Domestic Dynamics of China’s Foreign Policy Conference REPORT
15–16 March 2012 SINGAPORE
Domestic Dynamics of China’s Foreign Policy REPORT OF A CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY China Programme S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS)
Rapporteurs: Kalyan M. Kemburi and Irene Chan
15–16 March 2012 Marina Mandarin Hotel SINGAPORE S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University
This report summarises the proceedings of the workshop as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editors appointed by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report. The workshop adheres to the Chatham House rule. Accordingly, beyond the paper presenters cited, no other attributions have been included in this conference report.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
5
Opening Remarks
6
Session 1: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
7
Session 2: PLA and Foreign Policy
11
Session 3: Non-Traditional Actors’ Influence on Foreign Policy Making
15
Session 4: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
18
Session 5: Domestic Political Economy and Foreign Policy
22
Session 6: Cases: The Influence of Domestic Factors on Foreign Policyy
25
Conference Programme
28
Conference Participants
30
About RSIS
32
Executive Summary
The conference endeavoured to identify and analyse the role of various domestic actors, interest groups as well as governmental and nongovernmental agencies in China’s foreign policy making processes and in the implementation of policy initiatives. A total of 19 scholars from Australia, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Europe, and the United States presented papers at the conference, which was also attended by a diverse range of scholars, diplomats, and business leaders from the Asia-Pacific region. The conference was organised into six thematic sessions over two days. The first session laid the foundation for the conference by addressing how the domestic politics in China impact the foreign policy making process. The next session deliberated the role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which also included an analysis of defence industries’ international engagement and discourse of the literature associated with the PLA scholars. The third session discussed the influence of new actors including think tanks and media. The last session of the day one evaluated the ability of public opinion to influence key foreign policy issues. The first session on day two focused on understanding the emerging dynamics between domestic political economy and foreign policy including the role of companies and provinces. The last session of the conference included select case studies to understand the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy. These case studies included Sino-EU relations, Sino-U.S. relations, and influence of domestic politics on China’s maritime strategy. The conference deliberations resulted in some broad preliminary observations:
• First, due to political institutionalisation in China’s elite politics, elites are competing for political positions through various means. Although the dynamics of China’s elite politics have not drastically altered the course of China’s external relations, they have indeed changed the conduct of foreign policy.
• Second, recent years witnessed foreign-policy process becoming more open, pluralistic and institutionalised.
• Third, there is consensus among civilian and military leaders to accord top priority to domestic stability. Moreover, the Party needs to consolidate itself in the drastic social transformation and the PLA needs more time to achieve its “double leap-forward” in war preparation. The general state of China civil-military interaction on foreign/security affairs will remain positive based on a mutually beneficial relationship.
• Fourth, the recent discourse emerging from scholars associated with PLA is characterised by two features: conviction that the United States is a declining power and China is a rising power and unanimous resentment against the United States. Nevertheless, at present it is difficult to ascertain the scope and reach of this discourse.
• Fifth, while decisions continue to be made by a small group of leaders in Beijing, their decision-making is increasingly subject to popular pressures. The rise of popular nationalism could be attributed to the weakening of state capacity to control nationalism. The commercialisation of media and the impending power transition has made the Chinese state vulnerable to popular criticism as it seeks to balance the need to protect its interests and legitimacy, while avoiding further criticism from an increasingly nationalistic audience at home. Nevertheless, in contrast to the negative ways nationalism has been depicted, this influence can actually be positive for China’s diplomatic bargaining objectives.
• Sixth, there is a growing role of local government entities in the intensified cross-border interactions between China and its neighbours in the social, economic and cultural arenas. However, within Southeast Asia this interaction at times has created some challenges. For example, ASEAN officials are often perplexed by the increasing volume of Chinese proposals for cooperation, as they could not differentiate which ones were officially sanctioned by Beijing.
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Opening Remarks
Dr. Tan See Seng opening the conference
Tan See Seng opened the conference by citing the early 20th century German historian Eckart Kehr, who once noted, “A foreign policy has not only an antagonist in front of it but a homeland behind it.” This homeland consists of disparate sources of influence as well as ideas from a range of individuals and groups, at times with competing if not conflicting aims. This conference aims to identify and understand the actors, the institutions, as well as the special interests and lobbies, and the means with which they shape, directly or indirectly, China’s foreign policy. Tan noted that three decades of rapid economic growth accompanied by deepening global engagement, advancements in and the levelling effect of information technology, and the rise of social media have enabled the emergence of multiple interests groups in China. As recent debates within China suggest, the emerging “heterogenisation” of the Chinese polity has resulted in the blooming of different “flowers” (or ideas), if not quite a hundred certainly not few, on what is or should be of importance to China and how China ought to pursue them.
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Session 1 Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
Does China Fit? Considerations and Criticisms of the Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus Russell Moses provided a critical evaluation of a domestic and foreign policy nexus in China and the usefulness of studying domestic factors to understand and predict Beijing’s foreign policy making processes and choices. The presentation starts by posing several questions pertaining to domestic and foreign policy nexus: under what circumstances and with how much impact does this nexus work and how does such a relationship work. Moses highlighted that though there is abundant literature that agrees about the contours of the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy in general, literature related to China remains unresolved.
Russell Moses
China studies have always assumed that there is a compelling connection between domestic development in China and Beijing’s foreign policy. However, in establishing a connection between domestic politics and foreign policy, at least two challenges emerge: first is analytical i.e. difficulty in establishing causal linkages; differentiating between causation and correlation; defining what constitutes “domestic”; and what level of impact specific domestic variables have on particular foreign policy tracks. Second is the absence of reliable and verifiable information to study Chinese politics.
system should provoke a shift in foreign policy. Similarly, scholars should also look into how provinces interact with their foreign counterparts, and do the objectives of provincial foreign interaction differ from that of Beijing. Additionally, while determining the role of public opinion, Moses recommends moving beyond studying the “angry youth”. He noted that with an ageing population, Chinese foreign policy might find itself in a different demographic situation in a number of dimensions.
The inconsistencies in Beijing’s responses (for example, on North Korea) dampen the idea that Chinese foreign policy is somehow dependent on domestic conditions, or sometimes dependent. Moreover, these conditions have not been thoroughly identified in a way that would make them replicable and thus testable. This leads to the key question: is trying to see if China fits into this framework of domestic matters or internal structure propelling foreign policy worth the research effort?
All of these questions would be cast as hypotheses, which could then be tested to begin to determine something beyond simply “influence” or “impact”, and thereby begin to move beyond categories and classifications of domestic forces and their correlation with Chinese foreign policy.
In addition to listing the analytical challenges, Moses also highlighted opportunities in this regard. There is a potential to seek answers for questions of predictive nature. For example, what would a Chinese foreign policy look like if a particular leader emerged? The question deserves attention, for if domestic dynamics matter, then a change of leadership in an authoritarian
Bo Zhiyue started by noting that one of the most important features of China’s elite politics since 1992 has been institutionalisation. Although political competition within the Communist Party of China has not drastically altered the course of China’s foreign policy, it has affected the conduct of foreign policy. Zhiyue delineated the role of elite politics in foreign policy processes through the case
China’s Elite Politics and Foreign Policy
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Session 1
one hand, Xi tried to increase his international exposure by a series of foreign visits and on the other hand, he enlisted Jiang Zemin as his patron to bolster his chances. As vice president, Xi Jinping visited more countries then all of his predecessors. As the heir apparent to President Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao had conducted 25 foreign visits as a part of his grooming process while Zeng Qinghong visited only 10 countries as vice president. Xi, however, has visited 41 countries by March 2012. Xi’s two pronged strategy seems to be working. With his frequent foreign visits, Xi had sent a clear signal to the international community as well as the top leadership in China that he would be the future president of China. Any change to his status would hurt the image of China as a country of political stability. Meanwhile, Jiang Zemin and his protégés in the Politburo Standing Committee and the CMC had extended their support for Xi as the vice chairman of CMC.
Bo Zhiyue
studies of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, the two frontrunners of the fifth generation leadership. The political dynamics between Li Keqiang (who is supposedly favoured by Hu Jintao) and Xi Jinping (who purportedly has the backing of Jiang Zemin as a mentor) have significantly influenced the conduct of China’s foreign policy.
Zhiyue concluded that due to political institutionalisation in China’s elite politics, political elites in China are competing for political positions through various means; competition that has spilled into the conduct of China’s foreign policy. Although the dynamics of China’s elite politics have not drastically altered the course of China’s external relations, they have indeed changed the conduct of foreign policy.
Although Li Keqiang has been groomed as Premier Wen Jiabao’s successor, he has worked closely with both Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao on foreign affairs. Two recent illustrations clearly mark Li Keqiang’s important standing in foreign policy issues: First, emergence of the new concept of “core interests” in China’s foreign policy, which was first used internationally by Li during his visit to Australia. Second illustration involves Sino-North Korean relations, in which Li was not only the main emissary of Hu Jintao but also had the opportunity to interact and establish relations with key North Korean leadership during the leadership transition.
Bureaucratic Politics and China’s Foreign Policy Wang Runfei explored the relationships between bureaucratic politics and China’s foreign policy. As its economy soared and reform deepened, domestic factors have become increasingly important in foreign policy making whereby more organisations, institutions and individuals are involved. To understand the bureaucratic politics and foreign policy, the presentation dwells into three questions: Who is involved? What interests do they have? How do these actors with varied interests interact with each other in formulating the final policy? This discussion is undertaken by analyzing the leadership, institutional arrangement, and policy-making process.
In 2009, Xi Jinping faced notable setbacks, primary ones being the lip-sync controversy during the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Olympics; remarks in Mexico about foreigners in China; and mishandling of Urumqi riots. These controversies apparently affected Xi’s entry into the Central Military Commission. In order to increase his chances as the heir apparent to President Hu Jintao, Xi adopted a two-pronged strategy. On the 8
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Deemed as one of the most critical policy arenas, Runfei noted that foreign policy making in China has been historically centralised in the hands of top leadership. Indeed, the perceptions and judgments of paramount leaders directly influenced foreign policy making. Although China is not a democratic regime, domestic politics played a big part in formulating foreign policy, especially when the leadership is weakened or felt threatened at home; this domestic weakness resulted in Beijing’s tough stance with its neighbours. With regard to institutional arrangements, the presentation highlighted two levels: decision-making organisations and policy implementation organisations. At the decision making level, the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, led by President Hu Jintao (who also occupies the other top posts of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the Central Military Commission), is the ultimate decision making body. The twenty-five-member politburo deals with most critical policy issues facing China. The Leading Small Groups are in charge of handling external affairs and making policy recommendations to the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee. At the implementation level, various ministries and their local branches are held accountable; in case of foreign policy the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce and the International Department of Central Committee of CPC play an important role.
Wang Runfei
China requires reliable empirical evidence. In addition, to what extent would bureaucratic politics impacts foreign policy should become clearer only over a longer period of time.
Discussion Wang Jianwei began his commentary by making three general observations. First, three variables are important in studying the impact of domestic politics on China’s foreign policy: regime type, political economic structure, and other domestic factors. Second, efforts should be channelled for the consideration of the relationship between the theoretical constructs and the limitations in bringing empirical evidence to support these constructs. Third, what we want to accomplish by studying the impact of domestic politics in foreign policy. Is it to establish causality, correlation or inference?
An institutionalised policy-making process in terms of actors, transparency, and inclusiveness resulted in consistent and policy outcomes. In China, the policymaking processes are being involved in a bargaining between institutional decision-making bodies, policy implementing institutions, and other relevant entities like think tanks and State-OwnedEnterprises (SOEs). In recent years, the policy-making process has moved from single-handed dominance to more pluralistic decision-making process.
On Russell Moses’s paper, Jianwei noted that although several key questions are raised including a fundamental issue whether we could use western models in understanding China’s foreign policy making process, there is ample room for additional analysis and providing some answers. On Bo Zhiyue’s paper, Jianwei enquired whether Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang’s diplomatic activities are
Runfei concluded that the foreign-policy process is becoming more open, pluralistic and institutionalised. However, the establishment of causal relationships between bureaucratic politics and foreign policy in 9
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important for their chances for succession. He considered domestic politics to be more important than foreign visits; these visits are used for training, rather having a role in succession. Also, it is important to study what is the foreign policy orientation of these emerging leaders.
On alternate sources for study of China’s foreign policy, the memoirs of middle ranking officers from Ministry of Commerce were noted. Recent publications that discuss the turf war between Commerce and Foreign Affairs ministries are also an important source of study. Additionally, the diplomats who joined from academia are more open to discussion, thereby could be a firsthand source of information.
Other participants raised the following points: It seems during Xi Jinping ‘s visit to the United States, he acted outside the parameters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Xi’s advisers decided the agenda and objectives. Does it indicate the culmination of Xi’s training period and he is in the process of taking responsibility for U.S. policy?
Is it possible to conclude an individual leader’s country specialisation by studying the pattern of their foreign visits?
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Session 2 PLA and Foreign Policy
The PLA and Diplomacy: Unravelling Some Myths about Civil-Military Interaction in Chinese Foreign Policy-Making
the civilian commander-in-chief holds sway in policy decision process and respects views of professional soldiers, the CMC will follow his political and diplomatic line, which is preferably non-confrontational by nature. Third, the general state of affairs in China civil-military interaction on foreign/security affairs will remain positive based on a give-and-take mutually beneficial relationship. The Party needs to consolidate itself in the drastic social transformation, as its organisational atrophy has gradually evolved into foundational decay. The PLA needs more time to achieve its “double leapforward” in war preparation. Neither of them has stomach for armed confrontation if it is avoidable.
On the role of PLA in China’s diplomacy, You Ji discussed the key elements of interaction between the civilmilitary institutions in foreign policy making. Whereas, the foreign ministry is in charge of generic foreign affairs and routine diplomatic initiatives, the PLA is responsible for security/military-related foreign affairs in form of defining the ultimate bottom-line for employing force in conflicts; albeit it is hard to ascertain where Beijing’s normal diplomacy ends and the security/military dynamics begin.
In spite of this optimistic conclusion, You Ji ends with a word of caution because of some sources of uncertainties: First, the leadership transition in 2012, which will witness the emergence of Xi Jinping who might prefer a more proactive approach in protecting China’s core interest. Second, the line is very thin between civilians’ control and the PLA’s autonomy in formulating security/ military related foreign policy at the operational levels, and any miscalculations at the operational level could easily escalate into crisis at the strategic level. Third, the growing nationalistic tendencies both within the foreign and defence policy bureaucracy.
You Ji argued that despite the PLA’s directional leadership for security-related foreign affairs, civilian primacy prevails in the policy formulation pertaining to both domestic as well as foreign policy issues. The PLA has followed and supported Hu Jintao’s cardinal principles in running the state affairs; which was reciprocated by providing the PLA a degree of autonomy in operational matters. In the civil-military process dealing with foreign/defence affairs the Central Military Commission is largely the locus of decision-making on national security/military affairs and the civilian authority at the apex of power—the Politburo Standing Committee—often acts to endorse the military decisions; a set-up that provides operational leeway in reporting and implementing decisions and projects. However, this process coupled with absence of institutionalised channels of communication at times creates an impression that the PLA undertakes projects or acts on key national security decisions without seeking prior approval from the top civilian leadership. Discussing the case studies of 2007 ASAT test and first trial of J-20, You Ji dispels these misperceptions. Finally, the presentation concluded by highlighting three definite trends: First, the shared policy priority on domestic stability by both Party leaders and top soldiers, at least until the end of Hu Jintao’s reign in 2012; a priority that will significantly limit PLA’s assertiveness in security-related foreign affairs. Second, as long as
You Ji
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Session 2
Defence Industries: Growing Role for China’s Foreign Policy
growth coupled with decreasing defence budgets, profits became the main driver. Foreign policy played a negligible role in foreign defence sales in this period. The third phase starting from 2000 witnessed China adopting ‘Going abroad’ or ‘Go Global’ strategy with regard to its domestic industries, a strategy reflected in defence industries’ external engagement as well.
Arthur Ding discussed the role of defence industries in China’s foreign policy through case studies involving space industry. He highlighted that historically the defence industries have only played a limited and supportive function to traditional diplomatic establishment. This trend is witnessing a change with the growth of China’s indigenous technological capability, which is catalyzing the defence industries to transition from a supportive to reinforcing role in foreign interactions.
The most important policy initiative during this period was to provide financial assistance to industries involved in overseas business. In this regard, the financial initiatives by the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China are increasingly playing a critical role. In these circumstances, the ability for defence industries external engagement was enhanced. Aerospace industry provides a good example in this regard. Since the late 1980s, aerospace industry has become one of pioneering sectors developing broad external engagement by providing launching and payload services to clients. The China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) is the main entity to provide these services. CGWIC has transformed itself from providing merely commercial launching service to being a systems integrator.
Ding categorised the defence industries’ external engagement into three periods and noted the major features of these periods: First, before 1980, political ideology was the major driver for arms exports, largely driven by a desire to compete with the Soviet Union for influence. China’s exports accounted for only one per cent of total world arms market. The second phase extended from 1980 to 2000, during which China’s arms transfer witnessed qualitative as well as quantitative changes. The initial five years of this phase marked the total arms exports rising to three per cent of total arms share in the world. With the emphasis of the central government on development and economic
The financial assistance from institution like CDB and EIBC coupled with the central government emphasis on going global, could assist the CGWIC in accomplishing two goals: First, enhance international competitiveness and promote business internationally. Second, a strategic goal of strengthening China’s relations with client states and enhancing Beijing’s status in the world, a situation rising from the client states increasing dependency on CGWIC for provisions of services and technology; thus, the emergence of “satellite diplomacy”.
An Emerging Consensus on the U.S. Threat: The United States according to PLA Officers Liu Yawei discussed the emerging consensus among the PLA officers about the threat posed by the United States and the implications of these perceptions among the PLA for China’s foreign policy. The presentation provided an extensive analysis of the discourse emerging from
Arthur Ding
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Session 2
officers, scholars, and analysts associated with the military. One of the major characteristics of this discourse is a growing (not necessarily unanimous) conviction that the United States is a declining power and China is a rising power. Another feature is the unanimity in resentment against the United States both among the members of the Central Military Commission and the top generals of the PLA. Although it is hard to explain why the top brass of the PLA have such an amazing consensus on the threat posed by the United States, this unanimity has two consequences. First, in a country where political correctness is crucial in career advancement, this prevailing perception among the top brass is transmitted down, stifling the space for counter-arguments. Second, even if these perceptions fail to affect decision-making in the immediate future, it will certainly enhance the growing nationalism in China.
Liu Yawei
Fifth, the new generation PLA elites seem to inherit some of the romantic revolutionary worldview and the ideological impulses from the Mao era, which has coloured their analyses of the United States. Sixth, the emerging consensus among the PLA elites about threat from the United States has serious policy, budgetary, and political consequences.
Liu provided some preliminary observations about this issue. First, as the current top leadership of China lack military experience, they have preferred to refer military related decisions to the military echelons. Moreover, this also played a role in double-digit growth of military budget over the past two decades. Second, although the top civilian leadership may not be able to win the debate on the possibility of an armed conflict with the United States as advocated by the military, the PLA does not have any institutional power to insert its policy preference into the collective decision-making by the Politburo Standing Committee.
Discussion Lee Dongmin began by noting that the role of the PLA in Chinese foreign policy is an important topic. In recent years China’s military assertiveness in various security matters has generated considerable debate as to whether there is growing divergence of interests between the civilian and military organisations.
Third, while decisions continue to be made by a small group of leaders, their decision-making is increasingly subject to popular pressures; popular opinion which at times are being influenced by scholars and analysts associated with the military. Fourth, due to lack of transparent and institutionalised transfer of power in China, the contenders for the top positions require the endorsement and support from the military to either inherit power or to stay in power. This political environment has empowered the PLA and has provided an important channel to influence the decision-making.
Commenting on You Ji’s paper, Lee highlighted that it is challenging for outside observers to clearly demarcate the line dividing the roles of foreign ministry and the PLA in dealing with policies concerning foreign and security issues. An important question that requires further elaboration is whether the role played by the armed forces causes any problems in terms of the maintenance of civilian supremacy. Lee asked how the empirical developments can be explained in a coherent theoretical way. You’s paper characterised post-Maoist civil-military relations as having 13
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Other participants raised the following points:
shifted from “symbiosis” to “shared vital interest”. One may have some difficulty making a conceptual distinction between those two characterisations.
Is it possible to draw conclusions to identify when the PLA is told the comments in the media are useful and when they are harmful for the foreign-policy making process.
On Liu Yawei’s paper, Lee was interested to know more about the actual interactive processes, the interaction in the “black box” of the policy- making processes. Who are the main drivers allowing the PLA to make political comments, and who are the main policy actors restraining the PLA from making further political comments when it gets to the point of upsetting international relations. Is the PLA making its own decision to make political comments and refraining from them when necessary, or is there a tacit agreement between the civilian and the military authorities?
In recent years, the PLA has been playing a more important role in foreign policy because the military is sharing a much broader assignment and scope both domestically as well as internationally. Moreover, because Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao lack military experience compared to the previous leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the PLA has acquired more autonomy in operational aspects. Since 2007, China has initiated a process to privatise defence industry, how does this privatisation in defence industries affect foreign policy. How would the strong relationship between defence industries in the provinces and the local governments affect foreign policy at the sub-national level.
On Arthur Ding’s presentation, Lee noted that as the PLA still plays a significant role in the R&D of the major strategic industries such as aerospace, aviation, shipbuilding, and telecommunications, what role does it play in promoting its organisational interests in national development projects?
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Session 3 Non-Traditional Actors’ Influence on Foreign Policy Making
The Role of Think tanks and Scholars in Chinese Foreign Policy Making Linda Jakobson discussed the role of scholars and various think tanks in China’s foreign policy deliberations. She noted that China’s growing global outreach coupled with the expanding multifaceted character of the society has resulted in an increase in the number of interest groups and/or foreign policy actors who could potentially influence China’s foreign policy. China’s foreign policy mandarins must balance among these diverse and sometimes competing agendas to craft policies that enhance national interests. Jakobson noted that while evaluating the role of think tanks, the fundamental problem is how to define a ‘think tank’ in China. Most of the Chinese think tanks differ from a western derived definition of a think tank in that there are not able to maintain research independence; many are responsible for governmental activities; some do train and grant diplomas; and most importantly, almost all are committed to the ‘particular interest’ of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Similarly Chinese scholars are constrained by the overarching demand of the authoritarian state that their work does not question major policy decisions of the ruling party.
Linda Jakobson
‘independent’ and are centred around a former senior official, often with the financial backing of corporations or foundations. Apart from the emergence of a diverse range of think tanks, recent years have witnessed another important trend: personal interactions between the scholars and senior leaders in small-scale sessions. Jakobson while highlighting the omni-directional channels of influence for the think tanks and scholars, concluded the presentation on a cautionary advice of not to overestimate this ‘influence’.
Nevertheless, despite the constraints on their freedom of expression, Chinese researchers and analysts do play an important role in foreign policy making processes. One of the drivers is the increasing complexity of international issues, which require the Chinese policymakers to seek the specialised expertise of these scholars. They also provide a window through which foreign ideas as well as internal and domestic debates are channelled to decision makers.
Harmonising the Management of Foreign and Domestic Affairs in Chinese Foreign Policy In the context of increasing linkages between China’s external and internal situation brought about by globalisation, Zhang Qingmin evaluated the ability of the Chinese government to harmonise the management of foreign and domestic affairs in pursuing national objectives. In undertaking this evaluation the presentation involved discussion of four case studies: the 2005 anti-Japan demonstration and China’s relations with Japan; textile disputes between China and the U.S. and Europe; China’s arms sale to the Qaddafi regime and
The presentation categorised the Chinese think tanks in the field of international relations into four groups. First, research organisations directly under CPC, PLA or a government entity. Second, academic research organisations affiliated with CPC, PLA or a government entity. Third, University-affiliated research institutes. Fourth, Institutes established in last five years, which label themselves as ‘non-governmental’ or even 15
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Session 3
The Chinese government has found it difficult to harmonise the management of foreign and domestic affairs in foreign policy. Whatever China commits to the outside, it will have domestic consequences, where the government needs to garner support for its legitimacy. The difficulty lays in the fact that the external and domestic expectations for Chinese government do not always converge. What is considered as conciliatory internationally is always criticised domestically as too soft or betraying China’s interests, while what is considered patriotic domestically is always considered too offensive and assertive externally. At the crux of these developments is China’s Foreign Ministry, whose power is eroded due to the decentralisation of foreign policy power and pluralisation of foreign policy bureaucracies. Qingmin concluded that with rapid social changes, many non-governmental actors are increasingly getting involved in China’s foreign affairs. It is still difficult to fathom how these domestic sources influence foreign policy because their roles depend on the context as well as the issues concerned.
Zhang Qingmin
Beijing’s relations with the incoming Libyan government; and the institution of the Confucius Peace Prize in 2010. In case of the anti-Japanese demonstrations, Qingmin noted that the Chinese government might not have instigated the demonstrations, neither had it prohibited. However, the escalation of the demonstrations resulted in government responding on two fronts: external as well as domestic levels. Externally China toughened and made its position to oppose Japan’s bid to UN Security Council membership. Additionally, Beijing while clarifying its position on UNSC reforms, also undertook diplomatic missions to Africa to solicit support on China’s position on UN reform. Domestically, highranking officials and diplomats were sent to different parts of the country to delineate the importance of stable Sino-Japanese relations to China’s economic development and security. This was followed by charging of demonstrators who were involved in violence. Circumstantial evidence suggests that popular nationalism played a significant role in elite decision making on this Japan policy issue. The way the Chinese government managed the mass demonstration tells us that this domestic force is a mixed blessing or a doubleedged sword for Chinese foreign policy. Similarly, the presentation used the other case studies to show how the Chinese government balanced the management of foreign and domestic affairs.
Chinese Media and Foreign Policy Wang Jianwei discussed the role of media in affecting the discourse and in framing of China’s foreign policy. He underlined that it is no longer useful to describe the relationship between media and foreign policy making process as static and a one-way street. Rather the two have been become increasingly interactive and have formed a more symbiotic relationship. On the one hand, media serves as a watchdog by supervising the government; but on the other hand, media might assume the role of a lapdog by following/ repeating statements and policies of the government. Historically in China, media played the latter role; nevertheless recent years witness a change in this trend. With the transformation of China’s domestic political context at the macro level as well as the foreign policy making process, Chinese media has simultaneously experienced a series of changes. Top officials in the Chinese governmental hierarchy are no longer the exclusive bearers of policy-related information; 16
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media has increasingly able to influence government policymaking by transmitting, affecting and shaping public opinion. The presentation discussed these changes through analyzing Beijing’s handling of relations with Japan since 2005. By evaluating how media influenced Beijing’s handling of major bilateral issues with Japan, Jianwei concluded that the media-state relationship has been changing from the traditional uni-directional towards more bi-directional. Compared to the past the Chinese media now can exercise more influence on Chinese foreign policy making and implementation in terms of information dissemination, interest and opinion articulation, and policy recommendations; albeit such kind of effect on Chinese foreign policy making is still quite limited and the bi-directional relationship is still in its primitive stage.
Wang Jianwei
to influence foreign process. Also to what extent blogosphere is influencing foreign policy discourse?
Discussion
Other participants raised the following points:
James Reily commenting on Linda Jakobson’s paper noted that it is important to clearly identify and distinguish the two dependent variables: role of think tanks in foreign policy processes and the outcomes. Further, he underlined that rather than just listing the think tanks, it is pertinent to analyse the new and interesting roles that the think tanks are playing in the foreign policy processes.
Are the Chinese think tanks increasingly witnessing the trend of “revolving door” i.e. retired senior officials joining the think tanks? If this is the trend, does it improve the role and quality of think tanks in policy making? Does the nature of a foreign policy issue have an impact on how the media and civil society influence the foreign policy making. In recent years, China is witnessing emergence of a range of new think tanks with good sources of funding to organise conferences, engage in publications, and to influence a certain line of thinking in the media. Some of these entities have a focused business interests with an aim to hijack the government agenda; an illustration in this regard is the China Energy Fund.
Commenting on Zhang Qingmin’s paper, Reily disagreed with the characterisation of China as a weak society; in fact, all the four case studies in the presentation amply demonstrate that the society had a wide range of influences on processes as well as outcomes in some instances. Then the question is to identify under what conditions does the social actors are able to influence the processes and outcomes. Moreover, as the presentation noted, if there no single entity that dominates the foreign policy arena in China, what does it mean to foreign policy making.
In undertaking further research on textile disputes, it is pertinent to study the variations in domestic textile producers; dwell into which one lobbied heavily; and what are the differences in geographical distribution of these producers. This would help to correlate these factors with government response and identify which domestic producers got a better a deal in the process.
On Wang Jianwei’s paper, Reily posed the question of in what way the media is used by the Chinese government 17
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Session 4 Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
The Role of Public Opinion in Chinese Foreign Policy
foreign policy, it helps to identify some of the critical points in state-society interactions by focusing upon some of the key factors and decisive moments about when, where, and how public opinion might/might not affect China’s foreign policy.
James Reilly sought to provide an alternative approach to define the role of public opinion in Chinese foreign policy based on the concept of a wave of public mobilisation. He examined the origins of public mobilisation, and the interactions between public mobilisation and the state. He laid out the conditions under which Chinese authorities are likely to tolerate and respond to popular mobilisation. Finally, Reilly concluded by comparing the role of the state and societal factors in ending a wave.
In Search of Credibility: Nationalist Mobilisation and Chinese Diplomacy Jessica Weiss stressed the importance of international factors, particularly foreign perceptions, in affecting China’s use of nationalist mobilisation as a diplomatic strategy. In contrast to the negative ways nationalism has been depicted, she suggested that this influence could actually be positive for China’s diplomatic bargaining objectives. Whether nationalist sentiment can be useful in China’s bargaining depends largely on how China’s public opinion is perceived by foreign actors, particularly the foreign negotiators that China is dealing with.
Reilly pointed out three elements for measuring public opinion in China—public polls, political activism by non-state actors, and media coverage. Although each element can be manipulated to yield ideal results, Beijing’s response to and tolerance of each incidence of public mobilisation shows that the authoritarian state does take note of public opinion. He argued that the state’s toleration of protests affects the negotiating strategy taken by Chinese officials, the official rhetoric, public debates over policies, and the alteration of specific policy decisions. He concluded by contending while his proposed framework is not the panacea for addressing the effects of public opinion on China’s
Weiss argued that the international environment wields a certain influence on China’s domestic politics, especially the management of nationalist sentiments as it creates incentives for China to stifle or tolerate nationalist mobilisation. She pointed out that whether nationalist sentiment is a benefit or burden depends on the balance of resolve and reassurance China seeks to project in its diplomacy. Nationalist sentiments and mobilisation can be a tactical asset in bargaining leverage but if such mobilisation grows out of control and if foreigners begin to be incredulous of China’s plight, it becomes a liability. In conclusion, Weiss remarked that continuing to liberalise and make transparent foreign policy debates is beneficial to the Chinese government as it seeks to use public opinion in its negotiating strategy. While giving China more room to manoeuvre, the broadening sources of opinion enhance the government’s search for credibility when a genuine consensus arises from the convergence of liberal and conservative opinions. It also helps China to show resolve in its diplomacy while mitigating the perception that China is an insatiable
James Reilly
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Session 4
to protect its interests and legitimacy, while avoiding further criticism from an increasingly nationalistic audience at home. As the state capacity weakens, popular nationalism has a greater impact on foreign policy. He concluded that as Chinese nationalism continues to evolve the perception of the power distribution by the Chinese state is an important factor in this continuing evolution.
power with aggressive intentions. Weiss argued that foreign powers are more able to make concessions without being accused of appeasement if they can see more clearly that China’s interests are backed by a popular mandate.
The Evolving Impact of Chinese Nationalism on Chinese Foreign Policy Zhao Suisheng began his presentation by classifying Chinese nationalism into t wo categories: the traditional pragmatic nationalism led by the state and the new popular nationalism driven by emotive societal forces. He then offered two predominant views on Chinese nationalism. The first view was that unless nationalistic sentiment is in convergence with the Chinese government’s position, nationalism has little impact on foreign policy formulation. The second view was that in the past few years, the making of foreign policy is increasingly driven by a new form of nationalism, which is extremely influential and accepted by the state. Although Zhao professed that he subscribed to the former view, recent developments have made him rethink his position. Although the Chinese government still tries to harness nationalism as a tool to its own benefit, nationalism in China is evolving from state-led pragmatic nationalism into the current emotive popular nationalism driven by societal forces. He reasoned that this evolution was brought about by the expansion of China’s national interests and the shifting of power balance in favour of China as a result of the 2008/09 financial crisis and the popular perception of the decline of western powers. Hence, there is a convergence of official and popular nationalist discourses as the state starts to lean towards the position of popular nationalism.
Jessica Weiss
Zhao also attributed the rise of popular nationalism to the weakening of state capacity to control nationalism. The commercialisation of media and the impending power transition has made the Chinese state vulnerable to popular criticism as it seeks to balance the need
Zhao Suisheng
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Session 4
International Trust in East Asia: Causes and Consequences
survival of the strongest. The survey also provided three of the most negative issues affecting Sino-Japanese relations—40 per cent of the respondents chose historical issue, followed by the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island, and Taiwan. The top three most negative Sino-South Korean issues are North Korea, disputes over origins of Confucian culture and birthrights of cultural icons, and lastly the U.S.-South Korea alliance.
Chen Dingding began by arguing that trust is essential in all social relations, including inter-state relations. Leaders, especially Chinese leaders such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, frequently call for measures that can enhance mutual trust between countries. He pointed that there is little empirical research done to deal with this important issue, as it is hard to identify the exact measures that actually enhance mutual trust. Chen felt that East Asia today provides an ideal setting to test the relationship between major international relations theories and the role of trust in facilitating international cooperation.
Chen argued that his hypothesis was supported by the results of the study. Apart from social trust, nationalism, national interests, identity difference and historical memory all had a negative impact on Chinese citizens’ trust towards Japan and ROK. Chen asserted that conventional wisdom is largely correct as nationalism does have a negative impact on Chinese trust towards other countries and, therefore, other countries do have legitimate reasons to be concerned about Chinese nationalism. As the survey was only done in four cities, he acknowledged that it was not large enough to represent China entirely. He concluded that a panel study would better reveal the mechanisms of the independent variables. Chen suggested future improvements to his research such as a comparison between elite and public opinions and the development of better models to analyse the relationships between the independent and dependent variables.
In his survey, Chen set the dependent variable as Chinese trust in Japan and South Korea. The independent variables—nationalism, national interests, identity difference, historical memory and social trust—were designed to test the different IR theories such as realism and constructivism. Chen claimed that the study gave insights on the Chinese view of international politics and reflected that realist thinking is predominant in Chinese society as more than 70 per cent of the survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the world is essentially a battle for the
Discussion Russell Moses began by raising three questions regarding public opinion in China: (i) What is public opinion? (ii) What role do public opinion, outrage and lack of trust play? (iii) Where does this leave us? Moses commented that Reilly’s paper was a good examination of how public opinion operates in China. He proposed a fourth element to the three approaches Reilly pointed out in his study (how the public plays a role, how public opinion gets moved, how public opinion gets engaged in things)—how the state moves. He argued that the case studies presented shows that it is not the party per se but the elements within the party structure, factions which felt themselves on the losing
Chen Dingding
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Session 4
ago were not inspired or manipulated by the party or the state but were organised by disgruntled individuals on different campuses to go after different people within the party whom they felt were taking a soft-line or not being as strong about China’s perceived interests. Moses felt that analysts are overlooking elite politics and that disaggregation will become more important as China becomes more complicated and moves forward.
end of certain issue/problem and decided to take action by stirring popular sentiments. Therefore, it is interesting to examine the party dynamics that help drive public opinion. Moses commented that Weiss’ argument is interesting in that it allows insight on the evolution of Chinese foreign policy, which has become more complicated and nuanced than before. He was also interested to explore ways to determine when public opinion is positive and when it is not. On Zhao’s presentation, Moses commented that he shares Zhao’s concern and anxiety on the current state of things in China. He wondered if the mobilisation of public opinion is simply a result of internal political party conflict or of a genuine foreign policy change. He was curious in this respect about public opinion, and how it plays in terms of trust. It would be nice to see empirical evidence from Chen’s paper and he would be interested to see how the survey defines trust. What Chinese word is used for trust?
Other participants raised the following points: How does nationalistic outbursts by overseas Chinese nationals’ feedback into mainland China? For example, the impact of nationalistic displays of Chinese nationals overseas during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. How are such outbursts viewed by Mainland Chinese? Contrary to the evidence presented at this session, there is also evidence that shows that Chinese foreign policy making is becoming more exclusive and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been excluded in the decision-making process at times. How can these two contrary findings be reconciled?
Moses felt that there are two other areas that need further examination with regards to the impact of public opinion on Chinese foreign policy. The first is conditionality—when does public opinion not play a role in foreign policy. The second is disaggregation— who plays with what part of the public? It is widely accepted in Beijing that the anti-Japanese protests years
Genuine and spontaneous public opinion can influence foreign policy-making, but it can also be manufactured to support certain foreign policy goals. How can this causal indeterminacy be broken?
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Session 5 Domestic Political Economy and Foreign Policy
Companies and International Relations: The Case of China
Bohai Bay oil spill incident in relation to ConocoPhillips, he observed that there is a growing level of domestic activism in asking the Chinese government to be more responsive to corporate social responsibility in China. He felt that the main differences Chinese companies had with companies from other countries were that of state ownership which results in the lack of operational transparency, and China’s demographic changes.
Zha Daojiong sought to shed light on Chinese companies and their impact on China’s international relations. Among the challenges for framing a central question in his research on the link between Chinese companies and China’s international relations, Zha pointed to the dearth of literature on company-level business history and the predominant focus on stateowned enterprises. He suggested two main issues in which he would like to further examine for the link between companies on international relations. The first issue was on national security and the other was corporations acting as agents of diplomacy.
Zha concluded that controversies revolving around Chinese companies’ international involvement are bound to continue. He felt that having a China-U.S. bilateral investment treaty would be helpful in providing a roadmap for interaction and that the true test lies in how China transforms its development model.
Zha commented that domestic debates in China have raised many gunboat-conspiracy theories and a crucial question—why are Chinese companies being singled out as threats to other countries’ national security. He pointed to recent developments such as Google’s announcement to leave China amid charges of China undermining U.S. cyber security, western scepticism over China’s involvement in Africa and Latin America and the Chinalco-Rio Tinto merger debacle in Australia. Zha also argued that new challenges are also being posed from the Chinese society. Citing the example of the 2011
The Political Economy of Trade Protection, Chinese Style Li Xiaojun reflected that with the imposing of a wide variety of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on foreign competitors, China remains as one of most protected markets in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). He argued that trade policy-making in China after its WTO accession is no longer determined by the ruling elites or inter-bureaucratic competition, but increasingly by a multitude of non-state actors. He supported his argument with a detailed examination of predominant forms of lobbying in China, which is affected by the degree of state ownership and geographical distribution. He found that industries that have a higher percentage of state ownership and with a large employee base are more likely to lobby vertically through the bureaucracy to influence policy-making and implementation. Industries where the state sector is larger, less solvent, and employs more workers relative to other forms of ownership are more likely to receive protection through non-tariff barriers. Geographical concentration of size, employment and revenue leads to the creation of more non-tariff barriers. Li pointed that both geographically concentrated and dispersed industries which lobby horizontally through
Zha Daojiong
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Session 5
local governments are driven chiefly by debt dispersion issues. In conclusion, he reiterated his argument that in face of foreign competition, Chinese domestic industries often seek protection by influencing both the formulation and implementation of import-distorting measures.
Local Liberalism: China’s Provincial Approaches to ASEAN Li Mingjiang explored the growing role of local government entities with the intensification of crossborder interactions between China and its neighbours in the social, economic and cultural arenas under the theoretical framework of local liberalism. In his study, Li found that there is a high level of interaction between Chinese provincial governments and ASEAN secretariat officials. However, he noted that many ASEAN officials were confused by the increasing volume of Chinese proposals for cooperation, as they could not differentiate which ones were officially sanctioned by Beijing.
Li Xiaojun
He argued that unlike the central government, local governments are more interested in forging economic, cultural and social cooperation with foreign counterparts, instead of being primarily concerned about national security issues. To support his argument, Li listed the cases of southwestern Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi and their interaction with ASEAN. He highlighted that the Yunnan provincial government was the pioneer in setting up the cooperation framework between China and ASEAN. Li argued that China’s deepening relations with ASEAN was also a result of the rivalry between Guangxi and Yunnan. He concluded that while Beijing’s decisions will direct the future of ChinaASEAN relations, it is important to take into account the influence and behaviours of border provinces on foreign policy formulation and implementation.
Li Mingjiang
monopoly and savings in China. He agreed with Zha Daojiong’s observation that half of China’s investments abroad have led to economic, political and strategic disasters. He added that faith in Hu Jintao’s governing principle of putting people first and governing for the people (renmenzhuyi) was shaken by the series of hostage and investment crises in Africa, resulting in China’s new emphasis on ensuring its citizens’ safety overseas. He commented that resource nationalism is an international phenomenon and controversies involving Chinese investment will continue.
Discussion You Ji remarked that it is a strategic necessity for China to make overseas investments, given the high level of state 23
Domestic Dynamics of China’s Foreign Policy
Session 5
agents of diplomacy, it was unclear as to who is working for whom because Chinese leaders are increasingly seen as employees of state-owned enterprises with their involvement in seeking resources and sealing cooperation deals with foreigners.
You Ji concurred with Li Mingjiang that the impact of local government diplomacy and its contribution to China’s general diplomacy need further examination. While Beijing’s decision to deepen China’s economic integration with the world was likely a strategic choice motivated by foreign policy and national security considerations, local governments push for globalisation largely for economic interests, as they do not have equivalent commitments to protect China’s national interests. On Li Xiaojun’s paper, You Ji argued that the fragmented authoritarianism model is an outdated theory as Chinese society, economy and politics are no longer monolithic. He also cautioned that the use of such a theory should be relooked.
The problem of studying Chinese foreign policy is putting the horse behind the cart—there is a lot of analysis but the topic of analysis is never clearly defined. This lack of conceptualisation or operationalisation is the biggest problem of the study of foreign policy. What is the target of each of the three presentations? Which specific policies are related to the presenters’ respective researches? There should first be a theoretical definition for foreign policy and an identification of the specific kind of behaviour. We have to remind ourselves that we do not get so caught up with our dependent variables that we lose sight of our independent variable.
Other participants raised the following points: A participant added to the discussion on Li Xiaojun’s paper by highlighting a contradiction in his theoretical framework. He remarked that there should be no horizontal or vertical lobbying, based on Li’s claim that decision-making process in China is fragmented with multiple actors who have autonomy in decisionmaking. It was also noted that Li Minjiang’s study on local variations of Chinese foreign policy should include factors such as existing cooperation between different provinces and the political transitions.
What is the impact of territorial disputes on the economic projects between China and ASEAN countries? Will globalisation lead to a situation whereby external influence into China induces local authorities to create specific protectionist measures to safeguard local interests vis-à-vis the wider world? For example, the recent case of Apple in China regarding its ability/ inability to promote the iPad. As this pattern of local globalisation intensifies, to what extent will this level of local protectionism increase?
On relationship between companies and foreign policy, it was pointed that even though the corporations are
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Session 6 Cases: The Influence of Domestic Factors on Foreign Policyy
Chinese Domestic Political Economy and Sino-EU Relations: Exploring the Link between Europe’s Crisis and China’s Rebalancing Act Gustaaf Geeraerts pointed out that the basis of the Sino-EU relations was initially a division of labour whereby EU provided China capital and technology and China supplied cheap labour and low-priced goods. He found that the current economic downturn exposed the imbalances of the Sino-EU trade relationship and the increasingly unsustainable Chinese growth model, and changed the logic of the three-decade old relationship. He argued that the Eurozone crisis, in addition to the U.S. economic slowdown, demonstrated that China could not rely on rising trade surpluses to absorb the increasing distortion between its production and consumption rates. While China’s economic rise creates ample opportunities for European investors and exporters, its inevitable move up the value-added chain and the rapid development of its technological resources is reducing the economic complementarity between the two parties.
Gustaaf Geeraerts
Domestic Stability: A Key to Understanding China’s Policy Towards the United States Xiong Zhiyong’s hypothesis on China’s policy towards the United States was based on the theory that diplomacy is the extension of domestic politics. He pointed that as the current domestic situation in China is extremely complicated with increasing societal discontent towards the government, Chinese policy-makers’ first choice is to maintain stability at both fronts so that they would not be distracted from domestic issues by foreign affairs.
Geeraerts argued that the intensifying competition between China and the EU over the last decade has turned their relationship into a delicate balancing act between cooperation and competition. To avoid sliding into a zero-sum competition, there is a need to rebalance the Sino-EU trade relationship and to generate sustainable growth. He pointed that one of the conditions for rebalancing is that China successfully rebalances aggregate demand and shift the Chinese economy away from fixed asset investment and exports towards domestic consumption. A major hurdle highlighted by Geeraerts is that the main beneficiaries of the current Chinese economic model, which have gathered increasing influence over economic policy, will undoubtedly resist policy reforms for reductions in credit expansion and investment in order to increase household wealth and income. Therefore, much will depend on whether the Chinese leadership will be able to generate sufficient political support within the party to push through with the reforms.
Xiong Zhiyong
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Session 6
definite will to promote a healthy and solid relationship with the United States.
Using issues such core interests over Taiwan and Tibet, trade imbalance and currency exchange, and North Korea, Xiong stressed that Chinese policy-makers formulate their policies to correspond with their domestic stability aims. While the warming of cross -Taiwan Strait relations is heartening, he contended that no compromise is possible on China’s core interests for the Chinese leadership as nationalist sentiments has severely limited the room for manoeuvring. On the issue of Sino-U.S. trade imbalance and currency valuation, Xiong suggested that the imbalance could be resolved if the United States allows China to buy more high-tech products and if China agrees to import more cultural products and software. However, he maintained that there is no room for China to make a major concession on the revaluation of the renminbi.
China’s Domestic Norms and Maritime Strategy: A Study of the East and South China Seas Disputes Christopher Len adopted Peter Katzenstein’s definition of norms in his examination of China’s self-identification based on the belief system embodied by the top Chinese leadership from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao. Len argued that beliefs are central to an actor’s self-identification, as well as his sense of being and agency in the world that guides action, influences choice and provides a basis for self-evaluation. He highlighted the changing trends in China’s management of the East and South China Seas disputes against other claimants, from the rejection of negotiation during the Mao period to the flexible accommodation by offering to shelf disputes in favour of joint development during the Reform period and finally to the current state of active assertion, deterrence, and consolidation of China’s maritime claims under Hu Jintao post-2008.
Lastly, Xiong commented on the North Korean factor in Sino-U.S. relations. He pointed that there are at least three domestic considerations for China’s North Korean policy—the fear of the influx of refugees to northeastern China in the event of instability in North Korea, historical sentiment of the 1950 Korean War, and the ideological linkage between Communist Party of China and the North Korean regime. Given that China and the United States share many common interests on global issues, Xiong concluded that the Chinese government has a
Len sought to explain China’s approach towards the East and South China Seas under Mao as being strongly driven by two main pillars of Mao’s deeprooted ideological belief system—politics-in-command and self-reliance. China shelved maritime disputes to improve trade relations with neighbouring countries and counter Soviet influence in Asia, but Mao’s emphasis on self-reliance manifested itself through the attachment of strategic importance to the South China and resulted in the 1974 conflict over the Paracels archipelago with Vietnam. He argued that during the Reform period, China’s actions were no longer based on Maoist ideological drive and by examining the rationales of Chinese leaders from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, China’s behaviour in the East and South China Seas were formulated with the goal of addressing China’s domestic socio-economic challenges instead of being based on expansionist designs. Len stressed that China’s behaviour in the post-Mao
Christopher Len
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Session 6
domestic sources of China foreign policy is not just to identify the ingredients involved in the foreign policy making processes but also understand how these disparate ingredients are put together to influence the outcome. It is also important to know how these ingredients interact with each other and/or affect other ingredients.
era was ultimately determined through the prevailing principle of pragmatism set by Deng, based on a costbenefit assessment of the prevailing situation to ensure that maritime disputes would not upset its overall relations with its Asian neighbours. Len concluded that as China increasingly perceives itself as a sea power. The on-going domestic debate over how China should apply this new image will undoubtedly affect new generation of Chinese leadership and their formulation of China’s domestic development goals, its management of relations in the region, and its ability to meet its global responsibilities and obligations.
Other participants raised the following points: In the aftermath of the award of the 2010 Noble Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, to what extent do political issues shape the bilateral relations between China and the EU. How do the political concerns interact with economic issues. Moreover, how is EU perceiving Beijing’s use of economic tools against Norway, and are other EU members worried that China could use economic tools in influencing foreign policy in the future?
Discussion Commenting on the presentations Sheng Lijun noted that the most important aspect in understanding the
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Domestic Dynamics of China’s Foreign Policy
Conference programme
15 March 2012, Conference Day One
9:00 am Welcome Remarks Tan See Seng Deputy Director Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS 9:10 am
Session 1 Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
Does China Fit? Considerations and Criticisms of the Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus Russell Leigh Moses The Beijing Center
China’s Elite Politics and Foreign Policy Bo Zhiyue East Asia Institute
Bureaucratic Politics and China’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas and Choices Huang Jing National University of Singapore
Defence Industries: Growing Role for China’s Foreign Policy Arthur Ding National Chengchi University
Discussant Lee Dongmin S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Chair Li Mingjiang
An Emerging Consensus on the U.S. Threat: The United States According to PLA Officers Liu Yawei Carter Center’s China Program
12:30 pm
2:00 pm
Lunch Session 3 Non-Traditional Actors’ Influence on Foreign Policy Making
Chair Gustaaf Geeraerts
The Role of Think Tanks and Scholars in Chinese Foreign Policy Making Linda Jakobson Lowy Institute for International Policy
Discussant Wang Jianwei University of Macau
Harmonising the Management of Foreign and Domestic Affairs in Chinese Foreign Policy Zhang Qingmin Peking University
Chinese Media and Foreign Policy Wang Jianwei University of Macau
10:40 am
11:00 am
Tea Break Session 2 PLA and Foreign Policy
Chair Jessica Chen Weiss
Discussant James Reilly University of Sydney
The PLA and Diplomacy: Unravelling Some Myths about Civil-Military Interaction in Chinese Foreign PolicyMaking You Ji University of New South Wales
28
3:30 pm
Tea Break
Domestic Dynamics of China’s Foreign Policy
Conference programme
3:45 pm
Session 4 Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
Chair Xiong Zhiyong
Discussant You Ji University of New South Wales
The Role of Public Opinion in Chinese Foreign Policy James Reilly University of Sydney
In Search of Credibility: Nationalist Mobilisation and Chinese Diplomacy Jessica Chen Weiss Yale University
International Trust in East Asia: Causes and Consequences Chen Dingding University of Macau
Session 5 Domestic Political Economy and Foreign Policy
Chair Bo Zhiyue
Tea Break Session 6 Cases: The Influence of Domestic Factors on Foreign Policy
Chair Lee Dongmin
The Evolving Impact of Chinese Nationalism on Chinese Foreign Policy Zhao Suisheng University of Denver
16 March 2012, Conference Day Two
10:30 am
10:50 am
Discussant Russell Leigh Moses The Beijing Center
9:00 am
Local Liberalism: China’s Provincial Approaches to ASEAN Li Mingjiang S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Chinese Domestic Political Economy and Sino-EU Relations: Exploring the Link Between Europe’s Crisis and China’s Rebalancing Act Gustaaf Geeraerts Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies Domestic Stability: A Key to Understand China’s Policy toward the United States Xiong Zhiyong China Foreign Affairs University China’s Domestic Norms and Maritime Strategy: A Study of the East and South China Seas Disputes Christopher Len
Discussant Sheng Lijun Nanyanf Technological University
Companies and International Relations: The Case of China Zha Daojiong Peking University
12:20 pm End of Conference Lunch
The Political Economy of Trade Protection, Chinese Style Li Xiaojun Stanford University 29
Domestic Dynamics of China’s Foreign Policy
Conference Participants
Panellists
18 Xiong Zhiyong China Foreign Affairs University
1
Arthur Ding National Chengchi University
2
Bo Zhiyue EAI, NUS
3
Chen Dingding University of Macau
4
Christopher Len Institute for Security and Development Policy
5
Gustaaf Geeraerts Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies
6
James Reilly University of Sydney
7
Jessica Chen Weiss Yale University
8
Lee Dongmin RSIS, NTU
9
Li Mingjiang RSIS, NTU
19 You Ji UNSW 20 Zha Daojiong PKU 21 Zhang Qingmin PKU 22 Zhao Suisheng University of Denver
Participants 23 Lee Suan Tiang, AD/EH Strategy, MND 24 Yoo Myung Hee, APEC Secretariat 25 Foo An Gie, CAAS 26 Premarani Somasundram, Civil Service College 27 Bui Vinh Nguyen, CoB (NBS) 28 Andrej Fink, Delegation of the European Union
10 Li Xiaojun Stanford University
29 Wu Dan, EAI, NUS
11 Linda Jakobson Lowy Institute
30 Yoichi Suzuki, Embassy of Japan 31 Alfredo Toro Hardy, Embassy of Venezuela
12 Liu Yawei Carter Center
32 Renaud Bartolini, French Embassy
13 Russell Leigh Moses The Beijing Center
33 Felix Serfling, German Embassy 34 Vinai Kumar Singh, High Commission of India, Singapore
14 Sheng Lijun NTU
35 Seow Guorong, HSS
15 Tan See Seng RSIS, NTU
36 Rusell Charles Metge, HSS
16 Wang Jianwei University of Macau
37 Lim Kah Kiat, HSS 38 Lim Chee Kia, HSS
17 Wang Runfei NUS
39 Ling Pei Shan, MFA
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Domestic Dynamics of China’s Foreign Policy
Conference Participants
40 Lim Siew Hwung Lena, MINDEF
63 Sharinee Lalit Jagtiani, RSIS
41 Tan Chew Ling Elizabeth, MINDEF
64 Liu Liu, RSIS
42 Cynthia Leow, MINDEF
65 Jabin Thomas Jacob, RSIS
43 Ian Wong, MINDEF
66 Tan Seng Chye, RSIS
44 Angela Poh, MINDEF
67 Rajesh M. Basrur, RSIS
45 Goh Kee Tai, Ministry of Health
68 Ji Xianbai, RSIS
46 Sim Chengyan Gillian, Ministry of Home Affairs
69 Oh Ei Sun, RSIS
47 Lee Weihui, MOE
70 Bernard F.W. Loo, RSIS
48 Mahmood Fahmi, MOE
71 Catherine Chong, RSIS
49 Yeo Kok San, MOE
72 Hoang Oanh, RSIS
50 Lim Heng Lee, MOE
73 Teng Jianqun, RSIS
51 Ng Geok Peng, MOE/CPDD
74 Kalyan M Kemburi, RSIS
52 Tan Hwa Pheng, National Library Board
75 Irene Chan, RSIS
53 Wong Shuang Yann, NIE-Cluster (A) / HSSE
76 Sei Yue Theng, Strategic Planning & Development Division, MHQ, MHA
54 Reuben Wong, NUS
77 John P. Geis, United States Air Force Research Institute
55 Evelyn Gwee, PMO - NSCS
78 Rahul Gupta, University of London
56 Tiana Melita Desker, Public Service Division, Prime Minister’s Office
79 Keven Matthews, US Embassy Singapore
57 Sharon Awang Sitai, Prime Minister’s Office, Brunei Darussalam
80 John R. Wood, US Embassy Singapore
58 Cindy Khoo, PSD
81 Dell Marie Butler, Saferworld, U.K.
59 April Chin, Public Service Division
82 Polly Shen
60 Sim Hee Juat, Centre for Governance and Leadership, CSC
83 Deanna Kim 84 Ho Jin Yong
61 Zhang Hongzhou, RSIS
85 Jason Tan
62 Ho Tze Ern Benjamin, RSIS
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Domestic Dynamics of China’s Foreign Policy
About RSIS
The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is a professional graduate school of international affairs at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS’ mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international affairs. Its core functions are research, graduate teaching and networking. It produces cutting-edge research on Asia-Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict and Non-Traditional Security and International Political Economy. RSIS’ activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific.
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Domestic Dynamics of China’s Foreign Policy
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S. Rajaratnam School Of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798 TEL FAX E-MAIL WEBSITE 65-6790-6982 65-6793-2991 wwwrsis@ntu.edu.sg www.rsis.edu.sg