Principles of Comparative Politics 3rd Edition Golder Test Bank

Principles of Comparative Politics 3rd Edition Golder Test Bank

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Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 2: What Is Science?

Logic Questions 1. Major premise: If a country has a strong economy, the government will be popular.

Minor premise: The government is not popular.

Conclusion: Therefore, the country does not have a strong economy.

Is this a valid argument?

A. Yes. B. No. Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 2. Major premise: If a country has a strong economy, the government will be popular.

Minor premise: The government is not popular.

Conclusion: Therefore, the country does not have a strong economy.

What form (what type of categorical syllogism) does this argument take?

A. affirming the antecedent B. denying the antecedent C. affirming the consequent D. denying the consequent Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 3. Major premise: If the president commits a criminal act, then he can be impeached.

Minor premise: The president does not commit a criminal act.

Conclusion: Therefore, the president cannot be impeached.

Is this a valid argument?

A. Yes. B. No. Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 4. Major premise: If the president commits a criminal act, then he can be impeached.

Minor premise: The president does not commit a criminal act.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Conclusion: Therefore, the president cannot be impeached.

What form (what type of categorical syllogism) does this argument take?

A. affirming the antecedent B. denying the antecedent C. affirming the consequent D. denying the consequent Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 5. Major premise: If the president commits a criminal act, then he can be impeached.

Minor premise: The president cannot be impeached.

Conclusion: Therefore, the president has not committed a criminal act.

Is this a valid argument?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 6. Major premise: If the president commits a criminal act, then he can be impeached.

Minor premise: The president cannot be impeached.

Conclusion: Therefore, the president has not committed a criminal act.

What form (what type of categorical syllogism) does this argument take?

A. affirming the antecedent B. denying the antecedent C. affirming the consequent D. denying the consequent Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 7. Major premise: If a country employs proportional representation electoral rules, it will have many parties.

Minor premise: The country does not employ proportional representation electoral rules.

Conclusion: Therefore, the country does not have many parties.

Is this a valid argument?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 8. Major premise: If a country employs proportional representation electoral rules, it will have many parties.

Minor premise: The country does not employ proportional representation electoral rules.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Conclusion: Therefore, the country does not have many parties.

What form (what type of categorical syllogism) does this argument take?

A. affirming the antecedent B. denying the antecedent C. affirming the consequent D. denying the consequent Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 9. Major premise: If theory T is correct, all rich countries will be democracies.

Minor premise: All rich countries are democracies.

Conclusion: Therefore, theory T is correct.

Is this a valid argument?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 10. Major premise: If theory T is correct, all rich countries will be democracies.

Minor premise: All rich countries are democracies.

Conclusion: Therefore, theory T is correct.

What form (what type of categorical syllogism) does this argument take?

A. affirming the antecedent B. denying the antecedent C. affirming the consequent D. denying the consequent Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 11. Consider the following premise: “If theory T is correct, all rich countries will be democracies.” If you wanted to demonstrate that theory T was wrong, what would you have to observe?

A. a poor democracy B. a rich dictatorship C. a poor dictatorship D. a rich democracy Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 12. Major premise: If a country’s electoral rules are permissive, then votes should be translated into seats in a fairly proportional manner.

Minor premise: In the most recent election, votes were not translated into seats in a proportional manner.

Conclusion: Therefore, the country’s electoral rules are not permissive.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Is this a valid argument?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 13. Major premise: If a country’s electoral rules are permissive, then votes should be translated into seats in a fairly proportional manner.

Minor premise: In the most recent election, votes were not translated into seats in a proportional manner.

Conclusion: Therefore, the country’s electoral rules are not permissive.

What form (what type of categorical syllogism) does this argument take?

A. affirming the antecedent B. denying the antecedent C. affirming the consequent D. denying the consequent Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 14. Major premise: If a country has a participant culture, then democracy in that country will be stable.

Minor premise: Democracy in country X is stable.

Conclusion: Therefore, country X has a participant culture.

Is this a valid argument?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 15. Major premise: If a country has a participant culture, then democracy in that country will be stable.

Minor premise: Democracy in country X is stable.

Conclusion: Therefore, country X has a participant culture.

What form (what type of categorical syllogism) does this argument take?

A. affirming the antecedent B. denying the antecedent C. affirming the consequent D. denying the consequent Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 16. A valid argument is

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> A. one where the conclusion is true.

B. one where the conclusion is false.

C. one where you do not have to accept the conclusion if you accept the premises.

D. one where you have to accept the conclusion if you accept the premises.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 17. The deductive approach to learning A. starts with a set of observations and then tries to ascertain a pattern in the observations that can be used to generate an explanation.

B. formulates an expectation about what we ought to observe in light of a particular theory about the world and then sets out to see if the observations are consistent with that theory.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 18. If I observe a pattern in political events and decide to generate an explanation for those events, I am practicing ______ approach to learning.

A. deductive B. inductive C. deterministic D. probabilistic Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 19. If I derive some implications from a theory and collect observations to see if they are consistent with that theory, I am practicing ______ approach to learning.

A. deductive B. inductive C. deterministic D. probabilistic Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 20. Inductive reasoning is problematic because it relies on A. affirming the antecedent.

B. denying the antecedent.

C. affirming the consequent.

D. denying the consequent.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy

Scientific Statements 1. “Smoking increases the probability of getting cancer.” Is this a scientific statement?

A. Yes

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 2. “The sun revolves around the earth.” Is this a scientific statement?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 3. “Education spending increases under left-wing governments.” Is this a scientific statement?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 4. “Iceland is a country.” Is this a scientific statement?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 5. “Religious faith assures a person a place in the afterlife.” Is this a scientific statement?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 6. “Democracies are less likely to go to war than dictatorships.” Is this a scientific statement?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 7. “Democratic leaders are more likely to provide public goods for their citizens than dictators are.” Is this a scientific statement?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 8. “Dictators are more likely to provide public goods for their citizens than democratic leaders are.” Is this a scientific statement?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 9. “Smoking causes people to be taller than six feet.” Is this a scientific statement?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 10. “All mainstream U.S. senators agree that the House bill is unacceptable.” Is this statement scientific if “mainstream” is defined in terms of the acceptability of the House bill?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 11. “All mainstream U.S. senators agree that the House bill is unacceptable.” Is this statement scientific if “mainstream” is defined in terms of the ideology of the senators?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 12. “All good students get high grades.” Is this statement scientific if “good” is defined in terms of a student’s grade?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 13. “All good students get high grades.” Is this statement scientific if “good” is defined in terms of a student’s enthusiasm?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 1. “If a DEMOCRACY IS WEALTHY, then it will stay a democracy.” Are the conditions shown in capital letters sufficient or necessary to produce the effects described?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> A. Sufficient B. Necessary Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 2. “A country cannot maintain a democratic form of government unless IT HAS A CULTURE THAT PROMOTES CIVIC PARTICIPATION.” Are the conditions shown in capital letters sufficient or necessary to produce the effects described?

A. Sufficient B. Necessary Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 3. “Countries have many parties only WHEN THEY EMPLOY PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL RULES.” Are the conditions shown in capital letters sufficient or necessary to produce the effects described?

A. Sufficient B. Necessary Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 4. “Countries always have few parties WHEN THEY EMPLOY MAJORITARIAN ELECTORAL RULES.” Are the conditions shown in capital letters sufficient or necessary to produce the effects described?

A. Sufficient

B. Necessary Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 5. “IF A COUNTRY’S POPULATION IS ETHNICALLY HETEROGENEOUS, then it will experience political conflict.” Are the conditions shown in capital letters sufficient or necessary to produce the effects described?

A. Sufficient

B. Necessary Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 6. “A country cannot maintain democracy UNLESS IT HAS A TOLERANT CULTURE.” Are the conditions shown in capital letters sufficient or necessary to produce the effects described?

A. Sufficient B. Necessary Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 7. “Countries always maintain democratic regimes IF THEY HAVE A STRONG URBAN CLASS.” Are the conditions shown in capital letters sufficient or necessary to produce the effects described?

A. Sufficient B. Necessary Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Science 1. A falsifiable statement means that A. the statement is not scientific.

B. the statement is wrong.

C. the statement is potentially testable.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 2. Scientists never prove that their theories are correct. However, they can A. demonstrate that their theories are logically valid.

B. use empirical evidence to show that their theories are wrong.

C. claim that some theories have more empirical support than others.

D. all of these.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 3. A scientific statement must be falsifiable.

A. True B. False Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 4. Science is a collection of facts—it tells us what we know about the world.

A. True B. False Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 5. Statements that cannot ever be tested must be wrong.

A. True B. False Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Comparative Method 1. Imagine that an analyst is interested in understanding why civil wars occur. If the analyst chooses to study only cases in which civil wars have occurred (e.g., in the Congo, Greece, Spain, Sri Lanka, the United States, and Yugoslavia), then she is using A. Mill’s Method of Agreement.

B. Mill’s Method of Difference.

C. Mill’s Method of Agreement and Method of Difference.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 2. Imagine that an analyst is interested in understanding why civil wars occur. If the analyst chooses to study some cases in which civil war occurred (Greece, Spain, and Yugoslavia. and some cases in which they did not (Belgium, Italy, Switzerland), then he is using A. Mill’s Method of Agreement.

B. Mill’s Method of Difference.

C. Mill’s Method of Agreement and Method of Difference.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 3. According to the discussion in Chapter 2, it is possible for scientists to draw valid inferences from Mill’s Methods of Agreement and Difference only if A. the causal process is deterministic.

B. all the potential causes have been identified.

C. there is a single cause of the outcome.

D. none of these D. all of the assumptions listed must hold.

Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 3: What Is Politics?

Extensive Form Games 1. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium or equilibria of the game shown here?

Recall that the equilibrium should be written in the following form: (Player 1’s move at the first node, Player 2’s move at her top subgame, and Player 2’s move at her lower subgame).

A. (D; d, u) B. (U; u) C. (U; u, d) D. (D, d) D. (u, d; U) Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 2. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium or equilibria of the game shown here?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Recall that the equilibrium should be written in the following form: (Player 1’s move at the first node, Player 2’s move at her top subgame, and Player 2’s move at her lower subgame).

A. (D; u, u) B. (D; d, u) C. (D; u) D. (D; u, u) (D; d, u) E. (U; d, u) (U; d, d) Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 3. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium or equilibria of the game shown here?

Recall that the equilibrium should be written in the following form: (Player 1’s move at the first node, Player 2’s move at her top subgame, and Player 2’s move at her lower subgame).

A. (D; d, d) B. (D; d) C. (C; d, c) D. (C; c) Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 4. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium or equilibria of the game shown here?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Recall that the equilibrium should be written in the following form: (Player 1’s move at the first node, Player 2’s move at her top subgame, and Player 2’s move at her lower subgame).

A. (R; r) B. (L; l) C. (R; r) (L; l) D. (R; r, l) (L; r, l) E. (R; l) Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 5. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium or equilibria of the game shown here?

Recall that the equilibrium should be written in the following form: (Player 1’s move at the first node and Player 2’s move at the second subgame).

A. (U) B. (D; d) C. (U; d) D. (U; u, d) E. None of these Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 6. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium or equilibria of the game shown here?

Recall that the equilibrium should be written in the following form: (Player 1’s move at her first node, Player 1’s move at her last subgame, and Player 2’s move at his [only] subgame).

A. (U) B. (D; d) C. (D; u; R) D. (D; R) E. (D, R; u) Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Questions 1–3 (Exit, Voice, and Loyalty) go together.

1. Below is the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game between the state and the citizen. Recall that E is the payoff that the citizen gets when she exits, L is the payoff that the state gets from retaining a loyal citizen, 0 is the payoff that the citizen gets from remaining loyal, and C is the cost that the citizen must pay for using voice.

Let E = 0.5, let L > 1, and let C = 0.25.

What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium or equilibria for the game if you use these payoff values?

1 – C; L Respond

0 – C; 1 + L Ignore

Voice

Loyalty Loyalty

0; 1 + L Exit

Exit

E; 1

E – C; 1

Recall that the equilibrium should be written in the following form: (citizen’s move at her first node, citizen’s move at her last subgame, state’s move at his [only] subgame).

A. voice, exit; respond B. voice; exit C. voice; respond; exit D. exit, exit; respond E. voice, respond; ignore Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 2. What is the expected outcome of the game if you use these payoff values?

A. citizen uses voice, state responds B. citizen uses voice, state responds, citizen exits C. citizen exits D. citizen remains loyal

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> E. citizen uses voice, state ignores.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 3. What are the equilibrium payoffs for each player if you use these payoff values?

A. −.25; 1 + L B. .5, 1 C. .75; L D. .25; 1 E. 0; 1 + L Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Questions 4–6 (Exit, Voice, and Loyalty) go together.

4. Below is the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game between the state and the citizen. Recall that E is the payoff that the citizen gets when she exits, L is the payoff that the state gets from retaining a loyal citizen, 0 is the payoff that the citizen gets from remaining loyal, and C is the cost that the citizen must pay for using voice.

Let E = 0.5, let L > 1, and let C = 0.75.

What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium or equilibria for the game if you use these payoff values?

1 – C; L Respond

0 – C; 1 + L Ignore

Voice

Loyalty

Loyalty

0; 1 + L Exit

Exit

E; 1

E – C; 1

Recall that the equilibrium should be written in the following form: (citizen’s move at her first node, citizen’s move at her last subgame; state’s move at his [only] subgame).

A. exit, exit; respond B. voice, exit; respond

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> C. loyalty, exit; respond D. exit E. voice, exit; ignore Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 5. What is the expected outcome of the game if you use these payoff values?

A. citizen uses voice, state backs down B. citizen uses voice, state backs down, citizen exits C. citizen exits D. citizen remains loyal E. citizen uses voice, state backs down Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 6. What are the equilibrium payoffs for each player if you use these payoff values?

A. 0; 1 + L B. .25; 1 C. −.5; 1 + L D. −.25; 1 E. .5; 1 Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 7. What is required for a citizen to be able to easily influence the state according to the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game examined in Chapter 3?

A. The citizen can never influence the state.

B. The citizen must have a credible exit threat (E > 0).

C. The state must depend on the citizen (L > 1).

D. Voice must not be too costly (C < 1 − E).

E. The citizen must have a credible exit threat (E > 0), the state must be dependent (L > 1), and voice must not be too costly (C < 1 − E).

Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 8. Drawing on the insights from the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game examined in Chapter 3, what inferences could we have made about the citizens of the repressive East German regime during the height of the cold war (say, the 1960s through the early 1980s)?

A. that the citizens had a credible exit threat B. that the citizens did NOT have a credible exit threat C. We wouldn’t be able to tell if the citizens had a credible exit threat or not based on what we could observe at the time.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 9. Drawing on the insights from the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game examined in Chapter 3, what inferences could we have made about the government (the state of the repressive East German regime during the height of the cold war (say, the 1960s through the early 1980s)?

A. that the state was dependent B. that the state was autonomous C. We wouldn’t be able to tell if the state was dependent or autonomous based on what we could observe at the time.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 10. One of the insights from the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game is that it can be difficult to figure out who has power and who does not simply by observing their actions in the real world.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 11. According to the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty argument, what type of activity are people engaging in when they switch political parties?

A. exit B. voice C. loyalty Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 12. Drawing on the insights from the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game examined in Chapter 3, what can we infer when we see states ignoring the demands of their citizens? For example, if we know that the average North Korean citizen stays in North Korea and is badly treated by the government, and we also see the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il ignoring his citizens, then we can infer A. That the citizens have no exit threat and that the state (Kim Jong-Il) depends on the citizens.

B. That the citizens do have a credible exit threat and that the state depends on the citizens.

C. That the citizens do have a credible exit threat and that the state is autonomous.

D. We can’t assume anything about whether the citizens have a credible exit threat but we can assume that the state is autonomous.

E. We can’t assume anything about whether the state is autonomous or dependent, but we can assume that the citizens do not have a credible exit threat.

Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 13. Drawing on the insights from the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game examined in Chapter 3, what can we infer by the differing responses by the U.S. government following the financial crisis to the requests by the financial sector and U.S. automakers for bailouts?

A. The government did not depend on the support of the financial sector and automakers.

B. The government did not depend on the support of U.S. automakers.

C. The financial sector did not have a credible exit threat.

D. The U.S. automakers did not have a credible exit threat.

E. Neither the financial sector nor the U.S. automakers had credible exit threats.

Ans: D

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 14. Compared to the bailouts that the financial sector received following the financial crisis, the U.S. automakers: A. received a bailout similar in size.

B. received a much smaller bailout much more quickly.

C. received a much smaller bailout much slower.

D. received a much larger bailout.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 15. The Exit, Voice and Loyalty game explains the difficulty in the U.S. automakers receiving a bailout following the financial crisis compared to the financial sector by stating that the state was not dependent on the support of the automakers.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 16. The Exit, Voice and Loyalty game explains the difficulty in the U.S. automakers receiving a bailout following the financial crisis compared to the financial sector by stating that the automakers did not have a credible exit threat.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 17. Imagine that you are unhappy with your current job because you think you should have received a raise but your boss did not give you one. In this story, you can think of yourself as the “citizen” and your boss as the “state.” According to the predictions of the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game, in which of the scenarios shown below should you ask for a raise (that is, “use voice”)?

A. When you really need the job, have little chance of finding another, and when your boss could easily replace you.

B. When you really need the job, have little chance of finding another, and when your boss could NOT easily replace you.

C. When you don’t really need the job because you could easily find another similar job, and when your boss could easily replace you.

D. When you don’t really need the job because you could easily find another similar job, and when your boss could NOT easily replace you. e. According to the assumptions and logic of the EVL model, you should always ask for a raise in any of the scenarios listed above in answers (a–d).

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Above is the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game between the state (S) and the citizen (C). E is what the citizen gets from her exit option. R is what the state gets from the support (revenue) of the citizen. 0 is what the citizen gets for remaining loyal to the state. c is the cost for the citizen of exercising her voice option.

For the following questions, let R =2. Let c = 0.25.

18. Let E = 0.50. Write the payoffs for both actors in the game below. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? Please answer in the form (citizen’s 1st choice, citizen’s 2nd choice; state’s choice).

Ans: (Demand limits, Disinvest; Accept limits) Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

19. Now let E = −.25. . Write the payoffs for both actors in the game above. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? Please answer in the form (citizen’s 1st choice, citizen’s 2nd choice; state’s choice).

Ans: (Pay taxes, Pay taxes; Reject limits) Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 20. Given that the state depends on the citizen in this example (R > 1), to what extent does the citizen’s behavior depend on the attractiveness of her exit options? (3 points) Ans: Under these conditions, the citizen demand limits on state behavior if she has credible exit options, otherwise she pays taxes at start of game and makes no demands on the state.

Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 21. Given that the state depends on the citizen in this example (R > 1), to what extent does the state’s behavior depend on the attractiveness of the citizen’s exit options? (3 points) Ans: If the citizen lacks exit options, the state can reject the citizen’s demands–which deters such demands from being made. If the citizen has exit options, the state will accept limits on its behavior.

Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank

Chapter 4: The Origins of the Modern State Normal or Strategic Form Games Questions 1–2 (Normal or Strategic Form Games) go together.

1. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) in the game shown below?

A. Cooperate; Cooperate B. Cooperate; Cooperate and Defect; Defect C. Cooperate; Defect D. Defect; Defect E. Defect; Cooperate Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 2. What would you expect the outcome of this game to be?

A. I would expect both players to cooperate.

B. I would expect both players to defect.

C. Because there was more than one Nash equilibrium, it is difficult to say what the actual outcome of the game would be.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 3. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) in the game shown below?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

A. D; d B. none of these C. U; u D. D; u E. U; d Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 4. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) in the game shown below?

A. U, u B. none of these C. U, u; D, d D. D, u; U, d; D, d E. D; d Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 5. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) in the game shown below?

A. U, u; D, d B. none of these

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> C. U, u D. D, u; U, d E. D, d Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 6. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) in the game shown below?

A. U, u; U, d B. none of these C. U, u D. D, u E. U, d Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Questions 7–12 go together.

DVD Player Game 7. In 2006, there were a number of media reports about the next generation of DVD players, which produce much clearer picture and sound than that produced by current machines. However, there are two competing formats, Blu-ray (Sony) and HD DVD (Toshiba). Both are affiliated with certain movie studios, which have agreed to release their movies in one or the other of the new formats. This creates a problem for the producers of this new technology—they all want their own version to win out, but by competing they make it entirely likely that most consumers will sit back and wait until (a) one of the formats is a clear winner or (b) a newer, even better, method of supplying movies is developed by someone else. If the latter happens, both Sony and Toshiba lose out.

Imagine that both companies have developed a new product, but with different formats. If one of the companies would be willing to switch quickly (assume that copyright laws would allow it to produce something similar), that company would lose some time and market share but be able to get into the market. Consumers would be more willing to buy the new technology, and both companies would make more money. If neither company is willing to coordinate with the other, they end up in a war of attrition, with fewer customers. This is shown in the game below.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

What payoff would Toshiba get if it chose to produce HD DVD and Sony chose to produce Blu-Ray? A. 1.

B. 2.

C. 3.

D. 4.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 8. What payoff would Sony get if it chose to switch to HD DVD and Toshiba chose to produce HD DVD? A. 1.

B. 2.

C. 3.

D. 4.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 9. Which of the following preference orderings describes the way that Toshiba ranks the four possible outcomes? (Note: if X Y, then X is preferred to Y.) A. Both players produce HD DVD Toshiba produces HD DVD, Sony produces Blu-Ray Both players produce Blu-Ray Toshiba produces Blu-Ray, Sony produces HD DVD. B. Both players produce HD DVD Both players produce Blu-Ray Toshiba produces HD DVD, Sony produces Blu-Ray  Toshiba produces Blu-Ray, Sony produces HD DVD.  Both players produce HD DVD Toshiba produces HD DVD, Sony C. Both players produce Blu-Ray  produces Blu-Ray Toshiba produces Blu-Ray, Sony produces HD DVD.   Ans: B  Cognitive Domain: Application   Difficulty Level: Hard



10. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) in the game?

A. Switch to Blu-Ray; Blu-Ray and HD DVD; Switch to HD DVD B. Switch to Blu-Ray; Blu-Ray C. HD DVD; Blu-Ray D. HD DVD; Switch to HD DVD Ans: A

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 11. What is (are) the expected outcome (outcomes) of the game?

A. Because there was only one Nash equilibrium, I would expect both players to choose the strategies that constitute that equilibrium.

B. Because there was more than one Nash equilibrium, it is difficult to say what the actual outcome of the game would be.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 12. In the game, do the players (Sony and Toshiba) move simultaneously or sequentially?

A. Simultaneously B. Sequentially Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium Questions 13–16 go together.

Military Intervention Game 13. In the strategic game shown in Figure 1, below, the military in some unidentified country is split between those who wish to intervene in the political system and launch a coup (overthrowing the civilian government) and those who wish to maintain their apolitical position as members of the armed forces. Both military factions prefer that the military act as a cohesive unit, however.

What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) in the game?

A. Launch coup; Launch coup B. Stay out; Stay out C. Launch coup; Stay out D. Launch coup, Launch coup and Stay out; Stay out Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Figure 1: Normal Form Military Intervention Game

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

14. What can you say about how you expect the two factions to act if they were to play this game?

A. I would expect both players to launch a coup.

B. I would expect both players to stay out.

C. I would expect the interveners to launch a coup and the professional faction to stay out.

D. I would expect either A or B above would occur, but the game doesn’t allow me to say anything about which one is more likely.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 15. A similar situation between two military factions is shown in the extensive form game shown below. The key difference with the earlier game is that the faction that wishes to take over the civilian government makes the first move.

Figure 2: Extensive Form Military Intervention Game

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium?

A. Launch coup; Launch coup, Launch coup B. Stay out; Launch coup, Stay out C. Launch coup; Launch coup, Stay out D. Launch coup, Launch coup and Stay out; Stay out Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 16. If you were the leader of the military faction that wished to maximize its chances of intervening in your county’s politics, would it make a difference whether you were playing the Military Intervention Game shown in Figure 1 or the Military Intervention Game shown in Figure 2?

A. Yes, I would prefer to be playing the game in Figure 1.

B. Yes, I would prefer to be playing the game in Figure 2.

C. No, it wouldn’t make a difference to me which of the two games I was playing.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard Questions 17–24 go together.

Free Trade Game 17. Free trade occurs when goods and services between countries flow unhindered by governmentimposed restrictions such as tariffs, quotas, and antidumping laws that are often designed to protect domestic industries. Although it is well known that free trade creates winners and losers, a broad consensus exists among most economists that free trade has a large and unambiguous net gain for society as a whole. For example, Robert Whaples (2006) finds in a survey of economists that “87.5% agree that the U.S. should eliminate remaining tariffs and other barriers to trade” and that “90.1% disagree with the suggestion that the U.S. should restrict employers from outsourcing work to foreign countries.” Despite this consensus, it is not at all clear that countries will actually adopt policies promoting free trade.

Consider the following strategic situation in which the United States and the European Union (EU) are engaged in trade negotiations. Both countries must decide whether to reduce their tariffs or impose new tariffs. The best outcome for both countries is for them to impose new tariffs and for the other side to reduce tariffs; they could then export more easily to the other country and they would obtain increased revenue from the new tariffs. The worst outcome for both countries is for them to reduce tariffs and for the other country to increase tariffs; they would lose jobs as a result of reduced exports and the other country would benefit from their lower tariffs. Of the remaining two outcomes, both countries prefer the outcome in which they reduce tariffs to the one in which they both impose new tariffs. If both countries reduce their tariffs, then each country can benefit from increased free trade. If both countries impose new tariffs, there is a trade war in which each country sees a decline in trade and a loss of jobs. Based on this story, the preference ordering for the EU over the four possible outcomes is: • Impose; Reduce ; Reduce Impose; Impose Reduce; Impose.







Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> And the preference ordering for the United States is: • Reduce; Impose Reduce; Reduce Impose; Impose Impose; Reduce, where the EU’s action is given first, the United States’ action is given second, and “ ” means “is strictly preferred to.”







Using the ordinal preferences (4, 3, 2, 1) to capture these preference orderings, fill  in the empty payoff matrix. Based on the preference orderings in the Free Trade Game, what is this sort of game more generally called?

Figure 1: Free Trade Game

A. prisoner’s dilemma B. pure coordination game C. chicken D. asymmetric coordination game Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 18. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) of the game?

A. Reduce Tariffs; Reduce Tariffs B. Reduce Tariffs; Impose Tariffs C. Impose Tariffs; Reduce Tariffs D. Impose Tariffs; Impose Tariffs E. there is no Nash equilibrium Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 19. Does the European Union have a dominant strategy in the Free Trade Game?

A. Yes, reduce tariffs B. Yes, impose new tariffs C. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 20. Does the United States have a dominant strategy in the Free Trade Game?

A. Yes, reduce tariffs B. Yes, impose new tariffs C. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 21. What is (are) the expected outcome (outcomes) of the game?

A. Increased free trade.

B. lost jobs in European Union (EU), increased revenue for United States.

C. increased revenue in EU, lost jobs in the United States D. trade war E. can’t say because there was no Nash equilibrium Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard So far, you have solved the Free Trade Game assuming that it is played only once. In reality, though, countries often trade with each other many times and engage in multiple rounds of trade negotiations.

We now examine the Free Trade Game assuming that it is played over and over again. The European Union and the United States must now decide how to play the Free Trade Game in each round. Let’s assume that both countries play grim trigger strategies. In the present context, a grim trigger strategy means that a country will continue to reduce tariffs as long as the other country reduces its tariffs; but if the other country ever imposes new tariffs, it will impose new tariffs in the next round and in all future rounds.

22. Using the payoffs from the Free Trade Game, what is the present value of reducing tariffs?

A. 4/(1 − δ) B. 3/(1 − δ) C. 4 + 2δ/(1 − δ) D. δ/(1 − δ) Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 23. Using the payoffs from the Free Trade Game, what is the present value of imposing new tariffs?

A. 4/(1 − δ) B. 3/(1 − δ) C. 4 + 2δ/(1 − δ) D. δ/(1 − δ)

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 24. Is there a discount rate that it is possible to sustain (reduce tariffs; reduce tariffs) as a Nash equilibrium in this repeated Free Trade Game if the European Union and the United States use grim trigger strategies? If so, what is it?

A. Yes: δ > 0.25.

B. Yes: δ > 0.50.

C. No. D. Yes: δ > 0.75.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Questions 25–26 go together.

Mafia Game 25. In Chapter 4, we described the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in which two prisoners had to choose between ratting out their partner or keeping quiet. The Nash equilibrium in this game involved both prisoners’ deciding to talk even though they would both have been better off keeping quiet. If any of you watch episodes of Law and Order, TV’s longest running crime series, this scenario will probably be very familiar to you. However, many of you will probably be aware that there are certain types of criminals in the real world who rarely talk or rat out their accomplices. In particular, it is well known that members of the Mafia or Cosa Nostra rarely provide incriminating evidence against their accomplices. Why is this? The answer is that the Mafia organization imposes a cost, often physical and deadly, on anyone who talks to the police. This additional cost changes the structure of the strategic situation in which the two prisoners find themselves. Rather than playing the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma, we can think that the prisoners are playing a Mafia Game with a payoff matrix like the one shown in Figure 1, below; “c” is the cost imposed by the Mafia on a suspect who talks.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Figure 1: Mafia Game

What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) of the Mafia Game if c = 0?

A. Quiet; Quiet B. Talk; Talk C. Quiet; Talk and Talk, Quiet D. Quiet; Quiet and Talk; Talk Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

26. In the Mafia Game, what is the minimum cost that the Mafia needs to impose on members who talk in order for the Nash equilibrium to be one in which both suspects keep quiet?

A. anything greater than 10 B. 5 C. anything greater than 5 D. anything greater than 0 Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Questions 27–28 go together.

American Football Game 27. In an American football game, we can think that the offense has four possible strategies to progress down the field: run the ball, short throws, medium throws, and long throws. The defense has three strategies to try to stop this: counter the run, counter the pass, or blitz the quarterback. Let’s say that after studying many games, statisticians have come up with the payoff matrix shown in Figure 1, below, where the numbers in each cell indicate the expected number of yards either gained by the

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> offense or lost by the defense. As you can see, every yard gained by the offense is a yard lost by the defense. As always, the players prefer higher numbers to lower numbers.

Figure 1: American Football Game

What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria)?

A. Run; Counter run B. Short pass; Counter pass C. Run; Blitz D. Medium pass; Counter pass Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 28. Does the offense have a dominant strategy?

A. Yes: Run B. Yes: Short pass C. No D. Yes: Medium pass E. Yes: Long pass Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Origins of the State 1. A common factor in standard definitions of “the state” is A. that the state is an entity that uses force and/or coercion.

B. that the state is an entity that controls a given territory.

C. that those who govern are chosen by representative elections.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> D. all of these are common factors in the definition of the state.

E. Only (A) and (B) apply to standard definitions of the state.

Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 2. According to the definition of the “state” in Chapter 4, both democratic and nondemocratic states rule through coercion and the use of force.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 3. A failed state is a statelike entity that cannot coerce and is unable to successfully control the inhabitants of a given territory.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 4. The contractarian view of the state sees the creation of the state as resulting from a social contract between individuals in the state of nature in which the state provides security in exchange for obedience from the citizen.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy .

5. Social contract theorists see a security dilemma as existing primarily between A. individuals.

B. states.

C. individuals and the state.

D. ethnic groups.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 6. “The state of nature” describes situations in which there is no state.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 7. Individuals enjoy civil rights in the state of nature.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 8. Scholars who take a predatory view of the state see a security dilemma as existing primarily between A. individuals.

B. states.

C. individuals and the state.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> D. ethnic groups.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 9. The predatory view of the state holds that states that exercise an effective control over the use of violence are in a position to threaten the security of citizens, and thereby exploit them.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 10. Those who imagine that life in the state of nature is intolerable (or, for instance, “nasty, brutish, and short”) are more likely to A. accept a state only if it is subject to strict limits on what it can demand of its citizens.

B. accept giving up a great deal of rights (and revenue. in exchange for a state capable of offering protection.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 11. If the state is seen as a benign third party willing to protect citizens from each other in exchange for taxes, this is referred to as the A. contractarian view of the state.

B. predatory view of the state.

C. state of nature.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 12. As discussed in Chapter 4, Tilly argues that states first developed in early modern Europe when rulers (lords, kings, and the like). tried to eliminate or neutralize both internal and external rivals, to protect their own citizens (subjects), and to raise enough revenue to be able to carry out these activities. A key part of Tilly’s argument is that the principal goal of these rulers was to A. stay in power.

B. develop a state.

C. maintain the loyalty of subjects Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 13. According to Tilly, the political geography of modern Europe (that is, the development of states) was essentially an unintended consequence of the strategies employed by lords and kings to keep a grasp on power.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 14. If a state can use force against its citizens, and can use this coercive ability to demand that its citizens provide it with as much revenue (wealth, taxes, and so on) as it chooses, why wouldn’t a state act in a predatory manner?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> A. They do—we should expect all states to be predatory in an unlimited fashion.

B. If a state expects to be able extract more resources over time by committing to limit its predation, then it should do so.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium 15. According to the discussion of the contractarian view of the state in Chapter 4, in order for a state (civil society) to emerge from an initial “state of nature” situation, it must be the case that the state (a) is willing to impose sufficiently high punishments to deter individuals from engaging in antisocial behavior and (b) is also willing to refrain from taxing its citizens excessively.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 16. What is/are the defining characteristics of a state?

A. it is an entity that exists in a given territory B. it is an entity that rules through coercion C. it is an entity created by social contracts D. it is an entity that rules through coercion in a given territory Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 17. In Chapter 4, Somalia was used as an example of a failed state. What country invaded Somalia in December 2006 to help prevent the emergence of an Islamic state?

A. Eritrea B. Djibouti C. Ethiopia D. Kenya D. Darfur Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy

18. Why does Tilly describe the state as a protection racket?

A. because the state promises to protect the citizens B. because the state falsely promises to protect the citizens C. because the state promises to protect the citizens from dangers that it poses to them D. because he is referring to dictatorial states Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium Answer the questions about the following games in the space allotted: (all questions are worth 3 points unless otherwise noted

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Game 1:

19. What are the Nash equilibria in Game 1? Respond in the form (Player 1’s strategy; Player 2’s strategy).

Ans: Down; Left and Up; Right Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 20. Which strategy combination produces a Pareto optimal outcome (in Game 1)?

Ans: Down; Left and Up; Right Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Game 2:

21. What is the Nash equilibrium in Game 2?

Ans: Steal; Steal Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 22. What strategy combinations produce pareto optimal outcomes (in Game 2)?

Ans: All but (Steal; Steal)—that is, (Don’t steal; Don’t steal), (Steal; Don’t steal), and (Don’t steal; Steal).

Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Game 3:

23. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium in Game 3? Please answer in the form (Player 1’s strategy; Player 2’s strategy).

Ans: Down; South Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 24. What strategy combinations would produce pareto optimal outcomes in Game 3?

Ans: Up; North and Up; South Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 25. What might the players find frustrating about Game 3?

Ans: The outcome produced by (Up; North) is preferred by both players to the outcome produced by individually rational behavior. (Very good students might say, “Despite being preferred by both players, the outcome produced by [Up; North] is unattainable because it requires Player 1 to accept as credible Player 2’s incredible promise to not play ‘South’ in response to ‘Up.’”) Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard Game 4:

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 26. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium in Game 4? Please answer in the form (Player 1’s choice; Player 2’s choice at top node, Player 2’s choice at bottom node).

Ans: Steal; Steal, Steal Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 27. What strategy combinations would lead to pareto optimal outcomes in Game 4?

Ans: Don’t steal; Don’t steal, Don’t steal Don’t steal; Don’t steal, Steal Don’t steal; Steal, Don’t steal Don’t steal; Steal, Steal Steal; Don’t steal, Don’t steal Steal; Steal, Don’t steal Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard Compare Game 4 with Game 2 28. What is similar about their structure?

Ans: Each of two players has a choice between steal and don’t steal; payoffs for each action combination is the same in the two games.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 29. What is different about their structure?

Ans: In Game 4, Player 2 gets to observe Player 1’s choice before making a decision.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 30. What, if anything, is different about the expected behavior of the players in Games 2 and 4?

Ans: Nothing Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 31. Answer the following questions (3 points each) about the game in Figure 1

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

U

r

(3, 2)

l

(1, 1)

r

(1, 1)

2

1 D 2

l

(2, 3)

Figure 1 32a. List all of the logically possible strategy combinations for the game in Figure 1 (please use the following convention: [“Player 1’s strategy;” "Player 2’s action at upper node,” “Player 2’s action at lower node”]).

Ans: U; r, r U; r,l U; l, l U; l,r D; r, r D; r, l D; l, l D; l, r Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 32b. List each of the strategy combinations for the game in Figure 1 that are subgame perfect Nash equilibria.

Ans: U; r, l Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 33. Answer the following questions (3 points each) related to the game in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

34a. List all of the logically possible strategy combinations for the game in Figure 2 (please use the following convention: [“Player 1’s strategy;” “Player 2’s strategy”]).

Ans: U; r U; l D; r D; l Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 34b. List each of the strategy combinations for the game in Figure 2 that are Nash equilibria.

Ans: U; r D; l Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 5: Democracy and Dictatorship: Conceptualization and Measurement Questions 1–3 go together.

1. The Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) measure of democracy classifies a country as a democracy if (a) the chief executive is elected, (b) the legislature is elected, (c) more than one party competes, and (d) there has been an alternation in power. The Freedom House measure classifies a country’s level of “freedom” based on many criteria, including whether the government is accountable, the level of corruption, if minorities are autonomous, if people are treated equally under the law, if they have equality of opportunity, and so on. Say you had the following hypothesis: Governments are less corrupt in democracies than in non-democracies.

If you want your hypothesis to be falsifiable, which measure of democracy should you use?

A. you should use DD B. you should use Freedom House C. you could use either measure and the hypothesis would be falsifiable D. you should not use either measure Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 2. Say you had the following hypothesis: Democracies are more likely than dictatorships to join international organizations.

If you want your hypothesis to be falsifiable, which measure of democracy should you use?

A. You should use Democracy-Dictatorship.

B. You should use Freedom House.

C. You could use either measure and the hypothesis would be falsifiable.

D. You should not use either measure.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 3. Say you had the following hypothesis: Citizens have greater equality of opportunity in democracies than in non-democracies.

If you want your hypothesis to be falsifiable, which measure of democracy should you use?

A. You should use Democracy-Dictatorship.

B. You should use Freedom House.

C. You could use either measure and the hypothesis would be falsifiable.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> D. You should not use either measure.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 4. A minimalist conceptualization of democracy classifies a country as being democratic if it A. has a minimal set of civil rights B. has certain institutions C. produces certain outcomes Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 5. Democracy-Dictatorship classifies countries as democracies or dictatorships. Their measure of democracy is a(n): A. ordinal measure of democracy.

B. interval measure of democracy.

C. nominal measure of democracy.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 6. Imagine that a scholar wants to develop a measure of preelectoral coordination among parties in democracies. If she decides that she is most interested in whether two parties coordinate their electoral strategies at all versus both competing independently in an election, then is she conceptualizing preelectoral coordination in terms of a dichotomy or a continuum?

A. Dichotomy B. Continuum Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 7. Imagine that a scholar wants to develop a measure of preelectoral coordination among parties in democracies. If she thinks about the level of preelectoral coordination between any two parties as going from running independently at one extreme to merging into a single party at the other extreme, then is she conceptualizing preelectoral coordination in terms of a dichotomy or a continuum?

A. Dichotomy B. Continuum Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 8. Imagine that the true value of economic inequality in country X is 4, on a scale from 1 to 10. Say four people code the level of economic inequality in country X using two different measures of inequality, A and B. Measure A yields values of 2, 3, 5, and 6. Measure B yields values 6, 6, 7, and 6.

Is Measure A or Measure B a more reliable measure of democracy in country X? A. A is more reliable.

B. B is more reliable.

C. they are both equally reliable.

Ans: B

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 9. A “reliable” measure is one that A. corresponds to the concept that it is intended to reflect.

B. repeatedly and consistently produces the same score for a given case.

C. can be reproduced by third-party scholars.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 10. The economic growth rate in Bangladesh in 2000 was 3.7%. What kind of measure is this?

A. ordinal measure of democracy B. interval measure of democracy C. nominal measure of democracy Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 11. Imagine that the true value of democracy in country X is 5. Say four people code the level of democracy in country X using two different measures of democracy, A and B. Measure A yields values of 3, 4, 6, and 7. Measure B yields values 6, 6, 7, and 6. Is Measure A or Measure B a more valid measure of democracy in country X? A. A is more valid.

B. B is more valid.

C. They are both equally valid.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 12. In ancient times, demokratia meant A. rule by the people.

B. rule by the rich people.

C. rule by the poor people.

D. rule by the philosopher king.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 13. Aristotle believed that democracy was a corrupt form of government.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 14. Why did Dahl talk about polyarchies rather than democracies?

A. because he was not interested in democracies B. because all countries have democratic characteristics C. because he did not believe that any country was truly democratic D. because he thought that there were many types of democracies Ans: C

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 15. A government is an entity that uses coercion and the threat of force to rule in a given territory.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 16. A ______ is an entity that uses coercion and the threat of force to rule in a given territory and a ______ is the set of people who run the state or have the authority to act on behalf of a state.

A. state; government B. state; regime C. regime; government D. regime; state E. government; state Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 17. When George W. Bush left office and Barack Obama became president, there was a change in ______.

A. government B. regime C. state Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 18. When we talk about dictatorships and democracies, we are categorizing ______.

A. governments B. regimes C. states Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 6: The Economic Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship Modernization Theory and Survival Story 1. A great deal of empirical evidence indicates that there is a strong association between income and democracy. This is what would be predicted by A. modernization theory.

B. the survival story.

C. both modernization theory and the survival story.

D. neither; this evidence disproves implications from both theories.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 2. Modernization theory predicts that the likelihood of a transition to democracy increases with income, whereas the survival story predicts that the likelihood of becoming a democracy is unrelated to income.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 3. Modernization theory predicts that the likelihood of a transition to democracy decreases with income, whereas the survival story predicts that transitions to dictatorship become more likely with income.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 4. When testing the implications of modernization theory and the survival story, it is most appropriate to look at which of the following?

A. The absolute number of transitions to democracy and dictatorship at different levels of wealth.

B. The probability of a transition to democracy or dictatorship at different levels of wealth.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 5. According to the variant of modernization theory presented in Chapter 6, why did England develop a limited form of government in early modern Europe, whereas France developed an absolutist and autocratic form of government?

A. England did not have a revolution, whereas France did.

B. The English king relied on his citizens more for revenue than the French king did.

C. The French king was involved in more wars than the English king.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> D. The English king had to negotiate with a new type of economic elite (who possessed mobile assets), and the French king did not.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 6. Classic modernization theory relies on an empirical association between income and democracy.

The variant of modernization theory examined in Chapter 6 states that it is not income per se that encourages democracy but, rather, changes in the socioeconomic structure of a country that accompany development. The advantage of this variant of modernization theory is that it explicitly provides a causal mechanism linking economic development and democracy. Scholars testing this variant often continue to use a measure of income (such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita) to represent the level of development. Why? A. because a country’s GDP per capita exactly measures the level of development of its socioeconomic structure B. because a country’s level of GDP is generally a reasonable proxy (substitute) for the level of development of a country’s socioeconomic structure (To capture other features, scholars often include measures of natural resource abundance, such as oil, as well.)

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 7. According to the implications of the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game in Chapter 6, giving foreign aid to dictatorships is likely to: A. improve the welfare of the average citizen in these countries and destabilize dictatorial rule.

B. reduce the welfare of the average citizen in these countries and stabilize dictatorial rule.

C. have no effect on the regime’s stability.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 8. The effects of foreign aid on economic development depend on: A. cultural factors.

B. geographic region.

C. institutional structure.

D. leader personality.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 9. Foreign aid will have a detrimental effect on the recipient country’s economic development no matter what the size of the dictator’s winning coalition is: Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 10. Ansell and Samuels (2010) argue that the effect of inequality on democratization is dependent on the type of inequality: ______ inequality is positively associated with democratization, while ______ inequality is negatively associated with democratization.

A. Income; land

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> B. Land; income C. Political; land D. Income; political Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 11. Based on the implications of the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game, what should we expect the relationship to be between oil wealth and the prospects for democratization?

A. Oil wealth should be positively correlated with democratization.

B. Oil wealth should be negatively correlated with democratization.

C. There is no correlation between oil wealth and democratization.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 12. If oil wealth is negatively correlated with the prospects for democratization, then we should expect the following country to have the greatest potential for democratization: A. Qatar B. Kuwait C. Tunisia D. Oman Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 13. Which of the following is not a reason why natural resources tend to help dictators stay in power?

A. Oil revenue helps keep taxes down.

B. Dictators can hide information about the country’s finances.

C. Oil revenue helps buy the loyalty of the military.

D. Oil revenue increases demands for accountability and representation.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 14. States with high oil revenues tend to keep dictators in power because since dictators control national oil companies, they can effectively hide the country’s finances from the people.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 15. Which of the following explains why Muammar al-Qaddafi was able to hold on to power longer in Libya facing crisis than Hosni Mubarak in Egypt?

A. Oil revenue helps keep taxes down.

B. Dictators can hide information about the country’s finances.

C. Oil revenue helps buy the loyalty of the military.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 16. According to the implications of the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game in Chapter 6, we should expect that countries in which the state controls high levels of natural resources are more likely to be democratic than countries in which the state does not control high levels of natural resources.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 17. The predictions of modernization theory are best described by which statement?

A. Countries are less likely to survive as democracies as income increases.

B. Countries are more likely to become dictatorships as modernization increases.

C. Countries are more likely to become and remain democratic as income increases.

D. Countries are more likely to become but less likely to remain democratic as income increases.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

18. Country X is characterized by the following features: it is wealthy, it has an abundance of natural resources, and its population is poorly educated. Country Y is characterized by the following features: it is wealthy, its economy is dominated by the financial service sector, and its population is well educated. Based on the variant of modernization theory that we examined, which country is most likely to be democratic?

A. Country X B. Country Y Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 19. According to the implications from the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game in Chapter 6, states with unlimited governments (what we might think of as dictatorships) should exhibit variation in economic growth. When will dictatorships perform well (that is, have a growing economy)?

A. When the Parliamentarians have a credible exit threat and the Crown is dependent.

B. When the Parliamentarians have a credible exit threat and the Crown is autonomous.

C. When the Parliamentarians do not have a credible exit threat.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium Questions 20 and 21 go together.

20. Look at Figure 1, below. Is Figure 1(a) or Figure 1(b) most consistent with classical modernization theory?

A. Figure 1(a) B. Figure 1(b) C. neither Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 21. Look at Figure 1, below. Is Figure 1(a) or Figure 1(b) most consistent with the survival story?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> A. Figure 1(a) B. Figure 1(b) C. neither Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

22. According to the implications of the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game in Chapter 6, states with unlimited governments (what we might think of as dictatorships) should exhibit variation in economic growth. When will dictatorships perform poorly (i.e., have a stagnant economy)?

A. When the Parliamentarians have a credible exit threat and the Crown is dependent.

B. When the Parliamentarians have a credible exit threat and the Crown is autonomous.

C. When the Parliamentarians do not have a credible exit threat.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium

Dependent and Independent Variables 1. “Economic growth increases government stability.” What is the dependent variable?

A. economic growth B. government stability C. wealth Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 2. “Democracies are more likely to survive if they are parliamentary than if they are presidential.”

What is the dependent variable?

A. democratic survival

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> B. parliamentarism C. presidentialism Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 3. Consider Table 6.4 in your textbook. What is the dependent variable?

A. The dependent variable is the probability of democratic stability (survival).

B. The dependent variable is the probability of a democratic transition.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 4. Consider Table 6.5 in your textbook. What is the dependent variable?

A. The dependent variable is the probability of democratic stability (survival).

B. The dependent variable is the probability of a democratic transition.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 5. “Economic inequality is bad for democratic stability.” What is the independent variable?

A. economic inequality B. democratic stability C. wealth Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 6. “If citizens have mobile assets, then the government will not predate on them.” What is the independent variable?

A. mobile assets B. government predation C. loyalty Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 7. “In permissive systems, increasing the level of social heterogeneity has a positive effect on the number of parties in the party system.” What is the independent variable?

A. permissiveness of electoral system B. democratic stability C. number of parties D. social heterogeneity Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Interpreting Statistical Results 1. Consider the last column of results shown in Table 6.5 in your textbook. What effect does being an oil producer have on the probability that a democracy will be stable?

A. Being an oil producer increases the chances of democratic survival.

B. Being an oil producer decreases the chances of democratic survival.

C. Being an oil producer has no significant effect on the chances of democratic survival.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 2. Consider the last column of results shown in Table 6.5 in your textbook. What effect does an increase in wealth (measured by gross domestic product per capita) have on the probability that a democracy will be stable?

A. Increasing wealth increases the chances of democratic survival.

B. Increasing wealth decreases the chances of democratic survival.

C. Increasing wealth has no effect on the chances of democratic survival.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 3. Consider the last column of results shown in Table 6.5 in your textbook. What effect does an increase in economic growth (measured by Growth in gross domestic product per capita) have on the probability that a democracy will be stable?

A. Increasing economic growth increases the chances of democratic survival.

B. Increasing economic growth decreases the chances of democratic survival.

C. Increasing economic growth has no effect on the chances of democratic survival.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Questions 4–9 (Interpreting Statistical Results) go together.

4. Obtain a copy of Michael L. Ross’s article, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” from the journal World Politics 53, no. 2 (April 2001): 325–361 using your library resources. Skim the article. What is Ross’s dependent variable?

A. level of democracy B. whether a country is a democracy or not C. level of freedom Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 5. How is Ross’s dependent variable measured?

A. using Freedom House B. using Polity IV C. using PACL Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 6. What is the main hypothesis of the article?

A. Islamic countries have lower levels of democracy.

B. Wealthy countries have higher levels of democracy.

C. More oil reliant states have higher levels of democracy.

D. More oil reliant states have lower levels of democracy.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 7. Which of the following observations would falsify the main hypothesis of this article?

A. Oil reliance is unrelated to a country’s level of democracy.

B. Oil reliance decreases a country’s level of democracy.

C. Islamic countries have a higher level of democracy.

D. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries have a lower level of democracy.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 8. What sign (positive or negative) does Ross predict for the coefficient on his primary explanatory variable (oil)?

A. positive B. negative C. neither positive nor negative Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 9. What sign does Ross find for the coefficient on his primary explanatory variable (oil)? See Table 3, column 1, on page 341 of the article.

A. positive B. negative C. neither positive nor negative Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 10. Does Ross find that being an oil producer hinders the development of democracy only in the Middle East?

A. He finds that oil hinders democracy only in the Middle East (but not elsewhere).

B. He finds that oil does not hinder democracy in the Middle East.

C. He finds that oil hinders democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere.

D. He finds that oil hinders democracy everywhere except the Middle East.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Questions 11 and 12 go together.

11. Look at Table 1, below. What is the dependent variable?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> A. democratic survival B. democratic transition C. gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (wealth) D. growth in GDP per capita E. whether a country is an oil producer Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Table 1: Economic Determinants of Transitions to Democracy Dependent variable: Probability that a country will be a democracy this year if it was a dictatorship last year.

Independent variables

1946–1990

1946–1990

GDP per capita

0.0001* (0.00003)

N

-2.30* (0.09) 2,407

0.0001* (0.00003) –0.02* (0.01) –0.48** (0.24) –2.27* (0.09) 2,383

Log-likelihood

–233.01

–227.27

Growth in GDP per capita Oil producer Constant

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *greater than 99% significant; **greater than 95% significant; ***greater than 90% significant.

12. Which of the following statements is consistent with the inferences you could draw from the results shown in Table 1?

A. Increasing wealth increases the likelihood of a transition to democracy.

B. Increasing wealth increases the likelihood of democratic survival.

C. Oil-producing countries are more likely to transition to democracy.

D. Economic growth increases the likelihood of democratic emergence.

E. Oil production has no effect on transitions to democracy.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Credible Commitment Problems 1. Credible commitment problems are characterized by a temporal dimension (someone makes a promise today that she does not have an interest in keeping tomorrow) and by the fact that the person making the promise is not the one to benefit from the promise being kept. What are some mechanisms for dealing with credible commitment problems?

A. enforceable contracts B. repeated interactions C. institutions that alter the distribution of power D. all of these Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 2. Which of the following is (are) an example(s) of credible commitment problems in political settings?

A. Iraq’s Shia-dominated government promising Sunnis that if they disarm, the government will promise not to repress them and it will share power.

B. The British government in Northern Ireland promising to negotiate a political settlement with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) if the IRA will first turn in its arms.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> C. The African National Congress (the mainly Black political party) in South Africa promising not to redistribute wealth away from the white minority if it transfers political power and ends the apartheid era.

D. all of these Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 3. Many scholars have observed that rich countries tend to be democratic and democratic countries tend to rich. Identify and discuss two theoretical perspectives that have been offered to explain this phenomenon.

Explain the theoretical perspectives behind these competing explanations then discuss as many of the observable implications of these explanations as you can think of. Next, say which of these observable implications seem to be consistent with available evidence and which ones seem to be contradicted by available evidence. In sum, which explanation do you find most convincing? Why?

Ans: Varies Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 7: The Cultural Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship 1. Primordial cultural arguments regarding democracy state that any culture could be compatible with democratic institutions.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 2. One of the problems with the early forms of arguments about the cultural determinants of democracy is that they did not clearly specify what aspect of culture actually mattered for democracy to emerge or survive. Thus, their claims were not always presented in a falsifiable manner.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 3. In the 1960s, a new group of scholars began studying the link between culture and democracy.

Specifically, Almond and Verba used surveys to get information about how individuals in different countries felt about political institutions, actors, and processes. They claimed that the type of culture that is most compatible with democracy is A. parochial culture.

B. subject culture.

C. participant culture.

D. American culture.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 4. Almond and Verba studied political culture through the use of what?

A. case studies B. statistics C. surveys D. experiments.

D. formal models Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 5. In his books, Making Democracy Work and Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam highlights the importance of what factor when explaining why some democracies perform better than others?

A. wealth B. religion C. social capital D. institutions Ans: C

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 6. In Making Democracy Work and Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam highlights the importance of social capital when explaining why some democracies perform better than others. His argument supports the results of the experiments discussed in Chapter 7 that suggest that if we assume that democratic institutions tend to require a particular type of behavior, then individuals in societies whose interactions already require this behavior in everyday interactions will find it easier to adopt and support democracy.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 7. Which of the following causal relationships have political scientists posited as existing between civic culture and democracy?

A. Civic culture causes the emergence of democracy.

B. Democracy causes the emergence of a civic culture.

C. Some argue that civic culture causes the emergence of democracy, but others argue that democracy causes the emergence of a civic culture.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 8. Which of the following have been considered to be a part of civic culture?

A. belief that individuals can influence political decisions B. high support for the existing political system C. high levels of interpersonal trust D. preference for gradual societal change E. high levels of life satisfaction F. all of these Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 9. The ______ story suggests that economic development produces cultural change that leads to democratization, while the _________ story economic development leads to democratization, which, in turn, leads to cultural change.

A. institutions; values B. values; institutions C. direct; indirect D. indirect; direct Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 10. If we found evidence that economic development influences democracy through culture, it would be consistent with which modernization story?

A. values B. institutional C. direct

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> D. indirect Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 11. If we found evidence that economic development produces democratization, which then influences cultural change, it would be consistent with which modernization story?

A. values B. institutional C. direct D. indirect Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 12. If the effects of economic development on democracy disappear entirely once we control for, or take account of, cultural values, then we say that the relationship is ______ by cultural values.

A. dominated completely B. overlapped partially C. completely mediated D. partially mediated Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 13. According to the institutional story of modernization, cultural values are a consequence, not a cause, of democracy.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 14. Which of the following factors might limit the usefulness of surveys for drawing inferences about democratic stability?

A. Respondents in different countries are likely to understand the survey questions in very different ways, thus rendering their responses difficult to compare.

B. A country’s experience with democracy might lead respondents to focus on different aspects of democracy.

C. Both factors are likely to limit the usefulness of surveys.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 15. Consider the following hypothesis: “Islamic countries are likely to have lower levels of democracy than non-Islamic countries do.” What evidence would falsify it?

A. Islamic countries having a higher level of democracy B. Islamic countries having a lower level of democracy C. wealthy countries having a lower level of democracy D. oil reliant countries having a higher level of democracy Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Difficulty Level: Medium 16. In a recent article published in World Politics, “Islam and Authoritarianism,” M. Steven Fish hypothesizes that Islamic countries are likely to have lower levels of democracy than non-Islamic countries do. What is the dependent variable in this hypothesis?

A. whether a country is predominantly Muslim or not B. a country’s level of democracy Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 17. In Table 7.2 in Chapter 7, examine the coefficients on the independent variable “Muslim majority” from Models 1 and 2. Which of the following statements best describes the results?

A. Having a Muslim majority is always statistically significant and makes a country less likely to become democratic.

B. Having a Muslim majority has a significant effect only in Model 1.

C. Having a Muslim majority has no effect (the effect is not statistically significant) once the levels of wealth and economic growth are taken into account in Model 2.

D. Both (B) and (C) above are accurate descriptions of the results in Table 7.2.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 18. When individuals in a variety of different types of societies were asked to take part in experiments in which they played the Ultimatum and Dictator Games, researchers found a surprising amount of variation in the types of offers that were made and accepted or rejected. Most of the variation could be explained by A. gender B. age C. wealth D. education E. payoffs to cooperation F. market integration G. Both (E) and (F) Ans: G Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 19. The results of the experiments discussed in Chapter 7 suggest that when confronted with new situations, people react based on how they would normally behave in an analogous situation in their everyday lives. This suggests that if we assume that democratic institutions tend to require a particular type of behavior (for instance, a combination of cooperation, competition, and compromise), then individuals in societies whose interactions already require this behavior in everyday interactions will find it easier to adopt and support democracy.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Hard Questions 20 and 21 go together.

20. Political scientists have claimed that the link between culture and democracy is

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Major premise: If Catholicism is incompatible with democracy, then Catholic countries are more likely to be dictatorships than democracies.

Minor premise: Catholic countries today are more likely to be democracies than dictatorships.

Conclusion: Therefore, Catholicism is compatible with democracy.

What form does this argument take?

A. affirming the antecedent B. denying the antecedent C. affirming the consequent D. denying the consequent Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 21. Is this argument valid or invalid?

A. Valid B. Invalid Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Questions 22 and 23 go together.

22. Consider the following argument: Major premise: If Islam is incompatible with democracy, then Islamic countries are more likely to be dictatorships than democracies.

Minor premise: Islamic countries today are more likely to be dictatorships than democracies.

Conclusion: Therefore, Islam is incompatible with democracy.

What form does this argument take?

A. affirming the antecedent B. denying the antecedent C. affirming the consequent D. denying the consequent Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 23. Is this argument valid or invalid?

A. valid B. invalid Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Questions 24–32 go together.

24. Obtain a copy of the M. Steven Fish article, “Islam and Authoritarianism” from the journal World Politics 55, no. 1 (2002): 4–37, using your library resources. Skim the article. What is Fish’s dependent variable?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> A. democracy B. war C. civil war D. economic development Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 25. What is the key independent variable?

A. economic development B. oil reliance C. whether a country is predominantly Muslim or not D. whether a country is a former British colony or not Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 26. What is the main hypothesis of the article?

A. Wealthy countries have higher levels of democracy.

B. Islamic countries have higher levels of democracy.

C. Islamic countries have lower levels of democracy.

D. More oil reliant states have lower levels of democracy.

E. More oil reliant states have higher levels of democracy.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 27. Which of the following observations would falsify the main hypothesis of this article?

A. Islamic countries have a higher level of democracy.

B. Islamic countries have a lower level of democracy.

C. Wealthy countries have a lower level of democracy.

D. Oil reliant states have a higher level of democracy.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 28. What sign does Fish find for the coefficient on Islamic religious tradition? (Hint: See Table 3, column 1, on page 13 of the article).

A. positive B. negative C. neither positive nor negative Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 29. Is the sign that Fish found on the coefficient on Islamic religious tradition what he had predicted he would find?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 30. Fish examines several arguments about why Islam might be bad for democracy. What are they?

A. Muslim societies are prone to violence.

B. Muslim societies have lower levels of interpersonal trust.

C. Muslim societies are less secular.

D. Muslim societies subordinate women.

E. All of these are arguments the author examines.

Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 31. According to Fish’s findings (not his theories), what is the reason why Islamic societies have lower levels of democracy?

A. Muslim societies are prone to violence.

B. Muslim societies have lower levels of interpersonal trust.

C. Muslim societies are less secular.

D. Muslim societies subordinate women.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 32. One of the conclusions that Fish reaches is that Islam is antithetical to democracy because women are not treated equally in Islamic countries. He reaches this conclusion while using Freedom House as his main measure of democracy. Why might it be problematic to use Freedom House to examine the impact that the unequal treatment of women in Islamic countries has on democracy? Choose the most appropriate answer below. (Hint: Find the complete list of questions that are used to create a country’s Freedom House score at http://www.freedomhouse.org/. Identify any questions that make it problematic to use Freedom House scores to test Fish’s statement that Islam is bad for democracy because of its unequal treatment of women.)

A. because Freedom House is a bad measure of democracy B. because Freedom House is a measure of freedom, not democracy C. because a country’s Freedom House score is partially determined by how equally women are treated D. because a country’s Freedom House score does not take account of how equally women are treated Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 33. In the experiments discussed in Chapter 7, social scientists had subjects in a variety of countries play the “Ultimatum” and “Dictator” games. They found that A. the experimental results matched the theoretical predictions of how purely self-interested actors would behave.

B. the experimental results were similar across a wide range of industrialized democracies.

C. the experimental results varied greatly across a range of small-scale societies.

D. the scholars found all of the above to be true.

E. the scholars found only (B) and (C) to be true.

Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Difficulty Level: Medium 34. Some scholars argue that one aspect of culture that is important for democracy is how many different cultures exist within a single society. The idea is that too much cultural diversity can have a negative effect on the emergence or sustainability of democracy because it is harder for the citizens to coordinate and reach compromises on policies that will affect the entire country. In Table 7.3 in Chapter 7, what effect does the number of different cultures (measured by ethnic groups, religious groups, or cultural groups) have on the probability that a democracy will stay a democracy? (Hint: you will have to look at Models 3, 4, and 5.)

A. All of the independent variables in question have a negative and significant effect on the probability that a country can sustain democracy.

B. All of the independent variables in question have a positive and significant effect on the probability that a country can sustain democracy.

C. None of the independent variables in question has a significant effect on the probability that a country can sustain democracy.

D. The number of religious groups (Model 4) does not have a significant effect on the probability that a country can sustain democracy, but the other two measures (the number of ethnic groups [Model 3] and the number of cultural groups [Model 5]) both have a negative and significant effect.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard Questions 35–37 go together.

35. Look at the results in Table 1 below. Based on these results, does having a Muslim majority significantly increase, decrease, or have no effect on the likelihood that a democracy will remain a democracy?

A. It makes it more likely.

B. It makes it less likely.

C. It has no effect.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Table 1: Culture and Democratic Survival Dependent variable: Probability of Democratic Survival Independent variables

Model 1

Muslim majority −0.46 (0.28) Catholic majority –0.41* (0.20) GDP per capita 0.0001** (0.00003) Growth in GDP per capita 0.02*** (0.01) Oil producer 0.43 (0.31) Effective number of ethnic groups −0.09*** (0.05) Constant 1.88* (0.28) Observations 1784 Log-likelihood −161.41 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *greater than 90% significant; **greater than 95% significant; ***greater than 99% significant.

36. Look at the results in Table 1, above. Based on these results, does an increase in gross domestic product per capita significantly increase, decrease, or have no effect on the likelihood that a democracy will remain a democracy?

A. It makes it more likely.

B. It makes it less likely.

C. It has no effect.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 37. Imagine you are watching a political talk show (perhaps one of the ones that are shown on Sunday morning, or perhaps The Daily Show) and the pundits are discussing problems with the democratization process in Iraq. One of the guests claims that a key factor making it unlikely that democracy could survive in Iraq (even if it were established there). is that there are too many different ethnic groups in the country. Does the empirical evidence in Table 1 support such a claim?

A. Yes, because the coefficient on the Muslim majority variable is positive and significant.

B. No, because the coefficient on Effective number of ethnic groups implies that increasing the number of ethnic groups makes democratic survival more likely.

C. Sort of, because the coefficient on “Effective number of ethnic groups” is mildly significant (only one star) and it implies that increasing the number of ethnic groups makes democratic survival less likely.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 38. Why are some countries democracies and some countries not? Evaluate the logic and evidence behind explanations pointing to the importance of (a) wealth, (b) production profile (that is, a polity’s economic structure), and (c) political culture.

Ans: Varies Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 8: Democratic Transitions 1. German reunification took place in October 1990. This refers to the reunification of: A. Germany and Poland.

B. Germany and Austria.

C. West Germany and Slovakia.

D. East Germany and West Germany.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 2. Portugal, Spain, and Greece experienced transitions to democracy in which decade?

A. 1950s B. 1960s C. 1970s D. 1980s Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 3. South Korea experienced a transition to democracy in which decade?

A. 1950s B. 1970s C. 1980s D. None of these; South Korea is currently an isolated and repressive dictatorship.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 4. Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay experienced transitions to democracy in which decade?

A. 1970s B. 1980s C. 1990s Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 5. The noninterventionist policy of which Soviet leader was instrumental in the democratic transitions of 1989 across much of Eastern Europe?

A. Joseph Stalin B. Mikhail Gorbachev C. Nikita Khrushchev D. Boris Yeltsin Ans: B

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 6. The “velvet revolution” is a reference to the peaceful democratic transition in: A. Czechoslovakia.

B. Romania.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy

7. The violent repression of citizens protesting in favor of democracy in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 occurred in which country?

A. East Germany B. Poland C. Brazil D. China Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 8. Which country invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to prop up a Communist government against Islamic rebels (who were funded at the time by the United States)?

A. Russia B. The Soviet Union C. Chernobyl D. Iran Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 9. According to recent studies of attempts to externally impose democracy on a country by using military force, there is very little evidence, if any, to support the claim that such intervention increases the level of democracy in the target countries.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 10. Some politicians like to refer to cases in which the United States intervened successfully in order to establish democracy; Japan and West Germany after WWII are the favorite examples. However, according to the recent empirical research discussed in Chapter 8 (on democratic transitions), evidence shows that although attempts at the external imposition of democracy may promote some democratic-seeming reforms in the short run, they ultimately produce political instability in the target countries and are unlikely to lead to a stable democracy.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 11. The introduction of elections, legislatures, and parties in many dictatorships around the world is a sign that these countries are definitely moving toward democracy.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 12. A “public good” is: A. excludable and rivalrous.

B. nonexcludable and rivalrous.

C. excludable and nonrivalrous.

D. nonexcludable and nonrivalrous.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 13. Public goods are, by their nature, desirable. Thus, anyone who would benefit from such a good can be expected to contribute to its provision.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 14. Collective action theory indicates that individuals will automatically act collectively to achieve their goals whenever they share common interests (such as wanting to listen to NPR, protect environmental resources, or promote democracy).

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy The following Collective Action scenario applies to the next three questions.

Say you belong to a group that has fifty members (N), and in order to get a particular benefit (B. you need fifteen members (K) to contribute. Those who contribute to the provision of the benefit pay a cost (C). Of course, B > C. 15. If you know that 10 members of the group (aside from yourself) are willing to contribute, what should you do?

A. Contribute B. Not contribute Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 16. If you know that 45 members of the group (aside from yourself) are willing to contribute, what should you do?

A. Contribute B. Not contribute Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 17. If you know that 14 members of the group (aside from yourself) are willing to contribute, what should you do?

A. Contribute

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> B. Not contribute Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 18. When groups are small enough that members can monitor each other’s behavior, solving the freerider problem becomes: A. more difficult.

B. easier.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 19. Collective action theory suggests that minority groups may actually be more powerful than majority groups in some circumstances. This might explain why business lobbies are usually considered to be more effective at influencing political elites than trade unions are.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 20. Collective action theory helps explain why: A. protests in Eastern Europe were rare throughout most of the cold war.

B. there were massive protests across Eastern Europe in 1989.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 21. Imagine the following 10-person society featuring the threshold sequence α = {0, 1, 2, 4, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10}.

What would happen in this society?

A. Only the first member would go out and publicly protest.

B. Only the first three members would go out and publicly protest.

C. There would be a revolutionary cascade, and all members of the society except for person 10 (revolutionary threshold = 10) would publicly protest the opposition.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 22. If person 6 (revolutionary threshold = 5) from α has an unpleasant encounter with a government official and her revolutionary threshold is lowered to 4, what would happen now in the society α′ = {0, 1, 2, 4, 4, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10}?

A. There would be no change.

B. There would be a revolutionary cascade, and all members of the society except for person 10 (revolutionary threshold = 10) would publicly protest the opposition.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 23. If instead of Person 6 undergoing a threshold shift, it was Person 4 (threshold = 4) from α who had an unpleasant encounter with a government official and whose threshold was lowered (to 3), what would happen in the society α′′ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10}?

A. There would be no change.

B. There would be a revolutionary cascade, and all members of the society except for person 10 (revolutionary threshold = 10) would publicly protest the opposition.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 24. “Preference falsification” makes revolutions unpredictable and makes revolutions seem inevitable after they have occurred.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 25. The tipping, or threshold, models presented in Chapter 8 are used to explain why the public protests in Eastern Europe in 1989 were a surprise to most political observers, both inside and outside of Eastern Europe. According to the reading and lectures, why are revolutions always going to be a surprise?

A. revolutions tend to be irrational B. preference falsification C. revolutionary cascades D. none of these Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 26. In which of the following societies would there be a revolutionary cascade (revolution), given the distribution of revolutionary thresholds shown in the examples below?

A. {0, 1, 1, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10} B. {0, 1, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10} C. {0, 1, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} D. revolutions would occur in all of the above societies E. revolutions would occur only in (A) and (B) Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 27. In which of the two societies below is a revolution more likely to occur? γ = {0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 10} δ = {0, 1, 1, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 9, 10} A. γ B. δ Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 28. Collective action theory, which highlights the incentives for free riding, is better at explaining why: A. protests in Eastern Europe were rare throughout most of the cold war

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> B. there were massive protests across Eastern Europe in 1989 Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium Democratic Transition Game Consider the case that you are a soft-liner in an authoritarian regime who would like to introduce a policy of liberalization. Your goal is to co-opt the opposition into a broadened dictatorship, not to transition to democracy. You are a dictator, not a democrat!

1. If you open and civil society enters, then you achieve your objective of a Broadened Dictatorship.

2. If you open and civil society organizes, then you need to decide whether to democratize and become a full democracy or to repress.

3. A successful repression will lead to a narrow dictatorship, whereas an unsuccessful repression will lead to insurgency.

4. Repression is successful only if civil society is weak.

29. The game tree in Figure 1, below, is associated with the game in which you are sure that civil society is WEAK. Solve the game by backward induction. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? (Note: write the equilibrium in the form [Soft-liner’s 1st move, Soft-liner’s 2nd move; Civil Society’s move]).

A. Do nothing B. Do nothing, Democratize; Enter C. Do nothing, Democratize; Organize D. Open, Repress; Enter E. Open, Democratize; Organize Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Figure 1

30. What is the outcome of the game shown in Figure 1?

A. status quo B. broadened dictatorship C. narrow dictatorship D. full democracy Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 31. The game tree in Figure 2, below, is associated with the game in which you are sure that civil society is STRONG. Solve the game by backward induction. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium?

A. Do nothing B. Do nothing, Democratize; Enter C. Do nothing, Democratize; Organize D. Open, Repress; Enter E. Open, Democratize; Organize Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Figure 2

32. What is the outcome of the game shown in Figure 2?

A. status quo B. broadened dictatorship C. narrow dictatorship D. full democracy Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 33. Based on your answers to questions about the outcomes of the games shown in Figures 1 and 2 (questions 30 and 32 above), is it possible to get a transition to democracy in a situation with complete information?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium 34. When dictators liberalize in an attempt to co-opt opposition groups, they are trying to strengthen their hold on power. If they miscalculate and assume that the opposition is weak when in fact it is strong, their liberalizing attempts might embolden the opposition groups and eventually lead to a democratic transition. But if the opposition group is actually weak, and the dictator mistakenly thinks it is strong, then the dictator will not dare to liberalize in the first place, which is unfortunate for civil society whose members could have benefited from the liberalization. If you were a member of the opposition (civil society) and you were interested in a transition to democracy, or at least a liberalization of the regime, would you be better off in the situation in which the dictator (liberalizers) knew for sure the exact strength of civil society, or in the situation in which the dictator was uncertain whether civil society was strong or not?

A. The opposition is always better off under conditions of certainty.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> B. The opposition is always better off under conditions of uncertainty.

C. It would depend on whether the opposition was strong or weak. A weak opposition would prefer certainty, but a strong opposition would probably prefer uncertainty.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard 35. If leaders try to “broaden” their dictatorship by institutionalizing it (with a legislature, elections, political parties, and so on), does it follow that their regime will be more stable?

A. Yes; institutionalization always helps the stability and survival of dictatorships.

B. No, not necessarily; it will depend on the strength of the opposition (institutionalization will help stabilize a regime when the opposition is weak, but will destabilize it if the opposition is strong).

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Commitment Problems and Democratization In a paper entitled, “Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties,” Stathis Kalyvas (2000) examines whether religious parties are compatible with secular and liberal democratic institutions. He concludes that religious parties may be compatible with democracy so long as they can credibly commit not to impose a theocratic dictatorship if they come to power. He goes on to argue that some religions are better able to provide these credible commitments than others. We now provide a Religious Party Game that throws light on the credible commitment problem facing religious parties that Kalyvas describes.

The two players in our game are a dictatorial regime (Regime: that has recently introduced a process of democratization and a religious party [Religious Party] that seeks to gain power through the newly proposed democratic elections). The Religious Party is expected to win the elections and many fear that it will turn the country into a theocracy rather than continuing the process of democratic consolidation. The Regime has to decide whether to hold the elections as scheduled or to cancel them and retain power as a dictatorship. If elections are held and the Religious Party wins (which we are assuming will happen), then the Religious Party has to decide whether to pursue a moderate political agenda and support democratic consolidation or to subvert the democratization process and create a religious regime. The Religious Party comes in two types–moderate and radical. One way to think about these types is that religious parties have both moderate and radical factions; whichever faction is dominant determines the Religious Party’s type. Moderate religious parties prefer democratic consolidation to establishing a theocracy, whereas radical religious parties prefer the opposite.

There are three possible outcomes in this game: Continued Dictatorship, Religious Dictatorship, and Democratic Consolidation. Figure 3 illustrates an incomplete information version of this game with cardinal payoffs in which the Regime does not know whether they are interacting with a moderate Religious Party or a radical Religious Party. Now answer the following questions.

Figure 3: Radical Religious Party Game

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

36. Solve the subgame on the left, where the Religious Party is moderate, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? Note: write the equilibrium in the form (Regime’s move; Moderate party’s move).

A. Cancel elections; Pursue radical policy B. Hold elections; Pursue moderate policy C. Hold elections; Pursue radical policy D. Cancel elections; Pursue moderate policy Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 37. Now that you have solved the subgame on the left, what is the outcome of this subgame?

A. democratic consolidation B. new religious dictatorship D. continued dictatorship Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 38. Solve the subgame on the right, where the Religious Party is radical, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? Note: write the equilibrium in the form (Regime’s move; Radical Party’s move).

A. Cancel elections; Pursue radical policy B. Hold elections; Pursue moderate policy C. Hold elections; Pursue radical policy D. Cancel elections; Pursue moderate policy Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Difficulty Level: Medium 39. Now that you have solved the subgame on the right, what is the outcome of this subgame?

A. democratic consolidation B. new religious dictatorship C. continued dictatorship Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 40. What is the expected payoff to the Regime from choosing to cancel elections?

A. 5 B. 20 C. 25 D. 30 Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 41. What is the expected payoff to the Regime from choosing to hold elections?

A. 25p B. 5 + 20p C. 5 + 25p D. 5 + 30p Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 42. Use the expected payoffs from the two previous questions to calculate the critical probability at which the Regime will choose to hold elections rather than cancel them. (i.e., find the value of p such that the Regime’s payoff from canceling elections is exactly the same as its payoff from holding elections.)

A. p = 0.5 B. p = 0.66 C. p = 0.75 D. p = 0.8 Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 43. If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a probability of 0.75, will it choose to hold elections, cancel elections, or will it be indifferent between these two actions?

A. hold elections B. cancel elections C. be indifferent between holding and canceling Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 44. If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a probability of .8, will it choose to hold elections, cancel elections, or will it be indifferent between these two actions?

A. hold elections B. cancel elections C. be indifferent between holding and canceling Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 45. If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a probability of .5, will it choose to hold elections, cancel elections, or will it be indifferent between these two actions?

A. hold elections B. cancel elections C. be indifferent between holding and canceling Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 46. If you were a moderate religious party poised to win the elections, would you want the Regime to believe that you were moderate or radical?

A. moderate B. radical C. it wouldn’t matter Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 47. If you were a radical religious party poised to win the elections, would you want the Regime to believe that you were moderate or radical?

A. moderate B. radical C. it wouldn’t matter Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 48. If you solved the game correctly, you will find that the Regime will hold elections so long as it believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a high enough probability. If there is some uncertainty on the part of the Regime and the Religious Party is moderate and wants the elections to go ahead, why might it not be enough for the party to simply announce to the Regime that it is a moderate religious party and not a radical one? Choose the most appropriate answer from the options below.

A. because the regime does not want a new religious dictatorship B. because the announcement that it is moderate is not credible C. because the regime will repress the party Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Hard

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Figure 1 presents a game theoretic model of the strategic interaction between a “Soft-liner” elite and “Civil Society” during a potential transition to democracy. Answer the following questions related to this game.

Figure 1 Soft-liner Elite Confronts a Weak Civil Society

49. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game? Write the equilibrium in the form (soft-liner’s move at its top node, soft-liner’s move at its bottom node; Civil Society’s move).

Ans: Open, Repress; Enter Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 50. What is the expected outcome of the game?

Ans: broadened dictatorship Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Now, consider what would happen if the civil society was sufficiently strong that it would respond to repression by the soft-liners with an armed insurgency. Also consider what would happen if both actors considered facing an armed insurgency to be the worst possible outcome. (See Figure 2.)

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Figure 2: Soft-liner Elite Confronts a Strong Civil Society

Softliner

Do nothing

Open

Status quo

Civil Society society

(4; 3) Enter

Organize

Broadened dictatorship (5; 4) Softliner

Repress

Democratize

Armed Insurgency

Democratic Transition

(1; 1)

(2; 5)

51. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium to this game?

Ans: Do nothing, Democratize; Organize Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 52. What is the expected outcome of this game?

Ans: status quo Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 53. What are the pareto optimal outcomes in this game?

Ans: broadened dictatorship and democratic transition Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 54. If you were a member of Civil Society would you rather play the game in Figure 1 or Figure 2?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Ans: Figure 1. In the game in Figure 1, the Civil Society is able to achieve a broadened dictatorship, which the model assumes they prefer to the status quo—which is the outcome they can expect if the game in Figure 2 is played.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium 55. If you were a member of the soft-liner elite, would you rather play the game in Figure 1 or the game in Figure 2?

Ans: Figure 1—for the same reason that Civil Society prefers this game.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium 56. What, if anything, do you find ironic about the answers to Questions 7 and 8?

Ans: That both opposing players would prefer the outcome of the game in Figure 1 to the status quo, even though what Civil Society really wants is a democratic transition. So it’s in Civil Society’s interests to appear weak in order to get soft-liners to think they are playing the game in Figure 1. Or put differently, although it’s not surprising that the soft-liner elite does better when its “opponent” is weak, it is surprising that Civil Society also does better when it is “weak” than when it is strong.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 9: Democracy or Dictatorship: Does It Make a Difference?

1. Most economists and political scientists would be comfortable making the claim that having institutions protecting property rights is crucial for promoting economic growth. Where they might argue, however, is if and how property rights are related to regime type.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 2. Empirically, we do not see cases of contries that score high on the rule of law index but low on an index of electoral rights.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 3. Which policies would be better for economic growth, those that promote immediate consumption (spending) or those that promote investment?

A. Policies that promote immediate consumption.

B. Policies that promote investment.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 4. Which policies are likely to be unpopular with the general public in the short term, those that promote immediate consumption (spending) or those that promote investment?

A. Policies that promote immediate consumption.

B. Policies that promote investment.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 5. An overview of a variety of studies about the link between regime type and economic growth should lead one to the following conclusion: A. Democracy is better for growth than dictatorship.

B. Dictatorship is better for growth than democracy.

C. Regime type makes no difference.

D. There are some empirical studies that support each of the conclusions listed in (a)–(c), above. In part, this variation in conclusions is likely to be the result of the different datasets used across the analyses.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 6. According to the empirical evidence from tests of the effects of regime type on government performance, does democracy seem to be a necessary or a sufficient condition for ensuring a high level of material well-being for a country’s citizens?

A. Necessary B. Sufficient Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 7. Does democracy make a material difference in people’s lives? What evidence is there that democracy is associated with better well-being? Does democracy do better than all autocracies? Is it democracy per se, or particular aspects of polities that seem to be associated with better material outcomes?

Ans: Varies Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 10: Varieties of Dictatorship

1. The textbook distinguishes between the types of dictatorships based on: A. size of the country B. title of the leader C. identity of their support coalitions D. type of election Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 2. The three basic types of authoritarian regime outlined in the textbook include all of the following EXCEPT: A. monarchies.

B. oligarchies.

C. military.

D. civilian.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 3. Those dictators that hold elections and tolerate some degree of pluralism yet violate democratic standards are called: A. electoral authoritarian.

B. democratic pluralism.

C. liberal democracy.

D. pluralist dictatorship.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 4. Dictatorships that rely on their family and kin network to come to power and stay in power are called: A. monarchies.

B. military dictatorships.

C. dominant-party dictatorships.

D. personalistic dictatorships.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 5. In the country of Qatar, the successor to the king is selected by the ruling family by consensus based on their own best interests. Based on this information, Qatar can be labeled a: A. monarchy.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> B. military dictatorship.

C. dominant-party dictatorship.

D. personalistic dictatorship.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 6. A dictatorship ruled by a “junta” is a: A. monarchy.

B. military dictatorship.

C. dominant-party dictatorship.

D. personalistic dictatorship.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 7. Military dictatorships often claim the “guardians of the national interest:” Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 8. Military dictatorships rule in an altruistic manner and are unburdened by economic interests: Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 9. The unstable nature of the regime in Guinea demonstrates: A. that personalistic dictatorships are prone to being overthrown via popular revolution.

B. that military dictatorships are prone to military coups.

C. that dominant-party dictatorships are prone to external invasion.

D. that monarchies make efforts to slowly liberalize institutions.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 10. Dictatorships that rely on the support of a “junta” of leaders of the armed forces to remain in power are called: A. monarchies.

B. military dictatorships.

C. dominant-party dictatorships.

D. personalistic dictatorships.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 11. Dictatorships that do not rely on either the support of the military or a ruling family or kin network are called: A. monarchies.

B. military dictatorships.

C. civilian dictatorships.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 12. When we see a dictator removed from power, we are likely to see the dictator replaced by a dictator of a similar type: Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 13. The most common form of dictatorship from 1946 to 2008 has always been: A. monarchies.

B. military dictatorships.

C. civilian dictatorships.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 14. The Communist Party in the former Soviet Union is an excellent example of this type of regime: A. democracy.

B. monarchy.

C. military dictatorship.

D. personalistic dictatorship.

E. dominant-party dictatorship.

Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 15. Dominant-party dictatorships rely on the following to stay in power: A. controlling the military.

B. tying monetary and nonmonetary benefits to membership in the party.

C. restricting the ability off opposition parties to effectively compete .

D. only B and C. E. all of these.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 16. Dominant-party and personalistic dictatorships are both subcategories of the following type of dictatorship: A. monarchies.

B. military dictatorships.

C. civilian dictatorships.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 17. The military in personalistic dictatorships is often deliberately kept weak so as to not act as a power base for a potential rival: Ans: T

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 18. Personalistic dictatorships are often characterized by which of the following?

A. strong parties, strong militaries, and weak leaders B. free press, competitive elections, and multipartism C. weak press, strong secret police, and arbitrary uses of force Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 19. Personalistic dictators rely on ______ to maintain the loyalty of their support coalition and the citizenry more generally.

A. cult of personality B. strong parties C. free media D. supportive military Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 20. All of the following dictators are examples of personalist dictators EXCEPT: A. Alberto Fujimori (Peru).

B. Kim Jong-il (North Korea).

C. Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenistan).

D. Muammar al-Qaddafi (Libya).

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 21. The difference between hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes and competitive authoritarian regimes is that: A. the former is where the major party wins only half the time and the latter is where the major party wins the vast majority of the time.

B. the former is where the opposition parties win substantial minorities and the latter is where opposition parties often win in presidential elections.

C. the former is where the leader’s party wins with overwhelming majorities and the latter is where the opposition parties win substantial minorities in elections.

D. none of these.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 22. The dictatorship type that will be in office the shortest time is expected to be: A. military dictatorships.

B. personalistic dictatorships.

C. dominant-party dictatorships.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 23. The dictatorship type that is most likely to be followed by competitive elections is: A. military dictatorships.

B. personalistic dictatorships.

C. dominant-party dictatorships.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 24. What is the basic assumption behind the selectorate theory?

A. That dictators care more about staying in power than democratic leaders do.

B. That dictators use elections to discourage internal rivals from attempting coups.

C. That all political leaders are motivated by the desire to gain and maintain office.

D. All of these are important assumptions of the selectorate theory.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 25. According to BDM2S2, what is the selectorate?

A. These are all of the people who could elect the leader.

B. These are all of the people who do elect the leader.

C. These are all of the people who could select the leader.

D. These are all of the people who do select the leader.

E. none of these.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 26. According to BDM2S2, what is the winning coalition?

A. The party that wins.

B. The government coalition that wins.

C. The group of people who keep the leader in power.

D. The group of people who can select the leader.

E. The group of people who actually selected the leader.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 27. To stay in power, leaders must keep members of their winning coalitions happy.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 28. If members of a winning coalition get “paid” with things like money, special legal protections, or special business advantages, then this is an example of the government providing: A. public goods.

B. private goods.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 29. If members of a winning coalition get “paid” with things like national security, rule of law, primary and secondary education, then this is an example of the government providing: A. public goods.

B. private goods.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 30. A key part of the selectorate theory is that the actions of the leader (e.g., setting the tax rate) can affect the level of economic growth for the entire country.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 31. When will leaders have an incentive to provide public goods?

A. When S is small.

B. When S is large.

C. When W is small.

D. When W is large.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 32. BDM2S2 argue that a leader’s decision to provide (mostly) public versus (mostly) private goods is based on how civic-minded they are.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 33. According to the selectorate theory, when are the members of the winning coalition likely to have the highest loyalty to their leader?

A. When W/S is large.

B. When W/S is small.

C. When W/S is average size.

D. It doesn’t matter whether W/S is large, average, or small; they are always loyal.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 34. If you were the leader, what type of institutions would you want to set up (assuming that you wanted to stay in power)?

A. Institutions that would generate a small W and a small W/S. B. Institutions that would generate a small W and a large W/S. C. Institutions that would generate a large W and a large W/S. D. Institutions that would generate a large W and a small W/S. Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 35. If you were a member of the winning coalition, what type of institutions would you want to set up (assuming that you wanted to receive as many goods as possible)?

A. Institutions that would generate a small W and a small W/S. B. Institutions that would generate a small W and a large W/S. C. Institutions that would generate a large W and a large W/S. D. Institutions that would generate a large W and a small W/S. Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 36. If you were a member of the selectorate but not the winning coalition, what type of institutions would you want to set up (assuming that you wanted to receive as many goods as possible)?

A. Institutions that would generate a small W and a small W/S. B. Institutions that would generate a small W and a large W/S. C. Institutions that would generate a large W and a large W/S. D. Institutions that would generate a large W and a small W/S. Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 37. Loyalty toward the incumbent leader declines as the winning coalition grows relative to the selectorate (that is, as W/S gets larger).

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 38. Who was Leopold II? A. The King of Belgium from 1865 to 1909, who had a large winning coalition. He was known as a progressive leader who worked hard to provide public goods.

B. The ruler of the Congo Free State from 1885 to 1908. He had a small winning coalition and was known as a monstrously cruel and greedy leader.

C. “Leopold II” is the name of a hypothetical leader of a small S, large W/S regime.

D. Both (A) and (B) are true.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 39. In the United States of America, who belongs to the selectorate?

A. Everyone who lives in the United States.

B. Everyone who lives in the United States legally.

C. Everyone who is eligible to vote in presidential and congressional elections.

D. Everyone who actually does vote in presidential and congressional elections.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 40. According to a BBC article, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe had opposition leaders arrested after police broke up a banned political rally on March 11, 2007 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6457329.stm). The opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai appeared in court two days later with “a badly bruised face and stitches in a head wound.” The U.S.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> government, among others, was considering sanctions in response to Mugabe’s actions. According to the British Foreign Office minister, Lord David Triesman, “Zimbabwe's government had committed ‘actions . . . bordering on crimes against humanity.’ Lord Triesman pointed to the government's suppression of Mr. Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change and the eviction of hundreds of thousands of people from urban areas in 2005.” The article also notes, “More than 80% of Zimbabweans are living in poverty, with chronic unemployment and inflation running at more than 1,700%–the highest in the world.” Which of the following systems would provide incentives for the type of behavior described in this article?

A. Large W, large S B. Small W, small S C. Small W, large S D. Large W, small S Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 41. One way to describe the relationship between corruption and kleptocracy is to say that kleptocracy is corruption on a large scale—for example, when corruption is actually organized by a country’s political leaders with the goal of their personal enrichment.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 42. What set of institutions makes kleptocracy most likely?

A. a large W/S and a small W B. a small W/S and a small W C. a large W/S and a large W Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 43. According to some recent expert surveys, the experts estimate that North Korea has a winning coalition of 73 people! (This is down from several hundred a few decades ago.) This means that the W/S ratio is very, very small compared with almost any other country. Based on the selectorate theory, what kind of government performance should we expect to see in North Korea?

A. We should expect a high level of public goods provision and a high rate of economic growth.

B. We should expect a low-to-medium level of public goods provision and a medium rate of economic growth.

C. We should expect a low level of public goods provision and a low rate of economic growth.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 44. We are able to use the concepts of W (the winning coalition) and S (the selectorate) from the selectorate theory to make useful distinctions among regime types such as democracies, monarchies, military juntas, and so on. However, the authors of the selectorate theory themselves only consider the institutions in each country that determine W and S, rather than talking about countries in terms of being democracies or dictatorships (or different types of dictatorships).

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Difficulty Level: Medium 45. Once we apply the selectorate theory to our usual typology of regime types (democracies as well as various types of dictatorships), it provides us with a potential story both for why democracies produce a relatively high level of material well-being and for why some dictatorships perform better than others.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 46. According to the selectorate theory, when are we likely to see the best economic performance?

A. When W is big.

B. When W is small.

C. When W/S is big and W is big.

D. When W/S is small and W is big.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 47. Let’s say we want to apply the insights from the selectorate theory to analyze some question we have about democracies and dictatorships. In the language of the selectorate theory, the key factor that distinguishes democracies from dictatorships is the size of the winning coalition. If we further want to distinguish among dictatorships, we would examine the countries with small winning coalitions and look at variation over the size of the selectorate (so we would be comparing W/S).

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium Consider Figure 1, below, and answer the following questions.

Figure 1

48. Looking at Figure 1, where would you place most modern democracies?

A. A B. B

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> C. C D. D E. none of these Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 49. Looking at Figure 1, where would you place military dictatorships (juntas)?

A. A B. B C. C D. D E. none of these Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Table 1: Effect of W and W/S on Health Care Dependent variable: Government spending on health care as share of GDP. Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Winning coalition 4.09* (0.61) Selectorate −0.35 (0.51) W/S 3.95* (0.49) Constant 3.04* (0.32) 2.80* (0.33) N 1204 1204 2 R 0.22 0.22 GDP = gross domestic product.

50. Consider the results from Model 1 in Table 1, above. Does an increase in the Winning coalition significantly increase, decrease, or have no effect on the government spending on health care (measured as the share of GDP)?

A. It significantly increases spending on health care.

B. It significantly decreases spending on health care.

C. It has no effect on health care spending.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 51. Consider the results from Model 2 in Table 1, above. Does an increase in W/S significantly increase, decrease, or have no effect on the government spending on health care (measured as the share of GDP)?

A. It significantly increases spending on health care.

B. It significantly decreases spending on health care.

C. It has no effect on health care spending.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 52. According to the selectorate theory put forth by Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith, what are the two attributes of a polity that create incentives for leaders to produce economic growth and other desirable policy outcomes? Explain the mechanism by which these institutional features create such incentives and summarize the empirical evidence presented in class that is consistent with this theory. What, if anything does this theory say about the relationship between policy performance and democracy? What does it say about the relationship between policy performance and autocracy?

Ans: • Size of winning coalition, size of the selectorate.

• These factors determine the incentive the leader has to produce public goods as well as the bargaining power of citizens vs. the state.

• When W is large, the leader stays in power by producing public goods rather than private goods.

• When W/S is larger, the citizen is in a good bargaining position with the state, and so the leader has to raise a lot of revenue to stay in power. This gives the leader an incentive to encourage economic growth.

• Evidence shows that an increase in W leads to all kinds of good things, especially when S is large.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> •

Most big W, small S systems are democracies, so in some sense this explains the effect of democracy on policy performance, but not exactly (these are aspects found in democracies, they are not the definition of democracy; and many small W, small S systems (many of which would be considered autocracies) perform as well as democracies.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 11: Problems With Group Decision Making Imagine that three city council members are trying to decide how to spend a surplus. The options currently being debated are (i) spend it on improving primary education in the municipality, (ii) spend it on improving the level of medical care offered by the local hospital, or (iii) lower local taxes and use the surplus to cover the costs of existing programs. The council employs majority rule to make its decisions. The councillors have the following preference orderings over the spending choices: Councillor 1: Education Medical Tax cut Councillor 2: Medical Tax cut Education Councillor 3: Tax cut Education Medical

 Assume that the councillors hold around-robin tournament that pits each alternative against every   other alternative in a series of pair-wise votes. The winner is the alternative that wins the most  information,  answer the following four questions. contests. Based on this 1. Given the preference orderings listed above, what would the result be of a pair-wise contest between the spending choices education and medical?

A. education B. medical C. tax cut D. it would be a tie Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 2. Given the preference orderings listed above, what would the result be of a pair-wise contest between the spending choices medical and tax cut?

A. education B. medical C. tax cut D. it would be a tie Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 3. Given the preference orderings listed above, what would the result be of a pair-wise contest between the spending choices tax cut and education?

A. education B. medical C. tax cut D. it would be a tie Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Difficulty Level: Medium 4. Which of the outcomes, if any, is a Condorcet winner?

A. education B. medical D. tax cut D. there is no Condorcet winner in this example Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Now assume that Councillor 3 has to take a family member to the emergency room and has a very poor experience with the level of medical care provided at the local hospital. This leads her to view improving medical care as a higher priority than improving education in the municipality, if money is to be spent improving any programs. Councillors 1 and 2 do not change their preference orderings.

Thus, the councillors now have the following preference orderings over the spending choices: Councillor 1: Education Medical Tax cut Councillor 2: Medical Tax cut Education Councillor 3: Tax cut Medical Education

  a round-robin tournament that pits each alternative against every Assume that the councillors hold   other alternative in a series of pair-wise votes. The winner is the alternative that wins the most  contests. Based  on this information, answer the following four questions.

5. Given the preference orderings listed above, what would the result be of a pair-wise contest between the spending choices education and medical?

A. education B. medical C. tax cut D. it would be a tie Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 6. Given the preference orderings listed above, what would the result be of a pair-wise contest between the spending choices medical and tax cut?

A. education B. medical C. tax cut D. it would be a tie Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 7. Given the preference orderings listed above, what would the result be of a pair-wise contest between the spending choices tax cut and education?

A. education B. medical C. tax cut

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> D. it would be a tie Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 8. Which of the outcomes, if any, is a Condorcet winner?

A. education B. medical C. tax cut D. there is no Condorcet winner in this example Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 9. What is Codorcet’s paradox?

A. An option that beats all other options in a series of pair-wise contests.

B. A situation in which an actor has cyclical (non-transitive) preferences over alternatives.

C. A situation in which the collective preferences of a group are not guaranteed to be rational, even though each of the actors in the group individually have rational preferences.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 10. As the number of individuals and/or the number of alternatives involved in any decision-making situation increase, what happens to the likelihood of group intransitivity?

A. It stays the same.

B. It increases.

C. It decreases.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 11. From the point of view of someone trying to design the ideal set of decision-making rules, the key characteristic of the Borda Count that is troubling is that: A. It does not allow individuals to express their opinions over all of the alternatives.

B. Group choices can be influenced by the introduction of irrelevant alternatives.

C. It provides group members with incentives not to vote.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 12. If a voter chooses an alternative that is not her most preferred one because by doing so she can produce a more preferred final outcome than might otherwise be the case, then she is engaging in: A. sincere voting.

B. strategic voting.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 13. Consider the following preference orderings.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Councillor 1: Education Medical Tax cut Councillor 2: Medical Tax cut Education Councillor 3: Tax cut Education Medical

 If Councillor 1 gets to be the agenda setter and choose the ordering in which the three councillors   vote over the alternatives, which of the following agendas should she set in order to get her most  preferred outcome?

A. It wouldn’t make a difference; the final choice would be the same regardless of the agenda.

B. First a vote between education and medical, and then the winner against tax cuts.

C. First a vote between medical and tax cuts, and then the winner against education.

D. First a vote between tax cuts and education, and then the winner against medical.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 14. What’s the difference between a preference ordering and a utility function?

A. They are the same.

B. A utility function is a numerical scale that represents an individual’s preference ordering.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 15. Do voters need to have single-peaked preferences in order for the Median Voter Theorem to hold?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium

16. According to the logic of the median voter theorem, where should we expect candidates (or parties) to locate in the policy space in two-candidate (or two-party) races?

A. Anywhere in the ideological space.

B. They should each locate near the opposing extremes.

C. They should each locate in the middle of the ideological space.

D. They should each locate at the median voter’s ideal point.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium Figure 1 illustrates an election in which there are seven voters (A, B, C, D, E, F, G) arrayed along a single left–right issue dimension that runs from 0 (most left) to 10 (most right). Each voter is assumed to have a single-peaked preference ordering over the issue dimension and to vote for the party that is located closest to her ideal point. The voters are participating in a majority rule election in which there are two parties, P1 and P2, competing for office. These parties can be thought of as “officeseeking” parties since they only care about winning the election and getting into office.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Figure 1: Illustrating the Median Voter Theorem

17. What is the ideological position of the median voter in Figure 1?

A. 1.5 B. 2 C. 3 D.4 E. 5 F. 5.5 G. 7 H. 8 Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 18. Let’s suppose that P1 locates at Position 2 on the left–right issue dimension and that P2 locates at Position 7. Who wins the election in the situation illustrated by Figure 1?

A. The two parties tie.

B. P1 wins.

C. P2 wins.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 19. Now suppose that P1 locates at position 4 on the left-right issue dimension and that P2 locates at position 4. Who wins the election in the situation illustrated by Figure 1?

A. The two parties tie.

B. P1 wins.

C. P2 wins.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Suppose that some event occurs that causes several voters to adopt more centrist positions on the left– right issue dimension. The new distribution of voters is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Illustrating the Median Voter Theorem—A Centrist Electorate

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

20. Given the centrist nature of the distribution of voters in Figure 2, where will parties P1 and P2 locate in the left–right space?

A. 3 B. 3.5 C. 4 D. 4.5 E. 5 F. 5.5 G. 6 H. 6.5 Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Suppose now that some polarizing event occurs that causes several voters to adopt more extreme positions on the left–right issue dimension. The new distribution of voters is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Illustrating the Median Voter Theorem—A Polarized Electorate

21. Where will parties P1 and P2 locate in the left–right space given the polarized nature of the electorate shown in Figure 3?

A. 0 B. 1 C. 3 D. 5 E. 8 F. 9 G. 10 Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 22. What happens if we extend the logic of the median voter theorem to a multidimensional ideological space?

A. Nothing changes.

B. The most likely outcome is that there will be no Condorcet winner.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> C. The most likely outcome is that there will be cyclical majorities.

D. Both (B) and (C) are true.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 23. What is the fundamental implication of Arrow’s theorem?

A. No alternative can beat the one preferred by the median voter in pair-wise majority-rule elections if the number of voters is odd, voter preferences are single-peaked over a single policy dimension, and voters vote sincerely.

B. If there are two or more issue dimensions and three or more voters with preferences in the issue space who all vote sincerely, then it is likely (except in very extreme case) that there will be no Condorcet winner.

C. There is no possible decision-making rule satisfying a minimal standard of fairness that is guaranteed to produce a rational decision for a group.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Hard 24. Does Arrow’s theorem apply to majority rule decision-making procedures?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 25. Which of the following conditions are included in the set of fairness conditions that Arrow thought any minimally fair decision-making procedure should satisfy?

A. No single individual should fully determine the outcome regardless of the preferences of other group members.

B. The choice made by the group should not be affected by the rankings of irrelevant alternatives.

C. If everyone in the group prefers one alternative over another, the group choice should reflect these preferences.

D. Individuals’ personal judgments are not restricted.

E. All of these are part of Arrow’s criteria.

F. Only (A) and (B) are mentioned by Arrow.

Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 26. Describe, in your own words, each of the conditions in Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.

Ans: Rationality assumption: • Individuals or group has complete and transitive preferences.

Condition U (universal admissibility): • Individuals may have any preference ordering.

Condition P (Pareto optimality or unanimity): • If one option is preferred by everyone in a group, that should be the choice.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Condition I (Independence from irrelevant alternatives): • If every member’s assessment of j and k remains unchanged by a change in the attractiveness of some other alternative, then the group’s assessment of j and k should remain unchanged by the inclusion or a change in the attractiveness of some other alternative.

Condition D (Nondictatorship): • No individual can impose his or her will on an outcome.

Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 27. According to Arrow, if a decision-making procedure met conditions P, I, and D, it could not also meet both the rationality assumption and condition U. What does this say about the fundamental trade-off that all political institutions must face?

Ans: Varies Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard

28. Discuss the theoretical constraints on democracy. What tensions necessarily arise if democracy is to be understood as a minimally fair method of converting the preferences of individual citizens into stable social outcomes?

Ans: Varies Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 12: Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies 1. If a country has an independently elected president, then we necessarily consider it to be a presidential regime.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 2. Is it possible to have a monarch as a head of state in a democracy?

A. Yes, this can occur in semi-presidential regimes.

B. Yes, this can occur in presidential regimes.

C. Yes, this can occur in parliamentary regimes.

D. No, it is impossible for a country to be considered a democracy if it still has a monarchy.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 3. When we talk about “the government” in terms of distinguishing parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential systems (e.g., when we say that the government depends on the legislative majority as well as the president in a mixed system) we mean: A. the state.

B. all of the elected officials in a country.

C. the cabinet (made up of the prime minister and the other ministers).

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 4. If the opposition in the legislature proposes a vote on whether or not the current government should stay in power, then this is an example of: A. an investiture vote.

B. a no confidence vote.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 5. If an incoming government must face a formal vote before it can officially take office, this is referred to as: A. an investiture vote.

B. a no confidence vote.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 6. Which of the following statements best describes a vote of confidence?

A. A new government must pass a vote (on the cabinet's composition and proposed policies) in the legislature before it can take office.

B. A government declares that a vote on a particular piece of legislation is also a vote of support for the government itself; if the legislators do not support the legislation, then the government will resign (and new elections might result).

C. A group of legislators propose a vote on the support of the incumbent government. If the government passes the vote, then it stays in office. If it fails the vote, then it must resign (and new elections might result).

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 7. When you classify countries in terms of presidential versus not presidential (i.e., either parliamentary or semi-presidential), whether or not a country has an investiture vote is more important than whether or not they have a no confidence vote procedure.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 8. What is a constructive vote of no confidence?

A. When the legislature votes to approve an incoming cabinet.

B. When the members of the legislative majority propose a no confidence vote.

C. When the no confidence vote specifies an alternative government that will be installed if the no confidence vote is successful.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 9. To stay in power in a parliamentary democracy, the government must keep a majority of the members of the legislature happy.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 10. In which system(s) is the government not responsible to the legislature?

A. in a parliamentary regime B. in a presidential regime C. in a semi-presidential regime D. all of these E. only (A) and (C) F. only (B) and (C) Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 11. In which system(s) is the government responsible to the legislature but not the president?

A. in a parliamentary regime B. in a presidential regime C. in a semi-presidential regime

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> D. all of these E. only (A) and (C) F. only (B) and (C) Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 12. In which system(s) is the government responsible to the legislature and the president?

A. in a parliamentary regime B. in a presidential regime C. in a semi-presidential regime D. all of these E. only (A) and (C) F. only (B) and (C) Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 13. In which system(s) is the government responsible to the legislature?

A. in a parliamentary regime B. in a presidential regime C. in a semi-presidential regime D. all of these E. only (A) and (C) F. only (B) and (C) Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 14. In which system(s) is the government responsible to the president?

A. in a parliamentary regime B. in a presidential regime C. in a semi-presidential regime D. all of these E. only (A) and (C) F. only (B) and (C) Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 15. Which of the following defines a presidential regime?

A. Independently (directly or indirectly) elected president.

B. Government is responsible to the president but not to the legislature.

C. Both (A) and (B).

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 16. In a semi-presidential regime, who is the primary political actor during periods of cohabitation?

A. the president

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> B. the prime minister C. Both, depending on the issue–prime minister has more control over domestic politics, but president still has a role in foreign policy.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 17. Canada held an early general election on January 23, 2006, after the Liberal Party's minority government was toppled in a no-confidence vote on November 28, 2005. Canada does not have an independently elected president. Based on these two pieces of information, is Canada a presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential democracy?

A. presidential B. parliamentary C. semi-presidential Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 18. The difference between premier-presidential regimes and president-parliamentary regimes is the following: A. The former is responsible to the legislature while the latter is not.

B. The former is responsible to the president while the latter is not.

C. The former is not responsible to the legislature while the latter is.

D. The former is not responsible to the president while the latter is.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 19. A good example of a premier-presidential regime is the following country: A. China B. Ireland C. United Kingdom D. Italy Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 20. A good example of a president-parliamentary regime is the following country: A. China B. Netherlands C. Japan D. France Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 21. Presidents have more influence on policy in president-parliamentary regimes than premierpresidential regimes: Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Difficulty Level: Medium 22. Which of the following is an example of a presidential regime?

A. El Salvador B. Bangladesh C. France Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 23. Based on the following information from the Irish constitution, is Ireland presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential?

•

•

•

•

Article 12: There shall be a President of Ireland (Uachtarán na hÉireann), hereinafter called the President, who shall take precedence over all other persons in the State and who shall exercise and perform the powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution and by law. The President shall be elected by direct vote of the people.

Article 13: The President shall, on the nomination of the Dáil Éireann, appoint the Taoiseach, that is, the head of the Government or Prime Minister. The president shall, on the nomination of the Taoiseach with the previous approval of Dáil Éireann, appoint the other members of the Government. The President shall, on the advice of the Taoiseach, accept the resignation or terminate the appointment of any member of the Government. Dáil Éireann shall be summoned and dissolved by the President on the advice of the Taoiseach. The President may in his absolute discretion refuse to dissolve Dáil Éireann on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority in Dáil Éireann. . . . The President shall not be answerable to either House of the Oireachtas or to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and functions of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of these powers and functions.

Article 15: The National Parliament shall be called and known, and is in this Constitution generally referred to, as the Oireachtas. The Oireachtas shall consist of the President and two Houses, viz.: a House of Representatives to be called Dáil Éireann and a Senate to be called Seanad Éireann.

Article 28: The Government shall consist of not less than seven and not more than fifteen members who shall be appointed by the President in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. . . . The Government shall be responsible to the Dáil Éireann. The head of the government, or Prime Minister, shall be called, and is in this Constitution referred to as, the Taoiseach.

A. parliamentary B. presidential C. semi-presidential Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 24. Based on the following information from the Chilean constitution, is Chile presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential?

1980 Chilean Constitution: • Article 4: Chile is a democratic republic.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> • • • • •

Article 24: The government and administration of the State are vested in the President of the Republic, who is the Chief of the State.

Article 25: The President of the Republic shall hold office for a term of eight years and may not be reelected for the consecutive period.

Article 26: The President shall be elected by direct ballot, with an absolute majority of the votes validly cast.

Article 32: The special powers vested in the President of the Republic are the following: . . .

To appoint, and remove at will Ministers of State, Undersecretaries, Intendants, Governors and Mayors appointed by him.

Article 33: The Ministers of State are the direct and immediate collaborators of the President of the Republic in governing and administering the State.

A. parliamentary B. presidential C. semi-presidential Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 25. The March 2007 unity or grand coalition cabinet of the Palestinian Territories has 12 Hamas members and six Fatah members (the other seven members are nonpartisan or from much smaller parties). Of the legislative seats controlled by the government parties, Hamas controls around 59%.

Hamas received 48% of the government positions. Is this a good example of Gamsons Law? A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 26. Legislative elections were held in Finland on March 18, 2007. Eight parties won seats in parliament. Look at Table 11.16 at the end of Chapter 11 (page 459). Based on what you learned in Chapter 11 and the information in Table 11.16, the leader of which party is likely to be appointed formateur?

A. Center Party B. National Coalition Party C. Social Democratic Party D. Left Alliance Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 27. Legislative elections were held in Sweden on September 17, 2006, and seven parties won seats.

Although the left-wing Social Democratic Party won more seats than any other party, the leader of the largest right-wing party was appointed to be the first formateur. Which of the following statements might best explain this choice?

A. The choice of formateur is random. As a result, the leader of the largest right-wing party had the same chance of being chosen as did each of the other party leaders.

B. In this particular election, four right-wing parties ran as a preelectoral coalition and together won a majority of the seats. Because they had pledged to govern together if successful, it made sense to give the leader of the largest coalition party the position of formateur.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> C. The position of formateur is always offered first to a party on the right; if the first attempt to form a government fails, the second formateur will be chosen from a left-wing party, and so on.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 28. Look at Table 11.17 at the end of Chapter 11 (p. 460). This table shows the results from the 1996 legislative elections in Ecuador. Based on the results in Table 11.17, from which party would you expect the formateur to come if Ecuador were a parliamentary democracy?

A. Social Christian Party B. Ecuadorian Roldosista Party C. Popular Democracy D. New Country Movement Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 29. Look at Table 11.17 at the end of Chapter 11. This table shows the results from the 1996 legislative elections in Ecuador. Ecuador is in fact a presidential democracy. In the 1996 presidential elections, Abdalá Bucaram Ortz of the Ecuadorian Roldosista Party (PRE) was elected president ahead of Jaime Nebot Saadi of the Social Christian Party (PSC). Based on this new information, from which party would you now expect the formateur to come?

A. Social Christian Party B. Ecuadorian Roldosista Party C. Popular Democracy D. New Country Movement Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 30. What happens in a presidential democracy when a president does not command the support of a majority of the members of the legislature?

A. The legislature can pass a vote of no confidence and force the president to resign.

B. The president continues in office with a minority cabinet and the legislature has no power to make her leave office before her fixed term is up.

C. The president can dissolve the legislature and call new legislative elections.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 31. How are cabinet portfolios typically allocated in parliamentary regimes?

A. They are distributed among all of the parties who won seats in the legislature in proportion to each party’s percentage of legislative seats.

B. They are distributed among government parties in proportion to each party’s percentage of government coalition seats.

C. They are distributed randomly.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 32. Empirically, cabinet portfolios are distributed among government parties in rough proportion to the number of seats that each party contributes to the government’s legislative majority EXCEPT: A. Smaller parties are underrepresented and larger parties are overrepresented.

B. Smaller parties are overrepresented and larger parties are underrepresented.

C. Medium parties are overrepresented at the expense of larger parties.

D. Medium parties are underrepresented at the expense of smaller parties.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 33. Why are smaller parties overrepresented in the allocation of cabinet portfolios in coalition governments?

A. Smaller parties are able to cobble together greater public support for their platform.

B. Smaller parties may receive more portfolios, but they are less powerful.

C. Larger parties want to encourage smaller parties from remaining in the coalition.

D. Both A and B E. Both B and C Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 34. The Ukraine was in a situation of cohabitation from 2006 until the fall of 2007. In the spring of 2007, the president and the prime minister had a heated political conflict. The directly elected president (Viktor Yushchenko), who himself enjoys a fixed term of office, announced that the parliament would be dissolved (that is, elections would be held at the end of May to elect new members of parliament, which also means a new government). The Prime Minister (Viktor Yanukovych) argued that this dissolution order was not legitimate. The entire matter was then referred to a constitutional court. Based on this information, can you say what type of democratic institutions the Ukraine had at the time?

A. presidential B. parliamentary C. semi-presidential Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 35. Single-party majority governments survive in office longer than other types of government in parliamentary democracies.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 36. What answer best describes the identity of the formateur in presidential regimes?

A. the leader of the largest party B. the president C. the prime minister D. the president, but only if he is the leader of the largest party Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 37. Minority governments are more common in parliamentary regimes than presidential ones.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium In Table 1, below, we report the results from the Swedish parliamentary elections of 1982. Based on these results, answer the following three questions.

Table 1: Swedish Election Results Party Left Party Social Democrats People’s Party Moderate Unity Party Center Party Total

Seats 20 166 21 86 56 349

Party position Most left

Most right

38. If a government formed between the People’s Party and the Left Party, then what type of government would it be?

A. minority coalition government B. surplus majority government C. connected minimal winning coalition D. minimal winning coalition Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 39. If a government formed between the Social Democrats, the Center Party, and the Moderate Unity Party, then what type of government would it be?

A. minority coalition government B. surplus majority government C. connected minimal winning coalition D. minimal winning coalition.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 40. The formateur would most likely be the leader of which party?

A. Left Party B. Social Democrats C. People’s Party D. Moderate Unity Party D. Center Party Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 41. A preelectoral coalition is a collection of parties that do not compete independently at election time.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 2. Preelectoral coalitions provide voters with more democratic transparency in the government formation process than government coalitions whose members begin bargaining after elections.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 43. Endogenous election timing occurs in countries where the timing of elections is fixed.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 44. What do governments do according to the Political Surfing story of election timing?

A. They actively manipulate the economy and call elections when the economy is going well.

B. They do not actively manipulate the economy but wait to call elections until the economy is going well.

C. Call elections when the economy is about to get bad.

D. They call elections when their popularity is high.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 45. The allocation of cabinet seats among parties is more proportional in presidential regimes than parliamentary regimes.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 46. Coalition governments rarely occur in presidential regimes.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 47. Nonpartisan ministers are more common in parliamentary regimes than presidential ones.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 48. Votes of no confidence do not exist in presidential systems.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy Use Table 2, below, to answer the following three questions.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Table 2: 2002 Legislative Election Results in Germany

Party Party of Democratic Socialism Greens Social Democratic Party Free Democratic Party Christian Democratic Party Total

Seats 2 55 251 47 248 603

Ideology Most left

Most right

49. Look at the election results from Germany in 2002 in Table 2. If a government formed between the Christian Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party, then what type of government would it be? Pick the best answer from those shown below.

A. minority coalition government B. surplus majority government C. connected minimal winning coalition D. minimal winning coalition Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 50. If a government had formed between the Social Democratic Party and the Greens, then what type of government would it be?

A. a minority coalition government B. a minimal winning coalition government C. a surplus majority government Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 51. If a government had formed between the Christian Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party, then what type of government would it be?

A. a minority coalition government B. a minimal winning coalition government A. a surplus majority government Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 52. If politicians are purely office seeking, what type of government would they prefer to form?

A. connected coalition B. surplus majority government C. connected minimal winning coalition D. minimal winning coalition E. least minimal winning coalition Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Difficulty Level: Medium 53. All parliamentary systems have an investiture vote Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 54. Which of the following statements best describes a vote of confidence?

A. A new government must pass a vote (on the cabinet’s composition and proposed policies) in the legislature before it can take office.

B. A government declares that a vote on a particular piece of legislation is also a vote on support for the government itself; if the legislators do not support the legislation, then the government will resign (and new elections might result).

C. A group of legislators propose a vote on support for the incumbent government. If the government passes the vote, then it stays in office. If it fails the vote, then it must resign (and new elections might result).

D. None of these.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 55. What is the role of the formateur?

A. to appoint someone to form the government B. to manage the bargaining process of government formation C. to appoint the informateur D. to call for a vote of confidence Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 56. The chapter contains a lengthy discussion of the government formation process in Germany in 1987 following legislative elections in that country. Did the distribution of seats in the German cabinet after the 1987 election demonstrate that party leaders were pure office seekers, pure policy seekers, or some combination? Explain.

Ans: A combination; pure office seekers in the CDU/CSU would have formed a coalition with Greens, but they had to give up only a little bit of office motivation to gain a lot of policy concession, so we can’t say confidently that they were pure policy seekers either.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 57. In a representative democracy, ______ delegate authority to ______ in order to act on their behalf: A. citizens; administrators B. bureaucrats; citizens C. principal; agents D. principal; administrators Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 58. In a representative democracy, the series of problems related to delegation are called: A. principal–agent problems B. linkage problems C. representative problems Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 59. The agent is always able to implement his or her ideal preference under delegation: Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 60. The delegation problem where the principal cannot observe the agent’s type (preferences, motivations, or skills) is known as: A. moral hazard B. linkage problem C. adverse selection Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 61. The delegation problem where the principal doesn’t have complete information about how the agent is performing is known as: A. moral hazard B. linkage problem C. adverse selection Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 13: Elections and Electoral Systems 1. About half of the legislative and presidential elections that took place between 1946 and 2000 were held in dictatorships.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 2. Some scholars argue that elections in dictatorships serve a purpose even if they are not the mechanism for selecting leaders. They argue that elections can stabilize the dictatorship by: A. discouraging opposition groups from challenging the dictator.

B. dividing the opposition by allowing some groups to participate but not others.

C. presenting a democratic “appearance” to satisfy international organizations.

D. all of these are reasons given to explain why dictatorships have elections.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 3. What is (are) the key difference(s) between majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems?

A. In majoritarian systems, the winning candidate(s) must win a majority or plurality of the vote, whereas this is not necessary in PR systems.

B. PR systems use large district magnitudes or two-round systems in single districts to elect candidates.

C. All PR systems use party lists.

D. All of these are differences between majoritarian and PR systems.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 4. What is the district magnitude in a single-member district?

A. 1 B. 2 C. 10 D. Can’t say based on the information given Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 5. Is it possible for a candidate to win in a majoritarian electoral system, such as single-member district plurality, without receiving a majority of the votes?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 6. Single-member district plurality (SMDP) systems are sometimes criticized because they: A. do not allow voters to hold their representatives accountable very easily.

B. can produce very unrepresentative electoral outcomes at the district level.

C. both (A) and (B) are common criticisms of SMDP systems.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium Imagine that you lived in the constituency of St. Ives in the United Kingdom and that your preference ordering among the political parties was Labour > Liberal > Liberal Democrat > Conservative. The electoral system is a single-member district plurality system. Look at Table 1 and answer the following two questions.

Table 1: UK Legislative Elections Results, St. Ives Constituency

David Harris (Conservative) Andrew George (Liberal Democrat) Stephen Warr (Labour) Graham Stevens (Liberal)

Votes

Vote (%)

24,528 22,883 9,144 577

42.9 40.1 16 1

Harris is elected 7. If you were to vote sincerely, which party’s candidate would you vote for?

A. Conservative B. Liberal Democrat C. Labour D. Liberal Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 8. If you were to vote strategically, which party’s candidate would you vote for?

A. Conservative B. Liberal Democrat C. Labour D. Liberal Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 9. The most common method used for electing presidents in the world today is the majority-runoff two-round system.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Difficulty Level: Medium 10. The supplementary vote system is cheaper for election officials to administer than majority runoff two-round systems are.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 11. We can characterize all proportional representation systems as those with multimember districts and in which either a quota or a divisor is used to determine which candidates are elected in a district.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium The hypothetical election results shown in Table 2 correspond to questions 12–14.

Table 2: Hypothetical Election Results for a Hypothetical District Using a Quota.

Party A Party B Party C Party D Party E Party F Total Votes

35,000

22,000

21,500

13,500

6,350

1,650 100,000

Votes/quota Automatic seats Remainder Remainder seats Total seats 10 12. The election results in Table 2 are for a district in which 10 candidates are elected. This country uses the Hare quota with largest remainders to allocate seats. If the Hare quota is calculated as the total number of votes in the district divided by the total number of seats available in the district, what is the Hare quota in this district?

A. 35,000 B. 10,000 C. 3,000 D. 100,000 E. not enough information provided to calculate the Hare quota Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 13. In the district described in Table 2, how many total seats does Party B win?

A. 0 B. 1

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> C. 2 D. 3 E. 4 F. 5 Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 14. In the district described in Table 2, how many total seats does Party E win?

A. 0 B. 1 C. 2 D. 3 E. 4 F. 5 Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Now imagine that the votes for each party shown in Table 2 are the same, but that they are for a district where 10 candidates are elected using a highest average system to allocate seats. This means that the votes parties receive are divided by a series of numbers to give quotients. This country uses the d’Hondt method (the divisors are 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . ). Seats are allocated to the party with the largest quotient, then the second largest, then the third largest . . . until all of the seats have been allocated. In Table 3, the quotients have already been calculated for you and are shown in italics. Use Table 3 to answer Questions 15–18.

Table 3: Hypothetical Election Results for a Hypothetical District Using Highest Averages.

Votes

Party A 35,000

Party B 22,000

Party C 21,500

Party D 13,500

Party E 6,350

Party F 1,650

Total 100,000

1

35,000

22,000

21,500

13,500

6,350

1,650

2

17,500

11,000

10,750

6,750

3,175

825

3

11,666.7

7,333.3

7,166.7

4,500

2,116.7

550

4

8,750

5,500

5,375

3,375

1,587.5

412.5

5

7,000

4,400

4,300

2,700

1,270

330

Total seats 10 15. In the district described in Table 3, how many total seats does Party B win?

A. 0 B. 1

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> C. 2 D. 3 E. 4 F. 5 Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 16. In the district described in Table 3, how many total seats does Party E win?

A. 0 B. 1 C. 2 D. 3 E. 4 F. 5 Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 17. If the election results shown in Table 3 above were for a district with a magnitude of 1 and plurality rule was used (in other words, you have an single-member district plurality system), what would the outcome be?

A. Candidates from parties A and B would each win 5 seats.

B. Candidates from party A would win 10 seats.

C. A candidate from party A would win 1 seat and the other parties would get 0 seats.

D. You can’t answer this question unless you know what the second, third, fourth, and so on, preference ranking is on each ballot that was cast.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 18. If the election results shown in Table 3, above, were for a district with a magnitude of 1 and the alternative vote rule was used, what would the outcome be?

A. candidates from parties A and B would each win 5 seats.

B. candidates from party A would win 10 seats.

C. a candidate from party A would win 1 seat and the other parties would get 0 seats.

D. you can’t answer this question unless you know what the second, third, fourth, and so on, preference ranking is on each ballot that was cast.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 19. All proportional electoral systems have natural thresholds. Some have formal thresholds written into the electoral law as well.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 20. Which type of party list gives the most power to the party leadership (over the individual candidates)?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> A. closed party list B. open party list C. free party list Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 21. Countries with electoral tiers above the district level are typically more favorable to smaller parties.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 22. Which of the following is NOT a disadvantage of the single nontransferable vote system?

A. few incentives to build broad-based coalitions B. encourages patronage C. strengthens parties D. favors well-organized parties Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 23. What is a mixed electoral system?

A. It is when the government depends on the legislature and the president.

B. It is when you have districts that elect different numbers of people.

C. It is when the electoral system uses both a majoritarian formula and a proportional formula.

D. It is when you have multimember districts.

E. It is when the winning candidate must win a majority or plurality of the vote.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 24. The electoral system used by the most countries is: A. single-member district plurality.

B. two-round systems.

C. list PR. D. single nontransferable vote.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 25. Most people in the world live under which type of electoral system?

A. single-member district plurality B. two-round systems C. list PR D. single nontransferable vote Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 26. Most dictatorships (measured by the Freedom House measure) that hold elections use which type of electoral rules?

A. majoritarian B. proportional C. mixed Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 27. The choice of electoral systems in former colonies across the world was strongly influenced by the electoral system used by the former colonial ruler. Thus, many former British colonies use singlemember district plurality, whereas many former French colonies use two-round system.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 28. The electoral system used for legislative elections (for the House of Representatives) in the United States is: A. single-member district plurality.

B. two-round system.

C. list PR. D. single nontransferable vote.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 29. What is measured by “district magnitude”?

A. the number of voters in a district B. the geographic size of the district C. the number of seats in a district D. the relative importance of the district Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Medium Use the information in Table 4, below, for the following two questions.

Table 4: Election Results in another Hypothetical District.

Votes

Party A 47,000

Party B 16,000

Party C 15,800

Party D 12,000

Party E 6,100

Party F 3,100

Total 100,000

30. Imagine that the election results in Table 4 are for a country using single-member district plurality rule to elect its candidates. Which party or parties will win in this district?

A. Party A B. Party B C. Party C D. Party D E. Party E Ans: A

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 31. Imagine now that the election results in Table 4 are the first preference votes in a majoritarian system that uses an alternative voting rule (like Australia) where a candidate is automatically elected if he wins an absolute majority of first-round preferences. Which party’s candidate wins the single available seat in this district?

A. The candidate from Party A. B. The candidate from Party B. C. Both the candidate from Party A and the candidate from Party B will win seats.

D. It will depend on the preference rankings for each candidate, so it is impossible to answer this question based on the information provided.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Imagine now that these election results are for a district where ten candidates are elected. This country uses the Hare quota with largest remainders to allocate seats. To answer the following six questions, you may want to use Table 5, below.

Table 5: Hypothetical Election Results in a Ten-Seat District.

Votes Votes/quota Automatic seats Remainder Remainder seats Total seats

Party A 47,000

Party B 16,000

Party C 15,800

Party D 12,000

Party E 6,100

Party F 3,100

Total 100,000

10

32. If the Hare quota is calculated as the Total Number of Votes in the district divided by the total number of seats available, what is the Hare quota in the hypothetical district in Table 5?

A. 47,000 B. 10,000 C. 1,000 D. 100,000 Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 33. How many remainder seats does Party A win?

A. 1 B. 2 C. 3 D. 4 E. 5 Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 34. How many total seats does Party A win?

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> A. 1 B. 2 C. 3 D. 4 E. 5 Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 35. How many automatic seats does Party D win?

A. 1 B. 2 C. 3 D. 4 E. 5 Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 36. How many total seats does Party E win?

A. 0 B. 1 C. 2 D. 3 E. 4 Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 37. How many total seats does Party F win?

A. 0 B. 1 C. 2 D. 3 D. 4 Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 38. Electoral systems with upper tiers (electoral tiers above the district level) are typically more favorable to smaller parties than electoral systems with a single tier.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 39. Is party discipline normally higher when open party lists are used or when closed party lists are used in proportional representation systems?

A. open party lists B. closed party lists D. it’s about the same

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 40. A common side effect of electoral thresholds is that voters for small parties end up wasting their votes if the party they voted for cannot surpass the threshold. This is more likely to occur when the threshold is high.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium Imagine now that we have a country that employs a mixed electoral system. In the lowest electoral tier, there are five districts, each electing one person by SMDP. In the upper electoral tier there is one big national district that elects five individuals using a List PR system. As you can see, there are 10 individuals elected in total from the two electoral tiers. The election results are shown in Table 6.

Answer the following four questions.

Table 6: Election Results in a Mixed Electoral System.

Votes in Each Electoral District

Seats Won

1

2

3

4

5

National District

Party A

3,000

3,000

3,000

3,000

3,000

15,000

60

Party B

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

10,000

40

Total

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,0000

25,000

100

%

SMDP

List PR

Total

41. If the SMDP = single-member district plurality If mixed system were “independent,” how many SMDP seats would Party A win?

A. 0 B. 2 C. 3 C. 4 E. 5 Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 42. If the mixed system were “independent,” how many TOTAL seats would Party A win?

A. 4 B. 5 C. 6 D. 7 E. 8 Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 43. If the mixed system were “dependent,” how many single-member district plurality seats would Party A win?

A. 0 B. 2 C. 3 D. 4 E. 5 Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 44. If the mixed system were “dependent,” how many TOTAL seats would Party A win?

A. 4 B. 5 C. 6 D. 7 E. 8 Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 45. All electoral systems create at least some incentive for actors to behave strategically rather than reveal their sincere preferences.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium Choosing Electoral Rules: A Game-Theoretic Approach When would incumbent politicians be likely to abandon disproportional single-member district electoral laws in favor of a “fairer” proportional representation system (as occurred in New Zealand about a decade ago)?

The following game can be used to explain the prospects for institutional reform in democracies. To keep things simple, we can think about the prospect for institutional reform (such as a change from single-member district plurality rule to proportional representation) as a game between a large party and a small party. They each must decide whether to vote for or against the proposed electoral reform. If the large party votes against reform, reform efforts fail and the next election is conducted under the existing rules.

Assume that voters prefer a more proportional electoral system. Thus, parties enjoy an electoral benefit if they vote for reform, but only if the other party votes against reform. Conversely, if a party votes against the reform, it pays a cost, but only if the other party votes for. Payoffs representing this electoral reform game are displayed in the following strategic-form game, where the large party's net electoral benefits from blocking reform are larger than the benefits the parties enjoy from being seen as lone reformers.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Figure 1. The Electoral Reform Game–Example 1

46. What strategy combination(s) form(s) a Nash equilibrium in the above game? Hint: use the form (Large strategy; Small strategy).

A. For; For B. For; Against and Against; For C. Against; For D. Against; Against D. For; Against Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 47. If this were an accurate model of a particular country at a particular time, what would you predict about the behavior of the parties?

A. Both parties will support reforms.

B. Neither party will support reforms.

C. The large party will support reforms, but the small party will oppose them.

D. The large party will oppose reforms, but the small party will support them.

E. No way to tell based on the information given here.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Now, suppose the large party controls which bills are voted on (perhaps because it controls the relevant committee in the legislature). The game below is similar to the one above, but now the large party can choose to propose a reform (in which case the parties play a version of the game above), or they can block a reform bill before it gets to the floor (in which case they compete against the small party under existing laws). Answer the following two questions.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Figure 2: The Electoral Reform Game—When the Large Party Controls the Legislative Agenda

48. What strategy combinations form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to the above game? Hint: use the form (Large’s move at first node, Large’s move at second node; Small’s move at top node, Small's move at bottom node).

A. Block B. Block, Against; For, Against C. Block, Against; For, For D. Propose reform, For; For, Against D. Against; For Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 49. What does your response to the previous question say about the credibility of a large party that (a) controls the proposal process; (b) does not propose reform; but (c) claims that it supports reform?

A. the claim is credible B. the claim is not credible Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Now, let’s ask what happens when the parties play a game like the one in Figure 1, except that the benefit to the large party of having disproportional rules is much less, and the penalties to the smaller party from disproportional electoral rules are lower. This might be because the smaller party has been attracting a larger electorate, whereas the large party has been losing voters. This new situation is modeled in Figure 3 below. Using Figure 3, answer the following three questions.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Figure 3. The Electoral Reform Game—Example 2

50. What strategy combination(s) form(s) a Nash equilibrium in the above game? Hint: use the form (Large strategy; Small strategy).

A. For; For B. For; Against and Against; For C. Against; For D. Against; Against E. For; Against Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 51. If this were an accurate model of a particular country at a particular time, what would you predict about the behavior of the large party? The small party?

A. Both parties will support reforms.

B. Neither party will support reforms.

C. The large party will support reforms, but the small party will oppose them.

D. The large party will oppose reforms, but the small party will support them.

E. No way to tell.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 52. Compare your answers to the questions that asked you to predict the behavior of the two parties, given the particular game being examined (Questions 46 and 50). What does your analysis of the two games say about the conditions under which politicians who benefit from existing electoral laws are likely to support reforms that will help other parties?

A. Large parties will never support reforms.

B. If a large party is losing its size advantage and there is an electoral advantage from being seen as a reformer, then it will support the reform.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> C. Large parties will always support reforms.

D. Can’t say based on the information given.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 14: Social Cleavages and Party Systems 1. A nonpartisan democracy is: A. a democracy with no political parties.

B. a democracy in which the political system is not heavily divided.

C. a democracy in which the party system is based on ethnic divisions.

D. a democracy in which voters do not identify with the political parties.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 2. A one-party dominant system has only one legal party.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 3. Political parties do what?

A. They help to structure the political world.

B. They mobilize the masses.

C. They recruit and socialize the political elite.

D. They provide a link between the rulers and the ruled.

E. All of these F. Only (C) and (D) Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 4. What does it mean for a social cleavage to be politically salient?

A. All social cleavages that can be identified in a country are politically salient.

B. If a social cleavage in a given country defines a political conflict, it is said to be politically salient.

The same social cleavage might be politically salient in one country but not in another.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy Table 1 illustrates how society X is divided up along two identity cleavages.

Table 1: Identity Matrix for a Hypothetical Country X

East

French Speaking (%) 34

English Speaking (%) 2

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> West

4

60

5. According to the information in Table 1, does society X have crosscutting or reinforcing cleavages?

A. crosscutting B. reinforcing C. neither Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Table 2 illustrates how society Y is divided up along two identity cleavages.

Table 2: Identity Matrix for a Hypothetical Country Y French speaking

English speaking

East

23%

25%

West

25%

27%

6. According to the information in Table 2, does society Y have crosscutting or reinforcing cleavages?

A. crosscutting B. reinforcing C. neither Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 7. Based on the correlation and distribution of attributes in countries X and Y above, which country do you expect to have more politicized social groups (controlling for other factors)?

A. X will have more.

B. Y will have more.

C. X and Y will have the same.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Table 3 illustrates how a hypothetical society A is divided up along two cleavages.

Table 3: Identity Matrix for a Hypothetical Country A French Speaking Flemish Speaking (%) (%) Catholic

55

2

Protestant

3

40

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 8. According to the information in Table 3, does Society A have crosscutting or reinforcing cleavages?

A. crosscutting B. reinforcing Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Table 4 illustrates how society B is divided up along two cleavages. In order to be in power in society B, you need the support of 55% of the population.

Table 4: Cleavage Structure of Society B French Speaking Flemish Speaking (%) (%) Catholic

35

20

Protestant

30

15

9. According to the information in Table 4, does society B have crosscutting or reinforcing cleavages?

A. crosscutting B. reinforcing Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 10. If you were a Flemish-speaking Catholic political entrepreneur interested in mobilizing a minimal winning coalition (consisting of at least 50% of the population), which group would you try to politicize in society B? A. French speakers B. Flemish speakers C. Protestants D. Catholics Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 11. Based on the correlation and distribution of attributes in countries A and B, which country do you expect to have more politicized social groups (controlling for other factors)?

A. A will have more.

B. B will have more.

C. A and B will have the same.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> In Table 5, we illustrate the distribution of attributes in a hypothetical community in the New York City Borough of Queens that is divided along language and race lines. Use this table to answer the following three questions.

Table 5: Distribution of Attributes in a Hypothetical Queens Neighborhood White (%)

South Asian (%)

Latino (%)

English speaking

18

14

14

Spanish speaking

7

2

13

Hindi speaking

0

7

0

Polish speaking

25

0

0

12. If you know that someone is a Latino, can you predict with much certainty what language he or she speaks?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 13. If you know that someone is a Hindi-speaker, can you predict with much certainty what racial group he or she belongs to?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 14. Let’s assume that experience from recent elections in this New York community have led political analysts to expect that in order to win political office, a candidate needs to win at least 48% of the vote. Let’s also assume that political entrepreneurs will try to mobilize voters along either racial or linguistic lines. If this is the case, what identity category or categories COULD be activated or politicized to win the election? In other words, what identity category or categories (racial or linguistic) form minimal winning coalitions?

A. Latino B. English speaking C. White D. English speaking or South Asian E. White or Polish speaking Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> In Table 6, we illustrate the distribution of attributes in a hypothetical Los Angeles community that is divided along language and race lines. Answer the following questions.

Table 6: Distribution of Attributes in a Hypothetical Los Angeles Community English

speaking Spanish speaking Korean speaking

(%)

(%)

(%)

Latino

20

31

0

Asian

17

0

14

Black

10

0

0

White

8

0

0

15. If you know that someone is an English speaker, can you predict with much certainty what racial group he or she belongs to?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 16. If you know that someone is a Latino, can you predict with much certainty what language he or she speaks?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 17. If you know that someone is Asian, can you predict with much certainty what language he or she speaks?

A. Yes B. No Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 18. Based on your answers to the previous three questions, would you say that the attributes in this hypothetical Los Angeles community are more crosscutting or more reinforcing?

A. crosscutting B. reinforcing

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium Let’s assume that in order to win political office in this Los Angeles community, a candidate needs to win at least 50% of the vote. Let’s also assume that political entrepreneurs will try to mobilize voters along either racial or linguistic lines, using the existing identity categories listed above.

19. If this is the case, what identity category or categories COULD be activated or politicized to win the election? In other words, what identity category or categories (racial or linguistic) form minimal winning coalitions?

A. Latino B. English speaking C. Black D. Asian E. Either (A) or (B) F. Either (B) or (C) G. Either (A) or (D) H. Either (B) or (D) Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 20. If you answered the previous question correctly, you will find that there are two identity categories that form minimal winning coalitions. According to the logic of the theory that predicts minimal winning coalitions, which of these two identity categories do you think is most likely to be politicized?

A. Latino B. English speaking C. Black D. Asian Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 21. In the previous questions, you should have found that there were two identity categories that form minimal winning coalitions. Are there any groups of individuals that are members of both minimal winning coalitions? If so, who are they?

A. No. B. Yes, English-speaking Latinos C. Yes, English-speaking Asians D. Yes, Spanish-speaking Latinos E. Yes, English-speaking Blacks Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 22. When we talk about “district magnitude” we are referring to: A. Whether a district is important or not for a national candidate’s victory.

B. The population size of a district.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> C. The average income of the population in a district.

D. The number of representatives elected in a district.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 23. The mechanical effect of an electoral system refers to the way that votes are translated into seats.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 24. In disproportional electoral systems, the mechanical effect rewards large parties and punishes small ones.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 25. The existence of the mechanical effect of electoral systems creates an incentive for voters and elites to behave strategically.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 26. Is the incentive to vote strategically higher or lower when the district magnitude is large?

A. higher B. lower C. the same Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 27. No electoral rules allow a perfectly proportional transfer from votes into seats, although some electoral systems are much more proportional than others.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 28. Why do electoral rules affect how many parties a country has?

A. mechanical effect B. strategic voting C. strategic entry D. all of these, because the mechanical effect provides incentives for (B) and (C) Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 29. What is the connection between district magnitude and the permissiveness of an electoral system?

A. When district magnitude is low, permissiveness is high.

B. When district magnitude is high, permissiveness is high.

Ans: B

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 30. France has recently banned people from covering their faces in public, which was widely understood to target Muslim women from wearing full-face veils. This indicates that the ______ cleavage is still salient in France.

A. urban–rural B. confessional C. class D. secular–clerical Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Medium 31. According to Duverger’s theory, when are you likely to see many parties in a country?

A. When the country uses a proportional representation electoral system.

B. When the country has many politically salient cleavages.

C. When the country has many politically salient cleavages and the electoral system is not proportional.

D. When the country has many politically salient cleavages and the electoral system is proportional.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 32. The results of empirical tests of Duverger’s theory show that increasing ethnic heterogeneity always leads to more legislative parties, regardless of the permissiveness of the electoral system.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 33. Nonpermissive electoral systems (such as single-member district plurality) are thought to benefit a small number of large parties because: A. they have a strong mechanical reductive effect on the way votes are translated into seats.

B. there are many incentives to engage in strategic voting.

C. there are many incentives to engage in strategic entry.

D. all of the above explain the benefits to larger parties.

Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 34. Duverger’s theory predicts that if a country with a homogeneous society (few cleavages) uses permissive electoral rules, then it will have many parties.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 35. Duverger’s theory predicts that if a country with a homogeneous society (few cleavages) uses disproportional electoral rules, then it will have many parties.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Difficulty Level: Medium 36. According to the logic of Duverger’s theory, if a country with a heterogeneous society (many cleavages) like Israel switched from its current permissive electoral rules to a disproportional system (such as the one the United States uses), what would you expect to happen to its party system?

A. The number of parties in the legislature would decrease.

B. The number of parties in the legislature would increase.

C. The number of parties in the legislature would stay the same.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 37. According to the logic of Duverger’s theory, if the United States changed its electoral rules and adopted a permissive form of PR (with large district magnitudes), what do you predict would happen?

(You should assume that the United States has a fairly heterogeneous society—i.e., many cleavages.)

A. The number of parties in the legislature would decrease.

B. The number of parties in the legislature would increase.

C. The number of parties in the legislature would stay the same.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 38. To test Duverger’s theory, we need to have a measure of the number of cleavages in a society.

The measure that is used most often is the effective number of ethnic groups. What does an analyst need to assume if she is to use this measure?

A. That ethnicity is the only type of cleavage that exists in a society.

B. That all of the nonethnic cleavages in a society (class, religion, region, and so on) are highly correlated with the ethnic cleavages.

C. That there are no ethnic cleavages in a society.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 39. The results of empirical tests of Duverger’s theory show that increasing ethnic heterogeneity always leads to more legislative parties, regardless of the permissiveness of the electoral system.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 40. Posner’s study of the Chewas and Tumbukas in Zambia and Malawi suggests that ethnic groups in Africa nearly always organize politically along ethnic lines, unlike ethnic groups in other parts of the world, who are typically more responsive to the logic of minimal winning coalitions.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 41. How might Duverger’s Law be used to explain why there are only about two effective parties in the United States?

Ans: Single-member district electoral system encourages two parties despite nontrivial heterogeneity.

Cognitive Domain: Application

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Test Bank Chapter 15: Institutional Veto Players 1. The discussion of federalism in the chapter contains a distinction between de facto federalism and de jure federalism. The latter is referred to as “federalism in structure.” To be classified as federal in structure, what features must a country have?

A. A unitary state.

B. Constitutionally regional governments that cannot be unilaterally abolished by the national government. Both the regional and the national government govern their own citizens directly, and both have independent bases of authority.

C. A bicameral legislature, in which legislative deliberations occur in two distinct assemblies.

D. devolution E. all of these Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 2. The majority of independent countries in the world today are federal in structure.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 3. Imagine a country with an ethnically heterogeneous population. The different ethnic groups are geographically clustered so that if you consider particular areas of the country in isolation, they have relatively homogeneous populations. If such a country were to adopt a federal system, which type of federalism would you expect it to adopt?

A. congruent and symmetric B. congruent and asymmetric C. incongruent and symmetric D. incongruent and asymmetric Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 4. It is nearly always the case that a researcher can determine how centralized a country is by looking at its constitution.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 5. When researchers study federalism in practice (de facto federalism), what measure do they use to estimate how centralized a country is?

A. The effective number of parties.

B. The central government’s share of tax revenue.

C. The number of regional subunits in the country.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Medium 6. Political scientists tend to view federalism (de jure federalism) as a constitutional issue but decentralization (de facto federalism) as a budgetary one.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 7. According to political scientists, what is the relationship between federalism and government accountability?

A. Federalism enhances accountability.

B. Federalism undermines government accountability.

C. Different political scientists have argued both (a) and (b) above.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 8. The majority of independent countries in the world today are bicameral in structure.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 9. In which of the following countries would you expect to see legislators engaging in more creditclaiming behavior?

A. in bicameral parliamentary democracies B. in unicameral parliamentary democracies Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 10. Even upper houses that are generally considered to be weak can, in some circumstances, significantly influence the legislative process.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 11. In most bicameral systems, the upper house represents the citizens of subnational geographic units. Thus, the upper chamber often suffers from malapportionment.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 12. The majority of bicameral countries in the world today are characterized by symmetric bicameralism in structure.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> 13. Over time, most countries have moved away from having class-based upper chambers, though territorially based upper chambers tend to be able to retain their legitimacy.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium Figure 1 illustrates a situation of a unicameral legislature in which there is a median voter (MV) and a status quo policy (SQ) arrayed along a single left-right issue dimension that runs from 0 (most left) to 10 (most right). The MV is assumed to have a single-peaked utility function and to vote for the policy that is located closest to her ideal point. Assume that a voter will vote for a new policy over the status quo if she is indifferent between them.

Figure 1: Illustrating a Unicameral Legislature

14. In Figure 1, what is the range of policies that the median voter prefers to the status quo?

A. 3–5 B. 0–10 C. 3–6 D. 3–9 E. 6–10 Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 15. If the median voter in the legislature in Figure 1 gets to propose a new policy, what would she propose?

A. 2 B. 3 C. 4 D. 5 E. 6 F. 7 G. 8 Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 16. In Figure 1, what would the outcome be after the median voter proposes a new policy and all members of the legislature vote between the new policy and the status quo?

A. 2 B. 3 C. 4 D. 5 E. 6

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> F. 7 G. 8 Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium In Figure 2, we illustrate a situation where we have a bicameral legislature. The location of the status quo policy is SQ, the location of the median voter in the lower chamber is LC, and the location of the median voter in the upper chamber is UC. Assume that both median voters have a single-peaked utility function and that the support of both chambers is needed to pass a new policy. Assume that a voter will vote for a new policy over the status quo if she is indifferent between them.

Figure 2: Illustrating a Bicameral Legislature

17. In Figure 2, what is the range of policies that the median voter in the lower chamber prefers to the status quo?

A. 3–5 B. 0–10 C. 3–6 D. 3–9 E. 6–10 Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 18. In Figure 2, what is the range of policies that the median voter in the upper chamber prefers to the status quo?

A. 3–5 B. 0–10 C. 3–6 D. 3–9 E. 6–10 Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 19. In Figure 2, what is the overlapping range of policies preferred by both chambers to the status quo?

A. 3–5 B. 2–3

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> C. 3–6 D. 3–9 E. 6–10 Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 20. If the lower chamber is the agenda setter and can make take-it-or-leave-it proposals, where on the left-right issue dimension will the lower chamber make its policy proposal?

A. 3 B. 4 C. 5 D. 6 E. 7 Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 21. If the upper chamber is the agenda setter and can make take-it-or-leave-it proposals, where on the left-right issue dimension will the lower chamber make its policy proposal?

A. 3 B. 4 C. 5 D. 6 E. 7 Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 22. Based on your answers to the previous two questions, does an institutional rule designating which chamber has agenda-setting power affect policy outcomes?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 23. Imagine that the status quo policy shown in Figure 2 were actually at 5 (assume that nothing else has changed). Would this different status quo affect the answers to the previous questions concerning Figure 2?

A. Yes, because the acceptable ranges for each median voter would be different. In fact, in this case the status quo could not be overturned in favor of any new policy.

B. No, all of the answers to the preceding questions would be the same.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 24. “Constitutionalism” refers to constitutions that are written in a single document, as opposed to constitutions that have several sources, some of which may be unwritten.

Ans: F

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 25. The majority of independent countries in the world today have codified constitutions.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 26. In which of the following types of democracies would it be easier to change the current constitution?

A. in a country with an entrenched constitution B. in a country with an unentrenched constitution Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 27. In which of the following types of democracies would it be easier for the legislature to enact any policy change that it wanted to make (assuming a majority of legislators were in agreement), no matter how radical?

A. in a country with a legislative supremacy constitution.

B. in a country with a higher law constitution.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 28. The adoption of higher law constitutions has often coincided with transitions to democracy. In many cases, the adoption of this type of constitution was a deliberate choice meant to provide individuals with additional protection from the state.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 29. Is it possible to change the political status quo without the agreement of all of the institutional and the partisan veto players?

A. Yes B. No Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 30. In the U.S. case, are actors such as the president and the Congress considered to be institutional veto players or partisan veto players?

A. institutional veto players B. partisan veto players Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium In Figure 3, we have two veto players, A and B, who are located in a two-dimensional issue space.

The status quo policy is given by the point SQ. Potential policy proposals are denoted by X.

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year>

Figure 3: Two Veto Players

31. Using Figure 3, draw indifference curves for each veto player (A and B) with respect to the status quo (SQ). Shade in the winset if there is one. Which of the potential policy proposals (labeled X1–X4), would win in a pairwise contest against the status quo?

A. X1 B. X2 C. X3 D. X4 Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 32. If Figure 3 remained the same except that B were no longer a veto player–that is, if A could choose policy independently—where would policy end up?

A. X1 B. X2 C. X3 D. X4 E. A F. B G. SQ Ans: E

Instructor Resource <Author>, <title, edition> SAGE Publishing, <copyright year> Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 33. If Figure 3 remained the same except that A were no longer a veto player–that is, if B could choose policy independently, where would policy end up?

A. X1 B. X2 C. X3 D. X4 E. A F. B G. SQ Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 34. Veto player theory suggests that countries containing many veto players with conflicting policy preferences are likely to be characterized by: A. greater policy stability.

B. smaller shifts in policy.

C. less variation in policy shifts.

D. weaker agenda-setting powers.

E. all of these are characteristics likely to occur in such a situation.

Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Instructor Resource Clark, Golder, and Golder, Principles of Comparative Politics, 3rd edition SAGE Publishing, 2018

Test Bank Chapter 16: Consequences of Democratic Institutions Majoritarian or Consensus Democracy?

1. According to the majoritarian vision of democracy, what role should citizens who hold minority preferences play in determining policy?

A. They should serve as a check on the power of the majority.

B. Their opinions should be a part of a consensus that determines policy.

C. Citizens with minority preferences should have no role in the policy-making process.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 2. Government accountability gauges the extent to which it is possible to reward or punish policy makers for the policies that are chosen. Which of the following statements best characterizes accountability as a goal in both types of democracies?

A. Accountability is an important goal in both majoritarian and consensus democracies, but is only achieved in consensus democracies.

B. Accountability tends to be only an important goal for majoritarian democracies, and only majoritarian democracies achieve it.

C. Accountability is only an important goal for consensus democracies, and only consensus democracies achieve it.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 3. The ability of voters to hold their elected officials accountable depends on: A. Voters following retrospective voting behavior B. A sufficiently high level of clarity of responsibility C. Both (A) and (B) Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 4. Mandates are not particularly important in consensus democracies.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Knowledge Difficulty Level: Easy 5. Government identifiability is higher when there are many parties but they form preelectoral coalitions than when there are many parties that only begin bargaining over government formation after elections.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension

1

Instructor Resource Clark, Golder, and Golder, Principles of Comparative Politics, 3rd edition SAGE Publishing, 2018

Difficulty Level: Medium 6. Which of the following institutions lead to higher levels of clarity of responsibility?

A. a federal system B. coalition governments C. legislative committee systems that give power to opposition parties D. all of these E. none of these Ans: E Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy

7. Responsiveness is an important goal for both the majoritarian and the consensus visions of democracy, though each conceptualize the term quite differently.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 8. If a constitution writer wanted to choose institutions to disperse power and generate high levels of ideological congruence between representatives and citizens, which vision of democracy would she be trying to achieve?

A. Majoritarian B. Consensus Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 9. Which of the following countries most closely meets the guidelines of a majoritarian democracy?

A. New Zealand (prior to 1996) B. Netherlands C. Belgium D. Japan Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy 10. Which of the following countries most closely meets the guidelines of a consensus democracy?

A. New Zealand (prior to 1996) B. United Kingdom C. Belgium D. Japan Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Easy

The Effect of Political Institutions on Fiscal Policy 11. When political economists talk about fiscal policy, what are they referring to?

2

Instructor Resource Clark, Golder, and Golder, Principles of Comparative Politics, 3rd edition SAGE Publishing, 2018

A. The use of taxing and spending decisions to reach government goals.

B. The set of government policies related to the raising of revenues through taxation.

C. The set of policies accomplished through government spending.

D. The manipulation of interest rates and the money supply to reach government goals.

E. All of these.

F. Only answers (A), (B), and (C) refer to fiscal policy.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 12. Analysts who look at fiscal activity in advanced industrialized countries in the postwar period find that there is very little cross-national variation in the level of fiscal activity.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 13. According to the Meltzer–Richards model of the size of government, preferences over tax rates are a function of a voter’s income. Voters with a higher-than-average level of income prefer low taxes while voters with a lower-than-average income prefer high taxes.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 14. Why might the demand for redistribution that analysts find in the empirical data differ from that predicted by the Meltzer-Richards model?

A. The model assumes full turnout, so the model’s predictions should be more accurate in countries with higher levels of turnout than in other cases.

B. The model assumes income inequality, but the empirical data show no evidence of income inequality in the analyses of advanced industrialized countries presented in the chapter.

Ans: A Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium 15. Why does the partisan model of macroeconomic policy predict that changes in partisan control of the government will lead to predicable changes in fiscal policy?

A. It doesn’t; the partisan model of macroeconomic policy is about whether voters are extreme or moderate. Extreme voters want redistribution and moderate voters do not.

B. Because it assumes that left wing parties represent voters who want more redistribution (and thus, higher levels of fiscal activity) and right-wing parties represent voters who want less redistribution.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium 16. Empirical evidence indicates that fiscal activity is higher in countries that use proportional representation than in ones that adopt majoritarian electoral rules.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium

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Instructor Resource Clark, Golder, and Golder, Principles of Comparative Politics, 3rd edition SAGE Publishing, 2018

Electoral Laws, Federalism, and Ethnic Conflict 17. The analysis presented by Fearon and Laitin (1996) suggests that conflict is likely whenever different ethnic groups coexist within a single state.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 18. In recent years, economists and political scientists have reached a consensus regarding the exact causal relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and economic growth.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 19. According to recent work on the size of ethnic groups and democratic stability, when are democracies likely to be particularly unstable?

A. when there are many ethnic groups B. when there are few ethnic groups C. when there is a permanent majority Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 20. If potential conflicts exist in ethnically divided societies, which electoral rules would political scientists recommend in order to mitigate the conflict?

A. proportional representation electoral rules.

B. majoritarian electoral rules.

C. scholars don’t agree on the best course of action in this case. Some recommend PR and others recommend majoritarian rules.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium 21. Is federalism a useful tool for reducing ethnic conflict?

A. Yes. Political decentralization reduces ethnic conflict by increasing opportunities to participate in government and by giving groups discretion over their political, social, and economic affairs.

B. No. Political decentralization strengthens regionally based ethnic identities and strengthens, rather than weakens, ethnic divisions.

C. It depends. Political decentralization reduces ethnic conflict when regional parties are weak but it increases ethnic conflict when they are strong.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium 22. Which of the following institutional mechanisms are thought to prevent regionally based identity parties from dominating subnational governments?

A. preferential voting systems B. Presidential elections, where the presidency is an important political prize and the elections are held at the same time as subnational elections.

C. cross-regional voting requirements

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Instructor Resource Clark, Golder, and Golder, Principles of Comparative Politics, 3rd edition SAGE Publishing, 2018

D. all of these Ans: D Cognitive Domain: Application Difficulty Level: Medium

Presidentialism and Democratic Survival 23. Having problems making policy quickly, locating responsibility for policy, and making comprehensive policy are characteristics of presidential systems. Parliamentary systems, particularly those with coalition governments, do not suffer from these problems.

Ans: F Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Medium 24. If you were asked to recommend whether a poor country with a multiparty system should adopt presidentialism or parliamentarism, which would you choose? Assume that your goal is to allow them to avoid democratic collapse. Assume also that the country is unlikely to change either its level of income or its electoral rules in the near future.

A. presidentialism B. parliamentarism C. It wouldn’t make a difference for democratic survival in this case.

Ans: B Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium 25. If you were asked to recommend whether a rich country with a two-party system should adopt presidentialism or parliamentarism, which would you choose? Assume that your goal is to allow them to avoid democratic collapse. Assume also that the country is unlikely to change either its level of income or its electoral rules in the near future.

A. presidentialism B. parliamentarism C. It wouldn’t make a much of difference for democratic survival in this case, so they should use some other criteria on which to base their decision.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium 26. Large numbers of veto players in a country encourage policy stability on the one hand, but political instability on the other.

Ans: T Cognitive Domain: Comprehension Difficulty Level: Easy 27. If a moderately poor country with a high level of social heterogeneity had adopted a constitution that specified presidentialism, what kind of electoral rules would you suggest they employ in order to maximize their chances for survival as a democracy?

A. It wouldn’t matter, because they would have a multiparty system no matter the electoral rules.

B. It wouldn’t matter, because they would have a two-party system no matter the electoral rules.

C. Majoritarian (single-member district) rules so that they would have a small number of large parties.

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Instructor Resource Clark, Golder, and Golder, Principles of Comparative Politics, 3rd edition SAGE Publishing, 2018

D. Proportional representation so that they would have a small number of large parties.

E. Proportional representation so that they would have a large number of large parties.

Ans: C Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Medium 28. Brazil is a large, ethnically heterogeneous, primarily Catholic country. It has a presidential system with proportional representation electoral laws. Based on this description and the hypothetical regression results below, what factors about Brazil encourage political extremism? What factors discourage political extremism? Which have no effect?

Table 1: Testing Theories of Political Extremism Dependent Variable: Level of Political Extremism Variables Small population Economic development Ethnic diversity Large agriculture sector Catholic majority Presidential regime Single-member district plurality

Model 1 −0.29* 0.10 0.27* 0.62* 0.04 −0.14* −0.53*

Ans: •

Variables relevant to Brazil that encourage extremism: Having a large population (instead of a small one), ethnic heterogeneity, and proportional representation electoral rules (instead of SMPD).

• Variables relevant to Brazil that discourage extremism: Presidential regime.

• Variables relevant to Brazil that have no effect on extremism: Catholic majority.

• Variables that have significant coefficients but that are not mentioned in the information about Brazil given in the question: Economic development, having a large agriculture sector.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 29. Drawing on discussions in various chapters throughout the textbook, can you think of reasons that might explain the regression results you began analyzing in the previous question?

Ans: Varies Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 30. Venezuela is an ethnically heterogeneous country with a presidential system and a level of wealth that has been fluctuating above and below a per capita income level of $6,055 PPP USD. Although it has one of the longest records of democratic rule in Latin America, the democratic system has become increasingly fragile in recent years (indeed, many would argue that it is no longer democratic). In recent years the degree of party fractionalization in the legislature has increased and national income has fallen.

In a sentence or two, what have you learned in this class that might explain the increasing fragility of democratic rule in Venezuela?

Ans: Poorer countries more likely to experience transitions to autocracy, particularly if they have a presidential system with a multiparty legislature.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis

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Instructor Resource Clark, Golder, and Golder, Principles of Comparative Politics, 3rd edition SAGE Publishing, 2018

Difficulty Level: Medium 31. In 2005, Iraq had a per capita gross domestic product of US$3,400 and derived 95% of its foreign exchange earnings from oil. The literacy rate was 40.4% compared with a global average of 82%. It has three main ethnic groups Shia Muslim (56% of the population), Sunni Muslim (28%) and Kurds (15%), which amounts to 3.1 effective ethnic groups.

Which of these factors might contribute to the emergence and survival of democracy, which ones might hinder the emergence and survival of democracy, and which do you think are irrelevant for the emergence and survival of democracy?

Finally, if you were compelled to design a constitution for Iraq that maximized the probability of democratic consolidation, which institutions would you choose? For example, would you recommend a presidential or a parliamentary regime? What electoral system would you suggest? Please indicate the reasoning (logic and evidence) behind your answer.

Ans: Part A • Iraq’s level of income is low. Przeworski and Limongi suggest that countries above US$6,055 that experience democracy are likely to stay democracies forever. Clark argues that increased wealth is also associated with the emergence of democracy. Either way, there is nothing about Iraq’s level of wealth that would encourage the emergence or survival of democracy.

• There is considerable evidence that reliance on mineral extraction, in general, and oil extraction to be specific, discourages the emergence and survival of democracy. In addition, because oil is a highly capital intense industry, owners of such assets are not likely to possess credible exit threats. Consequently, the presence of such actors is not expected to encourage the kind of government—elite bargaining likely to lead to limited government in general, or democracy specifically.

• Iraq’s social structure contains a fair degree of ethnic/religious diversity that some have argued is bad for the emergence and survival of democracy. Chandra argues, however, that it is not ethnic diversity per se, but the existence of a “permanent minority” that is problematic for democracy (because the permanent majority might rule in such a way that leaves that group grieved and likely to view governing institutions as illegitimate). Alas, because the Shia are a majority, there is a good chance that most democratic electoral systems would make them a permanent majority and the Sunni and Kurdish minorities would have incentives to support extra-constitutional attempts to overthrow the government.

Part B • •

Although the prospects for democratic survival in Iraq are grim, the choice of institutions could, at the margin, make a big difference.

One might argue that a strong chief executive in the form of a president that is elected by all Iraq might be necessary to create national unity, but if one did, it would be important to try to ensure that the president did not confront a highly fractionalized legislature. One way to do this is to try to encourage the formation of a two-party system. We know from Duverger’s law, that singlemember district plurality (SMDP) will encourage the formation of a two-party system and, given a sufficient degree of ethnic fractionalization, large district magnitude PR will encourage the formation of a multiparty system.

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Instructor Resource Clark, Golder, and Golder, Principles of Comparative Politics, 3rd edition SAGE Publishing, 2018

•

Thus, although there may be good reasons to adopt PR (suppose you wanted to encourage the formation of an ambitious welfare state), If you chose presidentialism, choose an SMPD electoral system could be crucial for the survival of democracy in Iraq.

• A good answer would also include a discussion of federalism, whether and what kind ought to be adopted.

Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard 33. If you were asked to give advice on the following questions, what would your answer be?

We are writing a constitution for a new democracy in a large country with many social and ethnic cleavages and a per capita income of about US$5,000 in 1985 dollars. We would like to do everything we can to try to ensure the consolidation of our democratic regime.

First, what other goals do you think we should have in mind when writing our constitution?

Second, what advice would you give us on specific institutional forms? Proportional representation or a single-member plurality system? Should we choose a parliamentary or a presidential system? Federal or unitary system? Unicameral or bicameral legislature?

In addition to answering these questions, could you give us some sense as to how you arrived at your answers? Also, can you tell us why you think the choices you’ve recommended are compatible with each other?

Ans: Varies Cognitive Domain: Analysis Difficulty Level: Hard

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