Introduction to Philosophy (with Logic) by RUEL F. PEPA

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY Readings in Academic Philosophy (with Logic)

edited by

Ruel F. Pepa, Ph.D.

Zetetics Publishers

PREFACE This introductory textbook to Philosophy is an anthology of philosophical essays representing a wide range of philosophical climates, traditions, tendencies and commitments to prepare and introduce new enthusiasts to the academic field of Philosophy. This volume is divided into two major sections: Part One being Philosophy and Part Two being Logic. Logic is further subdivided into: 1) Aristotelian Logic; and 2) Symbolic Logic. Academic Philosophy explores issues in the areas of 1) Basic Philosophy; 2) Darwinian Evolutionary Theory and Philosophy; 3) Philosophy and Science; 4) Philosophy and Religion; 5) Philosophy and Society; 6) Metaphysics; and 7) Philosophy and Language. The editor has determined that an exploration of basic issues relative to these classic philosophical areas is essential for the novice to really get a sensible and meaningful feel of philosophy in general and of academic philosophy in particular. The editor extends his sincere thanks and appreciation to Mr Glenn Agbing for the finishing touches on the manuscript.

Ruel F. Pepa, Ph.D.

For Maree Khrystin Charlize

and Mari Khleyn Lexis

Table of Contents

PART I - PHILOSOPHY BASIC PHILOSOPHY What is Philosophy? Paul Rezendes Knowledge and Wisdom Bertrand Russell

5 13

DARWINIAN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY Peter Singer: Architect of the Culture of Death Donald Demarco

Humans and Other Animals Kenan Malik

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE An Introduction to Epistemology in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy Ruel F. Pepa

A Critique of Science in Russell Stannard‘s ―The God Experiment‖ Jeff Dahms

Philosophy: Rigorous Science or Intuitive Thought A critique of Mind by John Searle Richard Schain A Philosophical Theorizing in Search of A Method of Transformative Philosophizing Ruel F. Pepa

Post-Industrial Humanism: Transformative Humanization of Nature (or ―Naturization‖ of Humanity) Toward a Moral Technology Ruel F. Pepa

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION Is Nothing Sacred? (A Review of Don Cupitt‘s Is Nothing Sacred? The Non-Realist Philosophy of Religion) Nicholas Rundle.

God, Freedom, and Evil Joe Manzari

On the Challenge of Filipino Theologizing Ruel F. Pepa

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY Sorting out the Zeitgeist: The Moral Philosophy of Iris Murdoch Mary Midgley

105

Resolving the Objective-Subjective Conflict in Moral 111 Valuation An inquiry into the problems of the origin of values in general and of moral values in particular Ruel F. Pepa Moral Philosophy Roger Jones

125

Ten great female philosophers: The thinking woman‘s women Ellie Levenson

131

METAPHYSICS An Introduction to Metaphysics in Ancient Philosophy Ruel F. Pepa

141

Metaphysics and the Problem of Existence Richard Schain

147

―Fragments of Philosophy‖ (or ―Philosophical 155 Fragments‖) on the Sensitivity and Sensibility of Human Life Towards Transformative Philosophizing (with apologies to Kierkegaard) Ruel F. Pepa A Review of John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality Jerry Shaffer, Ph. D.

165

The Matrix Movie Series: A Berkeleyan Affirmation of Reality Ruel F. Pepa

171

PHILOSOPHY AND LANGUAGE Language as Our Means of Communication Michael Dummett

179

Truth Is Stranger Than It Used To Be Michael McKinney

195

Wittgenstein and the Problem of Meaning Ruel F. Pepa

203

PART II - LOGIC CLASSICAL LOGIC Lesson 1 - The Meaning and Value of Logic

219

Lesson 2 - Logical Arguments

223

Lesson 3 - Standard Form Categorical Syllogism (I) Standard Form Categorical Proposition

229

237 Lesson 4 - Standard Form Categorical Syllogism (II) Rules of Validity for the Categorical Syllogism Lesson 5 - Logical Relations

245

Lesson 6 - Logical Translation of Equivalences

251

Lesson 7 - Grammatical Translation

257

SYMBOLIC LOGIC Lesson 1 - Symbolic Representation of Compound Statements

265

Lesson 2 - Compound Statements and Their Truth Values 271 Lesson 3 - Arguments in Symbols

277

Lesson 4 - Symbolic Representation of Basic Deductive Arguments

283

PART I PHILOSOPHY

BASIC PHILOSOPHY

What is Philosophy? Paul Rezendes

Knowledge and Wisdom Bertrand Russell

What is Philosophy? Paul Rezendes I. If I must give an answer to this question, I prefer Plato‘s: true philosophy is not in books or in lectures which cannot answer questions, but instead is like light flashing forth as when a fire is kindled, the result of teacher and pupil engaged in the joint task of investigation. (Letters 7.341c.) Of course, the main problem is that this answer appears little more than psychological. Furthermore, standing alone it does little to justify the maintenance of separate departments in bookstores, libraries and colleges or save them from the creeping usurpation of other departments -- logic by math, metaphysics by physics and psychology, epistemology by psychology, ethics by sociology, and aesthetics by art. Even ―worse‖, it does little to distinguish ―real‖ philosophy from the ―junk‖ philosophy which clutters the shelves where the professions would prefer to see Plato, Wittgenstein or Russell. Nevertheless, these objections beg the question: whether philosophy is a separate discipline, and by what criteria we decide both that it is so, and that its ―separateness‖ is definable.

II. But ―what is philosophy‖ is not an empirical question. If we don‘t know what it is, we can‘t tell whether we‘ve found it in an example, but if we do know, then why are we searching in examples? More subtly, we can do a fairly adequate search for what has been called philosophy in the English language, and perhaps even look for what has been called by similar terms in related languages -- French, Greek, Latin. But how do we answer whether there is anything among the Chinese, Tibetan or New Guinean materials that should be a part of our empirical study? What criteria do we use to decide what is an adequate translation of ―philosophy‖? One might suggest to a speaker of Chinese that she read selected texts and after a dose of Plato or Kant or A.J. Ayer, say to her ―what would she call ‗that?‘‖ -- ―What word would describe what was just read?‖ This poses two obvious problems. First, do we have any guarantee that the same word would be used, or used univocally within each author, let alone for all of the authors which our intuitions tell us should be counted as philosophers? And should we require that our study subject also read Foucault and Deepak Chopra? Further, who should we ask to do the reading? Must we automatically exclude someone who would group new age metaphysics with Schopenhauer or Hegel? Or should the tendency (if there were one) of a non-western-speaking person to group the Upanishads with Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus instead tell us something about our own notions of what counts as philosophy? 5

III. Well, I suppose that we could answer, in the pragmatic fashion I find attractive, that we all have a general sense of what philosophy is, and that we should work from that core notion to develop our definition. The problem such an enterprise always faces, of course, is what will count as the core notion. Postmodernists and critical legal studies might take to an extreme rejecting common intuition and core agreement, but we do not have to go so far towards skepticism to find the problem of ―core notion‖ when defining philosophy. Are there any three candidates more clearly from different ―camps‖ than Anglo-America analytic philosophy, Continental deconstructionism, and Zen Buddhism? And is anything clearer than that each would, for one reason or another, lay claim to some core notion of what philosophy is which the others somehow lack?

IV. Looking back over the past few paragraphs, I notice that each ends with a question. I admit that I have recognized it, and consciously chosen not to change it. And saying those two things, I think that I have just touched on what I am prepared to call philosophy. Lon Fuller is recorded as a natural law thinker who discovered the ‗internal‘ morality of law. Despite occasional lapses into the language of correspondence theory, Fuller‘s greatest contribution to jurisprudence was his emphasis that our decision about what to accept as law is not merely an empirical question. He repeatedly emphasized that the law is not something that is simply waiting to be found - it is something waiting to be made, guided by our purpose in making law in the first place. What I suggest by way of an answer to ―what is philosophy‖ is analogous to what Fuller suggested by way of an answer to ―what is law‖: replace the question ―what is philosophy‖ with the question ―what are we prepared to call ‗philosophy.‘‖ By focusing on the goals of what we are already prepared to call philosophy we can be more inclusive. It is then easier to see the similarities in Zen Buddhism, Continental deconstructionism and Anglo-American analytic philosophy if, by taking the emphasis off of method or result, we instead ask, ―what did these very different groups of folks try to do such that we are at least tempted to call them all philosophers?‖ And I do believe that the temptation exists - we can recognize a common urge, if not a common set of empirical characteristics. Concerns about the paradox of inquiry do not stop us from recognizing that it is possible to exclude some things from the term ‗philosophy‘ on such a purposive analysis. I cannot imagine that anyone would be tempted to say that the instruction manual for

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

my new computer is philosophy. We need to mark off the differences between what we would all easily accept as philosophy and what we would not. The next step is not to find out what is common to the clear examples of philosophy - because that class might be too narrow because of the differences among camps. Rather, the next step would be to mark off the differences between the common cases on each side of the divide between philosophy and non-philosophy, and ask - what different purposes are being pursued on each side? Once we have a clearer view of that, we can then ask whether previously excluded cases should be brought in as philosophy or not. Like Fuller‘s notion of the morality of law, cases will meet the various parameters of the purposes of philosophy better and worse, more or less, because our task will lead us to develop a range of values which will disclose an absolute bottom below which the label of philosophy will be intolerable, but above which there can be honest difference of opinion. We will be faced with a choice, not a question of simple ―yes or no,‖ but ―what we are prepared to tolerate or accept?‖ We will be faced with a choice, for which we should accept responsibility.

V. Philosophy begins in questions - this seems common to things readily called philosophy. And it is hard to argue that being aware of the questions raising them in the first place -- is absent from philosophy and present in other fields: bicycle repair, for instance. There are certain cognitive activities, verbally learned behavior, for instance, that nonetheless search for stasis: as Socrates argues in Republic I, techne in itself does not seek its own improvement, but to improve its subject-matter. The self-awareness that gives rise to criticism and improvement seems essential to philosophy. The goals in doing philosophy must typically include conscious self-criticism. Thus, questioning and self-awareness seem common philosophic activities. The goal seems to be projective and proactive change and improvement. Nevertheless, communication also seems common to philosophies - they are all at least attempting to use language to convey something. Thus, goals of language also seem important in doing philosophy: explanatory power, clarity, persuasiveness, relationships of support (proof) between statements.

VI. Sections IV and V displayed two characteristics of philosophy: Choice and Questions. On the one hand, it hardly seems to be philosophy if it does not at least start with questions. But, in addition, it hardly seems to be philosophy if the process did not involve a moment of judgment, of decision with a value dimension. The question ―what is philosophy‖ is a disguised ―what should philosophy be?‖ Euthydemus and Dionysodorus did not deserve to be called philosophers, yet Socrates did. Logical puzzles do not rise to the level of

philosophy. Self-help books with ―Chicken Soup‖ in the title are too satisfied with platitudes to be called philosophy, although their effort to generate understanding gives them at least a superficial appearance of philosophy. Sophomoric attempts at philosophy are painfully obvious. Even if we cannot say what philosophy is, we are not without guidance -- or at least some type of intuition -- about better or worse philosophy. In fact, we would not want to say that someone knew what philosophy was if they could not distinguish bad efforts from good as well as real efforts from no effort to philosophize. The notion of philosophy not only allows distinctions between good and bad philosophy, but also provides goals of aspiration which, even when not perfectly realized, inform our activity as if serving as limits. Philosophy as a value-driven activity is a good, a thing to be desired.

VII. I cannot write about what I am prepared to call philosophy without offering a quote from a book which had profound influence on me in my youth, and which still resonantes today, after years of more formal philosophy: Herman Hesse‘s The Glass Bead Game (a/k/a Magister Ludi). The following passage is taken from Hesse‘s introduction to the book, entitled The Glass Bead Game: A General Introduction To Its History For The Layman. Up to that time every game had been a serial arrangement, an ordering, grouping and confronting of concentrated concepts from many fields of thought and aesthetics, a rapid recollection of eternal values and forms, a brief, virtuoso flight through the realms of the mind. Only after some time did there enter into the Game ... the idea of contemplation.

This new element arose out of a perceived evil. Mnemonist, people with freakish memories and no other virtues, were capable of playing dazzling games, dismaying and confusing the other participants by their rapid muster of countless ideas. In the course of time such displays of virtuosity fell under a strict ban, and contemplation became a highly important component of the Game. ... In this way the hieroglyphs of the Game were kept from degenerating into mere empty signs. Throughout its history the Game was closely allied with music, and usually proceeded according to musical or mathematical rules. One theme, two themes, or three themes were elaborated, varied and underwent a development quite similar to that of the theme in a Bach fugue or a concerto movement. A Game, for example, might start from a given astronomical configuration, or from the actual theme of a Bach fugue, or from a sentence out of Liebniz or the Upanishads, and from this theme, depending on the intentions and talents of the player, it could

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

either further explore and elaborate the initial motif or else enrich its expansiveness by allusions to kindred concepts.

This passage speaks more to me of the goals of philosophy than any formal definition. VIII. I said at the beginning that if I had to give a definition of philosophy, I would use Platoâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s from the Seventh Letter. I return to that point now after quoting Hesse and talking about values and goals, because that is the natural tendency of what I have written. Philosophy is about understanding, but about self-conscious understanding. That is what I am prepared to call philosophy. I do not think I could do better in a succinct statement than to say as Plato did, that it is the flash of light when the fire of understanding is kindled. But, oh, what a long and difficult path to get to where that light flashes - and that path, too, is philosophy.

ÂŠ Paul Rezendes

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Anglo-America analytic philosophy

Post-modernism

Continental deconstructionism

Zen Buddhism

Techne

Contemplation

Name: _________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―What is Philosophy?‖ 1. Explain the notion that ―true philosophy is like light flashing forth as when a fire is kindled . . . in the joint task of investigation‖?

2. What is the ―core notion‖ of philosophy common in analytic, continental and Buddhist philosophies?

3. How do you understand the term techne? Why do we say that philosophy is not simply a techne?

4. Why do we say that philosophy is a matter of ―choice‖ and ―ques-tions‖?

5. Why do we say that philosophy is not matter of mere understanding but a matter of self-conscious understanding?

Knowledge and Wisdom Bertrand Russell Most people would agree that, although our age far surpasses all previous ages in knowledge, there has been no correlative increase in wisdom. But agreement ceases as soon as we attempt to define â&#x20AC;&#x2014;wisdomâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC; and consider means of promoting it. I want to ask first what wisdom is, and then what can be done to teach it. There are, I think, several factors that contribute to wisdom. Of these I should put first a sense of proportion: the capacity to take account of all the important factors in a problem and to attach to each its due weight. This has become more difficult than it used to be owing to the extent and complexity of the specialized knowledge required of various kinds of technicians. Suppose, for example, that you are engaged in research in scientific medicine. The work is difficult and is likely to absorb the whole of your intellectual energy. You have no time to consider the effect which your discoveries or inventions may have outside the field of medicine. You succeed (let us say), as modern medicine has succeeded, in enormously lowering the infant deathrate, not only in Europe and America, but also in Asia and Africa. This has the entirely unintended result of making the food supply inadequate and lowering the standard of life in the most populous parts of the world. To take an even more spectacular example, which is in everybodyâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s mind at the present time: You study the composition of the atom from a disinterested desire for knowledge, and incidentally place in the hands of powerful lunatics the means of destroying the human race. In such ways the pursuit of knowledge may become harmful unless it is combined with wisdom; and wisdom in the sense of comprehensive vision is not necessarily present in specialists in the pursuit of knowledge.

Comprehensiveness alone, however, is not enough to constitute wisdom. There must be, also, a certain awareness of the ends of human life. This may be illustrated by the study of history. Many eminent historians have done more harm than good because they viewed facts through the distorting medium of their own passions. Hegel had a philosophy of history which did not suffer from any lack of comprehensiveness, since it started from the earliest times and continued into an indefinite future. But the chief lesson of history which he sought to inculcate was that from the year 400 AD down to his own time Germany had been the most important nation and the standardbearer of progress in the world. Perhaps one could stretch the comprehensiveness that constitutes wisdom to include not only intellect but also feeling. It is by no means uncommon to find men whose knowledge is wide but whose feelings are narrow. Such men lack what I call wisdom.

It is not only in public ways, but in private life equally, that wisdom is needed. It is needed in the choice of ends to be pursued and in emancipation from personal prejudice. Even an end which it would be noble to pursue if it were attainable may be pursued unwisely if it is inherently impossible of achievement. Many men in past ages devoted their lives to a search for the philosopher‘s stone and the elixir of life. No doubt, if they could have found them, they would have conferred great benefits upon mankind, but as it was their lives were wasted. To descend to less heroic matters, consider the case of two men, Mr A and Mr B, who hate each other and, through mutual hatred, bring each other to destruction. Suppose you go the Mr A and say, ‗Why do you hate Mr B?‘ He will no doubt give you an appalling list of Mr B‘s vices, partly true, partly false. And now suppose you go to Mr B. He will give you an exactly similar list of Mr A‘s vices with an equal admixture of truth and falsehood. Suppose you now come back to Mr A and say, ‗You will be surprised to learn that Mr B says the same things about you as you say about him‘, and you go to Mr B and make a similar speech. The first effect, no doubt, will be to increase their mutual hatred, since each will be so horrified by the other‘s injustice. But perhaps, if you have sufficient patience and sufficient persuasiveness, you may succeed in convincing each that the other has only the normal share of human wickedness, and that their enmity is harmful to both. If you can do this, you will have instilled some fragment of wisdom.

I think the essence of wisdom is emancipation, as far as possible, from the tyranny of the here and now. We cannot help the egoism of our senses. Sight and sound and touch are bound up with our own bodies and cannot be impersonal. Our emotions start similarly from ourselves. An infant feels hunger or discomfort, and is unaffected except by his own physical condition. Gradually with the years, his horizon widens, and, in proportion as his thoughts and feelings become less personal and less concerned with his own physical states, he achieves growing wisdom. This is of course a matter of degree. No one can view the world with complete impartiality; and if anyone could, he would hardly be able to remain alive. But it is possible to make a continual approach towards impartiality, on the one hand, by knowing things somewhat remote in time or space, and on the other hand, by giving to such things their due weight in our feelings. It is this approach towards impartiality that constitutes growth in wisdom. Can wisdom in this sense be taught? And, if it can, should the teaching of it be one of the aims of education? I should answer both these questions in the affirmative. We are told on Sundays that we should love our neighbors as ourselves. On the other six days of the week, we are exhorted to hate. But you will remember that the precept was exemplified by saying that the Samaritan was our neighbor. We no longer have any wish to hate Samaritans and so we

KNOWLEDGE AND WISDOM

are apt to miss the point of the parable. If you want to get its point, you should substitute Communist or anti-Communist, as the case may be, for Samaritan. It might be objected that it is right to hate those who do harm. I do not think so. If you hate them, it is only too likely that you will become equally harmful; and it is very unlikely that you will induce them to abandon their evil ways. Hatred of evil is itself a kind of bondage to evil. The way out is through understanding, not through hate. I am not advocating non-resistance. But I am saying that resistance, if it is to be effective in preventing the spread of evil, should be combined with the greatest degree of understanding and the smallest degree of force that is compatible with the survival of the good things that we wish to preserve. It is commonly urged that a point of view such as I have been advocating is incompatible with vigor in action. I do not think history bears out this view. Queen Elizabeth I in England and Henry IV in France lived in a world where almost everybody was fanatical, either on the Protestant or on the Catholic side. Both remained free from the errors of their time and both, by remaining free, were beneficent and certainly not ineffective. Abraham Lincoln conducted a great war without ever departing from what I have called wisdom. I have said that in some degree wisdom can be taught. I think that this teaching should have a larger intellectual element than has been customary in what has been thought of as moral instruction. I think that the disastrous results of hatred and narrow-mindedness to those who feel them can be pointed out incidentally in the course of giving knowledge. I do not think that knowledge and morals ought to be too much separated. It is true that the kind of specialized knowledge which is required for various kinds of skill has very little to do with wisdom. But it should be supplemented in education by wider surveys calculated to put it in its place in the totality of human activities. Even the best technicians should also be good citizens; and when I say â&#x20AC;&#x2014;citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;, I mean citizens of the world and not of this or that sect or nation. With every increase of knowledge and skill, wisdom becomes more necessary, for every such increase augments our capacity of realizing our purposes, and therefore augments our capacity for evil, if our purposes are unwise. The world needs wisdom as it has never needed it before; and if knowledge continues to increase, the world will need wisdom in the future even more than it does now.

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Sense of proportion

Comprehensive vision

Emancipation

Personal prejudice

Tyranny

Name: _________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Knowledge and Wisdom‖

1. What are the characteristics of a comprehensive vision? Can we say that comprehensive knowledge may constitute wisdom? Why?

2. What is in ―feeling‖ that it has the ―power‖ to transform knowledge into wisdom? What about ―knowledge‖—does it likewise have the power to transform feeling into wisdom? Explain.

3. The ―here and how‖ affirms the concreteness and authenticity of human existence. In what ways and instances can the here and now become ―tyrannical‖?

4. Explain how more understanding and less force effectively resist evil.

5. Why is it imminent that for every increase in knowledge a corresponding increase in wisdom is necessary?

DARWINIAN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY Peter Singer: Architect of the Culture of Death Donald Demarco

Humans and Other Animals Kenan Malik

Peter Singer: Architect of the Culture of Death Donald Demarco The new tradition that Peter Singer welcomes is founded on a “qualityof-life” ethic. It allegedly replaces the outgoing morality that is based on the “sanctity-of-life.” “After ruling our thoughts and our decisions about life and death for nearly two thousand years, the traditional Western ethic has collapsed.” On this triumphant note, Professor Peter Singer begins his milestone book, Rethinking Life and Death. It conveys an attitude of revolutionary confidence that brings to mind another atheistic iconoclast, Derek Humphry, who has said, ―We are trying to overturn 2,000 years of Christian tradition.‖ The new tradition that Singer welcomes is founded on a ―quality-of-life‖ ethic. It allegedly replaces the outgoing morality that is based on the ―sanctity-oflife.‖ Wesley J. Smith states that Rethinking Life and Death can fairly be called the Mein Kampf of the euthanasia movement, in that it drops many of the euphemisms common to pro-euthanasia writing and acknowledges euthanasia for what it is: killing.‖ A disability advocacy group that calls itself ―Not Dead Yet‖ has fiercely objected to Singer‘s views on euthanasia. Some refer to him as ―Professor Death.‖ Others have gone as far as to liken him to Josef Mengele. Troy McClure, an advocate for the disabled, calls him ―the most dangerous man in the world today.‖ There is indeed a bluntness to Singer‘s pronouncements that gives his thought a certain transparency. This makes his philosophy, comparatively speaking, easy to understand and to evaluate.

Despite the vehemence of some of his opponents, Professor Singer is regarded, in other circles, as an important and highly respected philosopher and bioethicist. His books are widely read, his articles frequently appear in anthologies, he is very much in demand throughout the world as a speaker, and has lectured at prestigious universities in different countries. He currently holds the Ira W. Decamp chair of Bioethics at Princeton University‘s Center for the Study of Human Values. And he has written a major article for Encyclopedia Britannica. Singer‘s philosophy begins in a broad egalitarianism and culminates in a narrow preferentialism. His egalitarianism has won him many supporters; his preferentialism has earned him his detractors. Hence, he is both strongly admired and soundly vilified. In his widely read article, ―All Animals Are Equal,‖ Singer expresses his disdain for racism and sexism. Here he is on solid ground. From

this beachhead, he invites his readers to conquer ―the last remaining form of discrimination,‖ which is discrimination against animals. He refers to this form of discrimination, borrowing the term from Richard Ryder, ―speciesism.‖ This latter form of discrimination rests on the wholly unwarranted assumption, in Singer‘s view, that one species is superior to another. ―I am urging,‖ he writes, ―that we extend to other species the basic principle of equality that most of us recognize should be extended to all members of our own species.‖ Here Singer endears himself to animal ―rights‖ activists. In 1992, he devoted an entire book to the subject, Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals. Singer rejects what he regards as non-philosophical ways of understanding human beings and non-human animals. He finds notions of ―sanctity-of-life,‖

―dignity,‖ ―created in the image of God,‖ and so on to be spurious. ―Fine phrases,‖ he says, ―are the last resource of those who have run out of argument.‖ He also sees no moral or philosophical significance to traditional terms such as

―being,‖ ―nature‖ and ―essence.‖ He takes pride in being a modern philosopher who has cast off such ―metaphysical and religious shackles.‖ What is fundamentally relevant, for Singer, is the capacity of humans and non-human animals to suffer. Surely non-human animals, especially mammals, suffer. At this point, Singer adds to his egalitarian followers those who base their ethics on compassion. Singer deplores the fact that we cruelly and unconscionably oppress and misuse non-human animals by eating their flesh and experimenting on them. Thus he advocates a vegetarian diet for everyone and a greatly restricted use of animal experimentation. By using a broad egalitarian base that elicits a compassionate response to the capacity of human and non-human animals to suffer, Singer thereby replaces the sanctity-of-life ethic with a quality-of-life ethic that, in his view, has a more solid and realistic foundation. In this way Singer appears to possess a myriad of modern virtues. He is broadminded, fair, nondiscriminatory, compassionate, innovative, iconoclastic, and consistent. It is the quality of life that counts, not some abstract and gratuitous notion that cannot be validated or substantiated through rational inquiry. Charles Darwin once conjectured that ―animals, our fellow brethren in pain, disease, suffering and famine ... may partake of our origin in one common ancestor — we may all be melted together.‖ Singer takes Darwin‘s ―conjecture‖ and turns it into a conviction. Thus he adds to his coterie of adherents, Darwinists and assorted evolutionists. Humans and non-human animals are fundamentally sufferers. They possess consciousness that gives them the capacity to suffer or to enjoy life, to be miserable or to be happy. This incontrovertible fact gives Singer a basis,

PETER SINGER: ARCHITECT OF THE CULTURE OF DEATH

ironically, for a new form of discrimination that is more invidious than the ones he roundly condemns. Singer identifies the suffering/enjoying status of all animals with their quality of life. It follows from this precept, then, that those who suffer more than others have less quality-of-life, and those who do not possess an insufficiently developed consciousness fall below the plane of personhood. He argues, for example, that where a baby has Down syndrome, and in other instances of ―life that has begun very badly,‖ parents should be free to kill the child within 28 days after birth. Here he is in fundamental agreement with Michael Tooley, a philosopher he admires, who states that ―new-born humans are neither persons nor quasi-persons, and their destruction is in no way intrinsically wrong.‖ Tooley believes that killing infants becomes wrong when they acquire ―morally significant properties,‖ an event he believes occurs about three months after their birth.

According to Singer, some humans are non-persons, while some nonhuman animals are persons. The key is not nature or species membership, but consciousness. A pre-conscious human cannot suffer as much as a conscious horse. In dealing with animals, we care only about their quality of life. We put a horse that has broken its leg out of its misery as quickly as possible. This merciful act spares the animal an untold amount of needless suffering. If we look upon human animals in the same fashion, our opposition to killing those who are suffering will begin to dissolve. The ―quality-of-life‖ ethic has a tangible correlative when it relates to suffering; the ―sanctity-of-life‖ seemingly relates to a mere vapor. Here is where Singer picks up his detractors. According to this avant garde thinker, unborn babies or neonates, lacking the requisite consciousness to qualify as persons, have less right to continue to live than an adult gorilla. By the same token, a suffering or disabled child would have a weaker claim not to be killed than a mature pig. Singer writes, in Rethinking Life and Death:

Human babies are not born self-aware or capable of grasping their lives over time. They are not persons. Hence their lives would seem to be no more worthy of protection that the life of a fetus. And writing specifically about Down Syndrome babies, he advocates trading a disabled or defective child (one who is apparently doomed to too much suffering) for one who has better prospects for happiness: We may not want a child to start on life‘s uncertain voyage if the prospects are clouded. When this can be known at a very early stage in the voyage, we may still have a chance to make a fresh start. This means detaching ourselves from the infant who has been born, cutting ourselves free before the ties that have already begun to bind us to our child have become irresistible. Instead of

going forward and putting all our effort into making the best of the situation, we can still say no, and start again from the beginning. Needless to say, we all begin our lives on an uncertain voyage. Life is full of surprises. A Helen Keller can enjoy a fulfilling life, despite her limitations; Loeb and Leopold can become hardened killers, despite the fact that they were darlings of fortune. Who can prognosticate? Human beings should not be subject to factory control criteria. Even in starting again, one still does not generate the same individual that was lost. Singer‘s concern for quality-of-life causes him to miss the reality and the value of the underlying life. Ironically, the man who claimed to be conquering the last domain of discrimination was offending his readers precisely because of his penchant for discrimination (and even in failing to discriminate). A number of statements that appeared in the first edition of his Practical Ethics were expurgated from the second edition. They include his demeaning of persons with Down syndrome, reviling mentally challenged individuals as ―vegetables,‖ rating the mind of a one-year-old human below that of many brute animals, and stating that ―not ... everything the Nazis did was horrendous; we cannot condemn euthanasia just because the Nazis did it.‖

For Peter Singer a human being is not a subject who suffers, but a sufferer. Singer‘s error here is to identify the subject with consciousness. This is an error that dates back to 17th Century Cartesianism — ―I think therefore I am‖ (which is to identify being with thinking). Descartes defined man solely in terms of his consciousness as a thinking thing (res cogitans) rather than as a subject who possesses consciousness. At the heart of Pope John Paul II‘s personalism (his philosophy of the person) is the recognition that it is the concrete individual person who is the subject of consciousness. The subject comes before consciousness. That subject may exist prior to consciousness (as in the case of the human embryo) or during lapses of consciousness (as in sleep or in a coma). But the existing subject is not to be identified with consciousness itself, which is an operation or activity of the subject. The Holy Father rejects what he calls the ―hypostatization of the cogito‖ (the reification of consciousness) precisely because it ignores the fundamental reality of the subject of consciousness — the person — who is also the object of love. ―Consciousness itself‘ is to be regarded ―neither as an individual subject nor as an independent faculty.‖ John Paul refers to the elevation of consciousness to the equivalent of the person‘s being as “the great anthropocentric shift in philosophy.” What he means by this ―shift‖ is a movement away from existence to a kind of absolutization of consciousness. Referring to Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Holy Father reiterates

PETER SINGER: ARCHITECT OF THE CULTURE OF DEATH

that ―it is not thought which determines existence, but existence, “esse,” which determines thought!‖ Singer, by trying to be more broadminded than is reasonable, has created a philosophy that actually dehumanizes people, reducing them to points of consciousness that are indistinguishable from those of many non-human animals. Therefore, what is of primary importance for the Princeton bioethicists is not the existence of the being in question, but its quality of life. But this process of dehumanization leads directly to discrimination against those whose quality of life is not sufficiently developed. Singer has little choice but to divide humanity into those who have a preferred state of life from those who do not. In this way, his broad egalitarianism decays into a narrow preferentialism:

When we reject belief in God we must give up the idea that life on this planet has some preordained meaning. Life as a whole has no meaning. Life began, as the best available theories tell us, in a chance combination of gasses; it then evolved through random mutation and natural selection. All this just happened; it did not happen to any overall purpose. Now that it has resulted in the existence of beings who prefer some states of affairs to others, however, it may be possible for particular lives to be meaningful. In this sense some atheists can find meaning in life. Life can be meaningful for an atheist when he is able to spend his life in a ―preferred state.‖ The atheistic perspective here does not center on people, however, it centers on happiness. This curious preference for happiness over people engenders a rather chilling logic. It is not human life or the existing human being that is good, but the ―preferred state.‖ Human life is not sacrosanct, but a certain kind of life can be ―meaningful.‖ If one baby is disabled, does it not make sense to kill it and replace it with one who is not and ―therefore‖ has a better chance for happiness? ―When the death of the disabled infant,‖ writes Singer, ―will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed.‖ Singer has a point, though perhaps marginal at best, that all other things being equal, it is better to be more happy than to be less happy. Yet this point hardly forms a basis for ending the life of a person who has less happiness than the hypothetically conceived greater happiness of his possible replacement. Ethics should center on the person, not the quantum of happiness a person may or may not enjoy. It is the subject who exists that has the right to life, and neither Peter Singer nor anyone else who employs a ―relative happiness calculator‖ should expropriate that right. Having neglected concrete existence, Singer inevitably wanders into

abstractions. He is a humanist, one might say, because he wants people to enjoy better and happier states of life. But the more relevant point is that he is not particularly interested in the actual lives of those who are faced with states that he believes to be less than preferable. On the other hand, Pope John Paul II stresses that each human life is ―inviolable, unrepeatable, and irreplaceable.‖ In stating this, the Pontiff is implying that our first priority should be loving human beings rather than preferring better states. In a 1995 article in the London Spectator entitled ―Killing Babies Isn‘t Always Wrong,‖ Singer said of the Pope, ―I sometimes think that he and I at least share the virtue of seeing clearly what is at stake.‖ The Culture of Life based on the sanctity-of-life ethic is at stake. The Pope and the Meister Singer are poles apart. ―That day had to come,‖ states Singer, ―when Copernicus proved that the earth is not at the center of the universe. It is ridiculous to pretend that the old ethics make sense when plainly they do not. The notion that human life is sacred just because it‘s human is medieval.‖ There are a number of things that are ―plain.‖ One is that Copernicus did not ―prove‖ that the earth is not at the center of the universe. He proposed a theory based on the erroneous assumption that planets travel in perfect circles and hypothesized that the sun was at the center, not of the universe, but of what we now refer to as the solar system, Another is that the sacredness of life is a Judaeo-Christian notion, not an arbitrary fabrication of the Middle Ages. Yet another is that it is unethical to kill disabled people just because they are disabled. At a Princeton forum Professor Singer remarked that he would have supported the parents of his disabled protesters, if they had sought to kill their disabled offspring in infancy. This is the kind of unkind remark that will ensure that his disabled protesters will continue to protest. An additional error in Singer‘s thinking is the assumption he makes that the suffering (or happiness) of individuals can somehow be added to each other and thus create ―all this suffering in the world.‖ C. S. Lewis explains that if you have a toothache of intensity x and another person in the room with you also has a toothache of intensity x, ―You may, if you choose, say that the total amount of pain in the room is now 2x. But you must remember that no one is suffering 2x.‖ There is no composite pain in anyone‘s consciousness. There is no such thing as the sum of collective human suffering, because no one suffers it. Yet another error in Singer‘s thinking is that philosophy should be built up solely on the basis of rational thinking, and that feelings and emotions should be distrusted, if not uprooted. Concerning the infant child, he advises

PETER SINGER: ARCHITECT OF THE CULTURE OF DEATH

us, in Practical Ethics, to ―put aside feelings based on its small, helpless and — sometimes — cute appearance,‖ so we can look at the more ethically relevant aspects, such as its quality of life. This coldly cerebral approach is radically incompatible with our ability to derive any enjoyment whatsoever from life. By ―putting feelings aside,‖ we would be putting enjoyment aside. It is not the mind that becomes filled with joy, but the heart. Thus the man (Peter Singer) who allegedly prizes happiness is eager to de-activate the very faculty that makes happiness possible. Dr. David Gend, who is a general practitioner and secretary of the Queensland, Australia, branch of the World Federation of Doctors who Respect Human Life, suggests that Singer‘s announcement of the collapse of the sanctity-of-life ethic is premature:

Nevertheless, Herod could not slaughter all the innocents, and Singer will not corrupt the love of innocence in every reader. As long as some hearts are softened by the image of an infant stirring in its sleep, or even by their baby‘s movements on ultrasound at sixteen weeks, Singer‘s call to ―put feelings aside‖ in killing babies will reek of decay.‖ Reason and emotion are not antagonistic to each other. This is the assumption intrinsic to Cartesian dualism in the integrated person, reason and emotion form an indissoluble unity. For a person to set aside his feelings, therefore, in order to view a situation ―ethically‖ is tantamount to setting aside his humanity. It is precisely this utter detachment from one‘s moral feelings, particularly relevant in the case where an individual experiences no emotions whatsoever while holding an infant, that is suggestive of a moral disorder. Singer seems to view practical ethics the way one views practical mathematics. But this is to dehumanize ethics. Perceiving the ethical significance of things is not a specialized activity of reason. There is a ―moral sense‖ (James Q. Wilson) and a ―wisdom in disgust‖ (Leon Kass), a ―knowledge through connaturality‖ (Jacques Maritain), and a ―copresence‖ (Gabriel Marcel), that involves the harmonious integration of reason and emotion. ―The heart has reasons that reason knows nothing of,‖ said Pascal. Neurobiologist Antonio Damasio, author of Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, finds scientific evidence that ―Absence of emotion appears to be at least as pernicious for rationality as excessive emotion ... Emotion may well be the support system without which the edifice of reason cannot function properly and may even collapse.‖ The ethic that is more likely to ―collapse,‖ therefore is not one that is based on the personal integration of reason and emotion, but the rational approach that is dissociated from emotion and thereby left one-sided, vulnerable, and counterproductive.

Professor Singer underscores the importance of reason, broadmindedness, and compassion. But his emphasis on reason displaces human feelings. His

advocacy of broadmindedness causes him to lose sight of the distinctiveness of the human being (he does not object to sexual ―relationships‖ between humans and non-human animals). And his sensitivity for compassion is exercised at the expense of failing to understand how suffering can have personal meaning. In the end, his philosophy is one-sided and distorted. It plays into the Culture of Death because it distrusts the province of the heart, fails to discern the true dignity of the human person, and elevates the killing of innocent human beings — young and old — to the level of a social therapeutic. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT DeMarco, Donald. ―Peter Singer: Architect of the Culture of Death.‖ Social Justice Review 94 no. 9-10 (September/October 2003):154-157 Reprinted with permission of Social Justice Review.

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Culture of Death ―Quality-of-life ethic‖ vs. ―Sanctity-of-life ethic‖ Euthanasia Bioethics/Bioethicist Egalitarianism Preferentialism Species

Iconoclasm/Iconoclastic Avant garde Personalism (Philosophy of the Person) ―Hypostatization of the Cogito‖

Reification of consciousness Absolutization of consciousness Cartesianism

Name: _________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Peter Singer: Architect of the Culture of Death‖

1. What is your personal view about euthanasia and abortion—are they moral or immoral? Why?

2. What do you think of Singer‘s view that ―some humans are non-persons, while some non-human animals are persons‖?

3. Do you believe in the notion that ―[w]hen we reject belief in God we must give up the idea that life on this planet has some preordained meaning?‖

4. What do you think of the notion that ―philosophy should be built up solely on the basis of rational thinking, and that feelings and emotions should be distrusted, if not uprooted?‖

5. Explain Pope John Paul II‘s Personalism or Philosophy of the Person. What do you think of it?

6. How do you look at the ethics of Peter Singer in relation to the reli-giocultural orientation of the Filipino? What is your personal opinion about Singer‘s view and about the said Filipino orientation?

Humans and Other Animals Kenan Malik I’ll never Be such a gosling to obey instinct, but stand As if a man were author of himself And knew no other kin. Corialanus‘ paean to human freedom would have been regarded, for most of the past 500 years, as unexceptional. It was taken for granted by most Western thinkers from the Renaissance onwards that human beings were exceptional creatures because of their possession of reason and consciousness, language and morality. Reason, as Descartes put it, ‗is the noblest thing we can have because it makes us in a certain manner equal to God and exempts us from being his subjects‘. This was the philosophy at the heart of both the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment. Today, though, we no longer think in this way. The idea of humans as exceptional beings is seen as both scientifically false and politically dangerous.

For most scientists, exceptionalism smacks of mysticism. Their Holy Grail is to understand humans in the same language as the rest of physical nature. And politically, there has developed an increasing tendency to see human hubris as the root of most of the ills of the world, from global warming to ethnic cleansing. ‗We need protection from ourselves‘, the biologist Lynn Margulis has of the human species. This combination of scientific naturalism and political pessimism is helping transform our understanding of the human condition.

Historically, the question of what it is to be human—Who are we? Where did we come from? What defines our nature?—has been in the domain of poets and philosophers, theologians and novelists. In the Western tradition it was Aristotle and Aquinas, Dante and Descartes, Shakespeare and Schopenhauer to whom people turned for answers. Then came the publication in 1859 of Charles Darwin‘s On The Origin of Species. Darwin‘s masterpiece transformed the debate not only by throwing new light on the relationship between humans and the rest of nature but also by holding out the hope that in understanding that relationship we might also begin to unravel the deepest mysteries of human existence. ‗Origin of man now solved‘, Darwin wrote in his notebook in 1838. ‗He who understands baboon will do more for metaphysics than Locke.‘ Thirteen years after The Origin of the Species, Darwin published The Expressions of the Emotions in Man and the Animals, his most explicit attempt

to demonstrate the animal roots of human nature. The emotional stuff of everyday life—love, joy, anger, sulkiness, guilt, disgust, horror, modesty— was, Darwin suggested, common both across all humans and between humans and other animals. This was a challenge both to the Creationist idea that emotions were specifically given to humans by God and to the racist view that every race had evolved separately. Darwin‘s argument that human emotions are universal, evolved and derived from those of animals was (and remains) deeply contentious. The book was a sensational bestseller. Nine thousand copies sold within four months—an extraordinary figure for the time. (The Origin of Species had an initial print run of just 1250.) Yet after its second edition in 1889, the book remained largely forgotten for more than a century. Indeed, until a new edition appeared in 1998 to great acclaim, few would have even known that Darwin had written such a work. Why did The Expressions of the Emotions collect dust for much of the twentieth century? Largely because in the decades that followed its publication, evolutionary theory was used to demonstrate, not the unity of humankind, but rather the idea that the struggle for existence had created unequal races, and that capitalist exploitation, colonial conquest and even genocide were simply the working out of the laws of natural selection. As the racist consequences of social Darwinism became apparent, so psychologists and anthropologists increasingly shied away from any biological explanation of human behaviour. In the wake of Nazism and the Holocaust, the idea that human behaviour was entirely a cultural artefact came to dominate postwar thinking. The very idea of human nature became taboo. ‗We knew how politically loaded discussions of inborn differences could become‘, the anthropologist Margaret Mead, one of the leading cultural anthropologists of the twentieth century, recalled in her autobiography Blackberry Winter. ‗It seemed to us that further study of inborn similarities would have to wait upon less troubled times.‘ The republication of The Expressions of the Emotions in 1998 reflected, however, another shift in perceptions of human nature. By the end of the twentieth century sociological explanations of human behaviour had increasingly fallen into disrepute, while evolutionary explanations had once more become fashionable. Not only are ‗claims about human nature less dangerous than many people think‘, Steven Pinker argued in The Blank Slate, his full-frontal assault on cultural relativism, but ‗the denial of human nature can be more dangerous than people think‘. It was in the 1970s that the debate about human nature was reignited by

HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS 33 two books, neither which of which was, paradoxically, primarily about humans, but both of which have been hugely influential in shaping the debate about the nature of being human and both of which remain almost as controversial now as they were then: EO Wilson‘s Sociobiology (1975) and Richard Dawkins‘

The Selfish Gene (1976), two books whose very titles have helped sculpt the contemporary language of human nature. ‗Skill in wielding metaphors and symbols‘, Richard Dawkins has written ‗is one of the hallmarks of scientific genius‘. Whether Dawkins himself qualifies as a scientific genius only history will record. But there have been few scientists—indeed, few writers in any genre—more skilled at metaphor-wielding. And there have been few more evocative metaphors in the modern age than that of ‗the selfish gene‘, nor a scientific book with a greater impact on public consciousness than Dawkins‘ 1976 work that introduced both the phrase and the author to a startled non-scientific audience. The Selfish Gene crystalised the ‗gene-eyed view‘ of evolution developed through the 1960s and 1970s by a new generation of evolutionary thinkers, in particular William Hamilton and John Maynard Smith in England and the Americans George Williams and Robert Trivers. Evolution, Dawkins claimed, cares solely about the gene, not the individual. Individuals die at the end of their lifetimes, but a gene is potentially immortal. Genes are ‗selfish‘ because their only function is to survive at the expense of their rivals. The body is simply a ‗survival machine‘ built by genes to enable them to survive. The publication of The Selfish Gene helped launch the so-called ‗Darwin wars‘. Critics such as Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin savaged what they called Dawkins‘ ‗ultra-Darwinism‘, the belief that ‗natural selection regulates everything of importance in evolution‘. Much of Gould‘s criticisms were laid out in the columns he wrote for the magazine Natural History, many of which were collected in a series of books beginning with Ever Since Darwin. Dawkins hit back and in a number of books—The Extended Phonotype, Climbing Mount Improbable, The Blind Watchmaker and River Out of Eden— refined and expanded his argument, challenging both Creationists and his Darwinian critics. The fiercest defence of ‗ultra-Darwinism‘ came not from Dawkins but from the philosopher Daniel Dennett whose 1995 book Darwin‘s Dangerous Idea, describes Darwinism as a ‗universal acid‘ that eats through just about every traditional view and leaves in its wake a revolutionised world view. The Selfish Gene, however, was not just a book about Darwinian theory but also, as the writer Andrew Brown puts it in The Darwin Wars, ‗a book about genes read as a book about people‘. The very idea of the selfish gene

shocked many critics, seemingly attributing agency to genes and denying it to humans—though this is to be so dazzled by Dawkins‘ metaphoric skills as to miss his actual beliefs. The controversy was fuelled by the fact that The Selfish Gene was published barely a year after the storm had broken over EO Wilson‘s Sociobiology. Wilson, a Harvard entomologist and world expert on ants, set out to synthesise all the known knowledge about social animals—from corals and jellyfish to ants and bees to birds and primates. But in the book‘s first and last chapters he also tried to show that the same principles of behaviour also applied to humans. ‗Behaviour and social structure‘, Wilson believed, ‗like all biological phenomena, can be studied as ―organs‖, extensions of the genes that exist because of their superior adaptive value‘. Gould and Lewontin (Wilson‘s colleagues at Harvard) accused him of giving vent to theories that ‗led to the establishment of gas chambers in Nazi chambers‘. In her book Beast and Man, an attempt to restore biology to discussions of human nature, the philosopher Mary Midgely nevertheless denounced sociobiology as ‗biological Thatcherism, romantic and egotistic, celebrating evolution as a ceaseless crescendo of competition between essentially ―selfish‖ individual organisms‘. In Not in our Genes, a book that Lewontin cowrote with British biologist Stephen Rose and American psychologist Leon Kamin, Wilson is painted as a ‗neoconservative libertarian‘ and sociobiology as ‗yet another attempt to put a natural scientific foundation under Adam Smith‘.

Once the hysteria of the initial response had died down the argument about the nature of sociobiology transmuted into the nature-nurture debate: is nature or nurture more important in shaping human psychology, behaviour and society? The debate generated considerable heat and invective, but beneath the caricatures thrown up by both sides there existed a surprising amount of commonality. ‗No serious student of human behaviour has denied the potent effect of evolved biology on our cultural lives‘, Stephen Jay Gould wrote in An Urchin in the Storm. ‗Our struggle is to figure out how biology affects us not whether it does.‘ The philosopher Janet Radcliffe Richards, a prominent supporter of evolutionary psychology, agreed. ‗The disagreement between evolutionary psychologists and standard social science theorists‘, she wrote in Human Nature After Darwin, ‗is not about whether the environment influences what we are but only about the extent to which an understanding of evolutionary origins can help show how and to what extent this happens.‘

Meanwhile, sociobiology itself transmuted into evolutionary psychology, partly at least to avoid the political opprobrium attached to the label ‗sociobiology‘. In 1992 three academics, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby and

HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS

Jerome Barkow edited a collection of papers under the title The Adapted Mind, which has come to be seen as a seminal work in laying the foundations of the new science of human nature. Like Darwin in The Expressions of the Emotions, evolutionary psychologists sought both to ground human psychology in animal nature and to demonstrate the universality of human behaviours. The fieldwork of animal behaviourists has, in recent years, revealed the enormous complexity of the social life of animals, especially primates. Frans de Waal‘s fascinating study of chimpanzees at Arnhem zoo, for instance, popularised in books such as Good Natured and Chimpanzee Politics, often read like a cross between Dynasty and King Lear, an invitation into a world of generous friendships, treacherous alliances and bitter power struggles. The subtitles of his books—The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals and Power and Sex Among Apes—tell their own story. For de Waal the lives of Great Apes open a window into the roots of human politics and morality. A stream of books by other primatologists—Andrew Whiten and Richard Byrne‘s Machiavellian Intelligence, David Premack‘s The Mind of an Ape, Richard Wrangham‘s Demonic Males, Robert Sapolsky‘s A Primate‘s Memoir, Marian Stamp Dawkins‘ Through Our Eyes Only?—have all tried to use the lives of primates to shine a light on the human condition.

If the study of animal lives has provided one source of data for the new science of human nature, another has come from the study of human lives across cultural divides. Even though human beings are ‗morally free to make and remake themselves infinitely‘, Matt Ridley wrote in The Red Queen, ‗we do not do so. We stick to the same monotonously human pattern of organising our affairs. If we were more adventurous, there would be societies without love, without ambition, without sexual desire, without marriage, without art, without grammar, without smiles.‘ There are not because all these are evolved traits, and hence common to all humans. Discover universal traits, the argument runs, and you are likely to have discovered evolved characteristics. Darwin himself had enlisted the help of dozens of missionaries and colonial officers in writing The Expression of the Emotions, asking them to describe the way non-Europeans expressed certain emotions, to demonstrate that ‗all the chief expressions exhibited by man are the same throughout the world‘. In the 1960s, Paul Ekman updated Darwin‘s work by showing photographs of different facial expressions to people in 21 different cultures. Overwhelmingly Ekman‘s subjects, irrespective of culture, attributed the same emotions to each expression. Ekaman‘s studies, detailed in a series of books including The Face of Man and Emotions Revealed, have become classics in the field. More recently Marc Hauser has posed fiendish moral conundrums to people across different cultures. In his book Moral Minds Hauser argues that not only has

‗nature designed a universal sense of wrong and right‘, but that humans are universally sensitive to the Kantian imperative that one should not treat people solely as means, but primarily as ends. In the wake of 9/11 religion has become a key theme in the new science of human nature. The universality and persistence of religion has led many—such as Sam Harris in The End of Faith, Daniel Dennett in Breaking the Spell and Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion—to see it as an evolutionary hangover which has become maladaptive. All three books draw heavily on the work of anthropologist Scott Atran who in his book In Gods We Trust explores humans in all cultures possess an evolved desire for supernatural explanations. But the universal trait that lies at the heart of evolutionary psychology is the universality of the sex differences. As David Buss suggests in The Evolution of Desire: The Strategies of Human Mating, men and women can be viewed almost as distinct species. Men and women have different evolutionary strategies and therefore different evolved traits. ‗Women‘s minds evolved to suit the demands of bearing and rearing children and of gathering plant food‘, Matt Ridley wrote in The Red Queen. ‗Men‘s minds evolved to suit the demands of rising in a male hierarchy, fighting over women and providing meat for a family‘. Men tend to be promiscuous, aggressive, risk-taking and spatially aware, women monogamous, cooperative, nurturing and linguistically advanced. For critics, such arguments only confirmed their suspicions of the ideological character of evolutionary psychology. By the mid 1990s the map of human nature had been transformed. Where once the idea of human nature was treated with suspicion and ridicule, there was now barely a human activity for which someone did not have an evolutionary account. Human nature had been fully restored into discussions of human behaviour, political policy and social organisation. Darwinism, as former LSE director John Ashworth has put it, has become ‗an ―ism‖ for our times‘. But the restoration of human nature to public debate, and the increasing importance of science in defining the boundaries of that nature, has not made any easier the question of how we understand what it means to be human. Few people would deny that humans are animals, evolved beings with evolved bodies and evolved minds. Equally, few would deny that humans are in some fashion distinct from other animals. ‗We are built as gene machines‘, Richard Dawkins wrote in The Selfish Gene, but we also possess ‗the power to turn against our creators. We alone on earth can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.‘ According to Steven Pinker he is ‗by Darwinian standards...

a horrible mistake‘. Why? Because he has chosen to remain childless. ‗I am happy to be that way‘, he adds, ‗and if my genes don‘t like it they can go and jump in the lake‘.

HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS

But here is the rub. If we are built as gene machines how do we possess the power ‗to turn against our creators‘, or to tell our genes to ‗go jump in the lake‘? If a horse or a chimp told its genes to go take a jump, it would not survive very long in evolutionary terms. So how is it possible for humans to act like this? Pinker explains it like this in How the Mind Works: The mechanistic stance allows us to understand what makes us tick and how we fit into the physical universe. When those discussions wind down for the day, we go back to talking about each other as free and dignified human beings. But freedom and dignity here have no relationship to the physical world, and hence to human nature. They seem to float free in a universe of their own. ‗First we are told that our genes know what is best for us, that they control our lives , programming every little wheel in the human survival machine‘, Frans de Waal observes in The Ape and The Sushi Master. ‗But then the same authors let us know we have the option to rebel, that we are free to act differently... These authors want to have it both ways: human behaviour is an evolutionary product except when it is hard to explain.‘ The real problem, as neurologist and writer Ray Tallis suggests in his wonderful book The Explicit Animal, is that we still lack an adequate framework in which to explore what it is to be human. Like every other organism, humans are shaped by both nature and nurture. But unlike any other organism, we are also defined by our ability to transcend both, by our capacity to overcome the constraints imposed both by our genetic and our cultural heritage. It is not that human beings have floated free of the laws of causation. It is rather that humans are not simply the passive end result of a chain of causes, whether natural or environmental. We have developed the capacity to intervene actively in both nature and culture, to shape both to our will. We are biological beings, and under the purview of biological and physical laws. But we are also conscious beings with purpose and agency, traits the possession of which allow us to design ways of breaking - or at least easing - the constraints of biological and physical laws. To misquote Corialanus, to be human, it seems, is both to be such a gosling to obey instinct and to stand as if a man were author of himself.

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Exceptionalism

Mysticism

Human hubris

Global warming

Ethnic Cleansin

Scientific naturalism

Political pessimism

Creationism/Creationist idea

Cultural Relativism

Natural selection

Sociobiology

Evolutionary psychology

Kantian imperative

Mechanistic stance

Ultra-Darwinism

Nature-nurture debate

Name: _________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Humans and Other Animals‖

1. Do you consider humans as exceptional beings? Why? How has the Darwinian evolutionary theory contributed to the development of the view that this notion is ―both scientifically false and politically dangerous‖?

2. What is your view on Hauser argument ―that not only has ‗nature designed a universal sense of wrong and right‘, but that humans are universally sensitive to the Kantian imperative that one should not treat people solely as means, but primarily as ends?

3. How has social Darwinism led and contributed to the notion of racism?

4. What is the â&#x20AC;&#x2022;nature vs. nurture debateâ&#x20AC;&#x2013;? On which side are you? Or isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;t there a common point that levels off and ultimately resolves the controversy? Explain your answer.

5. Do you believe that universal traits are evolved characteristics? Why?

6. What is your own view the human being?

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE An Introduction to Epistemology in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy Ruel F. Pepa

A Critique of Science in Russell Stannard’s “The God Experiment” Jeff Dahms

Philosophy: Rigorous Science or Intuitive Thought A critique of Mind by John Searle

Richard Schain

A Philosophical Theorizing in Search of A Method of Transformative Philosophizing Ruel F. Pepa

Post-Industrial Humanism: Transformative Humanization of Nature (or “Naturization” of Humanity) Toward a Moral Technology Ruel F. Pepa

An Introduction to Epistemology in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy Ruel F. Pepa I. Continental Rationalism Aristotelian philosophy became dominant in the formation of medieval Christian theology. This synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology was a variety of philosophical systems known as Scholasticism. It was the dominant philosophical system in Europe for quite a long period of time, i.e., until the 17th century. However, during the Renaissance (15th and 16th centuries), other varieties of ancient philosophy were likewise revived and used to attack the Scholastics. These included the Renaissance Platonism and even Skepticism, as well as those of others who were known by their mystical inclination. Among these varied groups, the revival of ancient skepticism played a central role in the historical development of philosophy. The major proponent of Neo-Skepticism was Montaigne (1533-1592) who focused more on the basic problem of epistemology which is the issue of what can be known. This direction of development led to the formation of methods used by the new scientific schools that conflicted with and cast doubt on principles that came down from the medieval period.

The leading philosophers of continental rationalism were Rene Descartes, Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. Rationalism is an epistemological position that ascertains truth and knowledge solely by reason and not by experience. A. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) Descartes was a French philosopher and mathematician whose philosophical preoccupation was on the problem of guaranteeing the certainty of knowledge. In this connection, he proposed a method in order to formulate a strong foundation for knowledge. He was convinced on the necessity of a clear and definite idea that could not be doubted and could become the point of departure to derive further truths. His epistemological method was known as methodical doubt, whereby at the end, after and exhaustive process of doubting everything, the last point where we could get was nothing else but to conclude that ―I think therefore, I am‖ (Cogito, ergo sum). This is the most fundamental truth – a statement that cannot be doubted, and therefore, it is the end of doubting. This certainty was used by Descartes as a paradigm or model to distinguish the thinking substance from the extended substance – the mind from matter. 43

This principle Descartes used to formulate ―truthful‖ arguments about nature, mind and God. Descartes‘ revolutionary methodology was so influential, he is the acknowledged Father of Modern Philosophy. DESCARTES‘ METHODICAL DOUBT

1) I can doubt anything. 2) When I am doubting, what I definitely cannot doubt is the fact that I am doubting.

3) When I am doubting, I must be thinking. 4) When I am thinking, I must be existing. COGITO, ERGO, SUM! (I think, therefore, I am!)

B. Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza (1632-1677) Not too long after Descartes‘ death, a brilliant thinker emerged to improve on what Descartes had developed. Spinoza advanced his idea that reality has only one substance and that is God, and two of God‘s attributes are thought and extension. Everything that exists and can be known about is a ―piece‖, an aspect of God. Spinoza‘s God, however, was antithetical to the God of Judeo-Christian religious tradition. For him, God was Nature and Nature was God – this but all classical theism but the all-embracing pantheism. Spinoza‘s God was the laws and principles of reality from which everything followed. He also thought that the mind and body were two aspects of the same entity that could be understood by logic and natural science.

C. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) The third leading rationalistic philosopher of the 17th century was Leibniz. He was basically a metaphysicist who advanced the concept of the most fundamental elements of the world; these he called monads. According to Leibniz, monads were independent centers of force or energy and each monad was internally determined by its definition. Since monads are independent entities, they could not interact among themselves. But they have ―pre-established harmony‖, so that the movement of a monad coincides with that of another.

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Leibniz said that God chose the monads in the world to make this world the best of all possible worlds. According to Leibniz, it was through rational analysis that truths about monads could be discovered.

II. British Empiricism The leading rationalists that we studied in Lesson 3 were epistemologists who focused on metaphysical truths that could only be ascertained by reason. Contrary to this way of philosophizing was the emphasis on sense experience that developed in Great Britain. British empirical philosophers stressed on the significance of sense experience in determining the basis of truth and knowledge. A. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) The British thinker and scientist Francis Bacon set the initial pace of British empirical philosophy‘s development. It was he who advanced the significance of an empirical or experiential theory of knowledge as a means to eliminate so many metaphysical and theological difficulties that characterized philosophy.

For Bacon, this was the most relevant thing to do if knowledge was to truly advance. This concern was later elaborated by another leading empiricist, John Locke. B. John Locke (1632-1704) Locke posited that the source of all knowledge is sense experience. Previously, some people were led to believe that there is some pre-determined, undefinable substance that underlies experience. Locke was not convinced.

He believed that at the birth of a human person, his mind is tabula rasa, a clean slate, that will be written on with the data of experience as the person grows and expands his relations in his social milieu. For John Locke, there is no pre-existing idea in the human mind prior to experience. C. Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753) Though an empiricist philosopher himself, Berkeley nevertheless saw some dangerous skeptical and irreligious elements in Locke‘s theory because of its dependence on material substance for ideas to be attached to. Berkeley proposed that what we can truly know are only ideas and ideas can only exist in the minds that perceive them. Hence, ―to be is to be perceived‖. There is no material reality. What makes the world exist even without any human perceiver is the fact that God exists eternally and God perceives everything at all times. Berkeley‘s empiricism was also known as absolute idealism – a complete

denial of the existence of a material world.

D. David Hume (1711-1776) It was Hume who followed Berkeley in the succession of leading British empirical philosophers. He attempted to prove that a thoroughly consistent empirical epistemology leads to absolute skepticism. Hume‘s chief contribution to empirical philosophy was the notion that no one can get from empirical knowledge any causal information about experience. No person can either deduce or induce the cause or the effect of experience. Hence, there is basis for us to accept that the future must resemble the past. Our own thinking that something can be predicted to happen at a future time is only habit or custom and the relationship of what we perceive to be the cause and effect is only a constant conjunction and not a necessary connection. Only the premises and the conclusion of a logically valid deductive argument can have a necessary connection. Hume also argued that no empirical data can lead us to any real knowledge of substance, mind, or God. This was the core of David Hume‘s skepticism.

III. German Idealism A. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) The German philosopher Immanuel Kant claimed that he was awakened from his dogmatic slumber after reading the works of the British empiricist David Hume. It led him to the realization that there were deeper regions in the problem of knowledge demanding not only serious attention but convincing solution. Kant was convinced that humans really possessed genuine knowledge. His problem now was to show beyond the shadow of doubt how, despite Hume‘s penetrating critique, knowledge was possible. The initial contention of Kant was that all knowledge really begins in experience. However, it does not mean that all knowledge comes from experience. The human mind provides forms and categories that are instrumental to describe experience. Since these factors are the conditions necessary for all possible human experience, experience gains certain characteristics. Yet, this knowledge cannot be extended to a level that is beyond all possible experience, i.e., to the noumena or things-in-themselves which are the real substances of what can be experienced (phenomena), to the self, or to God. B. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)

An Introduction to Epistemology in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy 47

Kant was the major influence in the formation of a new metaphysical movement in Germany. It started from Kant‘s claim that the individual contributes the form of all possible experience. Hegel promoted the idea that the basic element of reality—which in the language of Hegel is The Real—is not a principle of organization inherent to the mind but a process that acts through individuals and reveal its essence in the history of the world. This universal reason has revealed itself in the varied forms of development in the world—from a purely physical phase, to a biological one, to a human one. In the human level, the movement of society‘s development is from ancient tyranny toward freedom in a final state where reason dominates – a state where all previous contradictory developments will be resolved. Hegel formulated a metaphysical notion wherein all of human history was rational. The intellectual climate of Europe in the 19th century was immensely influenced by Hegel‘s ideas. Karl Marx‘s ideas were directly influenced specifically by Hegel‘s Dialectics. Hegel‘s influence also created storms in U.S. through the writings of Josiah Royce, et al. In England, the major proponent of Hegelian idealism that exerted tremendous influence in the academe was F.H.

Bradley.

IV. Contemporary Philosophy Contemporary philosophy is twentieth-century philosophy. It is partly an expression of intellectual revolt trained toward Hegelianism. A. In the U.S., Great Britain and Austria In the U.S. and Great Britain and partly in Austria, Hegelian metaphysics was rejected by: 1) Bertrand Russell‘s modern empiricism (England); 2) pragmatism (U.S.); 3) logical positivism (England and Vienna, Austria); and 4) linguistic philosophy (England and U.S.). The proponents of pragmatism advocated a practical theory of truth: The true is that which works. With William James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952). American pragmatism dominated the intellectual atmosphere of the U.S. in the first half of the 20th century. Logical positivism, which was the result of modern advances in logic and neo-Humean empiricism, was promoted and expounded by the logician and mathematical philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) who was later supported by his distinguished Austrian student, Ludwig Wittgenstein (18891951). Wittgenstein‘s first philosophical magnum opus Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus became the ―bible‖ of Logical Positivism in the hands of a group of scientific and mathematical philosophers in Austria called Vienna Circle.

The British and Austrian logical positivists and linguistic analytic philosophers challenged and dismissed all forms of metaphysical statements. They insisted that a statement can only be true if and only if it is verifiable by logical or empirical process, and no metaphysical statement could pass this verifiability test. B. Continental Europe In France and Germany, however, different types of philosophy developed as a reaction to Hegelianism. One of the most extreme reaction was that of the Danish thinker Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). He was convinced that all metaphysical systems had failed; and to face life courageously, an individual ought to cling to a conviction be means of taking a ―leap of faith‖, i.e., a non-rational path to give an authentic meaning to life. Kierkegaard stressed the significance of subjectivity, encounter and despair as the true concern of philosophizing in its genuine sense. This Kierkegaardian emphasis has, in turn, tremendously influenced the development of a philosophical movement in literature called existentialism. Included among the many significant reactions to Kant was Phenomenology which was developed by the German mathematical philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). He attempted to advance an elaborate method to analyze experience as it presents itself by holding in abeyance (technically called bracketing in Phenomenological language) questions related to the self, as well as other abstract ideas. His most distinguished student, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), developed a kind of philosophizing where the focus is on ―being-in-the-world‖ which in turn has influenced the existential philosophizing of

Jean-Paul Sartre and other thinkers of the existential movement. The most basic point of departure of Sartrean existential phenomenology is the statement ―Existence precedes essence (meaning).‖ It means that there cannot be any meaning of anything in reality without man who is the only meaningbestowing entity in the world. In other words, there are no aspects of this world that have inherent essences or meanings; it is only man who gives meanings to them, and it is only man who exists, for to exist is to ―outstand‖ (ex = out; sistere = stand) and only man out-stands? Yes, things are, but they do not out-stand. Hence, all meanings in this world depend on human existence. Existence truly precedes essence!

A Critique of Science in Russell Stannard’s “The God Experiment” Jeff Dahms Review of Russell Stannard‘s The God Experiment: Can Science Prove the Existence of God? Mawhah, NJ: Mindspring. 1999 Down the centuries there have been various attempts to prove the existence of God, and to demonstrate God’s action in the world. Russell Stannard, the distinguished physicist and author, looks at what modern science can bring to the discussion. Are the difficulties of “knowing” God the same difficulties physicists now confront in “knowing” the physical world? Comparing the latest scientific theories and age-old religious thinking, Stannard produces some startling parallels. He examines Creationism and the Big Bang, Biblical miracles and Quantum physics, and the idea of an omniscient God in the context of 4D space-time. Written in a clear and lucid way, The God Experiment is a fascinating challenge to our assumptions about God, science and our place in the Universe.

The Prayer Experiment Stannard‘s overarching view is that science and religion have very much in common. Science is a little more experimentally ambiguous, tentative and broadly inferential than we commonly think and theology is more empirically approachable. They have quite similar methodologies; they make continual progress over time; they share insights which are mutually beneficial, they even cross fertilize each other‘s ideas. He devotes his opening chapter to a major experimental realization of this view. It illustrates the deep dilemmas just beneath the surface of this kind of melding of science and religion that are easier to gloss over in the more abstract discussions. The chapter describes a current multi-center trial of the efficacy of prayer in enhancing the surgical outcome for 600 coronary artery surgery patients, results due in 2002. There is a body of report now in the literature of studies like this though not of this scale. The implicit message of this and related studies is, ‗We are just out there doing the science like any other regular scientists and letting the die fall where they may.‘ This is a large and expensive study and obviously of serious intent at least 51

in terms of the effort and monies invested. It is centered at the New England Deaconess Hospital at Boston. Stannard is a trustee of the foundation funding the study and it is illustrative of his central thesis—the exploration of the extent to which theology can be regarded as a science. Something very different to normal science is going on here and I do not just mean the investigation of a supernatural effect. At first glance it looks like a large scale experiment in an area where the preliminary work suggests something interesting might be happening. Something interesting of course would be a gross understatement as what is being suggested is the reproducible measurement of supernatural phenomena. It is not just a routine study like many thousands of others which map psychosomatic functions such as, ‗Having a positive outlook, a strong set of personal beliefs or going to church etc can improve medical outcomes.‘ He is explicit—the study aims to specify a supernatural outcome. Fundamental issues underlie this experiment and reflect on the whole field of the current science-religion debate.

The Design of the Experiment. We can get a good handle on what is really going on in the prayer experiment if we simply take it at face value—consider it as one would a regular scientific experiment and see how it looks. The first oddity is the experimental design. The main effect chosen is very complex to measure—the long term outcomes of post coronary artery surgery. It is also a hugely expensive trial. For revolutionary science dramatic evidence is required. If it is intended to scientifically demonstrate miraculous healing there are far less ambiguous ways to do so and there is no need to go to anything like this expense. One could have people pray for the miraculous reattachment of cardiac mitral valve leaflets torn off their attachments to the heart muscle after a heart attack. It is easy to follow what is happening sonographically, and there is an unequivocal outcome. The leaflets don‘t reattach themselves in any natural way. It is either surgery or a miracle. Alternatively one could pray for a vital organ like a kidney to be provided to neonates born without them—very simple to specify and measure, life threatening in the extreme, and an unambiguous outcome. You wouldn‘t even need a control group to impress everyone and very few patients would be needed. The biggest post-coronary surgery risks are bleeding and stroke. Moderately dangerous and sometimes catastrophic post-operative bleeding are the top serious risks. Prayer for the miraculous alteration of this course of events is

A Critique of Science in Russell Stannard‘s ―The God Experiment‖ 53

a request for a very substantial intervention. Replacing the damaged platelets in the blood stream is the most frequent thing that surgeons do to treat postoperative bleeding. Supernatural intervention at this level is a major biological event no less impressive than the more readily measurable events suggested above. The big difference between the coronary trial and the very simple low-cost experiments above is the ease with which one can monitor what is going on. A positive outcome might be interpreted as divine miraculous intervention, though an alternative explicit hypothesis might be that there is some Para-psychological phenomenon like telepathic healing going on. The next oddity is that there is no control for this. It would have been very easy to include such in the design and rule it in or out as a competing explanation of a positive effect. It is difficult to understand why this would not be done when claims of such magnitude are under consideration. A claim that merely the power of prayerful activity is being tested without interest in discriminating the mechanism when such hugely different contentious mechanisms are competing explanations would seem very strange and would normally be thought of as a major error of experimental design in a scientific study like this. This is particularly so since the experimenters know that a positive outcome would be widely used as a support for the reality of miraculous healing. Science is about putting one‘s hypothesis on the line—designing the simplest most powerful experimental test and living with the consequences. Whilst it is true that scientists will sometimes hang on to their favorite hypotheses in the face of initial negative experimental outcome the purpose of the experimental program is to be the theory deal breaker. This is an experiment with no possible negative outcome. A negative outcome will not be taken as evidence against miraculous healing even by the experimenters. God may fail to cooperate etc. The claim is that a positive outcome will not be an unequivocal demonstration of a miraculous process as there is an uncontrolled alternative hypothesis. Everyone knows in advance of course how a positive outcome will be received. Stannard says he is a little bemused at all of the fuss and attention the study is getting. Clearly the journalists calling him are aware of the implications of what is going on and the way a positive outcome will be universally interpreted.

The next question that might be asked is how the main effect is produced and specified. In the coronary study the people praying for the patients are given only the first names of the patients they are praying for. With six hundred patients and (?) six hundred controls presumably there are many patients named John. It would be very important in this confusing circumstance to be very specific in

the instructions to intercessors. How would the intercessors be instructed to specify their prayers? ‗Please God intervene miraculously in the healing process of the John that I have been allocated (and no others) in the experimental group not any of the Johns in the control group.‘ The John who is to be saved, by the way is in the experimental group by chance and not because of some virtue, unless God is rigging the allocation to experimental and control groups. Presumably God then performs a miracle on the experimental John altering the outcome of the surgery. The above account is not meant to offend in any way. But inevitably it starts to sound offensive because the proposition becomes manifestly absurd when examined closely. Any deep or detailed description of what one thinks is going on sounds like the above. Do any groups no matter how anthropomorphic in their god beliefs really think that this is how the world is? Do gods who make universes sit still for this kind of micromanipulation? Consider further the way a presumed experimental effect like this would be routinely defined in further trials. Suppose the experiment is successful, it is repeated and the effect is reliable and a second experiment rules out telepathic healing as an explanation. We might next choose representatives from various religious traditions (and also atheists perhaps as controls) to see who are the most effective at intercession. We should vary the number of people praying to see how many patients the intercessors can effectively pray for. We should see what kind of prayer work best—prayers of praise—beseeching prayers— prayers of penitence and so on. This is the road of science. We could establish whether the intercessors even need to know the patient‘s name. We should investigate whether there is any very gifted folk who can bring about the miraculous cures of thousands perhaps through their intercessory prayers? They would be very important to identify. Somewhere down the track we would arrive at an outcome just like any other equivalent experimental program. The outcome could look like this. Lutherans and Mormons, are demonstrated to be the only effective Christian groups in praying for miraculous healing. One Islamic fundamentalist intercessor is also successful and both Hindu and Buddhist representatives have failed. On average 5.6 patients can be effectively prayed for by one experimenter before the effect falls off. Prayers for cardiac

A Critique of Science in Russell Stannard‘s ―The God Experiment‖ 55

healing are twice as effective as prayers for breast cancer healing. It takes 2.3 days on average to get a mitral valve spontaneously repaired. What is wrong with the above, apart from the fact that it sounds blasphemous? Again it is not intended to offend. This is exactly how a real experimental program would be pursued. What is wrong is that no one, not the experimenters, not the most loyal of religious constituents believe that the world is like this. The reason no one is concerned that we would end up in the above absurd scenario is that this project is not about the start of a detailed, on going scientific investigation which could in fact produce such an outcome. This is not about science; it is about using science as a prop for a belief system. We rightly protest when science is used to prop up ideological/political views such as the race/IQ pseudo research. This experiment may seem innocuous but in the end it is bad for religion and bad for science.

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Psychosomatic

Supernatural intervention

Para-psychological phenomenon

Telepathic healing

Micromanipulation

Miraculous healing

Name: __________________________ Section: __________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―A Critique of Science in Russell Stannard‘s ‗The God Experiment‘‖ 1. What do you mean by the term ―scientific‖? Do you believe that there is really an intersecting point between religion and science? How and why? Can theology be considered a real science? Explain your answer.

2. What do you think are the characteristics of a truly genuine scientific experiment? Is the so-called ―God Experiment‖ a truly genuine scientific experiment? Why?

3. Do you believe in miraculous healing? How does it square off with medical science?

Philosophy: Rigorous Science or Intuitive Thought A critique of Mind by John Searle

Richard Schain Ever since its origins in the antique Hellenic world, philosophy has been bedeviled by a double identity—a search for meaning in human existence or a search for reliable knowledge of the world. The first approach will always be associated with Plato, of whom Alfred North Whitehead said that all subsequent philosophy was only a series of footnotes. The second is exemplified by

Aristotle, who in the Middle Ages was regarded as ‗The Philosopher.‘ To be sure, there are many overlaps of both aspects of philosophy in these two great figures of the antique world, but the relative emphasis in them is clear. In the twentieth century, this duality of philosophy was noted by the mathematician-philosopher Bertrand Russell in a comment that all philosophers were either inclined to science or to mysticism. Russell himself regarded intuitive aspects of philosophy as mysticism. There was no doubt where Russell‘s sympathies lay; he and other proponents of the analytic method in philosophy are responsible for the pejorative meaning now usually associated with the term ‗mysticism.‘ The ‗mystics‘ may be regarded as being predominant throughout most of the history of western philosophy when the latter was dominated by Christian dogma with its substructure of Platonic metaphysics. However, beginning with the Siecle des lumieres, then followed by the incredible scientific revolution of the past two centuries, philosophy has come to adopt the scientific world-view and even regard itself as a science. Most contemporary philosophers identify with Husserl‘s defining philosophy as ‗rigorous science‘ (strenge Wissenschaft). William James once joked that if they dared, philosophers would wear white coats. The problem for scientific philosophy today is that the mind—which has been an essential focus of philosophical thought since Descartes—already has not one but two fields of science connected with it, neurology and psychology.

The neurological sciences have taken giant steps in studying brain structures and relating them to mental processes. The psychological sciences have equally progressed by analyzing perception, cognition, and behavior and subjecting them to experimental study. What then is left for philosophy as science other than popularizing the scientific advances made by scientists in these fields? It is notable that the history of ‗scientific‘ philosophy reveals that its domain has steadily diminished as astronomy, medicine, physics, and physiology matured into bona fide scientific specialties. The same has happened with psychology in the last century. 59

John Searle is a distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley who has published extensively on the philosophy of mind. His most recent book on this topic proposes to provide a comprehensive review of the entire subject. The reader is immediately exposed to Searle‘s style when the author asserts at the beginning that ‗all of the most famous and influential theories [on the mind] are false.‘ Searle later puts forth his own point of view that places subjective mental phenomena as part of nature but ontologically distinct from object phenomena. Searle reviews contemporary theories of mind from the perspective of philosophy as rigorous science. There are discussions of consciousness, intentionality, mental causation, free will, and the self. The last chapter is entitled ‗Philosophy and the Scientific World-View.‘ He makes the following categorical statement: ‗So if we are interested in reality and truth, there is really no such thing as ―scientific reality‖ or ―scientific truth.‖ There are just the facts that we know. I cannot tell you how much confusion in philosophy has been generated by the failure to perceive these points.‘ Like the emotionless Detective Friday of the American television series Dragnet whose trademark saying was ‗just the facts, ma‘am, just the facts,‘ Searle wants just the facts. Of course, he is not alone in this viewpoint in contemporary academic philosophy; it is shared implicitly or explicitly by most analytically minded philosophers committed to the scientific world-view. In fact, Searle would have to be placed among the more openminded academicians since he accepts concepts such as consciousness and the self as bona fide mental realities in their own right, not ontologically reducible to physical entities. He views the former ‗as much as part of the natural world as is photosynthesis or digestion.‘ Searle does not want to be classified as a materialist or a dualist. Searle‘s approach reflects the pervasive influence of phenomenology in modern philosophy, although there is no mention of Husserl in his discussions. Consciousness is a real phenomenon; therefore it must be objectively described in its own right. In fact, Searle seems to be skirting dangerously close to dualism with his point of view. The mere fact that he views the brain as causally related to the mind does not obviate the fact that he accepts the latter as a realm ontologically distinct from the neuronal network of the brain. This sounds like Cartesian dualism with an unspecified relationship between the two ontological realms instead of the pineal gland performing this function. Still, Searle thinks of Descartes‘ ideas as a ‗disaster‘ for philosophy, a common point of view among materialist philosophers. One might compare his formulation with that of Schopenhauer, who labeled Searle‘s mental ‗first person ontology‘ as will and his object ‗third person ontology‘ as representation [Wille und Vorstellung.] Of course they differ in that Schopenhauer was deeply pessimistic about the

Philosophy: Rigorous Science or Intuitive Thought

principle of individuation he called ‗will‘ while Searle, as befits an unbiased proponent of ‗biological naturalism‘ toward the mind, avoids value judgments either way. The phenomenology of Searle reveals itself in that he is not interested in the rich intuitive content of western philosophy that has characterized it ever since the era of Socrates. Plato is not even mentioned in this book described as an introduction to the philosophy of mind. Nor is Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bergson, Berdyaev, Whitehead, or Teilhard de Chardin. William James gets a passing comment. Presumably these are philosophers whose ideas about the mind do not meet the strictly factual criteria subscribed to by Searle. Not for him is the proclamation of Kierkegaard that ‗truth is subjectivity‘ or Berdyaev‘s discovery of meaning in creativity. He uses the same approach in his ‗first person ontology‘ as in his ‗third person ontology.‘ The knowledge of subjectivity is just materialism pitched at a different level. When one reads Searle‘s book, it is possible to feel as Socrates is said to have felt when he came across the book of Anaxagoras on the mind. The story is recounted by Plato in the Phaedo. Socrates had heard that Anaxagoras taught that Mind [Nous] was the cause of all things. He expected to find the mind‘s ideas about the common good in Anaxagoras‘ writing. However, he was grievously disappointed because all he found was physical and physiological discussions but nothing about what he thought was important about the mind. After that,

Socrates turned to his own mind in his search for wisdom. If one expects to find philosophical depth in Searle‘s book, he or she will be similarly disappointed. Philosophy as rigorous science is the only topic; there is no consideration of the mind‘s search for man‘s place in existence or of the wisdom that accrues from a higher type of mental activity. For the philosopher, the important thing about mind should be its content of creative thought not the mechanics of its operation. The latter can be left to scientists who are competent in these problems. Philosophy in this latter area will never be taken seriously by scientists anyway, since philosophers do not engage in the principal requirements of modern science — data collection, data analysis, and verification of hypotheses. Without these functions, philosophers can only perform as armchair theorists, relying on the discoveries of others to propound their theories and incapable of verifying them by scientific methods.

The risk exists of philosophy again becoming a sterile scholasticism. However, philosophy is indispensable in the search for meaning in the world since meaning stems from the subjective element of existence, an element not explicable by scientific investigation. The sciences may provide useful metaphors in this search but the mind thinking creatively is the only

source of meaning in human existence. Profound philosophy about the mind existed prior to modern science. Another way of expressing this dichotomy is to recognize the universal metaphysical need of human beings as distinct from their need to objectivize existence. This need has been historically gratified by religions; thus Schopenhauer thought of religion as ‗the metaphysics of the people.‘ Schopenhauer, who was an elitist of the first order, believed that philosophy should perform this role for those of greater intellectual capacity. However one may view Schopenhauer‘s prejudices, he is correct in thinking the metaphysical need is properly satisfied in unfettered philosophic activity. Man has been referred to as the animal metaphysicum and philosophy is metaphysics. These concepts require valuation of the mysteriously rational, mysteriously mystical human mind above mere phenomenological analysis.

Name: _________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for “Philosophy: Rigorous Science or Intuitive Thought” 1. Do you believe, as Searle does, that ―the brain [is] causally related to the mind‖? Explain your answer.

2. What makes Richard Schain think that John Searle is a phenomenologist? Do a simple research on Phenomenology and the philosopher Edmund Husserl.

3. How does Science differ from Philosophy, according to Schain? In this connection, try to explain in your own words the statement, ―[P]hilosophy is indispensable in the search for meaning in the world since meaning stems from the subjective element of existence, an element not explicable by scientific investigation.‖

A Philosophical Theorizing in Search of A Method of Transformative Philosophizing Ruel F. Pepa I. Philosophy As A Breaking Free from Classical Philosophy Philosophy, as we know it (or as it is known by those who know it), consists of elaborations (or presentations of elaborations) of propositions/ proposals that widen and/or deepen, analyze and/or criticize, contradict and/or annihilate preceding elaborations (or presentations of elaborations) of certain propositions/proposals. Hence, the development of philosophy, like the historic time in which it runs, is a linearity of affirmations and negations, advocacies and assaults, praises and protestations. But however we look into the internalities of particular philosophical formulations and presentations, the linearity of movements occurs on a beaten path, nay a steel railroad, that, if retrogressive immortality may theoretically/ hypothetically sustain us, unconditionally leads back to Socrates or even further back to the Pre-Socratics. As if only the ancient Greeks/Hellenes were supernaturally/magically gifted with both the spirit and the intellect to inaugurate the enterprise we now call Philosophy. What right do we, non-Greeks/non-Hellenes, have to philosophize? Or, is philosophizing a matter of right? Are we, non-Greeks/non-Hellenes, only relegated to the sideline/periphery of the intelletual terrain/arena to discuss the history of philosophy and later, debate on philosophical issues whose roots of problematization automatically trace back to issues--however seemingly amusingly trivial and simplistic they are in the modern world of thematization--originally raised by the Greek mind? Philosophy‘s history brings us to non-Greek/non-Hellene territories, no question about it, for there has been a deparochialization of Philosophy through generations marked by a temporal boundary that separates B.C.E. (before the common era) from the C.E. (common era). There was, in fact, a cosmopolitanization of Philosophy heightened in a geographical region-Northwestern Europe and the British Isles--cartographically over and above its birthplace. Philosophy‘s ―elevation‖ is symbolic of its more serious and more sophisticated level of achievement in the modern age in terms of intellectual configurations, challenges, complexities, and controversies. But the whole process and event are not a severance of linkage from what is originally Greek/ Hellene. Philosophy, therefore, as we know it now, is the undying flow of Greek/

Hellene problematization--the persistence of perennial global Hellenization. This is classic/classical philosophy. And in this historic and geographic movement, could there be an institutionalization of a certain form/type of alienation that has artificialized the way intellectuals in another milieu like ours look at, interpret, anticipate, and propose to approach the crucial nodes of life in the here and now, the there and then, and even the unforeseen/unforeseeable? Or, probably our cultural location is so uniquely special so that alienation is not an issue because the categories of the so-called classical philosophy perfectly match our reality? Has classical philosophy been alienating us, or have we been the ones alienating classical philosophy? Should philosophy be always classical? Is there a way to inaugurate a philosophy that is not classical and yet, still a philosophy, no more, no less? When the first of the ―classicals‖—the Pre-Socratics—started to philosophize, they looked at the world where they lived; they looked at themselves as they relate with the world; and they looked inside themselves as individuals uniquely distinguished from others. This is the universal starting point of philosophizing—non-Greek/non-Hellene or whatever. Yet, this universal point of departure can only be truly meaningful if grounded in reality. This is pure and simple philosophizing that transcends the territories of time and space or time-space/space-time. And as we look at the world we live in in the context of our present realities; as we look at the ways we relate with these realities; and as we look inside us as unique individuals affected and affecting, influenced and influencing these realities, have we not embarked into an enterprise we call philosophy/philosophizing?

II. Toward a Method of Philosophizing Classical philosophy, as system-building, is both Greek/Hellene and metaphysical in rootage, influence, and dynamic. What I propose in this paper is not a system of philosophy/philosophical system--hence, non-metaphysical (even anti-metaphysical) and I believe non-Greek/non-Hellene (but without being antiGreek/anti-Hellene). It‘s not even a philosophy but rather a philosophizing--not a system but a method. A method of philosophizing has the advantage of being universal, not in prescribing an absolute and all-encompassing paradigm or thinking/thought-paradigm/thought-system intended to fit the Leibnizian ―all possible worlds,‖ but in critically problematizing, approaching, focusing to, analyzing, synthesizing, and evaluating an event/the hermeneutic of an event, the causal factor(s) that has(have) effected the event, and the thought-power that has woven and interwoven the fibers of formulation that constitutes the hermeneutic of the event.

A Philosophical Theorizing in Search of A Method of Transformative Philosophizing 67

A method of philosophizing is also a pragmatico-evolutionary movement of perception-reflection-action that constitutes the dialectical spontaneity of a praxis open to the signification of flux, the disintegration of norms, and the formation of the novel and the avant-garde. A method of philosophizing, like the philosophizer equipped with it, is an authentic warrior flexible in seasons of warfare, capable to laugh at defeats and celebrate in victories. A pragmatico-evolutionary method of philosophizing is inherently transformative—a transformative philosophizing that takes the challenge of and responds to the Marxian critique of hermeneuticist philosophy [―Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point is to change it.‖ (Theses on Feuerbach)] I am, therefore, proposing for a philosophy that is transformative philosophizing, clear-eyed and wide-ranging in perception, deep and insightful in reflection, and empowering, influential, and transforming in action. It is a method of philosophizing to which no race, region, nation or ethnicity can ever lay claim. This philosophizing is non-metaphysical, much less non-Greek/non-Hellene. But it has all the critical power to disentangle and disintegrate metaphysical generalizations and problematizations, seriosities, and follies, as well as all the userfriendliness to be in the disposal of anyone in any situation—paramount or virtual, national or global—in normal, even abnormal, circumstances. This method of philosophizing is aimed to ultimately de-professionalize philosophy/philosophizing. So that, philosophizing is no longer the ―esoteric‖ and specialized task of academically ―anointed‖ gurus and mahatmas.

III. A Method of Philosophizing Called “Transformative Philosophizing” Transformative philosophizing consists of a multi-progressive path of transcendence and renewal. The cycle is constituted by the philosophical tasks of 1) translation: the propositionalization of a phenomenon/event; 2) hermeneutics/interpretation: the abstracting intellectualization of the components or mechanics of the interpreted phenomenon/event; 3) analysis: an investigation into the salient components or mechanics of the interpreted phenomenon/event; 4) pragmatization: the verification of how the analyzed mechanics of the phenomenon/event are operationalized in human experience; 5) synthesis: the integration of the pragmatically confirmed theorizing and the theoretically signified practice; and 6) evaluation: a propositional assessment of the transformative worth of the phenomenon/event, wherein the transformation could effect a new paradigm of existence that strengthens one‘s ―will-to-power‖ and supports her/his courage in ―saying-yes-to-life.‖ [with apologies to Nietzsche]

Transformative philosophizing is an act of critically ―gliding‖ along

the empirico-rational milieu of the cultural apparatus with an aim to effect transformation of being and strength of character in the stability of a welldefined state of affairs through cognitive enlightenment and intellectual empowerment with the instrumentality of transformative philosophizingâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s multi-procedural cycle of progression toward transcendence and renewal. Transformative philosophizing is a reflective act/active reflection that looks deeply into the ordered chaos/chaotic order of human flexibility/flexible humanity equipped with all the capability of embracing the persistence of the recurrence of eternity/ eternal recurrence in space-time/time-space continuum.

ÂŠ Ruel F. Pepa March 14, 2004 Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Classical Philosophy

Problematization

Thematization

Deparochialization

Cosmopolitanization

Hellenization

Philosophy vs Philosophizing

Propositionalization

Hermeneuticist philosophy

Pragmatization

Pragmatico-evolutionary method of philosophizing Empirico-rational milieu of the cultural apparatus

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―A Philosophical Theorizing in Search of A Method of Transformative Philosophizing‖ 1. What is Classical Philosophy? Do you agree with Pepa that philosophizing may be done outside of the framework of Classical Philosophy and hence lead to its ―deprofessionalization‖? Explain your answer.

2. Do you believe that there was a universal starting point of philosophizing? Explain your answer.

3. How do you understand transformative philosophizing as a method of multi-procedural cycle of progression toward transcendence and renewal?

Post-Industrial Humanism: Transformative Humanization of Nature (or “Naturization” of Humanity) Toward a Moral Technology Ruel F. Pepa Prelude Technology as transforming and transformative is human interpretation and pragmatization. It is an appropriation of the scientific for human purposes. The act of appropriation, by the way, is one of interpretation and pragmatization that responds to a human responsibility. Hence, technology ideally carries the value of responsibility. And responsibility in this sense is measured in human terms. On such basis, the morality of technology is reflected on how technology humanizes, empowers, and elevates the human being. Moral technology should, in that sense, be a transforming/ transformative instrument to: (1) alleviate sufferings; (2) resolve conflicts; and (3) promote happiness.

The Rise of Modern Science and Technology The modern era in world history is characterized by the widespread dominance of science and technology at the expense of the ecosystem. Such dominance is a narrow and shallow signification of human service and facility

– a shortsighted attempt to satisfy human needs and wants without considering the tragic consequences of devastating the natural resources. The destruction of the ecosystem has been perpetrated by the immoral technology of the modern world. ‗Worldwide in scope and profligate in its ill effects, deforestation stands as a symbol of the environmental degradation that concerns us so much. Many other stresses vie for our attention: depletion of the ozone layer, with its threat of harmful ultraviolet radiation; loss of reefs and wetlands, so rich in their variety of life-forms; contamination of the air with emissions and the waters with pollutants; and all aggravated by the pressures of a global population rising by a million every four days‘ (Canby, 1994).

Such losses and destruction in the modern/ industrial era are the major concerns being addressed now by the morality of the post-industrial era. The Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess provides us with certain normative principles that characterize a type of humanism that humanizes nature and ‗naturizes‘ humanity, if you will: (1) ‗The flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has intrinsic value. The value of non-human life forms is independent of the usefulness these may have for narrow human purposes. 71

72 (2) ‗Richness and diversity of life forms are values in themselves and contribute to the flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth.

(3) ‗Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.‘ (Anker, 1998)

The Weltanschauung of the Industrial Era At this point, we should deem it necessary that a better understanding of the worldview of the post-industrial era can be effectively laid out if viewed in contrast with the kind of worldview that has empowered the events and personalities of the industrial era. The celebrated futuristic theorist of the ‗70s and ‗80s, Alvin Toffler enumerated three key concepts that animated the industrial era: the war with nature, the importance of evolution, and the progress principle. Regarding the war with nature, Toffler says in The Third Wave (1990): ‗The idea that nature was there to be exploited provided a convenient rationalization for shortsightedness and selfishness: There has been so much destruction in nature, so much brutality towards the earth‘s ecosystem, because of this worldview. And this worldview has created a sense of arrogance in man who has developed the notion that he is the principle of a long process of evolution‘ (Toffler, ibid.).

With the first two key concepts of the industrial era, the third key concept which is the progress principle is now well entrenched. It is ‗the idea that history flows irreversibly toward a better life for humanity‘ (Toffler, ibid.). Adam Smith in his The Wealth of Nations and Karl Marx in his Das Kapital had their own respective theories of human progress. In the industrial framework, time is linear and space is concentrated to satisfy the demands of the progress principle. The very idea of progress entails the linearity of time. And since industrialization is the highest stage of progressive evolution, its centers being the urban cities are the most important space concentrations. On the metaphysical question of ‗What are things made of from the perspective of the industrial era?‘, reality is looked upon not as a fused or integrated entity but as a structure built upon a multiplicity of components. This is known as the atomic view of reality and this is the foundation of the principle of individualism. As the old agricultural civilization decayed, as trade expanded and towns multiplied in the century or two before the dawn of industrialism, the rising merchant classes, demanding the freedom to trade and lend and expand their markets, gave rise to a new conception of the individual—the person as atom.

Post-Industrial Humanism: Transformative Humanization of Nature . . . 73

The Weltanschauung of the Post-Industrial Era\ In the post-industrial era or the third wave civilization (as this is called by Toffler), humanity is reconciled with nature. ‗There is no such thing as either man [i.e., human] or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other and couples the machine together‘ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977). And the war is against those who have declared war against nature in the industrial era. Now is the age of ‗ecosophy‘ or ‗eco-philosophy‘ whose leading proponent is the Norwegian thinker Arne Naess. ‗During the last thirty years philosophers in the West have critiqued the underlying assumptions of modern philosophy in relation to the natural world. This development has been part of an ongoing expansion of philosophical work involving cross-cultural studies of worldviews or ultimate philosophies. Since philosophical studies in the West have often ignored the natural world, and since most studies in ethics have focused on human values, those approaches which emphasize ecocentric values have been referred to as eco-philosophy. Just as the aim of traditional philosophy is Sophia or wisdom, so the aim of eco-philosophy is ecosophy or ecological wisdom. The practice of ecophilosophy is an ongoing, comprehensive, deep inquiry into values, the nature of the world, and the self‘ (Drengson, 1999). In the post-industrial era, the seemingly omnipotent notion of uninterrupted linear evolution has already lost its momentum. There has been a wholesale breakdown in the most basic key concepts of the industrial era‘s worldview which gives the final death blow to the progress principle that animates the entire infrastructure of the industrial era. Finally, the paradigm shift has been felt as the concepts of time and space change and as the atomic model of reality is displaced by the holistic model.

Postlude The direction now of post-industrial technology aimed to humanize nature and ‗naturize‘ humanity is one of synthesis: the non-subversion of the ecosystem whereof humanity is subsumed to be a part. Human progress is therefore construed in the post-industrial sense as a bi-condition of ecosystem protection and defense. In this condition, there is no viable way to come up with a real workable human development program in isolation of certain considerations affecting the ecological network. Deleuze and Guattari say: [We] make no distinction between man and nature: the human essence of nature and the natural essence of man become one within nature in the form of production or industry, just as they do within the life of man as a species. Industry is then no longer considered from the extrinsic point of view of utility, but rather from the point of view of its fundamental

identity with nature as production of man and by man. Not man as the king of creation, but rather as the being who is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of beings, who is responsible for even the stars and animal life, and who ceaselessly plugs an organmachine into an energy-machine, a tree into his body, abreast into his mouth, the sun into his asshole: the eternal custodian of the machines of the universe (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977). Further human development that is proper or morally defensible is possible only if there should be immediate and concerted conservation and/ or preservation measures instituted for the world‘s remaining natural resource base, if there is to be continuing but sustainable use of it by mankind. Such continuing human development should be with the end in view of more equitable sharing and benefits distribution. A simple enough prescription, but one that is quite a tall order to do from any perspective—historical, political, economic, social, etc.— even under the best of circumstances. And, truth to tell, the actual condition of the world today is anything but the best of circumstances.

Therefore, ‗moral technology‘—if indeed there is such a thing existing or even forthcoming anytime soon—sure has its work cut out for it. But whether or not technology is or becomes moral and thus transforming or transformative, still it is just an instrument to alleviate sufferings, resolve conflicts, and promote happiness. Ultimately, it is still man himself who determines the fate of his environment and the destiny of his own species. The synthesis that fully integrates human development with earth‘s ecological network glimmers in the horizon, beckoning.

REFERENCES Anker, Peder. 1998. ‗Ecosophy: An Outline of Its Metaethics.‘ http:// trumpeter.athabascau.ca Canby, Thomas y. 1994. Our Changing Earth. Washington D.C.: National Geographic Society. Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. 1977. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New York: Viking Penguin. Drengson, Alan. 1999. ‗Ecophilosophy, Ecosophy and the Deep Ecology Movement: An Overview.‘ http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca Toffler, Alvin. 1990. The Third Wave. New York: Bantam Books. © Ruel F. Pepa

Post-Industrial Humanism: Transformative Humanization of Nature . . . 75

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Humanization of nature

â&#x20AC;&#x2022;Naturizationâ&#x20AC;&#x2013; of humanity

Moral technology

Weltanschauung

Ecosophy or Ecophilosophy

Industrial vs Post-industrial

Pragmatization

Ecosystem

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Post-Industrial Humanism: Transformative Humanization of Nature (or ‗Naturization‘ of Humanity) Toward a Moral Technology‖ 1. Why is there a need to humanize nature and ―naturize‖ humanity? In the modern/industrial era where has the human being located her/himself in relation to nature? What about in the post-modern era?

2. What do we mean when we say that a technology is ―moral‖?

3. What are the three key concepts of the industrial era? Explain in your own words each of them.

4. What is the difference between the worldview of the industrial era and the post-industrial era?

5. What do you think of the Philippine societyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;is it modern/industrial or post-industrial? Explain your answer.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION Is Nothing Sacred?

(A Review of Don Cupittâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Is Nothing Sacred? The Non-Realist Philosophy of Religion) (Fordham University Press, NY, 2002) Nicholas Rundle.

God, Freedom, and Evil Joe Manzari The University of California at San Diego

On the Challenge of Filipino Theologizing Ruel F. Pepa

Is Nothing Sacred?

(A Review of Don Cupitt’s Is Nothing Sacred? The Non-Realist Philosophy of Religion) (Fordham University Press, NY, 2002) Nicholas Rundle. (Reviewed February 2003) Don Cupitt is one of the world‘s most controversial theologianphilosophers. In his popular and, some would say, subversive BBC TV series of the 1980s, ‗The Sea of Faith‘, Cupitt asserted that religion, in order to survive, must free itself from supernatural beliefs and be seen instead as a form of human cultural expression. Cupitt has been described by some as a Christian atheist and he has not been afraid to attack the church and theologians. In his 1980 book Taking Leave of God Cupitt accused the church of exercising ‗psychological terrorism‘,1 and defined his own role as that of a rescuer. Jesus is to be rescued from dogmatic captivity and God from metaphysical captivity. Jesus, the ‗ugly little man‘, has in his more recent books, such as Reforming Christianity returned to centre stage where Kingdom religion—the religion of immediacy preached by Jesus—must emerge from the ‗rusty and oppressive‘ machinery of the mediated religion of the Church2. Cupitt exhorts his readers to a belief-less religion where worship and belief in a supernatural realm are replaced by a definition of religion as a way people relate themselves to life and celebrate life.

Cupitt‘s latest book, Is Nothing Sacred, needs to be read against the background of the radical Sea of Faith movement as well as the controversy and vituperation that has followed him as he has sought to promote his nonrealist Christianity from within the Church. In the introduction to Is Nothing Sacred (p XI ) Cupitt defines nonrealism in this way: Suppose we become acutely aware of our own human limits: we realise that we are always inside human language, and only ever see the world through our human eyes. All that is ever accessible to us is the relative god, my god. As I see this, metaphysics dies and I am left knowing only my god, my guiding religious ideal. And this is the non-realist philosophy of religion in a nutshell.

The value of the Introduction lies not only in the succinct way in which Cupitt summarises his thought but the chronological account of the way his ideas have developed; a kind of chronological apologia. Until now only Scott 81

Cowdell‘s 1988 book, Atheist Priest (SCM) provided any kind of guide to the themes which have emerged from Cupitt‘s earlier books as he journeyed from Christian orthodoxy to a radical empty humanism and a love of transience. Cupitt quotes with a touch of humour the English establishment figure, Baroness

Warnock who bracketed together the philosophers, Derrida, Rorty, and Cupitt as enemies of objective truth and public morals (ix). However the reader also gets a sense of how difficult Cupitt‘s journey has been for him and how hurtful he has found the accusations that his philosophy is, ―simply a euphemism for sheer and shameless unbelief.‖ (xv). Perhaps Cupitt has received more opprobrium than other equally radical thinkers because he has drawn attention to the stultifying insularity of the British academic and ecclesiastical establishments. It is perhaps appropriate that his latest book of essays has appeared in a series on continental theologians because Cupitt has been a pioneer in the exploration of continental European thought and its implications for the way in which life is lived. Is Nothing Sacred is comprised of a series of essays from the period 1980-2000. They explore themes from Kant and Nietzsche, and sketch Cupitt‘s vision for radical religion. I appreciated the essay in which he explores the history of religious art. Cupitt is particularly knowledgeable about art. He traces the dissolution of any kind of division between sacred and secular art in the modern and post modern eras. He notes the move towards the abstract and to postmodern art which seeks to disturb and confront, rather than to console or uplift the observer who can no longer remain only a contemplating observer but is drawn into the emerging flux of being. Cupitt, much as I suspect to the annoyance of the retiring Archbishop of Canterbury, remains a priest. As an Anglican priest myself I note in this book and in others, Cupitt‘s real pastoral concern for his readers and hearers to find their own way to liberation. The old style religion of mediated salvation is replaced by religion as therapy which serves to divest people of an addiction to be what Bishop Richard Holloway has called in public, ‗meaning junkies‘. In chapter six Cupitt explores therapy as a way of freeing people to accept life as it is, rather than turning life into a weapon to make ourselves unhappy. He focuses on the Buddha as the best exponent of the therapeutic approach. Cupitt has at times been content to call himself a Christian Buddhist. In this chapter he encourages his readers to see religion as reconciling us to what is and might be in this world, rather than providing us with information about illusory worlds or Platonic ideals. It is no wonder that Cupitt‘s style of theologising has profoundly influenced novelists like Philip Pullman and Iris Murdoch. The turn to life, a theme that emerges in Cupitt‘s more recent books, is summarised in an article entitled, ‗The Value of Life‘ in which he explores the

Is Nothing Sacred?

requirement to develop an appropriate environmental ethic. He draws attention to the nostalgic utopian tendency in conservation movements and traces this to western assumptions about an unchanging morality ‗out there‘ needing only to be grasped and applied rather than an ―ever-renewed creative activity through which we give our life worth and keep the human enterprise going.‖ (p 124) In the final two chapters of the book Cupitt reprints two essays in which he responds to criticisms by two British Anglican theologians, the establishment liberal David Edwards and Rowan Williams, soon to become the leader of the Anglican Communion. In his disputation with Edwards Cupitt attacks theological liberalism at its weakest point. Cupitt sees the liberal project as one of cleaning up the language and presentation of the faith in the hope that the result will more than satisfy a post Christian world, hungry for spirituality as well as restore passion and commitment to the mainstream Church. Cupitt rejects these liberal aspirations and calls for root and branch reform by appealing to the feminist critique of Christianity and to Jesus‘ radical this-world ethic. Here the reader gets a sense of Cupitt‘s determination to staying within a Church in which many regard him as an ecclesiastical cuckoo. The last words of this book have him reiterating a promise to change the Church from within and claiming his own place within the Church. His vision of the future Church, reiterated in many of his books is of democratic undogmatic Quaker style non-realist communities fired by a solar ethic. Individuals and communities live like the sun pouring themselves out for others without hope for spiritual reward. Can we see the shadow of Kant‘s ethics in Cupitt‘s solar ethic? In his reply to Rowan Williams Cupitt employs the metaphor of the dance to describe the ambiguity of religious claims to truth, which must at the same time be negated. He quotes Derrida in defence of a playful use of language that is ultimately incapable of definition. Cupitt finds much in common with Williams, both writers seeking to employ language as play, an arena for meaning making in this world although Cupitt believes that nothing can lie beyond language. Cupitt defends himself by a discussion of the void, or Nihil, a common theme in his writings. Cupitt is taking the path of many mystics by saying that faith is not information gathering or belief but a radical death into unknowing, a kenotic embrace of the void rather than a retreat into a closed circle of certainty. Cupitt accuses Williams of taking the side of a nostalgic easygoing Christendom-type religion rather than seeking to make connections and learn the language of the world which only comes by entering the place of dark unknowing. He urges Williams to come out of the religious closet and declare himself a non-realist.

I hope that Williams and Cupitt will continue the dance of debate and that voice of radicals like Cupitt and the Sea of Faith will be as much valued and

respected as the voices of powerful lobby groups. In every area of contemporary life, the Church included, conservatives and liberals continually squabble about the moral high ground. They usually make common cause only to suppress the unpopular radical who points out the real state of the Emperor‘s robe-less condition. Perhaps it‘s worth recalling that in the Gospel the sworn enemies Pontius Pilate and Herod made friends in order to crucify Jesus. One hopes that the prophetic Cupitt will keep the radical nature of faith alive in the Church of the Kingdom which may yet emerge from the wreckage of institutional Churchianity. I found Is Nothing Sacred a valuable and important addition to my knowledge and appreciation of Cupitt. I have found Cupitt‘s writings enormously influential in the development and maturation of my own faith. Unlike Cupitt I am prepared to be open (most days) to a faith in a transcendent God beyond the god of human imagination and creativity to which humans can relate as I/thou. I certainly believe that Cupitt deserves to be more widely read in Australia. More and more people are struggling to find a way through a postmodern world where the old nostalgia often peddled by political and religious leaders seems less and less convincing and where the void of loss leads many to nihilist despair. Cupitt also speaks powerfully to the condition of many postChristians and post-theists who still want to value the transformative potential of religion without God. He challenges those who want to escape into Harry Potter fantasies where the truth is out there somewhere waiting to be decoded, delivered by Santa or downloaded from the Internet.

This book is a good introduction to most of the major themes that Cupitt has wrestled with since his turn to non-realism in 1980. If you have not before read Cupitt and engage with Is Nothing Sacred you may well discover why the Adelaide-based scientist and author Paul Davies calls Cupitt as one of the most exciting theologians of our era.3 You may not agree with Cupitt but I think you might discover in the questions he is asking a powerful antidote to the religious pulp fiction that so often passes for theology, spirituality, personal group and other meaning-making genres in our era. Notes 1. As described by T. Beeson Rebels and Reformers (SCM 1999) p.171. 2. Cupitt, D Reforming Christianity Santa Rosa California 2001 Polebridge Press p 7 3. Davies, P ‗The Ingeniously Ordered Universe‘ p 38 in Wallace, Fisher et al (eds) Time and Tide (John Hunt, 2001)

Is Nothing Sacred?

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Environmental ethic

Theological liberalism

Root and branch reform

Institutional ―Churchianity‖

Jesus‘ ―radical this-world‖ ethic

Solar ethic

Feminist critique of Christianity

Opprobrium

―Kenotic embrace of the void‖

Stultifying

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Is Nothing Sacred?‖ 1. What do you think of Don Cupitt‘s view that ―religion, in order to survive, must free itself from supernatural beliefs and be seen instead as a form of human cultural expression‖?

2. How do you understand the concept of ―religion‖? In relation to that, what do you think of a ―religion‖ where ―worship and belief in a supernatural realm are replaced by a definition of religion as a way people relate themselves to life and celebrate life‖?

3. What do you think of the idea that ―[t]he old style religion of mediated salvation [should be] replaced by religion as therapy [a way of freeing people to accept life as it is, rather than turning life into a weapon to make ourselves unhappy] which serves to divest people of an addiction to be . . . . ‗meaning junkies‘‖?

4. How do view Cupitt‘s idea of faith as ―not information gathering or belief but a radical death into unknowing, a kenotic embrace of the void rather than a retreat into a closed circle of certainty‖?

5. After reading this selection and gaining some basic background about Don Cupitt and his theology—or, atheology—would you agree with the impression of Baroness Warnock that along with Derrida and Rorty, Cupitt is an enemy of ―objective truth and public morals‖? In other words, what is your general evaluation of Don Cupitt and his theology or ―theologizing‖?

God, Freedom, and Evil Joe Manzari The University of California at San Diego 1 The existence of evil and suffering presents one of the largest obstacles to 2 belief in God --for both the theist and the atheist alike. The incalculable amount of human suffering and pain has led many to conclude that it is unbelievable that there is an all-powerful and all-loving God who would allow such misery and pain. In this paper I will present the problem of evil in its two most popular forms, the logical and external problems, show how the problems may be satisfactorily answered, and then show how the existence of evil rather than being

a defeater for belief may be used as a pointer to the existence of God .

The Logical Problem of Evil The logical problem of evil is most poignantly presented in J.L. Mackie‘s 4 treatise ―Evil and Omnipotence ‖ where he charges the theist with contradictory beliefs. He argues that religious belief, rather than lacking rational support, is ―positively irrational, that several parts of the essential theological doctrine are 5 inconsistent with one another.‖ What are these doctrines? The theist is committed to the following set of beliefs, which we will refer to as set A:

(1) God exists. (2) God is omnipotent. (3) God is omniscient. (4) God is omni-benevolent. (5) Evil exists. The atheologian charges the theist with self-contradictory beliefs, however these five propositions do not themselves formally entail a contradiction. The atheologian must present an additional proposition that is either necessarily true, essential to theism, or a logical consequence of the other propositions in set A for the logical consequences of the sum to be contradictory. So what propositions does the atheologian provide? These are

the propositions provided by Mackie. 6. A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can. 7. There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do. Proposition (6) not only fails to be necessarily true but fails to be contingently true as well. For example, suppose you are at home with your friend John. Your friend John is a clumsy fellow and proceeds to bump his leg against the coffee table causing his leg to swell and inflict him with pain. Being a kind friend you

rush to the medicine cabinet to get him pain reliever; however to your dismay, the cabinet is empty. Due to your limited knowledge of first aid the only thing you can think of to help your friend‘s pain is to saw his leg off. Now at this point you would be willing to eliminate the evil, his throbbing shin, as far as you can. This solution is not considered morally justified although it satisfies proposition (6). But why? The key to the moral culpability lies in the ability to eliminate the evil in question, namely the pain in his shin, without eliminating a greater good, namely that of your friends ability to use his leg, or bringing about a greater evil. So a more sophisticated version of proposition (6) can be restated as 6a. A good being eliminates every evil that it knows about and that it can eliminate without either bringing about a greater evil or eliminating a good state of affairs that outweighs the evil. It is in response to this proposition that the Free Will Theodicy of G. W.

Leibniz applies . God, valuing man‘s freedom, decided to provide him with a will that was free to choose good over evil, rather than constraining his will, allowing him to choose only good. Mackie objects to this theological framework claiming that ―this is utterly opposed to what theists say about sin in other contexts.‖

Mackie leaves this notion rather vague and fails to

expound upon it throughout his treatise . The theist needs only to provide a possible solution to proposition (6a) to escape contradiction. The question of how probable this and other solutions will be raised in the second section when confronting the external version of the problem. A popular objection to the free will defense asks why God did not create a world full of free creatures that would freely choose good over evil. If he is omnipotent, should not he be able to create any possible world? The answer to these questions can be found in response to proposition (7). A qualification needs to be made to Mackie‘s proposition (7); what we must say is that there are no non-logical limits to what an omnipotent being can do. God is omnipotent only if he can perform actions that are logically possible for him to perform. For example, God cannot create square circles or married

bachelors in any possible world. So if God is a logical entity, do we have reason to believe that he could create a world of free creatures who always choose good over evil? In the same manner that God cannot create a square circle, he cannot make someone freely choose to do something. Thus, if God grants people genuine freedom, then it is impossible for him to determine what they will do. All that God can do is create the circumstances in which a person can make free choices and then stand back and let them make the choices. According to Leibniz‘s theodicy, our actual world is the best of all possible worlds, the world with the greatest amount of good and the least amount of

God, Freedom, and Evil

evil. God, being omnipotent, had many possible worlds to choose from at the time of creation. Of those possible worlds, he chose to actualize the best one based on his omni-benevolent nature. Leibniz would argue that the world which the atheologian is arguing he could have created, namely one where all free creatures freely choose only good, was not a logical possibility for God to create and that every possible world that God had to choose from had evil

and sin. Some have argued that this is a limit on Godâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s power, rendering his omnipotence void, commonly referred to as the Paradox of Omnipotence. However, it must be noted that omnipotence, defined as the attribute of being all powerful, does not imply the ability to do anything, but rather omnipotence implies that God can do whatever power can do. Within that scope, we see that power does not provide a blank check for performing contradictions.

A further assumption made by the atheologian is that if God is omnibenevolent that he would prefer a world without evil over a world with evil. This assumption is dubious for two reasons. First, there are many cases where we allow evil and suffering to occur in a personâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s life in order to bring about a greater good. For example, parents recognize when discipline is needed to teach their children to become mature, responsible adults. Similarly, it is a noted fact that many people come to a knowledge of God through their pain

and suffering. Second, if God were to intervene every time an evil act were about to occur (for instance turning terrorist bullets to rubber before it hits its target), all notions of moral responsibility and accountability would be shattered. The atheologian is therefore not in a position to charge the theist with contradictory beliefs; however he can choose to argue that the theories developed by the theist, although possible, are improbable.

2 The External Problem of Evil The external problem of evil claims that although the existence of evil is not a prima facie reason to charge the theist with contradictory beliefs, the apparently unnecessary and pointless evil in the world is however incompatible with the omni-conception of God. The theist will agree that some instances of evil appear to be gratuitous ; however, he will challenge the inference from apparently gratuitous evil to the reality of gratuitous evil. To

examine whether the evil experienced is truly gratuitous it would be beneficial to examine both the quantity and nature of evil in the world. In considering the quantity of evil in the world, we can also recognize that, although the world seems to be a terrible place, there is on balance more good than evil. People generally agree that life is worth living, and when things are looking bad people, have hope in looking to the future. If the evil were so overwhelming, everyone would have committed suicide.

In examining the nature of evil, the theist is free to use all the resources from his worldview in answering the objection. Here it seems that answering the problem is easier from the perspective of Christian theism than from the perspective of belief in the mere existence of God. There are four Christian doctrines which give us reason to regard apparently gratuitous evil as merely apparent. These four doctrines will be explored further below First, the chief purpose of life is not happiness, but the knowledge of God. One reason we find the problem of evil to be so compelling is that we think that if God exists, he is obligated to create a warm comfortable environment for his human pets. However, on the Christian view, this is false. The purpose of life is not happiness per se but rather the knowledge of God which can bring everlasting fulfillment. Many evils may seem pointless with respect to producing human happiness yet may be fruitful in coming to a knowledge of God. Second, mankind is in a state of rebellion against God and God‘s purposes. The terrible moral evils we witness in the world are a testimony to man‘s depravity and state of spiritual alienation from God. Rather than submitting to God, man rebelled and chose against him-- leaving man to grope in spiritual darkness. The Christian is thus not surprised by the evils; he, on the contrary, expects them. Third, God‘s purpose is not restricted to this life but spills over beyond the grave into eternity. According to Christianity, this life is but a flicker in comparison to the vastness of eternity. The temporality of life and the pains experienced therein will be but a ―slight momentary affliction‖ preparing us

for an eternal weight of glory that waits beyond all comparison. Fourth, the knowledge of God is an incommensurable good. God would be justified in asking us to bear extreme suffering to receive the gift of eternity in heaven. But God, by his grace and mercy, does not even ask us for that. Instead he fills our lives with peace, joy, meaning and purpose. But regardless of what he asks us to endure, it would be worth it to enter heaven. A final point which deserves mention is that of our cognitive limitations regarding the assessment of probability with respect to the nature of evil. Certainly, many evils seem pointless; however, we are simply not in a position to judge whether they are pointless or not. The murder of one innocent man may send a ripple effect through history, where God‘s morally sufficient reason for allowing it may not be revealed until centuries later. When considering God‘s providence over the whole of history, seeing the end from the beginning, it becomes evident how hopeless it is for limited observers to speculate on the probability of God‘s having morally sufficient reasons for the evils that we see.

God, Freedom, and Evil

3 The Argument for the Existence of God from Evil If God does not exist, life is without objective moral values. For apart from God there is no ultimate standard of value. Rather, moral values are reduced to

personal taste, social conventions, or linguistic anomalies. However, we do acknowledge that objective values exist; for example, it is morally wrong to torture a baby for fun. We may formalize this arguments as follows:

(1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist. (2) Evil exists. (3) Therefore, objective moral values exist. (4) Therefore, God exists.

The first premise is one agreed upon by theist and atheists alike. The second premise is furnished by the atheist in posing the problem of evil. So the conclusion that both objective moral values and God exist follows logically.

In a similar fashion, when dealing with the external problem of evil we may implement the G.E. Moore shift and turn one man‘s modus ponens into another man‘s modus tollens. The atheologian presents the following argument with respect to the external problem of evil: (5) If God exists, gratuitous evil does not exist. (6) Gratuitous evil exists. (7) Therefore, God does not exist. However, as seen in the preceding section, due to our inherent cognitive limitations and inability to discern God‘s morally justified reasons for permitting various evils, we are not in a position reliably to judge the nature of evil. In asking the question of whether evil is really gratuitous, the most important question is, ironically, whether God exists. So the theist may argue thus:

(5) If God exists, gratuitous evil does not exist. (8) God exists. (9) Therefore, gratuitous evil does not exist. As Daniel Howard Snyder points out, the problem of evil is a problem only for ―the theist who finds all its premises and inferences compelling and who has lousy grounds for believing in theism‖; but if one has more compelling grounds for theism, then the problem of evil ―is not a problem.‖

Endnotes 1

In the realm of philosophical discussion, the existence of objective moral values is itself a claim worthy of investigation. However, due to the limited scope of this paper, it will be

assumed that an objective notion of good and evil is true and present. This assumption can be made because it is the one raising the problem of evil who is citing evil as an objective problem present in the world, rather than a sociological or psychological phenomenon.

For the purposes of this paper, I will be using the omni-conception of God familiar to the major monotheistic religions. This conception provides God the attributes of omniscience, omni-benevolence, and omnipotence.

I am much indebted to William Lane Craig, Alvin Plantinga, and James Moreland for my thoughts on this topic.

The works that developed my understanding of the issue include: (i) Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990). (ii) Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002). (iii) William Lane Craig and James Porter Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003).

J.L. Mackie, ―Evil and Omnipotence,‖ Mind 64, no. 254 (1955): 200 – 212. Ibid., 200. 6

Ibid., 200 – 201

G. W. Leibniz, ―Theodicy: A Defense of Theism,‖ in Philosophy of Religion: Fourth Edition, ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomas Learning, 2003), 146 – 151. 8

G Mackie, 210.

It seems strange that Mackie would contest this issue, namely that freedom is valued greater than sin, when theologians such as Louis De Molina, Thomas Flint, Alfred Freddoso and William Lane Craig would agree with Leibniz on this issue regarding providence, free will, depravity, and redemption.

Most theologians hold to this conception of God as a logical entity. However, one may side with Descartes or Martin Luther, holding that God is unbound by the laws of logic. This rare view is, however, even more flawed because the contradiction made by the premises in set A will be of little interest. Why? Because the logically unbound God could bring it about that all the premises of set A are true even if the set is contradictory. So the theologian who holds to this view of God will be unimpressed by Mackie‘s argument and will not find any difficulty in the contradictions presented.

The question of evil may also be raised with regard to natural evils. As will be explored further in section 2, in comparison to mere theism, the Christian theist has more explanatory power available for answering the problem of evil. Three points regarding natural evil should be mentioned. First, it is inscrutable how intertwined natural evils are with human moral evils. Imagine if there were no moral evils, only natural evils, and the entire human race followed the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount. The damage caused by droughts, fires, famines, floods, and other disasters would be greatly reduced. The wealth of the world would be largely redistributed which, as a result, would greatly reduce disease, medical care would be more readily available, and people would live in decent housing rather than poorly constructed shacks which are prone to damage from disasters. Second, a world containing gratuitous natural evils may be necessary for people to come to a knowledge of God (See n13). God aims for us to seek him in a free, un-coerced manner. Perhaps it is only through pointless natural evil that people would turn to God. Finally, God may have created a physical world which operates according to certain natural laws which

God, Freedom, and Evil 95 he, for the most part, does not intervene with. He may intervene to perform miracles; however, this would be an exception rather than a rule. Permitting natural evils would not be wrong if those who endure in faith through the afflictions are rewarded with incommensurable good in the afterlife. The fact that he does not intervene physically does not mean he is uninvolved--for he can strengthen and comfort the suffering by his Spirit. 12 For more on the Paradox of Omnipotence see Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 168-173.

The knowledge of God as an insurmountable good will be further explored in section 2.

Gratuitous evil can be understood evil that does not appear to be contributing to a greater good or helping prevent a greater evil, such as a fawn burning to death in a forest fire or a child suffering a long painful death caused by a genetic disorder.

William Rowe argues in this fashion in his article ―The Inductive Argument from Evil Against the Existence of God‖ (1979). 15 Quote from the apostle Paul in 2Cor. 4:16 – 18.

Due to the scope of this paper, I do not have the space required to defend my views on objective morality and the nature of value. So I will simply reference my thoughts to the chapter on moral obligation in Richard Swinburne‘s The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 184 – 216. 17

See n16.

Daniel Howard-Snyder, ―Introduction‖ in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1996), xi.

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Atheology/Atheologian

Omnibenevolent

Prima facie

Omnipotent

Omniscient

gratuitous

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―God, Freedom and Evil‖ 1. What do you think is wrong with the notion of ―a world full of free creatures that would freely choose good over evil‖? Is a person truly free—or does a person really make a choice—if he is only prone to choose what is good? Explain your answer.

2. How do you understand the statement that ―there are no non-logical limits to what an omnipotent being can do‖? What is the idea behind the concept of a God who is a logical entity?

3. Do you agree that ―although the world seems to be a terrible place, there is on balance more good than evil‖? Explain your answer.

4. Do you believe that ―the chief purpose of life is not happiness, but the knowledge of God‖? Explain your answer.

5. What do you think is the view of the theist that‖ if God were to intervene every time an evil act were about to occur (for instance turning terrorist bullets to rubber before it hits its target), all notions of moral responsibility and accountability would be shattered‖?

6. Do you agree to the principle that ―If God does not exist, life is without objective moral values. For apart from God there is no ultimate standard of value. Rather, moral values are reduced to personal taste, social conventions, or linguistic anomalies‖? Explain your answer.

On the Challenge of Filipino Theologizing Ruel F. Pepa Can we not find a way to draw inspiration in theologizing from our experience of spirituality as Filipinos sans elements of Christianity? Perhaps the better question is, Isn‘t it really feasible to talk of Filipino spirituality outside of the trappings of Christian presuppositions and influences? Well, of course, I‘d like to believe that Christianity genuinely deeply inspires lives—no question about that. But isn‘t it more worth considering if it is still possible to hear—even in its faintest manifestations—the resonance of pre-colonial spirituality? I feel more challenged by an exploratory study to seek a way to get to the distant past where hopefully we could find and be inspired by a deeper spirituality of our ancient ancestors. I am challenged by the possibility of a more meaningful type of spirituality that is free from the colonial and therefore alienating hegemony of Judaeo-Christian theological formulations.

The feasibility of connecting to the ancient roots in reflection of certain so-called fundamental ideas of faith should be sought. And in this consideration, I‘d rather think of faith not strictly in Christian terms for doing so would be alienating to the faithful of other spiritual persuasions. One project that very much responds to this is the one done by the actress and environmental activist Chin-chin Gutierrez which culminated in the production of a collection of ancient lullabies or cradle music from different Philippine ethno-linguistic traditions. This is a ―three-year project [considered as] the first known compilation of documented ‗cradle music‘ interpreted by a pop artist from personal research, interviews and recordings with various tribal and linguistic groups in the Philippines.‖ (http://www.oovrag.com/books/ 2004uyayi.shtml) Perhaps, a more expanded view of spirituality free from the confines of the metanarratives laid down by established religions of Western orientations is of notable significance at this point of our reflection. Chin-chin‘s spiritual reflections and project bring to our 21st century sensibility and sensitivity the morphological resonance of a deep spirituality that captures in artistic expressions the richness of a past that is notyet-dead and to which we can authentically and significantly connect. I‘d like to believe that a further consideration of this special concern may be profoundly enriched by a careful review of what C. G. Jung wants to say in the elaboration of his depth-psychology theorizing.

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Resonance of pre-colonial spirituality Meta-narratives Depth psychology

Alienating hegemony

Morphological resonance

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for â&#x20AC;&#x2022;On the Challenge of Filipino Theologizingâ&#x20AC;&#x2013; 1. Do you think we can have spirituality without any trappings of Christianity?

2. Do you believe that it is still possible for us to connect to the ancient roots of Filipino spirituality?

3. What is your own view of spirituality? Write a short essay.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY Sorting out the Zeitgeist: The Moral Philosophy of Iris Murdoch

Mary Midgley

Resolving the Objective-Subjective Conflict in Moral Valuation An inquiry into the problems of the origin of values in general and of moral values in

particular Ruel F. Pepa

Moral Philosophy Roger Jones

Ten great female philosophers: The thinking womanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s women Ellie Levenson

Sorting out the Zeitgeist: The Moral Philosophy of Iris Murdoch Mary Midgley Bright moonlight flooded down St Giles‘s as Iris and I, just ceasing to be undergraduates, stumbled home to Somerville at the end of an exhausting evening in the June of 1942. Our recent exams had exhausted us for a start. But, on top of this, our kind tutor had invited us, as a special treat, to dine with two highly distinguished contemporary sages and we had been listening attentively all the evening to their distinguished opinions. ‗So, finally,‘ I asked, ‗what about it? Did we learn something new this evening?‘ ‗Oh yes, I think so,‘ declared Iris, gazing up at the enormous moon. ‗I do think so. X is a good man and Y is a bad man‘. At which exact but grotesquely unfashionable judgment we both fell about laughing so helplessly that the rare passers-by looked round in alarm and all the cats ran away.

Iris, however, has never minded being unfashionable. That is what makes The Sovereignty of Good so good - what makes it, still, one of the very few modern books of philosophy which people outside academic philosophy find really helpful. It shares that distinction with C.S. Lewis‘s little book, The Abolition of Man, which shoots with equally deadly aim at the same target. Both books effectively debunk the colorful, fantastic screen of up-to-date ideas inside which we live—a screen which, despite a lot of surface activity, has not actually changed much since they were written. As Iris puts it, ‗a smart set of concepts may be a most efficient instrument of corruption‘, because, as she explains: We are anxiety-ridden animals. Our minds are continually active, fabricating an anxious, self-pre-occupied, often falsifying veil which partially conceals the world. What chiefly pierces that veil is a sharp, direct perception of things which are no part of our own being. For instance: I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing now but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important ... (page 84) The veil, however, is persistent and terribly hard to detect. In every age it subtly provides new, unnoticed ways of evading reality. Detecting those new forms is a prime business of philosophy, but of course philosophers often find it

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no easier than other people. (It is always a significant question to ask about any philosopher; ‗what are they afraid of?‘ During the twentieth century, intellectual fashions have provided escape by claiming to isolate individuals progressively, first from God, then from their own societies (‗there is no such thing as society‘) and finally from the rest of nature, thus crediting them with an extraordinary, supernatural kind of independence. At each stage, the reformers were rejecting genuinely oppressive claims. But at each stage the real, practical reasons for this rejection were gradually forgotten as one theorist after another (Nietzsche, Freud, Skinner, Heidegger, Sartre, Hayek, Dawkins) dived in to indulge in the exaggerated rhetoric which, when these elements were combined, added up to an extreme and reductive individualism.

That extremism made it increasingly hard to think out any intelligent reconciliation which would bring together the best parts of their various campaigns. So (as Iris points out) what we got instead was a strange, halfconscious jumble composed of the most dramatic parts of each doctrine because these parts were both the most exciting and the easiest to remember. The very powerful image with which we are here presented... is behaviourist in its connection of the meaning and being of action with the publicly observable, it is existentialist in its elimination of the substantial self and its emphasis on the solitary omnipotent will, and it is utilitarian in its assumption that morality is and can only be concerned with public acts. The names of these doctrines may not be familiar to all of us but, as she says, we are all familiar with the ideal figure who personifies them because he dominates the stories that we read and watch: He is the hero of every modern novel.... This man is with us still, free, independent, lonely, powerful, rational, responsible, brave, the hero of so many novels and books of moral philosophy. The raison d’etre of this attractive but misleading creature is not far to seek. He is the offspring of the age of science, confidently rational and yet increasingly aware of his alienation from the material universe which his discoveries reveal. (page 80)

Since Iris wrote, environmental dangers have made us much more uneasy about that last form of alienation. Yet the power-fantasy she describes is as potent as ever. What upholds it is still ‗the domination of science, or rather . . . . the domination of inexact ideas of science which haunt philosophers and other thinkers‘. For it is not science itself that makes this wild, flattering escape seem necessary. The demand comes from ideologies (such as the behaviourism— ideology of B.F. Skinner) which have used the name of science and have grotesquely exaggerated its power. Put very crudely, what frightens us is our

Sorting out the Zeitgeist: The Moral Philosophy of Iris Murdoch 107

superstitious belief that there exists a single, vast, infallible system called science which completely explains human existence and which thereby proves that the familiar kinds of freedom which we experience every day are an illusion. To escape this threat, theorists have invented a special kind of metaphysical freedom, sending us up, like autonomous hot-air balloons, to a stratosphere beyond the reach of nature and science. Is that where we want to live? Iris comments: I find the image of man which I have sketched above both alien and implausible. That is, more precisely, I have simple empirical objections (I do not think people are necessarily or essentially ‗like that‘), I have philosophical objections (I do not find the arguments convincing), and I have moral objections (I do not think people ought to picture themselves in this way). It is a delicate and tricky matter to keep these kinds of objections separate in one‘s mind. This difficulty faces anyone who tries to penetrate a contemporary myth. Intellectual and emotional aspects of the current veil are so intricately tangled that it is hard to make any special point without seeming to say something morally objectionable.

Throughout the last century the concept of freedom has been treated with an unconditional reverence which has made it seem illicit even to ask, on any particular occasion, which freedom? Freedom from what? Freedom from scruple? Freedom from friendship and the bonds of affection? Freedom from principle? Freedom from all tradition? Freedom from feeling? These freedoms are the easy privileges of psychopaths, oafs and depressives. The prophets who exalt freedom as the supreme or only value do not actually aim at those privileges. They make that clear by their examples. What then (Iris asks) are they proposing? Existentialism, in both its Continental and its Anglo-Saxon versions, is an attempt to solve the problem without really facing it; to solve it by attributing to the individual an empty, lonely freedom, if he wishes, to ‗fly in the face of the facts‘. What it pictures is indeed the fearful solitude of the individual marooned upon a tiny island in the midst of a sea of scientific facts, and morality escaping from science only by a wild leap of the will. But our situation is not like this.

Under the term Existentialism she includes, a wide tradition stretching from Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to Heidegger and Sartre, a tradition which is less mentioned today than it used to be simply because its cruder elements are by now largely accepted and taken for granted. They are also echoed in a different accent by American libertarians. She concedes that, in facing hard dilemmas, we may indeed feel our situation to be hopelessly unintelligible and irrational. But this (she suggests) is because we concentrate arbitrarily on the moment of apparent decision, ignoring the mass of imaginative work that was done earlier, work which depends above all on deliberate and selective

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attention. She instances a woman who has been half-consciously despising her daughter-in-law and who, wondering whether she is being unfair, ‗reflects deliberately about D until gradually her vision of D alters‘. This woman now sees facts that she did not see before, not by deceiving herself but by using ‗just and loving attention‘. The imagination (that is) can itself be used to pierce and unweave the veil with which it has helped to blind us. It is not just a deluding factor or a luxury item to amuse humanists. It is itself a vital organ, a workshop where we forge our view of the world and thereby our actions.

This kind of reflective, imaginative attention—not arbitrary, sudden decision—is, of course, what chiefly marks out people who are acting relatively freely and responsibly from those who are not. Certainly we have only limited control over our attention. But not even the most bigoted and fatalistic of determinists ever really doubts that we are able to make a vast difference by exercising this measure of control over it, and that the power to do this is a part of our natural heritage. The business of the various sciences is (as serious scientists know) to help in the understanding of such natural processes, not to deny that they take place. That kind of denial is ideology, not science. For much of the last century, modern libertarians of various stripes have been fighting a ghost-war here, not against science itself but against false scientistic prophets. A glance at The Sovereignty of Good might well help to release them for better and more cheerful occupations.

From The Philosopher, Volume LXXXVI No. 1, and written in Spring 1998

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Extreme and reductive individualism. Behaviorism/Behaviorist Existentialism/Existentialist Utilitarianism/Utilitarian Power-fantasy Metaphysical freedom

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Sorting out the Zeitgeist: The Moral Philosophy of Iris Murdoch‖ 1. What do you think is the meaning of the statement,‖ Intellectual and emotional aspects of the current veil are so intricately tangled that it is hard to make any special point without seeming to say something morally objectionable‖?

2. How does Existentialism view and understand freedom? Do you agree to this view? Why?

3. How does Iris Murdoch clarify the issue of human freedom? Do you agree with her? Why?

4. How do you understand the following statement: â&#x20AC;&#x2022;The business of the various sciences is (as serious scientists know) to help in the understanding of such natural processes, not to deny that they take place. That kind of denial is ideology, not science.â&#x20AC;&#x2013;?

5. Is there a common point of agreement between Philosophy and Science? Explain your answer.

Resolving the Objective-Subjective Conflict in Moral Valuation An inquiry into the problems of the origin of values in general and of moral values in particular

Ruel F.Pepa Introduction The context of this discussion is focused on values specifically appreciated by humans. This clarificatory introduction is important to distinguish human values from things ‗valued‘ by other living species in the animal and plant realms. The issue of value enters at this particular consideration as humans observe how plants and animals are benefiting from their environments. Under these circumstances, it may be assumed that animals and plants ‗value‘ the things from which they benefit in terms of survival and life sustenance. We say that water, plants and air are valuable for animals because the latter depend on them in these animals‘ need to drink, eat, and breathe. However, we as humans are limited as to the access to evidence pertaining to whether animals really ‗value‘ these things or not in the same way that we do. In other words, do these animals really consciously exercise a sense of appreciation in the act of ‗valuating‘ the things that are useful to them? Is such an act really a valuation?

Is there a way for us to find certain answers to these concerns? Is it worthwhile to deal with this matter seriously in the context of this particular treatise‘s main inquiry? These questions being unanswered at this point in time (or may even be unanswerable at any point in time), a better course is to proceed on the path that has been beaten to resolve the major burden of this treatise.

Are Values Basically Objective in Origin? There are people who claim that values have external sources — points of origin distinct from us. In many cases, these external origins are even considered to be of a higher nature such as God, Bathala, Allah, the Absolute Reality, Brahman, Nature, etc. With these sources, values emanating from them are deemed to be thoroughly objective. This perspective assumes the non-necessity of the human factor in the existence of values. In other words, humans are not necessary in the formation of values, so that values exist independent of humans. In this sense, it is said that values are basically objective and it specifically means that (1) values are factual properties regardless of whether there are humans or not, or (2) values emanate from supernatural origin, or (3) values are inherent in nature. Regarding the first, it doesn‘t make sense at all to say that humans could not have valued things if these things were not to the least inherently valuable. It is a most basic assumption that things are deemed valuable based on the

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112 appreciation that humans extend to them so as to satisfy or achieve human purposes. In short, things of this world are axiologically neutral by and in themselves and can only be said to be either valuable or insignificant depending on the purposes that humans have determined for their usefulness or uselessness. The words of Wittgenstein at 6.41 of the Tractatus agree to this point:

...In the world everything is as it is and everything happens as it does happen; in it no value exists — and if it did exist it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must be outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.[1] A further clarification of this view is revealed by the pericope where it is located in the Tractatus: 6.373 The world is independent of my will. 6.374 Even if all that we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour granted by fate, so to speak; for there is no logical connexion between the will and the world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connexion itself is surely not something that we could will. 6.43 If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world not the facts — not what can be expressed by means of language. In short, the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must so to speak, wax and wane as a whole. The world of the happy man is different from that of the unhappy man.[2] The whole point being presented here is summarized in Wittgenstein‘s Notebooks (p. 77): ‗Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic.‘[3] Things of this world can only become valuable as humans attribute values to them. This matter of values further extends particularly more strongly to aesthetics and ethics, the latter being our focus of concern in this treatise. We can then say based on the presuppositions that we have already established— that in matters of ethics and morality, the stronger can the claim be that moral values can never be found inherent in states of affairs or events without humans to value them. Moral values are therefore strictly basically human in origin. Values in general and moral values in particular are basically of human origin; hence, they are basically subjective in terms or origin. The entirety of the previous discussion can be essentially presented via the following logical arguments:

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1. ‗Values are basically either inherent to things valued or humanattributed. If values are basically inherent, then, they are not basically humanattributed. Hence, if values are basically human-attributed, then, they are not basically inherent.‘ 2. ‗Values are basically either inherent to things valued or humanattributed. If values are basically inherent, then, they are basically objective in origin. If values are basically human-attributed, then, they are basically subjective in origin. Therefore, values are either basically objective or basically subjective in origin.‘ 3. ‗Values are basically either objective or subjective in origin. If values are basically objective in origin, then, they are not subjective in origin. Therefore, if values are not basically objective in origin, then, they are subjective in origin.‘ Now that the first argument supportive of the objective origin of values has been debunked, could the next be a tenable claim? Do values emanate from a supernatural origin? [The term ‗supernatural‘ used in the context of the succeeding discussion is different in meaning from the context of its use in Wittgenstein‘s ‗Lecture on Ethics.‘ In the latter context, the term ‗supernatural‘ is linguistically contrasted with the ‗natural‘ which is the realm where the sciences operate. The contrast being linguistic in character does not in any way imply an affirmation of the reality of a higher dimension of existence inhabited by more intelligent and more powerful denizens. Says Wittgenstein: ‗I can only describe my feeling by the metaphor, that, if a man could write a book on Ethics which really was a book on Ethics, this would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world. Our words used as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and conveying meaning and sense, natural meaning and sense. Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it. I said that so far as facts and propositions are concerned there is only relative value and relative good, right, etc.‘] Perhaps it could still be safely said that the majority of people in this world believe in a supernatural entity they call ‗god‘ or even many of this type of being which are called ‗gods.‘ They generally believe that values, specifically moral ones, emanate from or dispensed by this ‗supernatural reality‘ or ‗ultimate reality,‘ if you will. He (if we want to personify this reality) has formed the world as well as the things found in this world, and has established values— both artistic and moral—for all creation, more specifically humans, to obey. Of course, it is not logically impossible for such supernatural entities to exist and have done such dispensation of values. However, we can neither make any final conclusion or affirmation as to certainty of their existence. We should definitely opt to exercise strong belief -- which could be construed as ‗faith‘ in religious

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language game--but such cannot be considered as objective proof. Looking at the problem now of which of the set of moral laws or moral bans we ought to obey, the complication has been created by the differences among groups of people or communities of people who recognize different ‗gods‘ or supernatural beings: the Judeo-Christian tradition; the Hindus; the Confucians; the Taoists, etc. These supernatural beings as well as the thought systems and religions honoring and worshipping them have accompanying systems of morality. There could be some points of similarity, but in a lot of instances, differences are so pronounced and oftentimes very wide. It is, therefore, difficult if not really impossible for us to ascertain the most accurate supernatural foundation. This factor tells us that no evidence is available to prove the necessary supernatural origin of objective moral values. At this point, nothing is left in our minds but the impression that even the socalled morality of supernatural origin is subjectively attained by people who needs and wants are determined out of a common goal to live and enjoy life in a peaceful and productive milieu rather than having been ‗commanded‘ to be and to do so from a supernatural dimension. What about the third option now -- are values inherent in nature? Those who hold the notion that values are inherent in nature promote the argument that moral laws are within the realm of nature and hence, part of the natural world. It is further held by them that anything that violates or goes contrary to nature is therefore wrong. But there seems to have some confusion here in treating ‗moral laws‘ at par with what science tells us as ‗natural laws‘ like the law of gravity, the law of buoyancy, and others. There is a difference in meaning when the word ‗law‘ is used in relation to nature and when the same word is used in relation to morality. Natural laws are descriptive, whereas moral laws are prescriptive. Natural laws, on the other hand, are generalizations based on contrast regularities discovered in events or states of affairs. On the other hand, moral laws are ‗invented‘ for the maintenance of order and to promote acceptable behaviors and attitudes or conducts in human relations. In H.O. Mounce‘s discussion of Wittgenstein‘s view of ethics in the Tractatus, Mounce says: ‗The ethical problem is not to determine what is so but what to do, what attitude one is to adopt.‘[4] For those who affirm the reality of ‗natural moral laws,‘ one thing should be proved: that there are laws discovered and discoverable (or observed and observable) in nature telling humans the way they ought or ought not to behave. But it seems to be difficult, if not impossible at all, to prove it because nothing prescriptive actually issues out of nature. In other words, nature does not demand morality to be acted on by humans. It is a reconfirmation that moral values are not basically objective in origin even if we appeal to nature. To ‗see‘ in

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nature some events or states of affairs that move or lead us to behave morally is but an interpretation of an entire gamut of experience involving human interest in favor of and advantageous to our circumstances, needs, desires, objectives and satisfaction. In this sense, moral values formed out of our relationship with nature are therefore basically subjective. In the article ‗Naturalism,‘ Charles R. Pigden says: ‗In the famous Principia Ethica, G.E. Moore contended that most moralists have been naturalists and that all naturalists are guilty of a common fallacy. They have confused the property of goodness with the things that possess that property or with some other property that good things possess. This is what naturalistic fallacy is: a mixing of two distinct items.‘[5]

The Basic Subjective Origin of Values, Particularly Moral Values The notion that values have a basic subjective origin doesn‘t necessarily mean that they are always subjective through and through, i.e., at all times. Hence, when it is argued that values have a basic subjective origin, what is hereby contradicted is the opposite notion that values have a basic objective origin -- not that values are objective. It only means that even if it is claimed that values have a basic subjective origin, such a claim does not necessarily contradict the notion that values may be objective. This matter is a vital aspect of the thesis of this treatise which in the progressive development of the discussions about it will ultimately unveil the non-contradictory character of what is being proposed as an ethics that is both objective and relative. Relativity of values in general and moral values in particular is however an offshoot of subjectivity and this matter will be discussed later to summarize the points being raised here. In logical terms, we say: 1. ‗Values either have a basic subjective origin or a basic objective origin. It has been demolished that values have a basic objective origin. Hence, values have a basic subjective origin.‘ 2. ‗Objective values may issue out of values whose basic origin is subjective. Values are really of basic subjective origin. Therefore, it cannot be that objective values will not issue out of values whose basic origin is subjective.‘

3. ‗Objective values may issue out of values whose basic origin is subjective. Relative values may also issue out of values whose basic origin is subjective. And the basic origin of values are really subjective. Therefore, it can be that values are both relative and objective.‘ 4. ‗If values can both be relative and objective, then, it cannot be that there is contradiction between relative values and objective values.‘ Going back to the issue of the basic subjective origin of values, particularly moral values, it is simply the idea that the starting point or the begin-all of

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valuation is a person‘s expression of his/ her personal desires or feelings. Nevertheless, the Humean view that reason doesn‘t play any role in the function of moral judgment is not hereby affirmed. This writer believes otherwise. [James Rachels observes in his article ‗Subjectivism‘: ‗[T]he function of moral judgment, says Hume, is to guide conduct, but reason alone can never tell us what to do. Reason merely informs us of the nature and consequences of our action and of the logical relations between propositions... Hume concludes that in the final analysis, ‗Morality is determined by sentiment.‘[6] Reason plays a vital role in such function because the acceptability of someone‘s personal feelings or desires demands rationality from a moral agent and reasonableness in a moral act. Perhaps, the rhetorical statement of Blaise Pascal applies here: ‗The heart has its reason that reason does not know.‘ However, that which we consider subjective may evolve towards the direction of the objective. Yet an ‗evolved‘ value seen in the objective realm doesn‘t have the ‗natural‘ characteristics inherently found in the original properties of matters of fact located in this realm. At this point, let us further discuss the complexities surrounding the issue of the subjectivity of values so that a smooth transition could be effected from subjectivity to relativity which are actually so much related between each other. In fact, value relativity issues out of value subjectivity. In other words, value subjectivity effects value relativity and there could be no value relativity without value subjectivity.

Logically we say, ‗There is value relativity if and only if there is value subjectivity. And there is value subjectivity. Therefore, there is value relativity.‘

From Simple to Critical Subjectivity in Ethics: James Rachels’ Analysis Simple Subjectivism In James Rachels‘ discussion of subjectivity in his article, ‗Subjectivism,‘ he distinguishes between two types of subjectivism: the simple one and the improved version called emotivism. This is the way his discussion goes: The historical development of ethical subjectivism illustrates a process typical of philosophical theories. It began as a simple idea — in the words of David Hume, that morality is more a matter of feeling than of reason. But as objections were raised against the theory, and as its defenders tried to answer those objections, the theory became more complicated. So far, we have not attempted to formulate the theory very precisely — we have been content with a rough statement of its basic idea. Now, however, we need to go a bit beyond that.

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One way of formulating ethical subjectivism more precisely is this: we take it to be the thesis that when a person says that something is morally good or bad, this means that he or she approves of that thing, or disapproves of it, and nothing more... We might call this version of the theory simple subjectivism... However, simple subjectivism is open to several rather obvious objections, because it has implications that are contrary to what we know to be the case (or at least contrary to what we think we know) about the nature of moral evaluation. For one thing, simple subjectivism contradicts the plain fact that we can sometimes be wrong in our moral evaluations. None of us are infallible. We make mistakes and when we discover that we are mistaken we may want to change our judgments. But if simple subjectivism were correct, this would be impossible — because simple subjectivism implies that each of us in infallible. ...In the face such difficulties, many philosophers have chosen to reject the whole idea of ethical subjectivism. Others, however, have taken a different approach. The problem, they say, is not that the basic idea of ethical subjectivism is wrong. The problem is that ‗simple subjectivism‘ is too simple a way or expressing that idea. Thus, these philosophers have continued to have confidence in the basic idea of ethical subjectivism and have tried to refine it

— to give it a new, improved formulation — so that these difficulties can be overcome. The improved version was a theory that came to be known as emotivism...[7] The criticism towards simple subjectivism is a valid one if this type of subjectivism really creates difficulties to clearly determine the rightness or wrongness of moral evaluations. In this situation, everybody becomes entitled to his or her moral views and opinions without the obligation of testing whether his or her moral evaluation is right or wrong. (We could sense a situation of relativism here, but this is not the type of relativistic position that is advocated in this treatise.) In other words, there is really right or wrong moral evaluation and under this condition, everybody really becomes ‗infallible.‘ Some critiques of simple subjectivism who do not intend to totally reject the whole notion of ethical subjectivism but to salvage its more basic idea are, however, correct in their intention to transcend its prominent errors and make a refinement of it.

As has previously been discussed, the basic subjectivity of values in general, and moral values in particular, owing to the fact that values have a basic subjective origin, is an empirically defensible and logically coherent position. This is the basic idea of ethical subjectivism which is salvageable.

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But is emotivism the truly critical alternative to transcend the errors of simple subjectivism? Let us look at emotivism closely.

Emotivism: An Improvement from Simple Subjectivism The starting point of emotivism is the recognition that humans use language in so many ways. We use it not only in expressing factual statements whereby we give information that may either be true or false. With language we may also issue requests and commands whose objective is not to give information or describe a state of affairs but rather prescribe an action or attitude. The statement, ‗President Macapagal-Arroyo is against human rights violations,‘ is descriptive, whereas, ‗Let us condemn human rights violations!‘ is prescriptive.

Looking at the issue of moral language, emotivism holds that ‗moral language is not fact-stating language; it is not typically used to convey information. Its purpose is entirely different. It is used, first, as a means of influencing people‘s behavior: if someone says ‗You ought not to do that,‘ they are trying to stop you from doing it. And second, moral language is used to express (not report) one‘s attitude.‘[8] Comparing simple subjectivism with emotivism at this point, we say, on the one hand, simple subjectivism grasps ethical statements as factual statements reporting the speaker‘s attitude. So that when President Macapagal-Arroyo says that she is against human rights violation, such is tantamount to saying, ‗I (Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo) do not approve human rights violation‘ — a factual statement about his attitude. On the other hand, emotivism disagrees that Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo‘s words are an expression of fact. According to emotivism, what Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo says is simply, ‗Damn human rights violation!‘ or ‗To hell with human rights violation!‘ Regarding this view, Rachels observes that the difference between simple subjectivism and emotivism is not a superficial hair-splitting matter but an important one. Simple subjectivism says that statements of moral judgment are statements about feelings, whereas, emotivism says that they are statements of feelings. Thus, they cannot be subjected to truth-value analysis. If I believe that X acted alone in plotting the assassination of Ninoy Aquino and another person believes that X was ordered or commanded by a group of conspiring Marcos cronies to plot the assassination of Ninoy Aquino, such a disagreement is over facts. However, if I advocate the view that capital punishment or death penalty is an effective deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes while another believes otherwise, the disagreement is in opinion or views. The first type of disagreement can be solved by an appeal to facts which in turn will determine which of the two beliefs is true (because both cannot be true). The second

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type, however, is a matter of making a choice based on desires or feelings, i.e., making one of the views desirable over the other according to the particular individual‘s perspective, barring the possibility of choosing both. Rachels rightly echoes the points made by the American philosopher C.L. Stevenson (the most prominent spokesperson of emotivism) in his classical book on the subject of emotivism, Ethics and Language, that such an opposition is a ‗disagreement in attitude and contrast it with disagreements about attitudes. Moral disagreement, says Stevenson, are disagreements in attitude. Simple subjectivism could not explain moral disagreement because once it interpreted moral judgments as statement about attitudes, the disagreement vanished.‘[9]

There has been an expression of a similar view prior to this in a chapter of an earlier work by Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, entitled ‗Critique of Ethics and Theology‘: Thus, although our theory of ethics might fairly be said to be radically subjectivist, it differs in a very important respect from the orthodox subjectivist theory. For the orthodox subjectivist does not deny, as we do, that the sentences of a moralizer express genuine propositions. All he denies is that they express propositions about the speaker‘s feelings. If this were so, ethical judgments clearly would be capable of being true or false. They would be true if the speaker had the relevant feelings, and false if he had not. And this is a matter whish is, in principle, empirically verifiable. Furthermore they could be significantly contradicted. For if I say, ‗Tolerance is a virtue,‘ and someone answers, ‗you don‘t approve of it,‘ he would on the ordinary subjectivist theory, be contradicting me, because in saying that tolerance was a virtue, I should not be making any statement about my own feelings or about anything else. I should simply be evincing my feelings, which is not all the same thing as saying that I have them.[10] However, not all is secured yet for emotivism‘s place as a formidable position having transcended the loopholes of simple subjectivism. Rachel makes the criticism that emotivism has also faced some rough sailing. Says he: ‗Emotivism also had its problems and they were sufficiently serious that today most philosophers reject the theory. One of the main problems was that emotivism could not account for the place of reason in ethics.‘[11]

Rational Subjectivism Rachels who is a subjectivist would classify his variety of subjectivism as rational. According to him, there ought to be good reasons to support value judgment of any kind in general and moral judgment in particular. We tend to evaluate actions as either right or wrong. Mere expressions of personal likes and dislikes may not need supporting reasons. Without the latter, such expressions

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amount only to arbitrary statements. Rachels says, ‗[A]ny adequate theory of the nature of moral judgments and the reasons that support them. It is at just this point that emotivism falters.‘[12]

In conclusion, Rachels comments: Thus, as our final attempt to formulate an adequate subjectivist understanding of ethical judgment, we might say, nothing is morally right if it is such that the process of thinking through its nature and consequences would cause or sustain a feeling of approval toward it in a person who was being as reasonable and impartial as is humanly possible (italics supplied).[13]

An Evaluation of J. Rachels’ Analysis The central issue brought out by Rachels in his critique of emotivism and in the formulation of his ‗rational‘ brand of subjectivism is the importance of reason as the determinant of the moral rightness or wrongness of an action. Basically, there should be no quarrel at all regarding this matter. The only problem here is that it is difficult to establish objective rationality or reasonableness in matters of ethics or morality on the individual plane. In other words, the only meaningful rationality on that plane is subjective considering the fact that an individual A‘s moral choice of x is rational or reasonable depending on circumstances that led him/ her to make such a moral choice. Whereas, in the case of individual B‘s moral rejection of x, such is likewise rational or reasonable from his/ her perspective and in his/ her own right. So that, A and B are rational or reasonable in their own respective decisions, even if they are opposite to or contrasting each other. The element of ‗thinking through‘ that is being proposed here by Rachels is an acceptable aspect of making moral judgments rational or reasonable. But again, such a process -- if we call it a process at all -- is done on the individual plane. Hence, the function of which is still subjective, i.e., depending on the circumstance and conditions surrounding the individual person making the choice or decision. All in all, the basic subjective origin of moral judgments has been proven once and for all a formidable assumption in the tracing of the rootage of morality and ethics. This assumption is also the foundation of moral or ethical relativity which is the bridge that ultimately leads us to a more realistic type of ethical or moral objectivity that is far different from an ethical objectivity that depends on moral facts. The type of moral or ethical objectivity that is herein being proposed dialectically develops from the subjective rootage and evolves therefrom along relativity until it reaches the point of objectivity. In short this type of moral or ethical objectivity cannot really be formulated without making any basic and initial recognition of the twofold reality of its subjective-relative beginnings.

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We cannot actually underestimate the basic importance of subjectivity in its universal applicability. Even science basically starts off from subjectivity. In this regard, let me quote Prof. Claro Ceniza, the eminent symbolic logician and analytic philosopher of De La Salle University--Manila, in his article ‗Logic of Confirmation and Objectivity‘ that appears in SOPHIA, vol. XXV, 1995-96: Subjectivity can be helpful in producing preliminary hypotheses, even in science. In fact, there is no other way of producing preliminary hypotheses except by ways that are affected and influenced by subjectivity. We tend to advance preliminary theses to which our personal experiences and cultures direct us. Science, however, and everyday life cannot remain on that level. There is always an objective way of finding out what the object in question really is either by common consent or better through the process of confirmation and disconfirmation.[14]

ENDNOTES 1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as quoted in Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus (ed.) H.O. Mounce (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p.94. 2. Ibid., pp. 95-96. 3. Ibid., p. 95. 4. Mounce, Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus, p. 97. 5. Charles Pigden, ‗Naturalism‘ in A Companion to Ethics (ed.) Singer, Peter (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 426. 6. James Rachels, ‗Subjectivism‘ in A Companion to Ethics, p. 433. 7. Ibid., pp. 434-436. 8. Ibid., p. 437. 9. Ibid., p. 438. 10. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 144. 11. Op. cit., Rachels, p. 438. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., p. 440. 14. Claro Ceniza, ‗Logic of Confirmation and Objectivity‘ in SOPHIA, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. (ed.) Elwood, Brian Douglas (Manila: De La Salle University Press, Inc., 1995-1196), p. 40 © Ruel F. Pepa

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Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Values

Absolute Reality

Objectivity vs. Subjectivity

Objective values

Subjective values

Relativity of values

Simple subjectivism

Emotivism

Rational subjectivism

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Resolving the Objective-Subjective Conflict in Moral Valuation‖ 1. Do you believe that the human factor is necessary in the formation of values? Explain your answer.

2. How do you understand the notion that even if values have a subjective origin, it doesn‘t mean that they may not be objective? In this consideration, how do we get from subjectivity to objectivity?

3. How do you distinguish between simple and critical subjectivism?

Moral Philosophy Roger Jones For most people morals are sets of rules that we ought to obey, they tell us what is right or wrong. Moral philosophers want to discover how these rules are justified, and at the logical consequences of moral or ethical beliefs.

The age of enlightenment saw a questioning of religious and traditional values. If religion is questioned, then so to is morality. Philosophers needed to base moral system on justifiable grounds. Kant‘s moral system is based on rationality. It attempts to show how any rational being would agree to universal moral laws. Its influence has been enormous and modern philosophers still use Kant‘s ideas as a starting point for discussions on morality. The other great ethical system of the post-enlightenment era is Utilitarianism. Proposed by the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham (17481832), the principal of utility is based on happiness and was seen as being a scientific approach to morality. Critical philosophers of the nineteenth century were less certain that universal moral values could be upheld. For Marx morality and ethics were part of bourgeois ideology: sets of ideas that ignored the exploitative economic arrangements of society and contributed to False Consciousness. Nietzsche looked at the origins of morality, and like Marx, saw moral systems as arising from the interests of social groups. For Nietzsche the individual had to go beyond accepted morality to create a new morality for himself. In the twentieth century, there has been growing pessimism about the possibility of a universal moral system. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80) emphasized the subjective judgments that an individual must make in order to be ―authentic‖. Anglo-American philosophers have wondered whether philosophy could say anything meaningful at all about what is right or good, as they put it moral statements have no ―truth value‖. For these analytic philosophers the role of philosophy is to analyze how we use moral concepts, rather than say what morality should be. Writers like A.J. Ayer (1910-89) suggested that moral statements simply express the moral sentiments or attitudes of the individual and that philosophy has no way of evaluating which set of moral statements is best. 125

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Kant’s Categorical Imperative For Kant human beings as moral agents are rational and autonomous (free to make choices). He thinks that as rational beings we are able to judge whether any action is moral by asking if the action is consistent with the categorical imperative. One formulation of the categorical imperative is, ―Act only on that maxim (intention) whereby at the same time you can will that it shall become a universal law‖. What Kant means by this is that they way that we judge an action to be moral is to universalise it: If I want to know if telling a lie on a particular occasion is justifiable, I must try to imagine what would happen if everyone was to lie. Kant thinks that any rational being would agree that a world in which there is no lying is preferable to one in which lying was common; in a society in which lying was common no one could trust the word of anyone else.

Another formulation is: ―Always act to treat humanity, whether in yourself or in others, as an end in itself, never merely as a means.‖ What Kant means by this is that a rational being should not be used as a means to another person‘s happiness; if we use another person as a means to our ends then we have removed that person‘s autonomy.

Utilitarianism Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) in Britain developed the moral theory called Utilitarianism. It aimed to give a method of moral judgment based on experience rather than dogma. Bentham thought that an action was good if it increased pleasure, bad if it increased pain. An action or law would by good if it produced ―The greatest happiness for the greatest number‖. He developed a ―happiness calculus‖ in order to calculate for any action or law what the consequences in terms of pleasure or pain would be. Using these principals he designed a prison called the panopticon where punishment would be measured out according to the amount of pain caused by the offender. Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) called utilitarianism ―pig philosophy‖; as it appeared to base the goal of ethics on the swinish pleasures of the multitude. In the light of this criticism, J S Mill refined Bentham‘s theory by suggesting that there were higher and lower pleasures, and that the higher pleasures were preferable. As he puts it: ―Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied‖. By lower pleasures Mill meant pleasures of the flesh, and by higher pleasures, pleasures of the intellect. One consequence of Mill‘s modification was that it was no longer possible to use Bentham‘s ―happiness calculus‖.

Moral Philosophy

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Nietzsche: The genealogy of morals For Nietzsche there are two basic types of morality: master morality and slave morality. By this, he means that moral codes arise from people‘s social origins. Master morality sees the noble as good and emphasizes heroism, courage and individual greatness as can be found in the aristocratic morality of the ancient Greeks. Slave morality is the morality of the weak. What harms the weak is called ―evil‖, and what helps them is called good. Christian ethics are identified with slave morality. Nietzsche thought that each individual needs to create their own moral system: the point of morality is to enable each individual to sublimate and control their passions, in order to emphasize the creativity inherent in their being. Sartre and Bad Faith Sartre is an atheist, and as such believed that individuals have no objective way of formulating morality. If we follow a moral system or religion, we are acting in ―Bad faith‖ by denying that we have the responsibility for determining our own choices. Like Nietzsche, Sartre believed that it is the individual who needs to create their own moral code. Sartre believed that individuals should act authentically, that is make choices based on the understanding that we are responsible for creating ourselves.

Kant‘s moral system

Utilitarianism

Bourgeois ideology

False consciousness

Authentic

Kant‘s categorical imperative

Panopticon

Happiness calculus

Master morality

Slave morality

Bad faith

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Moral Philosophy‖ 1. What do you think of Kant‘s moral philosophy based on rationality? Can human rationality be truly a strong basis to establish universal moral laws? Explain your answer.

2. Is happiness of the majority of people—as in Utilitarianism—an impeccable aim of all moral acts? Explain your answer.

3. Do you believe that judgment of right or wrong, good or bad is determined by an ideology that dominates a social condition? Explain your answer.

4. Do you agree with Nietzsche that ―the individual had to go beyond accepted morality to create a new morality for himself‖? Explain your answer.

5. Do you agree with Sartre that an individual must make ―subjective [moral] judgments‖ in order to be ―authentic‖? Explain your answer.

6. Do you agree with A. J. Ayer that ―moral statements simply express the moral sentiments or attitudes of the individual and that philosophy has no way of evaluating which set of moral statements is best‖?

Ten great female philosophers: The thinking woman’s women Ellie Levenson For most of history, the groundbreaking philosophers have all been men, and philosophy has always been a male genre. Women had neither the education nor the time to pursue the life of the mind. In modern times, especially in the past 200 years, women have made immense cultural contributions - but much more to literature and the arts than to philosophy. I feel women in general are less comfortable than men in inhabiting a highly austere, cold, analytical space, such as the one which philosophy involves. Women as a whole—and there are obvious exceptions—are more drawn to practical, personal matters. It is not that they inherently lack a talent or aptitude for philosophy or higher mathematics, but rather that they are more unwilling than men to devote their lives to a frigid space from which the natural and the human have been eliminated. Now that women have at last gained access to higher education, we are waiting to see what they can achieve in the fields where men have distinguished themselves, above all in philosophy. At the moment, however, the genre of philosophy is not flourishing; systematic reasoning no longer has the prestige or cultural value that it once had. The entire way we approach the world has changed. Philosophy once claimed to provide a rigorous method to search for the meaning of life, and it was a precious substitute for dogmatic religion. But in modern times, religion among the educated classes in Europe and North America has lost ground, and intellectuals are neglecting the basic human need to find answers. Philosophers are now at the margin. Philosophy has shrunk in reputation and stature—it‘s an academic exercise.

The last truly important movement in the world of philosophy was existentialism, in the post-war Paris of Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus and Simone de Beauvoir. There have been theories of language since then, but without the profound insight of the best philosophy. Post-structuralism and post-modernism, by their slippery relativism, have destroyed the concept of philosophy. No one cares about philosophers—cultural criticism has come to the fore. Media and glitzy pop culture dominate now, and people need help to negotiate and survive it. The term ―female philosopher‖ doesn‘t even make sense to me. Simone de Beauvoir was a thinker rather than a philosopher. A philosopher for me is someone who is removed from everyday concerns and manipulates terms and concepts like counters on a grid or chessboard. Both Simone de Beauvoir and 131

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Ayn Rand, another favourite of mine, have their own highly influential system of thought, and therefore they belong on any list of great philosophers.

Rand‘s mix of theory, social observations and commentary was very original, though we see her Romantic sources. Her system is broad and complex and well deserves to be incorporated into the philosophy curriculum. Simone de Beauvoir‘s magnum opus, The Second Sex (which hugely influenced me in my youth), demonstrates her hybrid consciousness. It doesn‘t conform to the strict definition of philosophy because it‘s an amalgamation of abstract thought and history and anthropology—real facts. The genre problem is probably why both these women are absent from the list. But Plato too was a writer of dramatic fiction—so that it is no basis for dismissing Rand.

The term philosopher is passé, anyhow, and should be abandoned. The thinker of modern times should be partly abstract and partly practical. Karl Marx, the winner of the Radio 4 poll yesterday, was indeed a truly major thinker. He was not a captive of abstraction and always kept his eye on society and its evolution. But for me his failures emanated from his indifference to the individual and his ruthless privileging of the group. It has become tiresome to constantly blame every blip in women‘s lives on sexism and discrimination by men. Today‘s lack of major female philosophers is not due to lack of talent but to the collapse of philosophy. Philosophy as traditionally practised may be a dead genre. This is the age of the internet in which we are constantly flooded by information in fragments. Each person at the computer is embarked on a quest for and fabrication of his or her identity. The web mimics human neurology, and it is fundmentally altering young people‘s brains. The web, for good or ill, is instantaneous. Philosophy belongs to a vanished age of much slower and rhetorically formal inquiry.

Today‘s philosophers are now antiquarians.

Hannah Arendt: 1906-1975 German-born Jewish philosopher who studied under Heidegger (with whom she also had a brief relationship) before being imprisoned by the Gestapo in 1933 for her work on anti-Semitic propaganda. She escaped and fled to Paris; seven years later, following the fall of France, she moved to the US. Initial interests in existentialism and in the thought of St Augustine gave place to a more political awareness. She is best known for The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), as well as for her coverage of Adolf Eichmann‘s trial (published first in The New Yorker and then in her 1963 book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil). Her justification for capital punishment in Eichmann‘s case was that, as Eichmann had not wanted

Ten great female philosophers: The thinking woman‘s women 133 to share the earth with the Jews, the Jewish state had no reason to share the earth with him. The first two volumes of her projected three-volume Life of the Mind were published posthumously, as was her Reflections on Kant‘s Political

Philosophy.

Hypatia of Alexandria: C370-415AD Follower of Plotinius who developed neo-Platonism at Alexandria from about 400 to her death in 415. She was so well-known, apparently, that correspondence addressed only to ―The Philosopher‖ is said to have reached her. Also a leading mathematician and astronomer, she is thought to have taught ideas relating to different levels of reality and humanity‘s ability to understand them. She seems to have believed that everything in the natural world emanates from ―the one‖ - and that human beings lack the mental capacity fully to comprehend ultimate reality. Her subsequent obscurity probably reflects the fact that none of her work survives (although letters from a pupil do). It appears, however, that her influence made the city‘s Christian community feel threatened—perhaps partly because of her emphasis on the value of science. She was torn to death by a Christian mob (including monks armed with oyster shells). Admirers revere her as a philosophical martyr comparable to Socrates.

Simone de Beauvoir: 1908-1986 Undeservedly overshadowed by her lover, Jean-Paul Sartre, Beauvoir developed an education in traditional philosophy (she wrote a thesis on Leibniz) into more radical explorations of feminism and existentialism. Some of her ideas—about human freedom, for example, and about ―beingfor-itself‖ and ―being-in-itself‖—overlapped with Sartre‘s, but her best philosophical work, such as The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948), was important in its own right, as was her towering work of feminist ideology, The Second Sex (1949). In The Second Sex, Beauvoir argues that women have been held back throughout history by the perception that they are a ―deviation‖ from the male norm- an assumption that must be broken if feminism is to succeed.

Elizabeth Anscombe: 1919-2001 Oxbridge-rooted academic principally concerned with defining the actual nature of phenomena such as mind and morality, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe has been described as the pre-eminent British philosopher of the 20th century. She had intellectual roots not only in classical philosophy but also in Roman Catholicism and in the modern philosophy of Wittgenstein and Frege. A friend of Wittgenstein, she produced the definitive (and still

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unrevised) translation of his Philosophical Investigations in 1953, as well as the Introduction to Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus in 1959. Her Intention (1957) is considered to be the founding document of modern ―action theory‖. An analytical philosopher of exceptional rigour, she allegedly once said to A J Ayer: ―If you didn‘t talk so quickly, people wouldn‘t think you were so clever‖; to which the philosopher replied: ―If you didn‘t talk so slowly, people wouldn‘t think you were so profound.‖

Anne, Lady Conway: 1631-1679 An English follower of Descartes with an interest in the kabbala and, later, Quakerism. Born Anne Finch, she studied philosophy secondhand—via her brother— under Henry More at Cambridge. Her sex debarred her from studying the subject herself, but she corresponded with More for most of her relatively short life—she died at the age of 47. Preoccupied with the question of substance, she doubted the existence of inert matter. She developed a God-based theory of nature as an integrated mental and material order (―life and figure are distinct attributes of one substance‖), made up of individual ―monads‖. In this, she anticipated Leibniz, who acknowledged her as an influence. Her one surviving work, Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, was published posthumously (and anonymously) in 1690.

Anne Conway suffered from severe migraines and is said to have considered the operation known as trepanning as a possible cure.

Sarah Margaret Fuller: 1810-1850 US-born feminist and champion of transcendental idealism, her Woman of the Nineteenth Century was America‘s first major feminist manifesto. A pupil of Emerson, she taught in Rhode Island and Boston before moving to Europe in 1846 and marrying an Italian aristocrat. Together with her husband and son, she drowned off Fire Island, New York, after fleeing the Italian revolution.

Susan Haack: 1945British-born professor of philosophy and law at the University of Miami. She inhabits the difficult end of the spectrum, propounding an epistemological theory called foundherentism, a kind of Third Way between foundationalism and coherentism. (If you need to ask, you wouldn‘t understand.) Works include: Deviant Logic (1974), Philosophy of Logics (1978), and Defending Science— Within Reason Between Scientism and Cynicism (2003).

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Mary Wollstonecraft: 1759-1797 English feminist and egalitarian, associated with Thomas Paine and William Godwin (her husband). A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790) argued against the slave trade; A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792) did what it said on the jacket. Described marriage as ―legal prostitution‖. Opposed monarchy, church and military. Died after giving birth to the future Mary Shelley.

Ayn Rand: 1905-1982 Controversial Russian novelist and philosopher, a ―radical capitalist‖ whose works are popular with young Tories (and Camille Paglia). Moved to US in 1924 and developed a philosophy of individualism she called Objectivism (―a philosophy for living on earth‖). Best-known works: The Fountainhead (1935) and Atlas Shrugged (1957). Appeared in a Tobias Wolff memoir, and was played by Helen Mirren in a 1999 film about her life.

Dame Mary Warnock: 1924Mary Warnock has significantly more influence on the way British society thinks of itself than any living male philosopher. She is a champion of a woman‘s right to philosophise. A veteran of royal commissions and committees of inquiry, she has published (among much else) The Uses of Philosophy (1992), and Women Philosophers (1996).

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Existentialism

Post-structuralism

Post-modernism

Slippery relativism

Romanticism/Romantic

Sexism

Feminism

Transcendental Idealism

Foundherentism

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Ten great female philosophers: The thinking woman‘s women‖

1. Why is it that the majority of philosophers we know in history are male? What makes Philosophy so unilateral in terms of gender—is it something social or genetic? Explain your answer.

2. What is the author‘s view on the difference between a philosopher and a thinker? Do you agree with the author in her view that the term philosopher is already obsolete and in the post-modern world, the term thinker is more relevant? Explain your answer.

3. What can you say about how the philosopher Hypatia of Alexandria was murdered by Christians in AD 415? What does the event say about the Christians of that time? What do you know bout the genuine teachings of Christ in relation to killing people?

4. What do you think was in the mind of Mary Wollstonecraft to opine that â&#x20AC;&#x2014;marriage is legal prostitutionâ&#x20AC;&#x2013;? Do you agree? Explain your answer.

METAPHYSICS An Introduction to Metaphysics in Ancient Philosophy Ruel F. Pepa

Metaphysics and the Problem of Existence Richard Schain

“Fragments of Philosophy” (or “Philosophical Fragments”) on the Sensitivity and Sensibility of Human Life Towards Transformative Philosophizing (with apologies to Kierkegaard) Ruel F. Pepa

A Review of John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (published by Free Press: N.Y., 1995) Jerry Shaffer, Ph. D.

The Matrix Movie Series: A Berkeleyan Affirmation of Reality Ruel F. Pepa

An Introduction to Metaphysics in Ancient Philosophy Ruel F. Pepa A. The Pre-Socratic Thinkers (ca. 6th century BC) They were called ―Pre-Socratics‖ simply to locate their historical space in the development of classical philosophy with the great Greek philosopher Socrates as the point of reference; literally, they were philosophers who lived before the time of Socrates. Western philosophy began with them in Greece, particularly in a place called Miletus, a Greek settlement in Anatolia. History records that the first known philosopher was Thales of Miletus whose two leading students, Anaximander and Anaximenes, became likewise important thinkers during their time. These philosophers, like the others whose ideas were discussed in intellectual circles of that era, could more precisely be called metaphysicists or cosmologists. They were preoccupied with the aim of seeking a fundamental element of reality or vital force whereby a comprehensive explanation could be given of anything that had appearance and hence could be known by human consciousness. That is the concern of the philosophical field of metaphysics. The eminent British philosopher Bertrand Russell says in his ―Mysticism and Logic‖: ―Metaphysics is an attempt to conceive the world as a whole by means of thought.‖

For Thales, all was fundamentally water, while Anaximenes thought that is was air. Anaximander, however was more abstract in his view; for him there was only the boundless or the infinite behind all appearances. Perhaps, Anaximander‘s was a better way of saying that we ought not to think of the unthinkable.

Other pre-Socratics were also abstract in their metaphysical quests. In the case of Heraclitus and Parminedes, the issue was whether the most basic character of the world or reality was change or permanence. Heraclitus said it was change; Parminedes insisted it was permanence. In defense of his belief, Heraclitus even said that no one could possibly step into the same river twice. Another abstract concern was on the matter of whether there was only one (monism) or more than one (pluralism) fundamental element of reality.

B. Socrates (470-399 BC) Socrates was a native of the Greek city-state of Athens. His philosophical concern was more on the issues of moral value, i.e., what a person ought to do. In this sense, Socrates was more of an axiologist or more specifically an ethicist. He was a thorn in the flesh of Sophists who became famous in teaching people

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how to be successful in life regardless of whether the way to it was morally right or wrong. In the case of Socrates, the latter principle of giving importance to what is morally right must be the ultimate concern in a life that could truly be called meaningful. It was Socrates who said that the unexamined life is not worth living. Though Socrates became very famous in Athens, particularly among the youth, he never wrote anything. All information about him and his thoughts came to us through the writings of his prolific and equally eminent student, Plate. In Plato‘s Dialogues, Socrates is described as the gadfly of Athens because of his way of always asking people the reason why they do what they do. By this, Socrates tried to make people become aware that reasonable principles are basically important and necessary to justify their actions.

Such method of Socrates (better known as the Socratic Method), offended the Sophists who had been enjoying the support of the society‘s upper class. As a result, he was arrested and accused of spreading false ideas and corrupting the young people of Athens. Plato‘s Apology records Socrates‘ trial wherein Socrates proved that his accusers were actually ignorant of what their charges really meant, besides the fact that they could not come up with evidence to validate these charges. Socrates also told his listeners that the Delphic Oracle revealed to him that he was the wisest of men, the fact that he alone knew nothing and knew that he knew nothing, while all the others claimed that they knew something. His accusers misconstrued such statement as a personal assault to their dignity and honor, and based on grounds not founded on reason and facts, Socrates, despite his wisdom and eloquence, was meted the death sentence. He was given a cup of hemlock to drink and die. He drank to his death, but he lived on as a great philosopher.

C. Plato (428-354 BC) Plato was the most distinguished student of Socrates and his fame flourished after Socrates‘ execution. Plato developed the first comprehensive system of philosophy and founded the first formal school, the Academy. Plato was basically an epistemologist who advanced the notion that true knowledge must be of universals or general types or kinds and not of particulars. To know a particular chair like an armchair or a monoblock chair, the knowing person must first know what general characteristics make up the ―chairness‖ of chair. Otherwise, s/he cannot really recognize the particular characteristics of ―chairness‖ in an armchair or a monoblock chair. Plato proposed that these universals are called Forms or Platonic Ideas. These are precisely and obviously expressed in mathematics. They are known by the mind, not the sense organs. The realm of Platonic Ideas is the Forms of things that can never change; it is

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a permanent realm. The philosophers, therefore, should be concerned with the realm of Forms rather than with this world of appearances, according to Plato. Being the highest type of intellectuals, philosophers should be the rulers of societies. This idea Plato proposed in his famous masterpiece, The Republic. He said that the world would be near-perfect if kings were philosophers and philosophers were kings because only a philosopher-king would know what genuine justice is, and being knowledgeable of the realm of Forms, he alone could realize the reign of justice in all societies. Such was Platoâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s political philosophy. Later in life, Plato focused his mind more on ethics or the issue of the moral good. For him, the ultimate idea which illuminates the rest of the pure ideas is the idea of the good. As he grew older, his attitude towards this notion became more mystical. A few centuries after his death, the philosophical school of Neo-Platonism emerged (ca. 3rd century AD). This school gave more emphasis on the mystical or supernatural aspects of Platonism, identifying the idea of good with God.

D. Aristotle (384-321 BC) Aristotle was Platoâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s most outstanding student. He developed the most comprehensive system of philosophy in the ancient western civilization. Aristotle broke with his teacher Plato, contending that the world of changing particulars was more important than Platoâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s realm of permanent universals. In 335 BC, Aristotle founded his own school in Athens; he called it Lyceum. Aristotle was more concentrated on the study of natural sciences and the majority of his writings were on scientific subjects, mostly on biology. Aristotle was convinced that changes and development in this world could be explained by a thorough study of states of affairs as they are experienced, without having to deny their reality of seek explanation by an appeal to a higher type of reality. For him, all objects in the natural world were composed of form and matter, and the changes that we observed in matter are the emergence of one form in place of another; these changes Aristotle called substitution. Substitution happens because every object of the natural world must satisfy its goal or telos which is what by its nature it must achieve. For example, stones fall down because they are essentially material and the material seek the lowest point as their goal. Aristotle was convinced that every natural species has the state of perfection as its ultimate goal and for Aristotle it was a state of perfect rest. The cosmos, according to Aristotle, is an ordered striving to attain this perfection. The highest point of reference of this order is the Unmoved Mover, the absolute and ultimate cosmic factor which fully and perfectly

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achieves its essence of eternal thought. Aristotleâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s cosmology dominated Western philosophy until the emergence of Nicolaus Copernicus in the 16th century AD.

Metaphysics and the Problem of Existence Richard Schain 1 The first question to be faced is whether there is such a thing as a specific problem of human existence. There are problems of survival, of security, of procreation and of power, These are challenges of living that humans share with all other creatures. Homo sapiens, however, has always exhibited a distinctive aspect to his life, conceived by Aristotle as a metaphysical need to know that is of a different order from the problems he shares with the rest of the animal kingdom. This need or problem was formulated by the painter Gauguin in three questions placed on one of his large paintings of Tahitian life. Gauguin was a remarkable writer of philosophy as well as a painter, and his letters, journals and unpublished articles deserve wider attention than confinement to scholars of art history. Freely translated (in accord with his spirit), they convey the following: Why am I here? What must I do? What can I hope for? These questions encompass the specific problem of human existence; they may be fused into the single question, â&#x20AC;&#x2022;What is the meaning of my life?â&#x20AC;&#x2013;

Immediately, it must be acknowledged that not all individuals are troubled with this problem to the same degree. In fact, it may be confidently asserted that it is a pressing problem for only a small minority. The vast majority of individuals only dimly recognize a problem of existence that distinguishes them from other types of living creatures. The distinctive metaphysical problem of human existence has always been the concern of the few. The semi-mythical Heraclitus is said to have referred to them as hoi oligoi, superior beings were few in number. This type of intellectual elitism has often been adopted by philosophically-minded thinkers seeking to comprehend their isolation in the world. The many who do not feel this problem can be separated into three categories: utilitarian materialists, religious believers and those committed to scientific values. The materialists are by far the largest group of those who are largely oblivious to the metaphysical problem of existence. These are the practical members of society who are responsive to the material problems of daily living. They are the stalwarts of civilized life who provide for themselves, their families and their communities. They judge their success in life by their accomplishments in the here-and-now of social existence. Intimations of mortality may be troublesome at times but, by and large, they are not transformed into awareness of the specifically human problem of existence. 147

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Religious believers are those for whom the problem of existence has been answered by a religious faith. For Christians, the adherence to traditional Christian beliefs and practices answers the question of the meaning of their life. Religious believers may be materialists as well in the sense that this term is defined above but with the additional dimension of a metaphysical element expressed as a relationship to God or some surrogate figure. The nineteenth century conviction that the age of science would do away with religious dogma has not turned out to be correct. Religious institutions are flourishing at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Finally, we come to those who do not recognize a metaphysical problem of existence because they espouse a scientific or scholarly way of thought. These are the scientific specialists, scholars, Gelehrten, and all like-minded types who have dominated philosophy for the past two centuries. For them, the problem of existence has become a matter of cognitive science to be answered through analysis of the brain-mind problem, using techniques borrowed from neurophysiology, linguistics and computer science. The problem itself is not recognized as such because all mental processes are believed — as an act of faith — to be a matter of biology. The placement of the problem of human existence on a metaphysical level is dismissed out of hand because science does not accept the metaphysical as a valid category of knowledge. These types may be labeled as ―materialists of the mind‖ since their one article of faith is that all phenomena, mental or otherwise, are ultimately material in nature and subject to analytic investigation.

The difficulty with the approach to the problem of human existence through cognitive science is that it is never elaborated in a meaningful manner. The principal requirement necessary is to recognize its metaphysical nature. The history of civilization has shown that there is a metaphysical need running through humanity like a recurrent symphonic chord. There exists a state of mind, more precisely, a state of consciousness in which this need is embedded. No satisfaction is to be found in materialist explanations, no matter how much they may be padded with ethical theories. Yet the question of consciousness today is dominated by cognitive scientists whose only concern is to analyze it and explain how it is possible. Laborious dissections of thought, analogous to producing a Gray‘s Anatomy of the mind, are put forth as advances in its understanding. Cognitive scientists would like to show how consciousness is exclusively a phenomenon of the brain, thus establishing it within the framework of the materialist world view. But by now, it is evident that this will never happen — as William James predicted over a century ago in his Principles of Psychology. While consciousness is being recently more regarded as a phenomenon in its own right (e.g. John Searle), the approach to it is still analytic and value-free.

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2 The ―solution‖ to the metaphysical problem of existence is to be found in the values arising within the conscious mind, not in the analysis of the latter‘s nature. The antique Greeks are still our models in philosophy because they were concerned with values, not with analysis of the structure of the mind, which was always a secondary consideration with them. The human condition requires a value-rich metaphysics, without which human beings are merely an out-ofcontrol animal species, on the verge of destroying the milieu in which they live. If Homo sapiens does not respond to the problem of his existence through creating a metaphysical consciousness, he becomes an abortive entity that has missed its purpose. It is not enough for him to survive in the midst of family, offices, honors or possessions, he must develop his mind as something more than a tool for dominating his social and material milieu. This reality transcends all other realities for him. However, nature has always been profligate of individuals in achieving its goals and the human species is no exception.

The process of mental maturation is dependent on experiences that make possible the deepening of consciousness, although they do not guarantee it. Experiences can be had at every level of existence, ranging from climbing Mount Everest to reading Plato. The common denominator is increasing depth of consciousness. The oracles of antiquity: ―know yourself,‖ ―become what you are,‖ ―living according to one‘s physis,‖ [nature] all were concerned with deepening of consciousness. A genuine philosophy concerns itself with these questions, not with the futile effort at reductionist analyses of the mind. Two indicators of the metaphysical need of individuals are the popular appeal of religious sectarianism and ―New Age‖ spirituality. By and large, however, one must look to his own self for metaphysical development. Experiencing a writing or a teaching is one thing, subordinating one‘s mind to them is another. If Christ is permitted to enter one‘s interior life, he should not be permitted to monopolize it. A still valid criterion for judging the value of contemporary movements is the one Socrates used in judging the Sophists — do they make money from their teaching? Philosophy and commerce are incompatible activities Glorification of the unconscious mind, a concept first expressed by Schopenhauer and brought onto the stage of public awareness by Freud, has undermined the values of philosophy. But the unconscious mind is a contradiction in terms; if a thought is unconscious, it is not part of the mind, which necessarily implies consciousness. The emergence of a thought or idea into consciousness is a creative act of the first order that marks the nature of the human condition. To say that one is ―unconsciously‖ aware of something is like saying a fertilized ovum qualifies as Homo sapiens. The metaphysical fact

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of human development is the emergence of a being possessed of consciousness. If awareness is not present in the conscious state, it forever remains in the void of metaphysical non-being. Philosophy has to do with probing the problem of existence for those individuals who feel it to be central to their lives. What it decidedly is not is a scholarly discipline analogous to chemistry, physics or mathematics. The imprisonment of philosophy within academic structures has resulted in its disfiguration so that its nature has been radically changed. Philosophy today has been transformed into two distinct subjects; a) a subdivision of history concentrating on the study of philosophers or philosophic movements and b) a branch of theoretical psychology analyzing the nature of cognition. Both of these are topics deserving of a certain amount of study but they are not philosophy. Philosophy is the love of wisdom, it is a desire for metaphysical knowledge that is meaningless in the context of objective scientific methodology. Scholars are not philosophers and philosophers not scholars, although there may be some overlap as, for example, a neurologist having some knowledge of the electrician‘s craft. But as one does not look to electricians for models of what it is to be a neurologist, so one cannot look to scholars for models in philosophy.

Philosophical activity can be regarded as a sign of nature transcending its biological limits. If this be mysticism, to paraphrase the American revolutionary hero Patrick Henry, then opponents are free to make the most of it. The hallmarks of the philosopher are metaphysical intelligence, strength of mind and independence of the societal milieu. There are many such figures from the antique world but perhaps the most interesting is the semi-mythical figure of Heraclitus of Ephesus. Virtually nothing is known of his life, but his writings reveal a personality who meets the criteria given above. ―I searched out myself‖ may be taken as the guiding principle of philosophy and the password to the philosophic life. The polar opposite of the philosopher is the scholar who searches out the paraphernalia of history in order to arrange them according to his inclinations. The antique world had its models in this area also but they were clearly distinguished from philosophy.

3 The problem of existence arises from the self and its solution comes from the same source — the enlargement of consciousness that is the outcome of searching into it. However... there is a painful aspect to this search. The self that is the key to a metaphysical universe is also a function of physical being and is dependent on physical processes for its development. There is no escaping the physical world or the mortality that is its consequence. One cannot develop without the five senses and a functional brain, all of which are

Metaphysics and the Problem of Existence subject to decay and death. The moving finger writes and then writes no more.

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The metaphysically developed ancients regarded reconciliation with death as an essential element of philosophy. The problem of existence has to reconcile metaphysics with the fact of one‘s mortality From the time of the Pharaohs, powerful individuals have tried to erect monuments and create entities that were meant to perpetuate their existence. Christianity invented the idea of resurrection to evade the perceived finality of death. On a more modest scale, there is the idea that generational continuity continues one‘s existence or, even more modestly, that this is accomplished through influences and memories initiated during life. Nevertheless, the tragedy of the disappearance of every vital self from the extant world remains a reality to be faced by all, especially philosophers. The miracle of the creation of a living mind reaches its end. Biological death has to be directly faced and apprehended. But there is a metaphysical way of apprehending individual existence; It is a shame to think and feel as if Kant never revealed the relativity of time and space. The latter are pseudo-dimensions erected by the mind as a practical affair in order to orient oneself amidst the chaotic quality of being. An individual‘s existence is a permanent fact that cannot be abolished because it seems to be terminated by the passage of time. One exists in eternity, Development of this awareness is a joyous feeling as was poetically recorded by Nietzsche. Although it is impossible to escape entirely the instinctual demand to perceive life as existing in a space-time continuum, it is possible to become aware of the relativity of these dimensions and come to a more profound appraisal of one‘s place in the universe. What has been created cannot become uncreated. The only possible reason for the incredible complexity of life processes is the meaningful creation of an individual. Meaning implies existence in eternity. Otherwise, ―it is just a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.‖ St. Augustine wrote that the only two problems of philosophy were God and the soul, but it is quite appropriate to remove God from this list. The unique phenomenon of metaphysics is the development of an individual consciousness. The problem of human existence is to make this development occur. Analytic thought is a movement away from this process, albeit it may be necessary for controlling the physical elements of one‘s existence. It is a loss to abdicate direction of this development to institutions of any type as spontaneity of thought is the sine qua non of metaphysical knowledge. The opposite of this knowledge is not error but ignorance, obtuseness, cowardice or shallow materialist thinking.

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The creation of values is the special sign of a metaphysical consciousness. Every person is guided by values, the question is whether they are created or obtained second hand. The best way of judging an individual is to ascertain the nature of his values. There is no reason to shrink from this judgement, it is far better than judgements based on race, ethnicity, religion or even behavior. It is impossible to live without values, but to live fully one must create his own. Otherwise one is a puppet of society or an animal left to his primitive instincts. The concept of metaphysics has been held in bad repute throughout the age of science. Paul Tillich, who is one of the most important of twentieth century metaphysical philosophers, felt constrained to abandon the word entirely in favor of ontology. However, its meaning in his writings is the same. Nietzsche, whose entire life and works were dedicated to metaphysical values, refused to accept the term, preferring to think of himself as a psychologist and devotee of ―Wissenschaft‘ (science in its broadest sense). For him, metaphysics meant belief in God, heaven, hell, immortality, and mendacious religious dogmas. But he understood the importance of the soul even if he criticized the Christian concept of it. The idea ―reverence for the soul‖ comes from Nietzsche, not Albert Schweitzer. The inescapable fact is that the idea of a metaphysical self or soul is more in accord with the phenomena of Homo sapiens than are the dogmas of a scientific neurology.

We who live in the shadow of the overpowering forces of scientific technology can hardly be capable of assessing their impact upon ourselves. Sartre was correct in his thought that there is no escape of the individual from the situation in which he finds himself. Our qualities and values are enormously determined by it. But the image and the ideal of the metaphysical self can still be brought into consciousness and valued more highly than they are today. The metaphysical need can be acknowledged without violating one‘s intellectual conscience and can be rigorously pursued in full accord with the facts of existence. Philosophy is the name given to the effort to live up to this high aspiration.

The metaphysical need to know

Intellectual elitism

Gelehrten

Conscious mind

Unconscious mind

Metaphysical consciousness Wissenschaft

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Metaphysics and the Problem of Existence‖ 1. What is the difference between the questions ―What is the meaning of life?‖ and ―What is the meaning of my life?‖?

2. Philosophically reflect on your life and answer the questions: a. Why am I here? b. What must I do? c. What can I hope for?

3. How do you understand the following types of non-philosophical people: a. utilitarian materialists; b. religious believers; and c. scientific enthusiasts? Where do you classify the Filipinos in general? Why?

4. What is the meaning of the statement, ―The ―solution‖ to the metaphysical problem of existence is to be found in the values arising within the conscious mind, not in the analysis of the latter‘s nature‖?

5. How do you understand the statement,‖ The problem of existence arises from the self and its solution comes from the same source — the enlargement of consciousness that is the outcome of searching into it‖?

6. How do you evaluate the following statement: ―St. Augustine wrote that the only two problems of philosophy were God and the soul, but it is quite appropriate to remove God from this list. The unique phenomenon of metaphysics is the development of an individual consciousness. The problem of human existence is to make this development occur.‖?

“Fragments of Philosophy” (or “Philosophical Fragments”) on the Sensitivity and Sensibility of Human Life Towards Transformative Philosophizing (with apologies to Kierkegaard) Ruel F. Pepa “Truth is subjectivity.” Soren Kierkegaard “There are no facts, only interpretations.” Friedrich Nietzsche “One should write philosophy only as one writes a poem.” Ludwig Wittgenstein “Humanism is centered upon the agency of human individuality and subjective intuition, rather than on received ideas and approved authority.” Edward W. Said

Part I Introduction LIFE GETS UNEASY when you feel you seem to be at the end of the road. Forces pull you to the wayside—to the left, to the right. There‘s no going onward. You tell yourself, the visible reality has done so much to your sanity. ―I am here right now because the things I have been doing are within the light of consciousness. I have met lonely events and joyful ones and I have learned lessons from them in the light of that consciousness.‖ The radical perspectivist Friedrich Nietzsche says: After having looked enough between the philosopher‘s lines and fingers,

I say to myself: by far the great part of conscious thinking must still be included among instinctive activities, and that goes even for philosophical thinking. We have to relearn here, as one has had to relearn about heredity and what is ―innate.‖ As the act of birth deserves no consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, so ―being conscious‖ is not in any decisive sense the opposite of what is instinctive: most of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly guided and forced into certain channels by his instincts.(1)

Consciousness meets this world of the senses and we hitch our dreams, our aspirations, on it. We shed real tears in the deepest moments of our tragedies. Our laughter echoes in the loftiest moments of celebration. And then, the sober moments of reflection as we consider going on in life. Well, it surely doesn‘t end here right now. But my gut-feeling doesn‘t intend to give up yet. At least, not now... not yet. 155

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Ideas... ideas... ideas glide into my mind, coming from so many directions. Appeals from the depth of the scientific and the analytic convince the intellect to sing paeans of praises to the comfort and delight bestowed by the achievements of modernity—the wonders of technology, the life that has been made easy by a myriad of gadgets, instruments and equipment that rule households, offices and workplaces, even classrooms and game-boards of the modern age.

Yet, appeals of equal magnitude emanate from the spirit. That which sustains the human in me brings me to the innermost recesses of my being and convinces me that the ocean of feelings is far deeper than the superficiality of what may be quantified and measured, analyzed and captured by the senses in the onedimensional segments of time... in the three-dimensional character of space. What gives excitement to life, what makes me consider the significance of it, what leads me to an appreciation of the beautiful, the good, and the true, lies deeply in the core of my being. It is solely the depth of my spirituality that has access into it. No instruments of modern technology can ever scratch even the outermost filament of its covering. It is only the authentic me that has the power to embrace the rise and fall of the waves in this ocean of feelings. It is the untaught spirit of life in me that breathes meaning in the celebration of eternity amidst the dances of change, amidst the weaving and unweaving of colors that burst in the skies of rejoicing and fall on the ground of defeat and disappointment.

But life goes on in transcending the here and now. The overcoming continues. After the fall, we want to rise. This is the elan of life. The most primal life-force persists and that‘s the drive of life. The single outstanding request brought about by the consciousness that comes out of it is a sincere appreciation of this life-force‘s delicate operation in the sensitivity and sensibility of humanity. It is not the scientific and the analytic that have guided us to chart the deepest corners of the realm of the spirit. None of the five senses can access even the periphery of its threshold. But the scientific and the analytic, the spiritual and the emotional are all human. And it is so lamentable that there are forces that have torn them all apart. What could be philosophical at this point is to ask questions, however heart-rending and passionfilled these questions may be. Is there no center where a convergence point is located? Isn‘t a sense of elation expressed in triumphs as humanity appropriates the achievements of science and technology? Can we heighten our spirituality as we positively relate with the wonders of science and technology? Is there a way whereby the workings of modern science and technology can effect physico-chemical changes for the human organism to have a positive attitude towards life? Where do we focus now the eyes of

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meaningful philosophizing—towards the greatness of science and technology and the force of objectivity that animates them, or towards the dignity of human spirituality that exalts the interiority of the human in the depth of subjective being? In what area can philosophizing be truly transformative in consideration of these sides?

Part II Transformative Philosophizing and the Subjectivity of Philosophy TRANSFORMATIVE PHILOSOPHIZING is basically subjective interpretation of individual human experience. In this case, philosophy is not concerned with the problematization of the analytico-mathematical and the scientific. Modern philosophers have mixed matters of the objective and matters of the subjective and fit them altogether in an objective mold. Of course, two plus two will never become five in any possible world. Neither can matters of scientific experimentation be of interest to the philosopher as a philosopher.

Kierkegaard says: Modern philosophy has tried anything and everything in the effort to help the individual to transcend himself objectively, which is a wholly impossible feat; existence exercises its restraining influence, and if philosophers nowadays had not become mere scribblers in the service of a fantastic thinking and its pre-occupation, they would long ago have perceived that suicide was the only tolerable practical interpretation of its striving. But the scribbling modern philosophy holds passion in contempt; and yet passion is the culmination of existence for an existing individual—and we are all of us existing individuals.(2) Practitioners of the sciences and the mathematical fields have dabbled into the things of another dimension—the philosophical. We are now in an era where we can more meaningfully distinguish between the scientific (objective) and the personal (subjective). Our contemporry philosophers are more intense and penetrating to perceive and understand the dynamics of the time. Listen to the words of the great Indian sage Rabindranath Tagore:

What is the truth of this world? It is not the masses of substance, not in the number of things, but in their relatedness, which neither can be counted, nor measured, nor abstracted. It is not in the materials which are many, but in the expression which is one. All our knowledge of things is knowing them in their relation to the Universe, in that relation which is truth. A drop of water is not a particular assortment of elements; it is the miracle of a harmonious mutuality, in which the two reveal the One. No amount of analysis can reveal to us this mystery of unity. Matter is

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an abstraction; we shall never be able to realize what it is, for our world of reality does not acknowledge it. Even the giant forces of the world, centripetal and centrifugal, are kept out of our recognition. They are the day-labourers not admitted into the audience-hall of creation. But light and sound come to us in their gay dresses as troubadors singing serenades before the windows of the senses. What is constantly before us, claiming our attention, is not the kitchen, but the feast; not the anatomy of the world, but its countenance. There is the dancing ring of seasons; the many-coloured wings of erratic life flitting between birth and death. The importance of these does not lie in their existence as mere facts, but in their language of harmony, the mother-tongue of our own soul, through which they are communicated to us.(3) The issue of philosophy is actually the issue of meaningfulness— the meaningfulness not of anything else but life—of my life specifically (subjectively) and of human life in general (inter-subjectively). Meaningfulness as an issue is all-encompassing, i.e., objectively and subjectively. However, in philosophy it is definitely focused on the subjective personal experiences of individual human beings. The meaningfulness of my life is not dependent on what science or mathematics tells me. Life‘s meaning transcends the scientific and the mathematical. In The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, the Danish rebel thinker records: What would be the use of discovering so-called objective truth, of working through all of the systems of philosophy and of being able, if required, to review them all and show up the inconsistencies within each system; what good would it do me to be able to develop a theory of the state and combine all the details into a single whole, and so construct a world in which I did not live, but only held up to the view of others; what good would it do me to be able to explain the meaning of Christianity if it had no deeper significance for me and for my life; what good would it do me if truth stood before me, cold and naked, not caring whether I recognized her or not, and producing in me a shudder of fear rather than a trusting devotion? I certainly do not deny that I still recognize an imperative of understanding and that through it one can work upon men, but it must be taken up into my life, and that is what I now recognize as the most important thing. That is what my soul longs after, as the African desert thirst for water.(4) Philosophy brings us to more exciting terrains of life where the wind of freedom blows incessantly, and carries us to new discoveries in uncharted milieus— unstructured, rustic, pregnant with mysteries; open to be molded by the power of the subjective mind, challenging the human spirit, defiant of the dictates of metanarratives imposed by over-confident systematizers coming

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from the alien territories of science and mathematics. Philosophy empowers us to be in perfect control of our personal individual lives. Philosophy brings us to the deepest recesses of our individuality. Philosophy affirms our humanity that has its being without any necessary connection with the objective. Philosophically, the objective is trivial, given, may be done away with, in the process of subjective signification. Philosophy transforms us in ways that can never be done by the sciences and mathematics. Philosophy is an expression of human freedom. Philosophy is in a dimension unlimited by the hard boundaries of objective requirements. Philosophy is subjective freedom in a situation of praxis—the subjective reflection of human experience which, individually, is of subjective character.

I think... I believe... I feel what I believe. I believe what I feel.

Part III Transformative Philosophizing and World Construction THE WORLD IS A CONSTRUCTION of the human mind. The world as a matter of construction is a reality that passes through interpretations. The world as reality—or reality as the world—is, therefore, a construction based on interpretations, i.e., interpretations provide the ―materials‖ for construction. In ―world-construction,‖ the initial task of interpretation is done in relation to the objective: the objective is interpreted and, in the process, is subjectified. Subjectification is the process whereby the objective is appropriated into and becomes subjective by signifying it in the act of interpretation. The objective, per se, is devoid of meaning, usefulness and relevance. Hence, it lacks the character ―material‖ to the shaping up of what would later develop as history.

The sciences also make use of and seriously attend to the objective. In fact, it is the life-blood of the sciences. But even the sciences go through the process of subjectification as their achievements are pragmatized in technologies. It is the process of pragmatization that signifies the sciences. Pragmatization could also be construed as an interpretation. When science and technology are appropriated in the world, they undergo the process of trans-signification and are hence subjectified. The American philosopher Nelson Goodman in his Of Mind and Other Matters talks of a constructivist philosophy. According to fellow constructivist philosopher, Jerome Bruner: ―It‘s central thesis ‗constructivism‘ is that contrary to common sense there is no unique ‗real world‘ that pre-exists and is independent of human mental activity and human language; that what we call the world is a product of some mind whose symbolic procedures construct the world.‖(5)

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Part IV Conclusion TRANSFORMATIVE PHILOSOPHIZING takes us into the depth of the distinction between the objective and the subjective. In the context of how we deal with reality through the predominantly modernist approach of our generation, the scientific and the analytico-mathematical are generally taken to be objective. Objective considerations are defined not only in terms of the observable but more so in terms of the measurable/ quantifiable and the experimentable. If certain aspects of reality are deemed to be objective, it is therefore assumed that to do justice to their objectiveness/objectivity, the most appropriate step to an inquiry into or an exploration of it is via the scientific and/or the analytico-mathematical terrains. In other words, the objective is best analyzed and evaluated in scientific and/or analytico-mathematical terms. In modernist terms, we cannot really disengage the objective from the scientific and/or the analytico-mathematical.

On that basis, it is truly difficult to deal with the objective in other terms. And since on the other side of the reality divide, the subjective rules, another field of human intellectual endeavor should be appropriated for its signification: the philosophical. The philosophical, therefore, associates itself with the subjective and vice versa. Matters of value and virtue, the choice of anything that suits individual, subjective preference, are matters of philosophy. Kierkegaard writes: For an objective reflection the truth becomes an object, something objective, and thought must be pointed away from the subject. For a subjective reflection the truth becomes a matter of appropriation of inwardness, of subjectivity, and thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and his subjectivity.(6) ENDNOTES (1)Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), #3, p. 11. (2)Soren Kierkegard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swanson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 176. (3)Rabindranath Tagore, â&#x20AC;&#x2022;Creative Unityâ&#x20AC;&#x2013; in Great Works of Rabindranath Tagore (Delhi: Rose Publications, ____), p. 489.

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(4)Soren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, trans. Alexander Dru, in A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed., Robert Bretall (New York: Modern Library, 1946), p. 5. (5)Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 95. (6)Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postcript, p. 171. © Ruel F. Pepa, 2005

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Deterministic philosophy of mind

Mental event

Elan of life

Human spirituality

Transformative philosophizing

Pragmatization

Analytico-mathematical

Subjectification

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ――Fragments of Philosophy . . .‖‖ 1. What has modern science done to enhance the quality of human life? Does it make modern science the ultimate ground of human progress? Why? Do you believe that modern science has failed in certain ways? Explain your answer.

2. Is there an aspect of our humanity that is so exclusive that it cannot be touched by science? What is that aspect and why has science dismally failed to access it?

What is your idea about human spirituality?

4. In what way can we distinguish between the scientific and the personal? What do you think is basically more important than the other in the human condition? Explain your answer.

5. How do you understand the notion that ―the world is a construction of the human mind‖? Do you believe in it? Explain your answer.

6. What do you think is the idea behind the statement, ―Life‘s meaning transcends the scientific and the mathematical‖?

A Review of John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (published by Free Press: N.Y., 1995) Jerry Shaffer, Ph. D. John Searle is a well-known American philosopher, at the University of California- Berkeley. He has written a number of books such as ―Speech Acts,‖ ―Intentionality,‖ ―The Rediscovery of the Mind,‖ and ―Minds, Brains, and Science,‖ and a multitude of scholarly articles. Searle is very much a Modernist philosopher. He believes that there exist objective facts which make the world the way it is and that at least some of these facts can be known to a high degree of probability. He is careful to define key terms as precisely as he can and explain them with a multitude of examples. He writes in a plain and unadorned style, avoiding flowery passages and dark sayings. No special expertise is needed to understand this book. Any theses he advances he defends with arguments that he believes to be rigorous and logical. But for all his Modernism, he is Post-Modern in holding that much of our knowledge is concerned with facts which are socially constructed. Most of this ``book consists of an examination of these social facts and an explanation of how they arise. In this book, Searle defends the ―Realist‖ view that there exists a real world comprised of objective facts which fall into two categories. In one category are (1) those facts (he calls them ―brute facts‖) which exist independently of what humans think about them and (2) those facts which depend for their existence on human thought (he calls them ―social facts.‖) Examples of the first sort are the mental fact that I am now in pain and the physical facts that Mount Everest has snow and ice at its summit and that hydrogen atoms have one electron. Examples of the second sort of fact, social facts, are that this piece of paper is a five dollar bill, that he is a citizen of the U. S., that the New York Giants won the 1991 Superbowl, and that he owns a piece of property in Berkeley, CA. Of course, in order to state facts we need the existence of language, a social fact, but the facts we state can be distinguished from our statement of them. Facts are facts, whether they are stated or not. Furthermore nothing in Searle‘s view implies that there is some ―best‖ language for stating facts. Different and even incommensurable languages may be needed to describe the facts. For Searle, long before there were humans, there were brute physical facts. Eventually, as consciousness appeared, there came to be brute mental facts. However, as humans developed, there has come into existence a new kind of 165

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fact, social fact, generated by human practices and human attitudes. The project of this book is two-fold, (1) to justify his Realism, his claim that there are objective brute and social facts, and (2) to explain how social facts, and the social reality they comprise, come into existence. Let me start with Searle‘s views on (2). Social facts come into existence through human construction. We produce a social reality by (1)the assigning of functions or roles to physical objects, (turning pieces of matter into chairs, lecture halls, money, swimming holes, national parks, and countries) by groups of individuals who (2) share a common intention to treat those objects in that way, and (3) conform to rules for the treatment of those objects. Much of the book consists of working out some of the details of how social reality is constructed. For Searle, these social constructions are realities consisting of objective facts. There is such a country as the U. S.; and a certain number of citizens and a certain number of non-citizens inhabit it. There is also the physical reality consisting of the physical particles which exist in the space occupied by the U. S. But the social realities and the physical realities are not separate and independent. Searle thinks of the social facts as a kind of overlay, existing, ―so to speak, on top of brute physical facts‖(p.35). The brute physical facts could exist without there being a U. S., but there could not be a U. S. without the brute physical facts. The overlay exists by virtue of the common intentions, functions, and rules adopted by humans. For example, a physical object, a piece of paper becomes a five dollar bill by virtue of the rule-governed use to which it is put by a group of people. The five dollar bill is a reality, but it is a social reality, constructed out of the piece of paper by the collective attitudes of the group that use it. The second half of Searle‘s book consists of his defense of his Realism, the existence of a real world consisting of facts which exist independently of human agreement in representations, intentions, practices, rules, and language. On this view, except for the little corner of the world that is constituted by human agreement, most of the world would remain the same whether we humans existed or not and will go on long after everything human has perished. Searle defends his Realism in two ways, first by examining the main arguments of those who attack Realism and showing what he believes to be various logical flaws which rob those arguments of any force. I will give one example. Consider the Big Dipper. It is by agreement that we pick out those stars and give them that name and that agreement goes back only some thousands of years. But to claim that the Big Dipper does not exist independently of the concept of the Big Dipper or that the Big Dipper has only existed for some

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thousands of years is to confuse properties of the concept with properties of the thing picked out by that concept. It would be a fallacy akin to claiming that babies do not exist until they are given names or called babies. Searle‘s second line of defense of Realism is to argue that any alternative to Realism assumes the very truth of Realism. (1) For example, to claim that an individual‘s world is a construction based on certain features of the brain is to assume that brains exist and have certain features. To claim that certain realities are socially constructed is to assume that there exist social beings coming to certain agreements. To claim that everything exists in some context or other is to assume that various contexts exist. And it makes no sense to reply that brains, social beings, or contexts are themselves constructs; who or what would they be constructed by or out of? Furthermore (2) for example, that the five dollar bill is a social construction requires that there be the piece of paper, or whatever, that is taken, by agreement, to be that piece of money. Social realities are overlays on physical realities, requiring those physical realities for their own reality. And, finally (3), for the social construction to succeed, it must bring into existence a (social) *reality*, a *real* five dollar bill, for example, which constitutes the *fact* that this is a real five dollar bill and makes *true* the statement, ―This is a real five dollar bill.‖ Searle points out that these considerations do not show that there is a real world. They merely show that anything we say commits us to the Realist assumption that there is a real world. Nor do they tell us anything about what that world is like or what we can know about it. Searle ends by asking why it is important to defend Realism. After all, he says, don‘t all of us, whatever our views, take our cars to the mechanic and brush our teeth, as if cars and teeth really exist? He thinks that the rejection of Realism is dangerous in tending to undermine rationality and open the gates to anti-rational forces. ―Philosophical theories make a tremendous difference to every aspect of our lives‖ (p. 197).

Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Social facts

Realism

Brute physical facts

Brute mental fact

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―A Review of John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality‖ 1. What does John Searle mean by the notion that ―much of our knowledge is concerned with facts which are socially constructed‖?

2. What do you think are the differences between brute physical facts, brute mental facts and social facts?

3. What is the meaning of the statement, ―[T]he rejection of Realism is dangerous in tending to undermine rationality and open the gates to antirational forces‖?

The Matrix Movie Series: A Berkeleyan Affirmation of Reality Ruel F. Pepa I. The Meaning of Berkeleyan Idealism in Relation to the Notion of Virtual Reality This paper evaluates the Matrix movie series (The Matrix; Matrix Reloaded; and Matrix Revolutions) in the philosophical light of Berkeleyan subjective idealism. The 17th/18th-century Irish empiricist George Berkeley generally held that physical objects we basically call solid in the context of the three-dimensional world are nothing but fictional. They apparently present themselves before our senses, but in reality, they do not have actual existence independent of our perception of them. In terms of the digital technology of our contemporary world which Alvin Toffler calls the ―third wave‖ era, the Berkeleyan paradigm is closest to the notion of ―virtual reality.‖ As we know it within the limits of present-day developments in digital technology, to get into virtual reality, one puts on a helmet, a pair of goggles fitted with mini-screens for the eyes, a pair of sensitive gloves that react to hand and finger movements and earphones. One‘s movements are connected to the computer which spontaneously adjusts the projected pictures to create the illusion that the said movements occur right within the space the pictures depict. The world that this virtual reality creates may best be described in Berkeleyan terms as ―all in the mind.‖

II. Berkeley’s Reality: A Denial of Matter’s Existence Berkeley‘s conception of reality denies the existence of matter. He simply believes that matter, as this concept is used in physics, does not exist. Berkeley‘s subjective idealism doesn‘t necessarily affect the form of words we use in day-to-day conversation. So that even if we say the Bermuda Triangle exists, Berkeley will not contradict us with the words, ―It‘s only in the mind.‖ The existence of the Bermuda Triangle is only specifically meaningful if we were to go to the area of the Atlantic Ocean off southeast Florida where an imaginary line is formed from Melbourne, Florida to Bermuda to Puerto Rico and back to Florida. Yet, the empirical meaning of the verb ―to exist‖ doesn‘t apply on the concept ―matter,‖ for the simple reason that matter in itself cannot be subjected to observation. This point may be made clearer if seen through the Wittgensteinian idea of language-games. In the language-game of daily life, it may be meaningfully and soundly said that the Bermuda Triangle really does exist because the 171

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existence of anything in such language-game simply means certain states of affairs are observed by the senses in the world. This is the ―empirical‖ sense of the concept of existing. Whereas in the language-game of the physical sciences, the matter that comprises the area called Bermuda Triangle exists in the sense that violent storms and downward air currents frequently occur there causing the disappearance of ships and airplanes on a number of occasions due to unexplainable turbulence and other atmospheric disturbances. We should not confuse the language-game of daily life and that of the physical sciences thereby making the metaphysical claims that matter really exists independent of the mind. In this light, Berkeley‘s flat denial of matter‘s existence is simply a denial of the metaphysical claim that ―matter‖ (as is meant in the physical sciences) can ―exist‖ (as is meant in the empirical sense).

III. Berkeley’s Reality as Virtual Reality Berkeley‘s reality—the world we experience around us on a daily basis— is a virtual reality. In this reality, the ―computer‖ that processes data is God whose power is far more immense than what we limited humans could come up with directly absorbing and processing all our experiences and sensations in our minds. We, in fact, actually explore and move around in the world that God has created in the same manner and capability that we can explore and move around in the spatio-temporal milieu of a man-made virtual reality. Yet, both these worlds—in the Berkeleyan sense—are nothing but illusory. Reality, therefore, rests alone on one‘s experience of them and on the power that processes information to generate them. In daily life, we normally say things around us are real and we have a way to distinguish them from dreams, or hallucinations, or imagined objects. The reality of these ordinary objects is simply determined on the basis of a constant and regular conjunction to the laws of mechanics. There are spatio-temporal limitations in our movements in this world and memory serves us well to make sense out of life‘s regularity--states of affairs distinctly absent in the ―absurdities‖ and disconnection characteristic of dreams and hallucinations. This point makes Berkeley‘s conception of reality logically intact in the presence of a God who maintains constancy and regularity in this world through an eternally sharp memory of locations and appearances. So that even if you leave your house and you no longer see it, God‘s eternally sharp memory has always maintained a mental configuration of how it appeared when you left it, and when you return to it, it will instantly reproduce in the same exact configuration. However, your house, per se, i.e., considered as a reality independent of perception, doesn‘t really exist. We say, its reality is virtual, not actual.

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IV. The Matrix Movie Series as A Berkeleyan Affirmation of Virtual Reality The Matrix series of sci-fi action movies produced by Warner Brothers is founded on the notion that the material world as defined in terms of paramount reality is illusory. In other words, there is no paramount reality. The Matrix series is pregnant with the idea that we are heading towards a future that is created, generated, interpreted, and realized by the unbounded thrust of fast-paces development in digital technology. It belongs to an age run and controlled by the explosive dynamics of unrestrained information flow and mind-blowing stream of knowledge-invasion never seen in past civilization. In the present run of computer-enhanced events, an inverse relation between paramount reality and virtual reality gradually occurs leading to the final demise of paramount reality in the fast approaching era.

The computer technology right amid us is seen in all its multi-variagated forms of optical computer, the DNA computer, the molecular and dot computers, and the quantum computer, along with the complementary development of nanotechnology, robotics, and the human genome project. They constitute the Matrix that will ultimately stamp out paramount reality and lead virtual reality to its point of no return. The George Berkeley of 17th/18th-century Enlightenment who was taken lightly to the point of ridicule has slowly gained ground since the inception of the post-industrial era. With the aforementioned technology of this era, the Matrix has already been set up to affirm once and for all the reality theorized, advanced, and fought for by George Berkeley.

ÂŠ Ruel F. Pepa, March 22, 2004 Words/Concepts/Terms to Discuss and/or Ponder On Subjective idealism

Third wave era

Digital technology

Virtual reality

Language games

Paramount reality

Nanotechnology

Robotics

Human genome project

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―The Matrix Movie Series: A Berkeleyan Affirmation of Reality‖ 1. How does Berkeleyan subjective idealism conceive reality? How does this conception of reality relate with Toffler‘s view of ―third wave‖ reality?

2. Do you agree to the notion that the language of daily life should be seen as something different from the language game of the physical sciences? Explain your answer.

3. What do you think is the significance of ―god‖ in Berkeley‘s conception of reality? Does the same significance apply to what we know now as virtual reality? Explain your answer.

4. In your own ―realistic‖ assessment of the whole discussion at hand, is it really possible to ―stamp out‖ paramount reality? Explain your answer.

PHILOSOPHY AND LANGUAGE Language as Our Means of Communication Michael Dummett

Truth Is Stranger Than It Used To Be Michael McKinney

Wittgenstein and the Problem of Meaning Ruel F. Pepa

Language as Our Means of Communication Michael Dummett Language serves two purposes for us: as an instrument of communication and as a vehicle of thought. Which is its primary role? Is it because we can express our thoughts in words that we can use words to convey those thoughts to others? Or is it rather that it is because we can communicate with one another by means of words that we can use words to express our thoughts to ourselves? Informal disputes frequently arise over whether we ―think in words‖. Some maintain that they always think in words; others that they do so only sometimes. When two or more people are talking with one another, the process would be misrepresented by supposing that, before speaking, each first conceived a thought in his mind and then put it into the words he uttered. Occasionally, a speaker may pause to consider what to say before making his contribution to the conversation; he may be making up his mind what is the truth of the matter, or he may be pondering how best to express what he already thinks. For the most part, however, there is no such preliminary reflection: each speaker comes straight out with what he has to say. In such a case, the verbal utterance is not a linguistic formulation of a prior thought: the speaker is thinking in words, words that he utters out loud. He is framing his thoughts at the same time as he communicates them. Someone asked a question about some matter about which he has never thought may take a little time to respond. He may not be reflecting on how to express his opinion verbally: he may be reflecting on the topic itself, calling to mind the various considerations bearing on it one way and the other. Chivvied to give a response by a questioner who says, ―You must know what you think‖, he may reasonably, if comically, reply, ―How can I know what I think until I hear what I say?‖ But how is it when we think silently to ourselves? Clearly, we often do then rehearse our thoughts in sentences: but are we, in such a case, thinking for the first time the thoughts expressed by those sentences, or merely thinking how to express our thoughts in words? To say the latter would be to say that we are thinking how to express in words the thoughts we already have. Sometimes, indeed, this is a correct description of what is taking place—for instance, when we have already expressed those thoughts in words, but in words that would be unsuitable for some forthcoming occasion. This may be because, so expressed, our hearers would not readily understand, or because they might be offended or embarrassed. It is plain, nevertheless, that it would often falsify the process of thinking to oneself to describe it as thinking how to express our thoughts in

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words: we are often in a position in which our inner verbal formulation of the thought is the first time we have ever framed just that thought, one in which we could say to ourselves, ―I did not know that I thought that until I said it to myself‘. Thought needs a vehicle: there is no such thing as a bare thought, one not expressed by anything, either by externally observable speech or action, or by internal imagery. Often the vehicle is linguistic; but this need not mean that the thought is formulated in sentences which, if spoken aloud, would adequately convey it to others. I can employ, as a vehicle of my thought, the kind of shorthand that will suffice to record a thought in notes I make for my own use.

Another person might be unable to interpret those notes, because they rely on associations peculiar to me. The notes do not fully express the thoughts they record, but adequately, serve to call them to my mind; and in the same way, when I am engaging in a rapid train of thought, the words that go through my head may encapsulate my successive thoughts for me, although they do not fully express them. A thought can, however, be expressed otherwise than in words, but an outward action other than speech. If I sit up in my chair, turn my head and assume an alert look, I may well be giving expression to the thought, ―What was that strange noise?‖; if after a moment I shrug my shoulders and return to what I was doing, I may express the thought, ―It was probably nothing important‖. To ascribe such thoughts to me is not to suggest that those words, or any words, went through my head: my thoughts were sufficiently expressed by my actions. When someone is driving a car or steering a boat, he may have to think very rapidly how to take avoiding action when another car or boat approaches in an unexpected direction. His thought is unlikely to be conducted in words. It is more likely to be conducted in mental imagery superimposed upon the scene he sees with his eyes, even though, later, he can recount his thoughts in language. The process of thought that goes through the mind of someone driving a car or steering a boat is the kind of thought in which an animal can engage. Animals can often solve quite difficult problems about how to deal with physical situations confronting them; but their thought can bear only on what they can presently perceive, because its vehicle can only be imagined manipulation of their perceptions, just like the thought of the person driving a car or steering a boat. A human being, by contrast, may frequently be struck by a thought having nothing to do with his current activity: he may stop in his tracks, turn round and go back, because he has just remembered something he had forgotten to do or to take with him. An animal cannot behave in this way, because his thoughts cannot float free of his present environment.

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Language is thus very often, but not invariably, the vehicle of human thought. One can have any given thought only if one has grasped the concepts involved in that thought: one cannot think, ―That is not a river, but a lake‖, unless one has the concepts of a river and of a lake. A great many of our concepts we have acquired only through our learning of language; most of these could not have been acquired in any other way. As Wittgenstein remarked, a dog may be expecting his master to come, but he cannot be expecting him to come in an hour‘s time, or next week. Our knowledge of language makes us capable of thoughts that we could not have if we had no language, whatever may be their vehicles on a particular occasion. A language is essentially a communal possession, that is, essentially an instrument for communication between different people, people who share that language. It is a mistake of principle to think of each individual as having a language peculiar to himself—an idiolect—and to regard the primary notion as being that of the idiolect, a common dialect being a set of overlapping idiolects and a language, as we ordinarily think of it, a set of closely resembling dialects. Of course, the word ―dialect‖ is used in different senses. Sometimes it merely means a language that lacks prestige: one not used in the legislature, one in which newspapers are not printed or sermons preached. But a dialect in the other sense, that is, properly so called, is not a language in its own right, but a way of speaking a language, as an accent is a way of pronouncing a language. A foreigner ought to try to use a language as the natives do, following them in vocabulary, syntax and idiom: it is impolite of him knowingly to insist on speaking it in some other way. But when two people are speaking together in the same language, each using his own language, it is usually impolite for either to mimic the other; it gives the impression of mockery. This often applies to the use by one of them of the dialect that the other is using. I am afraid that I cannot illustrate this in Italian, because I do not know it nearly well enough, so an English illustration will have to serve. When a Scotsman and an Englishman are speaking to one another, the Scotsman may use the expression ―wee balms‖, meaning ‗little children‘. He will expect the Englishman to understand him— that much of Scottish dialect is widely known. But he will not expect him to copy him. If the Englishman, in reply, were to speak of ‗wee brains‘, he would give the impression of mocking him, just as he would do if he copied his accent instead of using his own.

An idiolect is not related to a language, or even to a dialect, as a dialect is related to a language. Of course, each individual speaker has his personal linguistic habits. Of the vocabulary which the dictionary lists, he will know and freely use some words, he will understand but hardly ever himself use certain other words, and he will be quite unfamiliar with yet other—probably

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many other—words. He is likely, moreover to misunderstand and misuse a certain range of words. And the extent of these four categories will vary from individual speaker to individual speaker. These personal peculiarities of individual speakers do not, however, make of idiolects structures that could subsist of themselves; rather, they are ways that an individual has of speaking the language that he shares with others, and have just been explained by reference to that common language. An individual‘s idiolect could not exist without there being a common language of which it was an idiolect: it could not be his private language, unrelated to any other, in which— since by hypothesis he could not use it for communication—he might frame his private thoughts and, perhaps, keep his diary. In his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein gave a famous argument to the effect that there cannot be a private language. For the purpose of this argument, he understood the expression ―a private language‖ in a very restricted way: in this sense, someone has a private language only if he is the sole person who could understand it. The reason for this restriction is that Wittgenstein‘s immediate target of attack was a very common conception of our cognitive relation to our own sensations—our manner of thinking about them. One notorious way of expressing this conception is by saying that it is impossible to convey to others what our sensations are like: for this reason, it is maintained, I cannot know whether something that we agree in calling ―yellow‖ does not appear to you as what we should both call ―red‖ appears to me. Another way to express the same conception is to say that words for phenomenal features such as colour have a dual meaning in the minds of all who use them: they have the public meaning which we invoke when we converse with others; and they have the private meanings which for each subject expresses the sensation that he experiences when he perceives something of the given colour. It is because he attaches this private meaning to a colour-word that he is able to use it in accordance with its public meaning. He recognises the colour-sensation to which some object gives rise in him as that which he calls by that colour-name, and uses the colour-name to convey to others what he sees. This is effective because our colour-sensations are systematically correlated with the physical properties of the light that strikes our eyes, but, so far as we shall ever be able to tell, in a way that differs from individual to individual.

According to this idea, the private meaning that one subject attaches to the colour-word cannot in principle be communicated to any other subject; if the subject had a private word with that meaning, he could never explain its sense to anybody else. I believe, however, that Wittgenstein‘s argument suffices to prove the

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impossibility of a private language in a broader sense, that of a language which only one person does understand. The fact that someone could, or believes that he could, instruct another person in the use of his private language makes no essential difference to the situation, so long as he has not done so. Once he has taught the language to another, and he and the other start to converse in it, then we have a new situation: now it really is a language, even if, so far, with only two speakers. But, while it remained the property of only a single individual, it was not yet a genuine language at all. Of course, we must take care how we frame this thesis. A code is not a private language, even if known to only one person. If someone knows a common language, but uses, for soliloquy or for his private notebook, certain otherwise non-existent words of his own invention in place of certain words of the common language, he is not employing a private language in the relevant sense, because the use of the words he has invented remains responsible to the use of the words of the common language that they encode. A private language of the kind which Wittgenstein‘s argument aims to show cannot exist, is one the meanings of whose words are not given by reference to the meanings of the words of any other language, but are directly conferred on them solely by the individual whose language it is. The argument turns on the evident principle that the meaning of a word or more complex linguistic expression depends upon there being a right and a wrong concerning its use. This right and wrong relate both to construction and to application. In a common language such as English, a gross grammatical error destroys meaning, if the number-word ―three‖ or the noun ―problem‖ is used as a verb in some sentence, that sentence is, as it stands, meaningless. It may be possible to work out what the speaker is intending to say; but what he has said has no meaning, as he said it. More importantly, even if what a speaker says has a determinate meaning in the language, there must be, if he was making an assertion, an agreed criterion for whether what he said was true. If he was asking a question, there must be an agreed criterion for what would be the right answer; if he was declaring what should be done, there must be an agreed criterion for whether his demand was complied with; similarly if he was giving voice to a wish, making a bet or the like. Very often, it will be far from straightforward to determine the truth or falsity of an assertion: but it must be a matter of common agreement what is to count as a ground for its truth, and what forms of argument for its support or against it are valid. The criteria for the truth of very simple forms of statement, such as ―It is snowing‖ or ―The bottle is on the shelf‖, must be applicable by quite direct observation.

A private language cannot have objective standards of right and wrong. There is no one to judge whether what is said is right or wrong, whether it

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is correctly or incorrectly constructed, whether the predicate is or is not true of the object to which it is applied. If a sensation is being identified, there is no standard by which it can be decided whether it was identified correctly or incorrectly, whether the sensation so identified really is or is not the same as the sensation to which that name was originally attached. There is only the individual speaker, who is judge in his own case. As Wittgenstein says, whatever will seem right will be right: and that means that there is not in reality any right or wrong here at all. A private language is no genuine language, because what is of the essence of language, principles that determine whether anything has really been said or not, and other principles that determine whether what has been said is true or false, are lacking.

It follows that there cannot be a language unless it is common to a whole community, a body of speakers. This does not of course imply that a language is dead when only one person who knows it remains: it dies when that last speaker dies. It was still a genuine language even when only one person knew it, because it had been the common possession of a community of speakers. A dead language is still a language, because it was once the common possession of a community of speakers; if it has left behind a literature, we can still discover from this what were the norms that governed it. Nor does it imply that an utterance in a language is correct provided only that a majority of the linguistic communityâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;most or even all of its speakersâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; would judge or be inclined to judge that it was correct. There can of course be massive communal error in judging the truth of propositions whose truth-value is not readily determinable: the most obvious example of this is the long adherence of humanity to the geocentric picture of the universe. There can also be a widespread tendency to make erroneous judgements about more particular matters, for instance to think that the thunder follows the lightning instead of merely being heard after the lightning is seen. When we learn a language, we do not merely acquire propensities to speak in certain ways and to judge the truthvalue of what is said in certain ways. Rather, we come to grasp certain principles governing our employment of language: principles that determine the formation of sentences out of their component words, and how the meanings of those sentences are derived from the meanings of the words, and principles that govern by what means we are to decide the truth or falsity of a declarative statement. These principles, if they are truly to govern our use of the language, must be the object of common agreement, but their application, though often obvious, is by no means always straightforward: hence the disagreements that so frequently arise between us. It is the principles that we learn to accept which determine whether what is said is correct or incorrect, true or false, not whether speakers at large are disposed to think it one or the other.

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From this we must infer that the primary purpose of language is as an instrument of communication. The words and sentences of a language could not have the meanings that they have were the language not used as an instrument of communication, because they would not have those meanings unless it were the common possession of a community of speakers. It is because it serves as an instrument of communication that it can also serve as a vehicle of thought. Language is essentially, not accidentally, a social phenomenon; we have language, and hence are able to have the thoughts we have, only because we are members of a human society. As we are reminded with wearisome frequency by professors of linguistics, languages change; if they did not, we here should all be speaking Proto-Indo European. The fission of Latin into the many Romance languages took place in historical times. The least interesting reason for linguistic change is the introduction of new words, or new senses for old words, for new kinds of object or newly-discovered objects or kinds of object. But languages change also because the rules or principles governing them come to be flouted. A language must be subject to rules; otherwise its expressions would have no meanings and we could not use it to say one thing rather than another. But the paradox of language lies in the fact that, although it has rules, there is no authority to enforce those rules. The only penalty for failing to abide by the rules of a language is that of failing to convey anything to oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s hearers. If it were not possible to convey oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s meaning at all unless one adhered strictly to the rules governing the language one was speaking, then there would be no linguistic change save that required for making reference to new kinds of object. But this is of course far from being so. When someone utters a grammatically incorrect sentence, or uses a word in a garbled form or in the wrong sense, it is very often possible to guess what mistake he was making, and hence what correctly phrased sentence would have expressed the meaning he was intending to convey. But some hearers will rightly guess at the intended meaning without realising that any mistake had been made. If such hearers repeat the mistake, or other speakers make the same mistake, it will gain currency: if it gains sufficient currency, it will cease to be a mistake. A grammatical rule will have been altered, or a word have acquired a new form or a new sense. The paradox of language is that those who must obey the rules if language are at the same time the rule-givers: if they come to concur in speaking in accordance with systematic violations of the existing rules, those ways of speaking cease to be violations and come to exemplify the new rules that are now in force. The professors of linguistics who so incessantly remind us that languages change often speak and write as though an utterance bears its meaning on its face, as if its meaning were as observable a feature as the way it is pronounced.

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They say that a native speaker may express his meaning however he chooses, just because there is no external authority to compel him to speak as the rules that govern the language require. Obviously this is not so. An utterance that is correctly expressed bears the meaning that it does precisely because of the rules that govern the language: those rules determine what each word means and how they combine to confer its meaning on the sentence that is composed of them. It is on the basis of those same rules that it is often possible to guess the meaning that a speaker intended to convey by means of an utterance that he has expressed incorrectly. Such professors of linguistics frequently use their cry, ―You can‘t stop language from changing‖, to insinuate that linguistic change is an irresistible natural force beyond the control of the speakers of the language. Obviously, it is not: if the language changes, it is the speakers who change it. Some changes are beneficial, some malign, particularly those that impoverish the vocabulary of the language by depriving a word of its former meaning and attaching to it a meaning that another word already had. Linguistic change is not irresistible: when a particular change destroys a means of avoiding ambiguity or diminishes the expressive power of the language, it ought to be resisted and sometimes can be successfully resisted. Two people can communicate with one another by means of language— the only means we have to communicate any but the simplest thoughts and wants-only if there is a language that they both know, at least to some extent. Speaking and listening to the speech of others are conscious activities. They might not be. We can imagine being in a condition of not being able consciously to discriminate the sounds that others, or that we ourselves, made when we spoke: after all, it is a common experience to hear others talking, but to be unable to make out what they are saying. In such a condition it might be that the words that others addressed to us aroused in our minds the thoughts they were expressing, without our being able consciously to articulate their utterances into their component words, and that likewise, when we spoke ourselves, we were aware of the thoughts we were expressing but unaware in any detail of the sounds by means of which we were expressing them. After all, we can remember the gist of what someone said, that is, its content, without being able to recall the words he used: might it not be like that for us at the very time of hearing someone speak? It is interesting to consider whether this fantasy is a genuine possibility or not; but it is at least a fantasy. Our knowledge of a language is a conscious knowledge, and our use of it a conscious activity.

In what does someone‘s knowledge of a language consist? What are the rules that determine what meanings the words and sentences of a language have? The explanatory priority must be given to the meanings of sentences: as the famous statement of Gottlob Frege has it, it is only in the context of a

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sentence that a word has a meaning. The meaning of a word is its contribution to the meaning of a sentence of which it is part: we can explain the meaning of a word only as contributing to the meaning of a sentence in which it occurs, and hence only if we have a conception of what, in general, a sentence may mean. Sentences of course serve many different purposes. Some may be used to state what is the case; others may be used to enquire what is the case, to express a wish that something were the case, to demand or to pray that something be the case. Of these, their use to assert what is the case may be considered primary: we cannot explain the other uses of sentences unless we understand what is meant by saying that a question has been answered, that a wish has been fulfilled, that a demand has been complied with, that a prayer has been answered. So the central problem is to account for the meanings of declarative sentences that can be used to make assertions. The general explanation of the meanings of declarative sentences which is by far the most popular among analytical philosophers is the truth-conditional one first systematically proposed by Frege in the first volume of his Basic Laws of Arithmetic and endorsed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his celebrated early book Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. This is the theory that the meaning of a declarative sentence is given as, or determined by, the condition for an assertion made by it on any particular occasion to be true. On this theory, we must explain a speakerâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s understanding of a declarative sentence as consisting in his knowledge of the condition for an assertoric utterance of it on any particular occasion to be true. The difficulty with this theory is twofold: to explain how we learn to associate such conditions with the sentences of the language; and to explain in what our grasp of those conditions consists. We are often in a position to establish one or another statement as true, or as highly probable, by observation or by reasoning based upon observation. That is what we learn when we learn our language: we learn what is to count as establishing the statements that can be made in the language as true or as probable. We learn how to report our observations in language; and we learn what forms of reasoning are valid. Obviously, there are many statements that we understand perfectly well, but of which we have no reason to judge true or false. It is natural to take our understanding of them to reside in our ability to judge whether something would establish or render probable their truth. But this would not be sufficient from the standpoint of the truth-conditional theory of meaning: to understand the statement, we must, on this theory, know the condition that must hold for it to be true, whether or not this is a condition that we can recognise as obtaining, whenever it obtains. How are we supposed to have come by this knowledge, simply from learning to use our language? It is certainly part of it that we should have acquired the ability to recognise when the truth of a given statement has been established or shown to be probable; but it is hardly part

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of learning to use the language to come to grasp the condition for it to be true, independently of there being any ground for us to assert it. An ability to recognise that the truth of a statement has been established or shown to be probable is manifested in a speakerâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s employment of the language. He treats the statement as true, either by himself asserting it or else by accepting inferences drawn from it, drawing such inferences himself or in his other conduct acting upon the truth of the statement. In the case of a statement whose truth has not so far been established or shown to be probable, a speaker may well still be able to show himself capable of recognising that its truth was established or shown to be probable, if this should later occur; he would thus show that he satisfied this criterion for understanding the sentence used to make the statement. He could show it by what he said in this regard about certain hypothetical circumstances; but he could also show it by his employment in other sentences of the various words that make up the sentence in question. An account of understanding in terms of a speakerâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s ability to recognise what shows a statement to be true does not rest on attributing to the speaker any inner mental processes accompanying his speech or his listening to the speech of others; it rests only on his observable use of the language. It is this -- his observable use of the language -- which provides the ordinary basis on which we judge that he does or does not understand this or that expression. The truth-conditional account of understanding, by contrast, involves ascribing to the speaker, for every statement he understands, a conception of the condition required for it to be true. This is not just a conception of a state of affairs in which he could recognise the truth of the statement as having been established, for it is essential to the truth-conditional theory that the statement may be true independently of our means of coming to know that it is true: what anyone must have, on this theory, in order to understand the statement, is a grasp of the condition for it to be true, whether or not we are in a position to recognise it to be true. When we do not know whether a statement is or is not true, we may know an effective method of finding out whether it is true. But often we do not know of any such effective method: we simply have to leave it open whether or not we shall hit upon reasons to think it true or reasons to think it false, without any assurance that we shall ever do either. Now truth conditional theorists normally accept classical logic, and, with it, the principle of bivalence. This is the principle, namely, that every statement is determinately either true or false, provided, at least, that it is not ambiguous and that its meaning is definite rather than vague. Hence, even if we do not know any effective method for finding out whether a given statement is true or false, those who accept this principle must presume that, independently of our knowledge, it is either true or false. It may be true, even it we shall never nave any reason to think it so; equally, it may be

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raise, even though we shall never have any reason to deny it. The truth-conditional theory of understanding therefore requires the attribution to a speaker, for him to understand a language, of an ability to frame, for every statement he understands, an inner mental conception of a state of affairs that would render that statement true. What form does his grasp of this inner mental conception take? The proponent of a truthconditional theory of meaning and understanding cannot say that it consists in an ability to formulate in words the condition for the truth of any given statement, or else his explanation would be circular: he would be explaining the understanding of language in terms of a prior knowledge of language. His grasp of the truth-condition -- rather than his knowledge that it is the condition for the truth of the given statementâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;must, rather, be effected without the help of language. That we have any such languageless grasp of the condition for the truth of every statement we understand is highly implausible: what we have is an understanding of our language. As Wittgenstein said, when we say something, knowing what we mean, we do not have meanings in our heads running along beside the words: the words we utter are the vehicle of our thought. The truth-conditional theory of understanding makes it uncertain whether anyone else understands what we say as we do. On this theory, we cannot tell for sure whether he understands from what he says or how he responds to what we say. We could tell for sure only if we could look into his mind to see if he had the same conception as we do of what would render our statements true; for he might without having that conception know all that was needed to use the language correctly. The logical positivists did not subscribe to the truth-conditional theory of meaning; instead, they advocated the verificationist theory according to which the meaning of a statement consists in the manner in which it might be verified. So far, this agrees with the account of understanding as the ability to recognise when the truth of the statement has been established. So far, in my opinion, the positivists were not in error. They went wrong, however, in their narrow conception of what the verification of any statement must consist in. They thought that the verification of any empirical statement must consist in a suitable sequence of sense-impressions. The meanings of statements of logic and mathematics had then to be explained in a completely different way. This was an atomistic theory of meaning: it allowed it as in principle possible that someone should understand any one sentence of a language without understanding any other of its sentences, nor, therefore, any of the words in that one sentence. In a sense, indeed, a tourist armed with a phrase-book can associate the correct meaning with a sentence of a language he does not know: but, while he may be said to know the meaning of the sentence, he does not

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in the true sense understand it, because he does not grasp the meanings of the component words nor how they are put together to form a sentence with that overall meaning. Moreover, the conception of verification as receiving an appropriate sequence of sense-impressions bears little relation to our actual procedures for recognising the truth of a statement: we should be hard put to it to say what sense-impressions led us to endorse the statement ―The Government is far less popular than it was just after the election‖. Where the logical positivists went astray was in failing to comprehend the interconnectedness of language. Many expressions cannot be understood unless other expressions are first understood. The positivist conception of verification does not tally with what in practice we take as establishing the truth of a statement, either conclusively or with probability. In the normal case, this will not consist in unassisted sensory observation, but will involve inferential reasoning, and will thus depend on our understanding of the other statements that form part of the argument. Sentences do not, as the positivists thought, fall into a dichotomy of empirical ones and mathematical ones. Rather, there is a scale at one end of which stand sentences capable of being used as reports of observation, and may therefore be verified without appeal to any kind of reasoning, and at the other end of which stand mathematical theorems, established by deductive reasoning unaided by observation. Most of the statements we make occupy intermediate positions on this scale: the manner in which we establish their truth involves both observation and inferential argument. A plausible theory which treats the meanings of sentences as given by what is required to establish statements made by means of them as true will explain this in terms of the way in which we actually so establish them, and not as the occurrence of sequences of sense-impressions. Because the word ―venficationism‖ has misleading associations with the mistaken theories of the logical positivists, I should prefer to call such a theory ‗justificationist‘ rather than ‗verificationist‘: it explains the meaning of a statement in terms of what would justify asserting it. In particular, the meaning of a theological statement, such as ―God knows the secret impulses of men‖, ―God forgives the sins of the penitent‖ or the fundamental ―There is a God‖, will be given, on a justificationist theory of meaning, by whatever arguments in favour of them we correctly recognise as cogent. When acceptance of any particular such statement rests on revelation, this will be a feature of its meaning, together with the grounds for believing it to have been revealed. Of course, these are propositions over which there is and has been great dispute: but those who argue for and against them do so on the assumption that such arguments are objectively either valid or fallacious: and their validity or invalidity turn on our considered judgements of their soundness or unsoundness. On the truth-conditional theory of meaning, by contrast, the

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meaning of a theological statement, like that of any other statement, is given by the condition for it to be true. In this context, this phrase comes very close to being meaningless: what can it mean to say that someone knows the condition for the statement ―God exists‖ to be true? The justificationist theory connects the meanings of our statements, including theological ones, with our actual linguistic practice, not with a prelinguistic capacity to envisage confirmatory states of affairs.

Dialect

Verificationism

Justificationism

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Language as Our Means of Communication‖ 1. Do we really think in words or is there a way that thought may occur in non-linguistic form? Explain your answer.

2. What do you think about the possibility of a ―private‖ language? Is it possible or not? Why or why not?

3. What is the meaning of the statement, ―A language is essentially a communal possession‖?

4. What is the truth-conditional theory of meaning?

5. What is the verificationist theory of meaning?

Truth Is Stranger Than It Used To Be Michael McKinney The contemptuous Humpty Dumpty, sitting up on his wall, said to Alice, ―When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—nothing more nor less.‖ Somewhat perplexed by this, Alice replied, ―The question is whether you can make words mean so many different things.‖ ―The question is,‖ barked Humpty Dumpty, ―which is to be master— that‘s all.‖ Humpty Dumpty‘s attitude is all too prevalent today. Truth has become whatever we wish it to be—that‘s all. It is whatever we decide it to be. We are the yardstick; we are the master. The old, traditional concepts look the same and are discussed in the same way, but they do not have the same meanings as they used to. Surely there‘s a consensus on truths such as ―two plus two equals four‖ and ―the earth revolves around the sun,‖ but is there a body of truth to explain the bigger fundamental questions: Who are we? Why are we here? What should we be doing? How are we to interact? Is this life all there is? The human mind longs for answers to these questions, and while they once seemed within our grasp, they now appear to be intangible. Today, truth has come under the Big Top. It‘s a circus full of sideshows. We have for our approval an endless cacophony of ideas. The fringes are attacking the core. Nonsense is taking center stage. All opinions and feelings are valid and up for grabs, because society no longer considers any truth to be absolute. Instead, there are many beliefs, many realities, many truths. It would be difficult here to give a complete overview, even in a very general way, of the history of humanity‘s relationship with truth. We cannot possibly cover all the complexities and nuances of a good epistemological study. We can agree, however, that people have always been on a quest to know, always sought the answers to the big questions. We have searched for truth, order and the meaning of life. And when the answers we‘ve come up with have left us wanting, we‘ve gone off in all kinds of creative new directions.

IN SEARCH OF TRUTH Let‘s review a few of the twists and turns we humans have taken to get us where we are today. Just over a thousand years ago, when the survivors and descendants of the 195

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barbarian invasions and the catastrophic fall of the Roman Empire stood on the threshold of a new millennium, they feared for the end of the world. But the year 1000 came and went, new days dawned, and there were mouths to feed, so Europeans began to rebuild their world. What ensued was perhaps the most religiously oriented period in Western history, the Middle Ages. People wanted to contemplate God, to study God, to understand and advance His will as they understood it. The quest for truth became a function of the dominant religion of the day, Roman Catholicism. Self-determined intellectual inquiry was replaced with prayer and the church‘s reading of the Scriptures. The church overshadowed all. In the mind of the average person, there was one God, one church, one truth. In reaction to the domination and perceived excesses of the church and the medieval system, a gradually rising attitude of secularism brought a new emphasis on the individual‘s direct and private relationship with God. As a result, there was a resurgence of classical thought, and the church began to be called into question on almost everything. During this period, the basis of the Renaissance (―rebirth‖), truth began to shift from religion to science. Whereas truth had always been determined in reference to something else—God, universal intelligence, natural law, reason or nature—man became, to borrow a phrase from the Greek Sophist Protagoras, ―the measure of all things.‖ Consequently human beings began to see things in a new way. Francis Bacon stands out as one who got the intellectual wheels turning in a new direction. While not a scientist himself, Bacon is credited with being the father of the scientific method. He saw in science something far more profound than his predecessors had: a way to improve the human condition. The determination of truth, once the province of God, the church, and possibly the ―divinely ordained‖ king, was now within anyone‘s grasp—reason with a common touch.

This seemingly subtle reorientation created a profound change, however. The world would now be seen through the eyes of science. The right to determine truth would be pulled down from the heavens and handed over to the inductive, quantitative realm of science. This empirical approach lies at the core of our thinking today. Equipped with the new tools of science, humans aspired to revolutionize the world. What followed, in fact, was a series of revolutions and explorations, and the subsequent conquest of the planet.

SHIFTING FOUNDATIONS The new approach was applied and adapted to all areas of life. Modern

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society, beginning with the Scientific Revolution and on into the Age of Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, was built on a foundation of science and the technology that resulted from it, with the invisible hand of capitalism financing its inexorable rise. As tools of and by themselves, they proved effective in advancing the physical realm, but as a foundation for all truth, they were deficient. Because universally acclaimed truth was no longer available to bind us, we became disconnected from one another. We drifted into the meaninglessness from which we once sought refuge. Friedrich Nietzsche, the last of the three great German philosophers of the 19th century (the other two being Hegel and Marx), came along and made the definitive statement that set the stage for what was to follow. Contemptuous of those who had tried to secularize morality by divorcing it from Christianity, Nietzsche pronounced God dead (see ―Bio Vision‖ on page 62). This meant the death of truth—in particular, the truth of any authority beyond the self. By the beginning of the 20th century, his nihilistic thinking began to weave its way into the fabric of society. What was once thought of as incomprehensible and absurd, even offensive, became widely accepted. These ideas were given further impetus by Charles Darwin‘s theories regarding evolution. The idea of natural selection placed man within a linear, or progressive, model of development; in other words, any change that was responsive to current thoughts and trends had to be positive. Therefore the ground was always shifting. Justification for our beliefs, now in our own hands, was given substance by nothing more tangible than our feelings and personal gratification. Separated from our foundations and lost, humanity has been groping for truth ever since. The modern world searched for truth scientifically. Modernism possessed a confident worldview. Believing that nothing exists beyond what our senses can perceive, modernists determined truth as they experienced it. Modernism, with its unconditional belief in objective reality, saw truth as the result of statements that could be either proved or disproved. It was an idea founded on a false assumption: the autonomous man. This idea that we alone can determine reality and truth has made truth selflegitimizing. However, although it sounds inspiring and appeals to our basic human nature, it is not a genuine formula by which to determine all truth. The applied science of technology was supposed to be the 20th-century messiah, but for many it appears to have exhausted its potential in that it has not, as Francis Bacon wished, improved the human condition. The problem is that when we put absolute faith in something that by definition isn‘t absolute,

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we quite naturally become disillusioned, anxious and untrusting. But instead of going back to the basics and rethinking our premises, we now say that no one is right and everyone is right. This is relativism of the most brazen sort. With a loss of confidence, we see the world as a by-product of many realities and many truths. Everything is possible and nothing is certain. Truth is a story. It isn‘t the end, it‘s the means. This reaction to the overconfident stance of modernism is the essence of postmodernism.

Management guru Peter Drucker says we are living amid the most profound societal change in human history. Sadly, we are facing this unprecedented cultural change without guideposts.

DON’T THINK—FEEL We can‘t stop or slow down change, but we can find anchors to help us cope with it. Truth is such an anchor. But we prefer opinions. We prefer stances that allow for relative values, giving us wiggle room. Personal preference means we don‘t have to think. We don‘t have to be unpopular. We can be lazy and avoid dealing with anything. We can rest on sentiment. As Linus of the comic strip ―Peanuts‖ said as he defended his belief in the Great Pumpkin, ―it doesn‘t matter what you believe, so long as you are sincere.‖ This is the meaningless neutral approach to truth we see today. A postmodern society taken to its inevitable conclusion means there is no such thing as common sense because there are no commonly held thoughts, feelings or opinions to which we can possibly appeal. This is a condition fraught with confusion and prone to strife. With no foundation for truth, the highest value that can be placed on any truth is its capacity to please and its practical utility—how it makes us feel. Feelings and opinions must then be elevated over truth. And this we have done. It can be argued that by the 1970s we lost the language of truth. Yet human beings seek stability. Consequently this postmodern society has retreated to the only thing we really can know: our own feelings (a self-defeating position at best). Enamored with our own feelings, we want contradictory things. We are lost, but we don‘t want anyone to show us the way. We want justice, but we don‘t want judgments. We want results, but we don‘t want discipline. We want love, but we are turned inward. We want tolerance, but we don‘t like differences. We want unity, but we want to be left alone. We want solutions, but nothing is absolute. We don‘t even know how to know what we know. In the 1999 book Culture Shift, author David Henderson wrote, ―Feelings dominate our world. They have hijacked our language. We say ‗I feel‘ instead of

Truth Is Stranger Than It Used To Be 199 ‗I think‘ or ‗I believe.‘ When we have a decision to make, a belief to defend, or an action to justify, it is to our feelings we go for confirmation. If it feels good, do it. . . . Few people have the self-mastery to make their feelings secondary and conduct their lives according to convictions. In a world in which self-expression and selfgratification reign, concepts like self-denial and self-control seem like antiques.‖ And Henderson then quite poignantly adds, ―Why should I mistrust my feelings when I‘ve worked so hard to get in touch with them?‖

Today, awash in a gush of emotions, we are sinking in the language of the self.

CULTURE OF THE SELF Journalist-author Robert Hughes thinks we need to grow up. His book Culture of Complaint is an indictment of American politics, art and culture. In it he writes, ―The pursuit of the Inner Child has taken over just at the moment when Americans ought to be figuring out where their Inner Adult is, and how that disregarded oldster got buried under the rubble of pop psychology and specious short-term gratification. . . . We create an infantilized culture of complaint, in which Big Daddy is always to blame and the expansion of rights goes on without the other half of citizenship—attachment to duties and obligations. To be infantile is a regressive way to defy the stress of corporate culture: Don‘t tread on me, I‘m vulnerable. The emphasis is on the subjective: how we feel about things, rather than what we think or can know.‖ Again, feelings over truth. This philosophy of life permeates our entertainment media as well. Bob Pittman, the founding chairman of the ever popular MTV Network, said, ―What we‘ve introduced with MTV is a non-narrative form. . . . We rely on mood and emotion. We make you feel a certain way as opposed to you walking away with any particular knowledge.‖ Is it any wonder that pop star SinÈad O‘Connor, after losing a rather nasty custody battle for the three-year-old daughter she had deliberately conceived with a man she described as a total stranger, was able to sincerely conclude: ―I wouldn‘t do it again. Not because it‘s immoral, but because it was stressful.‖ And we as a society certainly understand.

We‘re even afraid to express the truth any more. Historian Gertrude Himmelfarb, in her 1995 book The De-moralization of Society, quotes British literary critic Richard Hoggart on the subject of his hometown: ―In Hunslet, a working-class district of Leeds, within which I was brought up, old people will still enunciate, as guides to living, the moral rules they learned at Sunday School and Chapel. Then they almost always add, these days: ‗But it‘s only my opinion, of course.‘‖ Himmelfarb then comments, ―That is hardly a stirring faith by which to order one‘s private life.‖

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We are not only afraid to speak the truth but we often find it offensive when we hear it. Those who speak the truth are called harsh, rude and uncaring. What is so alarming about all of this is not that these ideas and approaches are new to the history of humankind. They‘re not. It is that they permeate our society. These aren‘t the thoughts of a few in the ivory towers of higher learning; these ideas have infiltrated to some extent the thinking of every man, woman and child on the planet. They have become our culture. It‘s a mistake, however, to dismiss this as something that just happened to us. We made a choice to give in to our most basic nature, the desire to make ourselves the final authority. And we will have to make a conscious, even heroic choice to straighten the situation out. But it is not a popular choice to make.

TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES Why don‘t we embrace the truth? Or to put it another way, why aren‘t we comfortable with one true answer to each of our most fundamental questions? Certainly humanity has been misled throughout history by those who have claimed to be the sole arbiters of truth. From the world-ruling empires to the church to the nation-state, these institutions defined and controlled truth but, perhaps more importantly, also controlled the practical applications of truth: morality, ethics, justice, freedom, law, etc. The interpretations of these aspects of truth have had devastating consequences for civilizations of the past. Society‘s trust has been betrayed by much error mixed with truth. This has caused many to reject the possibility of absolute truth (see ―Winning Hearts and Minds,‖ opposite). Truth causes us to address issues that we would find easier, certainly more convenient, not to face. Truth encompasses discipline, accountability, character, faith and principles. Understandably these are tough issues, and truth doesn‘t allow us to sweep them under the carpet. Truth also gives us clarity. It exposes nonsense. It clarifies without us having to wade through all of the sentimentality to get to the heart of the matter. As an anchor point, it gives us direction in spite of what is going on around us.

These qualities of truth give it a predictable edge. Truth cuts and draws blood, and when people are exposed to it, they often get hurt. At the same time, though, truth binds us in a way that opinions and feelings never will.

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for ―Truth is Stranger Than It Used to Be‖ 1.

Explain what the meaning of the ―relativization‖ of truth is.

2. What impetus in history brought about the Renaissance which led to the ultimate twilight of the Middle Ages?

Make your own evaluation of:

a. the positive effects of developments in science and technology to improve the human condition.

b. the negative effects brought about by science and technology detrimental to the human condition.

4. Give your own assessment of why in the post-modern society what matters most is no longer objective truth but rather subjective feeling.

5. What do you think should be the major concern of philosophyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the objective world of science or the subjective realm of human existence? Why?

Wittgenstein and the Problem of Meaning Ruel F. Pepa Introduction In philosophy, the issue of meaning is a classical problem and in the restructuring of academic philosophy in contemporary times, this issue has been assigned to philosophy of language. The development of philosophic thoughts in historic time saw how the issue of meaning has been approached from the time of Plato and Aristotle to the contemporary period. Although we can say that more recent approaches have been proposed by philosophical theories of post-modern (or post-structural) era, the concern of this presentation specifically focuses on the significance of the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s contribution to the age-long discussions of this issue. An evaluation of what has occurred through time as philosophers continue to deal with the issue of meaning places the achievement of Wittgenstein over and above his predecessors and contemporaries. It could even be reasonably said that such an uncontested achievement of a single philosophical genius beyond his lifetime has been used not only as a take-off point but even as a solid bridge to inaugurate the forms and concerns of what we now call post-modern philosophy. Others may be critical of this view, believing that the developments of post-modern thoughts in contemporary philosophy were ushered into the intellectual and scholarly scene independent of Wittgenstein. But a careful and serious reading of Wittgenstein‘s post-Tractatus writings (mostly post-humously published) will tell us that as early as that period, Wittgenstein‘s thoughts had already been pregnant with ―postmodern‖ tendencies and ideas. So that, at this point, we could simply say that Wittgenstein was in a way and in his own right a prophet of what would soon come up in the realm of contemporary philosophy.

The Problem of Meaning in the Pre-Wittgenstein History of Philosophy A. Plato and Aristotle’s Theory of Meaning Both Plato and Aristotle held the referential theory of meaning. By this theory, we mean that the meaning of a word is found in what the word refers to. As far as Plato was concerned, he proposed that words function like proper names. So that even if a word is what we grammatically call a common name, its meaning must be found in the referent which it is supposed to name. For example, the word ―chair‖ in grammar is a common name but its supposed referent that gives it meaning is not just any chair in particular; the referent that grants it meaning is the perfect, ideal ―chair‖ that can only be found in the Realm of Universals. However, in Aristotle‘s view, the same word is meaningful 203

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because it refers to all the chairs that may be found in the world. It is common knowledge among students of philosophy that Aristotle didn‘t quite bite the idea of Plato‘s Realm of Universals as it is advanced in the latter‘s Theory of Forms. In passing, we can say that the referential theory of meaning has some real practical value in the casual affairs of life. A human child starts to learn the language of his/her people by way of the referential method wherein the meaning of a word is known by pointing to the thing or object that it refers to. The meaning that is known by this manner is called ostensive definition. Bertrand Russell explains, ―Ostensive definition‖ may be defined as ―any process by which a person is taught to understand a word otherwise than by the use of other words.‖…

Ostensive definition, in its earliest form, requires certain conditions. There must be a feature of the environment which is noticeable, distinctive, emotionally interesting and (as a rule) frequently recurring, and the adult must frequently utter the name of this feature at a moment when the infant is attending to it. Of course there are risks of error…. In general, though not universally, repetition is necessary for an ostensive definition, for ostensive definition consists in the creation of a habit, and habits, as a rule, are learned gradually…1

B. Gottlob Frege’s Challenge o the Referential Theory of Meaning2 The German mathematician Gottlob Frege challenged the referential theory of meaning in his philosophical treatise, ―Sense and Reference.‖ He contends that the meanings of the complex terms ―the morning star‖ and ―the evening star‖ are not the same, yet, they have the same reference and that is the planet Venus. Hence, if the meaning of a word or a term is its reference as the referential theory assumes, then there is no difference at all between the terms ―the morning star‖ and ―the evening star‖ because both refer to Venus. But this claim is obviously unacceptable because mere common sense tells us that the word ―morning‖ in ―the morning star‖ and the word ―evening‖ in ―the evening star‖ are definitely distinct from each other. In his theory of meaning, Frege affirms the notion that complex terms like the abovementioned ones are proper names. (Proper names could also be single terms.) Every proper name, in turn, expresses a meaning and designate a reference.

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C. John Stuart Mill’s Challenge to Frege’s “Proper Names”3 The British philosopher J. S. Mill precede Frege by almost half a century. Yet, prior to Frege‘s theory, Mill had already advanced a more complex distinction between ―proper names‖ (which he calls ―singular names‖) like Saint Paul, Socrates or Frege, and ―general names‖ like red, mammal, human, or house. Mill used the categories of denotation and connotation to differentiate between singular names and general names. According to him singular names are merely denotative, meaning, a singular name denotes a referent whereas general names are mainly connotative, meaning, a general name connotes an attribute. For example, the singular name ―Saint Paul‖ denotes its proper referent but it does not connote any attribute pertaining to this early Christian apostle. However, the general name ―dog‖ denotes all the animals called by this name in the past, in the present and in the future. It also connotes the attributes possessed by all dogs. Faced with this distinction, the question that comes up now is: Where does meaning reside—in the denotation or in the connotation? If we listen to Mill, meaning is in the connotation, not in the denotation. Hence, in this sense, singular names, having only denotations in terms of their referents, are deprived of meanings and only general terms are meaningful.

D. Russell’s Theory of Meaning as Denotation4 The British mathematical philosopher Bertrand Russell (who incidentally was a baptismal godson of J.S. Mill) took the contrary position by asserting that meaning resides in the denotation and not in the connotation. In his treatise, ―On Denoting‖, Russell sustained the survival of the referential theory of meaning in the present century. It also marked the beginning of a confusion that had haunted philosophical empiricism for decades whose systematic expressions are found in the works of the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle. This was the confused treatment of the difference between meaning and truth. In Russell‘s ―On Denoting‖, he asserts that terms like ―The present King of France‖ is meaningless because it doesn‘t denote any referent at all (i.e., considering that during Russell‘s time, France was already a republic and the monarchical period was but a thing of the past). Actually, the term is meaningful but devoid of truth. Hence, meaningless is not dependent on truth, though truth must be based on meaningless. Presented logically, we say,

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All true x are meaningful, but not all meaningful x are true.5 In an enlightening evaluation of the referential theory of meaning, U.P. philosopher Andresito Acuña in his Philosophical Analysis has the following to say: In fairness to those who subscribe to the referential theory of meaning in the early 20th century empiricism, the theory has many accomplishments. When the theory was applied to some major branches in Philosophy, Ethics, Metaphysics or Theology, numerous objectionable concepts were uncovered such as concepts like intrinsic good, being, God, mind, material substratum, the absolute, etc. These concepts purport to have referents while in fact they have none. As a consequence, these concepts were committed to the limbo of meaningless utterances. When applied to the budding science of psychology of many mentalistic concepts like ego, spirit, soul, intention, and volition. As a result, psychology today has acquired a technical language analogous to the language of physics.6

The Problem of Meaning in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Development A. Wittgenstein’s Pre-Tractatus and Tractatus Conceptions of Meaning Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s pre-Tractatus conception of meaning is of the classical referential type. Such is reflected in his Notebooks 1914-16. Regarding this, the Wittgensteinian scholar P.M.S. Hacker of Oxford comments that before Wittgenstein fully crystallized his more complex conception of meaning in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he had the classical notion that ―names to have a determinate meaning they must be uniquely and unambiguously

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correlated with simple constituents of the world. . . . The meaning of a logically proper name is a simple object, the object is the meaning. The essential point is that there must be unanalyzable non-composite objects if language is to be related to the world. These simple objects must be indestructible; they are the substance of the world‖7 Wittgenstein—being a student of Russell in Cambridge and whose great influence shaped Wittgenstein‘s philosophical formative years—was initially a natural heir of the Russellian referential theory of meaning. However, further development enhanced by his readings of Gottlob Frege‘s works and others related thereto and culminated in the writing of the Tractatus marked a dramatic change in Wittgenstein‘s conception of meaning which now became deeper in form and more complex in presentation. In the Tractatus, meaning is no longer determined through things or objects per se. Meaning is determined in propositions or statements about the world, and in 1.1 of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein says: ―The world is the totality of facts, not of things.‖8 It means that ―To say that the world is a totality of things would be to leave out that things fit together. Things exist only in facts.‖9 Now, what is a fact? Further in the Tractatus, he says:

2. What is the case—a fact—is the existence of a state of affairs. 2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things). 2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs. 2.012 In logic nothing is accidental; if a thing can occur is a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.10 Regarding this, Tractatus commentarist and Wittgensteinian philosopher H.O. Mounce explains: To illustrate this, consider the propositions ‗Socrates is fat‘ and ‗Plato is thin‘. These, we shall suppose, represent states of affairs. These states of affairs hold in the world; but notice that they might not have done so. Socrates might have been thin and Plato fat. Now what this shows is that states of affairs are complex. For we can imagine them rearranged, the elements appearing in combinations different from those in which they actually appear. But in logic, says Wittgenstein at 2.012, nothing is accidental; if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself. Thus it is written into Socrates and into Plato that each can be fat and thin. There is a range of possible states of affairs into which Socrates and Plato fit. Which of these

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states of affairs are actual is not a matter of logic; but it is a matter of logic which states of affairs are possible. Whether Socrates is fat or thin is a matter of fact, but it is a matter of logic that he can be either one or the other.11 In other words, facts are states of affairs and states of affairs are not only what is actually in the world but what can possibly be sustained by the things found in the world. So that a statement of fact is not necessarily meaningful only on the basis of its one-to-one correspondence with what is actually found in the world but on the basis that it is also possible to occur in the world, given the things that we know are in the world. This theory of meaning, Wittgenstein called, ―the picture theory of meaning and representation.‖ What we are trying to say here is that in Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus, the initial importance of an actual object as reference in the world to establish the meaning of a word-or name—is not repudiated. ―At some point there must be objects, and therefore names, which are absolutely simple. Otherwise, there would be no contrast between language and the world and nothing could be said.‖12 However, it does not imply that meaningfulness ought to be always checked against what is actually found in the world. We only come to the world if we want to know the truth or falsity of a statement where such a word or name occurs as a constituent of a state of affairs. At this point, it is necessary for us to make a distinction between meaning and truth. ―…[I]n order to be true (or false) a proposition must already possess a sense. The sense of a proposition, in short, must be independent of whether it is in fact true or false.‖13

B. Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus Analysis of Meaning Expressed in His Philosophical Investigations Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s post-Tractatus conception of meaning comprehensively expressed in the pages of his monumental Philosophical Investigations is not only an attempt to improve and transcend the theory that he proposes in the Tractatus. It is rather a rigorous criticism of the classical referential theory of meaning in general. In the P.I. Wittgenstein convincingly destroyed the theory in a disarmingly simple yet profound discussion of two counter-examples. The first is about the word ―Excalibur.‖ According to the referential theory, the meaning of this word is supposed to be the actual object called ―Excalibur.‖ The following however, is Wittgenstein‘s penetrating critique found in # 39 of the P.I.: …The word ―Excalibur‖, say, is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not exist. But it is clear that the

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sentence ―Excalibur has a sharp blade‖ make sense whether Excalibur is still whole or is broken up. But if ―Excalibur‖ is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when Excalibur is broken in pieces; and as no object would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. But then the sentence ―Excalibur has a sharp blade‖ would contain a word that had no meaning and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense; so there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it consists….14 Regarding the second counter-example, Wittgenstein further discusses in # 40 of the P.I.: Let us first discuss this point of the argument: that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it. –It is important to note that the word ―meaning‖ is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that ‗corresponds‘ to the word. That is to confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N.N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that for if the name ceased to have meaning, it would make no sense to say ―Mr. N.N. is dead.‖15 In demolishing the referential theory, what Wittgenstein imparts to us is a better and more realistic way of looking at the whole problem of meaning. This he succinctly puts in # 43 of the P.I.: For a large class of cases—though not for all in which we employ the word ―meaning‖ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. Moreover, the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.16 It tells us that a name really denotes a bearer but this does not imply that the meaning of such a name should be identified with the bearer but rather with its use in a statement that signify a certain or definite context.

C. Wittgenstein’s “Use” Theory of Meaning We use words in a lot of ways. We name persons, things, or places by means of words. A syntactical combination of words may give an information, ask a question, express a desire or give a command. In Wittgenstein‘s theory of meaning the use of a word is an act that is done by human beings in certain linguistic situations. In the P.I., Wittgenstein says: But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question, and command?—These are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call symbols, words, sentences. And the multiplicity is not something fixed given once for all, but new types of language, new language-games as we may say come into existence, and others become

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obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.) Here the term ―language-game‖ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.17 Being ―part of an activity or of a form of life‖, speaking a language is something that is done naturally by people in flesh and blood in actual situations. Wittgenstein is being critical here of some, specifically philosophers, who have been used to using specialized terms in a very artificial way. Well, these terms like, the absolute, essence, substance, etc., are surely part of a language-game. But the fact that they are not used by people in real events of daily living in the sense that they are specially used by philosophers (in this particular case) makes them artificial, i.e., they have no form of life. The meaning of a word is therefore determined in the context of its usage which Wittgenstein calls ―language-game.‖ Say, for example, the word ―bachelor‖; we need to determine the particular language-game where it is used. In the languagegame of the academe, ―bachelor‖ is a collegiate-level academic degree granted by a school

(university or college) to a student who successfully finished four year of undergraduate studies. The same word in another language-game would mean a male who is still single inspite of the fact he is already of marriageable age. Another word is ―club.‖ In one language-game it means an organized group of people. In another language-game it is a hard stick used to beat people.

Regarding the Wittgensteinian use theory of meaning contextually applied in language-games, P.M.S. Hacker comments: Philosophical problems arise out of ordinary language and are, in general, to be resolved by looking into its workings by considering the diverse uses of expressions. The Tractatus had pursued the real logical form of the proposition. The new method in philosophy demands a clarification of linguistic use, but not in order to achieve an use understanding for the first time, but to eliminate misunderstanding. We words without first giving or even being able to give rules for their use just as we use money as a means of exchange and store of value, without being able to describe the underlying conversations, rules and laws which enable it to fulfill these functions. One can find one‘s way around a city although one may be unable to draw a map of it. Being able to use words correctly, as well as recognize correct and incorrect use of them, is to understand them, to know their meaning. (italics supplied.)18 Regarding the Wittgensteinian concept of ―language-game‖, every Wittgensteinian scholar has his/her own interpretation. Hence, we are confronted here with a myriad interpretations. However, I have found the interpretation

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of U.P. philosopher Acuña simpler and easier to understand. Says he in his Philosophical Analysis: I want you to try to imagine an activity that cannot be done without the use of language. Can reporting an event be done ithout the use of words? I don‘t think so. Similarly, can giving orders and obeying them be done without the use of words? I think not …. The point is: If you have an activity that cannot be done without language, then you have a genuine language-game. And if another person can play your language-game, then your language-game has a form of life.19 ENDNOTES 1 Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits (new York: A Clarion Book, Published by Simon and Schuster, 1967), pp.63-66 2 Gottlob Frege, ―Sense and Reference‖ 3 John Stuart Mill, ―Of Names‖ 4 Bertrand Russell, ―On Denoting‖ 5 1. For any x such that if x is true (Tx), then x is meaningful (Mx), and x is true(Tx). Therefore, x is meaningful (Mx). 2. For any x such that if x is true, then x is meaningful, and x is not meaningful. Therefore x is not true. 3. For any x such that if x is true, then x is meaningful, and x is not true. Therefore, x is not meaningful. 4. For any x such that if x is true, then x is meaningful, and x is meaningful. Therefore, x is true. 5. There is an x such that x is both meaningful and true. 6. There is an x such that x is meaningful but not true. 6 Andresito Acuña, Philosophical Analysis (4th Edition) (Quezon City: U.P. Department of Philosophy 1998), p.24. 7 P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 41. 8 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 9 H.O. Mounce, Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus, An Introduction, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p.18. 10 Op. cit., Tractatus 11 12

Op. cit., Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus, p. 20. Loc. cit.

Ibid., p.21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. By G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1968),#39. 15 Ibid., #40. 16 Ibid., #43. 14

Ibid., # 23. Op. cit., Insight and Illusion, p. 124. 19 Op. cit., Philosophical Analysis, p. 31. 18

Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________ Questions for â&#x20AC;&#x2022;Wittgenstein and the Problem of Meaningâ&#x20AC;&#x2013; 1.

What is the Referential Theory of Meaning is?

How did Gottlob Frege criticize the Referential Theory of Meaning?

3. What is Wittgensteinâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s Use Theory of Meaning in his Philosophical Investigations.

PART II LOGIC

CLASSICAL LOGIC This module will

introduce the students to the technicalities of classical logicâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;also known as Aristotelian logic or deductive logicâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;with the objective of sharpening their ability to reason out.

All grown-up human beings, under normal circumstances, have the ability to use reason in discourses. This module will formally enhance that ability. The lessons will acquaint the students with the rules and methods of forming sound arguments to effect right reasoning.

The ability to reason out correctly is not only useful and beneficial in the academe but more so in daily life. So many problems are blown out of proportion and lead to bitter misunderstanding and fights because of human failure to clarify things, particularly statements. A formal study of logic like the lessons that we have in this module is aimed at contributing to the perennial desire of reasonable people to make this world a better place to live inâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a world of understanding and peace.

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Lesson 1 The Meaning and Value of Logic

OBJECTIVES By the end of this lesson, the student is able to: 1. familiarize him/herself with the more technical definition of logic. 2. be aware of the importance of logic in daily life. 3. be acquainted with the rules and methods of forming sound arguments.

A. What is Logic? The general field of logic is argument. Technically, argument is understood not in its ordinary meaning of bickering or quarreling where two or more people are involved in a shouting match. In logic, an argument is a discourse wherein a statement is being proved to be true by means of other statements that serve as evidence to the former. For example, I can try to prove the truth of the statement ―Plato is mortal‖ by the evidence of the statements, ―All men are mortal‖ and ―Plato is a man‖ granting that these statements are both true. Basically, this is what we mean by ―argument‖ in the field of logic.

Arguments are different from mere assertions because the latter are only statements not connected with each other logically, i.e., nothing is being proved and the statements do not serve as evidence for any other statements. Examples are: ―Manila is always flooded during a heavy rain‖. ―The mayor of Manila is Mayor Lim‖. These are two true statements but are not in anyway logically connected; hence, they do not comprise an argument. In logic, it is not enough to be concerned with argument; the argument has to be correct. This is the specific concern of logic: correctness of argument. The logician is therefore responsible for dealing with the standard rules of correctly getting from the evidence to the statement whose truth is being proved – the latter we call ―conclusion‖. Logic, therefore, is the study of the rules of correct argument.

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B. Why Study Logic? 1. To sharpen perception of correctness. There are times when common sense is not enough to determine the correctness of an argument or our understanding of an argument‘s correctness. Here is an example: ―Only students are permitted to enter this classroom and Jose is a student. So, Jose can enter this classroom. It is a correct argument? It is not. 2. To be able to mechanically evaluate lengthy arguments. There are arguments where a series of complicated statements are evidence to a point that is being proved. The human mind is limited in handling such situations. In mathematics, for example, there are complicated problems that require us to sit down and do some calculation with pen and paper. Here is an example of complicated argument: ―If Juan passes the entrance exam, he is admitted. If he is not admitted, he will apply for a job. If he applies for a job, he needs references. Juan decides not to take the exam. Therefore, he needs references‖. By being familiar with the standard rules of logic, it will not be difficult to handle complicated arguments. 3. To avoid obvious fallacies. Sad to say, there are instances when we ignore obvious fallacies or statements that do not connect because we want to prove a point that is personally or subjectively advantageous to what we desperately want to happen. Such situations consequently place us in embarrassment. For example, ―All exclusive schools have basketball teams in the NCAA. If we want to be called an exclusive school, we must also have a basketball team in the NCAA‖. This is an obvious fallacy – no doubt.

EXERCISE Name: __________________________ Section: ________________ Date:__________________________ Lesson 1 The Meaning and Value of Logic 1. Classical logic is also known as ________________ or _______________. 2. ________________________ is the general field of logic. 3. An argument is a __________________ wherein a _______________ is proved to be ________________ by other statements that serve as __________________ to the former. 4. The concern of logic is __________________ of argument. 5. Logic is the study of the _________________ of _________________ argument. 6. We study logic to sharpen ____________________ of correctness. 7. We study logic to ___________________ evaluate ________________ arguments. 8. We study logic to __________________ obvious fallacies. 9. _______________________ are only statements not logically connected. 10. The logician‘s responsibility is to correctly proceed from the __________ _________ to the _____________________.

Solve the Puzzle Six members of a mixed hockey team are Mr. A, Mr. B, Mr. C, Mrs. D, Miss E, and Miss F. The positions they occupy are center, right wing, left wing, right defense, left defense and goalie, though not necessarily in that order. Mr. A is a bachelor. Mr. B is 20 yrs. old. Miss E is the left defense‘s step-sister. Mr. C is the center‘s neighbor. The right wing is the center‘s grandson. The left wing is the son-in-law of the right defense. Who plays each position?

Lesson 2 Logical Arguments OBJECTIVES By the end of the lesson, the student is able to: 1. recognize logical propositions and arguments. 2. distinguish between real arguments and pseudo-arguments. 3. identify valid and invalid arguments.

A. The Components of an Argument An argument is basically composed of propositions that function as either premises or conclusions. The premises are the evidence to prove the truth of the conclusion and the conclusion is the point that is proved to be true. A proposition is always in the declarative mode. Two or more declarative sentences with the same meaning express one proposition. Examples: ―I am a Filipino‖, ―Ako ay Pilipino‖, ―Soy un Filipino‖, ―I am not a non-Filipino‖ are declarative sentences that express only one proposition. Logic is concerned with propositions, not with sentences per se, except, of course, those sentences that express propositions. A proposition is what a declarative sentence means and logic is concerned with connection between meanings, not with mere words. There are certain clue words in the English language that indicate premises and conclusions in an argument. However, the occurrence of those clue words does not always indicate that a series of statements is an argument. In an argument, words like ―therefore‖, ―thus‖, ―hence‖, ―so‖, & ―consequently‖ usually precede the conclusion. Words like ―because‖, ―since‖, ―for‖ commonly precede a premise of an argument. Often, the conjunction ―and‖ is used to connect two or more premises in an argument. A clue word may not precede a proposition but if the other propositions are preceded by premise clue works or the conjunction ―and‖, the proposition with no clue word at the beginning must be the conclusion. For example: ―All Filipinos are non-whites because all south Asians are non-whites and all Filipinos are south Asians‖. Take note: The first proposition, ―All Filipinos are non-whites‖ is not preceded by a clue word. The second proposition, ―All south Asians are 223

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non-whites‖ is preceded by the clue word ―because‖. The last proposition ―All Filipinos are south Asians‖ is preceded by the conjunction ―and‖. Any of the last two propositions cannot be the conclusion because of the clue words that precede each of them. Therefore, the first proposition is the conclusion, though no conclusion clue word precedes it.

B. Pseudo-Arguments As has been said, not all statements preceded by the abovementioned clue words always comprise an argument: It may only have the semblance of an argument but is not in reality. Hence, it is a pseudo-argument – a simple assertion. There are two types of pseudo-arguments where clue words may appear:

1. Causal explanation. ―Because I slept late last night, I feel so sleepy now‖. We can logically evaluate an argument by looking into the evidential function of the premise or premises on the conclusion. In the above-example, no evidence is being stated to prove the conclusion that ―I feel so sleepy now‖. It is rather an assertion stating the cause for the fact that I feel so sleepy now. The relation between ―I slept last night‖ and ―I feel sleepy now‖ is therefore not logical but rather factual because the process of proving is not based on the meanings of statements but on the experiential ―cause-effect‖ sequence.

2. Repeated assertions. ―The LAKAS-NUCD is the best political party. Its members have always been the best and will always be the best. Therefore, it is clear that the LAKAS-NUCD is the best political party‖. Two or more assertions do not necessarily make an argument. In a real argument the conclusion does not merely repeat one of the supposed premises.

C. Real Arguments There are two types of real arguments: deductive and inductive. 1. In a deductive argument, it is claimed that if the premises are true, then, the conclusion must be absolutely true. In other words, the truth or falsehood of the conclusion necessarily follows from the truth or falsehood of the premises. It is therefore impossible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true.

2. In an inductive argument, it is claimed that if the premises are true, then the

Logical Arguments

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conclusion is more or less probable – not absolutely true. Inductive arguments serve the sciences very well because the latter‘s dependence on observations and experiments where repetitive consistency enables scientists to predict future occurrences based on the notion of probability. For example: ―Ver got 1.25 in the prelim exam and 1.00 in the midterm exam. It is therefore very probable that Ver will get either 1.00 or 1.25 in the final exam‖. It is also possible, however, that Ver may get a grade lower than 1.25 in the final exam.

D. The Meaning of Validity Valid arguments can have various combinations of true and false propositions. Validity is defined by the consistent relation in the meanings of the premises and other conclusion, based on the assumption that the premises are true even if experience tells us that a premise is false. Logic is not concerned with what experience tells us; it is concerned with what the conclusion says based on the meanings of statements that we get from the premises.

Examples: 1. ―All men are flowers and all flowers are shoes. Therefore all men are shoes‖. This is a case where all propositions are experientially or factually false, but still the argument is considered valid. 2. ―All men are dogs and all dogs are rational beings. Therefore, all men are rational beings‖. This is a case where the premises are factually false while the conclusion is factually true, but arguments are still valid. Invalid arguments, on the other hand, can have any kind of combination of true and false propositions. Examples: A 1.

―All Tagalogs are mortal and all Filipinos are mortal.

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Therefore all Tagalogs are Filipinosâ&#x20AC;&#x2013;. In this argument where we have AB/CB/AC combinations, the premises are all factually true and even the conclusion is factually true. But the argument is invalid because the premises do not serve as valid evidence to prove the truth of the conclusion. To make the point more easily understood, here is another sample argument with the same combinations: A 2.

â&#x20AC;&#x2022;All dogs are animals and all cats are animals. A

Therefore, all dogs are catsâ&#x20AC;&#x2013;. (AB/CB/AC). It becomes clear now that two factually true premises do not always lead to true conclusion. Hence, the argument is invalid.

EXERCISE Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________

Lesson 2 Logical Arguments Analyze the following. If thereâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s no argument, write Assertion. If there is an argument, 1.underline the conclusion; and 2.identify the argument as Deductive or Inductive.

1. No flower is a leaf because all flowers bloom and no leaf blooms.

2. Sports magazines have helped the popularization of soccer and so has television, but each medium must be regulated.

3. All dictators believe in peace and democrats believe in peace, therefore all dictators are democrats.

4. Ninety-five percent of the members voted in favor of the changes proposed.

No doubt about it. Therefore, there is no problem now.

5. I have fever now because I got drenched when it suddenly rained last night.

6. If you study logic, you will improve your reasoning power. If you do not study logic, you will always rely on common sense. Since you will either study logic or you would not, it follows that you will either improve your reasoning power or always rely on common sense.

7. The government is a failure in economic leadership. It has never been successful in alleviating poverty in the country. Read the newspaper and you‘ll be convinced. It follows, therefore, that the government is a total hogwash.

8. Since some Ilocanos are thrifty people, it is likely that all Ilocanos are thrifty people.

9. Class attendance should be given less importance because such a system restricts the independence of the students.

10. Since aspirin ―x‖ dissolves faster in a glass of water than does aspirin ―y‖, it follows that aspirin ―x‖ will dissolve faster in the human stomach than will aspirin ―y‖.

11. If this is not a difficult game, then I do not know a difficult game when I play one.

12. Since no military men are democrats, no military men are people with sound moral views on politics, for all democrats are people with sound moral views on politics.

Lesson 3 Standard Form Categorical Syllogism (I) Standard Form Categorical Proposition OBJECTIVES By the end of this lesson, the student is able to: 1. formulate standard form categorical propositions basic in Aristotelian or classical logic. 2. determine the distribution of the terms in a standard form categorical proposition. 3. distinguish different categorical proposition.

form/kind

(code

description)

4. classify proposition according to its (code & description) form/kind. Classical logic or Aristotelian logic is done via deductive arguments, more technically expressed through categorical syllogisms. This presentation of arguments was developed by Aristotle in the 4th century BC and it remained to be the most dominant method for handling deductive arguments until the 19th century. Though symbolic logic has dominated the present era, Aristotelian logic is still presently useful and relevant for the purpose of evaluating deductive arguments.

A. The Standard Form Categorical Proposition Basic to the study of standard form categorical syllogism is the knowledge of how to formulate standard form categorical propositions. Having this knowledge will allow us to effectively apply the rules of validity to the categorical syllogism in a standardized way. Initially, let us familiarize ourselves with the following models of standard form categorical propositions:

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FIGURE 3-1

Standard Form Categorical Syllogism (I)

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A standard form categorical proposition must have: a quantifier (except the singular propositions), a subject term, a copula and a predicate term, in that order. 1. The quantifier. It is the part of the proposition that tells how much of the subject term is being referred to. The only standard quantifiers used in Aristotelian logic are: ―all‖, ―no‖, and ―some‖. Singular propositions do not have quantifiers but they are mentally regarded as universal and therefore imagined to have ―all‖ before affirmative propositions or ―no‖ before negative propositions (no. 5 and 6 in Fig. 3-1). ―All‖ is the quantifier for universal propositions whose quality is affirmative, while ―no‖ is the quantifier for universal propositions whose quality is negative. ―Some‖ is the quantifier used for particular propositions where what is being referred to is only a part of the subject class and whose quality of proposition is affirmative. The word ―not‖ is placed immediately before the predicate term when the particular proposition has the negative quality. 2. The subject and predicate terms. They refer to classes of objects; hence, propositions can be said to be asserting a relation between classes of objects. When we say class, we mean a collection of objects having some common properties or characteristics. Grammatically, classes are nouns that may or may not be modified by adjectives. Hence, ―intelligent‖ is not a class but a characteristic that may modify a class of people or students, for example. But ―intelligent people‖ or ―intelligent students‖ is a class and therefore can be used as subject or predicate term. In the case of singular propositions, the subject is not a class but it can be treated as a class having only one member.

3. The copula. It is the relational connector between the subject and the predicate terms in a standard form categorical proposition. It is a form of the verb ―to be‖ in the present tense that adapts syntactically or grammatically to the number (singular or plural) and person (first, second, or third person) of the subject term. In singular and particular propositions whose quality is negative, the copula is immediately followed by the word ―not‖. In our list of model standard form categorical propositions (Figure 3-1), you will notice that each proposition is coded according to the quantity and quality of the proposition. Propositions of universal quantity and affirmative quality [universalaffirmative propositions] are coded ―A‖. Propositions of universal quantity and negative quality [universal-negative propositions] are coded ―E‖. Propositions of particular quantity and affirmative quality [particular-affirmative propositions] are coded ―I‖. Propositions of particular quantity and

232 negative quality [particular-negative propositions] are coded ―O‖. Propositions of singular quantity and affirmative quality [singular-affirmative propositions] are treated like universal-affirmative propositions, hence are coded ―A (sing)‖.

Propositions of singular quantity and negative quality [singular-negative propositions] are treated like universal-negative propositions, hence are coded ―E (sing)‖.

B. Distribution of Subject and Predicate Terms The technical term ―distribution‖ determines whether the subject term and the predicate term refer to an entire class or only part of a class. A term is said to be distributed if reference is being made to all members of the class designated by that term. A term is said to be undistributed if reference is being made to only a few members of the class designated by that term. We used the symbol ―D‖ for distributed and ―U‖ for undistributed. 1. “A” proposition. The subject term is distributed (D) as determined by the quantifier ―all‖ while the predicate term is ―undistributed‖ (U), by the fact that only a part of the predicate term is being referred to by the subject term. Example:

―All dogs are animals.‖ The subject term ―dogs‖ is D because reference is being made to all members of the entire class of dogs. The predicate term ―animals‖ is U because reference is being made to only a part of the entire class of animals, i.e., all dogs are only a part of the entire class of all animals. Hence, D

―All dogs are animals‖.

2. “E” proposition. Both the subject and predicate terms are distributed (D) because the entire class of the subject is excluded from the entire class of the predicate. Example: ―No dogs are cats‖. It tells us that all members of the entire class of dogs are excluded from all members of the entire class of cats. Hence,

Standard Form Categorical Syllogism (I)

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―No dogs are cats‖. 3. “I” proposition. Both subject and predicate terms are undistributed. The subject term being preceded by the quantifier ―some‖ makes it obviously undistributed (U), by the fact that only a few members of the entire class designated by the subject term is being referred to. The predicate term, on the other hand, is likewise undistributed by the fact that only a part of the predicate term is being referred to by the subject term. Example: ―Some students are intelligent people‖. The subject term ―students‖ is U because reference is being made to only a part (some members) of the entire class of all students. The predicate term ―intelligent people‖ is also U because reference is being made to only a part of the entire class of intelligent people, i.e., the class of students are only a part of the entire class of all intelligent people. Hence, U U ―Some students are intelligent people‖. 4. “O” proposition. The subject term is undistributed (U) while the predicate term is distributed (D). again, as indicated by the quantifier ―some‖ that precedes it, the subject term is obviously undistributed. But since the quality of the proposition is negative, it is a situation where the subject term is excluded from the entire class of all member objects designated by the predicate term. Hence, the predicate term is distributed. Example: ―Some students are not intelligent people‖. The subject term ―students‖ is U because reference is being made to only a part (some members) of the entire class of all students. The predicate term ―intelligent people‖ is D because the partial class of students is excluded from all members of the entire class of all intelligent people. Hence, U D Some students are not intelligent people.

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FIGURE 3-2 Distribution Summary: “A” (u/a) --------- All D are U.

“O” (p/n) ------- Some U are not D

“E” (u/n) --------- No D are D.

“A (sing)” ------- D is U*

“I” (p/a) ---------- Some U are U. “E (sing)” -------

D is not D

*Exception to the rule: An A(sing) proposition has both the subject and the predicate distributed (D) if it is a definition or a definite description. Examples: D

1. Barack Obama is the President of the USA. [This proposition is a definite description. Since both the subject and the predicate are

distributed, there is no change in the proposition‘s meaning even if the subject and the predicate are interchanged.] D

2. Biology is the scientific study of life. [This is a definition.]

EXERCISE Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________

Lesson 3 Standard Form Categorical Proposition Identify the subject and predicate terms; state the quality and quantity; code each proposition (A E I O); state the distribution of the terms.

1. Some girls are beautiful people.

2. No Filipinos are cowards.

3. All teachers are scholars.

4. Some tables are not objects made of wood.

5. Eric is an intelligent student.

6. No members of the Philippine Congress are women who do not have college education.

7. Some students who dropped some of their courses last semester are not members of next yearâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s graduating class.

8. All persons who are not so careful in everything that they do are people prone to failures.

9. Albert is not a member of the varsity basketball team.

10. No examinees who did not pass the board exam are candidates qualified for the available jobs.

Lesson 4 Standard Form Categorical Syllogism (II) Rules of Validity for the Categorical Syllogism OBJECTIVES By the end of this lesson the student is able to: 1. distinguish between a valid categorical syllogism and an invalid one. 2. utilize the universal rules or axioms that govern classical logic. 3. examine and recognize carefully fallacious arguments in classical logic. Universal rules or axioms are used in classical or Aristotelian logic to test the validity of arguments expressed in standard form categorical syllogisms.

A. Axiom 1 There must be three terms each of which is used twice. All men are mortal beings. Plato is a man. Therefore, Plato is a mortal being.

In this categorical syllogism, three terms are used: 1. men/man; 2. mortal being(s); and 3. Plato. The first is used twice: ―men‖ which is the subject term of the first premise and ―man‖ which is the predicate term of the second premise. The second is also used twice: ―mortal beings‖ which is one predicate term of the first premise and ―mortal being‖ which is the predicate term of the conclusion. The third is likewise used twice: ―Plato‖ which is the subject term of the second premise and the subject term of the conclusion. By virtue of Axiom 1, the argument is therefore valid. Violation of this axiom is called ―four-term fallacy‖. However, it is of no logical significance if a term is plural one time and singular another time. It should also be noted that if the term in one proposition is changed to its equivalent synonym, no violation is committed. Remember that in logic, we are particularly concerned with meanings, not with words per se. 237

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1) An obvious example of a 4-term fallacy. ―All policemen are law enforcers‖.

―All law enforcers are courageous people‖. ―Therefore all policemen are people with military training‖. This argument has four terms: 1. policemen; 2. law enforcers; 3. courageous people; 4. people with military training. However, only two terms, ―policemen‖ and ―law enforcers‖ are used twice; a clear violation of Axiom 1.

2) The next example, however, is grossly deceptive and it is not easy to immediately perceive the fallacious character of arguments like this one: ―All situations governed by laws are situations set by a lawmaker. The reality of nature is a situation governed by laws. Therefore, the reality of nature is a situation set by a lawmaker‖. Apparently, three terms used twice are found in this argument: 1. ―situation(s) governed by laws‖ (1st and 2nd premises); 2. ―situation(s) set by a lawmaker‖ (1st premise and conclusion); and 3. ―reality of nature‖ (2nd premise and conclusion). The hitch, however, is in the use of the term ―situation governed by laws‖ because its meaning in the first premise is not the same as the meaning of the similar term used in the second premise. The laws in the first premise are man-made laws enacted by lawmakers in a government‘s legislative body, whereas the laws in the second premise are natural laws not made by men but discovered experientially and according to observable regularities of constant patterns of occurrences in nature. Hence, the meaning of this term used in the first premise is different from the meaning of apparently similar term used in the second premise. The argument is therefore a violation of Axiom 1 and a case of a four-term fallacy. Here is another example of this sort: ―All stars are objects found in heaven and Sharon Cuneta is a star. Therefore, Sharon Cuneta is an object found in heaven‖.

B. Axiom 2 The middle term must be distributed at least once. Here, we will apply our knowledge of distribution analysis to determine whether the middle term is distributed or undistributed. But before we proceed to distribution analysis, let us first determine what the middle term is. The middle term is a term found in the categorical syllogism but is not found in the

Standard Form Categorical Syllogism (II)

239

conclusion. It is therefore found in the premises. In the categorical syllogism, ―All honor students are intelligent people and Juan is an honor student, therefore, Juan is an intelligent person‖, the middle term is ―honor students‖. It is not found in the conclusion; nevertheless, it is found in the premises. Now, let us proceed to distribution analysis to determine if the middle term is distributed at least once. D U ―A‖ - - - ―All honor students are intelligent people‖. D U ―A (sing)‖ - - - ―Juan is an honor student‖. D

―A (sing)‖ - - - ―Therefore, Juan is an intelligent person‖. 1. The argument satisfies Axiom 1. 2. The middle term ―honor student(s)‖ is distributed (D) in the first premise, though undistributed (U) in the second premise. But the requirement of Axiom 2 is that it must be distributed at least once only.

3. Hence, the argument satisfies Axiom 2 and is therefore valid. Let us have another example: ―All dictators are oppressors and Fujimori is an oppressor. Therefore Fujimori is a dictator‖.

Distribution Analysis: D

―A‖ - - - - - - ―All dictators are oppressors‖. DU ―A (sing)‖ - - - - - - ―Fujimori is an oppressor‖. DU ―A (sing)‖ - - - - - - ―Therefore, Fujimori is a dictator‖. 1. The middle term is: ―oppressor(s)‖. [It is the term in the argument that is not found in the conclusion.] 2. The middle term ―oppressor(s)‖ is found in both the first and second premises. 3. The middle term ―oppressor(s)‖ is undistributed (U) in both premises.

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4. Hence, the argument violates Axiom 2 and is therefore invalid. Violation of Axiom 2 is technically called ―the fallacy of undistributed middle term‖.

C. Axiom 3 If a term is distributed in the conclusion, it must be distributed in a premise. D

All democratic leaders are pro-people leaders. D

Fidel Castro is a democratic leader. D

Therefore, Fidel Castro is a pro-people leader. 1. One term in conclusion—―Fidel Castro‖—is distributed (D). It must also be distributed in a premise. 2. Fidel Castro‖ which also occurs in the second premise as distributed satisfies the requirement of Axiom 3. 3. The whole argument also satisfies the requirements of axioms 1 and 2.

4. Hence, the argument is valid. Here is another example: D U Fidel Ramos is a minority president. D

Fidel Ramos is an unpopular president. D U Therefore, all unpopular presidents are minority presidents. 1. One term is distributed in the conclusion: ―unpopular president(s)‖. It must also be distributed in a premise. 2. ―unpopular president(s)‖ which also occurs in the second premise as undistributed does not satisfy the requirement of Axiom 3.

Standard Form Categorical Syllogism (II) 3. Though the whole argument satisfies axioms 1 and 2, its violation of Axiom

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3 renders it invalid. Violation of Axiom 3 is technically called ―the fallacy of illicit process‖.

D. Axiom 4 If both premises are affirmative, the conclusion must be affirmative. Violation of Axiom 4 is technically called ―the fallacy of drawing negative conclusion from affirmative premises‖. The following is an example of this violation. ―All intelligent students are persons qualified to participate‖. ―Some intelligent students are students of Trinity College‖. ―Therefore, some students of Trinity College are not persons qualified to participate‖.

E. Axiom 5 If one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative. Violation of Axiom 5 is technically called ―the fallacy of drawing an affirmative conclusion from a negative premise‖. An example of this violation is as follows: ―All private high schools are learning institutions‖. ―UP Integrated High School is not a private high school.‖ ―Therefore, UP Integrated High School is a learning institution.‖

F. Axiom 6 If both premises are negative, no conclusion can necessarily be drawn. Violation of axiom 6 is technically called ―the fallacy of two negative premises‖. An example of this violation is as follows: ―No teachers are persons allowed to enter the room.‖ ―Some people outside the building are not teachers.‖

―Therefore, some persons allowed to enter the room are not people outside the building.‖

EXERCISE Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________

Lesson 4 Rule of Validity for the Categorical Syllogism Re-arrange the following syllogisms with the conclusion last (if necessary) and indicate whether the argument is valid or invalid. Perform distribution analysis. If invalid, state which rule is broken and what is the technical term of the fallacy. 1. All Filipinos are people who hold these views and Eric is a person who holds these views, hence, Eric is a Filipino. Premises: ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ Conclusion: ______________________________________________________________ valid? __________ invalid?_________________ Fallacy (if invalid) 2. Some politicians are deceivers because all deceivers are fools and some politicians are fools. Premises: ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ Conclusion: ______________________________________________________________ valid? __________ invalid?_________________ Fallacy (if invalid)

3. Albert is not a fish because Albert is a whale and no whale is a fish. Premises: ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ Conclusion: ______________________________________________________________ valid? __________ invalid?_________________ Fallacy (if invalid) 4. No turtles are healthy creatures, for no turtles are speedy runners and all fast runners are healthy creatures. Premises: ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ Conclusion: ______________________________________________________________ valid? __________ invalid?_________________ Fallacy (if invalid) 5. Some men are not successful people and no successful people are lazy people, therefore, some men are lazy people. Premises: ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ Conclusion: ______________________________________________________________ valid? __________ invalid?_________________ Fallacy (if invalid)

Lesson 5 Logical Relations OBJECTIVES By the end of the lesson, the student is able to: 1. state the seven logical relations among propositions. 2. differentiate the truth values involved in these relations. 3. recognize such relations through examples. 4. examine application of logical relations and truth values in proposition. When we talk of logical relations among propositions, we mean the relations of truth and falsity that hold between any two propositions. For example, if we know that ―All men are mortal beings‖ is true, we can deduce that the statement ―No men are mortal beings‖ is definitely false.

In classical logic, there are seven (7) of these logical relations among propositions.

A. Independence Two propositions are technically related as independent when the truth or falsity of any of them has no effect on the truth or falsity of the other. Let us say ―p‖ stands for the proposition ―All whales are mammals‖ and ―q‖ for the proposition ―All trees are big plants‖. If ―p‖ is true, ―q‖ is undetermined, and vice versa. If ―p‖ is false, ―q‖ is still undetermined and vice versa. p

B. Equivalence Two propositions of the same terms are said to be equivalent in relation if they are necessarily true together or false together. For example, the propositions ―All men are mortal beings‖ and ―No men are non-mortal beings‖ are equivalent. 245

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C. Contradiction Two propositions of the same terms are said to be contradictory in relation when if one is true the other must be false and when if one is false the other must be true. They cannot both be true or both be false. For example, ―All professors are intelligent people‖ and ―Some professors are not intelligent people‖. In logic, contradiction occurs between ―A‖ and ―O‖ propositions with the same subject and predicate, or between ―E‖ and ―I‖ propositions with the same subject and predicate. p

D. Contrariety Two propositions of the same terms are said to be contraries in relation when if one is true, the other is false and when if one is false, the other is undetermined. Contrariety occurs between ―A‖ and ―E‖ propositions. For example, ―All Filipinos are industrious‖ and ―No Filipinos are industrious‖. p

T F

F ?

T F

F ?

E. Subcontrariety This relation is the opposite of contrariety. If a proposition is true, then the other proposition of the same terms is undetermined. If a proposition is false, then the other proposition of the same terms is true. Subcontrariety occurs between ―I‖ and ―O‖ propositions.

Logical Relations

247

p T

q ?

q T

p ?

F. Implication Two propositions are said to have the relation of implication when a universal proposition (―A‖ or ―E‖) precedes a particular proposition (―I‖ or ―O‖) of the same terms and quality. In this situation, if the universal proposition is true, then the particular proposition must also be true. However, if the universal proposition is false, then the particular proposition is undetermined. There is a relation of implication if ―A‖ precedes ―I‖ or ―E‖ precedes ―O‖.

p (“A”)

q (“I”)

q (“E”) p (“O”)

G. Subimplication Two propositions are said to have the relation of subimplication when a particular proposition (―I‖ or ―O‖) precedes a universal proposition (―A‖ or ―E‖) of the same terms and quality. In this situation, if the particular proposition is true, then the universal proposition is undetermined. However, if the particular proposition is false, then the universal proposition must also be false. There is a relation of subimplication if ―I‖ precedes ―A‖ or ―O‖ precedes ―E‖.

q (“I”)

p (“A”)

q (“O”)

p (“E”)

248

The logical relations can be summarized by means of a device called â&#x20AC;&#x2022;the square oppositionâ&#x20AC;&#x2013; (below).

EXERCISE Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________

Lesson 5 Logical Relations Among Propositions

I. State the relationship between the following pairs of propositions. 1. All Filipinos are patriotic people. Some Filipinos are not patriotic people.

________________

2. Some students are intelligent people. Some students are not intelligent people.

________________

3. All Americans are friendly people. Some Americans are friendly people.

________________

4. Some animals are amphibious creatures. All animals are amphibious creatures.

________________

5. No soldiers are cowards. Some soldiers are cowards.

________________

6. No intelligent people are underachievers. All intelligent people are underachievers.

________________

7. All metals are conductors. No metals are non-conductors.

________________

8. All cows are vegetarians. No wild animals are herb-eaters.

________________

II. If the first proposition in each of the following groups of propositions is true (T), state what can be inferred about the truth or falsity of the other proposition in the group.

All philosophers are logicians.

(T)

No philosophers are logicians.

_____

Some philosophers are logicians.

_____

Some philosophers are not logicians.

_____

Some teachers are PhDs.

(T)

Some teachers are not PhDs.

_____

All teachers are PhDs.

_____

No teachers are PhDs.

_____

All North Africans are dark-complexioned people.

(T)

No North Africans are non-dark-complexioned people. _____ Some Egyptians are North Africans.

_____

Some North Africans are not dark-complexioned people. _____ 4.

Some X are not Y.

(T)

All X are Y.

_____

No X are Y.

_____

Some X are Y.

_____

This book‘s cover is black.

(T)

This book‘s cover is not black.

_____

This book‘s cover is red. This book‘s cover is not red.

_____ _____

Lesson 6 Logical Translation of Equivalences OBJECTIVES By the end of the lesson, the student is able to: 1. demonstrate the technical process of changing a standard form proposition into another standard form of proposition with the same meaning. 2. distinguish the three processes of logical translations: obversion, conversion, and contraposition. 3. examine carefully propositions and determine whether they are standard or not. 4. demonstrate the processes of logical translations. In doing logical translations of equivalences, we get into the process of transforming a standard form proposition without affecting the original meaning, i.e., the meaning of the former is retained in the latter. Logical translation is useful in determining whether different sentences are saying the same meaning. It is also beneficial in the evaluation of syllogisms where it appears that there are more than three terms but actually only have three terms. Three processes are involved in doing logical translations.

A. Obversion By this logical translation process, the quality (not the quantity) of a standard form proposition is changed and then, the predicate term is changed to its contradictory, i. e., to a term that refers to all objects other than those referred to by the predicate term. An example would be changing ―All dogs are animals‖ to ―No dogs are non-animals‖. You will notice that the quantity (universal) of the proposition is not changed; only the quality (from affirmative ―all‖ to negative ―no‖). You will also notice that the predicate ―animals‖ in the first proposition is changed to its contradictory by adding the prefix ―non-‖ which is the technical way in classical logic to contradict a term. Hence, in the example,

―All dogs are animals‖. = ―No dogs are non-animals‖. [The process of translation: 1. Change the quality (in the example, from affirmative to negative) without changing the quantity (universal). ―All‖ (universal – affirmative) -----------> ―No‖ (universal – negative) 251

252

2. Change the predicate to its contradictory. ―animals‖ ----------------------------> ―non-animals‖] More examples: * All students are learners. = No students are non-learners. (change quality) (contradictory predicate) * No teachers are lazy people. = All teachers are non-lazy people. (change quality) (contradictory predicate) * Some students are juniors. = Some students are not nonjuniors. (change quality) (contradictory predicate) * Some books are not paperbacks. = Some books are nonpaperbacks. (change quality) (contradictory predicate) The obversion process applies to all types of standard form categorical propositions – ―A‖, ―E‖, ―I‖, ―O‖, ―A (sing)‖ and ―E (sing)‖.

B. Conversion By this logical translation process, the order of the subject and the predicate terms in a standard form proposition is interchanged without affecting the meaning. Conversion, however, is a limited process that only applies generally to ―E‖ and ―I‖ propositions. These two types of propositions have the same distribution of the subject and the predicate terms: the subject of ―E‖ is D and the predicate is also D, while the subject of ―I‖ subject is U and the predicate is likewise U. Hence, for an A proposition to be converted, it has to be reformulated first into an E proposition. In the same vein, an O proposition has to be reformulated first into an I proposition to be converted. This situation only implies that no meaning change occurs even if the terms of the proposition are interchanged, as in these examples: ―E‖ – ―No bachelors are married men‖. = ―No married men are bachelors‖. ―I‖ – ―Some Filipina women are beautiful people‖. = ―Some beautiful people are Filipina women‖. However, in some instances, ―A‖ propositions can also be converted. In the case of universal ―A‖ proposition, there is a slight change in meaning if such is converted because the quantity of the proposition has to be changed to particular as in the following:

Logical Translation of Equivalences

253

―All gynecologists are medical doctors‖. = ―Some medical doctors are gynecologists‖. In the case, however, of singular ―A‖ propositions, certain conditions have to be met: the proposition must be a definition or a definite description as in the following: a. Definition ―Biology is the scientific study of living things‖. ―The scientific study of living things is biology‖.

b. Definite description ―Fidel Ramos is the president of the Philippines‖. = ―The president of the Philippines is Fidel Ramos‖. An ―O‖ proposition can never be converted.

C. Contraposition By this logical translation process, the subject and the predicate terms are interchanged and then, each term is contradicted. This process generally applies only to ―A‖ and ―O‖ propositions. But E propositions may be contraposed if they are reformulated into A propositions and I propositions may likewise be contraposed if they are reformulated into O propositions. Examples: ―A‖ – ―All men are mortal beings‖. = ―All non-mortal beings are non-men‖. ―O‖ – ―Some students are not lazy people‖. = ―Some non-lazy people are not non- students‖.

EXERCISE Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________

Lesson 6 Logical Translation of Equivalences I.

State the obverse of the following:

1. No teachers are students. 2. She is not a good teacher. 3. Some animals are not vegetarians. 4. This book is not a popular textbook. 5. Kim Jong-il is an oppressive leader.

II.

Convert the following.

1. All concrete buildings are sturdy structures. 2. No men are angels. 3. Some trees are not acacias. 4. Some brilliant students are weird-looking people. 5. Raul Gonzalez is the Secretary of Justice.

III.

State the contrapositive of the following.

1. Some women are teachers. 2. All citizens are taxpayers. 3. Some cars are not four-door sedans. 4. No priests are women. 5. All musicians are artists.

Lesson 7 Grammatical Translation OBJECTIVES By the end of the lesson, the student is able to: 1. grammatically translate non-standard statements to standard form categorical propositions. 2. determine the equivalence in meaning between that of a non-standard statement and that of its translation to a standard form categorical proposition. In classical logic, the rules of validity that we studied in Lesson 4 can only be applied to a syllogism if the propositions consisting it are in the standard form, so that relation between classes is clearly indicated. We cannot just determine the validity of an argument when the meanings of the propositions in it are not understood. Grammatically, translations are, therefore, necessary particularly in the following specific cases:

A. The Subject Is not First in a Proposition. ORIGINAL

* Inside the room went the students.

TRANSLATION

The students are the people who

(The subject is ―the students‖.)

*The assignment was accomplished by the researchers. (The subject is

went inside the room.

The researchers are the persons who accomplished the assignment.

―the researchers‖.)

257

258

B. The Predicate Is not a Class Term. ORIGINAL

TRANSLATION

* The students went inside the

The students are the people

room. (The predicate ―went inside

who went inside the room.

the room‖ is not a class term.)

*The researchers accomplished the assignments.

The researchers are the persons who accomplished the assignment.

C. No Copula ORIGINAL

TRANSLATION

* Sharon Cuneta sings very well.

Sharon Cuneta is an individual

(There‘s no copula in the statement.)

who sings very well. or Sharon

Cuneta is a very good singer.

D. No Quantifier ORIGINAL

*Children are naughty. (Sensitivity to language is required here. The statement wants to say that children are generally naughty. Hence, a

universal qualifier is needed.)

TRANSLATION

All children are naughty persons.

Grammatical Translation

259

E. Non-Standard Quantifiers Are Used. Non-standard quantifiers like ―every‖, ―one‖, ―any‖, ―none‖, ―a few‖, ―many‖, and others are used in ordinary language instead of the standard one (―all‖, ―no‖, ―some‖). ORIGINAL

TRANSLATION

―every‖, ―any‖ ―none‖ ―one‖,

―all‖ ―no‖ ―some‖ sometimes ―all‖,

―a few‖, ―many‖, ―most‖ ―a‖, and ―an‖

sometimes ―some‖ (sensitivity to

intention is the safeguard here.)

F. Denial of a Universal Affirmative Proposition ORIGINAL

―Not all students are intelligent‖looks

TRANSLATION

―Some students are not intelligent.‖

like an ―E‖ proposition. It is not. It is an ―O‖ proposition since the contradiction of an ―A‖ proposition

is an ―O‖ proposition.

G. Exclusive Propositions ORIGINAL

TRANSLATION

―Only members are qualified voters‖.

―All qualified voters are members‖.

or ―None but members are qualified

―All qualified voters are members‖.

voters‖. or ―Members alone are

―All qualified voters are members‖.

qualified voters‖.

260

Exclusive propositions can be translated to standard form by dropping the ―only‖, ―none but‖ or ―alone‖ (all indicators of exclusiveness), then making the predicate of the exclusive proposition the subject and the subject the predicate, and using ―all‖ for the quantifier.

H. Exceptive Propositions ORIGINAL ―All except (or ‗save‘, or ‗but‘) students are qualified‖.

TRANSLATION ―All qualified persons are non-students‖ or ―All non-students are qualified persons‖.

Take note: The subject of the exceptive proposition is contradicted when translated to standard form.

EXERCISE Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________

Lesson 7 Grammatical Translations Translate to standard form categorical propositions. 1. Insignificant things are done by senseless people.

2. Renato is not stupid.

3. Dogs are loyal.

4. Only

teachers

can

get

inside the library.

5. A few workers are absent.

6. None but professional musicians are invited to watch the opera.

An apple is a fruit.

8. Every performer is given a token of appreciation.

9. Many people are allergic to smoke.

10. Not all that glitters is gold.

11. Everyone except the bodyguards entered the presidentâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s room.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC In the previous module, we learned that the categorical syllogism is an effective tool in the analysis of deductive arguments. However, it has some limitations particularly in cases where arguments are presented in a complex manner as in the following: â&#x20AC;&#x2022;Danilo was not given the chance to be promoted. If he were promoted, he would tender a party. Juan says he was not given the chance, hence, he will tender a partyâ&#x20AC;&#x2013;. It will be very difficult to use classical logic in evaluating an argument like this. Modern logic has, however, arrived at new types of inference to handle such situations based on an analysis of the meanings of various compound propositions. This logic is commonly called symbolic logic because of its extensive application of symbolic representations in this new way of dealing with arguments.

263

Lesson 1 Symbolic Representation of Compound Statements OBJECTIVES By the end of the lesson, the student is able to: 1. differentiate between simple and compound statements. 2. symbolically represent connections between compound statements. 3. Symbolically represent simple and compound statements. 4. Isolate the logical form of a statement from its content.

In symbolic logic, the logical form of a statement--simple or compound-is isolated from its content. A simple statement has a single proposition and is symbolically represented by a single letter of the English alphabet in the lower case. A compound statement has two or more connected propositions and these propositions are likewise symbolically represented by letters of the English alphabet in the lower case. The connecting words in a compound statement are also symbolically represented. 1. Examples of simple propositions symbolically represented: a.

Plato is a philosopher. = p

All dogs are animals. = d

2. Examples of connected propositions in a compound statement symbolically represented. a. =

Juan will stay at home and Jose will go to school. h

{h represents ―Juan will stay at home‖; ^ represents the connector ―and‖ s represents ―Jose will go to school‖.] 265

266

b. Either Manuel will play basketball or he will do his homework. =

[b represents ―Manuel will play basketball‖, \/ represents the connector ―either…or‖; h represents ―he will do his homework‖.] c. If Albert will study his lessons, then, he will pass the exams. =

[s represents ―Albert will study his lessons‖; the connector ―if…then‖ is represented by ; p represents ―he will pass the exams‖.] d. Edmund will be successful if and only if he works hard. =s=h [s represents ―Edmund will be successful‖; = represents ―if and only if‖; h represents ―he works hard‖.] When a statement or proposition is negated or denied, the sign ~ is used before the letter that represents the statement. This symbol is called tilde. If the proposition ―Plato is a philosopher‖ is represented by ―p‖, its negation or denial, which is ―Plato is not a philosopher‖ is represented by ―~p‖.

A compound statement where two propositions are connected by ―and‖ is called a conjunction statement. The connector is represented by ^. A compound statement where two propositions are connected by either….. or ―is called an alternation or a disjunction statement. The connector is represented by . A compound statement where two propositions are connected by ―if…..then is called a conditional or implication statement. The connector is represented by . A compound statement where two propositions are connected by ―if and only if‖ is called a biconditional statement. The connector is represented by =.

Symbolic Representation of Compound Statements

267

More examples: Statement/Proposition

Representation

1. Myra will attend the party tonight.

2. Myra will not attend the party tonight.

3. Sheryll will stay in school and Lalaine will go home early. 4. Both Sheryll and Lalaine will not go home early.

s^l ~ (s ^ l)

5. Sheryll will not stay long in school and Lalaine will not go home early.

~s^~l

6. Either Maricel will take the exam or she will write a term paper.

e \/ t

7. Either Maricar will go to school or not.

s \/

8. If there‘s fire, then, there‘s smoke.

9. If there‘s no smoke, then, there‘s no fire.

10. We will win if and only if we practice regularly.

w = p

EXERCISE Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________

Lesson 1 Symbolic Representation of Compound Statements A. Represent the following statementsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;simple and compoundâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; using the underlined letters. 1.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is the president of the Philippines.

Manila is a Philippine city and Jakarta is an Indonesian city.

Either I sleep or do my homework.

If it rains hard, Manila gets flooded.

We will win the game, if and only if the players are skilled.

B. Negate or deny the above statements symbolically.

______________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

Lesson 2 Compound Statements and Their Truth Values OBJECTIVES By the end of the lesson, the student is able to: 1. determine the truth values of compound statements. 2. State the negation or denial of simple and compound statements. 3. Express in truth tables the truth values of compound statements.

Simple Statement If the simple statement, ―Plato is a philosopher‖ which is symbolically represented as ―p‖, is true (T), its negation or denial, which is represented as ―~p‖, is necessarily false (F). Hence, p

[If ―p‖ is true (It is true that Plato is a philosopher), then, ―~p‖ is false (It is false that Plato is not a philosopher). If ―p‖ is false (It is false that Plato is a philosopher, then ―~p‖ is true (It is true that Plato is not a philosopher).]

Compound Statements 1. Conjunction Statement (p ^ q). “p and q” p

p^q

271

272

Explanation:

a. If two true (T) propositions are combined in a conjunction statement, the statement is true (T). b. If one true (T) proposition is combined with a false (F) proposition in a conjunction statement, the statement is false. c. If two false (F) propositions are combined in a conjunction statement, the statement is false (F). 2. Alternation or Disjunction Statement (p \/ q). “either p or q”

p \/ q

Explanation: a. In an ―either…..or‖ statement, a combination of two true (T) propositions or one true and one false propositions yields a true (T) statement. b. However, a combination of two false (F) propositions yields a false (F) disjunction statement. 3. Conditional or Implicating Statement (p

q). “if p then q”

Compound Statements and Their Truth Values

273

Explanation:

a. In a conditional or implication statement, the first proposition is called the antecedent and the second proposition is called the consequent. b. If both antecedent and consequent are true (T), the implication statement is true (T). c. If both antecedent and consequent are false (F), the implication statement is also true (T). d. Even if the antecedent is false (F) but the consequent is true (T), the implication statement is true (T). e. The only instance where an implication statement is false (F) is if its antecedent is true (T) but its consequent is false (F). 4. Biconditional Statement (p = q). â&#x20AC;&#x153;p if and only if qâ&#x20AC;? p

p= q

Explanation: a. A biconditional statement is true (T) only if it consists of propositions that are either both true (T) or both false (F). b. If one proposition in a biconditional statement is true (T) and the other is false (F), the statement is false (F).

5. Negation or Denial of a Compound Statement The negation or denial of a compound statement is represented as follows:

p^q

~ (p ^ q)

~ (p

274

p \/ q

~ (p \/ q)

p=q

~ (p = q)

EXERCISE Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________

Lesson 2 Compound Statements and Their Truth Values

Represent symbolically and determine the truth value of each statement. 1. Marcos was a dictator (T) and Mandela is a Communist (F).

2. If Baguio is the capital of the Philippines (F), then, the capital of the Philippines is mountainous (T).

3. Either Imelda Marcos (F) or Cory Aquino is the president of the Philippines (F).

4. Pope John Paul II will avoid eating pork (F) if and only if he is a Muslim (F).

5. If Ramos is the president of the Philippines (T), then, he will control the press (F).

6. E-VAT is anti-poor (T) and the Anti-Terrorism Bill is anti-democratic (T).

7. Either Plato was Greek (T) or Roman (F).

8. President Ramos will surely be re-elected (F) if and only if the constitution is amended (T).

9. Either Manila is the capital of Russia (F) or it is the capital of India (F).

10. If I eat a lot of raisins (T), I will have indigestion (F).

Lesson 3 Arguments in Symbols OBJECTIVES By the end of this lesson, the students should be able to: 1. Symbolically represent the premise or premises and the conclusion of an argument. 2. appreciate the importance of isolating the logical form of all argument from its content. In symbolic logic, we do not only represent simple and compound statements; we also represent arguments. In doing so, we are also isolating the logical form of an argument from its content. For example: a. If we think logically, then we can differentiate between valid and invalid arguments. b. We think logically. c. Therefore, we can differentiate between valid and invalid arguments.

Symbolically, this argument can be vertically represented as follows: a.

d l d

It may also be horizontally expressed as:

[(1

d) ^ 1]

In the horizontal expression of an argument, a premise of compound statement with two propositions and mediated by a connector, is presented as a whole within parentheses. This premise is connected to another premise -277

278

whether simple or compound -- with the symbol ^ which also represents ―and‖. The entire group of premise or premises is presented as a whole within brackets to distinguish the premise(s) from the conclusion. Then, the premise(s) are related to the conclusion by , meaning ―therefore‖ (take note that this symbol also means ―if . . . .then‖). Hence, the argument [(1 d) ^ 1] d is read ―If 1 then d; and 1; therefore d‖. We can check the validity of this argument by doing a truth-value analysis:

[(l

F F

Here’s another example: a. Some arguments are difficult to analyze. b. Some arguments are easy to analyze. c. Therefore some arguments are difficult to analyze and some arguments are easy to analyze. * vertical expression in symbols: a. d b. e c.

d ^e

* horizontal expression in symbols:

[(d) ^ (e)]

(d ^ e)

Arguments in Symbols

279

* truth - value analysis to determine validity:

[ (d)

(e)]

Letâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s do this example this time: If there is fire, then, there is smoke. There is smoke therefore, there is fireâ&#x20AC;&#x2013;. * vertically, a.

b. c.

s s

* horizontally, [(f

s) ^ s]

* truth â&#x20AC;&#x201C; value analysis to determine validity: [(f

F F

T T

T F

F T

F F

The argument is invalid because there is an F in the truth-value line-up.

EXERCISE Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________

Lesson 3 Arguments in Symbols Represent symbolically and analyze the truth-value to determine the validity of each of the following statements. 1. Either Jane will pass or flunk the test. Jane will not pass the test. Therefore, Jane will flunk the test.

2. Maricris will play the piano. Ralph will play the violin. Therefore, Maricris will play the piano and Ralph will play the violin.

3. If James studies his lessons, then he will pass the test. James will not study his lessons, therefore, he will pass the test.

4. There are girls who will attend the party. Therefore, either there are girls or there are boys who will attend the party.

5. Either boys or girls will attend the party. Therefore, girls will attend the party.

Lesson 4 Symbolic Representation of Basic Deductive Arguments OBJECTIVES By the end of this lesson, the students should be able to: 1. determine the validity of a deductive argument by relating its premise(s) to the conclusion by means of truth-value analysis. 2. apply the forms of basic deductive arguments in varied instances. 3. detect forms of fallacies and invalid arguments.

A. Valid Argument Forms 1. Conjoining Conjuncts ―Teachers are invited. Students are invited. Therefore, teachers and students are invited.‖ [(t)

(s)]

2. Separating Conjuncts ―Teachers and students are invited. Therefore, teachers are invited.‖ or ―Teachers and students are invited. Therefore, students are invited‖. [(t ^ s)]

[(t

s)]

T T T

T T

T F

F F T F F F

T T

F F

F F F F

T T T F T F 283

284

3. Adding Alternates ―Teachers are invited. Therefore, either teachers or students are invited (or, therefore, either students or teachers are invited)‖.

[(t)]

(t v s)

[(t)]

(s v

T T T

T T F

F T T

F F F

F F

T T

4. Disjunctive Syllogism ―Either teachers or students are invited. Teachers are not invited. Therefore, students are invited‖. or ―Either teachers or students are invited. Students are not invited. Therefore, teachers are invited‖.

[(t v s) ^ ~ t]

TTT

F T T

TTF

F T F

FTT

FFF

[(t v s) ^ ~ s] TTT F

F T T

T T T

FTT F

F T F

T T

FFF

T T F

TTF

5. Modus Ponens ―If there is fire, then there is smoke. There is fire. Therefore, there is smoke‖.

[(f

s) ^ f]

T T

F F T

T F F

F F F

Symbolic Representation of Basic Deductive Arguments

285

6. Modus Tolens ―If there is fire, then there is smoke. There is no smoke. Therefore, there is no fire‖.

[(f

s) ^

~ s]

F T

F F

T T

F T

T T

7. Hypothetical Syllogism ―If I always study my lessons, I will pass the exams. If I pass the exams, I will get good grades. Therefore, if I always study my lessons, I will get good grades‖.

[(s

g)]

286

8. Constructive Dilemma â&#x20AC;&#x2022;Either teachers or students are invited. If teachers are invited, then, there will be ballroom dancing. If students are invited, then, there be will disco dancing. Therefore, either there will be ballroom dancing or disco dancingâ&#x20AC;&#x2013;. t

s b

[(t v s)

^ (t

b) ^ (s

d)]

(b v d)

T T

F T

T F

F F

T T F

F T F

T F F

F F F

Symbolic Representation of Basic Deductive Arguments

287

9. Destructive Dilemma â&#x20AC;&#x2022;If teachers are invited, then there will be ballroom dancing. If students are invited, then there will be disco dancing. Either there is no ballroom dancing or no disco dancing. Therefore, either teachers are not invited or students are not invitedâ&#x20AC;&#x2013;.

s b

d [(t

b) ^ (s

d) ^ (~b

T T

F T

T F T

F F

T T F

F T F

T F F

F F F

s)]

B. Invalid Argument Forms 1. Separating Disjuncts [(t v s)]

[(t v

T T T

T T

T T F

T T

F T T

F T T T

F F F

F F

F T

v ~d)]

(~t v ~s)

288

2. Adding Conjuncts [(t)]

(t ^

[(s)]

(t ^ s)

T T T

T T TT

T F F

T T F F

F F T

F F F T

F F F

3. Affirming Alternatives [(t v s)

[(t v s)

^ s]

TTT

T T T T

TTF

T T F F

TTF F F T T

FTT

F F T T

FTT T T F F

FFF

F F T F

FFF F T T F

TTT

T T T T

4. Denying Alternatives [(t v s) ^ ~t]

[(t v s) ^ s]

TTT T T F F

TTT

T T F F

TTF T T T T

TTF

FTT F F T F

FTT TT

FFF F F T T

F F

T T

5. Affirming the Consequent [(f

s) ^

T F

T T T

F F F

T T

F F

Symbolic Representation of Basic Deductive Arguments

289

6. Denying the Antecedent [(f

s) ^ ~f]

T F

F F F

T T

F T

7. Misplaced Middle s

[(s

g)]

T T

F T

F F

290

8. Pseudo-Dilemma (I) b

d t

[(b v d)

^ (t

b) ^ (s

T T

F T T

F F

T F T

T T

F F T

F F

T T T

F T F

T T T

T F F

T T

F F F

F T

T T

F T T

F F

T F T

T T

F F T

F F

T T

F T F

T T

T F F

T T

F F F

F T

T F

T T

T F

d)]

(t v s)

Symbolic Representation of Basic Deductive Arguments

291

9. Pseudo-Dilemma (II) t

b s

[(t

b) ^ (s

T T

T T T

F F

T T

T T T

T T

T F T

F F

F F T

T T T

T T

T F

T T T

T T

T F

T T T

T T

T F F

F F T

F T

F F F

T T T

T T

F T

d) ^ (~t v ~s)]

(~b v ~ d)

T T F

T F F

F F

T T F

T F F

F T

T F T F

F F

F F T F

T F F

F T

T F F

T T T

T T

T F F

T T T

T T

T F F F

F T T

T T

F F F F

T F T

F T

F F

EXERCISE Name: __________________________ Section: _________________ Date:__________________________

Lesson 4 Symbolic Representation of Basic Deductive Arguments

Represent the following arguments symbolically using the letters underlined. Determine whether the argument is valid or invalid by means of truth-value analysis.

1. If government is honest, then the nation will progress. The nation does not progress. Therefore, government is not honest.

2. Ramos will either serve the people or lead the country to economic disaster. Ramos will lead the country to economic disaster. Therefore, he will not serve the people.

3. If Estrada becomes president, the Philippines will be in chaos. If the Philippines gets into chaos, there will be civil war. Hence, if Estrada becomes the president, there will be civil war.

4. Ramos will either stay in power or retire in 1998. If the Constitution is amended, Ramos will stay in power. If the people assert their political w ill, Ramos will retire in 1998. Therefore, either the Constitution is amended or the people will assert their political will.

5. If teachers are progressive, students are s atisfied. If school administrators are liberal, students are satisfied. Hence, if teachers are progressive, school administrators are liberal.

References: Bachhuber, Andrew H. Introduction to Logic. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, Inc. 1957. Bittle, Celestine N. The Science of Correct Thinking, Logic. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company. 1950. Copi, Irving M. Introduction to Logic. London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd. 1971. Govier, Trudy. A Practical Study of Argument. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1985. Hurley, Patrick J. A Concise Introduction to Logic. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1985. Lambert, Karel and William Ulrich. The Nature of Argument. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc. 19___. McCall, Raymond J. Basic Logic. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1969. Seech, Zachary. Open Minds and Everyday Reasoning. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1993.

THE EDITOR Ruel F. Pepa has an AB in Philosophy, an MA in Theology, an MBA and a PhD in Theology. He is a lifetime member of the International Society for Philosophers (http://www.isfp.co.uk/open_membership_list.html) and the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology (http://phenomenologycenter.org/author/dr-ruel-f-pepa/)