A Tale of Two Futures

By CDR Tom “Brother” Murray, USN Commanding Officer, HSC-4

Much has been written of late on the purpose and identity of the Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Community. I have no identity crisis – I’m a utility player and a rescue pilot. My squadron provides critical protection and support to our Carrier Air Wing (CVW) and Carrier Strike Group on a daily basis; we also fill the gaps and seams when needed. When tasked, we deliver people and parts; provide permissive, contested and combat Search and Rescue coverage; and ruthlessly defend any asset with deadly accurate fires. But this article is not about the identity of the HSC Community. This article is also not an academic research paper. Rather, I’m writing to offer my thoughts on the future of the HSC Community, raise awareness about changes afoot, and generate discussion about the same. I see our CVW squadrons rapidly approaching a fork in the road. I didn’t see this fork approaching when I coordinated the first HS to HSC (CVW) squadron transition in 2007 as a first tour aviator at HS-8. But, I see it clearly now as I lead the last HSC (CVW) squadron to deploy with our traditional complement of eight MH-60S helicopters. This fork offers two futures – a future in which my successors have a significantly reduced capacity (Future 1) and a future with an ever-increasing workload (Future 2). Perhaps they are not mutually exclusive.

But first – a few sentences on innovation and change. Some reading this article may suppose that I am resisting change or unable to innovate. I am absolutely in favor of adapting to meet changing missions and operating environments. Further, I do not believe that the way we’ve always done business is good enough. However, I believe that the change about to occur in our HSC (CVW) squadrons may be out in front of some prerequisite discussions and resource reallocation. That is, funding for billets and airframes was cut and racks are being earmarked for redistribution prior to a shared understanding (or conversation) about how to rebalance Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) resources & requirements. We owe it to ourselves, to the future of our community, and to the NAE to have an open discussion about the changes afoot. And if the fully informed plan has us continue as briefed, I’ll be the first to jump in with both feet and get to work.

Future 1: Reduced Capacity

The HSC Community has been a community in “transition” for the entirety of its life. From Naval Air Ambulance Detachments in Kuwait and Iraq, to frequent pop up tasking around the globe, to Littoral Combat Ships and MQ-8B/C, and to being the most widely deployed Community in all of the NAE, HSC is literally everywhere and doing myriad things at any one time. It’s no surprise to many of us that the transition continues. In the latest significant change, the HSC (CVW) community – that is, our squadrons assigned to CVWs – is shifting from an eight MH-60S footprint (six airframes on the CVN and two airframes on a Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ship) to a five aircraft footprint (three MH60S on the CVN and two on a CLF). The decision, first shared with HSC Community leadership in mid-2020, is billed as a mix of budget savings from the Pentagon and one of many steps across the NAE toward freeing up CVN deck space (and rack space) for the evergrowing and ever-changing Air Wing of the Future.

MH-60S from HSC-4 departing USS CARL VINSON to provide long range personnel recovery for air wing operations.

To those who would ask how an HSC (CVW) squadron will solve the heavy SAR requirement prescribed in CV NATOPS with only three aircraft on the CVN, I’ll tell you: we can’t, and HSC Community leadership is well aware of this. There are ongoing efforts above my paygrade to update the SAR requirements in CV NATOPS and to educate NAE leadership on the impacts of a reduced HSC footprint. Is the time ripe to update the SAR requirements for our capital ships? Perhaps. However, such a change must be done with an acknowledgment that Plane Guard is much more than just flying “the D.” Some days it is ACTC opportunity. Others it is SAR training or H2P checks. It is always proficiency for flight crews, and it is often critical readiness generation for one of the missions in our wheelhouse.

To the more complicated question of whether we’ll still be able to do all of the other things…passenger moves, VERTREP, alerts, strafe and crew-served weapons currency, dirt landing currency, ACTC, etc., with a reduced footprint, I’ll say: I don’t think so, but the jury is still out. More precisely, I should say that we will not be able to do all of the other things at the same time. Today, with six airframes and ~12 crews on the CVN, I frequently execute multiple missions simultaneously, flying 3-4 of my aircraft at the same time. “Tomorrow,” with three airframes, I will be able to execute each mission sequentially (i.e., one at a time). Generating a section of aircraft for either readiness or ACTC events will become much more challenging (not impossible), and we’d likely be “two to make two” for SAR requirements most of the time. I know that data collection regarding this reduced footprint is ongoing by interested staffs to ensure that our decision makers have the most current info at their disposal.

There’s also the discussion of whether we could pull all 5x aircraft in this smaller squadron onto the CVN. Such a move would obviously serve to get us just about back to where we are today (albeit with little to no depth on the bench when aircraft don’t cooperate); however, that would leave holes on our CLF ships that require vertical lift capability.

Future 2: Increased Workload

There’s also a sea change underway across the NAE – and USN/DOD writ large – as we continue to wrap our collective arms and minds around the Great Power Competition (GPC). As it pertains to this article, I’ll focus on one small subset of that change… long range Personnel Recovery (i.e., Search and Rescue) from the CVN. Many have postulated that DOD capacity and force laydown will require the U.S. Navy to conduct much of its own rescue and recovery in certain branches of GPC. As I look around CVW 2 (literally… I’m writing this from deployment onboard USS Carl Vinson), I’m certain that task – long range Personnel Recovery (PR) – will fall to my squadron, the Legendary Black Knights of HSC-4.

To that end, and in support of CVW 2 tasking around the world, HSC-4 supports all CVW 2 flight operations with PR/SAR coverage (unless there’s a more logical PR asset already in place). From long range training of various types to long range operations in multiple AOs – sometimes via Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations or thanks to CMV-22B refueling to extend our SAR radius – we have promised our Air Wing brothers and sisters that we will be there, no matter when or where. We are executing what has been either overlooked or “whitecarded” for much too long. We are positioning rescue assets where they may be needed, when they may be needed. Many of these flights have required creative solutions for fuel. Most have required non-standard configurations (additional fuel tanks) and exposed the communication challenges we encounter at long range and low altitude. Some missions have stretched the limits of our crew days. All of these flights have made my squadron and our Air Wing better. Because we have not been content to whitecard, and because we are out there executing daily, CVW 2 and CCSG 1 know that HSC-4 is up to the task when we transition beyond Phase 0 operations.

These missions come at a cost – repeatedly flying a section of aircraft over the horizon on long range events costs flight hours and airframe hours and adds risk to an already high risk profession. On top of the additional search and rescue work my squadron is tasked with, the logistics beast will continue to grow and continue to be an incredibly important part of GPC. We will not be able to provide the same long range PR/SAR support to our Air Wing while completing all other tasking if we decrement our footprint to only 3x MH-60S on the aircraft carrier.

Future 1/2: Do Both?

Perhaps there is a world where we can support our growing workload with a reduced footprint in our HSC (CVW) squadrons. What if we reduce the SAR requirement close aboard our capital ships and eliminate the CLF detachment requirement for our HSC (CVW) squadrons? A slight reduction in CV NATOPS SAR requirements will provide some wiggle room in capacity. Simultaneously outsourcing CLF aircraft requirements to contracted services or filling with expeditionary detachments – if we need them at all – would allow a slightly smaller HSC (CVW) squadron to retain a five to six aircraft presence on the CVN. But what about the deck space on aircraft carriers?!? I can’t solve that one, but I think if you ask, you’ll find that we’ve got some really smart minds working it. Great conversations are already happening with all stakeholders – from working toward use of support equipment that can be shared across all T/M/S to creative storage solutions for gear that would otherwise occupy hangar bay square footage – we’re solving this problem on the deck plates right now and making recommendations to program offices and HHQ.

Summary

The requirement for long range Personnel Recovery is real – it is happening today. Theoretical / proposed solutions for long range Personnel Recovery assets in a future conflict are just that… proposed. After the decrement of our HSC (CVW) squadrons occurs, we will have a real problem – reduced assets to cover requirements – with a proposed solution that is not in place (e.g., joint forces or MH-60S on other platforms). Clearly I’m of the mind that we should not decrement our HSC (CVW) squadrons, or that we should at least pull the remaining 5 aircraft onto the CVN. However, I also acknowledge that this is a complex problem and that I don’t have all of the information.

The HSC Community has long been a gap and seam filler. When tasking arises ashore or at sea that doesn’t fit neatly into a particular T/M/S’s Required Operational Capability / Projected Operating Environment (ROC / POE), it is the HSC Community that more than likely solves the problem. From aerial firefighting (wildland and, sadly, USS Bonhomme Richard); to COVID patient moves aplenty; to Congressional Delegation and senior leader aerial surveys of anything and everything; to long range Personnel Recovery (PR); to many other missions that exceed this publication’s classification; the HSC Community will continue to provide that X-factor, covering the seams with its multi-mission airframe, can-do attitude, and versatile crews. At the end of the day, it’s up to NAE leadership to decide how much gap and seam filler we need on our capital ships. Gotta run – I’m walking in 5 on another long range Personnel Recovery event to ensure my Air Wing brethren get home safely!

Notes

Swain, Rob. “HSC Restructure: Resolving Organizational Dissonance through Cultural Alignment.” Rotor Review, Spring 2021 #152.

McCaffree, Justin. “The HSC Funnies.” Rotor Review, Winter 2020 #147.

HSC fighting the fire on Bonhomme RIchard