Transatlantic Relations in Flux
The Defining Question of European Rearmament
by ANDREW A. MICHTA One need only pick up the paper, tune into a television a number of U.S. allies. news program, or go on social media to see that U.S. One reason for the current flux in transatlantic relations relations with Europe are anything but “business as is a direct consequence of the end of the Cold War. The usual,” and that the differences do not concern simply the 1990 unification of Germany and the subsequent implosion personal styles of President Trump or individual European of the Warsaw Pact, and ultimately the Soviet Union itself, leaders. changed the relative power equation Since so much coverage is both on the Continent and globally. focused on personalities, the media On one hand, the United States often miss the larger structural emerged from the Cold War as the shifts underway in transatlantic sole superpower, with resources relations, with editorializing that prompted many to speak of the frequently obscuring what is taking dawning of an era of “unipolarity” place. In reality, the devolution of in which America would become transatlantic relations goes beyond a de facto global hegemon, its any particular administration – power unmatched. At the same though the tenor of it has varied time, with the disappearance of over time – and reflects fundamental the Soviet threat, Europe’s need shifts in power distribution and for American security guarantees the geostrategic challenges facing declined exponentially, for the allies the United States and its European no longer confronted a hostile bloc allies. intent on invading them should war We are at an inflection point break out. after three post-Cold War decades, This was visible not only in the and the choices confronting the dramatic cuts in European defense Andrew A. Michta United States when it comes to its budgets across the board, but also in relations with Europe, including the way in which NATO’s objectives NATO, our oldest alliance, will We are at an inflection were redefined in the 1990s and shape transatlantic relations going the first decade of the 2000s, with point after three postforward. There are a number of “out of area operations” such as Cold War decades, and differences between the United Kosovo and NATO enlargement into States and its allies in Europe when the choices confronting former Eastern Europe becoming it comes to the economy and trade the United States when defining missions. Moreover, the relations, from Germany’s decision continued weakening of the Russian it comes to its relations Federation under President Yeltsin, to go ahead with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline with Russia despite U.S. with Europe ... will as well as Russia’s failed efforts to opposition to it, through the use of democratize and create a market shape transatlantic Huawei G5 technology in some economy, were seen as a vindication relations going European networks, which the that Francis Fukuyama’s “end of U.S. opposes on security grounds, forward. history” was indeed coming to pass to weapons platform acquisitions, and that the liberal international most notably Germany’s decision order was ascendant around the not to include the F-35 into its fifth-generation aircraft globe. The U.S. approach to communist China during the competition. Still, no issue has registered as significantly past three decades also reflected the seemingly boundless as the question of defense spending, and what the Trump confidence of American policy elites that globalization Administration has considered “free-riding” on defense by and export-driven modernization would transform the 20
RIPON FORUM October 2020
