Avicenna: The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs Vol. 1, no. 1

spring 2011 vol 1 no 1

avicenna

THE STANFORD JOURNALthe ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS stanford journal on muslim affairs 1

avicenna THE STANFORD JOURNAL ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS

SPRING 2011 VOL 1 NO 1

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF Sahar Khan ’13 Irteza Binte-Farid ’13 ASSOCIATE EDITOR Mai El-Sadany ’11 COPY EDITOR Salman Arif, PhD ’11 DESIGNER Justin Calles ’13 FINANCIAL OFFICER Zahra Taji ’14 WEBMASTER Salahodeen Abdul-Kafi ’12

Avicenna—The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs would like to thank the ASSU Publications Board for their support.

All images in this journal are in the public domain with Creative Commons copyright licenses unless otherwise noted.

More information about these licences can be found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/.

Front cover: Pillars at Qutub Minar, Delhi, by Kevin Jones (Flickr user kevin.j) Back cover: Qutub Minar by Flickr user NID chick

2

avicenna

CONTENTS Editorial Note SAHAR KHAN

4

Egypt: Revolution or Military Coup?

JOEL BEININ

6

The Future of India’s Muslims RAFIQ DOSSANI

11

Islamic Fundamentalism: The Role of Covert Forces MOHAMMAD ALI

17

A Ghazal A poem translated by SHAHZAD BASHIR

20

Islamic Micro-Finance NEHA TAHIR

22

Envisioning a Progressive Muslim American Voice SALAM AL-MARAYATI

24

The Veil and the Body Scanner AGNES CHONG

30

The Origins of Religious Toleration in Medieval Islamic Lands DAVID KESSLER I’m Tired: A Hijabi’s Monologue SAHAR ULLAH

32 36

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

3

Editorial Note Avicenna throws down a gauntlet from antiquity to modernity. Everyone’s just trying to pick it up. That’s all.

But, who is Avicenna?

Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980–1037) was a Persian polymath, only one of the many philosopher-physicians of the Muslim world’s golden age. However, the reach of Avicenna’s work was not limited to the Muslim world. His breakthroughs, in the realm of philosophy or medicine, also broke new ground in Christian-Latin and Jewish societies. In the same vein, Avicenna—The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs endeavors to reach out to Muslims and non-Muslims alike in creating an academic agora where issues pertaining to Muslim societies and peoples may be explored.

As for any group of people, there are social, political, economic, historical, and spiritual dimensions to be enjoyed and delved into. Hence, our current issue traverses a broad terrain, covering topics relevant to American-Muslims and Muslims abroad in the same space. To name a few, our issue includes Sufi poetry and an article on an Islamic microfinance product. There is a historical account on the treatment of Jewish minorities in the Ottoman Empire and a contemporary one on the Muslim minority of India. Hopefully, we can give a taste of the kind of diversity that is to be had across and within Muslim societies.

Given the Avicennian ethos of diligent and sincere pursuit of knowledge, we propose to critically examine Muslim societies from the inside, rather than the outside. Our main objective is to fill a lacuna we perceive in general and academic discourse on Stanford’s campus; for too long, these societies have been observed from the exterior as objects; instead, they need to be engaged with as knowing subjects. Let us approach Muslim people and their nations not as mere appendages to American foreign policy, but as authors of their lives, possessing their own grievances and aspirations. Essentially, we invite you to a re-positioning, whereby Muslim societies are moved from the margins to center stage.

In so doing, we hope to offer a more nuanced comprehension of Muslims in the modern world. We would like to clarify that although Islam is discussed, we are focusing on the actors—Muslims (be they religious or cultural Muslims)—rather than the metaphysical set of ideas.

Recent events reveal that a large part of the Muslim world is in the throes of something new. Though we cannot decipher or evaluate the nature of these changes quite yet, they too mold the character of our project. Given the climate of change, we would like to express our best sentiments for the efforts of the people in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa). We cannot strive to speak on behalf of Muslim people without being a part of this people’s consciousness.

4

avicenna

Maybe a Muslim Renaissance is at grasp. Or, something less highbrow-sounding perhaps? Maybe structural upheaval is in the offing for societies, which for too long have been temporarily relieved with solutions that cure symptoms but not the disease. Maybe not. In any case, we could play the counter-factual game endlessly but only time will unravel reality’s course. And, we belong to a time, which insists that this journal is more than just an informative exercise; it is introspective too. There exists a people’s desire to re-examine the Muslim identity in a world where a different kind of wind is blowing and we (Muslim or non-Muslim) are undeniably moved by it.

Yours, Sahar Khan ’13 Editor-in-Chief

“Avicenna (Ibn Sina)”—photo taken at the Ibn Sina Museum in Afshana, Uzbekistan—by Night Eulen (Flickr user night_eulen)

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

5

Egypt: Revolution or Military Coup?

Joel Beinin Donald J. McLachlan Professor of History Professor of Middle East History Stanford University

The tipping point for the fall of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was the afternoon of January 28, 2011. After the conclusion of Friday noon prayers, the police and Central Security Forces tried to keep demonstrators away from the center of Cairo. They succeeded for about an hour. But, about 2:00 pm, 20,000 protestors broke through the blockades and took over the Qasr al-Nil Bridge connecting Giza and Zamalek to Tahrir Square, the hub of the downtown district. Two hours later the headquarters of the National Democratic Party led by former President Mubarak was on fire.

Earlier in the afternoon, crowds stormed regional NDP headquarters in the Suez Canal city of Isma‘iliyya and the Delta provincial capital of Mansura. The provincial NDP headquarters in Fayyum was torched a few hours later. Hundreds of thousands of protesters throughout the country defied the 6:00 pm curfew proclaimed by the regime and remained in the streets throughout the night. In Alexandria, Egypt’s second city, demonstrators drove the police and Central Security Force out of town. By the time President Mubarak addressed the nation that evening and announced he had requested the resignation of the entire cabinet, the army had begun to assume security responsibility for Egypt’s major cities.

The targets of angry crowds are rarely accidental. In this case, assaulting the offices 6

avicenna

of the ruling party in Cairo and other official buildings in Alexandria, Suez, and Tanta underscored one of the main chants of the demonstrators: “The people want an end to the regime.” Not “reform” and the resignation of the cabinet, which is a technocratic and administrative body with limited powers, but a regime change and a transition to democracy which would only begin with the resignation of President Mubarak.

Economic demands were prominent in the demonstrations of the January 25 “Day of Anger,” which launched the protest movement. Within days demonstrators set their sights squarely on the entire autocratic regime, whose oppression at last became unbearable. The demand for regime change intensified after January 28.

One of the most extraordinary aspects of the Egyptian uprising is that there was no identifiable leadership. Many of the extraparliamentary oppositional figures who were active in the last decade participated and spoke to the media. But they did not play an organizing or leading role. The vast majority of those who participated in the demonstrations did not belong to any political or religious party or movement and had not previously participated in public political activity.

As usual, Egypt’s opposition parties were ineffectual. The so-called “left” Tagammu‘ Party refused to endorse the January 25

demonstrations out of appreciation for the police (January 25 is Police Day in Egypt).

The pro-business Wafd Party never announced a clear position. Ghad (Tomorrow) Party leader Ayman Nour, who won 7 percent of the vote in the 2005 presidential elections, did support the demonstration. The physically frail Nour was beaten by police and ended up in the hospital on January 25. His party, however, is split and not particularly popular.

The Muslim Brothers, the largest and best organized opposition force in the country, abstained from the January 25 demonstrations, but belatedly endorsed the January 28 demonstrations. But there was almost no Islamic content to the demonstrations.

The tone was mostly nationalist and secular. The Brothers knew that if the popular movement failed, they would bear the brunt of the repression. Their role was low-key, but significant, since no one else had an organization capable of doing basic things like setting up first-aid stations in Tahrir Square, the epicenter of the protest movement.

Nobel Peace laureate and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Muhammad El-Baradei, also did not endorse the January 25 demonstrations. He joined the movement only after seeing that they were larger and more successful than expected. He subsequently announced, “If people, in particular young people… want me to lead the transition, I will not let them down.”

Despite his belated support and his previously irregular and ineffective organizing, El-Baradei was particularly popular among the youth. He is widely respected as a “clean” figure who would give Egypt a good face in the international community.

The Muslim Brothers endorsed El-Baradei as a transitional president—a very clever

move, since he had promised to organize elections that would allow them to participate, along with all the other political tendencies.

In December, when the Tunisian popular uprising was well under way, not even the most astute political analysts predicted that Egypt was on the verge of the most massive popular uprising it has experienced since the era of the British occupation (1882-1954). Many correctly pointed to the important differences between the two countries. Egypt’s population of 81 million is eight times larger than Tunisia’s, and its military-internal security apparatus numbers between one and two million people. Unlike the hard fist of former Tunisian president Zein al-‘Abidin Ben ‘Ali, President Mubarak cleverly deployed a combination of limited freedoms, cooptation, splitting the opposition, and velvet and iron-fisted repression which provided some opportunities, especially for intellectuals, to express political grievances and let off steam. Moreover, the Egyptian people have a reputation for political apathy and enduring suffering patiently. However, their patience had a limit.

The instant analysis of most of the mass media focused on two factors as explanations for the Egyptian upheaval. The first is the demonstration effect of the Tunisian uprising. The second is the new mobilizing capacities of Web 2.0 social media – blogs, Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, etc. Some also mentioned the relatively free flow of information across the Arab world as a result of satellite TV networks, especially Al Jazeera and Al Arabiyya.

These are undoubtedly part of the explanation. But Al Jazeera began broadcasting in 1996. It was a virtual cheerleader for the Tunisian uprising. But it was slow to cover the January 25 events in Egypt, the stanford journal on muslim affairs

7

which many suspected was due to pressure from the network’s patron, the Emir of Qatar. Despite its slow start, Al Jazeera more than made up for lost time, even after its reporters were arrested and their cameras confiscated on January 30. Mobile phones have been available in Egypt since 2003.

They have been far more prevalent tools for political mobilization than Facebook and Twitter. Blogs and Facebook have been used for political organizing (mostly unsuccessfully) for several years. On January 28 there was no internet access in most of Egypt, and the mobile phone networks were shut down.

The precise timing of the Egyptian uprising was unpredicted and unpredictable. But putting it in historical context highlights structural causes that make the events less surprising and diminish somewhat the significance of fashionable factors like social media.

It was an insurrection inspired largely by youth. Over half of Egypt’s population is younger than the thirty years Hosni Mubarak was in power. Middle class youth cannot easily marry and raise a family by relying solely on the wages they earn from jobs in Egypt, if they are employed at all. Unemployment is concentrated among first-time job seekers with a tertiary education. Such unemployed and underemployed youth typically work abroad for several years to save enough money to buy and furnish an apartment, the sine qua non of middle class marriage.

The Facebook page of the April 6 Youth Movement, which received prominent attention from the commentariat, had some 100,000 members before January 25. But the event for which the group is named—a national general strike called for April 6, 2008—did not happen. Its presence on the internet was and remains consider8

avicenna

ably greater than in urban neighborhoods and rural villages where computer access is limited and illiteracy rates are high.

Despite their close link to Muhammad El-Baradei, neither they nor he played a substantial role in the post-Mubarak transition.

The “We are all Khaled Sa‘id” Facebook page, named for a twenty-eight year old man who was brutally murdered in June 2010 by the Alexandria police, perhaps because they suspected him of uploading a YouTube video showing them sharing out drugs they seized in a bust, was much more influential. It had nearly 475,000 members

by January 25. Wael Ghonim, Google’s marketing manager for the Middle East and North Africa, anonymously administered the page. Ghonim returned to Egypt from his office in Dubai after January 25 and was detained by the security authorities for twelve days. Upon his release he was interviewed on the very popular “Ten PM” television show. He impressed the audience as sincere, modest, and straightforward—unlike any political leader Egypt has known in decades. Nonetheless, he too was not a major figure in the postMubarak phase.

The project of the neo-liberal economic restructuring of Egypt has been underway since 1991. After the installation of the government led by former Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif in July 2004, GDP growth took off—about 7 percent a year until the 2008 financial crisis and a very respectable 5 percent in 2010. The upper middle class and the elites have prospered. But there has been very little trickle down. According to the World Bank, over 44 percent of all Egyptians live below or just above the poverty line of $2.00 a day. The price of food skyrocketed after 2006. Consequently, the wages of most blue and white-collar workers was insufficient to sustain a family.

Protestors outside of presidental palace (by Flickr user Jano Charbel)

The cutbacks in government social spending shredded the social safety net put into place by the authoritarian-populist regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser. What was left was an authoritarian kleptocracy.

During its last decade the Mubarak regime tolerated mobilizations around several political and economic issues. In the foreign policy realm there were popular committees and demonstrations in solidarity with the second Palestinian intifada in 2000-02 and against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (which Mubarak did not support, though he did not waver in his alliance with the United States). In 2005-06 the Egyptian Movement for Change (popularly known “Kefaya” or “Enough”) burst on the scene calling for Mubarak not to run in the 2005 presidential elections (he did); not to groom his son Gamal to succeed him (which seemed likely until the popular uprising); to limit the powers of the executive branch of government (they were arguably expanded by the constitu-

tional amendments of 2005); and to end the state of emergency which has been in effect since 1981 (it was extended). There was also a strong campaign to support the independence of the Egyptian judiciary in spring 2006. But “Kefaya” lost steam around the time of the 2006 Lebanon War. Perhaps most importantly, since 1998 has been a rising wave of strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations and other actions by workers, with a big spike after the acceleration of the implementation of neo-liberal policies by the “government of businessmen” installed in July 2004. Over two million workers participated in more than 3,500 collective actions in the last twelve years.

They won some impressive economic demands. The government reneged on its promises whenever it thought it could get away with it, but this usually prompted workers to strike or protest yet again.

About 40 percent of all the collective actions have been in the private sector, where there are very few trade union committees. the stanford journal on muslim affairs

9

This is a completely new development.

The most important political gain by workers in this period was the establishment of two independent trade unions— the Independent General Union of Real Estate Tax Authority Workers in 2008 and the General Union for Health Technicians in December 2010. Three more were established after Mubarak’s demise, most notably the Independent Cairo Public Transport Authority Union, which represents 60,000 strategically placed workers.

The government was also forced to raise the basic monthly minimum wage to 400 Egyptian pounds (about $70)—wholly inadequate, but three to four times what it had been before.

The importance of the labor protest movement over the last decade was highlighted by a press release on January 30 in which the two independent unions then existing and representatives of workers from a dozen factory towns declared their intention to form an Independent Egyptian Trade Union Federation. This was necessary because the existing Egyptian Trade Union Federation has functioned as an arm of the Egyptian regime since it was established in 1957. This was the first new institution to emerge from the popular movement—a revolutionary act, since this is illegal according to existing Egyptian law.

All these mobilizations were reported on by the privately owned press which began proliferating after the establishment of alMasry al-Youm (The Egyptian Today) in spring 2004. Overly oppositional editors were sometimes jailed, fined, or beaten up.

But the enormous audience enjoyed by the satellite TV channels reduced the efficacy of repressing the local press, especially since the circulation of most newspapers and magazines is limited. Al-Masry alYoum, with a daily circulation of about 10 avicenna

100,000, is the largest and did not cross the boundaries of liberal opposition. As a result of all these developments, the barrier of fear, which is essential to maintaining an autocratic regime in power, was breached well before January 2011.

The missing element was for the Egyptian people to understand this. On January 28 they did.

The departure of Hosni Mubarak did not, in itself, bring about the regime change demanded by the protesters.

Rather than any of the popular forces, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has managed the post-Mubarak transition. They have done so in a way that seeks to minimize the extent of substantive change.The constitutional committee the generals appointed proposed eight amendments to the constitution dealing mostly with electoral procedures. It left the rest of the undemocratic 1971 constitution, which concentrates power in the hands of the executive, intact. Despite calls for a no vote on the amendments by most of the forces who participated in the uprising, with the notable exception of the Muslim Brothers, they passed with a majority of 77.2 percent in the March 19 referendum.

This means that the parliamentary elections which are to be held within six months could result in the Muslim Brothers and the National Democratic Party (whatever it may rename itself ) emerging as by far the two largest parliamentary blocs. No other political current has a nation-wide organization. The future of the “January 25th Revolution,” as Egyptians call it, is still in doubt.

This is an updated version of an article originally published on the Middle East Channel at ForeignPolicy.com.

a

The Future of India’s Muslims Rafiq Dossani Senior Research Scholar Executive Director, South Asia Initiative, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Stanford University

India’s Muslims account for 13.4 percent of the country’s 1.2 billion population and constitute its largest minority group. Since the country’s independence in 1947 and right up to the present decade, the Muslim community in various parts of the country has suffered hundreds of violent, sectarian attacks. A recent peak involved the Gujarat riots of 2002, when 2,000 Muslims were killed in a state-sponsored pogrom.

When the ruling party in Gujarat state, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was subsequently re-elected to power in the province with a larger electoral margin than before, it raised fears that the discrimination and violence were acquiesced to by the majority Hindu community.

These fears dissipated in 2004 when the BJP lost power in national elections, apparently in part because of its sectarian policies. However, the loss of life and assets in the Gujarat riots has raised the question of how the weakened Muslim community could recover.

In response, and in fulfillment of an electoral promise to Muslims, in 2005, the new national government in India, led by the Congress party, created a committee, termed the “Prime Ministers’ High-Level Committee on the Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community in India,” to study the status of the Muslim community to enable the state to

identify areas of intervention.1 Informally known as the Sachar Committee, named after its Chairperson, Rajendra Sachar, the Committee submitted a report in 2006.

Four years after the report has been written, far from acting on its findings, not a single area of intervention has been mooted by the state, even as the report remains largely ignored by the media and other organs of civil society. Why is this and what does it tell us about the future of India’s Muslims? This article will address these topics. It is organized as follows: we discuss the findings of the Sachar Committee Report, identify why its findings are ignored, and explore the implications of these events for the future of India’s Muslims.

Key Findings of the Sachar Committee Report The report’s key findings are as follows: (1) The socio-economic condition of India’s Muslims is near the bottom of the national ladder. Muslims are now only marginally ahead of the lowest group, the untouchable castes and tribes (known in official parlance as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribals, or, SC/ST). See the table on the following page.

Government of India. 2006. Prime Minister’s High-Level Committee on the Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community in India.

1

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

11

Table 1: Indicators of Muslims’ socioeconomic status

T* /S SC ia nd l-I Al s lim us

M Urban poverty (% of pop.)

38

23

36

Rural poverty (% of pop.)

27

23

35

Annual per capita spending (Rs.) Completed high school (%) Population aged over 20 years who are graduates (%)

635

24

712 520

43

21

This long-term decline is noteworthy because the Congress party is often blamed for the recent history of sectarian violence against Muslims over the past two decades. The reality differs however. In fact, the decline first began in British times (as pointed out in Dossani 2007, p. 146) and continued after independence.2 (3) The demographic factors often attributed in the media to the community’s backwardness, such as low urbanization, low female ratio, high child mortality, percentage attending madarsas (religious schools) and high population growth do not explain the differentials, as the following table shows.

Table 2: Demography of Muslims

3.6

6.7

2.4

ia

nd

s Sex Ratio (F/1000M)

*Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes

(2) The Muslims’ socio-economic decline is a long-term problem (p.153) rather than an outcome of recent sectarian violence. It reflects a steady decline since the country’s independence in 1947 relative to all other groups. The Muslims’ condition has declined even relative to the SC/ST, who jointly constitute 22.5% of the population. These latter groups were considered so behind at the time of independence in 1947 that the Constitution reserved 22.5% of all government jobs for them, along with other forms of affirmative action (none of which Muslims are eligible for).

l-I

lim

us

Al

M

Data for 2001 Percentage for All-India “completed high school” excludes Muslims and SC/ST* Source: Sachar Committee Report, p. 64, 151, 159, 299.

Note: Rupee: dollar conversion rate, as of November 2010: $1 = Rs.45.

950

927

IMR*

59

73

Under5MR†

83

101

Urban ratio

36

28

Population growth (1991–2001)

30

22

4

n/a

% attending madarsas

Data for 2001 Source: Sachar Committee Report, p. 76, 274, 281, 282 *Infant Mortality Rate † Mortality Rate of Children under 5 years of age

In fact, it is remarkable that given their depressed socio-economic status, women and infants are better looked after within Muslim communities than within the population as a whole.

Dossani, R. 2007. India Arriving. New York: Amacom Books.

2

12 avicenna

Why is Nothing Done?

The reason for the commissioning of the Sachar Committee Report by the Prime Minister was, per the Committee’s terms of reference, to provide information that would help the government “plan, formulate and implement specific interventions, policies and programs to address the issues relating to the socio-economic backwardness of the community” (p.v).

As noted above, no action followed.

It is not difficult to understand the official apathy to the Sachar Committee Report since it is the cause of the problem. The reason for Muslim decline lies in poor state investment in infrastructure for Muslims and continuing official and private discrimination. In government employment, the share of Muslims employed is 4.9 percent (see Table 3 below).

Note that the government (provincial and national) is a major employer, accounting for 70 percent of all employment (p.164).

In key sectors that are important for the protection of population rights, the share is also low: the proportion of Muslims in the judiciary (5 percent) and the Indian police services (4 percent) are below their share in the population and even below their share of the educated population (p.372).

The Sachar Report notes, on the consequences of official discrimination that, “The lackadaisical attitude of the government and the political mileage sought whenever communal riots occur has been very painful for the community. The governmental inaction in bringing to book the perpetrators of communal violence has been a sore point. On the other hand, the police, along with the media, overplay the involvement of Muslims in violent activities and underplay the involvement of other groups or organizations” (p.13).

The report points out that Muslims’ low shares of government employment reflect official discrimination rather than the fact that Muslims do not seek such jobs. For example, the report notes that in some states, to discourage non-Hindu applicants, the qualifying test for police force recruits includes tests of the knowledge of Hinduism (p.21). The report also notes that Muslim recruitment in the private sector is even worse than in government.

The report points out that “small or medium scale companies that dominate the private sector have not extended a level playing field to Muslims” (p.21).

Furthermore, the report states that “Muslim identity also comes in the way of admitting children to good educational institutions” (p.12). The report explains that, while Muslims apparently “prefer to send their children to ‘regular mainstream’ schools” (p.12), as a result of discrimination, Muslim children must be enrolled in religious schools (madarsas).

The Law, Political Action and Civil Society The above findings of the Sachar Committee Report suggest a pattern of state culpability in discrimination against Muslims, whether in government or private sector discrimination. It may seem surprising that the state and private sector can successfully discriminate against Muslims in a democratic country with an established rule of law. Why have aggrieved Muslims not taken their cases to the courts and won?

Muslims have indeed repeatedly resorted to the law to seek protection from discrimination. This includes areas such as accessing education and housing, as well as seeking to bring to court the perpetrators of violence against Muslims.

By the provisions of the Constitution, such the stanford journal on muslim affairs

13

the local courts to transfer land originally owned by Muslim trusts and appropriated by the local government back to the trusts. The national government officially sided with the Muslim trusts. Yet, as the report notes (p.228), “due to lack of enthusiasm on the part of the government”, it did not back the trusts by appearing with them in the initial court hearings.

In consequence, the hearings have been stalled, with the last hearing having occurred as far back as 1984.

Khwaja Muin-ud-din Chishti Dargah by John Johnston (Flickr user A tea but no e)

redress must be sought in provincial courts. This is a daunting challenge for Muslims, since provincial judicial action is often subject to influence by the local government. The Gujarat riots are a case in point where retraction of witness statements due to threats by law enforcement agencies and corrupt judges thwarted the investigation of those responsible.

This forces a round of onward appeals to higher courts at the national level. This becomes an arena where individuals, especially poor individuals, are likely to give up the fight. Civil society organizations could presumably carry the fight to national levels, but the general weakness of civil society combined with government apathy noted earlier remains a key barrier to success. We discuss the role of civil society in more detail below.

The Sachar Committee Report documents several case studies of the law courts’ discrimination against Muslims. One example is of a case filed in the capital city, New Delhi. In 1970, a case was filed with 14 avicenna

A second option open to Muslims is political action. Their large size, 160 million strong, makes them an important voting bloc. This suggests that their numbers are significant enough to undertake effective political action.

This has not been the case in practice however. In part, the problem arises because Muslims are a distributed minority in most of India. The only Indian state where Muslims are a majority is the state of Kashmir. Kashmir’s ability to play a leading role for Muslim development in India, however, does not exist due to the ongoing local unrest about autonomy.

This has, in effect, turned Kashmir into a near-police state with no space for political or civil society action on behalf of Muslims at large.3 At about the same time that India began its economic reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a key political change occurred: the rise of provincial political parties. In a series of elections that began with national elections in 1989 and continued in provincial elections, a dramatic The estimate of Indian troops stationed in the Kashmir Valley varies depending on the source.

In 2004, Times Online estimated the number at 250,000. (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ news/world/article392432.ece, downloaded November 29, 2010) It is certainly higher now; some estimates state 700,000, or one for every eight residents.

3

rise of provincial parties occurred in some key heartland states—notably Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh.

These three states account for about a third of India’s population.

The rise of provincialism weakened the two national parties, the Congress and the BJP, forcing them to build coalitions with several regional parties, in order to rule nationally. The rise of provincial parties represents rising opposition to the long hold on political power by upper caste Hindus that traditionally dominate the Congress and the BJP. Over the past two decades, this has led to a gradual shift in political and economic power to lower castes.

However, Muslim politicians were unable to leverage this shift to their community’s advantage.

After experimenting with joining regional parties, they found that the overtly lower-caste focus of these parties and their preoccupation with confronting the upper castes left no political space for Muslims. Hence, the decline of Muslims continued even after the rise of provincialism.

Having failed to leverage provincialism, Muslim politicians returned during the first decade of this century to their prereform party, the Congress. Since then, their hope is that the Congress, having lost its lower caste base, would become more dependent on the Muslim vote to win power and, in return, would support Muslim empowerment.

So far, this has been mere wishful thinking. The Congress party that emerged victorious in 2004 consists of an internal core that continues to be dominated by wealthy, upper-caste Hindus, primarily from northern India. What remains in the outer core are Muslims. The wealthy

upper caste Hindus of the north and low income Muslims in the Congress form a combination that does not work to the Muslims’ advantage. This subjects the Congress to frequent allegations by the BJP of being “overly” Muslim-friendly.

A third option for Muslims is to use civil society action through human rights groups. However, as noted earlier, civil society is generally ineffective in India.

In consequence, most organizations that promote Muslim causes are explicitly Muslim groups, i.e., they draw their membership from the Muslim community rather than citizens generally. This reduces their effectiveness as they are regularly suspected by the media and the state of supporting terrorism or possessing other ulterior motives.

Broad-based, multi-ethnic organs of civil society, such as humanitarian aid groups, have been extremely helpful for Muslims in responding to sectarian violence. For instance, they have organized camps for persons displaced from their homes during the Gujarat riots even in the face of official hostility.4 However, the sort of civil society that can make a difference during normal times – think-tanks and human rights groups that cut across ethnic lines —do not generally exist in any effective way in India for any group. Meanwhile, another key organ of civil society, the national media, which is mostly controlled by upper-caste northern Hindus, follows the suit of its political brethren in the Congress and the BJP in largely ignoring the Sachar Committee Report.

The Gujarat Chief Minister’s comment on announcing a shut-down of camps for the displaced “What shall we do? Run relief camps for them?

Do we want to open baby producing centres?” (statement made on September 9, 2002, about 6 months after the sectarian riots). http://www. indianet.nl/guj4jr03.html, downloaded November 29, 2010.

4

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

15

Rising GDP Rates Help Upper-Class Muslims But Not the Poor India’s rising GDP rate is sometimes viewed as the rising tide that will lift all boats. Indeed, many educated Muslims benefit significantly from India’s growth.

However, rising inequality of income means that poorer communities benefit much less than wealthier communities from India’s growth.5 The Sachar Committee Report notes that “Fearing for their security, Muslims are increasingly resorting to living in ghettos across the country.” (p.14) India’s Muslims are thus especially excluded from national growth because of “ghettoization”, i.e., being forced to move into ghettos in order to be safe from physical violence.

In consequence, “ghettoization” of poor Muslims means that they are among the most excluded of India’s poor from growth. As the report notes “living in ghettos… has not been to the advantage of the community…

(It) has made them easy targets for neglect by municipal and government authorities.

Water, sanitation, electricity, schools, public health facilities, banking facilities, anganwadis (child care centers), ration shops (subsidized public food distribution shops), roads and transport facilities—are all in short supply in these areas… Increasing ghettoization of the Community implies a shrinking space for it in the public sphere..”

Concluding thoughts Ultimately, the purpose of this article was to explore some of the factors behind the depressed socio-economic conditions of Muslim Indians.

A key official document, the Sachar Committee Report of 2006, presents important information on Three-fourths of India’s populations earns less than $2 per capita per day (PPP adjusted). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.2DAY, downloaded November 30, 2010.

5

16 avicenna

their condition. Our analysis of the report indicated that: (a) the socio-economic decline of Muslims is countrywide and severe, bringing the community almost to the level of the untouchable castes and tribal population, i.e., to the bottom of the socio-economic ladder (b) the decline is a long-term phenomenon and is associated with special features of Muslim demography or the two-decade long rise of Hindu religious parties such as the BJP. The causes of the decline lie in official hostility to Muslims that has led to poor state investment in infrastructure for Muslims and continuing official and private discrimination in employment and protection of basic rights such as safety.

The normal remedies of citizens in a functioning democracy with a rule of law like India are not available to most Muslims.

The law is ineffective on their behalf owing to official discrimination within the judiciary and interference by the state. Political trends, resulting from rising provincialism and the rise of lower-caste parties, has hurt them. Civil society’s general weakness and media apathy has also hurt Muslims.

Finally, increasing “ghettoization” of the community excludes them from India’s high growth rate, along with isolating them from the cultural and social mainstream.

Even the small gains Muslims derive from India’s growth will be at risk due to rising “ghettoization” and episodes of sectarian violence designed to destroy the community’s already meager economic base and social capital.

A conclusion from the above discussion is that, left to themselves and to the workings of regular politics and society, the Muslim community is likely to remain behind the mainstream and will, in fact, fall further behind, even as India moves ahead.

a

Islamic Fundamentalism: The Role of Covert Forces Mohammad Ali J.D. Candidate, UC Berkeley School of Law ’13 M.A., B.A., Stanford University ’10

As far back as the 11th century, a fringe Muslim group called the “Hashashin” was known to carry out political assassinations against the Abbasid Caliphate in the name of religious duty.1 In the post-9/11 world, Muslim extremist movements have cropped up with amazing rapidity and strength, to the point where the phrase “Islamic fundamentalism” has become nearly synonymous with terrorism. In modern political discourse, there is a widely held belief that Islam’s theological content and ideological bent inherently promote intolerance and condition individuals to reject secular (or “western”) values. Under this view, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is seen as a natural outgrowth of Islam’s core doctrines.

Although this argument is attractive, it lacks the analytic complexity needed to address the long history and incredible diversity of Islamic civilization. While it is true that Islamic theology—and more specifically, the special status assigned to martyrdom within Islam—deeply shapes Islamic fundamentalism, it is incorrect to posit that Islam by its very nature propagates extremism. Islam as a religious system has spanned almost 14 decades over a wide geographical area, and yet fundamentalist movements have only rarely gained traction. Even in cases where they Assassin. (2010). In Encyclopædia Britannica.

Retrieved January 11, 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/ EBchecked/topic/39133/Assassin-sect 1

gained prominence, such as the success of 14th century Syrian theologian Ibn Taymiyya, these movements have clashed with the Islamic norm, indicating a doctrinal gap between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, the fact that today fundamentalists constitute only a minority of Muslim believers is further proof that there is no definitive causal arrow between Islamic doctrine and Islamic fundamentalism.

A broader theory of extremism attributes fundamentalist orientations to economic and social marginalization. Conceptually, this argument is very appealing: because they lack opportunities for political or economic mobility, fundamentalists channel their frustrations by resorting to extremist beliefs and actions. Yet the empirical evidence for this theory is also dubious.

While it is true that some fundamentalists are frustrated individuals who feel marginalized, this is by no means an overriding trend. In fact, many of the leaders of Islamic fundamentalist organizations come from professional backgrounds. Osama bin Laden, for example, graduated with a degree in civil engineering from the prestigious King Abdulaziz University.2 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s right hand man and the mastermind behind Al-Qaeda, is a medical doctor. Thus, although this theory can be useful for certain individuals, as a whole it leaves the rise of Islamic fundamentalism unexplained.

Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 93.

2

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

17

If the rise of Islamic fundamentalism can be attributed neither to religious belief nor socioeconomic factors, how is one to explain its sudden emergence on a global scale? The main argument of this paper is that modern Islamic fundamentalism, an ideology which conceives of the world as a dichotomous struggle between justice and evil, or more precisely, Islam and everything else, is an artificial belief system molded into existence by vast amounts of funding from states looking to serve their own interests. That is to say, Islamic fundamentalism as we know it today, a movement that seems to be constantly at war with the West, is largely a product of money funneled in from the CIA, GID, and the ISI (Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan), both in the breadth of its scope and in the radical nature of its ideology.

The story of modern Islamic fundamentalism begins in Afghanistan during the Cold War. At a time when the United States and the Soviet Union faced each other in a global standoff based as much on ideology as self-interest, Afghanistan served as a perfect venue to fight a proxy war. The Soviets naturally supported communism in Afghanistan, thus setting the stage for American support of a countermovement, which in this case manifested itself in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. America and Saudi Arabia provided support via the ISI to a variety of groups on the ground, some of whom at times even fought against each other. Interestingly, “[m]any of ISI’s favored Afghan leaders, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, were Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamists…the CIA accepted ISI’s approach with little dissent.”3 Despite the lack of a coherent policy, America continued to inject vast amounts of money into the ISI, which Saudi Arabia matched to the dollar. What started as modest logisSteve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 67.

3

18 avicenna

tical support to anti-communist factions in the late 1970s eventually became billions of dollars in sophisticated weaponry and cash transfers to (often unidentified) rebel groups.

One may object to the thesis of American and Saudi political involvement as the primary cause for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism by pointing out that Sayyid Qutb, the intellectual grandfather of Islamic fundamentalism, framed the eternal struggle between East and West long before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. “Let us teach these children…that the white man is the enemy of humanity, and that they should destroy him at the first opportunity.”4 However, the practical implementation of his theoretical writings would not have been possible without the seemingly limitless funding from external states. Even from an ideological standpoint, America and Saudi Arabia’s contributions were essential because they consciously fomented rebellious tendencies by exporting Qurans and implicitly supporting General Zia-ul-Haq’s initiative to build madrassas along the Afghan border.5 Yet there is something deeper at play here than just Qutbian dogma or purely financial concerns (although these are by no means unimportant). When the Soviets entered Afghanistan, there is no doubt that Islamic fundamentalist sentiments existed. However, the claim here is that outside state actors supported fundamentalists—a disparate group made up of anticommunist nationalists, ex-prisoners, and indoctrinated youth—with full knowledge that these individuals had no chance of attaining victory. In fact, defeat of the Soviets was never even the goal—America was involved in Afghanistan only to maximize 4 5

Wright, 27.

Coll, 61.

the costs for the Soviet Union.6 This was a crucial mistake. In providing logistical and financial support/energy to these extremists through covert operations, these countries were actually energizing a population committed to victory—even at the cost of (or rather, in the open embrace of) death. The inevitability of failure in this movement enhanced the sense of “fighting for justice” among fundamentalists and framed the debate in very stark terms.

By providing just enough support to keep the fight going, but never giving them a chance to actually achieve victory, the CIA, GID, and ISI helped create a David versus Goliath mentality among extremists that shaped Islamic fundamentalism as it is known today.

Undoubtedly, the malleability of Islamic dogma was important in the development of Islamic fundamentalism, especially in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

The cult of martyrdom in Islam is also un6

Coll, 58.

like that of any other religious tradition, to the point where General Zia-ul-Haq was able to tell President Reagan that the “Afghan youth will fight the Soviet invasion with bare hands, if necessary.”7 Thus, the religious framework provided by Islam, which allows fundamentalists to view their existence in broad historical terms in which they must work toward reestablishing a world order dominated by Muslims, is an important enabling factor in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Yet the various groups within Afghanistan—from the Arab-Afghan jihadists to the indigenous nationalists to the madrassa-educated extremists—are ultimately all united because they had a common enemy in the Soviet Union, who they continuously fought because of a steady supply of money and weapons provided by the United States and Saudi Arabia. In trying to counter communism, then, America and Saudi Arabia essentially bolstered Islamic fundamentalism.

a

7

Coll, 61.

National Mosque in Kuala Lumpur (Flickr user Swamibu)

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

19

A Ghazal by Shah Niʿmatullah Vali (d. 1431) Translated by Shahzad Bashir Director, Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies Associate Professor of Religious Studies Stanford University Every atom of the world makes manifest a sun, and that dazzling sun gathers up a veil from the moon’s face.

Look into our eyes to see its light, the one to be seen will light up before you, unveiled.

We are a shadow, and no shadow appears all by itself.

How can there be a shadow without a sun’s light?

See the ocean and the waves, turn your sight to our essence.

That essence is a wine and this cup of ours a mere bubble.

No speaker has ever spoken words such as ours.

Speech of such subtlety is not written in any book.

No stranger appears in our luminous eyes.

The eye that sees a stranger is caught in a dream’s illusions.

His elixir of life has given Niʿmatullāh his life.

Without this life, a divine blessing, the world was a mirage.

Shāh Niʿmatullāh Valī was a prominent Sufi master, prose author, and poet. His hagiographies state that he was born in Aleppo, Syria, spent time in the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and Central Asia as a young man, and eventually settled in the region of Kerman in Iran where his tomb is a major pilgrimage center to this day.

His poetic oeuvre is voluminous and touches upon all themes customarily treated by classical Persian poets. This ghazal uses light and its associated elements such as sun, images, shadows, eyes, sight, dreams, and mirages to dramatize the relationship between human beings, the cosmos, and God. The interdependency of these three elements was a central point of discussion in Sufi thought during the later medieval period.

20 avicenna

Source: Dīvān-i Shāh Niʿmatullāh Valī Māhānī Kirmānī, ed. Mahmūd ʿAlī Darvīsh, 8th printing (Tehran: Sāzmān-i Intishārāt-i Jāvīdān, 1999), ghazal 1468, p. 562.

“Winter Daybreak” by Amanda Slater (Flickr user amandabhslater)

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

21

“Al Taawun”: Creating A Reserve On The Basis Of Justice And Cooperation Neha Tahir Economics/International Relations ’12 Creator of “Al Taawun” product The tremendous expansion that the Islamic Finance sector has seen over the past few years has encouraged many conventional banks to adopt Islamic Finance and benefit from what it has to offer, especially during the current global financial crisis.

Throughout this ongoing crisis situation, financial assets that are Shariah-compliant have been relatively less affected. Islamic Finance primarily prohibits dealing with Rib’a (interest) and distances itself from market speculation, and it is this nature of the system that has helped it stand unharmed even when entire financial systems have collapsed or have had to be bailed out. In fact, Islamic Finance has been regarded as a “system (that) could help us to get out of the current crisis” (economist Loretta Napoleoni).

With an incredible change in social lifestyles and the standards of living in the recent past, there has been a higher demand for personal loans, credit cards, wealth management, and so forth, to accommodate these changes. In the Islamic Finance system, however, there is no significant form of finance that caters to individual financial needs, and the Retail/Consumer Banking sector has a lot of scope for new products and services. With the limited services that the Islamic Finance industry currently provides its customers, one wonders when the industry will be able to realize its true potential of being the savior it is deemed to be.

Another industry that was initially found22 avicenna

ed for the purpose of poverty eradication has recently been facing a lot of global criticism and skepticism. Despite its potential to provide a plethora of low-income societal groups with basic financial access, the heroic status of microfinance is being questioned. Is the microfinance industry getting carried away by its enormous capacity to generate profits? Why have Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) started to go public, when the most concerned stakeholders of the industry should be the poor population it is supposed to benefit? How does the industry aim to alleviate poverty when it is charging its high-risk, poor customers, excessive rates of interest that in some cases are as high as 60 percent?

The union of the Islamic Finance and the Microfinance industries might be the answer to the recent failures that the Microfinance industry has been facing. Islamic Microfinance has been modeled upon the strength of the conventional Microfinance industry, with the scope to correct its inefficiencies, while still adhering to the common goals of an Islamic Economic System; these goals include ideas of justice and equality, as well as the proper distribution of income and wealth. Islam prohibits injustices in society, and Muslims all over the world are encouraged to resort to Islamic means of finance to avoid dealing with interest. In fact, interest is also condemned in the Quran: “Those who charge usury are in the same position as those controlled by the devil’s

influence. This is because they claim that usury is the same as commerce. However, God permits commerce, and prohibits usury. Thus, whoever heeds this commandment from his Lord, and refrains from usury, he may keep his past earnings, and his judgment rests with God. As for those who persist in usury, they incur Hell, wherein they abide forever” (Al-Baqarah 2:275).

However, not all kinds of Islamic Finance techniques cater to individual financial needs, particularly cash needs. This leaves the common man, in need of immediate cash, looking for an interest-free alternative to borrow money from, and lacking qualifications to get the loan from banks, at a complete dead end. In order to satisfy his need, the common man will resort to pawnshops, despite their high rates of interest.

The product, “Al Taawun” (which translates: “helping one another”), helps this common man satisfy his needs; it is built on the foundation of the Islamic principle of Qard Hasana, with a greater emphasis on the ‘cooperating with and helping one another’ motto. Al Taawun is a product to be launched by an Islamic Finance institution (for ex. A bank) that creates a network of individuals (its customers), all working together as a group. The individual members of this group contribute a sum of money to the group, the collective amount of which, every member gets to benefit from at different time periods during the year. The principle focus of this product is to create awareness about the concept of saving versus the concept of credit. Al

Taawun encourages people to create a reserve for themselves rather than resorting to credit-interest-based means of finance.

The model also overcomes the problem of exorbitant rates of interest that the conventional banking system employs; it also serves as an acceptable means of finance to the estimated 72 percent of people living in Muslim-majority countries that do not resort to conventional financial services (Honohon 2007) due to religious or cultural reasons.

Islam emphasizes a great deal the idea of justice, ‘’Adl’; the Quran talks about ‘Adl in Surah Al-Nahl: Verily, Allah enjoins Al-‘Adl (i.e. justice and worshipping none but Allah Alone) and Al-Ihsan (i.e. to be patient in performing your duties to Allah, totally for Allah’s sake and in accordance with the Sunnah (legal ways) of the Prophet peace be upon him in a perfect manner), and giving (help) to kith and kin (i.e. all that Allah has ordered you to give them e.g., wealth, visiting, looking after them, or any other kind of help), and forbids Al-Fahsha’ (i.e. all evil deeds, e.g. illegal sexual acts, disobedience of parents, polytheism, to tell lies, to give false witness, to kill a life without right), and Al-Munkar (i.e. all that is prohibited by Islamic law: polytheism of every kind, disbelief and every kind of evil deeds), and Al-Baghy (i.e. all kinds of oppression)” (Surah Al-Nahl, 16:90). Al Taawun is a step in the direction of an Islamic Economic system that tries to stay in line with the principles of Islam in creating a fair, just economic system that caters to every individual’s needs.

a

Iraqi Dinars by Eric Costello (Flickr user Eric)

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

23

Envisioning a Progressive Muslim American Voice Salam Al-Marayati Executive Director of Muslim Public Affairs Council Email: salam@mpac.org

Introduction The words “progressive” and “moderate” have been used throughout the last ten years to describe a commonly sought-out Muslim American voice to counter violent extremism. We have heard and seen political pundits decry ad nauseum the “silence of moderate Muslims.”

U.S. politics have ruined “moderate” and “progressive” thinking for Muslim Americans. Rather than identifying mainstream leaders who were rising up the ladder of significance in Muslim communities, the U.S. political and cultural establishments have branded individuals on the pedestal of moderate Islam as unpatriotic if they are to ever criticize U.S. policy in the Middle East.

The term “moderate” was most prominently distorted by Bush Administration officials after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and by neo-conservatives to mean those who promoted US policies in the Muslim world—pro-war and pro-Israel. In other words, the Muslims who were selected by the political right in America to become the spokespeople for moderates had no true standing in the Muslim community.

In actuality, many of them were viewed as self-hating Muslims with a political agenda at the expense of the U.S. and global Muslim community.

24 avicenna

This article is intended to outline the key elements of a progressive Muslim-American voice, one that is acceptable to the mainstream Muslim community and that can be understood by the larger American mainstream.

Quranic Stories of Progressive Thinkers—The Prophets The Quran illustrates progressive thinking through the stories of the Prophets.

For Muslims, the history of prophets is a chronicle of leaders who had a vision for their societies to change the status quo through innovative thinking while adhering to ethical values.

Abraham founded our current system of monotheistic faiths at a time when idolatry was the norm, and he was persecuted for his belief in one God. He built the first house of worship (the Kaaba) in the barren desert. Now millions make pilgrimage to that temple every year. Muslims commemorate Abraham in the five daily prayers along with Muhammad.

Moses led a movement for justice against the tyranny which had long manipulated public opinion, and Jesus led a movement and took a stance against blind imitation and economic exploitation.

Noah both literally and metaphorically led his people from treacherous conditions to safety after he had the vision of

danger looming on his society, inspiring him to invent a new vehicle for salvation.

Moving people forward from the status quo to a better condition is the defining factor in progressive thinking. It involves visionary approaches rooted in principles of justice and freedom. There is no single method or formula for such a noble cause. It is a human struggle determined by human interpretations of the divine texts. Conclusions from those interpretations vary according to time and place. As will be seen, the Quranic and/or Islamic tradition also exemplify and defend various elements that mark progressive thinking.

The Salman Rushdie Affairs is an important case in point involving the utilization of critical thinking to chart a new course for Muslims in the modern era. In 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led Iran in the revolution that toppled Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. In 1989, Khomeini issued a fatwa (legal opinion by an Islamic scholar) against Salman Rushdie for his blasphemous book, The Satanic Verses.

Khomeini declared Rushdie an apostate and called for his death. The Muslim world was stunned by both Rushdie’s defiance, since he was born into a Muslim family from India, and by Khomeini’s rule.

1. Critical Thinking

The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) took an opposing position to Khomeini. Critical thinking was required to assess how justice should be served in the 20th century and how best to serve the vital interests of Muslims.

Since one of the goals of Sharia (Islamic law) is to preserve freedom of expression, the death sentence had no solid ground on Islamic principles and Khomeini was in error.

Critical thinking removes the layers of confusion from customs and human predispositions that camouflage the essence of faith by overlaid centuries of traditionalism. Over 100 verses in the Quran allude to the need for people to utilize critical thinking (yatafakkarun), logic (ya’qilun), and deep reflection (yatadabbarun). Human doubt, even questions directed to God about His nature by the Prophets themselves, is acknowledged as a reality, perhaps a human frailty but not a sin. Denying people their freedoms, including the freedom to worship God, is in fact, the ultimate sin, not introspection. Denying freedom is actually denying the truth, which, according to Muhammad Asad, is the translation for kufr.

One cannot take a rule by one scholar, who bases his opinions on rulings from the past, and consider a principle such as free expression in Islam null and void.

Archaic rulings should never be invoked at the expense of principles. For this reason, MPAC condemned Rushdie’s book and Khomeini’s fatwa. Secondly, Muslims cannot confuse apostasy or blasphemy with treason. Even in the West, treason at a time of war is generally punishable by death. Changing religion can be disparaged by the faithful but cannot be banned by legislators or regulated by religious police. Otherwise, the Quranic principle of free worship is undermined: “Let there be no compulsion in matters of faith” (Quran 2:256).

Five Key Elements of Progressive Thinking The five key elements to progressive thinking for Muslims are: critical thinking, belief in diversity as the will of God, social and economic justice, human dignity, and liberation.

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

25

2. Diversity as the Will of God The belief in one God necessitates the belief in one human family, since Islam espouses that every human being was created with the spirit of God embedded in each soul. Moreover, the belief in the unity of God necessitates efforts to preserve equality of all human beings. This Islamic understanding moves people from the notion of tolerating the non-believer to a position of accepting all people as equals. In other words, judgmentalism is discouraged since God is the best of all judges and humans should not encroach upon God’s jurisdiction.

That is not to say that Islam accepts all human behavior. Otherwise, there would be no need for guidance by religion. Rather, the belief in human equality is a starting point to prevent superiority complexes that lead to the kind of hierarchies that in turn enable oppression. The Quran defines itself as a guide that takes people from “darkness to light.”

In terms of racial diversity, the Quran spells it out clearly: “O humanity! We have created you from a single pair, a male and a female, and made you into different nations and tribes, so that you may learn from one another….” (49:13).

Hajj is a time every year when delegates from all “nations and tribes” meet to celebrate diversity and the oneness of God. In terms of religious diversity, the Quran is replete with verses telling people to avoid compelling others to believe. If it were God’s will to make us one community, it certainly would have been accomplished. So how can we compel anyone to believe? The most striking verse on this matter deals with Sharia in the general sense, i.e. how God made laws for different religious groups: “Unto every one of 26 avicenna

you have We appointed a [different] law and way of life. And if God had so willed, He could surely have made you all one single community: but [He willed it otherwise] in order to test you by means of what He has vouchsafed unto, you. Vie, then, with one another in doing good works!

Unto God you all must return; and then He will make you truly understand all that on which you were wont to differ” (Quran 5:48).

3. Social and Economic Justice Religion is meant to serve people and to establish justice, a divine universal principle that transcends time and place.

Otherwise religion merely becomes an instrument of exploitation. Working for the dispossessed and the underprivileged is the hallmark of every great world religion.

Extricating the oppressed from the iron fist of tyrants is a favor to the exploited and a favor to the exploiter. The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) is known to have said, “Help your brother whether he is an oppressor or an oppressed,” A man said, “O God’s Apostle! I will help him if he is oppressed, but if he is an oppressor, how shall I help him?” The Prophet said, “By preventing him from oppressing (others), for that is how to help him.” (Bukhari, 9:85:4) If Islam and Muslims are not forthright on issues of justice in contemporary affairs, then they become irrelevant to the future of society and they are reduced to trivial customs that have been voluminously written on during eras of stagnation throughout Islamic history.

However, the Islamic revivalism that characterizes the works of Jamal ul-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abdu, and Shah Wali-Ullah, all of whom connect progres-

sive thinking with education and socioeconomic reform is the remedy. (For further information on these three and their ability to utilize ijtihad, reason, to reject blind imitation, see John Espositio, Islam: The Straight Path, Oxford, 1998.)

4. Human Dignity The Muslim’s main social responsibility is to defend the human rights of all people: “We have bestowed dignity on the Children of Adam” (Quran 17:70) The Quran once again directs the attention of the reader to serve all of humanity.

Their rights are the responsibility of the believers. Preserving human dignity is the precursor to treating people with mercy and compassion. It is interesting that God mandates one attribute onto Himself— mercy—and that Prophet Muhammad was sent to us as a “mercy to humanity.”

What a contrast to the callousness and apathy towards human life in many parts of the Muslim world today. Terrorism targets more Muslims than any other religious group. Yet, the victims of these brutal acts are simply statistics, and numbness to death is a red flag on the departure from the mission to embrace and foster human dignity.

Dr. Maher Hathout, Senior Advisor to the MPAC, has written extensively on this matter. His book, In Pursuit of Justice: The Jurisprudence of Human Rights in Islam is a must-read for anyone interested in revitalizing the essence of Islam—its nonnegotiable stance for human dignity.

5. Liberation Islam is filled with liberating principles, beginning with the first pillar, shahada, a testimony of faith. Entry into Islam is ful-

filled not by baptism, but by a declaration that there is no authority worth submitting to other than God. The shahada is designed to liberate the believer from the confine of any mortal. No king, military ruler, or dictator deserves our adulation or submission.

Zakat, another pillar of Islam, is similar to the Christian concept of tithing. The generated revenue from zakat is intended to serve several social causes including liberation. The term which the Quran uses to describe the pillar is literally translate d to be: “unshackle necks.”

Siam, or fasting, is intended to liberate human beings from their base impulses and desires.

We are all human, and thus, we need the spiritual exercise to nurture the soul so we do not become prisoners of our carnal instincts.

These five key elements of progressive Islamic thinking help to move people towards the goal of self-empowerment and social reform. Religious orthodoxy is not mutually exclusive with progressive thinking. There is a major distinction between applying classical understanding of Islam based on authenticated traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and imitating other individuals around the Prophet or those who invoke the Prophet’s name in their decrees. As a result of this lack of rigorous analysis over events throughout Islamic history, we see traditionalism decaying the legacy of Islam, and we see oppression, dictatorships, and theocracies take a stranglehold on Muslim countries.

Islam has no official clergy, yet Muslim countries do. In the Muslim world, democracies unfortunately are the exception, not the rule. Yet Islam is closer to democracy than to dictatorship. The Quranic mandate is for self-governance: Obey God, the Prophet and those with whom have been entrusted authority (Quran 4:59). the stanford journal on muslim affairs

27

Challenges to the Progressive Muslim American Voice 1. Identity There remains within the Muslim American community much confusion about its own identity. We are highly integrated into various communities and established throughout America, with an economic purchasing power of $170 billion (see MPAC’s “An Introduction to Muslim America,” http://www.mpac.org/publications/policy-papers/an-introduction-tomuslim-america.php). Yet many adults and children confuse Islam with cultural Arab or Pakistani customs, especially in areas involving gender relations. For example, young Muslim men and women are segregated in many social gatherings, yet they continute to engage with nonMuslim students of the opposite sex on a regular basis in a normal and healthy manner.

This results in a schizophrenic personality, one that is Muslim in certain mosque communities, and one that is American in social gatherings. It can result in extreme disengagement from the mainstream, in both the local Muslim community and the broader public. Depression and anti-social sentiment follow, leading to addictive and/or self-destructive behavior.

The young person might also pursue involvement in groups which provide the sense of belongingness not found in local communities. In many instances some Muslim Americans are physically living in America but can be mentally checked out from normative American cultural identification. Confusion abounds in many American mosques on discussions involving roots and identity. There is a significant identity crisis among young Muslim Americans, leading to a psychological “ghettoization.”

28 avicenna

2. Islamophobia In addition to the internal challenges Muslim Americans face on a regular basis, there is the daily ranting of Muslim-bashers. Network news, the internet, and talkshows fill the airwaves and information superhighway with nonsensical information if not sinister views. If a Muslim criticizes US policy in the Middle East, the bashers call that person anti-American and a proterrorist global conspiracy-follower.

Islamophobes use the loose term “ties to terrorism” to stigmatize Muslims and avoid lawsuits for libel. Yet anyone can be accused of “ties to terrorism” if they have associations throughout the world, including the American right-wing and Fox News. Muslim Americans need to be self-critical in their analysis on moving forward.

But when there is an outcry over trivial matters such as foot-baths for Muslims who want to perform ablution before prayer, hysteria is the outcome, with commentators taking a “sky-is-falling” approach towards religious accommodations for Muslims and demanding Muslims themselves to condemn such religious accommodation. The bashers demand that Muslim Americans become self-hating. In terms of reform, it is difficult to articulate the need for introspection and/or civic engagement when a community itself is under attack.

One egregious example of Islamophobia is the distortion of the term, Sharia, which simply is a noun meaning “The Way” or “The Path”. A similar, if not identical, concept is found in Judaism and Christianity that provides the main ethical approach (i.e. way or path) that is interpreted by scholars based on the cultures and norms of various societies and times. The “Way

to God” is through the principles found in divine texts: justice, mercy, compassion, and liberation. The goals of Sharia are enveloped by human dignity and developed by scholars with a consensus to secure the rights to life, mind, faith, family and property. The closest human document that fulfills these goals is the U.S. Constitution.

Islamophobia is an American problem which not only the Muslim American community needs to address. It is a disease and an irrational fear that has followed the footsteps of xenophobia against other minorities throughout American history. Similar challenges have confronted Catholics, Mormons and Jews. Racism has targeted African Americans and Hispanic Americans. Policies that aim to stereotype and scapegoat these groups, especially in difficult economic times, are a reality that must be exposed and addressed. Also, given this context, such policies are a roadblock for the emergence of a genuine Muslim American voice.

3. Terrorism If Muslim-bashers are demonizing Islam for Western audiences, Muslim terrorists work hand-in-hand with them. Terrorism is the worst scourge which Muslims are facing today. Most of the victims of terrorism are in fact Muslims, a form of lunatic fratricide.

Community centers, police stations, mosques in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are targeted by these terrorists. Terrorism is not warfare.

It is simply carnage and it is criminal. Lately, suicide attacks have taken place in Turkey and in a major church in Baghdad.

While the vast majority of Muslims worldwide abhor terrorism, the fraction of terrorists monopolizes and receives the most media limelight. Moderates do not make news. AlQaeda does. As one commentator wrote in an editorial after the attack on London’s Heath-

row airport, the 99.9% of moderates are irrelevant while the .1% of terrorists are of extreme relevance to our societies. Until that equation is reversed, Islam will be defined by what it is not rather than what it is.

Conclusion Governments and cultural establishments in the United States should adhere to separation of religion and power and cease from selecting “progressive” or “moderate” voices for the Muslim community. That cessation will actually serve the interests of the American people and Muslim American communities by giving hope and creating public spaces for indigenous voices for justice within mainstream communities. The terms “progressive” and “moderate” have been adulterated to the extent that they are counter-productive. At this point, the term “mainstream” is sufficient.

The same applies for dealing with governments of Muslim-majority populations.

The U.S. cannot continue in the business of appointing moderate governments to support geopolitical interests. Rather, mainstream groups that renounce terrorism as an instrument of change, that demand for the emancipation of Muslim women, and that support human rights and democracy, all of which are legitimate Islamic obligations and objectives, are the ones that the American people need to see and hear. Responsibilities for connecting with such groups are partially the responsibility of Muslim American movements. Hence, the U.S. government and Muslim American communities must work in partnership towards the goal of reform within Muslim American communities and throughout the Muslim world. These partnerships are not necessarily synonymous with overwhelming agreement or even the co-sponsorship of events. At times there will be a healthy separation of agenda-setting. But the common ground remains expansive for the emergence of a progressive Muslim American voice.

a

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

29

The Veil and the Body Scanner Agnes Chong J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School

As you flew home during this Winter break, did you have to go through a body scanner or else submit to an enhanced pat-down at your airport?

I did. But that is nothing new. For I have been subject to enhanced/random/selective airport screenings as well as secondary screenings each—and every—time I’ve travelled to, from, and within the United States.

As a Muslim woman who wears the veil, when I travel I don’t really worry about losing my rail pass (though this has happened), not being able to start my car (this too), missing the plane (this has not, despite the car fail), or even losing my luggage or my passport. The anxiety is mostly directed at what happens at the gates, where fellow barefoot travelers eyeball me whenever I am, without fail, selected for some sort of additional screening.

In recent years the extent of privacy intrusion has increased with the introduction of full body scanners and more recently enhanced pat-downs. But even before this, I was always selected for screening. I always travel in the lightest way possible, no extras, no belts, not even pockets for coins or keys. Even my cabin luggage is clear of any liquids, gels or even deodorant of any sort, which is not really recommended for long flights.

My walking through the initial screening never triggers any alarm, but I am always 30 avicenna

the one. The reasons given to me for why I am selected range from, “It’s random,” “You were just lucky,” to “Your headgear,” “The bulkiness of your clothing,” or even “Just because.”

The only time I recall not being selected was when I was travelling with my boss, who was a brunette mother of four and as white-looking as they come. Even though I escaped the extra attention, funnily enough my boss was “selected” on both legs of our trip for secondary screening. The officers kept a close eye on me while I waited helplessly on the side. Later my boss would joke that it was “second-hand” racial profiling.

But like airport security, it’s no laughing matter. Over the years airport security requirements have become more intense and intrusive, despite mounting evidence of its ineffectiveness and ample health and privacy risks.1 First it was just a “secondary” pat-down. Then it was the full body scanner, ostensibly introduced as a “voluntary alternative to a pat-down during secondary screening.” Now it seems that the full body scanner itself has become the primary screening, with the only alternative being an enhanced patdown, which, in the words of an angry San Diego traveler, is like having someone “touch my junk.”

I will not insert a sarcastic comment here about terrorists having won the war on terror if the only choices available are

for my private parts to be either gawked at or groped. The TSA claims that going through the scanner is optional, and that four out of five Americans choose the use of this technology over other alternatives.1 But as I headed home last week from the “land of the free,” I was not offered any alternatives. No one told me at any stage of the process what was happening. In fact there was only a small signpost right at the scanner that suggested I could opt for something else. But no one asked; and no one explained. I watched as others were herded through the gates of shame and told to hold up with their arms above their heads and their elbows at a bend, surrendering to the loss of liberties and the victory of the terrorists, and then walking away clearing their throats and adjusting their clothes.

Astute readers would probably argue that this is not a matter of freedom or human dignity—rather, it is a matter of security. But what of it? Coalitions have raised concerns about the effectiveness of these measures, questioning, for example, whether full body scanners are able to detect powdered explosives, the type that was used by the underwear bomber.2 Adam Savage of Mythbusters fame, true to form and not missing any opportunity to bust those myths, accidentally smuggled on board two 12-inch long steel razorblades despite having gone through the body scanner: “What the <expletive>, TSA, you saw my junk but somehow you missed these?!”3 This is not the kind of trade of freedom for security that is worth $160 million (at last count).

If four in five Americans opt to go through Transportation Security Administration, Advanced Imaging Technology, Available online: http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/index.shtm 2 Electronic Privacy Information Center and Others, Petition for Suspension of TSA Full Body Scanner Program, April 21, 2010.

3 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3yaqq9Jjb4 1

the full body scanner, it is only because the alternative is even more degrading.

As alternatives go though, shouldn’t I be counting my lucky stars as I do have a “choice,” no matter how meaningless?

No. After surrendering with bent elbows above my head to the body scanner, and then being made to wait for some humiliating minutes that felt like an eternity for the powers-that-be to give the final clearance to go, another officer called after me in a loud boom, “We’re not done with you.” You’re kidding, I showed you my private parts and that’s not enough?

“No,” she said, “We still need to pat down your veil.”

So why is it that I and other Muslim women are always singled out for such treatment? Surely, we are not all suspect?

Is it racial profiling or is it the “reality” of terrorism? I suspect it’s because airports are a highly-charged environment.

Airports, baggage scans, and security announcements warning of “increased security levels” are primes for terrorism, and therefore it is possible that border patrol are predisposed to categorize visiblyidentifiable Muslims as terrorists.

The Muslim woman’s veil is a highly visible and contested symbol of Islam, just as airport security has become a contested symbol of the war on terror. But while the veil is a statement of decency and modesty, body scanners shatter these moral concepts to force us to lay it bare, invading our human dignity without any semblance of reasonable suspicion. In this security theater, I would be willing to trade my freedom for security, but if and only if that security was more certain, and less absurd.

a

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

31

The Origins of Religious Tolerance in Medieval Islamic Lands David Kessler History ’11

As most historians would agree, Jews found considerable toleration in the lands of Medieval Islam. While they firmly held second-class citizenship, it was, at the time, an enviable right.1 And thus, while they could not point to many halcyon days under Muslim rule, violent oppression was equally exceptional.

The fundamental question, therefore, is how, and why, Muslim rulers tolerated their Jewish subjects. Certain scholars have dispensed with this issue altogether, by pronouncing Islamic toleration a historical myth. In most cases, they have either used a flawed rubric or have applied anachronistic standards to judge toleration. One way to address this question might be labeled the “comparative approach.” It proceeds by juxtaposing the Jews of medieval Islam with those of Christendom, and using the principal differences to account for any disparities in tolerance. The comparative approach is effective, as the popularity of Mark Cohen’s Under Crescent and Cross attests; but it carries with it some important caveats. The differences between Islamic As Bernard Lewis has written on this matter: “Second-class citizenship, though second class, is a kind of citizenship. It involves some rights, though not all, and is surely better than no rights at all...a recognized status, albeit one of inferiority to the dominant group, which is established by law, recognized by tradition, and confirmed by popular assent, is not to be despised.” Cf. Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 62.

1

32 avicenna

and Christian polities, and therefore the Jews they hosted, are too great to warrant a fully parallel comparison.

There is another way to account for the considerable but incomplete toleration that Medieval Islam offered Jews. This type of analysis traces the origins of toleration to Muslim history and society, and it arrives at a logical conclusion: the greatest role in ensuring Jewish toleration belongs to Islam itself. In particular, it was the jizya tax that set the basic contours of toleration, and then enshrined them in contract form.

The Place of Religion in Islamic Societies It is possible to exaggerate the role of religion in medieval Islamic polities, but it might be more difficult to understate its importance. For one thing, in contradistinction to Christianity, Islam never separated religious and secular law.2 On the social level, too, it was religious affiliation alone that defined communal boundaries. If, then, religion was the most fundamental identity in the Muslim polity, the first source to examine to learn why Islam offered Jews an incomplete toleration must be the Qu’ran, the sacred text of Islam.

Mark R. Cohen, Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 54.

2

Dome of the Rock and the Western Wall in Jerusalem by Duncan Harris (Flickr user ~Duncan~)

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

33

A Preliminary Reading of the Quran The historian who reads the Qu’ran for this purpose is immediately struck in two ways: first, at the high number of references to Jews and Jewish practices; and second, at the apparent duality of those references. For instance, one verse in the chapter of “The Table” reads: “O believers, take not Jews and Christians for allies; they are allies of one another.

Whoso among you takes them as allies is counted of their number.”3 Two pages later, the text takes a conciliatory turn, by promising that “The Jews, Sabeans, and Christians who believe in God and the Last Day and do righteous deeds— no fear shall fall upon them, nor shall they grieve.”4 If the story of Jews in Muslim lands was a bipolar one, alternating between systematic oppression on the one hand, and enlightened toleration on the other, then the historian could conveniently cite this set of verses as evidence. In actuality, of course, the history took a more intermediate course, in which a steady form of toleration prevailed. The question that remains then is not whether the Quran was heeded, but how it was heeded. A closer reading of the text, which moves beyond the ambivalent verses, will help answer this question.

The Historical Jizya: The Essence of Jewish Toleration The key to Jewish toleration lies in a single, unassuming Qur’anic passage: “Fight those [non-Muslims]…until they offer up the tribute, by hand, in humble mien.”5 The reference here, as traditionally interpreted, is to the jizya tax, which Tarif Khalidi, trans., The Qu’ran (New York: Penguin, 2008), 90.

4 Ibid., 92.

5 Khalidi, 148.

3

34 avicenna

served as a contract between ruler and ruled.

On the most basic level, the jizya officially granted protection to recognized monotheists, the dhimmi, in exchange for a duty. The accommodation included the fundamental rights of worship, security, and exemption from military service.6 While this contract was neglected by certain rulers who may have overtaxed their dhimmis or treated them too harshly, those rulers who dared violate it did so at their own peril; the prophet of Islam once stated, “Whoever oppresses a protégé or taxes him beyond his means, will have me as that man’s advocate.”7 Some historians have seen the jizya as more of a burden on minorities than a solemn guarantee of their toleration.

This view is unsatisfactory not only because it fails to situate the tax in its original context, but because it also contradicts the beliefs of the historical actors.

Even early, influential Muslim writers and political figures insisted that Muslim rulers “treat leniently those people who have a contract of protection from…

Muhammad.”8 The jizya, though more than a nominal fee, was not supposed to impoverish Jewish communities. If it was a token of subjugation, it was also one of toleration, a combination which is a feature of all premodern societies, not only Islamic ones.

Secondary Factors in Jewish Tolerance To claim that religious factors alone guaranteed or defined Jewish toleration Lewis, 20. Cf. also John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 34.

7 “How the Jizya is to be Collected and from Whom,” in Norman A. Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), 161.

8 Stillman, 161.

6

is, admittedly, to advance a slightly facile argument: even if Islam set the parameters of toleration, it could not enforce them in society. In addition to religion, then, two other factors bear mentioning — not so much because they are the next most important, but because they are easily overlooked.9 First, it is worth recalling that in Islamic societies, Jews were one of several ethnoreligious minorities. Whereas in Christian Europe, Jews were easily singled out for economic or religious discrimination, the Jews of Islamic lands usually lived alongside Coptic Christians, Zoroastrians, heterodox Muslims, or other minorities.

In many cases, a more diverse society is also, correspondingly, a more tolerant one; insofar as the Jews were concerned, the medieval Islamic polity was no exception.

A second factor in the limited form of Islamic accomodationism, which is proposed more tentatively, concerns the origins and geography of the Jewish people.

Like the Arabs who first propagated Islam, the Jews were indigenous to the Near East and had traditionally spoken Semitic languages (Hebrew, Aramaic, and later Arabic). The Jews of Arabia, in fact, had fully adopted tribal life long before the birth of Muhammad.10 It is therefore likely that an Arab Muslim society could assimilate Jewish populations more readily than a Christian one, especially in earlier periods. Assimilation and toleration are of course mutually exclusive, but for Jews, the latter has often been a corollary to the former.

If this analysis were solely concerned with ranking the most significant factors in Jewish tolerance in Muslim societies, here it would mention the economic and political realities that often advantaged the Jews of Islam. To discuss these factors in a cursory manner is arguably worse than not mentioning them at all.

10 Stillman, 4.

9

Periodizing Islamic Toleration of Jewish Subjects The forgoing analysis has primarily concerned itself with the Middle Ages, and not any other period in Judeo-Islamic history. However, it is worthwhile to consider whether its argument—that Islam itself shaped the bleak, but stable form of toleration Jews received under Islamic rule—might apply to the pre- and postmedieval periods, as well. To treat this issue comprehensively would of course require extensive research, but a few historical patterns are immediately identifiable. For instance, in the first century of Islam, political factors clearly overrode any religious mandates for coexistence: despite the earlier promulgation of a “proto-jizya,” Islamic militias targeted Medinese Jewish tribes as a political threat.11 On the other extreme of JudeoIslamic history, some fourteen centuries later, politics were again paramount: in the wake of Israel’s independence, the political currents in the Arab world rendered dhimmi rights irrelevant, causing the mass exodus of Middle Eastern Jews.

It should not be surprising that religious mandates for toleration failed to materialize in these periods. Religious doctrine is apt to go unheeded, even in the most traditional of polities. And even if Islam does not, formally, distinguish religion from politics, Islamic history attests to the difference between religious dogma and political practice. It would seem that in the Medieval period, the Jews of Islam were often insulated from, or else irrelevant to, the prevailing political forces in Islamic states. As a result, there were fewer obstacles for Muslim rulers and Muslim societies to implement the relatively tolerant religious edicts that concerned them.

a

11

Ibid., 11; 15.

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

35

A HIJABI’S MONOLOGUE

A Voice for Her Choice “Hidden Beauty”—tissue paper and acrylic—by Nabila Abdallah ’13

Hijabi—a word that is not proper Arabic but has become part of Muslim American parlance—refers to the Muslim woman who wears a headscarf. This term, which we first used in jest to refer to a series of monologues describing experiences of Muslim women in North America, eventually stuck.

Unlike Eve Ensler’s famous production, The Vagina Monologues, which personifies an often private aspect of women’s lives by giving it voice, The Hijabi Monologues instead takes something public, which everyone seems to have an opinion about, and gives it a personal voice.

In the summer of 2006 at the University of Chicago, the project was originally conceived by Dan Morrison after hearing my own and other friends’ stories and seriously considering the transformative power of stories - as he personally experienced. Together with Zeenat Rahman and myself, we 36 avicenna

founded the Hijabi Monologues, and I began writing, thinking and listening for possible stories from other Muslim American women.

The characters of each monologue wear the hijab, but the hijab is not the focus of any story. Although many of these stories resonate with other Muslims and women in general, they do not claim to tell every story or speak for everyone.

Our stories cover a range of experiences, from the comedic to the poignant. Humorous stories include anecdotes about the people who will approach hijabis on any given day, ready with a range of questions about Islam, and the guys that hit on them with their often clumsy pick-up strategies—an experience shared by many women.

More poignant stories include a narrative about the day one mother lost her son to a car accident and the day a student’s home was stormed by law enforcement officials and her father was arrested.

Stories have the potential to create a better understanding of our lives, generating empathy and a sense of shared humanity, while at the same time describing a unique experience.

Hijabis are not the only group that has struggled with outward differences which define how they are treated in society. The hijab, like race, has become a physical marker of difference, and certainly identifies a woman as a Muslim at a time when Muslims are subject to a number of stereotypes, public scrutiny and discrimination.

More often than not, a hijabi’s actions (or inactions) are viewed through the lens of religion in the same way that racial minorities’ actions are viewed through the lens of race. The Hijabi Monologues is about creating a space for American Muslim women to share their stories. Many Muslim women share the experience of facing an entire set of assumptions about their faith, politics, preferences, education, class, etc. based on whether they choose to wear, or not to wear, a headscarf. For this reason, The Hijabi Monologues never claims to speak for all Muslim women. All Muslim women are not American. All Muslim women are not hijabis. The monologue below “I’m tired” has been one that has resonated with many of the minorities in our audiences who have attended our shows. Its focus is the burden of representation that many racial, ethnic and religious minorities feel in the United States. This monologue has provoked and comforted—in one bookstore, a middle aged white male shouted throughout the performance in anger and had our actress’s microphones shut off. In that same the stanford journal on muslim affairs

37

bookstore, a Native American woman quietly said, “I am still asked ‘Where are you from?’ and ‘What’s your tribe?’” and then, “Thank you. Thank you for having this conversation.”

Ultimately, storytelling is the beginning of a deeper conversation. Through the power of storytelling, generalization and categorization are challenged. Through stories, strangers connect and doors are opened for sharing more stories.

And most importantly, the storyteller–in this case the Muslim American woman—becomes a complex human being, instead of a one-dimensional stereotype.

A monologue follows.

—Sahar Istiaque Ullah

✣ ✣ ✣ “I’m Tired” is one of The Hijabi Monologues performed at Stanford University in November 2010, directed by Sahar Khan ’13 and performed by Kate Hyder ’11.

I’m tired.

Do you know what it’s like to represent a billion human beings every day you walk out of your house?

To be looked at as the representative of an entire world religion?

A world religion.

Do you know what that’s like?

It’s exhausting. And can feel so. . . heavy.

Sometimes—it makes me angry.

And sometimes—I’m so tired of it.

I’m tired of not crossing some unknown rule of gender interaction to prevent folks from having a field day and saying— See? Those “religious” girls—they’re freaks.

I’m tired of not going to class because I didn’t read the assign38 avicenna

ment, and if I don’t say something incredibly brilliant my silence will be attributed to being inherently oppressed by my religion, men, and clothing. . . rather than the fact that I didn’t do my homework because I was screwing around on Facebook the previous night like 90 percent of the class.

I’m tired of carefully picking outfits—colors, accessories and silks—everyday for public relations purposes, to ensure I look “approachable yet modest” rather than “withdrawn and oppressed” when really, some days, it’s just so much easier to throw on my linen shawl and black abaya over my pajamas.

I’m tired of putting on my understanding patient face every time some idiot asks me “What do you speak over there?” and “Do you know you’re free here?” and “Why do your people hate us?” and “Is Islam and the West at war?” instead of saying—HELLO. Do you not see me? Do you not happen to see that I’m standing right here in front of you and I an NOT wielding a sword?”

And I’m tired of wanting to curse but don’t when some guy cuts me off on the highway and laughs through his window OR another guy asks my friend while waiting for ice cream “Where y’all from?” and after my friend responds Miami he says, “Listen. Don’t fuck with me. When I ask you where you’re from, don’t fucking tell me Miami; you tell me where you’re from.”

I don’t respond because I’m scared.

And everyone is watching.

I don’t want them to think—There goes another angry Muslim. Just can’t control their tempers. So emotional.

Because it’s not like that at all.

I am not another angry Muslim. I am not a bad example. I am not a good example.

I am just not a representation.

I am a human being. My name is Kate. And when I do break and say, “You know what? Fuck you. What the hell is your problem, asshole? Where are YOU from?” it has nothing to do with my religion.

—Sahar Ishtiaque Ullah, Co-Founder of Hijabi Monologues the stanford journal on muslim affairs

39

A P E O P L E ’ S P U B L I C AT I O N

40 avicenna

STANFORD UNIVERSITY