The Nature of Judgment in the Design Professions: Exploring the Dynamics of Action and Reflection

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE IDBE 15

ESSAY 1 The Nature of Judgment in the Design Professions Exploring the Dynamics of Action and Reflection

Richard W P Klopp January 2012

Submitted to the University of Cambridge in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Studies - Interdisciplinary Design for the Built Environment.

Supervisor: Nicholas Ray Director of Studies: Dr. Julie Jupp

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY (IDBE 15) ESSAY

THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT IN THE DESIGN PROFESSIONS

The Nature of Judgment in the Design Professions Exploring the Dynamics of Action and Reflection

Introduction This essay explores the theme of professional judgment. While general notions of both “professionalism” and “judgment” are touched upon, the main focus relates to the specific nature of professional judgment in the building design disciplines.

The research casts a wide net on the literature, and draws from personal experience as a practicing architect and design educator. It is hoped that the work will offer a useful starting point for other design professionals who wish to delve into this subject of great richness and relevance to practice.

In its essence, professional practice is a balancing act, whereby multiple demands and responsibilities are addressed in such a manner as to ensure that good judgment is served. Professionals engaged in the design of buildings must regularly exercise judgment based on a firm grasp of reality and high ideals for that reality. At the same time, they must find a balance between client objectives, regulatory requirements, social responsibilities, cultural aspirations, and the autonomous demands of the project as a holistic entity1.

Good judgment is perhaps the most highly valued ability that both clients and professional firms will seek of prospective candidates for a project team. Rarely, however, is good judgment explicitly defined. What is judgment in the professional sense of the term? How does one characterise this ubiquitous activity that is highly context sensitive in both the active mode of decision-making and the reflective mode of outcome-assessment?

Actions and outcomes can be judged at many levels and from different perspectives and value sets. Competing interests, time and budget constraints, shifting client demands, staffing problems, internal politics, lack of experience, and a host of other factors come to bear on professional judgement. These 1

These five demands are derived from Nagel’s (1979) essay “The Fragmentation of Value,” which Ray (2005b) applies to an architectural case study on the ethical dilemmas of practice.

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factors may develop into “situations” or “problems” where judgment becomes a very visible and decisive act. More commonly, however, professional judgment takes the form of a guiding hand that anticipates and responds to the emerging demands of the job in an assured, proactive and habitual manner. The difference between one professional that is constantly “putting out fires” and another that seems to effortlessly carry out a mandate, often boils down to differences in experience and the foresight that this experience offers (Guthrie 1995).

In the case of a building project and its design process, professional judgment is more than just one decision or action; it is an evolving construct comprised of a multitude of judgments that are incrementally added to, transformed, or eroded by new judgments. Since time is an important factor in the dynamics of judgment, predictions cannot simply be based on the successes of past actions – these actions must always be reconsidered in light of present circumstances and a context of shifting values.

This essay is structured in the following manner. It begins by characterising the specific nature of professional judgment and how it differs from a more general concept. This leads into a brief overview of judgment’s fundamental qualities and two operative modes: an active mode and a reflective mode. These two modes are brought together in a hybrid concept that draws from both Arendt’s actorspectator theory of judgment (Passerin d'Entreves 2006) and Abercrombie’s (1989) judgment pairing of perception-reasoning. The main body of the work will then examine the essential judgment factors of context, time, and experience as they relate to the practices of design professions. As a means of summing up the broad themes of this work, two models of judgment are discussed and for each a diagram is proposed. The first model attempts to describe the dynamic perceptual framework in which judgments are formulated in the active mode. The second model identifies seven distinct yet interrelated operative levels by which judgments may be assessed in the reflective mode. These levels are linked to spheres of professional competency that include team relations, procedural knowhow, risk management, executive capacity, technical performance, cultural contribution, and ethics.

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What is Professional Judgment?

The Canadian Handbook of Practice for Architects (CHOP) identifies “acute judgment” as “an essential skill in the provision of services” (NPP 2009). While the CHOP does not specifically define judgment, it does link it to the domain of expertise, something that is learned through professional education, practice experience, and mentorship. This structured learning process, which includes examination, provides the means by which professional member associations regulate entry into the profession and assure the public that all members can competently provide professional services to an acceptable standard. To maintain membership standing, many professional associations also require an ongoing commitment to professional development. (NPP 2009) Professional judgment can be linked to each of the CHOP’s four principles of professionalism: it is rooted in expertise, it operates in a context of autonomy, it is driven by a sense of commitment, and it is guided by accountability.

“Common sense” is a term often used interchangeably with “good judgment,” but Holt (1997), in The Designer’s Judgement, claims that good judgment in the context of professional work is something else. Professionals have the ability to “see” and “know” what others cannot due to their specialised knowledge and heightened sense of perception in matters relating to their particular discipline.

Thus

professional

judgment

is

not

necessarily

self-evident

or

easily

comprehensible, as common sense would imply.

Professional judgment is also more than mere opinion. Since professional judgment often entails matters of significant gravity – such as, life safety, financial investments, occupant wellbeing, etc. – it requires high levels of certainty and accountability, which must increase in proportion to the risk. While there is no formula for good judgment, professionals draw confidence from personal experience, best practices, standards and precedents: applying knowledge of “what has worked in the past” to the unique challenges of each new commission.

Design professionals such as architects are accountable not only to the clients that pay them for their services, but also to a much broader segment of society,

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which includes: the professional associations that give them the right to practice in a particular jurisdiction; the building occupants that have entrusted their quality of life; the regulatory authorities that defend public interests; the owners and shareholders of the firms at which they are employed; the project partners with whom they have collaborated; and the cultures of practice to whom they contribute new knowledge and precedents. Professional judgment involves representing, prioritising, and balancing the often-conflicting values of these various groups, while keeping one’s personal interests in check. “Doing what is right” might not be right for all, but it should aspire to the highest values and greatest good to society. This is the ethical dimension that infuses all professional judgment; ethics that are expressed through ones conduct and character: i.e. “what one does” and “the manner in which it is done.”

Professional judgment is a form of “good work,” which entails both actions and outcomes; means and ends; process and product. Since “good work” is an evolving concept, it carries with it a commitment to self-improvement. Richard Smith, in Paths of Judgement: The Revival of Practical Wisdom, describes the sensitivity to particulars of a situation as attentiveness, which “in practical judgement means that one is constantly open to further experience and the possibility of modifying one’s judgement” (1999: 330).

So far, we have explored some of the defining qualities of judgment in professional practice. But what is judgment exactly? And how does it operate? In The Art of Judgment, Vickers (1995) offers a two-word definition “responsible choice” and characterises judgment as “a personal, mental activity involving… intellect, sensibility, character and will.”2 A more descriptive definition distilled from the CHOP’s principles of professionalism might read as follows: Professional judgment – The practical and contextually appropriate application of knowledge directed in a purposeful and engaged fashion towards

fulfilling

client

objectives

and

broader

societal

values,

uncompromised by self-interests or other conflicting motivations, and taking full responsibility for one’s actions and advice.

2

As paraphrased by Holt (1997: 114)

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Vickers (1995) identifies three operative modes of judgment in cognition: reality judgments, the acute perception to capture an understanding of a situation in its present reality and context; value judgments, a sense of an ideal reality for that situation; and action judgments, the knowledge of how to act to achieve that ideal. He claims that the first two terms are inseparable and define ones “appreciation” or “readiness to see things one way rather than another” (Holt 1997: 114). There is a strong connection to ethics, which judgment draws from to determine its reading of an “unfulfilled ideal.”

Social norms and relations act as external sources of reference for these three internal modes of judgment. While judgments are made up in the minds of individuals, reacting from their own perspective to the particulars of a situation, they are very much a product of the common values and practices of the social context in which they are formed.

Judgments often emerge from social interaction and are therefore subject to the perceptions and influences of others, especially peers and those in higher authority. Engaging a professional is to defer judgment to a credible authority. In the case of design professionals, they assist their clients to make project-related judgments with regards to its reality (i.e., context and constraints), value (i.e., objectives and opportunities), and appropriate actions (i.e., process and methods). When society reflects upon the outcomes of these internal judgments, it can lead to changes in the collective perception of reality, the common appreciation of what is right, and conventions of best practice, which are the external judgments embodied in social norms.

This brings us to Hannah Arendt’s influential but uncompleted actor/spectator theory of judgment, which is described in the entry under her name in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Passerin d'Entreves, 2006). This theory proposes two distinct but interacting forms of judgment: one with active qualities and the other with contemplative qualities, each informing the other in an ongoing dialogue between individual and society.

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Two Types of Judgment Arendt identifies two judgment types that play out their dual roles in both political life and in the life of the mind: the first is an actor’s role in the position of engagement and active decision-making; the second is a spectator’s role in the position of standing apart and impartial observation (Passerin d'Entreves 2006).

In Anatomy of Judgment, Abercrombie (1989) attributes the cognitive functions of perception and reasoning to these roles. These two sets of concepts are brought together in Table 1, which describes a single hybrid pair of judgment types each with distinct operative qualities.

ACTION-ORIENTED PERSPICACIOUS JUDGMENT Act of Engagement

JUDGMENT TYPE

POSITION

actor (subjective individual)

ROLE

situational decision-making

ACTION

“to do what is right or good”

AIM

process / unknowns (dynamic) present (to guide outcomes) individual (tacit knowledge) Aristotle’s “particulars” perception

CONTEXT TEMPORAL FOCUS INFORMS PHILOSOPHICAL LINEAGE COGNITIVE FUNCTION

VALUE-ORIENTED REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT Act of Standing Apart spectator (inter-subjective public) detached problem-solving “to determine what is right or cull meaning from past actions” outcomes / givens (static) past (to guide future action) collective (socio-cultural norms) Kant’s “universals” reasoning

Table 1 – Two Types of Judgment: Action-oriented versus Value-oriented

Judgment can take the form of a situational response, i.e., “a judgment call,” which is informed by an accurate reading of a dynamic context (perception) or it can take the form of an expression of values, i.e., “a verdict,” which involves deliberation over a selection of relevant factors that are isolated from their context as evidence (reasoning). These two types of judgment – “doing what is right” versus “determining what is right” – draw on two philosophical lineages: Aristotle’s notion of phronesis (situational judgments involving particulars) and Kant’s idea of “enlarged mentality” (value judgments involving universals).

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To paraphrase the differences and interaction between these two judgments: the first draws on good practices and the values embedded in them to direct appropriate action under particular and evolving circumstances; the second draws on the knowledge of these particulars – i.e. data collected on past actions, context, and outcomes – as static elements for analysis directed towards advancing and communicating the principles of “rightness.” One is action-oriented and the other is value-oriented, but they both share the same end goal: the betterment of individuals and society. Whereas individual interests are often in conflict with each other and with those of the collective, one of the important functions of society is to safeguard the ideological basis of good judgment from the ever-present threat of corruption. This is particularly important for authority figures that can impose their rationality over others (Flyvbjerg 1998).

There is a difference between Vickers’ conception of action and value judgments with those on Table 1, which both use similar terminology for different types of judgment. The action-oriented, perspicacious judgment of Arendt’s “actor” encompasses all three of Vickers’ cognitive judgment modes. The value-oriented, reflective judgment of Arendt’s “spectator” is an external and second order type that involves “judging judgments.” These action-oriented and value-oriented judgments continually inform each other and add to an individual’s experience as well as a collective understanding of what is good.

For Schön (1983), the hallmark of professionalism is reflective practice, or “Reflection-in-Action,” in which these two modes operate concurrently in one practitioner’s decision-making process, thereby contributing to a process of continuous learning and self-improvement. Interestingly, practice means “doing” and “learning,” which ties it to both types of judgment.

The Context of Judgment in the Design Professions Since professional work involves the application of specialized knowledge in important matters of public concern, professional member associations are often granted the autonomy of self-regulation and exclusive rights to practice. These professional bodies provide a framework for defining sound judgment within a

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particular discipline and jurisdiction. They ensure that good judgment is fostered and that bad judgment is disciplined by setting out registration and admission requirements, codes of conduct, examples of best practice, and a commitment to continuing education and knowledge sharing. This provides a framework for defining sound judgment within a particular professional discipline, albeit one that keeps judgment “in-house”.

Expanding the view of judgment to encompass the multidisciplinary team context, in which building design is actually carried out, reveals the true complexity of professional practice with all its territorial issues, gaps in accountability, and communication challenges between different professional cultures. While an omniscient view may never be attainable by any one practitioner, project teams must nonetheless learn to cultivate broader team awareness if they wish to keep pace with the industry shift towards more integrated and collaborative models of practice, where judgment operates in relational contexts that are less hierarchical and directive. (Erden, Von Krogh, Ikujiro 2008; Constructing Excellence 2004).

Judgment is about process and outcomes, and the interrelationship between the two. Judgment is also about value and emphasis. It therefore requires discernment, which is the ability to discriminate not only between relevant and non-relevant factors in a situation, but also between appropriate and inappropriate responses (Collier 2006). In the forward to Architecture and its Ethical Dilemmas (Ray 2005a), Worthington describes an important historical shift in the role and status of professionals and their context for discretionary action: from an elite class of “gentlemen” of unquestioned integrity and authority to a much more “diverse, paradoxical world of multiple values and a need to make balanced judgments between many points of view” (2005: xv). Discernment in this context is increasing tied to ones sensitivity to group values.

The opening disclaimer of the CHOP alludes to the important role of context in professional judgment in architectural practice: “This Handbook describes procedures for general practice only; there are exceptions and differences for specific circumstances” (NPP 2009). What this is essentially saying is that practice is context-specific and the role of the professional is to best judge how to apply the ideals of best practice to specific circumstances.

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Theoretical notions of judgment and idealised standards of practice take on an unnerving level of complexity in the realities of professional practice, where decisions are made in multiple contexts of uncertainty and constraints: a relational context of multidisciplinary teamwork in which no one individual has all knowledge or decisive authority; an ethical context of diverse and often competing values, loyalties and interests; a wicked (Whelton and Ballard, 2002) and messy (Schön, 1983) design context of ill-defined problems and mandates; a commercial practice context of limited time, fees, and resources to complete the work; and a cognitive context of bounded rationality which operates when optimal decisions or outcomes are unknowable and one must rely on mental approximations and stopping rules such as satisficing to achieve acceptable results within a given time frame (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999).

In this context of uncertainty laden with risk and constraints, good judgment is dependant on ones ability to predict and control outcomes. Skill, experience and authority empower the professional to make responsible choices, but predicting the actions of others would be impossible without the social norms, contracts, and cultures of practice that engage them to perform to a certain level of expectation.

Trust is therefore an important condition to judgment, where teamwork or social relations are at play.

Judgment when applied to a process, such as building procurement, involves not just one, but a series of actions. Judgment is often perceived as an isolated and grandiose event – the culmination of long and careful deliberation – but in any process-based profession such as architecture, judgment is an ongoing activity involving many actions, large and small. These actions build on each other and are constantly modified to better suit or control the evolving context.

Process guidance is at the heart of professional practice. In The Role of Tacit Knowledge in Judgement and Decision Making, Guthrie (1995) describes the importance of good habits in the overall judgment process. While his observations are drawn from outdoor recreation and wilderness guiding, they are highly relevant to the design professions. For Guthrie (1995), good judgment and professionalism is not so much to do with the quality of decision-making in a crisis situation, but rather the anticipation and avoidance of a crisis in the first place. In

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his mind, this can only be accomplished by experts: those who are highly familiar with and attentive to the context and who have developed the routine practices that will guide the process in the right direction. A good judgment process prepares the ground for future judgments by constantly monitoring and interacting with the contextual factors that have a bearing on outcomes.

The Time Factor Judgments are made and assessed within specific temporal contexts that are constantly evolving and changing. Judgments are therefore best predictions of future outcomes, where time is the revealing factor. The old adage “time will tell” expresses the difference between decision-making and judgment: decisionmaking is an action; judgment is holding oneself accountable to the outcomes of that action (Vickers 1995). The quality of judgment may be revealed immediately, or it may take years, as is often the case with the work of design professionals.

Judgment often calls for a timely response, which Holt sums up eloquently in the following passage: It seems that any state of affairs in which there is an opportunity to change the course of events calls for an exercise of judgement. There is a link between judgement and initiative, for the precipitating factor in thinking about a change may be a growing disparity between what we feel the situation is really like and what we believe it could be… Wherever there is some element of discretion, judgement is involved. (1997: 114) Judgment is a temporally holistic response to the particularities of a situation, involving past, present, and future. Judgment applies knowledge of the past to the values of our present reality in order to direct future outcomes towards idealised ends. However, the values that define judgment are not static. They evolve with time and accumulation of new precedents, experiences or insights that change our perceptions of past events, the present reality, and the ideal future. This would imply that clients should not necessarily expect professionals to repeat past judgments when confronted with similar mandates. On the contrary, they should expect that with experience gained, relationships

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developed, context familiarity, and client feedback, higher-level judgments would be achieved. The nature of practice is that it “makes perfect,” which is why clients with repeat work should be interested in keeping project teams together through longer term partnering arrangements, as Latham promotes (2005: 43).

Time often imposes severe constraints on professional judgment, the conditions of which are a direct consequence of the earliest judgments in a new mandate: the schedule and fees proposed in response to a call for professional services.

Professionals must attempt to work within these limitations, but be able to judge at what point it becomes ethically unacceptable to do so. An overriding ethical response prioritises judgments such that it is not uncommon for professionals to delay the process to ensure that their judgment is not unduly impaired.

Praxis Knowledge Given the complexity and uncertainty of design practice, how is it that some professionals know immediately what to do, while others need excessive amounts of time to analyse the problem and explore options? Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988) have shown that in the hierarchy of competencies, the highest levels of expertise can only be achieved through experienced-based, situational knowledge. This “knowing” is immediate and not bogged down by analytical processes. Guthrie (1995) calls it tacit knowledge: something difficult to articulate because it involves situation recognition with all its dynamic contextual factors, many of which are highly familiar to the expert and therefore taken for granted.

For Guthrie (1995), the source of good judgment is this tacit or praxis-based knowledge, which expresses itself in some of the following competencies:

attentiveness – recognition that a situation needs attention;

perspicacity – knowledge of what to look out for or focus on;

foresight – anticipation of potential problems or opportunities;

imagination – coming to mind of appropriate actions and their consequences;

discernment – ability to select the most appropriate course of action; and

virtuosity – skill at carrying out those actions.

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As previously mentioned, praxis knowledge often operates tacitly and in the form of routine practices: spontaneous responses without deliberation to the unfolding of events. These practices, or habits, create the background for good judgment by proactively guiding the process towards better decision-making contexts and by freeing up the mind to attend to emerging situations.

Tacit knowledge appears to resemble intuition, but Guthrie (1995) emphasizes that sound judgment based on tacit knowledge is not intuition of the type that involves a “hunch,” “impression,” or “apprehension.” The difference he claims is that tacit knowledge can be rationalized and communicated, although it may not be comprehensible to someone without a similar level of competency. If intuition involves “knowing,” then it is in the domain of tacit knowledge. In this case, intuition, like tacit knowledge, offers immediate insight on the present reality based on recognition of similar experiences or observations.

Praxis knowledge can be acquired through trial-and-error; however, this is usually unacceptable in a professional context where “error” can result in the loss of life or capital investments. This explains why so much of a design professional’s work is analytical and “testing on paper”, because there is not the luxury of failure. It also highlights the importance of mentorship, sharing experiences, and heuristic methods for improving judgment.

Referring back to the two types of judgment, we find tacit knowledge in the realm of the action-oriented type and reasoning in the realm of the value-oriented type.

Schön (1983), Holt (1997) and many other authors have critiqued the formal education of professionals as being devoid of the praxis knowledge on which professional judgment is developed. They are referring to the action-oriented judgment type and the limitations of analytical methods in practice, which often are too slow and cumbersome, never have enough information, do not properly address complexity, and undervalue social and cultural concerns. Values derived from rational analysis can in fact undermine good judgment by overloading the scales against unquantifiable aspects.

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There is a trap associated with each type of judgment. The trap of the valueoriented, reflective type is that by “stepping away” from the context one becomes disconnected from the present reality and disengaged from relational factors that cannot be isolated. The trap of the action-oriented type is to fall into the automatic responses of tacit knowledge and miss opportunities to improve. Abercrombie suggests that improving judgment requires feedback between the two modes: We may learn to make better judgements if we can become aware of some of the factors that influence their formation. We may then be in the position to consider alternative judgements and choose from among many instead of blindly and automatically accepting the first that comes; in other words, we may become more receptive, or mentally more flexible.

(Abercrombie 1989: 17)

Discussion Two types of judgment have been presented in this work: one that is practical in nature and involves “doing what’s right” based on “reading the moment” and predicting the outcomes of actions in a dynamic and uncertain context; the other that is ideological in nature and involves the rational assessment of past actions in order to inform values and future actions.

Having come to the end of this essay, but with a great deal of research material still unwritten, I will conclude with two models of judgment that will gather much of the remaining content into a useful form for future research. The first model attempts to describe the process of predicting good judgment in a dynamic and uncertain context; the second model offers a method for classifying judgments according to seven distinct competencies required in professional practice.

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A Model for Understanding Judgment in the Active Mode This first model of judgment involves the thoughts and actions that derive from situational awareness and knowledge of past experience: perception that draws from precedent in the service of prediction. If we define judgment in the active mode as “best predictions in the context of complexity, uncertainty and contingency,” then the design process is a fertile ground for judgment, especially in the early conceptual stages, when both project form and intentions lack definition, and preliminary ideas determine much of what is to follow (Holt 1997).

Figure 1 attempts to capture the nature of this dynamic process in a diagram.

While it greatly oversimplifies the complexity and level of attachment between subject, actors and objects, it does express the qualities of a context in perpetual flux, where no one has complete information or control over all judgment factors.

The diagram represents the context of professional judgment as a field in which all possible factors, relevant and irrelevant, are arranged as objects around the project actors. From each actor’s point of view, not all factors can be perceived or known, but one can shift focus and attention and draw on the knowledge of others. Initially, the sheer quantity of objects is overwhelming, and one looks for guidance. Mentors and other professional resources draw attention to salient factors and provide values for judging what is a good situation or outcome, and what should be avoided. Over time, one begins to recognise patterns between actions in a specific context and their outcomes, which are recorded as precedents. Knowing “what to pay attention to” and “what is good” is the basis for good judgment, which relies on extensive precedent knowledge and an acute sense of perception and discernment.

When thinking about the context of judgment, it is easy to forget its dynamic nature. Objects, actors, and values are not static, but constantly evolving, interacting, and shifting in relative importance with one another. Making good judgments under these circumstances requires constant monitoring and interaction with the context. This is where Guthrie’s (1995) “good habits” or routine practices come in: as a means managing the context in order to improve ones ability to exercise good judgment.

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Our reacting to present bombardment of information involves ignoring some of it, seizing the rest and interpreting it in light of past experience in order to make as good a guess as possible about what is going to happen. This may be called the process of judgment.

(Abercrombie 1989: 14)

A

judging actor

b

area outside one’s field of awareness

c

field of awareness and expertise

d

pertinent judgment factor

e

extraneous judgment factor

f

judgment factors are constantly changing in relative importance

g

current directions of judgment factor

h

desired direction of judgment outcome

k

social norms, contracts and other means of controlling and predicting judgment outcomes

Figure 1 – A model describing the dynamic context of professional judgment in the active mode

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Despite the flux in the contextual factors of judgment, it is not a random process and there are predictive qualities, especially if one is sensitive to the concerns and interests of others. Prediction is also aided by social norms, power relations, contracts, codes, and cultures of practice, which define the acceptable range and limits of action (as represented by the bounded area on Figure 1).

Judgment in the active mode is described by many authors as an art involving virtuosity in both the technical and ethical sense (Vickers 1995; Holt 1997; Collier 2006; Flyvbjerg 2001). It requires acute social perception of what is considered “good” and “right,” which in the professional context is structured by codes of conduct and cultures of practice (Collier 2006). Judgment is a holistic response to a situation with all its contextual and relational aspects. In this sense, design professionals are engaged in a practice of art, i.e., responsible choice in a contingent context, rather than science, i.e., application of known concepts (Holt 1997). The problem with applying scientific method to the art of judgment is that it freezes, isolates, or nullifies contextual and relational factors that are constantly evolving, too numerous to consider, or too difficult to measure. Schön (1983), Holt (1997) and Ferguson (1992) have warned of professional judgment being reduced to technical-rationality or “problem solving” without properly addressing ethical concerns.

In describing the influence of a designer’s visual memory in development of new concepts, Ferguson (1992: 15) states that “the limits of any design are culturebound: all successful designs rest on specific precedents.” But good judgment is not just a product of past experience and present norms. Good judgment involves reinterpreting precedents in changing contexts and values, and an ethic to engage in social transformation and a critique of social norms. In this way, the professional does not just deliver what is expected, but also pushes the limits of acceptability to advance the notion of “rightness” by which future judgments are assessed (Holt 1997).

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A Model for Classifying Judgments in the Reflective Mode Having examined the dynamic context of judgment from an actor’s perspective, we now turn to the manifestations of judgment in professional practice: how judgment might be reflected upon from a public perspective and with the passage of time. Design professionals are engaged in process whereby judgments build on each other and can be used to correct errors in past judgment before they become

consequential.

Grouping

judgments

according

to

spheres

of

competencies and expectations helps to dissect an unmanageably broad concept into more practical themes for discussion and reflection. In practice, a model for classifying judgments would be a useful tool for identifying weaknesses that need to be managed and for understanding the causes of past failures. Encouraging reflection of this kind, both during the process and after, is a means of building awareness and enhancing the quality of future judgments.

This essay concludes with a model for classifying professional judgments according to seven levels of competency: relational, procedural, accountability, capacity, performance, aesthetic, and ethical. Ethical judgments fall into a higherlevel category that governs the interrelationship and prioritisation of judgments on the six lower levels, as shown in Figure 2. While space does not permit a detailed description of each of these levels, definitions are provided in the form of pertinent questions on Table 2. The essential feature of this model is the notion of an overarching faculty for strategic prioritisation of judgments. This provides the ethical core and bearings for the “balancing act” of professional practice.

Collier (2006) suggests that the artistic talents of architects make them uniquely qualified to exercise “moral imagination” in understanding ethical consequences.

However, this requires that empathy be directed in the appropriate fashion. While foresight gives the design professional the capacity for making ethical judgments, designers are notorious for empathising more with their projects than with the those that will interact with and inhabit them. At the heart of professional judgment is the consideration of the “greater good of others” and this is what the design professional must always return to.

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Figure 2 – A model for classifying professional judgments by spheres of competency

To briefly describe this model: each level of professional judgment corresponds to a specific sphere of competency and an expectation regarding proficiency. If a professional is significantly lacking in competency at any level, overall professional judgment will be undermined. As an example, a young architect may have developed an innovative concept that has exceeded the client’s technical performance expectations, has been recognized for its aesthetic contribution to professional culture, has the relational support of the project team, and has properly considered risk and accountability; yet the concept must be abandoned, because of insufficient procedural knowledge regarding the consent process and a lack of capacity to change the decision of the higher authorities having denied approval for the concept. In this same example, the architect would shows poor ethical judgment if after realising that approval would be unlikely, withholds this information from the client and pushes ahead in order to develop the concept further and buy time to exert political pressure on the deciding authorities.

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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY (IDBE 15) ESSAY

LEVELS OF JUDGMENT RELATIONAL JUDGMENTS

PROCEDURAL JUDGMENTS

THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT IN THE DESIGN PROFESSIONS

PERTINENT QUESTIONS Have you partnered well? Is your team effective/trustworthy?

What motivates/limits the actions of other team members?

Can you agree on common objectives and values?

Are you familiar with the process? Can you lead?

Do you manage your time and resources effectively?

Can you anticipate problems and engage in preventative action?

ACCOUNTABILITY JUDGMENTS

Do you know how to manage risk and liability?

What are your responsibilities and can you prioritise them?

Are you prudent? Have you taken the necessary precautions?

CAPACITY JUDGMENTS

Do you have the authority and support to fulfill your mandate?

How well can you assess your own/others abilities?

Does your status/reputation facilitate the consent process?

PERFORMANCE JUDGMENTS

Can you meet expectations and produce exemplary work?

Are you able to deliver on time, on budget, within scope of fees?

Do you manage internal resources well and achieve a profit?

AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS

Can you produce outcomes that are beautiful and inspiring?

Are you committed to a process that is meaningful to all?

Does your work contribute to culture?

ETHICAL JUDGMENTS

Are you able to balance your many obligations and interests?

How strong is your sense of values and morals?

What is your commitment to excellence and self-improvement?

Table 2 – Seven levels for assessing professional judgment

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THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT IN THE DESIGN PROFESSIONS

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