Jul 6 memo

NATIONAL SDCURITY COUN(;II,i

sEc&ET VEVORANDL]V

./ TOR:

1973

qICH'RD T, I'F\\ED\ .oHr'

SUEJECT:

July 6,

,l.

"Por BE, . P. txtt'

JaPan NSSM

I hawe previously mentioned to you teo basi. lrohlems ol approa.h .onlro,tins us on tle Japan NSSM (a cory is at Tah B):

-- wletheri a6 siat€ re.omends, ve should try to ger an iniiial judsment {rom tle P.esident on the qrcstion of vherher the U. S. intends to conrinue the alliar.e vftn Japa. .wei at Least lhe n and il so, vhelher tle political-secu ty aspecrs of our altia..e should be accorded prima.y over tle ec.homic aspe.ts. staie wonld also like ro get an initial judgment as to the veishi v€ accord rhe aliatr.e in relation to normalization of .elarions wit]1 Peliing, As yo! sill recall, tne opiions in ihe lirst d.an are fo.hular€d s6 as to try to eticit rnis judcm€nt be{..e the Ic soe tne other policy issues raised Iy the NssM r.quest.

-- wnether

tne alterMtive objectiwes pursuani to eacn o{ oui various iarerests in Japan sloutd be considered by the sR6 before tne rc aftempts to Lay onr and evaluate the poticy o?iions u.der eact ot rhe objectives.

on ihe fi.st ouestion, I believe t6at Dr. Kis6ingerrs marSinal cohrent or my me]mrabdrh of June 30 lat Tab r) !a3 p.o,ided an adequare answer: Lo sucn prelihinary jndSmetrt is app.opdab. rassnme ihat le would ag.€e urat ii w.n1d be Deanihgl€ss io assiBn a primacy to tte political securiy aspects oI our alliance in the .ategori.al hanner that Slaie (E,,r) wants. (What woold it mean in the .ase of soybeans, lor e*mple? ) I would intend to tell ihe Ic t. tay .u! ahd iadicaie the alie.natiye objectives and rhe policy oprion !ursuanr to rhem ir order ro elahle the Presiilent to de.ide vhai balance le vantB to strike heiveetr our various .ompeting objeciives and poli.ies in our reLationship vth Japan, on the second quesLion, the problem is raisedbyour requesiin ihe NssM lor alternative sets of objectives u.der an .l issues ee have posed. TakiDC a thorougl looh at the arternaiive obje.tives - vhat we want -- is, r believe, pa.ticula.ty appropriate at rhis juncture in our relatiors vith this .our!ry. T1re ag€n.iee are lik€1y to differ oh stat our orrjedives should be, as ven as .n tle hatance ve snould sirike betv€en corleiins

Metlodologically, ure NSSM reBpo,se could lr one draft tle alier.ative onjectiwes u.der each is8ue posed by the NSSM, as velL aE tne policy optiols pursua.t to each ol these alternaiive oljectiwe.. Giwen the ten major issues we hare losed in dle NSSM reqlest, the NSSM response *ilL take on a somevrar uvierdy size. (11, lor exam?le, tle IG produced tiree policy opiion3 f.r eacn oI dree aiternatiwe objectives under eacn ol tlâ‚Ź ten i3 vith about 90 lolicy optiors. ) It would, lowevâ‚Źr, Iave the advaniage ol looking ar the w]1.1e pactage more .ompiehensiwery, given rne leed io co.sider objectivee in ligli of tle policy neans to carry them out.

--

Coneider ale alternatiwe onjective3 uder each issle in tne SRc belore hawing the Ic 1ay ont poli.y options, rith the ohje.tive of gelti.g at least a lrelimi.ary decision on our basi. objectires. This vorld not prect e a reconsideratio. in tle se.o.d sRG meeting .f sohe of the ohjectires in light of rne more derailed .on3ideration of p.1i.y rean. ro giwe erfecr ro My ovn di3!o6itio. is to pu6ue tle NssM study in fwo stages, berievin3 that it vill .ondtrce iowald a tighier, hore conesive policy Eercise.

That v6n aft]l.rize he td i

--

That the 3i!dy 3hou1d a331me at least ine next fiwe year6.

co iNatior of the u.s.

-Japan anian.e over

T]1at a relative v.ight ca"not, at teast a! this staae, be put on rhe polftica1-secu ry aspecrs ol rhe alliance, and rhar the study shourd tlerefore proceed to develop altelnatiwe objectiwes a.d policy options n.der eacl of the is.nes poEed.

Tlat the sttrdy shodd filst

dewelop ard ewaluate alter.atiwe objeciiwes ude! each ol the issues, which will be .on6idered at the sRG leer helo.e policy options under each of the oljectives are dere1oped.

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