Smooth recovery? Don’t bank on it
Forecasters expect this to be the worst year for global growth since World War II. Kellogg professors weigh in on the factors behind the economic crisis and the prospects for recovery
To keep up with the purchasing demands of investors, brokers and banks turned to the subprime mortgage market. According to Hagerty, in certain instances, this risky behavior was encouraged. “There were incentive schemes present in these banks, which didn’t reward people for being really careful,” she says. “If you’re a wild risk-taker, you’re rewarded.”
“There are huge incentives for risk-taking. You get a giant reward if you get a big payoff, but you still get a truncated payoff if you blow it.” — Professor Kathleen Hagerty
Banks were able to sell these sub-prime mortgages by pooling them with other loans and packaging them into mortgage-backed securities to form a new type of derivative: collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. In theory, the AAA tranches of CDOs are safe, because it is unlikely that a large fraction of the mortgages in a CDO will default at the same time, explains Rebelo. In reality, many CDOs were the equivalent of “adding water to wine and putting it into new bottles,” he says. Banks that built their portfolios around these derivatives found themselves in trouble when home prices started to fall in all major U.S. markets because it exposed them to massive losses. However, “it was their concentrated portfolio that was the problem, more than the fact that they were trading in derivatives,” says Robert Korajczyk, the Harry G. Guthmann Professor of Finance. By December 2007, the U.S. was officially in a recession, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. Advanced economies, like Japan and the United Kingdom, and countries with close connections to the U.S. through product and capital markets, felt the impact most immediately and most severely, according to the IMF. The emerging and developing economies soon followed, although those with
By Rachel Fa rr e l l 30 Kellogg Spring 2009
kellogg.northwestern.edu/kwo
Kellogg Spring 2009 31
Photo ©Evanston Photographic Studios
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n Jan. 28, 2009, the global economy reached a new low. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that it had overestimated world growth for 2009. Growth was no longer projected at 2.2 percent, the rate the organization had anticipated in November 2008. Now, the IMF said, world growth was expected to be only 0.5 percent — the lowest rate in 60 years. During a press briefing that afternoon, IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard didn’t mince words. “We now expect the global economy to come to a virtual halt,” he said. The world economy was once a robust financial system. What went wrong, and why? Many people, including some Kellogg School professors, point fingers at the U.S. “The U.S. is the driver of global demand,” says Kathleen Hagerty, the First Chicago Distinguished Professor of Finance and senior associate dean of faculty and research. “So if something happens to the U.S., it has a huge effect on China and India [and other countries]. When one guy goes down, everyone goes down.” The downward spiral, some professors say, can be traced to 2001. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan lowered the overnight interest rate to 1.75 percent to mitigate the effects of a mild recession. “Many people think that these low interest rates played a key role in the current crisis,” says Sergio Rebelo, the Tokai Bank Professor of Finance, “because they fueled a rise in the demand for housing, which led to a substantial appreciation in home prices.” The housing bubble allowed investors to receive high returns on mortgage-backed securities, because “as mortgage credit expanded and home prices increased, mortgage default rates fell,” says Rebelo. Even those facing foreclosure were able to take out a home equity line of credit or sell their homes for a profit, since home values were rising so quickly. “That made banks feel that it was safe to continue to increase their real estate exposure,” Rebelo says.