Transatlantic Relations in Flux

Transatlantic Relations in Flux The Defining Question of European Rearmament

by ANDREW A. MICHTA

One need only pick up the paper, tune into a television a number of U.S. allies. news program, or go on social media to see that U.S. One reason for the current flux in transatlantic relations relations with Europe are anything but “business as is a direct consequence of the end of the Cold War. The usual,” and that the differences do not concern simply the 1990 unification of Germany and the subsequent implosion personal styles of President Trump or individual European of the Warsaw Pact, and ultimately the Soviet Union itself, leaders. changed the relative power equation

Since so much coverage is both on the Continent and globally. focused on personalities, the media On one hand, the United States often miss the larger structural emerged from the Cold War as the shifts underway in transatlantic sole superpower, with resources relations, with editorializing that prompted many to speak of the frequently obscuring what is taking dawning of an era of “unipolarity” place. In reality, the devolution of in which America would become transatlantic relations goes beyond a de facto global hegemon, its any particular administration – power unmatched. At the same though the tenor of it has varied time, with the disappearance of over time – and reflects fundamental the Soviet threat, Europe’s need shifts in power distribution and for American security guarantees the geostrategic challenges facing declined exponentially, for the allies the United States and its European no longer confronted a hostile bloc allies. intent on invading them should war

We are at an inflection point break out. after three post-Cold War decades, This was visible not only in the and the choices confronting the Andrew A. Michta dramatic cuts in European defense United States when it comes to its budgets across the board, but also in relations with Europe, including the way in which NATO’s objectives NATO, our oldest alliance, will We are at an inflection were redefined in the 1990s and shape transatlantic relations going point after three postthe first decade of the 2000s, with forward. There are a number of differences between the United Cold War decades, and “out of area operations” such as Kosovo and NATO enlargement into States and its allies in Europe when the choices confronting former Eastern Europe becoming it comes to the economy and trade the United States when defining missions. Moreover, the relations, from Germany’s decision to go ahead with the Nord Stream it comes to its relations continued weakening of the Russian Federation under President Yeltsin, 2 pipeline with Russia despite U.S. with Europe ... will as well as Russia’s failed efforts to opposition to it, through the use of shape transatlantic democratize and create a market Huawei G5 technology in some European networks, which the relations going economy, were seen as a vindication that Francis Fukuyama’s “end of U.S. opposes on security grounds, forward. history” was indeed coming to pass to weapons platform acquisitions, and that the liberal international most notably Germany’s decision order was ascendant around the not to include the F-35 into its fifth-generation aircraft globe. The U.S. approach to communist China during the competition. Still, no issue has registered as significantly past three decades also reflected the seemingly boundless as the question of defense spending, and what the Trump confidence of American policy elites that globalization Administration has considered “free-riding” on defense by and export-driven modernization would transform the

PRC into a “responsible stakeholder in the international voiced by a number of U.S. administrations – Democrat system.” And as the United States post-9/11 pursued the and Republican alike. Rather, the urgency of the issue Global War on Terror and Europeans lent limited support reflects the realization in Washington today that the West to American counterterrorist campaigns, there were early faces two near-peer competitors when it comes to military warning signs (the 2003 Iraq war) that a number of our power, with Russia acting as a revisionist power intent key allies in Europe were not willing to sign on to the US on revising the post-Cold War order, and China as a state national security agenda. determined to replace the U.S.-led international system

It took multiple warning shots in the 2000s, from the with a version of its own. The United States sees China Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 to Putin’s seizure of today as both a military and economic problem set, while Crimea in 2014 followed by a war in western Ukraine, Europe still looks at China as mainly an economic issue, to finally shake the policy consensus. Most important which although increasingly problematic, nonetheless among them were the provides a key economic 2008 economic crisis and opportunity, especially (for Europe) the 2015- as China’s Belt and Road 16 immigration wave Initiative and its 17+1 from the Middle East format for engagement and Africa for which the with Europe carry with European Union was it (from the vantage woefully unprepared and point of Europe’s largest which began to fragment economies) the promise of the EU’s already tenuous greater access to the Asian internal cohesion. The market. 2016 election of Donald With the United States Trump as President not Joint Force no longer only shocked the European structured to engage policy establishment, for virtually no European German Chancellor Angela Merkel talks to soldiers of the German armed forces Bundeswehr during a trainin two major theater operations at the same capital expected it, but also ing exercise in May 2019. time after almost 20 years added to the friction when of continuous warfare, it came to intra-NATO European rearmament relations, for President is critical to ensure that, Trump had insisted from With the United States Joint in the event of a crisis his first day in office Force no longer structured to in the Indo-Pacific that that the Europeans fulfill their pledge to spent 2% engage in two major theater would focus our attention and resources there, of their GDP on defense, operations at the same time after deterrence against Russia arguing that the current almost 20 years of continuous holds. This makes the arrangement in which the United States contributes warfare, European rearmament issue of defense spending by the Europeans a vital 70% of all NATO defense is critical... one. The key question spending was simply for transatlantic relations unfair when it came to today is whether our burden-sharing. Although the European allies did step up principal allies on the Continent, especially Germany, will on defense, increasing their outlays by $43 billion between reach a broader consensus with the United States about 2016-18 (and, according to NATO Secretary-General the nature of the threat confronting us all and about the Jens Stoltenberg, promising to increase their outlays by actions the allies must take to keep NATO viable. RF an additional $400 billion by 2024), only seven of the now 30 member-states have met the requirement, and the Andrew A. Michta is the dean of the College of situation is even more dire when it comes to the ability International and Security Studies at the George C. of individual nations to field real, usable, and exercised Marshall European Center for Security Studies in defense capabilities. Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The views presented

The defense spending issue remains central from are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the the U.S. perspective not so much because of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security administration’s allegedly “transactional” approach, for Studies, the Department of Defense, or the United States complaints about insufficient defense spending were Government.