QIO 11.2: International Peace & Security by The Observer

INSURGENCY: ISIL & BOKO HARAM EBOLA, ETHICS, & HEALTH SECURITY DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG SECURITY STUDIES: THE GENDER FACTOR SCOTLAND & EUROPEAN SECESSIONISM ISSUE 11.2

OCT. 2014

INTERNATIONAL PEACE & SECURITY

QUEEN’S INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER A LETTER FROM THE EDITOR Emerson Murray Dear Reader, Welcome to issue 11.2 of the Queen’s International Observer. Since 2003, the magazine has offered a global perspective to students at Queen’s University, and we aim to provide you with critical insights and quality research on international politics. Our second issue, “International Peace and Security, is meant to expose readers to alternative viewpoints on topics in the field of international security. Georgie Giannopoulous compares the response of President Bush and Obama to crises in the Middle East, while Darcy Wilford draws parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s insurgency and the Thirty Years’ War. Dylan Edmonds examines the international community’s response to Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protests and their impact on Chinese regime security. Meanwhile, Kanivanan Chinniah considers the economic side of Canadian-Chinese relations, and addresses criticisms of the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. Additionally, Harrison Jarvis analyzes the result of Scotland’s independence referendum in the context of European secessionist movements. Assistant Editor Holly Kallmeyer discusses the relation between political succession in Uzbekistan and Central Asian stability, while Assistant Editor Hayley McNorton critiques the Mexican government’s campaign against drug trafficking. As Editor-in-Chief, I highlight Boko Haram’s tactical shift in Northeast Nigeria, and consider alternatives to current counter-insurgency measures. The QIO is excited to display the work of external contributors. Sharan Kuganesan, a student in biology and global development, investigates the international community’s response to the growing Ebola epidemic. Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky, Director of the Centre for International Defence Policy, Assistant Professor of Political Studies at Queen’s University, and founder of Women in International Security – Canada, discusses the merits of gender mainstreaming in the field of security studies. Issue 11.2: International Peace and Security, is merely a glimpse of the creative ideas and diverse insights that the QIO team has to offer. If you share a passion for international affairs, consider writing for the QIO, as external submissions are always welcome. Until our next release, we hope that “International Peace and Security” peaks your curiosity. Sincerely, Emerson Murray, Editor-in-Chief Vol. 11 Holly Kallmeyer and Hayley McNorton, Assistant Editors Vol. 11

ISSUE 11.2

THE TEAM

Emerson Murray Editor-in-Chief

Holly Kallmeyer Assistant Editor

Hayley McNorton Raine Storey Assistant Editor Layout Editor

Kanivanan Chinniah Staff Writer

Dylan Edmonds Staff Writer

Georgie Giannopoulos Staff Writer

Corey Goldberg Staff Writer

Harrison Jarvis Staff Writer

Darcy Wilford Staff Writer

15 21

11 7 13

17 3 9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

3. EBOLA OUTBREAK 5. REVISITING THE MIDDLE EAST 7. ISIL & 30 YEARS WAR 9. BOKO HARAM 11. SUCCESSION IN UZBEKISTAN 13. DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG 15. CANADA, CHINA, & FIPA 17. MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS 17. SCOTTISH REFERENDUM 21. GENDER & SECURITY STUDIES

EMAIL: CONTACT@QUEENSOBSERVER.ORG WEBSITE: WWW.QUEENSOBSERVER.ORG

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The views expressed by the authors are their own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial board or the Queen’s International Affairs Association.

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Ebola Epidemic:

ETHICS, UNCERTAINTIES, AND GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY Sharan Kuganesan, Biology 15’

SOME OF THE most difficult questions about health policy were asked when the seemingly uncontrollable Ebola epidemic began to spread throughout West Africa. Who should receive the scarce vaccines? At what point are these untested vaccines allowed to cross borders? Is the international community doing enough to assist in this crisis? Have we considered the urgency of Ebola? The recent Ebola outbreak that began in Liberia created a mild uproar among Western audiences; ‘mild’, as Westerners were able to reassure themselves that the crisis existed thousands of miles away, far from home. Over the course of a few short weeks, the outbreak had spread to many parts of West Africa, including Guinea, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Nigeria. With a mortality rate of 50-90%, Ebola has taken approximately 4500 lives and infected 9000 other individuals since the initial outbreak. Differential Treatment creates Inequality

untested serum known as ‘ZMapp’ existed in very limited quantities, and was controversially administered to four infected individuals in the U.S., Spain, and France. The first dose was administered to two American healthcare workers during the first week of August, while 800 West Africans had already perished from the recent Ebola outbreak, 60 of whom were African healthcare workers. A few days later, the World Health Organization went through an extensive debate to determine if it would be ethical to offer the untested ZMapp serum to West African countries due to the circumstances of the outbreak. The fact that the same debates over ethics were absent before the drugs were administered to the Westerners has left many questioning the international health community. Writing for the Washington Post, Kim Yi Dionne asked, “If there is an equal respect for all human life, why do ethical issues stand as barriers for one population of people, but not for another?”

rican countries are ill-equipped to adequately respond to an outbreak of this caliber. Much like a disastrous domino effect, the rise of Ebola has created a severe state of hunger in Liberia and caused a decline in an already fragile economy, as fewer and fewer people go to work in fear of being infected. Today, the number of cases continues to rise exponentially due to the region’s lack of health infrastructure, resources, and professional expertise. “Ebola” by Global Panorama via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0. Modified from Original.

Unprepared for Outbreak

The current reaction to global infectious diseases is a set of Having undergone decades incoherent efforts filled with incon- of poverty and instability, it is no sistencies and hidden agendas. An surprise that the affected West Af-

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EBOLA EPIDEMIC // An Increase in Transmission Distrust in Western health authorities–stemming partly from decades of anti-colonial sentiments– was a main reason why Ebola spread so quickly and without notice. Foreign volunteers and healthcare workers are blamed at times like these for bringing diseases into the communities that they enter. For instance, several Liberians have kidnapped Ebola patients from hospitals in fear that medical personnel, rather than the virus, are responsible for killing their loved ones. As opposed to consulting community members about specific practices, Western health personnel have imposed medical procedures on many communities where trust has normally been given to traditional healers and elders. Cultural burial customs, such as kissing or

washing the deceased corpse, were suspended, which led to even more unrest. Due to these strict regulations, many would bury loved ones themselves in unsafe ways or would let the decomposing bodies sit at home, risking exposure to a disease that is transmissible even after death. Though these unsafe practices have slowly started to subside with an increase in public awareness, many people in affected communities have reacted with hostility, severely hindering progress in containing the outbreak. Moving Forward Based on dynamic modeling, the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that Ebola will affect up to 1.4 million individuals by the end of January 2015 if

the international community fails to drastically improve aid. Peter Piot, one of the first scientists to identify the Ebola virus in 1976, commented in a recent editorial in Eurosurveillance: “Ebola cannot be ignored in the hope that it will burn itself out.” The story of Ebola has been one of neglect and misunderstanding. Large pharmaceutical companies have yet to develop a vaccine for Ebola prior to its outbreak because the return on investment is low, reducing the vaccine’s profitability. If a virus of this caliber had broken out in New York or London, the international response would have been more rapidly coordinated months in advance of an outbreak. As a global community, it is important that Westerners no longer view Ebola as a problem occurring exclusively in distant places and start to consider the implications of a passive reaction to the outbreak.

“Medici con l’Africa Cuamm” by Luigi Baldelli via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0. Modified from Original.

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“President Barack Obama Campaign Headshot” by Tyler Driscoll via Flickr. Licensed under CC BYNC-SA 2.0. Modified from original.

““911: President George W. Bush Addresses Joint Session of Congress, 09/20/2001” by the U.S. National Archives via Flickr.

Iraq Revisited

OBAMA’S LABYRINTH Georgie Giannopoulos, Political Studies 17’

“America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.” - George W. Bush, September 11, 2001

“...through the pain we have felt and the grueling work required to bounce back – America is better positioned today to seize the future than any other nation on Earth.” - Barack Obama, September 10, 2014

THESE WERE the words of a president who was forced to recognize that his government could no longer protect its citizens from terrorism. In response to the 9/11 attacks, America launched into a war on terror. It was a war that pitted the West against the rest, Jihad against McWorld, and, in some eyes, Christianity against Islam.

Thirteen years later, President Obama, belonging to a different party and a different time, echoed the call to order that rang through America hours after the 9/11 attacks. Terrorism has always been an unpredictable force, but in a post 9/11 world it provides an even greater challenge. America now faces threats from a terrorist organization called

ISIL, or the Islamic State. General John M. Keane, Chairman of the Board at the Institute for the Study of War, said that “ISIL has already accomplished what the 9/11 Al Qaeda only dreamt about, but forfeited, when they over reached and attacked the American people.” On September 10, 2014 President Obama revealed his determined course of action. The first step, a systematic campaign of airstrikes, aims to put ISIL on defense and the Iraqi forces on offense. Second, America will provide increased ground support to Iraqi and Kurdish forces in the form of training, intelligence, and equipment. President Obama was, however, explicit in

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ISLAMIC STATE // noting that the United States has no desire to put troops on the ground. Third, the U.S. will continue to rely on its allies and substantial counterterrorism capabilities to prevent further attacks. Finally, they will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians. President Obama’s ability to defend the U.S.’s vital interests, which he articulated to the UN General Assembly in 2013, will determine the amount of popular support he receives for this plan. These vital interests include responding to external aggression against American allies and partners, ensuring the free flow of energy from the region, dismantling terrorist networks that threaten Americans, and zero tolerance for the development or use of weapons of mass destruction. Supporters of the strategy hail the changes in President Obama’s foreign policy for its shift away from employing overwhelming force to a proportional response focused on intelligence gathering and the assistance of local security forces. After President Bush’s doctrine of preemption was introduced in 2001, the mentality of American foreign policy was relatively the same as the KGB since its inception - shoot first, ask questions later. Whether or not one believes President Obama’s four step guide to fighting evil will be effective, he has ushered in a new age of American foreign policy - one that moves way from the Hulk simply stomping through the Middle East to a more Batman–like approach; come when needed and asked. On the other hand, President Obama has been condemned for creating an approach to fighting terrorism that is no more proactive than that of his predecessor. Critics are especially concerned about the military tactics outlined, as many

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prominent academics suggest that airstrikes are ineffective. Stephen Walt of Harvard University puts it most bluntly, stating that,

“

Killing terrorists with drones doesn’t seem to have worked, and may actually make the problem worse.

”

Others such as James Jeffrey, from the Washington Institute for Far East Policy, agrees with Walt and advocates for a different strategy. In his Joint Subcommittee Hearing, ‘The Rise of ISIL: Iraq and Beyond’ this July, he laid out a new strategy for the protection of American vital interests. He states that the first step is to deter, and if necessary, defeat any ISIL attacks on Jordan and other partners and allies. Then, he argues, the U.S. should coordinate policies with Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and the Gulf States. Finally, President Obama should conduct strikes against ISIL in both Iraq and Syria and recalibrate U.S. policy towards Baghdad. Jeffrey emphasizes the need for immediate action, arguing that as Iraq’s social divisions deepen and the Kurdistan Regional Government approaches virtual independence, the list of American options becomes

shorter and less effective. In addition, General Keane offers a broad criticism of American leadership, summarizing a popular opinion: “Let me conclude by simply saying this is a time for less handwringing about how we got here and who is at fault and more focus on US resolve to lead a determined effort to push back and eventually defeat ISIL, which should be a part of a larger comprehensive strategy to assist our partners in the region to stop the rise of radical Islam.” Hidden underneath the foreign policy and military jargon is a common theme linking the approaches of Presidents Bush and Obama; one that rests on the denotation of America’s excellence–a hyperbole of John Winthrop’s “shining city on a hill.” Both presidents talk about America as a protector and a role model on the international stage, invoking competing images of both a Herculean force protecting the world from evil and a Platonic philosopher inspiring generations to come. However, the mere existence of ISIL suggests that America cannot continue to fight fear by bombarding terrorist cells with American ideals. The root causes of terrorism must be addressed, and air strikes are ineffective in quelling ideological fundamentalism. With every speech made about American excellence, an opposing speech is made about American hegemony. With every claim that America is the world’s beacon of hope, a counter-claim is made that American values are poisoning the human race. This leaves President Obama in the middle of a labyrinth, trying to find a way out that both inspires the citizens who elected him and pacifies the enemies he has inherited or created abroad.

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The Islamic State

A HISTORICAL COUNTERPART? Darcy Wilford, History 15’

THE RECENT rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a story that many have followed since the declaration of a “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq. Over the past few months, reports of ethnic cleansing and summary executions have dominated international headlines. In trying to understand ISIL’s insurgency, comparisons can be drawn with the Thirty Years’ War. ISIL practices an extremist form of Sunni Islam with little tolerance for non-believers. In his manifesto, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi highlighted the necessity for vio-

lence in establishing his caliphate: The management of savagery is the next stage that the Umma [literally “the community of believers”] will pass through ... If we succeed in the management of this savagery, that stage (by the permission of God) will be a bridge to the Islamic state which has been awaited since the fall of the caliphate. The Umma that al-Baghdadi refers to would only include “believers,” implying that those who are unwilling to accept his version of Islam are “apostates,” and deserve a wide array of abuses. With violence at the core of ISIL doctrine, “apostate” minority com-

munities will remain the target of insurgent attacks. However, ISIL is not solely responsible for Iraq’s sectarian tensions. Under the leadership of Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi government enacted policies that favoured the majority Shi’ite population at the expense of Kurds and Sunnis. Corruption pervaded most levels of government, with Transparency International ranking Iraq the 171st worst country out of 177 surveyed in a 2013 report. Additionally, the armed forces and police have allegedly committed human rights abuses such as unlawful detention

ISLAMIC STATE // and extrajudicial killings that have only served to further marginalize the Sunni population. To further complicate religious tensions throughout Iraq, more than 50 Shi’ite militias have emerged and have been accused of attacking civilian Sunni populations. An examination of the Thirty Years’ War demonstrates why Iraq’s sectarian insurgency is so difficult to resolve, as the two share many similarities. The most obvious, noted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, is the “rising of religious identification as the principal motive for political action.” In the Thirty Years’ War, the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II issued the Edict of Restitution, which placed religious identity at the forefront of the conflict. The Edict was meant to restore many of the Catholic institutions that Protestants had seized during the Reformation. It marginalized the Protestants, however, and forced them into a combative position. Although some principalities were previously neutral, the Edict split the Holy Roman Empire along sectarian lines. Furthermore, the extreme nature of Ferdinand’s policy caused

“Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, painted portrait DDC_0583” by Thierry Ehrmann via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY 2.0. Modified from original.

PORTRAIT OF ABU BAKR AL-BAGDHADI, LEADER OF ISIL, BY TIERRY EHRMANN.

a number of prominent Catholic figures to disagree with it. ISIL’s fundamentalist interpretation of Sunni Islam can be viewed in a similar light, as the group’s violent insurgency and radicalism has galvanized the opposition of ethnic minorities, Shi’ites, and even Sunnis. The Thirty Years’ War was an enduring conflict that took decades to resolve, and is comparable to the situation in Syria and Iraq. Much like the Thirty Years’ War, any permanent solutions to this crisis could be decades away, and a significant reversal of ISIL’s gains is

necessary before stability is possible. In the case of the Holy Roman Empire, constant violence lasted until one side was weakened to the extent that bargaining was the only remaining option. An estimated forty percent of the population in what is now Germany perished in the war as it unfolded. Although it might not reach those figures, the death toll in Syria and Iraq will rise as the conflict deepens. The question remains, however, when the current violence will arrive at the point where negotiation becomes necessary.

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Boko Haram

THE FORGOTTEN INSURGENTS Emerson Murray, Editor-in-Chief

WHAT HAPPENED to Boko Haram? The Al-Qaeda affiliate has seized swathes of territory in Northeast Nigeria, has attacked bordering towns in Cameroon, and threatens to take Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State and the movement’s birthplace. In late August, Boko Haram declared a caliphate at Gwoza, a primarily Christian town southeast of Maiduguri. On October 3, AFP acquired Boko Haram’s latest video, showing a village it had seized as part of its “caliphate.” The video revealed how the group has applied strict Sharia law in communities under its control, with public punishments such as stoning, flogging, and severing hands. Previously, Boko Haram made headlines for anti-government terrorism: suicide bombings, razing communities, and kidnapping over 200 schoolgirls last April. The recent developments, however, are part of a tactical shift that mimics ISIL’s model of capturing and occupying land for state-building purposes. Although ISIL’s expansion has been the focus of international attention, Boko Haram remains a threat to regional and human security in West Africa that cannot be overlooked. According to figures from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Boko Haram’s insurgency has caused 11,000 deaths since July 2009, 5,000 of which occurred in the first eight months of this year. The violence has displaced 50,000

people since May 2013, mounting pressure on neighbouring countries such as Cameroon and Niger as refugees continue to arrive. Furthermore, Boko Haram has ties with a number of Islamist insurgent groups such as alShabaab, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. A coordination of efforts in light of ISIL’s recent gains could escalate regional instabilities and ethno-religious tensions. Given the pressing need to address Boko Haram’s insurgency, how has the international community reacted so far? Last May, international actors were poised to react to the upsurge of Boko Haram violence, especially with the highly publicized kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls in Chibok the month before. The UN Security Council, for example, announced the launch of financial sanctions and an arms embargo against Boko Haram in May. A summit in London, meanwhile, saw the U.S., U.K., and France pledge to assist the Nigerian government’s counter-insurgency efforts, and to help Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Benin, and Niger create a regional intelligence unit and co-ordinate border security measures. Although the rise of ISIL over the following months drew much attention away from Boko Haram’s insurgency, the U.S. renewed its commitment for a border security program in Nigeria and neighbouring countries in early September. More importantly, Ni-

geria, Chad, Niger, and Benin announced plans on October 7 for a multilateral combat mission against Boko Haram, setting November 20 as the deadline for establishing an operational command centre. Boko Haram will prevail, however, if multilateral interventions and Western assistance fail to address a key concern: the disregard of human rights and the ruleof-law by the Nigerian government and state security forces. Declaring a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states in May 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan called for “total war” against Boko Haram– an aggressive security response defined by extra-judicial killings, dragnet arrests, and the destruction of communities where group members allegedly lived. Amnesty International, moreover, released a report in September that revealed the use of “torture chambers” by the Nigerian police and military over the past ten years, with 5,000 detainees since 2009. The torture chambers have served as a location to interrogate suspected Boko Haram members, whom the military often arrests indiscriminately. The Nigerian government has failed to address the abuses, however, and the majority of cases in Amnesty’s report received neither an investigation nor legal resolve. ISSUE 11.2 The international community should therefore demand greater accountability from the Nigerian government as a condition for providing assistance. The continued

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BOKO HARAM // violation of human rights and the use of torture chambers delegitimize state and multilateral security efforts. Boko Haram emerged as a symptom of wider disaffection among many Northeastern Nigerians–the result of long-standing poverty, government corruption, and regional inequalities–and the Nigerian state needs to present itself as a viable alternative to an Islamic caliphate. A security response should, furthermore, shift away from President Jonathan’s “total war” approach. Daniel E. Agbiboa from the University of Oxford argued that the military’s aggressive use of force has led to a sense of “alienation” among many Northern Nigerians, which could lead to radicalization in support of Boko Haram. B o k o Haram has previously expressed a willingness to negotiate with the Nigerian government through peace talks. In September 2011, for example, the Nigerian government and Boko Haram agreed to a ceasefire at Maiduguri. The Nigerian government, however, failed to satisfy the conditions of the deal, which included legal recourse, financial compensation, and the requirement that state security forces stop killing and arresting militants. More recently, the Red Cross coordinated secret talks between Boko Haram militants and the Nigerian government for a prisoner exchange in Septem-

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ber. Although a disagreement over numbers caused the talks to fail, negotiation remains a possible alternative to military force. A greater recognition that Boko Haram is highly divided would also be useful. The Boko Haram faction led by Abubakar Shekau receives the bulk of media attention, but may not represent the entire insurgency. Jacob Zenn, an analyst of African and Eurasian Affairs at the Jamestown Foundation, reported that multiple factions likely exist within Boko Haram, but they unite for high-profile assaults and market

ment could complement state and multilateral counter-insurgency efforts. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), for example, is a vigilante group that mobilised as a response to the security forces’ perceived ineffectiveness and brutality, largely comprised of young men and, on occasion, women in Northeast Nigeria. The vigilantes, armed with sticks and machetes, patrol communities at risk of insurgent attacks, monitor checkpoints, and provide information on suspected Boko Haram members to the security forces. As local civilians, the vigilantes often benefit from knowing the communities in which they operate, and share the same language with residents. PM Jonathan has taken to the CJTF favourably, and in Borno State, members receive a monthly government salary. “Boko Haram” by AK Rockfeller via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0. Modified from original. T h e CJTF needs themselves under the same brand. more state regulation, however, to Nonetheless, certain factions have prevent radicalisation or stray vipublically criticized the most prom- olence from occurring among its inent one–Abubakar Shekau’s–for ranks. Nonetheless, a coordination targeting Nigerian civilians. of civilian engagement with a drive Intelligence gathering could for greater military accountabilitherefore focus on identifying Boko ty could improve the legitimacy of Haram factions that are open to state and multilateral security efdialogue with the Nigerian gov- forts. ernment. Meanwhile, prisoner ex- Achieving peace in Northchanges, financial compensation, east Nigeria is possible. Boko Haand promises for legal investiga- ram’s recent tactical shift, however, tions could serve as options at the requires greater attention from the bargaining table for factions that international community, and a rechoose to negotiate. consideration of current counter-in Finally, civilian engage- surgency measures.

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Uzbekistan

FAMILY STRUGGLE, REGIONAL TROU BLE Holly Kallmeyer, Assistant Editor

GULNARA KARIMOVA’S fall from grace shocked those who follow Uzbekistan’s domestic politics. Until last year, Karimova, daughter of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, had been in line to succeed her father. Instead, a shake-up in Uzbekistan’s ruling elite has unfolded, pointing to power struggles within the former Soviet Republic. While the political drama in Uzbekistan might seem trivial, it has vital implications not only for the country’s future but also for security in Central Asia. The Missing Daughter While the origins of Gulnara’s downfall can be traced to last September, when the Swiss government opened an investigation into her business ventures in Europe and froze her bank accounts, high levels of media censorship in Uzbekistan make it difficult to figure out the exact chain of events. Late last year, Gulnara’s social media accounts disappeared after she publically criticized other members of the first family, including her mother and sister. Last March, the BBC released a letter from Karimova that revealed, after months of silence, that security forces had placed her and her daughter under house arrest in Uzbekistan. Other news from the country’s capital, Tashkent, con-

firmed that police had raided her home and arrested her on unspecified charges. The latest information on her condition came out in late August, when Gulnara’s London-based PR firm released photos of a confrontation between her and guards as she tried to leave her house in Tashkent. Prior to her arrest, Gulnara had been groomed to succeed her father, Uzbek President Islam Karimov, whose health has begun to decline in recent years. She had political experience, serving as an ambassador to the United Nations and as an advisor for the Uzbek ministry of foreign affairs. Gulnara was also a powerful business player in Central Asia and a regional pop star. After Karimov, she was the most high profile figure in the country. Given his preference for her, Islam Karimov’s reluctance to intervene on his daughter’s behalf was puzzling. One plausible explanation is that Gulnara – with her lavish lifestyle in an impoverished country – became too controversial for her father to support. In particular, the Swiss government’s investigations into her business activities drew attention to a regime that already struggled with credibility both domestically and internationally. Indeed, Karimov may have had an interest in cutting Gulnara off to portray a commitment to the rule of

law. As much as he has tried to consolidate power, Karimov, who is 76 years old, cannot rule forever. Until last year, Gulnara, with her business connections and experience in foreign relations, was thought to be his obvious successor. At present, international observers no longer have the assurance that a stable, albeit authoritarian, transition will prevail upon Karimov’s eventual death. Troubles in Tashkent Gulnara’s loss of credibility, however, fails to tell the whole story of Uzbekistan’s power shift. A pre-existing rift between Gulnara and the head of Uzbekistan’s national security service, Rustam Inoyatov, is largely behind the power struggle in Tashkent. Rumours have circulated outside Uzbekistan that Inoyatov pressured Karimov to distance his government from Gulnara, ostensibly because she was a liability to the regime’s legitimacy. Inoyatov has the most to gain from Gulnara’s losses. As head of the national security service, which was responsible for the raid on Gulnara’s home, Inoyatov can simultaneously discredit Gulnara in the eyes of the public and portray the security service as a defender of law in Uzbekistan. As one of Uzbekistan’s

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“Gulnara Karimova” by Timir01 via Wikipedia. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0. Modified from original.

longest serving officials, he is a potential choice as Karimov’s successor. Considering his age, however, any pressures that Inoyatov exerted on Karimov likely aimed to further entrench the power of the security forces. For dictators, either appeasing or controlling security forces is essential, and it is therefore unsurprising that Karimov would defer to advice from Inoyatov. Yet with succession plans still unclear, Karimov’s death could create a power vacuum in Uzbekistan and heighten tensions within the ruling elites. In the political arena, only two alternatives exist to Gulnara as Karimov’s successor: the current prime minister, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and his deputy, Rustam Azimov. Given that the security forces will likely support Rustam Inoyatov, political elites may try to form a rival faction and appeal to popular support. While the elections that Uzbekistan hosts are widely recognized as corrupt, the results of upcoming parliamentary elections in December could actually be significant in shaping the country’s political landscape, as Karimov may not survive the parliament’s four year mandate. Political Transitions in Central Asia While former Soviet Republics in East Europe have largely

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democratized since the dissolution of the USSR, Soviet strongmen still hold the reins of those in Central Asia. The few political transitions that have occurred in Central Asia have ranged widely in terms of stability, hindering an accurate prediction of how Uzbekistan’s political situation will unfold. In Turkmenistan, the death of one brutal dictator, President Saparmurat Niyazov, in 2006 led to a rapid and smooth transition to another dictator; current President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow. In the process, however, several high-level politicians were either imprisoned or fled the country. Conversely, in Tajikistan, divisions among elites prompted a bloody civil war and the violent replacement of one dictatorial regime with another. Because of the authority that different elites had in Tajikistan’s various ethnic communities, rival politicians could mobilize civilian networks to support them through intercommunal violence. Comparable ethnic cleavages and local political affiliations exist in Uzbekistan, prompting worries that elite-level divisions could result in a similar civil conflict. While opposition in Central Asia is heavily repressed, this repression does not always lend itself to stability during times of transition. Those hoping that controversy over Gulnara’s imprisonment will spur a movement for democracy and transparency in Uzbekistan will be disappointed. In Central Asia, the 2005 Tulip Revolution led to democratization in Kyrgyzstan, but the country’s democracy is now only hanging on by a thread. Decades of repression across Central Asia have stifled civil society organizations, which are crucial to advocating for democracy and holding govern-

ments accountable. Uzbekistan and Security Uzbekistan is a crucial ally in Central Asia for western states and provides the primary route for ISAF to withdraw from Afghanistan. Political uncertainty or a power struggle between the security forces and political elites could compromise border security, and therefore the success of ISAF’s exit. The United States, in particular, depends on Uzbekistan’s cooperation for detaining militants it has captured in Afghanistan. Any regime changes that push Uzbekistan to ally more closely with Moscow could therefore risk the U.S.’s anti-terrorism operations in the region. There are also concerns that Afghanistan’s porous border with Tajikistan, which neighbours Uzbekistan, could allow the indirect flow of militants and drugs into Uzbekistan itself. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a terrorist organization with a history of trafficking opium, has notably cooperated with the Taliban in Afghanistan and will likely return to Uzbekistan after western forces leave. When the U.S. reduces its presence in Central Asia, domestic stability in Uzbekistan will be crucial to preventing a revitalization of terrorist networks. A rocky transition in Uzbekistan could jeopardize ISAF’s gains in quelling terrorism throughout Central Asia. Gulnara’s arrest indicates deep shifts in Uzbekistan’s political landscape, which pose challenges for the country’s stability and, as a result, the stability of the region.

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Democracy in Hong Kong

A POLITICAL RE-AWAKENING Dylan Edmonds, Political Studies 17’

IN THE EYES of the Chinese Community Party, Hong Kong has always been an “economic city” and not a “political one.” There was even a time when this special administrative region was proposed as a model for peaceful coexistence between mainland China and Taiwan. In late August, the mainland Chinese government decided to continue to require candidates for Hong Kong’s chief executive elections in 2017 to be nominated by a government committee, rather than opening the process to include civil nominations. Since then, political outcry from pro-democracy activists has rocked Hong Kong, and in the process, exposed the deep rifts between the centralized power of Beijing and its satellites. For the 2017 Hong Kong elections, a committee of political and economic elites in Beijing will vet candidates for chief executive, the island’s highest political post. Democratic activists in Hong Kong have deemed this procedure a violation of Article 45 of Hong Kong’s constitution, which calls for the free election of the chief executive “upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee [that] must itself follow strict democratic procedures.” Mr. Tai, a prominent leader in the “Occupy Central” movement, accused Beijing of completely disregarding the required “democratic procedures.” If Hong Kong’s Legislative Council were to reject Beijing’s controversial proposal, the 2012 election format would return. Only a small circle of individuals would

be eligible to vote, as opposed to granting universal suffrage to Hong Kong’s citizens. In 2012, 1,193 individuals were allowed to participate in the election in a polity of seven million. Although Beijing approved universal suffrage for the coming round of elections in August, its proposed model still falls short of the Occupy Movement’s vision for a just and democratic political system. To counter Beijing’s repressive tactics, the movement has staged massive demonstrations in Hong Kong’s bustling business district. The struggle has brought a new political dimension to Hong Kong, historically renowned as an economic powerhouse. Immediately after Beijing announced its decision to screen candidates for the chief executive, five thousand protesters assembled in a park near the current chief executive’s office. On September 14, a ‘black cloth’ march was carried out in one of Hong Kong’s commercial districts, while another sit-in has been planned for early October. Hong Kong’s youth demographic is largely behind the recent dissent. The city has the most unequal economy and second most expensive real estate market in the world, offering dismal prospects for its young adults. Beijing’s tightening political grip was a boiling point for their anger and frustration. As student groups are among the most tenacious activists for democratic reform, their combined efforts could jeopardize the security of the mainland regime. At present,

Beijing has resorted to scare tactics, with a past Chinese official warning that “blood will be shed” if the movement fails to back down, reminding some of the government’s brutal response to protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Internationally, the response to Hong Kong’s democratic deficit has been subdued. Britain, the former colonizer of Hong Kong, stated, “While we recognise that there is no perfect model, the important thing is that the people of Hong Kong have a genuine choice and a real stake in the outcome.” Hong Kong’s pro-democracy activists have interpreted Britain’s reluctance to explicitly endorse their movement as a betrayal. Moreover, the U.S. government has yet to publicly condemn Beijing’s ruling on the Hong Kong elections. When National Security Advisor Susan Rice visited China in early September, Hong Kong was not a central topic of discussion in meetings, indicating that it will also not be discussed during President Obama’s visit this November. By prioritizing stronger relations with China, the U.S. government’s ability to criticize Beijing’s stance on democratic reforms in Hong Kong is limited. China has emerged as a global power, and the US recognizes the benefits of a strong alliance. If Beijing were to launch a bloody crackdown, the US, having previously supported pro-democratic movements, would find itself in an awkward situation. The underlying problems that plague Hong Kong–an elitist political system, exorbitant housing

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prices, and growing inequality–are also present on the Chinese mainland. Beijing’s nightmare scenario would be a spill-over of political unrest from a city that was once pre-occupied with business. In particular, areas with non-Han ethnic populations, such as Xinjiang province, where pro-democracy movements have previously surfaced, could be affected in a contagion of renewed pro-democracy sentiment. In the past, the Chinese government has attempted

to limit the spread of information when faced with internal protests. The widespread coverage of Hong Kong, however, will challenge the regime’s ability to control discussion on democracy within its borders. For now, China appears safe from the confrontation of other great powers. The more imminent threat to its regime security comes from within, and the stakes are only getting higher.

“Hong Kong's Umbrella Revolution #umbrellarevolution #a7s” by Pasu Au Yeung via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0. Modified from original.

\\ CANADA & CHINA

Canada-China FIPA

PURSUING WHOSE INTERESTS? Kanivanan Chinniah, Economics 15’

THIS OCTOBER, the Foreign Investor Protection Agreement (FIPA) went into effect, after the Canadian government ratified the Foreign Investor Protection Agreement (FIPA) with China last month. The ratification process was two years long, reflecting the controversy and concerns surrounding the implications the agreement would have for Canada. Canadian nationalist opposition was quick to react, arguing that the deal would threaten Canadian sovereignty and energy security. The NDP, for example, called the agreement “badly one-sided,” claiming that Chinese corporations would now be able to own Canadian natural resources, and exploit them for political ends. Elizabeth May called the agreement a “sell out”, and stated that “at no time since 1867 has the sovereignty of Canada been significantly undermined.” In reality, the FIPA with China is a sensible step for encouraging

foreign direct investment. Economic growth requires stable sources of capital investment, and economic growth does not discriminate on the basis of capital ownership. Investments in Canada, regardless of their origin, will ultimately grow our national capital stock. FIPA, put simply, protects foreign investment from expropriation, or state seizure. Although Western liberal democracies have traditionally respected their citizens’ ownership of assets, the likelihood of expropriation increases when those assets are held by a foreign (Chinese) company. The text of the FIPA with China specifically states that “covered investments” or investors’ returns, whether Chinese or Canadian, shall not be “expropriated, nationalized, or subjected to measures having an equivalent effect to expropriation or nationalization”. Government actions convey information about policy prefer-

ences, and investors consider these signals when making investment decisions. Although the Canadian government has generally been friendly to foreign investment, past ambiguity in its signalling has caused bearish behaviour among investors. Consider, for example, when the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) agreed to purchase Nexen, a Canadian oil and gas company, for $15.1 billion in 2012. After a six-month evaluation of the takeover in accordance with the Canada Investment Act, the government allowed CNOOC to purchase Nexen. Shortly after approving the takeover, however, Canada signalled that foreign direct investment by state-owned companies would undergo further scrutiny, and that it would introduce more rules to discourage the presence of foreign state-owned enterprises. Prime Minister Harper, like

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CANADA & CHINA //

“Tar Sands” by Rainforest Action Network via Flickr. Licensed CC BY-NC 2.0. Modified from original.

many Conservatives at the time, was wary of relations with China. He declared that Canada would permit foreign direct investment by state-owned enterprises “only in exceptional circumstances,” creating more ambiguity and uncertainty over what constituted “exceptional circumstances.” Leading a government that generally favoured private sector-driven growth, Mr. Harper was understandably nervous that a foreign state-owned enterprise could control a piece of the Albertan oil sands and, by extension, a Canadian natural resource. The Canadian Ministry of Industry then announced that it would eventually raise investment barriers, without specifying a criteria or a timeframe for this increase. The executive branch therefore had sole discretion over these investment barriers, and without clear rules beyond Ministerial prerogative, investors risked losing their as-

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sets. The government’s ambiguous takeover guidelines reduced investment by state-owned companies almost immediately. Jim Prentice, the CIBC Senior Executive Vice-President and Vice-Chairman at the time, observed that foreign direct investment in the energy sector dropped from $27 billion to $2 billion, while merger and acquisition activity dropped from $66 billion to $8 billion in 2013 relative to 2014. Nonetheless, governments should not necessarily avoid pursuing nationalist economic policies. Prentice supports government action to curb the expansion of stateowned enterprise investment, but also criticizes the lack of clarity in communicating rules to investors. Policies that allow for the pursuit of Canadian interests within a clearly defined and non-political framework will stabilize investment flows. Currently, Canada’s approval process for investments is perceived as

vulnerable to political interference, which always scares investors. Foreign investor protection agreements both guarantee investment and create a set of rules to depoliticize and increase the certainty of government action. FIPA’s opponents singled out the clauses that granted investor protection for at least 31 years, regardless of changes in government, and the right of foreign corporations to sue the government for discriminating against them. These provisions, however, would all improve certainty and therefore drive the investment that Canadian industry needs Politicized and arbitrary trade policies will harm the accumulation of capital. Good investment policy should set clear rules, abide by the rules, and allow for claims when the rules are broken. The FIPA does exactly this.

\\ WAR ON DRUGS

Mexican Cartels

MOVING FORWARD Hayley McNorton, Assistant Editor

“Segundo Informe de Gobierno” by Presidencia de la República Mexicana via Flickr. Licensed under CC BYNC-SA 2.0. Modified from original.

ON 1 OCTOBER 2014, Mexican authorities arrested Héctor Beltrán-Leyva, the leader of the Beltrán-Leyva Cartel. Formerly associated with the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltrán-Leyva Cartel was among the most powerful in Mexico. It was responsible for producing, selling and transporting large quantities of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, and was involved in money laundering, extortion, kidnapping, contract hits, and arms trafficking. Beltrán-Leyva’s arrest is part of a string of high profile arrests by the Mexican government under the leadership of President Enrique Peña Nieto. While the crackdown is promising, it fails to address the structural problems in Mexican society that enable drug cartels to proliferate and threaten national security. Since the 1980s, famous drug cartels such as the Knights Templar and the Sinaloa Cartel have

wielded tremendous influence over Mexican society. In areas of Mexico that suffer from government inefficiency and poor social infrastructure, the cartels have stepped in to provide services and expand their influence. These services range from security services to public welfare, and vary among cartels. Municipal police were initially tasked with stopping the cartels. However, their inefficiency, and, in several cases, corruption, prompted President Felipe Calderón to deploy the Mexican armed forces in 2006. The deployment of the army had several drawbacks. Not only did the army’s involvement fail to combat the rise of cartels and municipal corruption, but the army has been accused of committing the same human rights abuses as the cartels. In 2011, for example, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Invol-

untary Disappearances (WGEID) conducted an investigation on the army’s efforts to combat the cartels. In their investigation, WGEID was informed that there were several instances where “military personnel interrogated people in detention and in some instances used torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to obtain information.”–the same tactics that most cartels use against their opponents. As a result of these difficulties and the Mexican government’s inability to successfully tackle cartels, President Enrique Peña Nieto pursued a different approach. After he was appointed in 2012, Nieto committed himself to creating an elite national police force of 10,000 officers by the end of 2013. This police force was to be a special force whose training would focus on combatting cartels. However, the developments in 2013 disrupted the police force’s implementation. Early in the year, Mexico saw the rise of a local armed vigilante groups who patrolled their communities to stave off the kidnappings, extortion, and violence that the government failed to prevent. Although local vigilante groups have been common in rural Mexico, the rate at which they emerged in early 2013 was unprecedented. Commonly called Las Autodefensas, these groups come primarily from the Mexican province

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WAR ON DRUGS // of Michoacán, a stronghold of the Knights Templar. The Mexican government initially condemned the Autodefensas because their activities were often illegal. However, in May 2014, it reached out to the Autodefensas and coopted them into a new Rural Defence Force. The Autodefensas became an armed unit within the force, working under state jurisdiction to fight cartels and reassert the state’s legitimate authority. Steven Dudley of Insight Crime noted that the law that established the Rural Force was not only vague, but potentially catastrophic. For example, the law failed to specify the type of assistance the government would provide, the kind activities the Rural Force could legally undertake, and the relation the Rural Force would have with municipal police forces. Throughout Latin America,

the use of state-sponsored paramilitary groups without a robust legal framework was disastrous in many cases. In the late twentieth century, Colombia, Peru and Guatemala all used paramilitary groups to repress insurgent movements. Although the paramilitary groups had different origins, in all three cases the state or the groups themselves took advantage of legal ambiguity to commit grave human rights abuses that, in some cases, escaped government control. These cases demonstrated the need to place state-sponsored paramilitary groups within a clear legal framework to outline their goals and methods. So far, however, legal ambiguity has not been the foremost problem with the Rural Force. Mexico’s cartels are notorious for their ability to adapt to challenges and continue their operations. This is no different with the prevalence of vigilante groups and the Rural Force. Rumours of cartel members infiltrating and creating “false” Autodefensas have circulated since their emergence.

Furthermore, rumours that cartel members have infiltrated the Rural Force have also arisen. This is unsurprising, as in the past Mexico’s drug cartels have infiltrated both the federal government and its secret service. The possibility that the Autodefensas are as corrupt as the police who failed to uphold the law has resulted in skepticism and paranoia among local populations. Regardless of how many high-profile cartel leaders are arrested, the cartels themselves will continue to survive because the Mexican government lacks the skill and capacity to effectively combat them. To succeed without deploying the army or a potentially counterproductive Rural Force, the Mexican government should address the structural problems that have allowed cartels to flourish. If successful, it would no longer be cutting the heads off a hydra, but killing the monster itself.

“Mvd6593640” by Abd allah Foteih via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0. Modified from original.

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S C O T T I S H

INSPIRATION FOR EUROPEAN SECESSIONISM?

R E F E R E N D U M

By Jamie McFarlane via Instagram. Licensed under CC BYNC-SA 2.0. Modified from original.

Harrison Jarvis, Economics and History 15’

ON THURSDAY 18 September 2014, over four million Scottish residents, representing 84.59% of the eligible voting population, travelled to polling stations across the country to determine if Scotland would secede from the 307-year old British union. The following morning, the BBC announced that the unionist camp was victorious in

the referendum. Plans for post-independence celebrations in the streets of Edinburgh and Glasgow were cancelled, and bagpipers who rehearsed “Scotland the Brave” in anticipation of Scottish sovereignty were told to pack up and go home. While unsuccessful, the 2014 Scottish independence referendum will affect independence movements

throughout Europe. The United Kingdom is sticking together, at least for a little bit longer. Onlookers no longer have to worry about the prospect of the break-up of the U.K. or grapple with the logistical dilemmas of an independent Scotland; for example, what currency it would adopt in the event of secession, what interna-

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SCOTTISH REFERENDUM // tional organizations it would join, how it would leverage its dwindling supply of North Sea oil, or how it would establish itself in the international community. Despite its outcome, the referendum is still a historic achievement for Scotland’s independence movement. The unitary system of government at present might not be suitable for the U.K., but in past years the Scottish nationalist movement has fought for significant devolution of powers. Scotland already has an independent legal system, and the policy portfolio of its government is wide. Nonetheless, those in Scotland seeking self-determination are not going anywhere. Westminster must be pragmatic and increase both the scope of Scottish legislation available to the Scottish Parliament and its influence over economic and foreign policy. Meanwhile, separatists in the Catalonia region of Spain are attempting to succeed where the Scottish National Party did not. Catalonia emerged from the 2007-2008 global financial crisis much stronger than other regions of Spain. As a designated autonomous community within the country, Catalonia is highly industrialized and accounted for 19% of Spain’s GDP in 2014. Madrid, however, has stalled Catalonia’s growth with frequent demands for cash transfers, which the government uses to combat unprecedented economic hardships elsewhere in the country. Catalan MPs from the Convergence and Union Party have lobbied Spanish parliament for a non-binding referendum on Catalonian independence, much like the members of the Scottish National Party did just under two years ago. Spain’s Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, has used constitutional

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tricks and legal loopholes to thwart the proposed vote at the expense of the democratic process. Regardless, PM Artur Mas of the Catalonian regional government has declared that preparations for a non-binding referendum on November 9 will push forward. Conversely, Rajoy’s British counterpart David Cameron permitted the Scottish referendum because “[his government] respected the SNP’s majority in Holyrood and gave the Scottish people their right to have their say.” Cameron’s decision was politically risky, but it temporarily appeased Scotland’s nationalists. With the “Better Together” campaign victory in the Scottish referendum, it is safe to say that his investment has paid dividends. Rajoy could have approved the November referendum on Catalonian independence and used little political capital in the process. The vote could still reveal that Catalonians believe they are “better together.” Contemporary secessionist claims in Europe are neither uncommon nor violent. Self-determination movements have ranged in success but have typically been peaceful, from the failing Lega Nord party in Italy and Kosovo’s successful breakaway from Serbia in 2008. However, a notable anomaly occurred in the 2014 Crimea crisis and subsequent conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The resulting successful referendum had dramatic implications for international peace and security. Russia’s sponsorship of this referendum created a diplomatic crisis. The Crimean Peninsula is now part of the Russian Federation and occupied by Russian troops, but lacks international recognition. Onlookers from around the world have questioned the legitimacy of Russian’s annexation of Crimea, which

Ukraine views as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, while supporters of the breakaway note that Crimeans differed significantly in their cultural heritage and language from the majority of Ukrainians. Because Russian officials conducted the referendum, it lacked the legitimacy of those in Western Europe. The contested nature of the referendum has led to violence, particularly in the pro-Russian regions of mainland Eastern Ukraine. Secession movements are challenging to states, and disputes over the nature of these agreements, or lack thereof, will continue to compromise international security. Scotland and Catalonia are only two examples of nationalism in Europe today. Other independence movements, from the Basque region of Spain to Moldova’s Transnistria, will ensure that questions of identity within Europe remain unsettled.

“No comes out on top, alas” by Stephen Mackenzie via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0. Modified from original.

\\ FEATURED PROFESSOR

“VME 15Mar10_000 122” by isafmedia via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY 2.0. Modified from original.

USING THE “F” WORD IN SECURITY STUDIES Stéfanie von Hlatky, Phd.

On 20 SEPTEMBER 2014, the “F” word became cool again. Feminism that is. Harry Potter actress Emma Watson, the new UN Women goodwill ambassador, has made it her business. Her UN speech in New York was a global call for action and an opportunity to launch the HeForShe campaign, an initiative to promote gender equality by asking men to get involved. On another continent, the Australian Army Chief, Lieutenant General David Morrison, also became a feminist superstar this year when he denounced soldiers who disapprove of women’s presence in the military, telling them they should “get out” if gender equality didn’t “suit them.” His Youtube video went viral with

some fans branding him as the Unlikely Feminist Hero. Yes, it looks like feminism is back indeed. What is different this time is that feminism is meant to be mainstream, to inform popular attitudes internationally, but also, to guide government action at every stage of the policy-making process. In the realm of international security, this approach was enshrined almost fifteen years ago, when the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The Resolution promotes the participation of women in all phases of conflict, from prevention to resolution. More specifically, the Resolution “urges Member States to ensure increased representation of

women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict”. It highlights that interventions must take into account how conflict impacts everyone, women, men, girls and boys, in distinct ways. The gender mainstreaming approach is meant to demonstrate that there is no onesize-fits-all solution to address international security challenges. In this respect, I would argue that Canada is lagging behind because the gender perspective is adopted in our dealings with other nations, but ignored internally. This is especially the case in the Department of National Defence (DND), where gender mainstreaming is being contested. This is unfortunate because Canada is a country where there are no restrictions on female participation in the military. But while the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were among the first to open their ranks to women across the board (even in combat), they have

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FEATURED PROFESSOR // of Defence Staff, General Lawson has launched an External Independent Review that will be tasked with investigating sexual misconduct in the CAF, the issue has remained relatively low profile since the scandal broke out in April 2014. In addition to examining current policies and procedures for dealing with sexual harassment and misconduct in the armed forces, the inquiry should relate the investigation to the role military culture might play in systematically failing to deal with the problem. The fact that women have no role in shaping military organi“The CAF does not differentiate between women culture and men when selecting personnel for international zational (since the CAF operations, including peace support operations”. are gender blind) A gender-mainstreaming lens, by should be a focal point for this incontrast, would emphasize how rec- vestigation. ognizing differences between wom- Finally, where does that en and men can ultimately enhance leave us, students and researchers in security operations and overall mil- International Relations and Security itary effectiveness. Studies? Saying that gender, like race The US Marines acknowl- and class, is about structural power edged as much with the deployment relations is accurate and important of Female Engagement Teams in Af- but is still somehow relegated to the ghanistan, who were deployed with realm of “critical theories” or “alterinfantry units for community-level native approaches” to the discipline. engagement and intelligence gath- Here, what the gender-mainstreamering with Afghan women. Men, in ing approach offers is to consider this case, could not have done the gender as a variable. For example, if job given the cultural and religious “Female Marines Patrol Marjah” by Mavia Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC context. This small but significant rines 2.0. Modified from original. example is to show that focusing on how the integration of women can lead to a better overall force is more fruitful than denying that gender matters. To implement more long-lasting and positive changes to Canada’s military culture, gender diversity should be better understood, not disregarded. Refusing to recognize that gender matters in the military also seems profoundly misguided given the many allegations of sexual misconduct in the CAF. While the Chief refused to acknowledge that gender differences matter in the daily business of the military. Especially outdated are the policies by which women have been integrated into the military. While women have made great strides, since approximately 15% of Canadian military personnel is female, it’s time to further encourage women’s participation by showing how they can improve military effectiveness. Yet, DND’s preference for evacuating gender from the equation is clear in its official statements:

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you are consciously or unconsciously ignoring women in your policy analysis or research design, you should realize that you are ignoring half of the social reality. Dropping the “F” bomb and integrating gender as part of our thinking in both research and policy is not just another ideological struggle, it’s sound scientific practice. Practitioners who have witnessed the benefits of gender mainstreaming, like Lieutenant General Morrison, can act as champions of change, while university professors can participate by including the gender perspective as yet another variable of significance that should be examined. After all, gender mainstreaming is about making the consideration of gender routine in the way we study global problems and design responses to them. This is not just a fad, it’s a skill we should all strive to develop. Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky is Director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Studies. She is also the founder of Women in International Security - Canada.