Agrarian Reform in the Philippines

Volume

V

No. 3

III

lib II

MayII I

June 1987

I

Agrarian Reform in the Philippines i

t

I mm

The

' ' ! EDITOR'S NOTE: No other tsme since the EDSA revolution has _ bitterly polarized the Philippine society than the proposed agrarian reform program. A_ we go to press_ the President is on the verge of signing a land reform order amMst emotional condemnations by both the landless and landowners, The landless,..its supposed beneficiary, spearheaded by the militant peasant organization, the Kilusang Magbubuldd ng Pili. pinas (KMP) have denounced the "watered down" version of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as no better than the failed Marcos-initiated progrant On the other hand, the landowners have issued an impassioned threat of civil disorder should the order be signed and implemented In a more ob/ective tone, Dr. MaLAgnes R. Quisumbing, our guestwriter for this issue, tries to sort out the conflicting issues and interests based from her numerous exposure on the land reform ism_ Dr. QuisumbingtsatpresentAssistantPro[essorat the University of the Philippines' School of Economics. She has done varied studies on Philippine agriculture and development, and of late, co.authored the section on land reform in An Agenda for Action for the Philippine Rural Sector by the Agricultu_l Policy and Strategy Team; and again a co-tmthor o1"the raonogrffph In Search of a Land Reform Design for the Philippines done this year by the UP Los Baffos AgriculturalPolicy Research Program.

Dr. Quisumbing reiterates her belief that land reform must be enacted before Congress convenes in July. One notes that even the conservative Catholic Church has thrown its support to this stand..But beyond the question of when looms a.btgger concern: Will it be a genuine land reform? Political observers believe that the answer to this indicates the course which the Aquino government is and may have been taldng since it was swept to where it is now by the original people power,

ISSN 0115-9097

present administration has empha-

rural development as a,focal point of its development strategy. Agriculture has been viewed as the sector which will lead both short-term recovery and longrun growth. However, the prospects for sustainable growth in the agricultural sector are hampered by the highly skewed distribution of landholdings which constitute a barrier to social and political stability as well as to the dual goals of equity and efficiency. More specifically, an agriculture-led, employment-oriented development strategy without a significant land reform program will not lead to a strong positive impact on the rural poor, nor will it lead to sustained broadbased rural development (Day/d, 1986: 1.4). Moreover, the agriculture growth process itself runs the risk of exacerbating that inequality, since benefits from new technology, irrigation, and market infrastrueture tend to be capitalized into higher land values, to the benefit of present landowners. Finally, the existing insurgency problem can be traced to the people's perception of social injustice, and this will only worsen ff redistributive structural refo-fius are not undertaken.

CONTENTS

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Agrarian Reform in the Philippines ....................................................

PIDS Working Papers ................................................................

P I DS Staff Papers

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" operations. Thereibre, the exemption of "' land under landlords' direct administra,i.'. '_.:' _':Oaf ' tion had the effect of reducing labor _'"_:_t¢ oommlrc/M..¢_la._/s,a input per hectare below an optimum _" _'_ "¢_(i_,. '__!ii' level. Second, the limitation to rice and •, _)J • . , • =, corn land induced landlords to divert their land to other crops. Third, regula. . ." . ,.._ ,., tions on tenancy contracts (especially the Previous administrations have, in prohibition of share tenancy)and control fact, recognized the importance of land on land rent reduced the incentive of reform as a policy issue. This is evidenced landowners to rent out their land in small by its continued presence in the econoparcels, thus decreasing potential employ, mic and political agenda since the period ment of landless workers (Hayami, of Commonwealth. However, the actual 1987b). Finally the encouragement of redistributive impact of previous proglarge-scale plantation agriculture served to' rams have been limited for several perpetuate a form of production organireasons. One reason is that prograrns have zation which is not suited to a landremained essentially the same over the scarce, labor surplus economy like the

of the 1950s, and the 1972 shift from a democratic to an authoritarian regime.)

While it is true that political motivation is certainly a crucial factor in agrarian reform, it is likewise true that in the medium and long-term, there are objective economic realities which are essential to make agrarian reform sustainable. Thus, agrarian reform must be viewed not only as a political nor counter-insurgency tool (which would lead to piecemea_ and short-term efforts) but as a part of a broader development strategy for the agricultural sector.

This paper aims to present and clarify some economic issues related to agrarian reform. It begins, by reviewing data on Philippine rural poverty and its

past years, land (i.e. government chase thirty of tenanted and its resaleputto tenants (Winfel, 1983]), and has not been responsive to the changing economic and political realities of the grassroots. Aside from the focus on tenanted land, previous programs have been further restricted to grain crops (i.e. rice and corn) on the argument that the inclusion of export crops traditionally grown on plantations may disrupt production and endanger an importatit source of foreign exchange earnings. At the same time, the Marcos administration pursued policies which, encouraged the development of large-

relationship tenurialthepatterns; proceeds to todiscuss issues ofIt the_ agri. cultural heterogeneity, economies of scale and tenurial arrangements. Later, policy directions under the Aquino administration are cited, namely, the Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform Provision of the 1986 Constitution, and the proposed Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Prog. ram (CARP). Finally, some policies which would provide incentives for an efficient and equitable pattern of land distribu. tion in the Philippines and supportive of agrarian reform are discussed.

scale plantation agriculture and the entry of foreign investment into the agricultural sector. Thus, whatever efforts were tnade' toward redistribution of land ownership in rich and corn were counteracted by policies which served to increase asset concentration ,in the plantation sector (Quisumbingand.4driano,1987).

The combinatiori'of those two conflitting policy directions also served to create biases against the efficient utilization of land for increasing employment and labor income. First, the limited application of previous programs to tenanted land created a strong incentive for landlords to evict tenants and cultivate their land under direct administration. Labor input and hence, agricultural output and labor income per hectare, are usually higher in smalJ family farms than large farms, based on hired labor, because of the inherent difficulty in supervising wage laborers for spatially. dispersed and ecologically diverse farm

Philippines., Another reason lbr the lukewarm impact of previous programs is the predominant political motivation without adequate consideration of the underlying economic factors which enable agrarian reform to be an economicallyviable proposition. Previous regimes have often introduced land reform policies as stop gap measures to appease political unrest - witness the past administrations' implementation of land reform policies only during crisis periods (e.g. the peasant unrest in the 1930s. the Huk movement

Table 1. 'Total Number of Familiesby Broad Industry Group (National Standard); Third Quarters,1980-1983 (in thousands) Average Annual Growth industry Group 1980 1981 1982 1983 Rate (%) Philippines Agriculture Non-agriculture Bottom 30% Total AgricultUre Non-agriculture

8677

8894

9111

9382

2.4

4897 3780

5042 3852

5120 3991

5346 3982

3.0 1.8

2599

2666

2771

2812

2.5

2124 475

2184 482

2217 514

2310 493

2,8 1.3

6078 2773 3305

6228 2858 3370

6380 2903 3477

6525 3036 3489

2.4 3.1 1.8

Other Income Groups Agriculture Non-agriculture Source: NCSO IIIIIII

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Rural Poverty and Land Tenure Patterns1

Table2.

RegionalPoverty indicators,1983 and 1985.

1983z

A distributional policy such as land reform is best understood when situated in the context of the poverty situation in the rural areas. Following the 1983 NEDA Development Planning Committee which classified the bottom 30 percent of the income bracket as poor, a cursory view of the rural poverty situation is needed.

Table I provides data on the number

191152

URBAN Region

NCR Metro Manila

RURAL

Proverty

Poverty

Provorty

Poverty

Poverty

Poverty

line 3

incidence

line

incidence

line

incidence

(inP)

(%)

(inP)

(%)

(inP)

1%)

840

11.2

3,282

44.1

....

1. Ilocos

678

40.3

3,093

56.2

2,139

51.1

of families for agricultural and nonagricultural income groups, broken down into poor and non-poor families for the

2. CagayanValley

678

43,i

2,897

48.6

2;092

55.6

3. Central Luzon

696

27.4

3,153

45.2

2,104

43.8

eriod 1980 to 1983. As of the third uarter of 1983, there are over 5.3 million families in the agricultural sector, representing 57 percent of total popula.

4.

5.

6.

7.

768 660 696 732

31.3 42.7 50.5 48.1

3,048 2,625 3,069 2,426

50.6 62.3 65,0 58.9

2,174 2,047 2,249 1,818

59.1 76.0 76.2 73.4

tion.

8. EasternVisayas

654

33.00

2,733

70.1

1,822

70.5

9. Western Mindanao 10. Northern Mindanao

768 678

40,1 38.6

2,650 2,952

61.6 65.7

2,025 2,022

66.0 66.3

11. Southern Mindanao 12. Central Mindanao

738 666

33.3 28.4

2,998 2,624

59.6 56.8

2,079 2,161

62.8 67.0

39.0

3,021

52.1

2,066

63.7

Over 82 percent

or 2.3 million

families in this sector belong to the bottom 30 percent income bracket.

The annual growth rate of the bottom 30 percent income bracket families is higher at 2.8 percent compared to the 1.3 percent annual increase of their non-agricultural counterparts. In general, we can conclude that from the absolute number of families and population growth rates,-the agricultural sector has experienced a substantial increase in poverty incidence relative to the rest of _he country,

Such

_ecause

it

a view, however, is not

based

1987

...........

on

is limited an

absolute

neasttre of deprivation nor does it con;ider regional variations in poverty incidence. A regional analysis of poverty would be more usefial in identifying key factors related to rural poverty,

Southern Tagalog Bicol Western Visayas Central Visayas

PHILIPPINES

1WorldBank

(1985),

2Inter-agency Working Group on Poverty Determination (1986).

3A per capita poverty line multiplied by 8 to make comparisions consistent with the 1985. The poverty line was computed based- on rice expenditure sufficient to meet calorie-requirements blown up to a food threshold and a total threshold. See World Bank (1985) fnrdetails.

Table 2 presents alternative estimates of poverty incidence in 1983 and 1985, based on the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO) Integrated Profile of the Rural Poor Survey of Houseb.olds (ISH); computed by the World Bank (1985) for 1983, and the Inter-Agency Working Group on Regional analysis of poverty is- Poverty Determination (1986) for 1984o important because poverty incidence What is immediately apparent is that the varies markedly across geographic regions.

World Bank poverty lines are conservative It is also essential in identifying priority compared to those adopted by the Interareas for intervention. The identification Agency Working Group, and this tends to of regions with high poverty incidence, underestimate the poverty incidence however, must be taken only as a first figures. In previous studies on the Philipstep because of wide intraregional pines, the World Bank has also tended to variation (e.g. between provinces and use conservative poverty lines; and this municipalities), practice has been criticized by Mangahas

(1985). Bearing these caveats in mind, let us proceed to Table 2. The data for 1983 show that regions with the highest poverty incidences are Western Visayas (50%), Central Visayas (48%), Bicol (43%), Cagayan Valley (43%), Ilocos (40%) and Western Mindanao (40 % ).

The lowest poverty incidence rates are in Metro Manila (11% ) and Central Luzon (27%).

Rural-urban breakdowns based on 1985 data show that poverty incidence is highest in the rural areas of Western Visayas (76.2%), Bicol (76.0%), Central Visayas (73.4%), Central Mindanao (67.0%),NorthernMindanao(66.3%),and Western Mindanao (66.0%). The regions

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Figure 19.83

"!

III!/

MAY -JuNE

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BIIIIIII ii

I. Regionol Poverty Incidence

i11

I

Rotios 1985

1

39.o _'----------_

1987

iii iml

.P.HI L.

_

PHIL.

_i S2J

1

NCR 1

jI 44.1 _+:'_56,2

2

2

I i

,

Io

t

2 1I-2_!

40.3 |

NCR

'

F

4.3.I _

+_"

1 ILOCOSt

" f31.3

i

4

V_; " .

5 BICOL

4

NCR

6

8. I •_

,,,

LUZON

5

5o5i

4

TAOALOG

,,

_

L_

_

8

6

EASTERN

7

8

_.....

',

_

10

33..

"""

11

60

40

I .

iL .

I •

20

_-

0

Percent

""

-

,*_

:

..... _65.7

1:..1 _

_59.6

...

-

:

I

9

I

' 2b

WESTERN MINDA

"w=

10

-- -

I +

_ _ _-_62.3

q_

38.6 _

l .

L_]50.6

.5

SOOTHER, _

7

33. 0

I ,

'

.... _=i 48.e

CENTRAL

42.7 t4

VALLEY

]

I

|

_

-_-.'::'

|

-"

I

" 4b " dO Percent

I

470

.8

I

"

I

dO

/ 12

11

CENTRAL MINDANAO

SOUTHERN MINDANAO

with the lowest rural poverty incidence are Central Luzon (43.8%) and Ilocos (51.1% ).

Agricultural incomes are substantially lower than non-agricultural incomes.

It comes as no surprise, therefore, that a greater number of families in the bottom 30 percent of the income distribution are

Table 3. ComparativeIndex of Mean Family Incomeby Type of Family (all families -- 10O) 1980-1983.

. in

agriculture. A more detailed picture can be obtained by examining an index

Types of family

T h i 1981 r d Q u1982 a r t • 1983 r 1980

F o u r1981 t h 1980

All Families

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

66.0

64.2

65.0

64.1

70.2

64.8

85.7

76.7

Palay Corn Coconut

67.4 56.4 59.7

64.3 49.6 55.2

64.4 46.2 57.5

61.3 44.1 75.0

81.5 51.7 58.7

75.7 38.1 49.2

97,2 40.6 76.6

109.3 40.6 70.8

Sugarcane Other Crops

15.4 67.4

Agricultural

of income by occupation as compared with the national average (See Table 3).

Except for livestock and poultry operators, incomes in the agricultural sector are generally below the national average.For example, agricultural wage laborers received 55.6 percent of the national average income in 1983.

More recent data from the 1983 ISH

I

I

IIIII

il

101.6 63.4

180,6 63.0

92.2 56.9

166.5 52,4

322.9 49.4

76.3 54.2

91.3 62.2 44.3

127.9 66.4 50,5

101,4 58.4 55.6

113,8 109.4 63.8 61.5 63,2 48.1

110.8 71.5 60.6

Non-agricultural

143.1

144.7

135,5

162.2

i-

142,2

144.6

144.3

100.0

299.6 127.7

LivestockandPoultry 112,6 114.3 Fishing 66,6 72.3 AgriculturalWages 50.8 50.0 andSalaries

permit us to analyze the breakdown of poverty incidence by main source of ,

Operators

Q 1982 u a r t e1983 r

129.3

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Table 4,

MAY--JUNE

Area of Farms, by Type and Tenure of Operator Philippines, 1971, (percentage distribution)

% of total physical farm Type of Farm

1987

Tenureof farma Ow=led Fully Part Ow_md Bwnar

Rentedor Leased For share For fixed money/ produce

100.0

62.9

11.0

16.3

1.9

1.6

4,1

2.2

Paiay Corn

31.3 17,6

49.8 69.5

15,9 8.1

23.0 18.2

4.6 0.3

1.3 2.3

1.5 0.5

3.8 1,2

Coconut

25.3

73,9

7.2

14.6

0.2

1.O

1.8

1.3

Tobacco

n.s.

53.8

17,3

23.4

1.4

1.2

--

2'.9

Sugarcane

4.3

48.4

18.1

10.9

2.7

0.6

16.2

3.0

Citrus

a.s.

45.4

4,5

15.1

0.1

ns.

33.5

1.4

All types

Runt free

Other t'orms Ma==ager Opera_ed

O[her_

Vegetable

0.2

62.0

12.0

17.2

3,6

2,1

0.4

2.9

tuber, roots and bulb crops

0.8

80.4

5.1

8.3

0,4

3.0

0.7

0.2

Coffee

0.6

36.5

4.1

4.6

0.2

2.6

0.8

1.3

Abaca

0.8

76.9

8.3

8.9

0.1

1.4

3.0

1.3

Banana

0.7

63.5

6.0

7.2

2,8

3.2

16,1

1.2

Pineapple

0.2

3.5

0.6

2.1

0.5

0,4

92.8

0.8

Other fruits

0.3

7.37

6.1

7,9

0.6

1.9

8.5

1,3

Chicken

n.s.

64.4

9.8

10.8

4.6

0.6

5,5

4,3

Hog

0.3

60.8

15.2

11.4

1.'1

1,5

8.1

1.9

Cattle

0.5

50.5

8.6

2.8

2,8

2,1

31.9

1.4

Others

12.9

71.5

9.9

9.9

0.6

2.2

4,0

2.1

;

As a percen_a!leof to,at fann are_ devoreclto a specific crop n.s. meansie_'sthan 0,09 percent.

Source: NCSO, 1971 Censusof Agricu/ture, Philippines, percenc in 1981. With respect to palay, the percentage of farm area under owneroperated status (both categories) inincreased from 65.7 percent to 68.1 percent from 1971 to 1981. However, the

owners decreased from 77.6 percent to 75.3 percent• while that rented or leased increased f'rom 1.8.5 percent to 19.6 percent. /t is relatively easy to shift land out from corn to avoid ir_clusion in OLTP

highest

percentage of palay'farm area which was rented or lease increased from 27.6 percent .to 29,4 percent.

Furtlaermore, while the percentage under snare tenancy

because corn production does not require so nmch semi-perrnanent land improvements as does paddy rice cultivation, A more dramatic deterioration occurred,

pineappie) is more difficult •because of change % category deimitionso Many of these were reported as marJager-operated in the 1971 cextsus; this category hasbeen

decreased, the leasehold percentage increased. This is consistent witb. the scheme to shift from share tenancy to leasehold operations,

in coconut; a drastic decline in percentage of owner-operated farms t'roln 81.1 percent to 73.8 percent; a marked increased in share and leasehold tenancy trom 14.8 percent to 214.9 percent. The trends in tenure status of corn and coconut fames are alarming, since these

el_nmated in _he later census, and it is u.nciear where the category has been absorbed.

One approach would classify manager-operated farms under those leased for a fixed amount of money/ produce; this is consistent with the leasing of large tracts for plantation

crops, which have t'he highest propoltion of tenanted farms, are also those with the

purposes from the NatiorJal Development Corporation.

The supposed

situation in corn, which was ro 'be under the Operadon Land

Transfer Program (OLTP), worse.

Corn area operated 2[

JI

is

slightly farm

by

llll

II lllll [

•

(e.g.

poverty

An analysis totgacco,

incidence,

of the commercial crops sugarca_te, bar_ana and

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Table 6 Sample Typology of Farm Enterprises and Crops in the Philippines.

Demand Supply

Peasant Foods (Consumed primarily within the agricultural sector, subsistence crops)

IMPORTS

wheat products

DOMESTIC

(wage-labor)

enterprise

Non-capitalist enterprisc

plantatio_

]_conomic Issues in Agrarian Reform

A

Industrial/Luxury (for Industrial use or consumption by high income groups))

Exports

feed grains milk

PRODUCTION

Peasant Enterprise

Capitalist

Consumed by wageearners;available on market

The Need for a Comprehensive Program

A genuiile land refonu program, being a question of just distribution of returns to land and natural resources, should :not be viewed as specific to any crop, to type of tenure, or economic size of operational landholding (David, 1986: 1.5). The pitfalls of confining agrarian refoma to specific crops or to particular tenurial forms not only create incentives for evasion, but also lead to neglect of crops/forms of productive organization where inequality is more pronounced, However, one of the difficulties of formulating such a comprehensive scheme is the underlying heterogeneity of the agrictfltural sector, The agricultural sector is ciaaracterized by different production and marketing arrangements across crops: Following de Janvry (1981), a typology of form

rice, corn, root crops, vegetables

livestock (backyard)

coffee,. tobacco, abaca

rice (G.O. 47) corn

palm oil commercial

sugar

coconut

coconut (as coconut oil)

sugar (for Industrial use)

enterprises can be made based on: (1) the mode of production to which they belong (primitive community, semifeudal, or capitalist); (2) their respective status in the labor market, (whether family or hired labor is predominant); and (3) the degree of control they exercise over the state. The typology of farm enterprises can then be interfaced with a typology of crops based on conditions of supply and demand. Supply comes from imports and domestic production, the latter coming from capitalist and peasant enterprises where the differentiating variables are jointly the scale of production and the use of hired labor. Demand- conditions, on the other hand, provide a basis for the classification of crops into four categories: peasant foods, wage foods, industrial and luxury crops, and exports, based on geographic locus of disappearance, the weight of the crops in the consumer price index, and the share of the crop marketed.

A typology of the agricultural sector would show the diversity of production arrangements in the.Philippines as shown in Table 6. For example, rootcrops, rice,

livestock

(for industrial use)

pineapple banana rubber sugar

coconut (as copra)

corn and vegetables are typically ga'own on small-scale peasant farms, while cornmercial farms and agribusiness corporations (e.g. those growing bananas and pineapples for export) would be classifled as capitalist enterprises because of large scale operations and the use of wagt_ labor_ There are also non-capitalist plantations such as those in sugar and coconut, where the predominant arrangement is tenancy or wage labor, the latter being differentiated from capitalist enterprises due to the existence of other social and institutional ties between the worker and the landlord (as in the hacienda system of Negros). The technical requirements for each crop as well as its labor institutions may be different so that a single agrarian reform scheme may not be uniformly applicable.

However, this does not negate the need for the redistribution of land ownership and access to rental income from land. Due to the difference in production-marketing arrangements across crops and variations in patterns of land ownership, which may have cultural and ecological bases (e.g, tribal and communal lands), land reform

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programs must be flexible in design and implementation. Thus, attention must be given to various institutional arrangements under which this can take place,

for custom flowing; sugar planters in Negros say that a farm size of 50 hectares enables efficient use of such large-scale machinery. However, this bottleneck for small holders can be solved through the use of the custom-plowing service of B. Economies of Scale tractors, which is readily available in the sugar areas of Batangas and Bukidnon, where both small and large sugar planters The loss of economies of scale is coexist. Thus, diseconomies of scale often used against the extension of land need not be inherent to small farms so reform to the plantation sector. It is long as a viable rental market for often argued that parcelling out or machinery and other support services dividing the operational unit may disrupt exists, production processes, with detrimental.

Data from sugar farms also indicate effects in productivity. This argument is that small farms may be more costbased on two premises: First, land efficient in producing sugar (Habits, reform is equated to the subdivision 1977). Table 7 shows that small sugar of operating units, and second, significant farms incur the least cost to produce _economies of scale exist in the plantation one picul of sugar. The cost per picul sector. However, both arguments do not even increased for longer farm size carehave convincing empirical evidence in gories. Furthermore, a comparison with their favor. First, land reform involves the other sugar-producing Asian countries redistribution of ownership, and is not reveals that the Philippines has extraequated with the subdivision of the ordinarily large farms. The Philippines operational unit. In this case, the loss of is an anomaly since almost half of its economies of scale is moot and academic, total sugar cane area consists of farms since the farm enterprise will still be exceeding 50 hectares in size, while farms operated as a large unit, though owner- smaller than 5 hectares account for ship will be democratized. Second, the 99 percent of sugar cane farms in existence of economies of scale in agri- Taiwan, 99 percent in Japan, 6°35 perculture is subject to question. Recent cent in India, and 72 percent in Pakistan. studies (e.g. Hayami and Ruttan, 1985, Habito points out that if other countries Ch. 6; Hayami, 1987a) have shown that, have done well with predominantly small although increasing returns in agricultural sugar cane farms, there seems to be no production tend to prevail in high-wage economies that demand large-scale capital equipment to save on labor, agriculture in low-wage developing economies is generally characterized by constant returns or even scale diseconomles. Even in the case of commercial crops such as

reason why the Philippines, cannot. If economies of scale do exist m processing and marketing activities, small farmers can still take advantage of these through

A recent study based on field obserrations (H_ami, Quisumbing and Adriano, 1987) has concluded that scale economies do not exist in the production of most tree crops such as coconuts, coffee, and cacao. Production and marketing of these crops require neither large-scale machinery nor central management, both of which could be pos_ible sources of scale economies. In the case of sugar, however, scale economies seem to be linked to the use of large-scale tractors

contract farming schemes or collective ownership.

C.

TenurialArrangement

A major issue in the land reform debate is whether or not the government should impose the type of tenure relations on land reform beneficiaries. For example, the shift from share tenancy to leasehold tenancy was instituted on the grounds that: (1)sharetenancyisinefficient compared to fixed rent (leasehod tenancy) or wage labor; (2)share tenancy is the most exploitative form of production relations; and (3)the tenant should be liberated fromhis "feudal bondage" to the landlord.

Despite the popular appeal Of such arguments, however, restrictions on the form of tenancy may have negative implication and may, in fact, be unfounded.

First, •theoretical studies have shown that, all other things being equal, in the presence of risk and uncertainty, sharecropping is equivalent to a combination of fixed-rent of fixed-wage contracts (Newbery, 1977, Reid, 1976). Empirical studies in the Philippines(e.g.Ministryof Agrarian Reform, 1983) also show no significant productivity differences between tenure categories, while farm practices, farm inputs and irrigation are variables which do affect farm production. Thus, singling out tenanted farms on the basis of the inefficiency argument is not justifiable. Second, assuming that labor income is the major source of

......

sugar, scale economies appear to exist only in processing activities but not in farm production itseff.

,

• JlJ m,

Table 7. Sugar Production Costs for Different Farm Sizes.

-..................

Farm Size

AverageCostper Picul (_'1

"

.....

Small

farms

( IO hectares

Medium forms

(between

Large

(above

farms

_ :_=_

and below)

IO7.50

IO to 50 hectares)

50 hectares

124 .OO

)

120 .OO

$ouroe of basic data : PHILSUCOM_ A :5aheme for the Rationalization of the Philippine SuE(If I_dustry,1985, InHablto(1987).

................

_,,

• .

'

I

IIIII I

1987 II IIiIII

IIIII

II

]

llllll

I

." li_

II III lllIllllllll

DEVELOPMENT

RESEARCH

NEWS

10

I

I

MAY

A

income for the tenant and agricultural

generate enough cash income, or to avail.

accruing the to land be shares more laborer, share or of capitaT'may labor vis-a-vis crucial in defining "exploitation" than the form of tenancy itself. That is, other forms of production organization which are not characterized by tenancy may even result in lower employment and labor income, and may even have higher concentrations in asset ownership. Per-

their desirecredit to sources becomehaveleaseholders of outside expressed (Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano, 1987:9). Thus, it may be wiser to make a transition to leasehold status optional, Furthermore, ' it is crucial that support services be part and parcel of a land reform strategy, (e.g. extension services to increase the skills and productivity of

! "." .' .""::':i'i. i::':'.::'!' '/.!.:. '"" '"' ' :.:..".ii.i:i._, :::i.. :tlf ....... "'""" '

haps the most obvious example would be wage labor on sugar plantations and capitalist enterprises like multinational agribusiness plantations. Third, since rural

the farmer_beneficiary, and credit programs) to enable him to purchase necessary production inputs. "

.wottldil

product and factor markets are imperfect, the landlord (ff he is not an absentee)

i!:':'" ......

may as the conduit credit neededserve to purchase productionfor inputs, Abolishing the social and economic

. '....

.".

i'"..'.

other

institutional

arrangements

may

have detrimental effects on the viability of the small farmer. Fourth, the issue of landless workers, who would be excluded from a tenure-based identification of land reform beneficiaries, is completely neglected. Finally, .restrictions may lead to even more inequitable production arrangements.

There is an increased incentive to evict tenants (and substitute hired labours) to avoid inclusion in land reform, thus reducing the amount of employment and labor income,

............... "'""':'

1987

i .:i..'"'i; ";'"i.i'"":".!'. ')" ' ''!":'"'"i'i"!'"i"i:i comzng:".: . ,:elite",, ..''.'.

....'....'

gro ':th_

'

'

.. .......

': ::i':i.'.: "'' ...i.". :.. '.. '' .:'... '..i.i.:.'iiiii. '...ii ''''''' :.'

: ..

institutions of tenancy without providing adequate support services through

- JUNE

Ill

'..:....:i.!.:):....ii' ..; workers to a _,.lU..t ._in the utilization ...: resources" (Article Moreover, the

share from their labor of marine and f.ishing XIH, Section 7). .

Constitution also pro=

..........:.:.._ vides the legal framework for the implei.'.':.

"..:.:

mentation aspects of th.e progr_n. In particular, the Constitution provides that: !.'";.'":":' ..:'.""ii'i"."'".: '" :' (1) The progam should, ensure landowners of "just compensation" for all their lands which have been affect by land reform; (2) Congess may prescribe Recent Development on the retention limit hased on a number of Agrarian. Reform 2 criteria ranging from "ecological, developmental, or equity considerations"; One of the major differences of the (3) incentives for voluntary land-sharing proposed agrarian reform program from schemes shall be provided by the state; its predecessors is that it is mandated in (4) One of the state's primary fimctions the 1986 Constitution. Unlike previous in the program is to ensure that the land reform policies, the scope and physical and marketing infrastructures

!::.i'.' "' ...'..:.":i "".'':":'.'.!'::.'i..':::..i:'."..'.':.i'".[".".:":":"'"'" ............... .:i:"7.: '("."..: coverage of the proposed program are sti-

essential to the production

"'..'..i..:...."'._

pulated in the newly ratified Constitution. Article XIII, specifically Sections 4 to 8 stipulatedthat all agricultural lands,

tion of the agricultural commodities shall be adequately provided; (5) Participation by all parties who will be affected

regardless of the crops being cultivated or their legal categories, (i.e., public or. private) shall be covered by the agrarian reform program. The potential coverage includes some 12 million hectares of cul".'i_.'"" tivated lands and four million hectares :':"" of uncultivated and idle lands affecting approximately 30 million farmers,

by the program should be elicited in the formulation of the agrarian reform scheme; and (6) The eovernment should develop mechanisms which will encourage landowners to invest the proceeds of the program to agribusiness/industrial undertakings.

Some critics (e.g. Lard, 1.986) point

.':':"':..':"' ' "::.:the ;._-s째cial":"and

ol,,:,renancy adequate,

'.:!.........:..:.:".

sup,..i.i

The above arguments do not imply that tenurial change is undesirable, Rather, these suggest that legislation, of tenurial changes without the provision of other . support mechanisms may be counterproductive.

For example, the often.legislated abolition.of share tenancy, may not be beneficial to the farmer who -is short of cash. On the other hand, share tenants who have already been able to

regular farmworkers and their respective families as beneficiaries, The Constitution also provides that the principle of agrarian reform shall be applied to the disposition and exploitation of natural resources especially those suitable for agricultural purposes. Like. wise, it empowers the government to formulate provisions which protect the rights of subsistence fishermen and fish-

and distribu-

out that the abovementioned clauses could restrict the equitable distribution of all agricultural croplands and natural resources. For instance, if just compensation were equated to the market value of the agricultural lands (which is the interpretation of the Constitutional Commission), then the redistribution of lands to small farmers and farmworkers will not jibe with the true spirit of. the land

DEVELOPMENT

RESEARCH

NEWS

11

MAY -JuNE

1987

IIIII11 reform program. Rather, such a redi.stribution would 0e equivalent to an exchange act_vi_y in a land market.

Further, since majority of the prospecCive beneficiaries of this program (i.e. the small farrn growers and farmworkers) belong to the lowes'c income rung of the country, a land price that is no different

visions would be substantially watered down.

This is one of the reasons why the present govermnent is trying to produce a land ret0rm package which already derans the concepts and the mechanics for irnpierrlenting the agrarian reform proga-am. The essential components of

can be implemented under RA 3844 and LOI 227, or und_ the series of Executive Orders regartiing sequestered lands.

Among the three programs which will affect privately-owned agricultural lands (i.e. Programs A, B and C), Program C encompasses the largest hectarage as it involves some 3.5 million hectares or

from its markec value would certainly be beyond the financial reach oi these beneficiaHes,

this program are discussed 'below.

approximately 35 percent of total land retorm areas (See Table 8). This ranks second to the area classified under Program D (it should be pointed out that the latter program is concerned with public and not privately-owned lands).

Another loophole m this Constltutional legislation pertatr.s to the t'etention limit. Not only is Congress accorded much leeway m terms of identifying the appropriate land ceiling but more amportantly, another seccionintheConsutution stipulates hectarage limits for public agricuhuraliands that can de owned or leased

"Agrarian reform must viewed

not

only

be

as a political

nor counter-insurgency tool but as a part of a broader development strategy for the agriculllgrai sector, ""

area

by private corporat:ions an.d Filipino individuals. Specxiicaily, Article XIII of the newly-ratified

Constitution,

section 3

Ot the 3.5 million hectares in Program C, lands categorized as plantations utilizing wage labor account t'or 2.33 million hectares, or 61 percent. The remaining

Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform

(CARP)

consists

of

562,000

hectares

of

tenanted rice and corn retained areas and 957,000 hectares of tenanted non-rice and corn areas. There is a concensus however, that the haciendas and agribusiness

states that:

Progrmn

"Priva_e corporarzons or associations may not hold such alienaole lands of the public' domain except, by lease,, for a ,period nor exceeding rwen_-five years,

The proposed Comprehensive Agrarian Reform' Prograrn is the cornerstone of the Aqumo Adrmnistration's land refbma strategy. Although the CARP is

plantations are the most politicaUysensitive, since there is no existing land reform legislation covering plantation agriculture.

Lastly, Program D involves the distribution of five million hectares' of

renewable Ibr not more than twentyfive years, renewable ]br not more than twenty-live .years, and not to exceed

still currently being examined (especially the mechanics of its implementation and possible sources of financing), the form

pubhc alienable and disposable lands suited for agriculture, and which can be reformed under Commonwealth Act 141

one thousand hectares in area. Cin'zens of the Phii'ippines may l'ease not more

and content of the program have akeady been developed.

and Executive orders issued by President Aquino.

than five thousand nectua'es, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereby'by purchase, homestead, or grant, "' (underscorings added),

The CARP, which will affect approxnnately 11.1 million hectares of agricultural lands (or roughly one half of the total area of arable lands), is intencted to take effect between 1987 and 1992.

Although this section incl.udes a conditional clause which particularly takes into

The CARP is divided into four programs, based on the land category covered and

accoun_ the '_r¢qtiirernei:tts of agrarian retorm '_ (refer to paragraph 2 of section 3), the past experience of the country is replete with instances whereby private foreign and domestic corporations as well as local individuals were able to augment their landholdings by using a sindiar Constitutional stipulation (refer to ArticZeXIIin the 1915 Constitution).

Lastly, if"the mechanics of the laud refoml program were letI fbr Congress to decide, its actual implementation may be considerably delayed. Moreover, it" Congie_s will be dominated by people coming front 'the landlord and elite group, then one could expect that the redistributive potential of the land reform pro-

its proposed time frame. Table 5 provides a description of these programs.

The first phase (Program A) calls for the completion of Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27 as well as the implementation of the landed estates program. This covers some 1.3 million hectares of tenanted rice and corn lands, or 12 percent o1" the total proposed reform area. Program A can be undertaken under existing laws.

Program B involves the expansion of land relbrm to idle and abandoned lands, and lands that will be expropriated. The affected land area is estimated at 939,000 hectares, 18 percent of the total land reform area (.See Table 8). This program

The Department of AgrarianReform (DAR) plans to implement Programs, A, B, and D in 1987, leaving the controversial Program C tbr implementation in 1989. The terminal year for the completion .of the four programs is set at 1992, the year when President Corazon Aquino ends her six-year term.

At present, the Cabinet Action Cornmittee is finalizing the mechanics of the CARP before Congress is convened in July 1987. The purpose is to define this program and. begin its implementation prior to the convening of Congress; it is hoped that its immediate implementation would reduce dramaticaUy the backlog (in terms of time and finances) that would result ff Congress .were left to design the agrarian reform pl'ogram.

Currently, however, the Committee is still laced with several constraints, primarily financial in nature. It is estimated that some P63 billion would

DEVELOPMENT

RESEARCH

NEWS

12

......

II

Table 8. The Four Programs of the ComprehensiveAgrarianReform Program (CARP)

PROGRAM CATEGORY

Program A

LAND DESCRIPTION

TARGETAREA Area Percentto Ithoumndh_=tares} total

Tenanted rice and corn lands under P.D. 27 -

Program B

1,300

11.7

722 11 562

6.5 n.s 5.1

939

8.5

189 300 50 300 100

1.7 2.7 0.4 2.7 0.9

Landsnot yet covered by DAR Lands covered by EPs Lands covered by LCs

Private lands - Idle and abandonedlands - Foreclosed lands - Sequestered farms - Voluntary offers = Lands to be expropriated

Program C

Plantations, etc., which are privatelands -

'

land administration 2,333 -- Tenantedrice and corn

Program D

1987-1989

land with the retention limit Tenanted non-rice and corn croplands

land census, and P5.4 billion for other operational and administrative expenses.

In terms of funding sources, the Committee hopes to finance 59 percent of the CARP's cost through foreign loans whi/_ the remaining 41 percent shall be generated from the domestic economy.

At present, the Committee, with the assistance of the Inter-Agency Tas_ Force, is carefully examining various mechanisms of obtaining funds from both foreign and local institutions/sources at the lowest cost possible.

There is also the question of just compensation for landowners. This issue is intimately linked to the subsidy which the government is willing to fund and is

Some Suggestions for Acting

21.0

562

5.1

957

8.6

5,000

45.1

1987-1989

Public A & D land suitablefor agriculture ("handog titulo"), DAR settlements, or logged-over lands, areasof cancelled/

TOTAL lands

11,091

of Basic Data: Gerardo Bulatao's during a PIDs Media Forum

IIlIIIIlI

be required to finance the four programs.

Land transfer acquisitions alone would cost the government about P28 billion (or 44 percent of the total financial cost of the CARP, assuming the state will subsidize 20 percent of the total land cornpensation value. The total expenditures include the following: P13.0 billion for credit services, P5.6 billion for extension services, P8.0 billion for the agro-forest development projects, P3.0 billion for

capable of financing, as well as its i affordabillty from the perspective of the prospective beneficiaries.

IIII

At this point, there is no question,, that there is a popular demand for 11I genuine agrarian reform program.

National public opinion polls (Mangahas, 1987) consistently show the sentiment of the majority as: (1) the extent of land reform under the Marcos regime was insufficient (64% ); (2) most would approve the extension of land reform coverage to all crops (67%), tenure forms (65%), natural resources (61%) and public lands (62%); and (30, 60) percent of the respondents are willing to pay a tax to Finance an expanded land refbrm program.

However, land reform is still an urgent and unresolved issue. While a majority (63%) are satisfied with government efforts on land reform so far, only

expired PLAs, TLAs, FLAs, andunnecessary and civilian reservations

Source

1987

Haciendasunder

Public alienable and disposablelands suitable for agriculture -

1987-1989

3,852

.,

-

TIME FRAME

MAY -JUNE II II II

100.0

half (51%) think that government has done better in this area than the Marcos

discussion of the A¢ce/erated Land Reform Program on Agrarian Reharm held lastFebruary I3, I987o

III

administration, and two-fifths (39 %) felt that there has been no change yet. Finally, two-thirds (65%); would like the

I

DEVELOPMENT

RESEARCH

NEWS

13

IIIII I IIIIIIlll President to enact land reform legislation right away to include Hacienda Luisita and not wait for Congress. All these results are indicative of the urgency of an accelerated land reform program and tile special need for the President's family to participate in it (Mangahas, 1987:4).

The comprehensive nature of the proposed agrarian reform program is a marked departure from its predecessors, Given current political realities and budgetary constraints, however, the likelihood of the dilution of the program's redistributive intent increases with each day's delay in the promulgation and implementation of land refoml legislation. Political pressure from land groups demanding exemption from the program, _i_ increase in the proposed seven hectare cenfion limit, and more generous modes of-compensation is mounting. Furthermore, there is a growing tendency to leave the implementation details to Congress. Unfortunately, history has shown that Congress tends to adopt a less redistributive stance towards land reform legis-

MAY -JUNE

lation. Thus, at this moment perhaps the most formidable barrier to land reform would be the landed elites who stand to lose their economic and political bases due to land reform.

Notwithstanding politieally-motivated opposition to the program, land reform will not succeed in bringing about a substantial improvement in efficiency and equity unless it is supported by policies designed to reduce incentives to hold land for speculation or hoarding as,well as to increase incentives for labor use.. Certain policies can be implemented immediately, such as a ceilhlg on aggregate landholdings, a progressive land tax and the deregulation of tenancy contracts as a complementary measure to the proposed prognun. Finally, to ensure the success of land reform, its rules must be simple, transparent, and uniform. Complex regulations and inclusions of numerous clauses for exceptions will reduce the chances of effective implementation.

Moreover, it will encourage activities from landed elites and

1987

the bureaucracy to seek "institutional rent at the expense of the poor who have little legal knowledge (Hayami, QuisumbingandAdriano, 1987:15).

NOTES 1This section is based largely on two papers, namely Quisumbing and Cruz (1986) and Mangahas and Quisumbing (1.986).

2This section is taken from a review of past land reform programs and accomplishments in Quisumbing and Adriano (1987).

3Based on the presentation Gerardo Bulatao, Undersecretary Planning, Department of Agrarian form, at the Philippine Institute Development Studies' Media Forum Agrarian Reform, 13 February 1987.

PIDS WORKING PAPERS

W.P. #8309 =

Economic Incentives and vantage in the Philippine Arsenio

W.P, #8401

BalisacarL

Interseetotal

Forest

Land

National W.P. #8403

Policy ment.

W.P0 # 8502

in

Management

Land

Use.

Adolfo

the

Philippines,

in the

Context

of

E

Revilla,

Jr.

W.P. #8405

W.P. #8406

W.P. #8407

W.P. #8601

Migration and Ma

cations.

Effects

of

Watershed

Trade Liberalization Experience pines,, 1960-84. Florian Alburo

lnte_Tated

Summary

Factors

Affecting

Survey of Philippines.

rket

in the Philip, and Geoffrey

Report:

Population

Ptes-

the

Choice

of Location:

A

Foreign and Local Firms in the Alejandro N. Herrin and Ernesto

M. Pernia.

Implications for Upland Development.

Ma. Concepcion Cruz.

Tenme, Technology and Productivity of Agro. for_txy Schemes. Ana Doris Capistrano and Sam Fujisak,_ Environmental

the Budget Deficit in the Philippines.

Remolona_

sure and Migration - Implications for Upland Development.

Ma. Concepcion Z C_ruz.

W.P. #8603

Pressure,

Financing

Industry.

Shephera_ W.P. #8602

The Impact of Government Policies on Forest Resources Utilization. Gerald C Nelson.

Population

A Review of Welfare in the Coconut Sylvia N, Guerrero.

EliM.

Issues on Commercial Forest Manage.

Cerenilla A, Cruz and Marian Segura.

delosAngele_ W.P. #8404

W.P. #8501

Capital Flows and Balanced Agro-

Industrial Development Manuel S. J. de Leon W.P. #8402

Comparative AdCotton Industry.

W.P. #8701

Macroeconomic Adjustment 1983-85. Manuel F. Montea

W.P. #8702

Costs of A_icultural Credit in the Philippines: The Short-Run Effects of Interest Rate Deregulation.

Cueva_

Modifi-

Irma

C

in the Philippines:

Corales

and

Carlos

E.

Wilfredo P. David.

W.P. #8408

Management ation: The Galvez.

W.P. # 8409

Workshop

and Cost of Watershed Reforest. pantabansan and Magat, Jose A,

Papers

on "The

Consequences

of

Small Rice FarmMechanizationin the Philip-

W.P. #8703

W.P. #8704

Can the Informal Lenders Be Co*Opted into Government Credit 1Programs?

Emmanuel F. Esguerro.

Comparative

Bank Study:

MarioR Lambert¢

A Background

Paper.

of for Refor on

::1987 ::

:

::

:: info_al:

::

ers: as _0fiduits:i:The:paperdkscusses ....

::

:i: ::::::::: ::::::::: : ::: :: :::::: :: .... : ::::::::

: :

..... ::::

....

i

_-

:: .... : : : :: : ::ReSults: of the :showed that ::;:::::::: ;: :: the generally : ::high :rate:::0f :recovery 0f :governmem, : : funds und:er:fiie istbe high: ::::::: : : : : ::penaity: rate: 6f 42 percent for all past due comparativeiy higher reason: :: is: :the USe::of entities ::other: than banks : to extend:Credit:to farmers:: : ......... : :basic prJn_

............... :: ....... ......

.....

ii:ciplesi:and:pr0cessess at work : because of : rnraifinancial:marketsi that::are One:is:tile naturalin : savings financial mobilization support the?_ got from ieciaiJzationlamong:rural:lenders accord-goVernment:and Central Bal_k; lnc0n!: ::::: : t61their:iC0nlpetition: advantage, of trast, KBs brancl'_esdid: intensive savings:: : Which:the division oflab0r:between funds i mobilization drive in regi.r_ns:ontside the ....

one as, i National.notable find.'mg:is However :o_ benefits t0 be:gained:fr0m linking credit rating:near: the NatiOnal Capital: Region : transactionS: m other :m_rkets. The ad, operate like branches of KBs. The:strong:: :: vantage :of the i:informal lender over the competitive eavirolm_ent could

::::

::: ii: :: :t

:: :::::::: :: .....

:::: ::::::: : ::::: ::::

:more: el:-

I_1

.....

::::

i::

formal iender is that the former does not : compelled them to operate as efficiently:.: i:s:g0od: for both. as: :: ........... of the: tfiree finantiial

.......

........

clientele inthe Philippines ::: ::: : : :: : ....

Primary data were::coitected fr0m a:: Sample of rural banks, brafiches of privaie : commercial banks and vrivate:: develop: :ment banks. Analysis Was mailflYbased :: on secondary and more aggregative data, :: fhe fi_dings could aid Jr_formulating the research design for the comparative bank : studies.:: : ........ .......

Results Showed that the performance i : 0if these financial instituti0ns is some :i way: conditioned by the.:_oper_ng:pollcy: framework i:e,_ RBs and PDBs did little : ::

:::

_'.IN'/A

i

:: ......

:::

ibfis:::::: co,mpr:ise: an: impi

ais0 ::::

: :: ::.....

:::: :

........ :

::::::: : corn: ::,

:with: ....

:::: :

: , ::Phdippme

:

........ :::: performance: :::of ::::c0:nduits:oi _e:r:fo6iises:::

Ad]unct Research .......

Fellow;Energy and EnvironmentalPolicyCenter, i ]oh n E Kenned F:ScI_O0Iof: : GoVemment, Harvard University :

: ::

: P

Research Fe!lowi Philippine :: Insti_ te:.for Developme:nt S mdie_and :::::::::: : :: : :: : : i ::: :

::: :::i :

.......... :,

,

.....

Project:: : This :paper uses: a simple:m0del:t0: :::::: ::::: estimate both..... the ..... , n : the elastlm,les of demand,: for e!eetrmity ma (RiBs): developing eCOnOmy: : : : implications: for: eiectricity :pricing :policy :: :: :banks: refo_si: The specific :c_,tactetistics: of : : its i: electrlcit 3

spiectswb,ch: t sold ....

: :ii

:

....

p g

...........

i ............... ..... .........

:

SeCretariat: and the ASEAN Col_u_nittee :::i::onTrade atidTouriSm Participants came ' :::academe, gOver_m_ent::sector: S: r0f lndustries::i .... I i : 'tl_e most:sueces_thl

organlzatior_s

Board approach; lhnit exclusion list: use a differentiated appr0ach peculiar to" the l eonC'rete C0ndffions Of member com_tries; Jower: doi_iestlC) c0ntent requirement; standstill and e_ent_ilal rol:lback of con-

The Ptailippme institwte fbr Develop_il ment St-t_dies (IDk_;) "P _' 'together with The Agricultural t.redit Pohcy Louncit. " ' ...._ " .......

(ACPC), andh01d 'the a Ohi0: State University: (OSU); witJ two:day workshop

:: use: of process : requh'ement; nontariff: barriers periodic assessment of::

"Rural Financial Markets Research," on: 19..20 August,. 1987. The venue f0rl the:

.....

i: :

• mong develop:: use o!ASEAN industrial : workshop is ihe Operations Room of: In: his:rep0rt, he: noted: : cooperation to increase complimer tar_-NEDA sa: Makati Builomg, Amorsoto St., : : : esia;Mala_;i : _ies' and esiablisttrnent of a DeveIo _nent : LegazpiVNage, Makati ....

Ba._k of Asean_ .... ......:.... :: ....... :

..........

:newly:industriaiizing countrk S) at::rio:st dyfmrnic :rates iri .the seven_ : ..... iel e:ighties,: however

......

An

in-house

sem.inar )o

:

discuss a _F

from page: i4) ........

...... analysis:. The demand

The Society for lnternationa_ Deveiopmentl (SID): is holding its 19th World

::Manila Electr ic: cam;:

Conference ::on: "POverty:: DeVelopment :i: cOilec{ive Survival':, 01i:Marcli 25..29

_

:

,

Completed research study On "mancmg Public Sector De_eioprnent Expenditure::: in the Philipp:mes, 1975.1985," will. be

: i

held on Augast ?, 1987 at the NEDA sa :: Makati Bldg, ]?his seminar will be the first i

Tile sub-: o/f a series t00e presented by Dr. Rosario are G. Manasan, prir;cipal i_vestigator of Poverty study: ........ : : : ...... : i crisis in the:Th:rd World and the Lessons :

: ii

::

:electlrici:tY:! _:::priee

Viron:: :and :to: a certain::extent:i: tique::0 national:. ....f tile NOn:Gover_maental System; .....

Marc:h:27:Pubiic ReSponsibilities andthe: ifiSe ...........

price:: :Role if:

of::tile State; March

The PISS,: together with Development Resea_'ch '_center-_: (IDRC):is t_oldh_g a Workshop ion the:

CoUective:

:

:

_.YpJand Resource PoLicy:ProgaoaunPro: i :i ject members:to present tlieia,preiin'iina-t'y i _slwillbe:: reports and to: alloW project membersl : )g::in:Devel0pinent and and selected participants to make recom: i : : :: GraSsroots:

:mendations finaliz,

: before project:

results: a*;6::

PIDS STAFF PAPERS 1.

S.P. #8201

An Analysis of Fertilizer in the Philippines.

Cristina C David and Arsenio M. Balisacar_

2.

S.P. #8202

(printed also in J. P.D. 1981).

Credit and Price Policies in Philippine

3.

S.P. 4#8203

culture. Cris'tina C David.

Government Policies and Farm

Mechanization

4.

S.P. #8204

5.

S.P. #8205

6.

S.P. #8301

Banks. Mario 1_ Lamberte.

Exchange Rate Flexibility

and

intervention

Policy in the Philippines. 1973-1981.

Filologo Pante, Jr. On the Use of the DRC Criterion in Selecting Projects. Erlinda M. Medalla.

7.

S.P. #8302

8.

S.P. #8303

9.

S.P. #8304

Monetary Aggregates and Economic Activity.

Mario R. Lambert_ Effective Protection Rates and Internal Indkect

S.P. #8305

Taxes in the Philippine Setting.

ManasarL Response to Balance of Payments 1970s, Powen

11.

S.P. #8

12.

S.P. 4#8402

13.

S.P. #8403

14.

101

Korea

and

the

Rosario

A Study of Philippine Real Property Ca3_¢tano W. Paderanga, Jr. Public Enterprise in the Philippines A Definitional and Taxonomical Rosario G. Manasan.

Development

15.

S.P. #8405

Survey of Expetience. EditaA. Tar_ Derived Protection for Nonffaded Product. Erlinda M. Medalla.

:16.

S_P. #8406

l7.

S.P. #8407

18.

Finance

and

State

findings

I !tions, ongoing and forthcoming I PIDS is a non.stock, non-profit tute's program to disseminate

21.

S.P. #8504

22.

S.P. #8505

23.

S.P. #8506

24.

S.P. # 8507

S, [nta[, Jr. Philippine Export

information

to promote

and Terms

iV[..

of Trade Instabi-

the Philippines.

Monres, Rodol.

ture of the Capital Markets: Case. Mario B. Larabert_

The Philipph-,.e

The Rural Banking

System:

S.P. #8509

Mario B. Lamberte Social Adequacy

and

Economic Internal

Need

Economic

The Philippine

PerStrue-

for RefOrms:-

Effects

of

Case: Mario B.

27.

S.P. #8601

. 28.

S.P. #8602

29.

S.P. #8603

A Macroeconomie

S.P. #8701

prises in the Philippines, 1975-1984.

Rosario G. Manasart Revenue Performance of National Government

A

Prirnary 30.

the utilization

Erlinda

Food, Fuel and Urbanization in Ale]andro N. I-lerrin, Manuel E fo F. Florentino.

Rural Development Experience: spectives. RobertE. Evensor_ Financial Liberalization and the

researches

31.

S.P. # 8702

32.

S.P. #8703

Impact of BOI Incentives on Rate of Return, Factor Prices and Relative Factor Use: A Comparative Analysis of Incentives Under the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 (P.D. 1789) and the Investment Incentive Policy Act (B.P. 391). Rosario G. Manasan.

Financial Reforms and Balance-of-payments Crisis: The Case of the Philippines. Eli Remolona and Marto Lamberte.

PHILIPPINE or related

of research

Overview

of Public

Enter-

Taxes, 1975-1985.

Rosario G. Manasan and Rosario G. Querubin Rural Financial Markets: A Review of lAterature. Mario B. Lamberte and Joseph Lira.

Residential Demand for Electricity and Pricing Policy Implication in a Developing Economy: The Case of the Philippines. Clodualdo R, Francisco.

DEVELOPMENT

studies done by other institutions.

projects wllich are of interest to policymakers, planners, administrators government research institution engaged in long.term policy-oriented

The views and opinions published studies or PIDS papers contained

Note.

lity, 1965-1982. Ponciano S. lnral, ,h.

Methodology for Measuring Protection and Comparative Advantage.

Erlinda M. Medalla and John H. Powe1:

S.P. # 8508

in i982: Exercise.

t_om PIDS-sponsored

Empirical

A Decomposition Analysis of Philippine Export and import Pexformance, 1974-198Z Ponciano

Social Security: Lamberte.

publication

and recommendations

S.P. #8503

26.

Taxation.

Banking:

NEWS

20.

H,

Modelling the Effects of Devaluation on Prices_ Output and the Trade Balance: The Philippine Experience. Mb_ Cecilia Gonzales.

The Development Bank of the Philippines and the Financial Crisis, A Descriptive AJmlysis.

Mario B. Lamberte.

The Protection Structure, Resource Flows and the Capital-Labor Ratio in Philippine Manufae-

S.P. #850i

I]: highlights

John

Estimating the Shadow Exchange Rate, the Shadow Wage Rate and the Social Rate of Discount for the Philippines.

Erlinda M. M edalkz

S.P. #8404

S.P. #8502

25.

G.

Crisis in the

Philippines.

19.

Agri-

in the Philippines. Cristina C. David.

Shadow Prices of Goods and Resources in the Philippines: AnAssessment.ErlindaM. Medalla.

Aal Analysis of the Behavior of the Commercial

10.

tuxing: A Short Medalla.

PIDS s_in_rs,

publiea-

and researchers are also announced. research. This publication is part of the Insti-

findings.

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