel to Colombia for the basics. Concerning access to groceries, people need to take many hours out of their day to possibly find the goods they are looking for. The entire process takes hours, and that is only for those with the time and money to do so. Buying the basic necessities such as toilet paper, cooking oil, and coffee involves waiting in lines at grocery stores that go through the street or down into basements.

Much of the time the product they need is gone, and they are shopping amongst empty shelves.

This crisis of insufficient resources in Venezuela also extends to critical necessities like medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. According to the Pharmaceutical Federation of Venezuela, more SUMMER 2017

than 85% of drugs are reported to be unavailable or difficult to find. This is especially problematic when paired with the malnutrition that is widely experienced. Reportedly, in the last year 75% of citizens said they had lost an average of 19 pounds (National Poll of Living Conditions).

Statistics like these reveal how dire the circumstances are getting in Venezuela, where most people do not have access to the basics.

In today’s Venezuela, the high death rate stemming from violence and lack of sufficient resources shows the desperate situation Venezuelans are in. The government must act quickly to help aid the food crisis that is occurring, but nothing is happening. The circumstances in Venezuela will only deteriorate if action isn’t taken to regulate inflation, food, and other necessities.

The country’s political and economic crisis is resulting in detrimental repercussions. With little hope of economic growth given the country’s oil-based economy, it is on the brink of collapse.

The opposition is fighting for Maduro’s referendum, which seems to be the best solution currently. Changing the political and economic system is important for long term change, Venezuela’s current political system, or lack thereof, cannot continue on.

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O Toronto, My Toronto Managing a Global City

By Gavrilo Randjelouc

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O

f all woes that could befall a city, few would think desirability as being among the most problematic. While citizens focus their energy on creating prosperity, civility, and cleanliness, it is a city’s allure that fosters divisiveness and conflict like nothing else. As outsiders become more interested in local offerings, Toronto becomes increasingly globalized, populous and dynamic.

Inhabitants are challenged at a very fundamental level; how will their role in the city change when their city’s role in the world changes?

From 2006 to 2016, the population of Toronto’s metropolitan area grew by 16%, which exceeded nationwide growth, albeit not dramatically. More active has been the city’s real-estate market. Home values have surged – from April 2016 to April 2017 alone, aggregate prices rose 33%. Such a rapid climb can, in part, be explained by Toronto’s attractiveness as a city. Toronto is a hub for immigrants and is one of the planet’s most multicultural cities, with a slim majority of its residents having been born outside of Canada.

Toronto has also seen activity from foreign buyers. Often, these are investors from mainland China – their interest in Canadian real estate comes from a cultural disposition towards real estate as an asset and a perceived security in the Canadian market that is desperately needed.

Commentators have also identified other, murkier factors.

The low interest rate environment has buoyed lending activity as mortgages become cheaper for potential buyers; come an inevitable interest rate hike, these buyers will see payments rise.

Some have also warned about excessive speculation artificially inflating home prices. Concerns of a general level of unsustainability have been echoed among economists.

For many, even sustainability in price growth is hardly desirable. Although their costliness hasn’t risen as dramatically as owned properties, rental units still compete with houses and condominiums for space and tenants in the city. Residents renting in high-demand areas are often taken aback by sharp increases in their monthly bills. Some are forced to move out. Unfortunate trends of unaffordability and eviction have been at the center of concerns surrounding housing in Toronto. Many are concerned that the city is prioritizing growth and development over the well-being of its inhabitants.

The pressures created by both threats of unsustainability and unaffordability have been felt by policy-makers. Noting the current state of the market, Ontario Finance Minister Charles Sousa has told the press that “people are expecting action – it’s SUMMER 2017

needed now”. Orthodox economic thought and a plethora of historical precedents do, however, offer a very clear course of action.

To start, rent prices rise rapidly when heightened demand is met with inadequate growth in supply. Developers in Toronto must comply with strict regulatory requirements, like constrictive zoning laws, when considering the development of new properties. “Our zoning and approval processes discourage new rentals”, noted one developer. Inadequately relaxed regulations cripple new development and, holding factors such as population growth constant, necessitate increases in price. While it is unlikely that those increases will halt entirely with gradual supply growth, deregulation would still significantly increase affordability and reduce the burden of rising costs on renters.

The structural unsustainability of the property market as a whole can be tackled via more restrictive lending practices. Heighted consumer debt has recently become a Canada-wide issue.

It is one that often accompanies real estate bubbles. Measures that limit the amount of financing raiseable through debt may protect buyers from the perils of overleveraging and would help preserve stability as national interest rates inevitably tail the United States’ upward trajectory. As these measures simultaneously limit demand, they too would curb price growth.

Such simple but effective tactics would enable the city’s economy to maintain a healthy level of growth - which helps Toronto raise revenue for future projects, like rapid transit lines - while remaining stable and affordable for its residents.

When Premier Kathleen Wynne’s provincial government announced their plan to pacify the volatile Toronto market and bolster affordability, these options were readily available to them along with significant historical data surrounding how to effectively implement them. What Wynne released instead, however, was an egregious, appallingly populist plot, which spurned logical solutions in favor of drastic, destabilizing reform. Expanding supply and managing consumer debt were nowhere to be found on the provincial government’s list of fixes. Instead, outlined was an eclectic combination of haplessly minute and hilariously ineffective measures whose inability to adequately address residents’ concerns is painfully obvious. Most prominent among these were a tax on “non-resident speculators” and an expansion of city-wide rent control.

The non-resident speculator or “foreign buyer tax” is not a new idea. Such taxes would significantly increase the cost of purchasing property in Toronto as a non-Canadian without imme37

diate intent to immigrate. Similar measures were implemented in Vancouver in 2016 because of increasingly lofty prices in that city. The market did cool down, briefly – it has since recovered and has continued to grow to record highs. Thus, the long-term efficacy of non-resident taxes as a measure is in dispute. Moreover, Toronto lacks the same level of foreign speculation interest as Vancouver, and the measure’s ambiguity may serve to deter capital investment into the city. The levy also does little for renters, whose growing expenses have had little to do with foreign investment. Indeed, a tax on foreign buyers offers little but a nod to nativist delusions of entitlement in an increasingly global city.

The other large proposal, a broadening of rent-control across the city, is an affront to well-understood principles of urban development. Fully 93% of economists agree that rent controls lower the quality and quantity of housing available for residents. These policies disincentive landlords from adequately maintaining their properties and force them to limit supply for prospective renters. In addition, by further squeezing developers’ profitability, they discourage future investment and construction, damaging the market and raising prices in a dreadful loop.

There are fleeting hints of the good in Wynne’s plan. Its proposed tax on vacant units would be a more targeted approach to combat pure speculation. Protecting evicted residents from unfair treatment, too, is a step in the right direction. Yet these measures will, perhaps intentionally, have only minor effects when compared to both Wynne’s grander proposals and the more reasonable alternatives she had glossed over. Her plan has gotten some details right, but it has hugely fumbled the bigger picture.

To that end, Wynne has followed in the steps of left-wing populists the world over. Radical reformers like Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders have grown increasingly popular in the Western political arena, fueled by strong turnouts and political involvement among younger voters. Much like her colleagues, Wynne is sidestepping structural solutions in favor of brash, anti-de-

velopmental rhetoric. This proves popular with disillusioned millennials feeling disconnected from policy-makers’ goals. Historically, however, such initiatives have created stagnation and deepening inequality.

Misguided gut reactions to housing crises have been a staple of fast-growing North American cities. San Francisco, which grew rapidly in the 20th century as a cultural and technological hub, has been much maligned by restrictive zoning laws and all-encompassing rent controls. Not only have these measures failed to preserve the city’s affordability, they have limited its growth and artificially prioritized earlier residents, whose rents become effectively subsidized, to the chagrin of newer arrivals. This has had the unfortunate effect of undermining meritocracy in the region; damaging San Francisco’s standing as an economic powerhouse.

Yet instead of taking heed of other cities’ missteps, Wynne and her government have decided to put Toronto through them as well.

That level of recklessness and short-sightedness prompts one to consider if Wynne’s plans are meant to provide long-term solutions at all. When coupled with the similarly radical provincial labour overhaul that has recently been announced, it seems quite possible that Wynne’s Liberals are making a desperate pivot towards the left to poach supporters of the provincial New Democratic Party ahead of next year’s election. Regardless, their handling of Toronto’s real-estate troubles is incredibly callous. Toronto is a world-class city – it needs to be treated like one.

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Democracy in Myanmar A Long Journey Ahead By: Haleigh Johns

November 2016 marked a new era of democracy for Myanmar, formerly known as Burma.

After over fifty years of military rule, the country held its first democratic elections. Although this change may seem a welcome development, many serious obstacles remain before Myanmar can truly enjoy the democracy it seeks.

The political situation in Myanmar is best known for the actions of Aung San Suu Kyi, an active leader of National League for Democracy.

Suu Kyi’s opposition to the military junta that controlled Myanmar landed her in house arrest from 1990 until 2011, with her recent release marking the beginnings of Myanmar’s move towards democracy and away from military dictatorship. Her Nobel laureate status has garnered notable media attention for the South Asian nation.

Suu Kyi’s release has been met with much resistance from her political opponents, and the military continue to hold considerable power.

In 2008, a new constitution was written for Myanmar. The document allotted a quarter of the seats in both upper and lower legislature houses to the military, and notably prohibits any person with a spouse or child with foreign citizenship from becoming president of the nation. This latter amendment was likely added by the military junta in order to prohibit Suu Kyi from leading Myanmar, as her children are British citizens.

Although Suu Kyi’s political party currently leads the nation and named one of their own members, U Htin Kyaw, as president, the political situation in Myanmar remains largely in the hands of the military. As the military holds a quarter of the seats in both legislatures, and a three-quarters majority is required to change any aspect of the nation’s constitution, the military has been able to block any attempts by the political majority to bring forward democratic reforms.

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Without a democratic political system, it remains unlikely that the power-nations of North America and Europe will take much interest in Myanmar. A better relationship with Western states is crucial for the small South Asian nation, which remains in abject poverty. Since the National League for Democracy has stated that they will not embrace a tight economic relationship with neighbouring China, westward trade seems to be the only option for the struggling state.

Ethnic and religious violence continues to plague Myanmar, further straining the nation’s limited resources. The Kachin, Shan, and Wa ethnic groups have yet to sign ceasefire agreements with the government. Further, Myanmar’s Buddhist majority has a long history of persecuting the Rohinya Muslim minority in Rakhine state.

Tens of thousands of citizens have been displaced due to ethnic and religious violence, even though Suu Kyi’s government had promised to protect these vulnerable groups.

Although Myanmar’s journey to democracy has instigated much change in the nation in the last ten years, there remains much to be done to achieve truly free and fair elections.

Until the deadlock of the military junta’s control over the legislatures and constitution is relaxed, it seems unlikely that major change will be able to be enacted. Further, unless the larger political problems are resolved, the ethnic and religious violence in certain areas of the country will continue until the government is less distracted with democratization. Major political upheaval will likely have to occur in order to bring the legislature back into the population’s hands. Without this democratic control, Myanmar will continue to occupy the fragile middle ground between military control and democracy.

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The Risks of Emphasizing

Human Rights in American Foreign Policy By: Harrison Giovannetti

In 1977, just months into his first and only term

in office, United States President Jimmy Carter declared his intention to make human rights “a fundamental tenant of [American] foreign policy.” By all accounts, this was a cause Carter sincerely wished to pursue; indeed, he often used his power as President to draw attention to human rights violations of other countries and to pressure their governments to address these concerns.

Though this approach provided his administration with legitimate – if limited – political victories, the ramifications of prioritizing human rights concerns were of far greater consequence.

While Carter was commended by many for publicly celebrating political dissidents from the USSR, measures such as this weakened relationships between the two countries and directly impeded critical arms-limitation talks. Rather than making concrete progress towards ameliorating living standards across the globe, Carter had some of his main foreign policy objectives defeated by his own idealism.

Forty years later, the United States again sees itself led by a self-described outsider who brings with him grand foreign policy goals along with little, if any, practical experience in the subject. Unlike Carter, however, Donald Trump has so far seemed content to downplay or outright ignore human rights issues when dealing with foreign powers – and this is for the better.

Guided largely by an “America First” doctrine that prioritizes domestic interests in dealings abroad, and that relies upon self-proclaimed expertise in deal-making, Trump has approached foreign policy in largely transactional terms. As a consequence, human rights have been given very little consideration in multinational relations.

This was evident in the President’s May visit to the Middle East, where he negotiated a multi-billion-dollar arms deal with Saudi Arabia’s autocratic government.

Throughout this visit, as well as in meetings with officials from Russia, Turkey, and Egypt, Trump made no mention of these countries’ re-

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cords of limiting free speech and minority rights – much to the antipathy of observers in the United States. However, while many of these individuals believe that the United States should use its power to advance Western values and political ideals across the globe, such an approach runs contrary to the country’s best interests.

While it would have been uplifting to witness the President denounce, say, the state of democracy in the Middle East and call on regional governments to enact sweeping reforms, one must ask: what, exactly, would this accomplish?

Were the President to openly criticize Saudi Arabia – or, for that matter, Turkey, Russia, or Egypt – for neglecting the human rights of its citizens, it is difficult to imagine this resulting in anything other than greater animosity and increased tensions between the nations. There are, of course, legitimate criticisms to be made against the actions Trump has taken as part of his early foray into Middle Eastern affairs, such as his aggressive rhetoric and resolute side-taking with respect to regional Sunni-Shia conflict. However, he deserves to be lauded for the broader approach he has taken – that is, his stated desire to cooperate more closely with the region’s major powers and to develop partnerships, though not rigid alliances, with them.

Cooperation, of course, can take on many different meanings and the act of relaxing tensions, in and of itself, will not necessarily ensure stability. Rather, the mutual benefits that can arise from such warming of relations are what actually work in guiding states towards peace. In the early 1970s, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev successfully agreed upon disarmament terms, unlike Carter, in part due to a conciliatory approach undertaken by the American side.

More recently, former president Barack Obama sought to ease long-standing hostilities with Cuba by lifting select sanctions. Thousands of travelers, tourism workers, and entrepreneurs on both shores have benefitted from the opportunities created by this policy shift; like Nixon’s work on arms reduction, however, this progress is set to be short-lived.

Despite the relative pragmatism he has demonstrated in his engagements with Middle Eastern leaders, Trump has on several occasions acted counter to the ideal of achieving stability SUMMER 2017

through détente. One such example is his handling of United States-Cuba relations. In June, it was announced that Trump would partially reverse his predecessor’s policy of normalizing relations with the island by imposing tighter restrictions on travel and business, justified on – of all grounds – human rights concerns. Putting aside legitimate questions of whether this is a genuine concern of the Trump administration or simply an act of political pandering, the result is nonetheless a contradictory and incoherent approach towards world issues by the leader of the most powerful country in the world.

Indeed, beyond eroding recently-improved relations between the two countries – and, by extension, impeding cooperation in areas such as commerce, science, and national security – emphasis on human rights has the result of reducing American credibility on the world stage. It is difficult to take the President seriously when he denounces the Cuban government for oppressing its people given that, less than a month before, he ignored similar concerns during negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Rather than taking a stand as a principled defender of human rights, or as a pragmatist pursuing global stability, Trump creates much ambiguity around his true motives by attempting to play both sides of the human rights issue.

For even the most idealistic president, principle often gives way to practical necessity. Whatever missteps Trump has made in the realm of foreign policy, his aversion to placing undue emphasis on human rights issues should not be counted among them. Recognizing the limitations of the United States’ ability to be a catalyst for effective change in foreign nations is prudent, not amoral, and should serve as a tenant of American diplomacy. Exactly how far Trump wishes to go in pursuing détente remains to be seen; at this point, it is unclear whether the President’s actions reflect a strategic approach towards select American adversaries or whether they are early moves in the crystallization of a “Trump Doctrine” of sorts.

Either way, they do represent a notable shift in the United States’ perception of their role in the world and, if followed through tactfully, may work to strengthen it.

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Thoughts on Canada and Peacekeeping in a New Modern Era By: Jacob Aheam

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W

ith Canada’s 150th birthday just having passed, it is an excellent time for Canadians to reflect on what makes Canada proud and unique.

On the outside looking in, Canada is characterized by an abundance of resources and a willingness to help other nations. Furthermore, some of the core distinctive qualities that constitute Canadian nationalism include multilateralism and peacekeeping. Unfortunately, these features that have been the cornerstone of Canadian identity are on a decline, predominantly due to misconceptions in regard to peacekeeping. Despite this, an evolution in peacekeeping is an opportunity for Canada to overcome its slump, and play a larger role in international peacekeeping movements. Moving into the next 150 years, Canada has the potential to re-evaluate its peacekeeping strategies and goals and become a role model in the modern international realm of peacekeeping.

Canada’s early efforts in United Nation’s peacekeeping missions shaped Canada’s national identity and global brand in the international community. In the Suez Crisis in 1956, it was Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson that put forward the idea of having a peacekeeping force intervene and stop the British and French forces from inflicting damage on Egypt. Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize; Canada was given an enhanced national identity and became recognized as a nation that was heavily committed to multilateralism and United Nations peacekeeping operations.

From 1948 to 1988, Canada produced roughly 10% of all peacekeepers sent on United Nations missions. In 1988, the United Nations won the Nobel Peace Prize, an accomplishment that Canada took immense pride in after decades of contributions to peacekeeping efforts.

Eventually, Canada’s internal conception of peacekeeping had transitioned from opportunity to burden. Moreover, Canada also began to lose credibility in the International sphere. This manifested in a string of failures in UN peacekeeping missions, specifically in Rwanda, Somalia and the Balkans during the 1990’s, all of which Canada faced heavy scrutiny for as a result. This ultimately led to the decline of peacekeeping in Canada.

By 2001, Canada had focused much of its foreign policy on the war in Afghanistan. The golden age SUMMER 2017

of peacekeeping in Canada had ended.

The decline of Canadian peacekeeping from the 1990’s onwards, significantly due to controversies abroad, correlated highly with the Security Council’s re-evaluation of peacekeeping procedures and objectives. In particular missions such as in Somalia and Rwanda, peacekeepers were refused proper resources or political support, and were provided with narrow mandates in situations where warring parties neglected peace agreements. After a period of reassessment, and with international conflict at a high level, the United Nations role was reaffirmed and new UN peacekeeping missions were authorized in the late 1990’s. UN peacekeeping also had a refined focus moving forward. Less emphasis was placed on playing a non-combat policing role between two warring parties. Furthermore, rather than entering conflicts with limited resources and small legal mandates, more emphasis was placed on grasping the complex nature of conflicts and subsequently creating more effective strategies for peaceful resolution. A new era of peacekeeping has begun, one encapsulated by a considerable transition from a classical to a modern form of peacekeeping, and unfortunately one that occurred largely without Canada. Many developing countries in South America and Africa, as well as many European countries, stepped up to the plate with Canada’s decline moving into the new era, an era that continues to this day.

In the 2015 election, it appeared as if Canada would be returning to the forefront of peacekeeping. Trudeau’s government vowed that Canada would renew their commitment to United Nations peacekeeping by aiding in international training efforts, and in a more tangible manner promising in August 2016 to offer up to 600 military personnel and 150 police for UN operations. These promises never materialized. In actuality, Canada has less than 30 personnel currently involved in UN peacekeeping, while over 90, 000 personnel are currently involved in UN operations. Canada also lacks in representation internationally, failing to have a single officer in the military branch at UN headquarters.

While Canada has been quick to support combat missions in Iraq and Syria, peacekeeping remains a moral imperative. Atrocities and conflicts 43

occur all over the world, especially in Africa and the Middle East, and Canada is turning their back on the international community and humanitarianism by not playing a role in United Nations peacekeeping efforts. Strategically, Canada also must ensure its credibility remains intact. With Canada vying for a security council seat, this is the most auspicious time for Canada to become active in United Nations peacekeeping, as political inaction could make Canada appear complacent in the international community.

In the dawn of the 21st century, United Nations peacekeeping had been stretched. The intricate root causes of conflicts, particularly the dynamics of civil war, are now being taken into account and enhanced training programs are being implemented. With the United Nations calling on countries for international aid, it is time for Canada to utilize it’s resources and become a major role player in this new modern structure of peacekeeping; one focused on capacity building and one that very much emulates Canada’s new role in Afghanistan.

Mali is an excellent prospective location for Canada to lead a major peacekeeping operation.

Islamic militant groups such as Ansar Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have forcefully pushed for Islamic law in Mali, and various ethnic groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad have fought for the rights of the Tuareg, a small minority ethnic group in Mali. Both these groups have been in constant civil strife with the Malian Army. Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa have incorporated the Tuareg, as well as other ethnic groups such as Bella and Songhai, into a strong multi-ethnic force driven by religious zeal. Furthermore, faltering alliances, corruption and continuous uncertainty have clouded Mali’s hopes for cohesion and a strong democracy.

Canada is highly capable of capacity building, also known as security sector reform, in Mali. This process involves the 3D’s method of stabilizing a region: defense, diplomacy and development.

This requires examining the underlying causes

of civil insecurity and government issues, such as corruption and poor alliances, and working to strengthen political, social and economic dynamics.

In Mali, a major concern is the inability to stop Islamic insurgents from infiltrating different regions of the country. By exhorting government officials to be more accountable for their actions, alliances can be strengthened, government integrity can overcome corruption, and the eradication of terror groups and the restoration of government is a very attainable goal. Incidents where resources intended for development are lost through corruption, as has occurred in Mali, will be few and far between. The implementation of such political strategies will therefore address the development and diplomacy aspect of security sector reform; a process which necessitates moving past simple military techniques and rather targeting the various substructures of government.

Another method to address the turmoil in Mali is through operational building. This involves training and acting as mentors for armies outside of the warring areas, and continuing to shadow armies as they enter conflicts. This military training addresses the defense aspect of security sector reform. Overall, a combination of the different aspects of security sector reform can help to extinguish the Islamic insurgents that plague Mali by stabilizing the region politically and militarily.

Solidifying Canada’s prominence as a peacekeeping nation, acting as a model for development, diplomacy and democracy, and exponentially improving Canada’s political activity within the United Nations are essentials if Canada is to maintain it’s position as an influential nation in the international community and stand by a time-honoured tradition. Entering a new chapter means taking on new challenges, and moving into the next 150 years, Canada has the opportunity to take charge in UN peacekeeping efforts and truly stand by Justin Trudeau’s mantra “Canada is back.”

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Trudeau’s Prudent Approach to Trump By: Cameron Rowe University of Toronto

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and the Canadian government, have demonstrated a surprising level of sophistication in recent multilateral negotiations.

The Canadian government at responded elegantly to Trump’s NATO defense demands, Trudeau has increased defense spending prior to NAFTA negotiations in August 2017, and has greatly navigated the changing political relation between Canada and Trump administration.

In May, during a speech at NATO’s headquarters United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump reiterated his long running view that Canada - along with other NATO states - were not paying their fair share on defence. Under the current NATO terms, Canada should be spending 2% of its annual GDP on defence. However, the state is presently only paying 1.2%.

Interestingly enough, out of the 28 member countries, only 5 are meeting their commitments of 2%.

Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, Chrystia Freeland, indicated in early June that Canada would be increasing its defense spending from 1.2% of the GDP to 1.4%, with the 2% commitment being targeted over the next 10 years. Freeland stressed the importance of Canada having its own self-sufficient military, stating “to rely solely on U.S. security umbrella would make us a client state.”

The announcement came conveniently prior to the upcoming NAFTA negotiations. President Trump has stated he wants to renegotiate NAFTA on terms more favourable to the U.S. in a letter of intent sent to Congress. Trump presidency has put pressure on Canada, with subtle warnings if Canada were to play hardball. Such as increased tariff on Canadian lumber exports, that were permitted under the pretext of unfair government subsidised to the industry.

The timing of the increased defence spending was not a coincidence. The biggest beneficiary of greater defence spending will be the U.S. military-industrial complex. Companies such as Boeing, Northrup Grumman, and Lockheed Martin – the three largest defense companies in the world - stand to benefit the most from these deals. Meaning, the U.S. companies will receive a large portion of the increased defence spending. For every defence spending inSUMMER 2017

crease of $1 billion (US), approximately 11, 200 U.S. jobs are created.Trump is well aware of this probable economic boost, as is Minister Freeland.

Trudeau has shown great flexibility in his management of foreign relations. An example was his decision not to cancel the previously signed $15 billion light armoured vehicle deal with Saudi Arabia. His decision was met with criticism of his government for being hypocritical to sell weapons to a government with questionable human rights record despite preaching tolerance and inclusion.

It is clear that in the last two years, Trudeau has been consistent with the liberal doctrine of campaigning on the left and governing on the centre.

Trump is an experienced negotiator, whereas the 45-year old Trudeau is not. Considering the gap in experience, he has been navigating this unknown territory elegantly. When Trump was elected, Trudeau hired former conservative PM Brian Mulroney to assist in communicating with the Trump administration and aiding U.S.-Canada relations. Mulroney has extensive experience with trade, as well as with Trump. They know each other on a personal level, and it was a clever move to ensure the relationship moves forward in a mutually beneficial manner.

NAFTA has largely not been beneficial for the U.S..

The last year the U.S. has a trade surplus is 1994, the year NAFTA was created. This means that Trump will be looking to strike a hard bargain.

The U.S. is Canada’s biggest exporter; when the exports to U.S. account for 20% of Canada’s GDP, it would be wise to listen to them. Trump has threatened to impose import tariffs which would devastate Canadian manufacturing sectors.

Despite, Brian Mulroney belonging to the Conservative party, Canada’s Prime Minister is showing Canadians that he is sourcing the people he needs on his team in order to deal with global issues, and demonstrating adequate flexibility on defence spending to serve the great good of maintaining a NAFTA that benefits Canada.

Canada’s foreign policy can be independent from, but not in isolation to, the US. When our biggest customer says they are not happy, Canada has to listen.

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A Tale of Two South Koreas By: Gillian Moir

North Korea’s nuclear program is on a dan-

gerous trajectory. The nation has successfully launched hundreds of short-range missiles that threaten much of the Asia-Pacific region. Today, they continue to tinker toward longer-range intercontinental missiles. Such weapons, if developed, could extend the hazard they pose to North Korea’s neighbours all the way to the American mainland.

The looming nuclear threat is likely why Western media covered the recent election in North Korea’s southern neighbour, South Korea, with unprecedented frequency. The winning candidate, Moon Jae-In, inherited a front-row seat to one of the world’s hottest issue and his actions could fathomably trigger a nuclear-war.

However, the Western media’s coverage focused disproportionately on the incoming president’s strategy for addressing and influencing the North Korea issue. While it’s true that the South Korean population remains aware of the threat posed by their northern peninsula-mates, Moon’s victory was for the most part based on another issue entirely.

The May 9th election was called following the impeachment of past president Park Guen-hye. Park was dismissed by the Supreme Court following a corruption scandal and investigation that revealed the government’s tight connections to a religious cult.

Park’s connection to the Church of Eternal Life cult is now known to be longstanding. In 1974, when Ms. Park’s father, Park Chung-hee, was president, her mother was killed by a North Korean spy. It was here that Ms. Park started to make connections to the murky figures that would come to derail her presidency in 2016. The cult leader, Choi Tae-min, became Ms. Park’s mentor and claimed to be in contact with the spirit of her late mother. Ms. Park quickly became friends with Choi’s daughter, Choi Soon-sil.

In 2013, when Ms. Park became South Korea’s first female leader, she remained tied to Choi Soon-sil. This friendship would ultimately cause Park’s downfall. In November 2016, following revelations of the dubious nature of their relationship, hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered in Seoul and around the nation. Protestors, mainly young South Koreans, demanded her resignation.

Popular at the start of her term, Park’s impeachment was only the climax in her fall from grace.

The crisis seems like a natural end, albeit an extreme one, for many, who have for years been criticizing Park’s opaque and heavy-handed leadership style. Her presidency has been characterized as a continuation of her father’s “dictatorial” style of governance. Throughout the first two years of her presidency, she was also criticized for holding only four press conferences, three without

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an opportunity to ask questions. In 2014, Park also established a commission to screen and prosecute those who criticized her on social media.

Ultimately, both South Korea’s Supreme Court and Parliament would vote for her impeachment In April, she was formally charged with abuse of power, bribery, and the leaking of government secrets.

During the four years that Park was president, she allegedly gave Choi access to confidential documents and treated her as a confidant. At minimum, this relationship allowed Choi to extort South Korean conglomerates for large sums of money. At the most severe, some critics claim that Park was nothing but a façade or a “puppet president” for Choi and other high-ranking cult officials, who governed behind the scenes. Commonly seen protest signs, echoing this sentiment, asked: “Who’s the real president?”

For voters, Moon Jae-in represented a drastic change from the corruption of the Park administration. During his inauguration speech, Mr. Moon announced: “I will become a clean president … I will become a president who can retire home as an ordinary citizen and is welcomed by neighbours.” Earlier in his career, Mr. Moon practiced as a human rights lawyer. He had defended students and labour activists, persecuted under Mrs. Park’s father. In fact, in the 1970s, Mr. Moon had been jailed for organizing student protests against the past president, military general, and Park Guen-hye’s father, Park Chung-hee.

Mr. Moon’s commitment to transparency and good governance is likely why he swept to power.

He represented a new face of domestic politics that prioritized human rights and clean politics, in SUMMER 2017

an era where Ms. Park deprived South Koreans of both.

Mr. Moon secured the biggest winning margin ever seen in in a South Korean presidential election. His promises of “truth committees” and severed ties between state and businesses successfully attracted 41% of the vote. (Song, 2017) It was this, rather than his stance on North Korea, that secured him such a decisive victory.

In the week running up to the election, Gallup Korea found that national security was only the third most important issue for voters. In fact, many South Koreans are reportedly unmoved by the increasing volatility within the peninsula. A sociology professor at Seoul National University, Park Myoung-kyu, suggests the reason South Koreans aren’t phased could be due to desensitization. After five decades of conflict at their doorstop, South Koreans have come to expect tensions to ease and return to the status quo.

The threat of North Korea is a reality South Koreans live with every day. Despite this, in the recent elections South Koreans showed how rather corruption and economic vitality more important political issues than national security. However, for the most part, western media ignored this nuance in South Korean Politics. Many news sources implied that this election was driven by national security concerns and fear over Donald Trump-related uncertainty, despite the truth being to the contrary.

Moon Jae-in does not represent a hard-stance against Kim Jong-un. Instead, he represents a new brand of domestic politics. One that is clean and looks to detangle itself from bribery, corruption, and conglomerate pressure.

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SPECIAL SECTION:

Media Response

A Critique of “Trump’s Foreign Policy Revolution” by Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post (January 26, 2017)

By: Patrick Hoy

I

n his January 26th column published in the Washington Post, Charles Krauthammer analyses President Donald Trump’s prospective foreign policy as outlined in his recent inaugural address and concludes that it “radically redefines the American national interest as understood since World War II.” Krauthammer highlights Trump’s emphasis on an “America First” policy and President Trump’s claims that for decades, the United States has engaged in a foreign policy which enriches foreign industry and foreign militaries at the expense of American interests. Krauthammer argues that the above isolationist rhetoric, ambivalence about the value of organizations like NATO, and withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership amount to a repudiation of a foreign policy model that has continued since the Truman presidency.

Krauthammer’s assessment that Trump’s anti-internationalist foreign policy proclamations and actions represent a significant departure from established norms is perceptive. Central themes of the Truman doctrine, which influenced post-war policy, include that the United States must “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” that the U.S. must “assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.”

Krauthammer is correct to note that American foreign aid and subsidization of foreign allies represented a central aspect of post-war American foreign policy, and he is also correct that Trump’s rhetoric and actions thus far – including drastic proposed budgetary cuts to the State Department, foreign aid programs, and even the World Bank, while simultaneously increasing military expenditures – represent a clear departure from established foreign policy protocol.

Where Krauthammer errs is in his somewhat face-value acceptance of the premise of American exceptionalism, stating that America’s internationalist approach to foreign policy defined the country’s national interest “beyond its narrow economic and security needs to encompass the safety and prosperity of a vast array of allies,” in a “free world marked by open trade and mutual defense.” His acceptance of American exceptionalism seeks to attach a level of moral superiority, THE OBSERVER

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generosity, righteousness, and beneficence that is not necessarily supported by the practical reality of American foreign engagement over the past century.

The assumed superiority of the American way of life is inherent in the principle of American exceptionalism which informs U.S. foreign policy. Yet this sense of exceptionalism includes obvious and often fatal paradoxes. American exceptionalism in diplomacy asserts that rather than solely following its own economic and political interests, the U.S. also respects the rights of self-determination and freedom for peoples of foreign states, and wishes to export democracy for the good of the world. Yet it also implies that the American way of life is superior, and as Williams notes, that “other people cannot really solve their problems and improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United States.” The salience of this final aspect can be seen in the historical reality that while the United States is willing to support the regimes of allies and other countries within its hegemonic orbit so long as they comply with American desires, for those states which fail to conform to American prescriptions for politically and economically organizing their societies, the United States is all-to-willing to engage in coercive behaviour to ensure that the rebellious peoples fall back in line.

Nevertheless, Krauthammer is perceptive and convincing in demonstrating that Trump’s approach to foreign policy represents a significant departure from established practice.

Trump’s anti-internationalist approach, which seeks to boost American military expenditures and adventurism while defunding international affairs operations by a staggering $319.2 billion over ten years (a budgetary reduction of 47.8%) - including key diplomatic offices, foreign operations and organizations, and Multilateral Development Banks– represent a clear repudiation of the use of soft power in American foreign policy.

Yet it is also worth noting that as researchers have demonstrated these diplomatic, economic, development, and aid programmes have been an incredibly effective mechanism for constructing the indirect, informal empire of the United States.

We are presented with a new conundrum: why would President Trump seek to defund programmes which have contributed to the propagation of American imperial power and have enormously enriched the corporate and financial classes, while at the same time continuing to boost American military might? Does this represent a regression to a less sophisticated subtype of indirect informal empire - namely “Gunboat Imperialism” – which does not use such advanced mechanisms of economic coercion as “structural adjustment programs,” and where instead “military force is flourished threateningly and occasionally deployed in the form of short, sharp military interventions” - akin to the “Dollar Diplomacy” of the early twentieth century ? Does it represent the powerful influence within the Trump administration of anti-statist forces from the alt-right movement and from within think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, who wish to dismantle ‘big government’ and set the United States on a path of isolationist “economic nationalism”? Or does it merely indicate the enormity of the ineptitude, lack of experience, rashness, and foolishness of this President – so ignorant of established foreign policy practices that he will end up strategically and economically weakening the empire at the same time that he seeks to demonstrate American superiority and strength?

SUMMER 2017

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THE OBSERVER METRIC 450 people killed in terrorist attacks since 2014

33,000 people killed by opioids in the US in 2015

70% increase in defence spending from 2016 to 2019

500,000 people expected to visit the 2017 Venice Biennale 103 deaths between ISIS affiliates and Philippine troops in

Marawi City

and Egypt

keeping efforts in 2017

2017 French presidential election

proximately one quarter of the population

by the Trump Administrationin May 2017

their work more relevant to policy makers

production of agricultural commodities

by President Trumpâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s budget

13 demands delivered to Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, 88 Canadian police, military experts, and troops involved in UN Peace 66 percent of votes for Emmanuel Macron in the second round of the

6 million people in Ivory Coast depend on cocoa for their livelihood ap-

110 billion dollars in arms trade between the US and Saudi Arabia announced 60 percent of international relations scholars surveyed in 2014 wish to make 10 billion USD in exports lost by Nigeria in the past 20 years due to decline in 74,000 Rohingyas forced to flee to Bangladesh since Myanmar goverment crackdowns began in October 2016

319.2 billion dollars in international affairs spending reductions proposed 33 percent increase from April 2016 to April 2017 in aggregate housing

prices in Toronto

352 out of 594 members of the Brazilian congress accused of criminal activity

70 million USD brought in by trophy hunting activities in

Namibia in the last 20 years

South Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s presidential election

41 percent of the vote won by Moon Jae-in in

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