Philippine Institute for Development Studies Surian sa mga Pag-aaral Pangkaunlaran ng Pilipinas
Policy Notes ISSN 1656-5266
No. 2009-03 (November 2009)
The 2008 global financial and economic crisis: impact on the Philippines and policy responses at the national and regional levels Josef T. Yap
T
he 2008 global financial and economic crisis triggered a synchronized recession among the major industrialized countries leading to a slump in international trade. The repercussions were particularly strong in East Asia where many economies have been relying on the export-oriented model of development. Table 1 shows that the more export-dependent economies in Asia experienced output contractions in the fourth quarter of 2008, a trend that extended into the first half of 2009. The Philippines was not spared the adverse effects of the crisis. Table 2 shows that exports contracted beginning in the fourth quarter of 2008 and reports of multilateral agencies indicate that the fall was deeper
than in most East Asian countries. This is one reason why economic growth decelerated sharply in 2008 and the first half of 2009. The causes and impacts of this slowdown, however, have to be analyzed carefully in order that policymakers would implement the appropriate measures in response to the global crisis. Philippine gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2007 recorded 7.1 percent and was the highest in the past three decades. However, this was largely supported by public construction which grew by 29.2 percent in PIDS Policy Notes are observations/analyses written by PIDS researchers on certain policy issues. The treatise is holistic in approach and aims to provide useful inputs for decisionmaking. The author is President of the Institute. This Note is largely culled from PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-30 titled “Impact of the global financial and economic crisis on the Philippines� by the author with C. Reyes and J. Cuenca. This Note refers to data that are more complete in the discussion paper. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of PIDS or any of the study’s sponsors.
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real terms in response to the ambitious infrastructure program of President Gloria Arroyo. This item contracted by 0.4 percent in 2008 and is another reason why GDP growth slowed down considerably in that year. Meanwhile, consumption and production were constrained by the surge in inflation which rose from only 2.8 percent in 2007 to 9.3 percent in 2008 following the jump in fuel and food prices. Added to this is the overall Table 1. Real GDP growth rates
08/Q1
Q2
Y/y (%) Q3 Q4
09/Q1
Q2
10.6 7.3 8.6 6.3 1.3 5.5 7.4 3.9 6.7 6.3 6.0 7.5
10.1 4.1 7.8 6.4 0.6 4.4 6.6 4.2 2.5 4.6 5.3 5.8
9.0 1.5 7.8 6.4 (0.3) 3.1 4.8 4.6 0.04 (1.1) 3.9 6.5
6.1 (7.8) 5.8 4.4 (8.7) (4.3) (6.3) 0.6 (9.5) (10.3) (7.1) 3.1
7.9 (3.8) 6.1 4.0 (7.2) (2.2) (3.9) 1.5 (3.5) (7.5) (4.9) 4.4
PRC Hong Kong India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taipei, China Thailand Viet Nam
6.8 (2.6) 5.8 5.2 (4.3) (3.4) 0.1 2.9 (4.2) (8.6) (4.2) 5.4
Source: Asia Recovery Information Center
decline in productivity in the past decade or so due to structural problems related to sluggish private investment, poor physical infrastructure, and weak institutions. Impact of the 2008 crisis Attributing the Philippines’ economic slowdown in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first half of 2009 solely to the 2008 global crisis is therefore incorrect. In fact, the impact of the 2008 crisis was not as severe compared with other East Asian economies as gleaned from Table 1. This can further be seen in the fairly stable unemployment rate until the third quarter of 2009 as shown in Table 2. Moreover, despite the sharp contraction in exports, GDP managed to expand in the first three quarters. It can even be argued that the blow rendered by the crisis was softened by existing structural problems in the Philippine economy. A key feature of the Philippine economy is the dichotomy between the export sector and manufacturing sector. Table 3 shows that the
Table 2. Basic macroeconomic data of the Philippines, 2001Q1 to 2009Q3
GDP growth (real, Y-o-Y) Average inflation Exports growth rate (nominal US$million) Unemployment rate Remittance growth rate (based on PhP)
Q1
Q2
2007 Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
2008 Q3
Q4
Q1
2009 Q2
Q3
6.9 2.9
8.3 2.3
6.8 2.6
6.3 3.3
3.9 5.6
4.2 9.7
4.6 12.2
2.9 9.7
0.6 6.9
0.8 3.2
0.8 0.3
9.4 7.80
4.6 7.40
2.3 7.80
9.9 6.30
2.8 7.40
5.5 8.00
4.1 7.40
-22.3 6.80
-36.8 7.69
-23.4 7.48
-21.5 7.60
16.2
1.2
(2.4)
(5.7)
(4.6)
10.9
16.0
17.4
19.8
14.7
13.12
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), National Statistics Office (NSO), and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
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share of manufactured exports from the Philippines increased from 61 percent in 1993 to 96 percent in 2005. However, the share of manufacturing value added in GDP remained stagnant at 22 percent. This stands in contrast to the experience of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand which recorded significant increases in the share of manufacturing value added in GDP. Meanwhile, the share of medium- and hightechnology exports doubled from 39.4 percent to 81 percent in the same period. The share of the same category in domestic manufacturing also increased, but only by 10 percentage points—30.7 percent to 40 percent. This dichotomy shielded the domestic economy from the more severe consequences of the contraction in global trade. Meanwhile, overseas remittances experienced robust growth when measured in peso terms
(Table 2). This has allayed fears that the global recession will result in massive layoffs. For example, there was concern that the slump in global shipping will adversely affect Filipino maritime workers. There is anecdotal evidence, though, that some shipping lines are actually replacing highly paid Western nationals instead with lower-paid Filipinos. Nevertheless, data show that a rise in unemployment rate indeed accompanied the slowdown. Data on labor turnover ratio reported by the Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics indicate that there was an increase in the first quarter of 2009 compared to the same period in 2008. One of the more severely affected sectors was manufacturing, which experienced a relatively large increase in the separation rate. This is consistent with the observation that the manufacturing sector experienced the biggest
Table 3. Indicators of industrial performance (1993 and 2005)
Economy
China Hong Kong India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Per Capita GDP in PPP dollars
Share of MVA in GDP (percentage)
2008
1993
2005
5,963 43,811 2,762 3,987 34,100 27,647 14,072 3,546 51,142 8,225
31.8 7.9 14.7 22.6 23.2 23.7 25.5 22.4 22.5 29.0
34.1 3.2 14.1 28.1 21.7 28.9 32.2 22.0 26.1 36.1
Share of Manufactured Share of MediumExports in Total and High-tech Value-added Merchandise Exports in Total Manufacturing 1993 2005 1993 2005 90.2 98.4 85.5 66.7 98.6 98.4 85.03 61.3 96.0 91.3
95.1 98.1 87.3 64.5 94.2 97.9 85.5 95.7 94.6 87.4
37.2 32.3 41.8 25.0 52.5 46.7 51.6 30.7 67.0 21.4
46.9 27.7 39.3 29.8 56.9 60.3 49.8 40.1 77.6 37.8
Share of Mediumand High-tech Exports in Manufactured Exports 1993 2005 28.5 43.6 16.7 14.9 84.6 54.8 62.9 39.4 70.5 38.1
57.5 64.2 22.6 33.1 82 75.1 72.1 81.4 72.1 61.6
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) website, Industrial Development Report 2009; International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook Database
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downturn in the aftermath of the crisis as a result of the fall in exports. The impact on poverty therefore remains to be a cause of concern. There are two pieces of evidence though that indicate that the poverty impact of the 2008 financial crisis will be small. One is that the nexus between GDP growth and poverty incidence is relatively weak in the Philippine context. This assertion is supported by the slow decline in poverty incidence from 40.6 percent in 1994 to 30.4 percent in 2003 despite modest economic growth during this period. This was followed by a disappointing rise of the poverty incidence to 32.9 percent in 2006 even when GDP growth improved significantly in 2005–07. The weak GDP growth-poverty nexus is also reflected in a cross-country comparison of poverty incidence (Table 4) wherein the Philippines has a higher rate of extreme poverty incidence—based on the one dollar a day criterion—than Viet Nam and China. The conclusion is that there is a large marginalized sector in the Philippines that is largely unaffected by the events in the mainstream economy. Table 4. Key poverty indicators
Population in Poverty Proportion of Population Gini Coefficient (in percent) below $1 (PPP) a Day (%) PRC Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Viet Nam
2.50 16.70 5.10 30.00 9.80 19.50
10.80 7.70 0.00 13.20 0.00 8.40
Source: Asian Development Bank Key Indicators, 2007
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0.47 0.34 0.40 0.44 0.42 0.37
The other evidence for the mild poverty impact of the 2008 global crisis comes directly from the household survey conducted under the auspices of the Community-based Monitoring System (CBMS) from March to July of 2009.1 The survey covered 3,274 households across nine barangays in the Philippines. These households were classified into urban NCR (or National Capital Region), urban outside NCR, and rural areas. The more significant transmission channel of the crisis based on the survey appears to be through overseas and domestic employment. Impact on domestic employment was examined by looking at changes among self-employed through their entrepreneurial activities and wage and salaried workers. One of the key findings was that only 2.8 percent of the households had a member who lost his/her job between November 2008 and the time the survey was conducted. Among the sample, 440 households or 13.4 percent had a member who was an overseas Filipino worker (OFW). Only 27 of these 440 households or 6.1 percent had a member-OFW who was retrenched between November 2008 and the time of the sample. These data support the assertion that the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis was relatively mild in the Philippines.
______________ 1 Reyes, C.M., A. Sobreviñas, and J. de Jesus. 2009. The impact of the global financial crisis on poverty in the Philippines. Paper presented at the Philippine Economic Society Annual Meeting, 13 November.
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What could negatively impact on poverty and show up in the 2009 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) would be the high inflation in 2008 that continued until the first quarter of 2009. Another factor would be the effects of the three devastating typhoons (Ondoy, Pepeng, and Santi) that hit Luzon in September and October of this year.
The implementation of ERP programs that focus on infrastructure is expected to put the country in a better position to attract foreign investments, which could create more employment during the recovery period. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that with a larger fiscal deficit looming, the government will have little leverage left in addressing the adverse impact of the crisis.
Domestic policy responses The Philippine government, through the Department of Finance (DOF) and the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), crafted a PhP330 billion fiscal package, formally known as the Economic Resiliency Plan (ERP), to respond to the global crisis. The said plan emphasized the importance of infrastructure in job generation and involved two waves of infrastructure.
mild contraction in 2008, value added from public construction recovered to 22.5 percent in the first three quarters of 2009. One reason for this jump is the acceleration of the implementation of various infrastructure projects under the Comprehensive Integrated Infrastructure Program (CIIP) which focuses on upgrading road networks and air and water transport facilities.
In 2009, the PhP160 billion increment was used to fund the 4,000–5,000 small projects in the BESF (budget of expenditures and sources of financing) which are geared toward quick job creation. The government intended to front-load infrastructure spending in the first half of the year. Many government agencies indicated commitments to spend at least 60 up to 80 percent of their infrastructure budgets in the first semester. In 2010 and beyond, PhP100 billion will fund big-ticket items under Public-Private Partnerships. Output and employment data indicate that the macroeconomic programs of the government had moderate success. After the
Unfortunately, however, private investors have not responded favorably to the looser monetary conditions and fiscal stimulus. Private construction even shrank by 6.5 percent in the second quarter of 2009. Hopefully, a favorable outcome from the proposed Public-Private Partnerships materializes. The implementation of ERP programs that focus on infrastructure is expected to put the country in a better position to attract foreign investments, which could create more employment during the recovery period. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that with a larger fiscal deficit looming, the government will have little leverage left in addressing the adverse impact of the crisis. PN 2009-03
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The impact of the social protection programs in helping mitigate the effects of the 2008 crisis cannot, however, be evaluated comprehensively at this stage. The CBMS survey data only give a general indication of the direction of the impact. Nonetheless, the structural problems related to these programs should provide a clue of what to anticipate.
One area where the government made great strides in response to the 1997 financial crisis was in social protection. Several programs were initiated to address both the lack of mechanisms to combat crisis situations and the deteriorating poverty situation. Majority of the programs were initiated under the Accelerated Hunger Mitigation Plan (AHMP), a strategy under the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 2004–2010. In view of this, the ERP includes the strengthening and expansion of selected social protection programs to help vulnerable sectors cope with the 2008 crisis. It should be noted that the budget allocation for “Social Security, Welfare, and Employment” increased from 4.5 percent in 2007 to 5.7 percent in 2008 and to 6.1 percent in 2009. The relevant programs are: i) Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) program for the poorest of the poor which is dubbed as the 4Ps: “Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program”; ii) PhilHealth Indigent Program; iii) Training for Work Scholarship Program; iv) Department of Health (DOH) program for primary and secondary hospitals; and v) other programs and interventions that include a) Nurses PN 2009-03
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Assigned for Rural Services (NARS) program where nurses are deployed in underserved areas in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); b) matching grants to local government units; and c) student loans. In addition to these programs, the government has scaled up the implementation of the Food-for-School Program (FSP) to help the chronic poor. The impact of the social protection programs in helping mitigate the effects of the 2008 crisis cannot, however, be evaluated comprehensively at this stage. The CBMS survey data only give a general indication of the direction of the impact. Nonetheless, the structural problems related to these programs should provide a clue of what to anticipate. Specifically, many of the country’s social protection programs suffer from several drawbacks. They are, for instance, hindered by low coverage and inadequate benefits, poor targeting, and operational constraints due to lack of coordination among program implementers. Low coverage incurred through the years and overreliance on foreign grants meant lower government spending on social services and higher risk of program discontinuation. Lack of funding support is exacerbated by poor targeting, causing leakage to and wastage of resources on the nonpoor and the near-poor. Furthermore, social protection programs are, in most cases, implemented on a piecemeal basis due to differing mandates of program implementers. As a result, overlaps and redundancies in
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sectoral and geographical beneficiaries abound, causing additional strain on scarce resources. It would therefore be useful for the government to address such shortcomings because these programs can play an integral role in addressing the economic slowdown in 2009, in particular, and the widespread poverty, in general. The medium-term policy agenda Since the 2008 global financial crisis had a relatively mild impact on the Philippine economy, policy measures should thus remain firmly focused on fundamental structural problems.2 One such issue is the weak tax effort, which was highlighted when the ERP led to projections of a fiscal deficit of 3.2 percent of GDP in 2009 compared to only 0.9 percent in 2008. Data showed a tax effort of only 13.5 percent of GDP in the first half of 2009 compared to 14.1 percent in the same period of 2008. Both figures are lower than the tax efforts in Thailand and Malaysia (15.2 and 15.3 percent, respectively, in 2008) and the most recent peak of 17 percent in 1997. It is imperative that policymakers implement fiscal reforms to address the low tax effort. For example, fiscal incentives have to be streamlined, if not completely eliminated. Not only are government resources needed to meet requirements for physical infrastructure but the achievement of the MDGs also hinges on having adequate financial support from the government. A scenario based on the
assumptions from the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) yields an estimated resource gap of 0.8 percent of GDP between 2007 and 2015. This is the amount of additional government resources required for the MDGs to be met. However, because of the higher inflation in 2008 and the lower growth from 2008 to 2010, the resource gap is expected to jump to 1.5 percent of GDP. Meanwhile, the existence of a fairly large marginalized sector—the “chronic poor”— implies that social protection must be more proactive. In other words, any existing support for the social inclusion aspect of these programs must not only remain intact but should also be expanded. Moreover, the continuous slide in the ratio of investment to GDP has to be arrested by addressing the concerns of the private sector which relate mostly to inadequate physical infrastructure (roads, transportation, ports, and power) and weak public institutions. In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention that the issue of infrastructure can be dovetailed to the process of global and regional rebalancing, a response that has been recommended at the regional level to address the 2008 crisis.
______________ 2 This writer even suggests that the crisis be used as a pretext to accelerate critical reforms. As the philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli said, “Never waste the opportunities offered by a good crisis.”
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Regional responses and implications for the Philippines: the process of rebalancing In response to the economic slide in the region, a recommendation for “rebalancing economic growth” in East Asia has been made.3 “Rebalancing,” however, means different things to different countries at the domestic level. In this context, then, it is important to distinguish between rebalancing at the regional level and rebalancing at the national level (or domestic level) and to see how these two processes relate to each other. Figure 1 proposes a framework that could be used as the basis for developing appropriate policies. Some experts have noted that Asia’s outwardoriented development model does not need to be overhauled. What will be required is to make adjustment in net exports and some shift toward production for Asian demand. In Figure 1. Linking regional and domestic rebalancing
other words, the main thrust of regional rebalancing should be an increase in intraregional trade and investment among East Asian economies, with more of the final exports going to economies in the region instead of to the US and Western Europe. In order to facilitate this transition, some economies have to import more from their neighbors, implying an increase in their domestic spending (consumption and investment). Intraregional trade can be driven by growth engines that are both regional and national in scope. One important area is cross-border infrastructure that will facilitate intraregional trade. There is therefore a need for ASEAN+3 financial cooperation to further promote the development of domestic financial markets and regional financial integration in order to facilitate the intermediation of Asian savings within the region as well as to attract foreign investment in instruments denominated in the domestic currency. Rebalancing therefore implies the use of East Asian resources for infrastructure projects in the region. This cross-border infrastructure can be a mechanism to address the infrastructure constraints that have limited private ______________ 3 Based on the economic identity equation, Y = C + I + G + X – M, where income (Y) is equal to consumption (C) plus investment (I) plus government taxes (G) plus the balance between exports (X) and imports (M), rebalancing can play around addressing the surpluses and inadequacies among these variables. For instance, some economies are overly reliant on exports, X. Hence, when a situation leads to a fall in exports, “rebalancing” would imply that these economies have to increase consumption, C, or investment, I, in order for output Y to be sustained.
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investment in countries like the Philippines. This is an example of a link from regional rebalancing to domestic rebalancing. Meanwhile, the development of China’s western region and shift toward more consumption spending can generate substantial demand at the regional level (meaning East Asia). This is an example of the link from domestic rebalancing to regional rebalancing. Apart from cross-border infrastructure, intraregional trade can also be enhanced by reviving the “Flying Geese model.”4 China and other middle-income countries in East Asia can be the new hubs of production networks or regional supply chains. Thailand, for example, can establish food manufacturing networks in Viet Nam, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and even Myanmar. Western China can be one of the primary export destinations as it catches up with the rest of the country. Japan and Korea can also expand their levels of imports and consumption.
Regional and domestic rebalancing can be effective mechanisms to address lingering structural problems in individual countries. For example, the accompanying shift in regional production networks can provide opportunities for small- and medium-term enterprises (SMEs), which are more flexible and adaptable to a rapidly changing environment.
structural problems in individual countries. For example, the accompanying shift in regional production networks can provide opportunities for small- and medium-term enterprises (SMEs), which are more flexible and adaptable to a rapidly changing environment. This is important for the Philippines where SMEs generate only 45 percent employment and roughly 30 percent of output compared to Korea (85 percent and 49 percent, respectively) and Japan (70 percent and 55 percent, respectively). Thus, the domestic rebalancing that will occur in response to regional rebalancing can address long-term inequity problems in the Philippines.5
Regional and domestic rebalancing can be effective mechanisms to address lingering ______________ 4 Patterned after a flying geese formation where there is a lead goose followed by several tiers of follower geese, the “Flying Geese model” of regional development refers to a catching-up process of industrialization in latecomer economies in East Asia where industrial development is transmitted from the leader (Japan) to the next tier of followers (newly industrializing economies) to the next, ASEAN 4, and so on and forth. 5 The poor performance of SMEs in the Philippines is one reason why there is a dichotomy between the export sector and domestic manufacturing sector. This is another ‘imbalance’ that can be addressed through ‘domestic rebalancing’.
For further information, please contact The Research Information Staff Philippine Institute for Development Studies NEDA sa Makati Building, 106 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village, 1229 Makati City Telephone Nos: (63-2) 894-2584 and 893-5705 Fax Nos: (63-2) 893-9589 and 816-1091 E-mail: jyap@mail.pids.gov.ph; jliguton@mail.pids.gov.ph The Policy Notes series is available online at http://www.pids.gov.ph. Reentered as second class mail at the Business Mail Service Office under Permit No. PS570-04 NCR. Valid until December 31, 2009.
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List of Discussion Papers released as of October 2009 DP 2009-01 DP 2009-02 DP 2009-03 DP 2009-04 DP 2009-05 DP 2009-06 DP 2009-07 DP 2009-08 DP 2009-09 DP 2009-10 DP 2009-11 DP 2009-12 DP 2009-13 DP 2009-14 DP 2009-15 DP 2009-16 DP 2009-17 DP 2009-18 DP 2009-19 DP 2009-20 DP 2009-21 DP 2009-22 DP 2009-23 DP 2009-24 DP 2009-25 DP 2009-26 DP 2009-27 DP 2009-28 DP 2009-29 DP 2009-30
Investment and capital flows: implications of the ASEAN economic community (R. Aldaba and J. Yap) Agricultural diversification and the fruits and vegetables subsector: policy issues and development constraints in the Philippines (R. Briones) Impact assessment of national and regional policies using the Philippine Regional General Equilibrium Model (PRGEM) (R. Briones) Asia’s underachiever: deep constraints in Philippine economic growth (R. Briones) Assessing the value of seasonal climate forecasts on farm-level corn production through simulation modeling (C. Reyes, K. Gonzales, C. Predo, and R. de Guzman) Climate variability, seasonal climate forecast, and corn farming in Isabela, Philippines: a farm and household level analysis (C. Reyes, S. Domingo, C. Mina, and K. Gonzales) Analysis of the impact of changes in the prices of rice and fuel on poverty in the Philippines (C Reyes, A. Sobrevinas, J. Bancolita, and J. de Jesus) Comparing GDP in constant and in chained prices: some new results (J. Dumagan) Profitable use of SCF in a policy context: the case of rice stockholding in the Philippines (C. Reyes and C. Mina) Fiscal decentralization and local finance reforms in the Philippines (G. Llanto) Policy options for rice and corn farmers in the face of seasonal climate variability (C. Reyes, S. Domingo, C. Mina, and K. Gonzales) Crop insurance: security for farmers and agricultural stakeholders in the face of seasonal climate variability (C. Reyes and S. Domingo) Revisiting sectoral liberalization: an alternative to the FTAAP? Implications on the Philippines (G. Manzano and M. Bedaño) Estimation of the food poverty line (J.R. Albert and W. Molano) Some statistical dimensions in the generation of Philippine poverty statistics (A. Pacificador Jr.) Small area estimation of poverty statistics (Z. Villa Juan-Albacea) Issues on the official poverty estimation methodology in the Philippines: comparability of estimates across space and over time (L.G. Bersales) A documentation of the Philippines’ Family Income and Expenditure Survey (C. Ericta and E. Fabian) Price collection for the consumer price index: a documentation (C. Ericta and R. Sta. Ana) A documentation of the Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (C. Ericta and J. Luis) Toward a strategic urban development and housing policy for the Philippines (B. Cariño and A. Corpuz) Reforming social protection policy: responding to the global financial crisis and beyond (R. Manasan) Social insurance in the Philippines: responding to the global financial crisis and beyond (R. Manasan) The impact of the global financial crisis on rural and microfinance in Asia (G. Llanto and J.A. Badiola) Preliminary results of the survey on persons with disabilities (PWDs) conducted in selected Metro Manila cities (J. Yap, C. Reyes, J.R. Albert, and A. Tabuga) Motives and giving norms behind remittances: the case of Filipino overseas workers and their recipient households (M. Alba and J.S. Sugui) Global study on child poverty and disparities: the case of the Philippines (PIDS) Incorporating regional rice production models in rice importation simulation model: a stochastic programming approach (C. Reyes, C. Mina, J. Crean, R. de Guzman, and K. Parton) Profiling poverty with multivariate adaptive regression splines (C. Mina and E. Barrios) Impact of the global financial and economic crisis on the Philippines (J. Yap, C. Reyes, and J. Cuenca)
The Discussion Paper Series can be downloaded from http://publication.pids.gov.ph/.
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