Urban Transformation: Tracking Amman’s Resilience and Adaptation to the Refugee Crisis

Manchester School of Architecture University of Manchester Manchester Metropolitan University MA Architecture and Urbanism Samar Manneh MMU ID: 19000558 UoM ID: 10554553 Cover: Talbieh Palestinian refugee Camp, Amman, Jordan (Author’s own, 2019).

Urban Transformation:

Tracking Amman’s Resilience and Adaptation to the Refugee Crisis Samar Manneh MA Architecture and Urbanism August 2018

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Table of Contents

CONTENTS Cover

I

Contents

V

List of Abbreviations

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgment

Abstract

IX XI XIX XXI

Introduction

1.0 Resilience: From Scepticism to Clarity

1.1 A Blurry Conception 1.2 Resilience Implementation in Cities 1.3 Reaching Closure - Urban Resilience in the Context of Refugees 2.0 Amman: Between a Superimposed Identity and the Making of the City 2.1 Essence Hunt 2.2 Amman’s Diversity Ingredients 2.3 Glimpses of Refugees’ Conditions in Amman’s Spatial Context 2.4 Amman’s Response towards Refugees 3.0 Striving for Resilience - Talbieh Camp Case Study 3.1 A Fragile Beginning – 1967 3.2 From Temporariness to “Permanency” 3.3 Camp’s Current Scenario: Between Different Attitudes 3.3.1 Socio-Economics 3.3.1.1 Community Perspective 3.3.1.2 Supplier Perspective 3.3.1.3 Reports and studies 3.3.2 Housing 3.3.2.1 Community Perspective 3.3.2.2 Supplier Perspective 3.3.2.3 Reports and studies 3.3.3 Infrastructure 3.3.3.1 Community Perspective 3.3.3.2 Supplier Perspective 3.3.3.3 Reports and studies 3.3.4 Integration with Surroundings

1 5 5 7 7

11 11 14 20 24 31 31 36 42 44 44 48 48 50 50 55 56 58 58 60 60 62

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Table of Contents

CONTENTS 4.0 Assessing Amman’s Resilience: Findings and Conclusions 4.1 Urban Inequality: Socio-economic Impact 4.2 Housing Drawback: A Development Gap between Amman and Refugee Camps 4.3 Intergenerationally Unsustainable Infrastructure 4.4 Conclusion

Bibliography

Appendix Appendix A: Sample Interview Questions Appendix B: Focus Group Discussions

65 65 67 74 77 83 91 91 93

List of Abbreviations

IX

List of Abbreviations UNRWA

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

DPA

Department of Palestinian Affairs

FGD

GAM

Focus Group Discussions Greater Amman Municipality

List of Illustrations

XI

List of Illustrations 1.0 Resilience: From Scepticism to Clarity

Page no.

1.1 A Blurry Conception Fig 1.1.1: A table showing the analysis of resilience definition in various systems

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1.2 Resilience Implementation in Cities Fig 1.2.1: The qualities of resilient systems

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Fig 1.2.2: The characteristics of urban resilience

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2.0 Amman: Between a Superimposed Identity and the Making of the City 2.1 Essence Hunt Fig 2.1.1: A map showing the location of Amman in the Middle East

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Fig 2.1.2: Timeline of refugee waves flowing into Jordan from 1863 and till 2020

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2.2 Amman’s Diversity Ingredients Fig 2.2.1: A map of old Amman, showing the Roman and Greek monuments which are now archeological sites

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Fig 2.2.2: The Roman Amphitheater when the Circassians began to dwell the area

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Fig 2.2.3: The Roman Amphitheater in 1925, before the major refugee influxes

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Fig 2.2.4: A map showing Al-Hijaz Railroad and the areas connected by it, 1914

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Fig 2.2.5: A map illustrating the urban growth of Amman between the years 1948 and 1984 in response to Palestinian refugee influxes

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Fig 2.2.6: A picture illustrating the phenomenal growth around the Roman Amphitheater, 2012

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Fig 2.2.7: A map showing the population and demographic composition of Jordan

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List of Illustrations

List of Illustrations 2.3 Glimpses of Refugees’ conditions in Amman’s Spatial Context Fig 2.3.1: A photo showing a low-income refugee’s apartment in Amman

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Fig 2.3.2: A photo showing refugees’ commercial activity in “Amman New camp” - a Palestinian urban camp in Amman

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Fig 2.2.3: A photo showing the housing situation and urban fabric of “Al-Hussein camp” - a Palestinian urban camp in Amman

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2.4 Amman’s Response towards Refugees Fig 2.4.1: A Figure showing Amman’s urban expansion between 1956-1985

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Fig 2.4.2: A map showing the distribution of Palestinian refugees in Jordan and the West Bank in 2005 according to UNRWA

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Fig 2.4.3: Results of the 1988 plan

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Fig 2.4.4: A map showing Amman’s boundary expansion

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3.0 Striving for Resilience - Talbieh Camp Case Study 3.1 A Fragile Beginning - 1967 Fig 3.1.1: A map showing the location of Talbieh Camp in relation to Amman's center and the airport

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Fig 3.1.2: A map showing the location of the tents camp in 1967 before the flooding

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Fig 3.1.3: A map showing the new location of the camp in 1968 after the flooding

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Fig (3.1.4 - 3.1.6): Pictures showing Talbieh Camp as tents in 1967

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Fig (3.1.7 - 3.1.8): Pictures showing the camp in 1968 when the “barrack” system replaced the tents

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Fig 3.1.9: Talbieh Camp masterplan in 1968

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List of Illustrations

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List of Illustrations 3.2 From Temporariness to “Permanency” Fig 3.2.1: An example of a “barrack” horizontal expansion Fig (3.2.2 - 3.2.3): Pictures showing exposed sewage

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Fig 3.2.4: A map showing the camp in 1978

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Fig 3.2.5: A map showing the camp in 1992, almost fully saturated compared to 1978

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Fig (3.2.6 - 3.2.15): Glimpses of life and the socio-economic conditions in Talbieh Camp

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3.3 Camp’s Current Scenario: Between Different Attitudes Fig 3.3.1: Talbieh Camp main entrance with a sign saying “Welcome to Talbieh Camp” in Arabic and English

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Fig 3.3.2: Talbieh Camp masterplan in 2020

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3.3.1 Socio-economics 3.3.1.1 Community Perspective Fig 3.3.1.1.1: A picture showing the only kids' Park; opens only during the summer

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Fig 3.3.1.1.2: A picture showing the football field, noting the useless, unused massive spaces of concrete

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Fig 3.3.1.1.3: A project of kids playing area located in a pocket between shelters

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Fig 3.3.1.1.4: The playing area after it was closed

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Fig (3.3.1.1.5 - 3.3.1.1.6): Pictures of the intended playing area project now

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Fig 3.3.1.1.7: A picture showing one of the FGD

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Fig 3.3.1.1.8: Areas marked unsafe by refugees in Talbieh Camp during FGD

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3.3.1.3 Reports and Studies Fig (3.3.1.3.1 - 3.3.1.3.6): Pictures showing glimpses of the economic activity in the camp 49

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List of Illustrations

List of Illustrations 3.3.2 Housing 3.3.2.1 Community Perspective Fig (3.3.2.1.1 - 3.3.2.1.2): Pictures showing a shelter in Talbieh Camp before the reconstruction done by UNRWA

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Fig (3.3.2.1.3 - 3.3.2.1.5): Pictures showing a shelter in Talbieh Camp after the reconstruction done by UNRWA

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Fig (3.3.2.1.6 - 3.3.2.1.7): Examples of shelters with temporary roofing

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Fig (3.3.2.1.8 - 3.3.2.1.10): An example of modifying a shelter’s design by closing the outdoor terrace

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Fig (3.3.2.1.11 - 3.3.2.1.14) : Examples of modifications done by refugees for privacy reasons due to the lack of space between shelters

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Fig (3.3.2.1.15 - 3.3.2.1.17): Examples of modifications done by refugees for more space 54 Fig (3.3.2.1.18 - 3.3.2.1.19): An example of a modification done by refugees for easier access for the elderly and disabled, noting street violation

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3.3.2.3 Reports and Studies Fig (3.3.2.2.3.1 - 3.3.2.2.3.2): An example of a private outdoor space in a shelter

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Fig (3.3.2.2.3.3 - 3.3.2.2.3.4): Talbieh's very poor construction and finishing materials

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3.3.3 Infrastructure 3.3.3.1 Community Perspective Fig (3.3.3.1.1 - 3.3.3.1.4): Pictures showing the poor waste management, disposal, and urban environment

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Fig (3.3.3.1.5 - 3.3.3.1.7): Pictures showing street blockage due to lack of parking spaces

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Fig (3.3.3.1.8 - 3.3.3.1.11): Pictures showing some of the infrastructural gaps in Talbieh Camp

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List of Illustrations

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List of Illustrations 3.3.3.3 Reports and Studies Fig (3.3.3.3.1 - 3.3.3.3.3): Pictures showing some of the deteriorated alleyways in Talbieh Camp

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Fig (3.3.3.3.4 - 3.3.3.3.5): Pictures showing some of Talbieh's streets and deteriorated sidewalks

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4.0 Assessing Amman’s Resilience: Findings and Conclusions 4.1 Urban Inequality: Socio-economic Impact Fig 4.1.1: A table showing the percentages of unemployed Jordanians in Amman aged 15+ years, quarterly and between the years 2010-2016

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Fig 4.1.2: A line chart showing the rise of absolute poverty line in Amman between the years 1997 and 2010

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Fig 4.1.3: A map showing the location and exclusion of Talbieh Camp in relation to the proposed Ring Road

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4.2 Housing Drawback: A Development Gap between Amman and Refugee Camps Fig 4.2.1: A map showing the location of Talbieh Camp in relation to the Airport Noise Corridor, indicating low resilience

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Fig 4.2.2: A picture showing shelter conditions and construction materials in Talbieh Camp

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Fig 4.2.3: A picture showing one storey shelters with temporary roofs in Talbieh Camp

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Fig 4.2.4: An aerial photograph of Abdoun area, a good and wealthy area in Amman

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Fig 4.2.5: A picture showing Amman's housing

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Fig 4.2.6: A diagram highlighting the resilience and equality gap in housing based on findings and comparisons

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List of Illustrations

List of Illustrations Fig (4.2.7 - 4.2.8): Interior pictures indicating the low-quality construction and conditions in Talbieh's shelters

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Fig 4.2.8: A diagram showing the evolution shelters in Talbieh Camp since its establishment and until 2020

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Fig 4.2.9: A diagram highlighting the population growth in Talbieh Camp since its establishment and until 2030 within its fixed boundaries

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Fig 4.2.10: A diagram highlighting major challenges for the camp exerted mainly by its temporary nature and resulting in an overcrowded poor urban environment

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4.3 Intergenerationally Unsustainable Infrastructure Fig 4.3.1: A picture showing Amman's flash flooding in 2015

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Fig 4.3.2: A graph showing the available water resources after implementing an intended improvement project is implemented and projected water demand in (million cubic meters/annum)

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4.4 Conclusion Fig 4.4.1: A table showing comparison results between Amman and Talbieh Camp that indicate Amman's very low resilience towards refugee crisis and camps

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Acknowledgment

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First of all, I wish to express my sincere gratitude for my course advisor Eamonn Canniffe, Principal Lecturer of the MA Architecture and Urbanism Course at Manchester School of Architecture.

I am also thankful to the course’s highly experienced teaching team for all the thoughtful guidance. I am particularly grateful for the assistance given by Tamara Salinas Cohn, Demetra Kourri, and Julie Fitzpatrick, whose constant support and feedback was a milestone in the completion of this research.

Also, I wish to show my gratitude to the UNRWA office in Jordan for making this study possible, and for organizing the needed site visits to Talbieh Camp. More specifically, I would like to thank the UNRWA Senior Urban Planner, Dr.Vijay Nikhra, for his guidance, advice, and support.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their support and great love, my father, Munir; my mother, Rima; and my brothers, Nader and Waseem. They kept me going, and this accomplishment would not have been possible without their support throughout the whole journey. Thank you.

-Samar Manneh

Abstract

XXI

Mass displacement is a worldwide challenge, as people are displaced by natural or man-made disasters, and they end up in other urban areas being amongst the most vulnerable groups.

Therefore, cities -with their governments, stakeholders, communities (new and existing populations), and systems- are put under a resilience challenge where they are urged to transform accordingly to accommodate, absorb, and integrate refugee flows successfully and sustainably taking into account resources’ availability.

Throughout history, Jordan’s capital Amman, while already having limited resources, has been affected due to the conflicts in neighboring countries. As a result, waves of refugees from Palestine, Iraq, and Syria rushed to Amman seeking stability, which transformed the urban structure of Amman and its socio-economics, as well as exerting pressure on the city’s infrastructure and housing development. This research aims to analyze the resilience of Amman and the adaptive capacity of its systems -such as its socio-economics, housing development, and infrastructure- towards the refugee crisis. How has Amman been coping since the 1950s?

How far is its development from becoming sustainable? Is Amman adequately resilient to cope further in the future? The research will analyze the adequacy, sustainability, and integration level of housing, water, and sanitation services as per the socio-economic profile of millions of refugees.

After a literature review on urban resilience and the city profile, the methodology used in this research includes analyzing a Palestinian refugee camp as a case study that represents Amman’s refugee camps- since they have similar conditions- which reflects the level of integration and resiliency that Amman possesses towards those camps and refugees. The methods used in analyzing the camp are FGD with refugees -as they represent the demand side, interviews with key services’ suppliers, and available studies on the camp in order to address the issue from multiple perspectives. Finally, the comparison method –between Amman and the camp- is used in assessing the resilience of Amman to the refugee crisis. Findings show the unsustainable and non-resilient way of handling the crisis, as Amman is now facing shortages in addressing demand for its residents and is still far away from achieving refugee-integration.

Introduction

1

Introduction Jordan is hosting 1.7 million Palestinian refugees, over 220,000 Iraqi refugees, and more than 1.2 million Syrian refugees (International Rescue Committee, 2018), making it the secondlargest refugee host per capita globally, according to UNHCR (Turnbull, 2019). As Amman is hosting 32% of those displaced populations (World Bank, 2017), the city is put under a severe major resilience challenge as the refugee crisis affected the demographic composition of Amman and its urban development.

This research aims to analyze the resilience status of Amman’s socio-economic, housing, and infrastructure systems and the ability of the city to achieve sustainable development and refugee integration in response to the refugee crisis, as they remain understudied. To achieve this aim, the research is structured in four chapters, and the methodology adopted in this research relies mainly on empirical studies and secondary sources.

The first chapter explores the literature available on resilience as a concept, and definitions of urban resilience, reaching at the end to the research definition of urban resilience, which is in the context of refugees. The main question associated with the literature review is how these definitions of resilience actually relate to the reality of refugee camps in Amman? In the second chapter, the structure was based on the target of achieving a comprehensive understanding of Amman -its context, historical background, assets, and what contributes in its unique identitybased on available data. Also, in order to assess a city’s resilience, it is crucial to identify the shocks and stresses that the city is facing (UN-Habitat, 2018). Thus, chapter two highlights that for Amman, while already facing difficulties addressing basic services and needs to its existing populations, the refugee crisis represents one of the main ongoing stress factors with major refugee influxes being the shocks that hit the city and affected its equilibrium steadystate, hence resulting in a long-term challenge that affected its urban systems. Furthermore, chapter two provides glimpses of refugees’ conditions in Amman’s spatial context and how the city grew and was urbanized in response to nearby tragedies until it became a metropolis.

Moving on to chapter three, a Palestinian urban refugee camp –Talbieh Camp- located in Amman, is chosen as a case study to represent and assess the current resilience status of Amman towards the refugee crisis and camps. In order to do the assessment, the study analyzed the issue of the socio-economic, housing, and infrastructure systems based on three perspectives.

The first is the community perspective, which is based on conducting four FGD regarding the four main aspects of study (socio-economic, housing, infrastructure, and integration with surroundings). This method was used to gain a better understanding and insights into people’s beliefs, concerns, observations, and assessment of their living environment. Moreover, as refugees represent a significant component in Amman, and in order to achieve the main aim of this research, exploring refugees’ experiences becomes crucial.

Introduction

2

The second is the supplier perspective, mainly UNRWA and the DPA. This perspective is based on conducting five qualitative semi-structured interviews with some of the key service suppliers; these include the Project Manager of Talbieh Camp, Camp Service Officer, manager of the Woman Program Center, manager of the DPA in Talbieh Camp, and Head of Camp Service Committee. The main aim is to gain insight about how service suppliers perceive the camp conditions regarding socio-economics, housing, and infrastructure. Questions mainly targeted understanding the capacity of the camp’s infrastructure -being located in and connected to Amman’s infrastructure- to cope with current and future increasing demands, the resilience and evolution of the camp -within the socio-economic context- in housing and infrastructure over the years, and needed interventions of priority. As for the third perspective, it is based on the available reports and studies on the camp obtained from the UNRWA office in Jordan.

After translating the obtained information from Arabic to English, the information was filtered and analyzed in the chapter in a chronological order, where it starts with the fragile beginning of the camp, and ends -53 years later- with its current scenario. This order was chosen to highlight the pace of development and resilience attempts that an Ammani refugee camp went through. In the camp’s current scenario, there is a specific focus on the different perspectives in order to stress the sometimes-opposing opinions of the community and suppliers, where their voices reflect on the narrative to highlight those gaps.

Finally, as urban systems include the built environment and socio-economics as well as other elements, for this research, and in the last and fourth chapter, the assessment focus is on socio-economics, housing, and infrastructure systems of Amman and their ability to absorb and adapt to the refugee crisis. This assessment relies mainly on understanding and analyzing information obtained from previous chapters, in addition to other statistics and additional data to help in the assessment and to highlight the development and supply gaps between Amman and its refugee camps. The conclusion of this research is based and related to the research definition of urban resilience and the characteristics that make systems resilient. The conclusion is complemented with an assessment table comparing findings about Amman and the chosen representative case study.

This research contributes to maintaining a direct realistic connection to those refugees' needs, lifestyles and conditions regarding certain aspects, and how they relate and are affected by measures taken by host cities, reflecting an open, direct channel of communicating needs and reality that are not accurately accounted for into the literature.

Resilience: From Scepticism to Clarity

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1.1 A Blurry Conception The first thing that crosses our minds when trying to define resilience is how flexible and vague this word can be, and how it can be adapted and used in various aspects and disciplines; that is why resilience was acknowledged by Time magazine as the “Buzzword” of 2013 (Walsh, 2013). Going back to the Latin origins of this “buzzword” –Resilio- in its purest form means to spring back or retreat, but with this meaning alone, it is yet difficult to comprehend its multiple facets. Many influential thinkers over the years tried to lend comprehensive meaning to resilience by annexing their discipline to it. For example, the concept of resilience was adopted in engineering, where it indicated the speed of recovery of a system to its original state after facing instabilities (Folke, 2006). Therefore, “engineering resilience” tackles systems as if they have a single balanced state that maintains their functionality (Folke, 2006). On the contrary, the ecological thinking states that there is no specific perfect stage of stability for a system in a city to retreat to, but rather defines the city as an ever-changing entity with multiple stages of equilibrium that change over time according to disturbances encountered (UN-Habitat, 2017). Based on that, the concept of resilience regarding eco-systems is defined

by Holling (1973) as a means of measuring the capability of those systems, while having multiple stable states, to maintain their functionality.

Later on, when it was realized that there is an interdependent relationship between human settlements and the systems they use and rely on, the concept of social-ecological resilience emerged. While engineering and ecological resilience rely mainly on maintainng a designated state of stability in the face of disturbances, social-ecological resilience introduces additional qualities to persistency, which are; “adaptation, learning, and self-organization” (Folke, 2006, p.259). Social-ecological resilience, therefore, has no certain or specific equilibrium stage, but it is rather “evolutionary” (O’Hare and White, 2013, p.277); and thus, constantly changing regardless of being threatened by disturbances or not. Moreover, social-ecological resilience includes the ability of communities to transform threats into strengths.

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Resilience: From Scepticism to Clarity

Fig 1.1.1: A table showing the analysis of resilience definition in various systems (UN-Habitat, 2017, p.5).

Resilience: From Scepticism to Clarity

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1.2 Resilience Implementation in Cities “As our world becomes predominantly urban, cities are increasingly emerging as the field where the main challenges for sustainable development will and must be tackled.” (UNHabitat, 2017, p.xv) Applying the concept of resilience to cities and urban settings is becoming crucial as according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “more than half of the world’s population today lives in urban areas, and this proportion is expected to increase to 68% by 2050” (UNDESA, 2018). Therefore, urgent planning action for this phenomenon is needed as it is exerting pressure on urban systems in cities and may cause permanent or inevitable long-term stresses. Resilience in the context of cities is defined as “Urban Resilience” (UN-Habitat, 2017, p.5). Conventionally, the urban resilience of a city is similar to engineering resilience in the way of controlling disturbances that tangible elements encounter, as both are measured by their speed in restoring their original state before the shock. This means that the city, according to the engineering perspective, is seen as an unchanging entity that is affected by predicted disturbances, which is incompatible with the vibrant, complex nature of cities. Cities consist of tangible and intangible complex, urban systems that incorporate many interdependent, connected elements which must be examined together, ranging from infrastructure and built environments to socio-economics and politics. In order to understand the meaning of urban resilience for cities, it is therefore important to define the urban system.

According to the UN-Habitat (2018), an urban system refers to “the process of connectivity, interaction, operation and organization” of the previously mentioned elements within a city (UN-Habitat, 2018, p.18).

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Resilience: From Scepticism to Clarity

When applied to cities, the real change in the definition of resilience lies in connecting it to the various challenges that cities encounter and to the various elements in the city affected by them.

Thus, urban resilience is a constantly-changing conception. For example, the concept of urban resilience was extensively adopted in the framework of urban hazards and risk-mitigation upon disasters, which is defined by Leichenko to be “the capacity of cities, with its infrastructure, urban populations, and communities to successfully recover from both natural and humanmade hazards” (Leichenko, 2011, p.165). While the Rockefeller Foundation’s definition of urban resilience is “the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience”(100 Resilient Cities, n.d.). According to the Rockefeller Foundation, there are certain qualities that make a system resilient (See Figure 1.2.1). The UN-Habitat adds to the Rockefeller Foundation’s definition a vital part; “sustainability ,” where it is defined as “the measurable ability of any urban system, with its inhabitants, to maintain continuity through all shocks and stresses, while positively adapting and transforming toward sustainability” (UN-Habitat, 2018, p.19).

“Resilience is viewed firstly as a framework for thinking, and secondly as an increasingly relevant issue in international development and urban studies” (100 Resilient Cities, n.d.)

Fig 1.2.1: The qualities of resilient systems (100 Resilient Cities, n.d.).

Fig 1.2.2: The characteristics of urban resilience (UN-Habitat, 2018, p.23).

Resilience: From Scepticism to Clarity

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1.3 Reaching Closure - Urban Resilience in the Context of Refugees All of this literature and conceptualization of urban resilience is trying to create guidelines for cities to face and respond to hazards, natural and human-made. However, the study on how urban systems respond to mass displacement remains limited. People are being displaced everyday by natural and man-made disasters and wind up in urban areas. Thus, the challenge exerted by this new rapid influx of possibly long-term residents on cities is global (Kirbyshire et al., 2017). Cities, therefore, experience pressures and struggle in providing basic services and needs to their existing and new populations adequately. Hence, the main challenge for host cities is how to integrate those “undesirables” and their “out-spaces” – as described by Agier (2010) – into the urban systems of the city positively.

In some cities like Amman, Palestinian refugees have been residing in camps or towns since 1948 or 1967, meaning that they are no longer considered mass displacement as they have been living there for more than fifty years. Moreover, as the resilience of Amman’s infrastructure, housing, and socio-economic systems remain understudied, this research aims to analyze the resilience of these systems and their adaptive capacity. Since the 1950s, Amman has been able to cope but is it sustainable? Is Amman adequately resilient to cope further in the future?

This research will analyze whether Amman was able to achieve sustainable development1 for millions of refugees by considering their socio-economic profile and addressing their basic needs with a specific focus on access to adequate housing, clean potable water, and sanitation services. Thus, for the purpose of this paper, urban resilience is defined as the capacity and capability of the city – with its urban elements, governments, local communities, and stakeholders – to adapt, absorb, and integrate rapid influx of refugees into the wide urban systems while considering their socio-economic profile and transforming positively towards sustainable communities.

¹ In this research, sustainable development is defined as the development that is capable of coping with existing needs and still has the capacity to adapt and cope with future needs and populations (“The Sustainable Development Agenda,” n.d.). To achieve sustainable development, there are three main elements that should be addressed; “economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental protection” (ibid).

Amman: Between a Superimposed Identity and the Making of the City

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2.1 Essence Hunt Amman is the capital of Jordan and a dynamic city well-known for its limestone buildings and Roman ruins. Jordan is seen as a safe haven in a region that is in turmoil, and Amman, being the capital, grew and got urbanized propelled by nearby tragedies, and is considered to be a model of diversity in the Arab World.

Cities around the world have unique characters and identities that distinguish them. For example, the city of Damascus is well-known as the oldest continuously inhabited city, Cairo is famous for being highly populated and crowded, and Beirut is widely recognized as a touristic city with beautiful scenery. But what about Amman’s identity? Tobin (2016) declares Amman as an “unrecognizable city,” and states that Amman is often “characterized in terms of what it lacks”, which is urban history (Tobin, 2016, p.25).

Fig 2.1.1: A map showing the location of Amman in the Middle East (Capital of Jordan map, n.d.).

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Amman: Between a Superimposed Identity and the Making of the City

“Amman is a modern Arab city rather than a great, ancient metropolis of the Orient: it has never rivalled Damascus or Cairo as a grand Islamic city of antiquity.” (Greenway and Ham, 2003, p.98) However, Amman does have an identity; its identity is hidden in its long history of hosting and absorbing people from neighboring countries. Statistics speak for themselves; Amman’s population is around 4 million (Jordan Population 2020, 2019). Almost half of this population is non-Jordanian, and only 38.6% is Jordanian (Obeidat, 2016). Before diving into how Amman, with its limited resources and relatively small size, coped with this rapid influx, a retrospect of the different waves of refugees that moved to the country over the years is needed to comprehend its identity and high diversity.

Fig 2.1.2: Timeline of refugee waves flowing into Jordan from 1863 and till 2020 (Author’s own, 2019).

Amman: Between a Superimposed Identity and the Making of the City

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Amman: Between a Superimposed Identity and the Making of the City

2.2 Amman’s Diversity Ingredients Amman, or Rabbat Ammon, as it was called when the Ammonites settled it in 1200 BC, went after that through a sequence of occupations, from Persians to Greeks to Romans (Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988). Some of those civilizations left traces in the city that can be seen till now, such as the Roman complex that not only is a very important archeological site, but also contributes a significant part of Jordanians’ daily lives (Abu-Khafajah and Rabady, 2013).

Amman was also occupied by Muslims for three centuries, where the city was mainly a military base and went through a decline until the end of the 19th century (Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988).

After the decline and during the Ottoman rule, the first wave of refugees came to the city in 1863 -the Circassian Muslims - fleeing religious persecution from the Russian Empire’s North Caucasus region (ibid). The first arrivals of Circassians inhabited the area around the Roman amphitheater, which, at that time, was unpopulated (Natho, 2009).

Fig 2.2.1: A map of old Amman, showing the Roman and Greek monuments which are now archeological sites (Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988, p.319).

Amman: Between a Superimposed Identity and the Making of the City

Fig 2.2.2: The Roman Amphitheater when the Circassians began to dwell the area (Natho, 2009, p.476).

Fig 2.2.3: The Roman Amphitheater in 1925, before the major refugee influxes.

Courtesy of the École Biblique, Jerusalem, cited in (Tobin, 2016, p.24).

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Amman: Between a Superimposed Identity and the Making of the City

However, the small village that consisted of a couple of houses and a population that did not exceed a few thousands started flourishing and the main reasons behind that are the agricultural and farming skills of the Circassians coupled with later on the construction of Hijaz Railway in 1902, which connected the Hijaz region (Potter et al., 2007). In addition to that, Amman was declared the capital of Transjordan in 1921 (Circassians in Jordan, n.d.). All this caused a population explosion that expanded over the period between 1921 and 1947, during those years, Amman’s population –according to GAM- increased from 10,000 to 40,000 consisting mainly of Syrian emigrants escaping the collapse of the French occupation in Syria (cited in Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988).

Fig 2.2.4: A map showing Al-Hijaz Railroad and the areas connected by it, 1914 (Nabataea: Maps of the Hejaz Railway, n.d.).

Amman: Between a Superimposed Identity and the Making of the City

17

After this period, the city was hit by another large portion of mass displacement due to the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, where the population, as stated by GAM in 1987, reached 230,000 (cited in Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988). Moreover, the following Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967 brought yet another wave of refugees causing the population to increase to approximately 500,000 as claimed by GAM in 1987 (cited in ibid). In order to accommodate this massive influx of refugees, 13 emergency camps were provided mainly around Amman’s outskirts (Khawaja and Arild Tiltnes, 2002). However, those camps –since made as a quick and temporary solutionlacked basic services and presented poor urban environments (Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988). The Arab-Israeli conflict had a devastating effect on the whole region and the city of Amman in particular as it affected the population structure, size, and socio-economics (Khawaja and Arild Tiltnes, 2002). This shock, by default, resulted in low rates of economic growth and a dramatic unplanned expansion of the city.

Fig 2.2.5: A map illustrating the urban growth of Amman between the years 1948 and 1984 in response to Palestinian refugee influxes. Courtesy of Dar Al Handasa cited in (Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988, p.320).

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Moreover, in the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War that extended over the years 1975 to 1990 and the fall of Sadam Hussien’s regime in mid-2000s, nearly a million Lebanese and about 300,000 Iraqi refugees fled their countries seeking stability and better living conditions in Jordan, particularly in Amman (Mansour-Ille et al., 2018). According to the Department of Statistics, Amman recorded a population of 1.94 million in 2004, and this figure reached more than 4 million in 2015 (Ghazal, 2016). However, that was not the last inflow that Amman has encountered; as starting from 2013 and till now, the “ever-growing Amman” -as described

by Al-Asad (cited in Potter et al., 2007, p.81)- has been accepting Syrian refugees escaping conflict and war in Syria. Statistics show that 1.265 million Syrians reside in Jordan, of whom 435,578 live in Amman (Ghazal, 2016).

Fig 2.2.6: A picture illustrating the phenomenal growth around the Roman Amphitheater, 2012.

Courtesy of Austin Jessie Davidson, cited in (Tobin, 2016, p.25).

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19

Looking back at that facts, it is concluded that Amman has been playing an increasingly significant role in providing space for the populations affected by the region’s turmoil. As this significant role gave Amman its identity and dynamics, it also involves a resilience challenge for a city with limited resources like Amman. Furthermore, this chapter will look into the previously mentioned refugees’ conditions in the spatial context of Amman, and how the city -with its limited resources- coped with the refugee crisis.

Fig 2.2.7: A map showing the population and demographic composition of Jordan; highlighting its diversity and significant role in the region (Ghazal, 2016).

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2.3 Glimpses of Refugees’ Conditions in Amman’s Spatial Context While many developed countries around the world experience rapid urban growth, Jordan marks one of the most urbanized countries, with 90.98 % of the population living in urban areas (Trading Economics, n.d.). Amman, being the capital, hosts 32% of the total refugees in Jordan (World Bank, 2017), and is the most affected by this urbanization that is fueled mainly by refugees hosted from neighboring countries. The two major refugee influxes were Palestinians, making half of Jordan’s population, and Syrians recording 1.2 million and making 13.2% of the total population (Kais, 2016). The increasing and continuous demands on services provision exerted pressure on a city that is already short in resources, especially water (Venot et al., 2014). In addition, the massive influx led to the competition on services between locals and refugees, which weakened the social fabric. However, refugees also bring new cultures.

For example, with 435,578 Syrians living in Amman (Ghazal, 2016), one cannot help but notice the number of Syrian restaurants that have been flourishing since 2012 (Hawkins et al., 2019). In other words, the refugee crisis transformed the makeup of Amman and affected its equilibrium remarkably, but the question is: was Amman’s service capacity and development able to successfully integrate these refugees in its urban elements?

Amman is a city where if one has enough money, they can access services. However, for refugees, their status as “refugees” and not Jordanians also affects their accessibility to services.

For example, renting prices in Amman are incredibly high, and affordable housing is scarce, and while this fact applies to the whole city, refugees like Gazans in particular face difficulties in buying properties as it depends mainly on having the Jordanian citizenship (Hawkins et al., 2019). On the contrary, other services like healthcare, accessibility is determined only by the ability to pay (ibid). While finding employment is one of the main pillars in achieving refugee integration, especially in urban settings (Kelberer, 2017), refugees in Amman are still struggling and not integrated. This is a citizenship-affected aspect where Syrian refugees, for example, were recently granted work permits, and other refugees are still not eligible to work (Hawkins et al., 2019).

Amman: Between a Superimposed Identity and the Making of the City

Fig 2.3.1: A photo showing a low-income refugee’s apartment in Amman (Hawkins et al., 2019, p.11).

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Fig 2.3.2: A photo showing refugees’ commercial activity in “Amman New camp” - a Palestinian urban camp in Amman. Photo by Nidal Ammouri (UNRWA, 2008a).

Fig 2.3.3: A photo showing the housing situation and urban fabric of “Al-Hussein camp” - a Palestinian urban camp in Amman (Barqawi, 2014).

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23

From a Jordanian point of view, Ammani people assess their socio-economic conditions and accessibility to housing and basic infrastructure in terms of “before and after” the refugee crisis, where they blame the deterioration of services provision on the presence of refugees (Hawkins et al., 2019). They perceive refugees as competition for employment, especially on low-paid jobs in the non-formal sector, which comprises more than 40% of the employment in Jordan (100ResilientCities, 2017). This perception weakens the social interaction and acceptance of refugees in host communities. It also leads to an “intangible” cultural burden, where refugees struggle to socially and culturally fit in (Hawkins et al., 2019). Furthermore, from a cultural-social aspect, Jordanians’ interaction with refugees is mostly class-driven and hierarchical “(employer/employee, customer/server)” (ibid, p.15).

Jordan has been suffering from a supply gap since even before the refugee crisis, as it has a small economic base and no oil riches, and is undergoing water shortage (The Office of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Hence, Amman was not able to cope with its existing populations, and once the waves of refugees came, the situation got worse. For example, the imbalance of resources caused by the recent Syrian influx is most evident in water supply, as water now is distributed once a week and citizens are receiving much less than the WHO standard, which is 120 liters per person per day (100ResilientCities, 2017). The overall results of the crisis are “an 83% increase in public debt, a 30% increase in youth unemployment, a 40% increase in demand for water, and a 17% increase in rental costs” (ibid, p.29).

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2.4 Amman’s Response towards Refugees Since its establishment in 1909, GAM has experienced shocking physical and population growth (James, 2017). Attempts to control the city’s development began emerging, starting from 1938, where a scheme was proposed mainly concerned with land distribution and transportation while neglecting socio-economic aspects (Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988). Expanding over an area of 31 km² in 1946 (James, 2017), GAM in 2011 reached an area of 700 km² (Ababsa, 2014). This expansion was mainly driven by the Arab-Israeli conflict and its aftermath, which led to the emergence of two planning attempts; one in 1956 similar in its covered aspects to the 1938 plan, and another one in 1968 (Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988). The plan of 1968 consisted of “landuse distribution for the urban area, transport and commercial policies for central Amman, and an overall transport policy for the city itself” (ibid, p.322). While the first Palestinian influx in 1948 was accommodated in camps, mainly inside Amman, the 1967 refugees were hosted in nine emergency camps mainly in the center or north of Jordan (Potter et al., 2007). Figure 2.4.1 depicts the massive growth that occurred between the years 1967 and 1978, exerting further pressure on the city’s services.

As a response, a plan to ease the pressure on services and the suggested spatial and socioeconomic problems was published in 1979 (Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988). The plan, which included short and long term phases covering 20 years in total, had a major accomplishment, which was the establishment of an “Urban Development Department” aiming at enhancing lowincome urban housing (ibid).

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25

Fig 2.4.1 (Left): Maps showing Amman’s urban expansion between the years 1956 and 1985 (Abu�Dayyeh, 2004, p.84).

Fig 2.4.2 (Right): A map showing the distribution of Palestinian refugees in Jordan and the West Bank in 2005 according to UNRWA (Husseini, 2014).

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Soon after that, the plan was developed into a more comprehensive scheme - “Greater Amman Comprehensive Development Plan (GACDP) 1985-2005” - with the main aims being limiting the urban sprawl while providing sufficient urban land for various uses especially affordable housing for low-income people, protecting agricultural lands, and encouraging a compact-city scheme to reduce additional infrastructure and services costs (Abu‐Dayyeh, 2004). The plan suggested urban expansion - especially residential - towards the East, where most informal settlements are concentrated, while preserving green spaces (Abu al Haija and Potter, 2013).

According to GAM (1987), as the population reached one million in 1988 within an area of 420 km², the new comprehensive plan would accommodate by 2005 around 2 million people (Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988). The plan was never fully implemented and failed in meeting its prolonged aim in limiting Amman’s expansion, and instead, the reality brought the exact opposite; urbanized areas increased towards the South and West to comply with increasing demands and agricultural lands decreased (Abu al Haija and Potter, 2013).

Fig 2.4.3: Results of the 1988 plan (Abu al Haija and Potter, 2013, p.3).

The city grew rapidly after that, mainly due to the unstopping inflow of Palestinian refugees in addition to Iraqi refugees fleeing their country after the Gulf Wars of 1990-1991 and 2003 and as a result, a new master plan to manage this new unplanned and rapid growth was urgent (Amman Institute for Urban Development, 2010). The low-density urbanization of the previous years strained the existing infrastructure, water, sewer systems, and public facilities (ibid).

Moreover, regulations were insufficient, and the city was facing difficulties in addressing basic services and needs (ibid). The refugee crisis also affected transport systems, resulting in high traffic congestion (100ResilientCities, 2017). The new plan was to be a “living document” that reacted to growth and pressures that the city faces (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011). Nevertheless, the refugee situation, which the municipality has lost control over, was not addressed in the plan (ibid), even though accessibility, affordability, and the quality of housing are typical components of any master plan.

Amman: Between a Superimposed Identity and the Making of the City

Fig 2.4.4: A map showing Amman’s boundary expansion (Ababsa, 2014).

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Drawing from all the aforementioned facts, it is concluded that Amman's uncontrolled haphazard growth and weak urban planning coupled with high poverty rates, limited resources, weak economic base, and high demands on housing exerted by refugee influxes affect the quality of life of the poor residents, especially refugees. In this research, a Palestinian urban camp located inside GAM boundaries was chosen as a case study to represent and assess the current resilience status of Amman towards the refugee crisis. As these refugees have been residing in the camp since 1967, the question is: to what extent are they being included and woven into the urban fabric and development of Amman over the years?

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3.1 A Fragile Beginning – 1967 Talbieh Camp is one of the six emergency camps built for Palestinian Refugees in 1968 due to the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 (UNRWA, 2009). Located 35 km south of Amman, the area assigned for the camp is a part of Al-Jiza (ibid), which is affiliated to GAM in services, and is near to an ancient Roman pool. Talbieh Camp is one of the smallest camps in Jordan, with an area of 130,000 square meters that was set up initially to accommodate 5,000 displaced Palestinians (ibid). However - just as everything else in Amman grows and explodes- this camp now has a population of approximately 10,000 and is continuing to increase in population within its fixed boundaries (Interviewee A, 2019)2.

Fig 3.1.1: A map showing the location of Talbieh Camp in relation to Amman's center and the airport. By author based on (OpenStreetMap, 2020).

² Head of Camp Service Committee (2019), pers. comm. 24 December. (Please refer to Appendix A for interview questions).

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The Jordanian government rented the camp’s land from its original landowners, and tents were provided to shelter the newcomers. Soon after that, heavy rain caused the area of the camp to flood and thus destroyed the tents. As a result, the location of the camp shifted to its present location, and more “permanent” shelters replaced tents.

Fig 3.1.2: A map showing the location of the tents camp in 1967 before the flooding (Vandermeulen and Vangronsveld, 2012, Volume I, p.41).

Fig 3.1.3: A map showing the new location of the camp in 1968 after the flooding (Vandermeulen and Vangronsveld, 2012, Volume I, p.41).

Fig (3.1.4 - 3.1.6): Pictures showing Talbieh Camp as tents in 1967 (UNRWA, n.d.)

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In 1968, the boundaries of the camp’s new location were defined by the DPA, and 5,000 refugees were accommodated in 810 concrete shelters donated by the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society (Vandermeulen and Vangronsveld, 2012). These shelters –which refugees call “barracks” - had temporary roofs made out of asbestos or Zinc and consisted of five rooms (Interviewee B, 2019)3 . These rooms were distributed amongst families where families of less than ten members lived in one room and families of ten members and above were granted two rooms (Vandermeulen and Vangronsveld, 2012). Having only one room with an area of 15 m²/family, the density of the camp was one person/ 2,4 m²-shelter (ibid). In addition, due to the lack of space, the kitchen, eating space, water storage, toilets, and shower areas were shared and not included inside shelters. However, although privacy was blurred amongst family members and neighbors, a refugee stated: “Shared facilities boosted the social life at that time when going to shower was considered a social event, and we used to socialize and eat together in the food hall where someone cooked for us” (Interviewee B, 2019)4 .

In addition, the “barracks system” included five rooms stacked together and then separated by a wide space and so on, as depicted in Figure (3.1.7 - 3.18). This wide space - approximately 10m- was used for social gatherings and allowed for some fresh air and light for residents (Vandermeulen and Vangronsveld, 2012). Despite the overcrowding inside shelters and the difficult economic situation of the refugees when they first came to Jordan, discussions with refugees and interviews with community activists showed that social relationships amongst them were very strong at that time, as they shared the same pain, hard situation, and common facilities.

Fig (3.1.7 - 3.1.8): Pictures showing the camp in 1968 when the “barrack” system replaced the tents (UNRWA, n.d.).

³ Manager of the Woman Program Center, (2019), pers. comm. 24 December. (Please refer to Appendix A for interview questions). ⁴ Manager of the Woman Program Center, (2019), pers. comm. 24 December.

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Basic infrastructure, shared public toilets and showers were provided for the camp during the early stages. To avoid disturbance and bad smells, these were located at the edges of the camp (Vandermeulen and Vangronsveld, 2012). However, the facilities provided for hygiene were not compatible with the number of people living in the camp (ibid). In addition, when interviewing a refugee and the manager of the Women Rehabilitation Center in Talbieh Camp (2019), she stated: “whenever there is a water cut-off or shortage, we used to go to the Roman Pool near the camp and carry barrels of water on our heads to the camp in order to use it.”

Moreover, one primary connection was established between the camp and the surrounding network, resulting in the isolation of the camp. The overall condition of the camp’s infrastructure in 1968 was terrible, as the roads were unpaved, and the camp was not connected with electricity, water, and sewage systems.

As concluded from discussions and interviews in addition to analyzing the camp masterplan in 1968, it is evident that the camp was not of high density. Many spaces were left vacant, which provided more light and air. As for primary services such as a food hall, kitchen, and a clinic, they were located at the center of the camp for easy access, and other secondary services were scattered in the camp such as education facilities, a youth club, playing areas, a mosque, and other services (see Figure 3.1.9). Those secondary services, plus having two trees for every five attached rooms, enhanced the quality of life in the camp at that time.

Socio-economically, refugees had nothing when they came to Jordan; they had no jobs or employment. However, being originally farmers in their home country, Palestine, a very small portion used to work in farming in nearby agricultural land or small shops, while the rest were living on aid and services provided by different agencies, mainly UNRWA. Surprisingly, refugees stated that their economic situation at that time was compatible with their living needs and was enough for them as they had few expenses5.

⁵ Concluded from focus group discussions with refugees. Please refer to Appendix B for more on focus group discussions.

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“The camp was beautiful and organized - we used to pick the camp's trees and eat while walking to school, it was delicious and it tasted sweet” (Interviewee B, 2019)6.

Fig 3.1.9: Talbieh camp masterplan in 1968; showing all the services and circulation network, noting the poor connection with surrounding neighborhoods and streets (Vandermeulen and Vangronsveld, 2012, Volume I, pp.

48, 49).

⁶ Manager of the Woman Program Center, (2019), pers. comm. 24 December.

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3.2 From Temporariness to “Permanency” After ten years –in 1978- the temporary nature of the Talbieh Camp was still evident as its development did not happen according to Jordanian planning regulations and without monitoring. Due to that, and because refugees started realizing that their stay in Jordan was getting longer, shelters started expanding in an unplanned horizontal manner. As a result of the unplanned expansion coupled with increasing populations, shelters encroached upon roads, making the camp more dense and resulting in less open space (Vandermeulen and Vangronsveld, 2012). Shelter expansion accrued using the same materials -Zinc, asbestos, and concrete- and refugees started constructing percolation pits to make private bathrooms for themselves in front or behind of their shelters (Interviewee A, 2019)7. Based on the interviews with the Camp officer and the head of the Camp Service Committee (2019), this situation remained until the 80’s when the camp was finally connected with the GAM sewage system.

However, this sewage system was exposed, which caused the spread of diseases and resulted in a highly polluted environment. Roads were still unpaved, and sewage ran “uncovered” through them.

Fig 3.2.1: An example of a “barrack” horizontal expansion (Vandermeulen and Vangronsveld, 2012, Volume I, p. 55).

⁷ Head of Camp Service Committee (2019), pers. comm. 24 December. (Please refer to Appendix A for interview questions).

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Fig (3.2.2 - 3.2.3): Pictures showing exposed sewage (UNRWA, n.d.).

The exposed sewage system was dealt with in a temporary manner –just as everything else in the camp- until a proper sewage system was constructed in 20038. By 1992, the population had exploded in the camp, resulting in the need for more shelters and extra space, which therefore resulted in large sheltering units separated only by small 1.5-2 m wide alleyways.

During that time, vertical expansion up to one extra floor was allowed, so people started expanding vertically (Vandermeulen and Vangronsveld, 2012). This densification affected the quality of life as it compromised ventilation inside shelters and the accessibility to sunlight.

â ¸ Head of Camp Service Committee, Manager of the Woman Program Center, Manager of the Department of Palestinian Affairs in Talbieh Camp, Talbieh Camp Officer, (2019), pers. comm. 24,29 December.

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Fig 3.2.4: A map showing Talbieh Camp in 1978. Gaps and some open spaces are still evident. Adapted from Google Maps (UNRWA, n.d.).

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Fig 3.2.5: A map showing the camp in 1992, almost fully saturated compared to 1978. Photo Source: Royal Jordanian Geographical Center, cited in (Vandermeulen and Vangronsveld, 2012, Volume I, p. 77).

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Between the establishment of the camp and connecting it to Amman’s public infrastructure, there was around a 36-year gap until the camp was finally realized as an “existing reality.”

When discussing this gap with refugees, they all agreed that the situation was bad regarding the quality of shelters, construction materials, and access to services. On the contrary, socioeconomic conditions were good in relation to that time despite the fact that the camp was becoming more crowded and that open space was starting to fade.

Fig (3.2.6 - 3.2.9), (3.2.10 - 3.2.15 on the opposite page): Glimpses of life and the socio-economic conditions in Talbieh camp (UNRWA, n.d.).

Striving for Resilience - Talbieh Camp Case Study

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3.3 Camp’s Current Scenario: Between Different Attitudes

Fig 3.3.1: Talbieh Camp main entrance with a sign saying “Welcome to Talbieh Camp” in Arabic and English, which highlights the physical differentiation and transition between the camp and surroundings (Author’s own, 2019).

Striving for Resilience - Talbieh Camp Case Study

Fig 3.3.2: Talbieh Camp masterplan in 2020. By Author based on (Google Maps, 2020).

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3.3.1 Socio-Economics 3.3.1.1 Community Perspective9 During the socio-economic session, the two main problems highlighted by refugees were the high unemployment rate and the spread of drugs in the camp. Poverty and unemployment caused around 40% of kids under the age of fifteen to quit school and work in order to help their families. As for employment, the location of the camp -being close to an industrial area and the airport- affected the types of jobs, where refugees mainly worked in construction, at the airport, and near-by factories. Others considered the location as a burden for job opportunities. Regarding the availability of public spaces, refugees stated that there are few –a football field, kids park- but these spaces are not safe at all times and can be accessed only during the daytime, especially for women and kids, as the refugees themselves marked these spaces as “unsafe spaces that require intervention.” During winter, main social gatherings occur in or in front of houses, and other events such as weddings or funerals all happen in one multi-purpose hall or the streets. Moreover, the historic Roman pool near the camp, which was a valuable recreational asset for the camp’s residents, is now closed for reconstruction.

Fig 3.3.1.1.1: A picture showing the only kids' Park; opens only during the summer (Author’s own, 2019).

Fig 3.3.1.1.2: A picture showing the football field, noting the useless, unused massive spaces of concrete (Author’s own, 2019).

⁹ This perspective is based on results of focus group discussions. Please refer to Appendix B for more on the socio-economic focus group session.

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Fig 3.3.1.1.3 (Left): A project of a kids playing area located in a pocket between shelters (UNRWA, n.d.).

Fig 3.3.1.1.4 (Right): The playing area after it was closed (UNRWA, n.d.).

Fig (3.3.1.1.5 - 3.3.1.1.6) : Pictures of the intended playing area project now. Due to the scarcity of playing areas for kids and public spaces, over using this project caused noise to adjacent neighbors and was therefore closed (Author’s own, 2019).

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Fig 3.3.1.1.7: A picture showing one of the FGD (Author’s own, 2019).

Striving for Resilience - Talbieh Camp Case Study

Fig 3.3.1.1.8 : Areas marked unsafe by refugees in Talbieh Camp during focus group discussions (Author’s own, 2019).

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3.3.1.2 Supplier Perspective10 Drawing from interviews conducted, there was consensus on the severity of the economic and social situation in the camp. Some say unemployment is a challenge that Jordan is facing in general, and not a challenge particularly for the camp, while others say the location of the camp plays a significant role in unemployment as a result for being 35 km away from Amman’s center in addition to the limited and costly transportation means from the camp to Amman.

Moreover, the camp’s location has a cultural and social effect on refugees as it isolates them from interacting with other cultures, social backgrounds, and beliefs, resulting in a community where the same culture and information are circulated every day amongst the same people.

Stressing on the need for and lack of open and social spaces, a refugee said: ‘’who does not desire a tree in front of his house? Or a place where his kids can play?’’ (interviewee A, 2019)11.

3.3.1.3 Reports and studies According to the Socio-economic and Environmental Survey conducted by UNRWA (2008b), only 18.9% of the total population is employed, and 73.3% of the population faces income shortages. In addition, the most common salary in the camp – which is 150 Jordanian Dinars (ibid) - highlights the low-income professions that refugees pursue. In a country where minimum wage is 220 JOD/person/month (Al-Ajlouni, 2020), the economic situation in Talbieh Camp is inadequate, resulting in 12% of families in poverty and 35.5% of them in absolute poverty (UNRWA,2008b), and hence correlating in high crime rates and the use of drugs. The FAFO report (2013), comparing Palestinian refugees inside and outside camps, shows how only 30% of women and 18% of children think it is safe to go out after daytime inside camps (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013). Difficult economic conditions have social effects as well, resulting in an average age for marriage that is 20 and sometimes even less for women (UNRWA, 2008b).

As for shelter ownership, the UNRWA (2008b) survey shows that the majority -63.5%- of the population in the camp owns their property, and only 16% rents it. This fact is partially true since none of the refugees actually “own” the land they live on, but instead buying, selling, and renting are done through “imaginary” contracts (Interviewee D, 2019)12. This is yet another temporary way of handling refugees that by default results in a low-quality living environment; since it is in the human nature to look after one's belongings, Palestinian refugees in Talbieh Camp -after 53 years- hardly own anything, they only have “the right of use” (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013). However, 69.3% of the refugees in Talbieh Camp perceived themselves to be financially similar to the rest of the community (UNRWA, 2008b).

¹⁰ This perspective is based on results of interviews with Head of Camp Service Committee, Manager of the Woman Program Center, Manager of the Department of Palestinian Affairs in Talbieh Camp, Talbieh Camp Officer, (2019), pers. comm. 24,29 December. Please refer to Appendix A for more on interview questions. ¹¹ Head of Camp Service Committee (2019), pers. comm. 24 December. (Please refer to Appendix A for interview questions). ¹² Manager of the Department of Palestinian Affairs in Talbieh Camp, (2019), pers. comm. 29 December. (Please refer to Appendix A for interview questions).

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Fig (3.3.1.3.1 - 3.3.1.3.6): Pictures showing glimpses of the economic activity in the camp. Noting that they are trying to invent spaces in front of their houses or randomly encroach upon streets in order to generate some income (Author’s own, 2019).

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3.2 Housing 3.3.2.1 Community Perspective13 Residents’ opinions about their shelters vary according to how and by whom it was built. For example, shelters built or recently rehabilitated by UNRWA were perceived as good compared to other shelters since residents participated in the design layout of their shelters. Moreover, UNRWA shelters are well-connected with sewage, water, and electricity networks, and they hardly face any disruption. On the contrary, shelters with temporary roofing materials such as asbestos and Zinc suffer badly from rain leaks and dampness, which cause chronic diseases such as asthma. In addition, shelters were marked to be hardly accessible by the elderly and disabled. Generally, shelters in Talbieh Camp suffer from bad construction and overcrowding; the limited size of the camp and the increasing demand for shelters led to the lack of ventilation and daylight. Although refugees perceived housing conditions to be improving over the years, 33.8% of the population highlighted that their shelters are in adverse conditions compared to other shelters, and 5% perceived their shelters as “inhabitable” (UNRWA, 2008b). Their growing numbers and needs merged with the fact that there are no planning regulations applied in the camp, resulted in an unpleasant living environment where people are expanding randomly and trying to modify or add to their shelters. These modifications are mainly because of the need for more space or the need for privacy.

¹³ This perspective is based on results of focus group discussions. Please refer to Appendix B for more on the Housing focus group session.

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Fig (3.3.2.1.1 - 3.3.2.1.2): Pictures showing a shelter in Talbieh Camp before the reconstruction done by UNRWA (UNRWA, n.d.).

Fig (3.3.2.1.3 - 3.3.2.1.5): Pictures showing a shelter in Talbieh Camp after the reconstruction done by UNRWA (UNRWA, n.d.).

Fig (3.3.2.1.6 - 3.3.2.1.7): Examples of shelters with temporary roofing (Author’s own, 2019).

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Fig (3.3.2.1.8 - 3.3.2.1.10): An example of modifying a shelter’s design by closing the outdoor terrace (Author’s own, 2019). When asking the residents about the reason behind this modification, they said: “if we want to open the door for some fresh air, we don’t have any privacy. We would have preferred this area to be inside.

It would have made a beautiful large living space.”

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Fig (3.3.2.1.11 - 3.3.2.1.14): Examples of modifications done by refugees for privacy reasons due to the lack of space between shelters (Author’s own, 2019).

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Fig (3.3.2.1.15 - 3.3.2.1.17): Examples of modifications done by refugees for more space (Author’s own, 2019). These expansions are hazardous, random, and not built according to any regulations.

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Fig (3.3.2.1.18 - 3.3.2.1.19): An example of a modification done by refugees for easier access for the elderly and disabled, noting street violation (Author’s own, 2019).

3.3.2.2 Supplier Perspective14 Comparing shelters’ conditions to Amman’s informal settlements and with the fact that these shelters are for refugees, they were perceived as competent but need improvement. As it is widely known that refugees live in tents or caravans, Talbieh Camp offers more “permanent” shelters. While compared to international living standards, a refugee said: “Europe and other donor countries, when they look at 10,000 people living in 130,000 square meters, this alone means misery; there are no roads, no ventilation, no clean air, shelters from tinplate. Anyone who would visit the camp will feel sorry for the refugees living here” (interviewee A, 2019)15.

Availability and affordability of shelters were also marked as an issue; this is mainly due to the lack of land available in the camp and its small size, and with the fact that only recently refugees were granted permission to expand vertically up to three floors (Interviewee D, 2019)16. Infrastructure-wise, there was consensus that all shelters are well-connected to piped water and sewage systems, and do not face any electricity cut-offs.

¹⁴ This perspective is based on result of interviews with Head of Camp Service Committee, Manager of the Woman Program Center, Manager of the Department of Palestinian Affairs in Talbieh Camp, Talbieh Camp Officer, (2019), pers. comm. 24, 29 December. Please refer to Appendix A for more on interview questions. ¹⁵ Head of Camp Service Committee (2019), pers. comm. 24 December. (Please refer to Appendix A for interview questions). ¹⁶ Manager of the Department of Palestinian Affairs in Talbieh Camp, (2019), pers. comm. 29 December. (Please refer to Appendix A for interview questions).

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3.3.2.3 Reports and studies Shelters improved over the years in the fact that now almost all families have their own toilets and kitchens, with 7.4% still sharing toilets and 8.3% having shared kitchens (UNRWA, 2008b). However, the size of shelters remains an issue, with half the shelters in Talbieh Camp having an area of less than 60 m² (ibid). Due to the fact that the average household size in the camp is 5.42 members, coupled with the fact that 60% of shelters have less than three rooms (excluding the kitchen and the bathroom), shelters suffer from overcrowding when it is measured by the number of persons per room (ibid). With 21% of shelters having three persons per room (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013), shelters undergo a lack of separation and privacy amongst family members, especially between opposite genders; this affects family relations negatively and causes social issues. Moreover, shelters in Talbieh Camp suffer from poor ventilation as approximately 53% of the shelters are ventilated from two sides only and 20.7% from one side (UNRWA, 2008b). Accordingly, poor ventilation leads to health issues, where 9.4% of the population suffers from chronic illnesses (ibid).

Outdoor private spaces are nonexistent in shelters, except for very few shelters having private open space. As for shelter construction, the most common materials used are hollow cement blocks for walls and roofs of mixed materials, mainly concrete slabs or Zinc and asbestos (ibid).

According to UNRWA (2008b), 68.8% of the shelters had temporary roofs made of Zinc and asbestos, while only 30% had ones made of concrete. This percentage has remained below 40% over the period up to 2020, further enforcing and rooting the temporary nature of the camp, both consciously and aesthetically (Interviewee E, 2019)17.

Fig (3.3.2.3.1 - 3.3.2.3.2): An example of a private outdoor space in a shelter (Author’s own, 2019).

¹⁷ Project Manager of Talbieh Camp, (2019), pers. comm. 29 December. (Please refer to Appendix A for interview questions).

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Fig (3.3.2.3.3 - 3.3.2.3.4): Talbieh's very poor construction and finishing materials (Author’s own, 2019).

Regarding Infrastructure and housing services, the UNRWA (2008b) survey shows that the majority of households obtain water from the GAM public network, and 80% of the residents use it as their drinking source as a result of an infrastructure improvement project done in 2006 (UNRWA, 2009). However, discussions with refugees show that they do not use the public network for drinking as it is highly polluted, which leaves them with no choice other than using expensive bottled or filtered water. Moreover, opposing suppliers’ perspective, water services face disruptions, especially during the summer (UNRWA, 2008b). While almost every household is connected to the sewage network, 0.9% of households are still using septic tanks (ibid).

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3.3.3 Infrastructure 3.3.3.1 Community Perspective18 Comparing the existing infrastructure situation with earlier periods, residents are now grateful that they do not have exposed sewer channels running between their houses and roads. As for the roads, they were addressed as very narrow and in deplorable conditions. In addition, there are no parking spaces in the camp. Hence, residents tend to park their cars in front of their shelters, and therefore, blocking the streets. This causes a major issue as emergency vehicles such as fire trucks and ambulances cannot reach all shelters in case of an emergency.

Furthermore, although well-lit, street lights are often vandalized and thus resulting in streets being unsafe spaces during the night. Amongst the most major issues was waste management throughout the camp, insufficient waste collection and disposal led to high pollution and the spread of insects and rodents. Moreover, the waste dumping site being located inside the camp and near their living spaces results in a poor urban environment.

Fig (3.3.3.1.1 3.3.3.1.4): Pictures showing the poor waste management, disposal, and urban environment (Author’s own, 2019).

š⠸ This perspective is based on results of focus group discussions. Please refer to Appendix B for more on the Infrastructure focus group session.

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Fig (3.3.3.1.5 - 3.3.3.1.7): Pictures showing street blockage due to lack of parking spaces (Author’s own, 2019).

Fig (3.3.3.1.8 - 3.3.3.1.11): Pictures showing some of the infrastructural gaps in Talbieh Camp (Author’s own, 2019).

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3.3.3.2 Supplier Perspective19 Drawing from interviews conducted, street lighting, water, and sewage systems face no disruptions. If there was a problem in these networks in the camp, it is reported by residents to one of the concerned authorities –Camp officer, Camp Service Committee, and DPA- and is immediately solved. The main roads are perceived to be paved and in good condition, while alleyways and secondary streets, which are 1.5-2 m wide, were marked as narrow and in poor conditions.

3.3.3.3 Reports and studies Due to the 2006 infrastructure project, infrastructure in the whole camp was improved (UNRWA, 2008b). However, since water in Jordan is distributed according to a weekly quota, the camp receives water once a week, and thus, water must be stored in tanks for later use (UNRWA, 2009). In a camp where most of the roofs are made of Zinc, it is not possible to store water in roof tanks, but instead, they use small tanks inside shelters, which is insufficient (ibid). Moreover, after forty years of use, percolation pits -even if not used any more- cause a humidity problem in buildings since the soil around them is very humid (ibid). In addition to causing severe dampness, percolation pits are considered a structural threat (ibid). As for street materials, main roads in the camp where commercial activities happen are asphalt, whereas alleyways and streets leading to people’s dwellings are mainly concrete, with few roads still unpaved (UNRWA, 2008b). In addition to the challenge of street width and street blockage by parked cars, sidewalks were not designed for handicapped accessibility as they are more than 20 cm high (UNRWA, 2009). While the majority of residents have their waste collected from their doors by UNRWA workers, this service was marked insufficient during interviews and FGD in addition to 50.4% of residents reporting insects and rodents (UNRWA, 2008b).

¹⁹ This perspective is based on results of interviews with Head of Camp Service Committee, Manager of the Woman Program Center, Manager of the Department of Palestinian Affairs in Talbieh Camp, Talbieh Camp Officer, (2019), pers. comm. 24, 29 December. Please refer to Appendix A for more on interview questions.

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Fig (3.3.3.3.1 - 3.3.3.3.3): Pictures showing some of the deteriorated alleyways in Talbieh Camp (Author’s own, 2019).

Fig (3.3.3.3.4 - 3.3.3.3.5): Pictures showing some of Talbieh's streets and deteriorated sidewalks (Author’s own, 2019).

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3.3.4 Integration with Surroundings20 It was concluded from FGD and interviews that socially, Palestinian refugees in Talbieh Camp are integrated with the surrounding residents. This is mainly due to the fact that around 4,500 people living around the camp are originally from the camp but moved out and expanded when they had enough money (Interviewee C, 2019)21. Thus, residents in and around the camp are refugees and relatives and they hardly face any conflict. As for services, interviews showed that there is no such thing as Palestinian refugees anymore as they have been living in the camp since 1967 and 87.6% of them hold a Jordanian National Number (UNRWA, 2008b), which means they are getting the same services and job opportunities as Jordanians.

Interviews also highlighted that electricity, water, and sewage companies are at the end profit organizations aiming for maximum revenue; hence if there is to be any reported disruption in their services, they would fix it immediately regardless of the location being a camp or not.

However, in FGD, refugees highlighted that they still face problems in finding employment and job opportunities because of their status as “Palestinian Refugees.”

According to the interview conducted with the Camp Service Officer (2019), the location of the camp was selected carefully by the government to be safe and appropriate for refugees to live. This contradicts with the fact that when Palestinian refugees came in 1967, a lot of vacant land in and around Amman’s center could have accommodated them. Instead, an isolated site was chosen. In addition, the camp’s location near the airport causes a noise challenge as well as the threat of slowly destroying the buildings of the camp due to heavy vibrations adding to the camp’s weak foundations. According to Talbieh Camp Improvement Plan done

by UNRWA (2009), physical links between the camp and surroundings are inadequate and limited, resulting in more isolation. These weak links are a result of illegal expansions done by the refugees as they are trying to change and cope with their increasing numbers. In addition, being bordered by a highway from the East limits social links and connections with Eastern neighborhoods and facilities. Hence, it is concluded that as much as refugees are trying to modify, integrate, and be resilient with the challenges they encounter over the years, the city and its development is not equally resilient at the same pace.

²⁰ This perspective is based on: a) Results of interviews with Head of Camp Service Committee, Manager of the Woman Program Center, Manager of the Department of Palestinian Affairs in Talbieh Camp, Talbieh Camp Officer, (2019), pers. comm. 24, 29 December. Please refer to Appendix A for more on interview questions. b) Results of focus group discussions. Please refer to Appendix B for more on the integration with surroundings focus group session. ²¹ Camp Service Officer, (2019), pers. comm. 29 December. (Please refer to Appendix A for interview questions).

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4.1 Urban Inequality: Socio-economic Impact Amman was labelled by The Economist in 2018 (cited in CWRA, 2019) as the most expensive city in the Arab Word. This challenge, which was also made worse by the crisis, is affecting the whole city in general and the most vulnerable, poorest groups, and refugees in particular.

The unemployment rate was 15% in 2016, mainly affecting women and young populations (100 Resilient Cities, 2017), and the rate increased in just two years to hit 18.7% in 2018 (Department of Statistics, 2018). As depicted in Figure 4.1.1, the percentage of unemployed Jordanians in Amman after the start of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2013 increased to 32.3%.

While this percentage decreased to 26% by the end of 2015, it dramatically increased to 42.8% in 2016. In other words, while socio-economic conditions are deteriorating, the demand for services is rising as per the growth in the refugee population, resulting in an imbalance.

Fig 4.1.1: A table showing the percentages of unemployed Jordanians in Amman aged 15+ years, quarterly and between the years 2010-2016 (Dos Statistical Online Database, n.d.a).

Moreover, as Figure 4.1.2 indicates, the absolute poverty line in Amman increased throughout 1997 to 2010, to reach JOD 814 in 2010 per person per year complemented with high living costs and low incomes (Obeidat, 2014). While the annual average total household income in Amman is JOD 12,657.2 (Department of Statistics, 2017a), the mean annual household income in Talbieh Camp is JOD 3,699 (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013). These numbers suggest the low-income jobs that camps’ refugees pursue and the high inequality in income between Amman and refugee camps which indicate a poor resilience state and, thus, making Amman “the most unequal governorate in Jordan with a Gini coefficient of 36.8 percent” (UNDP, 2015, p.27).

Fig 4.1.2: A line chart showing the rise of absolute poverty line in Amman between the years 1997 and 2010 (Dos Statistical Online Database, n.d.b).

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While the economic situation is affecting Amman as a whole, Amman’s camps' refugees -being amongst the most vulnerable communities- are affected by this challenging economic situation but at a faster pace than Amman’s residents. This gap is evident in household incomes where even Palestinian refugees living outside camps in Amman have higher household income than Amman’s camp refugees (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013). As for the social aspect, the location of refugee camps plays a major role. In Talbieh’s case, the location that was chosen in 1968 indicates low social-resilience as the area was completely deserted and only recently started to grow, resulting in a poor social-interaction between refugees and the host community, socially and physically. In addition, it resulted in a culturally-isolated community where the same information is reciprocated every day.

Referring to Figure 4.1.3, it is concluded that Talbieh Camp is located outside the proposed Ring Road boundary. This choice of location reinforces the idea gained from chapter 3 that the camp is designed to be temporary and without sustainable plans, which contradicts with the general development purposes of Ring Roads and highlight the integration gap. Furthermore, the Roman Pool located next to the camp, which was considered a major social asset for the camp’s population, is now closed. This action highlights the social inequality and vulnerability22, where even their only breathing space is taken from them.

Fig 4.1.3: A map showing the location and exclusion of Talbieh Camp in relation to the proposed Ring Road. By author based on (Ababsa, 2014).

²² Social vulnerability is when individuals undergo stress as a consequence of the impacts exerted by an environmental change. This social stress is widely common for vulnerable groups as it’s related to their socioeconomic situation summarized in lack of income and resources amongst other factors that all affect their livelihoods and their ability to cope and adapt with the ever-changing environment (Adger, 2000).

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4.2 Housing Drawback: A Development Gap between Amman and Refugee Camps As concluded in Chapter 2, the overall construction quality of Talbieh Camp is poor. Since it started as a quick and temporary solution for refugees in 1967, shelters developed from tents to barracks to their existing situation; mainly one storey buildings made of cement-block walls with temporary roofs (Zinc, asbestos, or mixed) or concrete roofs (which is less than 40% of the whole camp roofs). As a result of their temporary and fragile beginning, shelters in Talbieh have weak foundations, and the location of the camp is making this situation worse.

Being close to the airport, the vibrations caused by the latter affect the camps’ concrete buildings, in addition to the noise and pollution prompted by the same. Comparing shelters’ construction quality in Talbieh, which represents the similar conditions of Amman’s refugee camps, to Amman23 and according to the 2015 census, 58.3% of Amman’s residential-only units are made of stone, 41.43% are concrete, and 0.26% are of other materials such as mud bricks, asbestos, and Zinc (Department of Statistics, 2015a). Moreover, in Amman, the average household size is 4.6 (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013) with 4.3 as an average for the number of rooms and an average housing area of 138.1 m² (Department of Statistics, 2017b). When comparing these numbers to findings from chapter 3 about Talbieh, which are: 5.42 household size, 60% of shelters having less than three rooms24, and an average shelter area of 71.33 m² with majority of shelters having an area of 50 m2 (UNRWA, 2008b), one cannot help but notice the difference in housing overcrowding rates between Amman and the camp wherein Talbieh 21% of shelters have three persons per room and it is considered to have one of the lowest average per capita square meters of living space compared to other camps (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013).

Fig 4.2.1: A map showing the location of Talbieh Camp in relation to the Airport Noise Corridor, indicating low resilience. Amman Municipality, 1987 (cited in Potter et al., 2007).

²³ Please refer to Figures 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4, and 4.2.5 showing the difference in housing quality between the camp and Amman. ²⁴ Excluding the kitchen and the bathroom.

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Fig 4.2.2: A picture showing shelter conditions and construction materials in Talbieh Camp (UNRWA, n.d.).

Fig 4.2.3: A picture showing one storey shelters with temporary roofs in Talbieh camp (Chatriwala, 2011).

Assessing Amman’s Resilience: Findings and Conclusions

Fig 4.2.4: An aerial photograph of Abdoun area, a good and wealthy area in Amman (Aerial Photographic Archive for Archaeology in the Middle East, 2010).

Fig 4.2.5: A picture showing Amman's housing (Mustafa, 2019).

Fig 4.2.6: A diagram highlighting the resilience and equality gap in housing based on findings and comparisons (Author’s own, 2020).

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As for the quantity of housing, Jordan was suffering from a non-alignment between supply and demand even before the refugee crisis, where there has been a shortage in affordable housing and an overstock of middle and high income housing (Government of Jordan, 2016).

Moreover, the most recent Syrian crisis strained the housing market’s adaption capacity with shocks of high demands on affordable housing, making it difficult to absorb the increasing numbers of refugees (ibid). Moreover, the Jordanian housing market was 100,000 units short in supply in 2016, which is high compared to the estimated Jordanian annual average need (Government of Jordan, 2016). Thus, renting represents the only means to access affordable housing for poor populations, although renting prices are also increasing just like every other thing in Amman, including the inflation rate, which makes low price rents scarce. As concluded from previous chapters, not all refugees are even granted permission to own anything -like Gaza's refugees- and with their socio-economic profiles and limited resources, they can hardly rent. This affects the resilience of Jordan as a host community and leads to a feeling of instability amongst populations. In the case of Talbieh, it is concluded that although 63.5% of the population own their shelters and 16% of them are renting (UNRWA, 2008b), these contracts of ownership are “imaginary” and they do not actually “own” their shelters25. This further reinforces the temporary control of camps and refugees. However, with JOD 50 being the most common rent in Talbieh (ibid), other non-Palestinian populations –refugees or nonrefugees- tend to rent in the camp seeking lower rent prices, which affects the availability of housing units for Palestinian refugees residing there in the future.

Fig (4.2.7 - 4.2.8): Interior pictures indicating the low-quality construction and conditions in Talbieh's shelters (UNRWA, n.d.).

²⁵ Concluded from Interviews. Please refer to Chapter 3.

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Results of the Socio-Economic and Environmental Survey conducted by UNRWA (2008b) show how 38% of the residents in Talbieh evaluate their shelters as bad or inhabitable. This evaluation, as mentioned in chapter 3, is due to various reasons such as overcrowding, lack of gender separation, humidity, dampness, excessive heat during summers, leakage during winters, and many other issues. Also, refugees in Amman’s camps show the highest level of discontent with their housing conditions than refugees in any other governorate in Jordan (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013). Keeping this in mind, and observing the pace of shelter development, it is depicted that refugees’ shelters are not aligned with the needed development, as during the years from 2005 until 2008, the majority of shelters were not improved, with only 28.5% of shelters going through interventions mainly addressing finishing or adding a room (ibid). However, there are some attempts and efforts done by UNRWA recently addressing the development of shelters in the camp26; these include the reconstruction of 28 shelters in 2018-2019 and another 28 shelters in 2020-2021 (Interviewee E, 2019)27. While these efforts are highly appreciated, the gap in development is still evident28, as 29% of households in Amman’s refugee camps think that their shelters are in need for a complete reconstruction (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013). In Talbieh’s case, with a growth rate of 3.04%, the projected population in the camp is nearly 13,500 people in 2030, coupled with the fact the camp’s expansion is improbable, more sustainable solutions for shelter development and support are needed.

Fig 4.2.9: A diagram showing the evolution of shelters in Talbieh Camp since its establishment and until 2020.

Although there is an obvious development from tents to more “permanent” structures, the development is still not enough and unsustainable (Author’s own, 2020).

²⁶ Please refer to Figures (3.3.2.1.1 - 3.3.2.1.2) and (3.3.2.1.3 - 3.3.2.1.5) in chapter 3 showing an example of a shelter's reconstruction done by UNRWA in Talbieh Camp. ²⁷ Project Manager of Talbieh Camp, (2019), pers. comm. 29 December. (Please refer to Appendix A for interview questions). ²⁸ Stressing on this development gap, a refugee (interviewee B, 2019) said: ‘’don’t make some families happy while others are still crying.”

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Fig 4.2.10: A diagram highlighting population growth in Talbieh Camp since its establishment and until 2030 within its fixed boundaries (Author’s own, 2020).

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Fig 4.2.11: A diagram highlighting major challenges for the camp exerted mainly by its temporary nature and resulting in an overcrowded poor urban environment (Author’s own, 2020)

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4.3 Intergenerationally Unsustainable Infrastructure Jordan is known to be the second poorest country in per capita water availability in the world (Harake, 2019). As cited before, Jordan has been accepting millions of refugees for the past 70 years with Palestinians and Syrians as major influxes, which increased the demand on water and strained the country’s resources even more than before. For example, the most recent Syrian refugee influx is costing the water sector 500 JOD/refugee/year (Almomani et al., 2015).

For Amman, amongst the city’s chronic stresses come water shortages, and the failure of its aging infrastructure is one of the critical shocks that Amman is facing (100 Resilient Cities, 2017). Moreover, the city is dependent on imports from nearby countries in its supply, making it and its residents more vulnerable to the unpredictability of the prices and unreliability of continuous, high-quality supply (100 Resilient Cities, 2017). While 63% of the population in Amman has access to improved sanitation through the public network (CWRA, 2019), the rest of the population has to resort to other means to gain access to these services. Numbers speak for themselves, 52% of the population use mineral water as a drinking source, 31.5% uses filtered water, and only 14.2% use the public network (Department of Statistics, 2017c).

Furthermore, although 74.6% of households are connected to the public sewage network, 20.5% are still using absorption pits (Department of Statistics, 2015b). Also, since water and sanitation have high energy costs, they are considered an economic challenge in Jordan as well (Harake, 2019).

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Comparing these results with findings about Talbieh Camp, an infrastructural gap is still evident despite the 2006 infrastructure improvement project, where 11% of the population in Talbieh Camp does not use the primary network for drinking purposes due to its contamination and 67.5% face disruption in water services (UNRWA, 2008b). Refugees, due to that, while already vulnerable and poor, have no choice but to buy costly water for drinking purposes.

As mentioned earlier, households in Jordan receive water once a week and store water in tanks on roofs, but in the case of Talbieh, its temporary nature and roofing materials constrain people’s ability to store enough water for later use, reinforcing high vulnerability furthermore to water shortages (up to 3-4 days a week29). Also, lack of infrastructure from when the camp was founded led to refugees constructing percolation pits for themselves, which nowadays, even with the improved infrastructure, has long-lasting side effects such as humidity inside shelters and structural threats. Percolation pits also have ill-effects such as the spread of insects and rodents, leading to an unhealthy environment and mental disturbances, and affecting people’s dignity and social well-being. As for waste management, Talbieh Camp has been described by UNRWA as ‘environmental pollution’ (cited in Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013, p64), which highlights the insufficient waste management and collection in the camp. This situation is not limited to Talbieh Camp, but all of Amman’s refugee camps, where every two in five households demonstrate dissatisfaction with their urban environment, cleanliness, and safety (ibid).

Despite having a dry climate, Amman suffers from intense and short rainfalls that cause some areas of the city to flood, usually where the most vulnerable communities live (CWRA, 2019).

In the case of Talbieh, interviews with key suppliers showed that the location of the camp was chosen to be environmentally safe for refugees, which contradicts with the fact that the camp flooded in 1967 and refugees were moved to another location before they finally moved to the current site, and thus causing more social vulnerability for refugees.

Fig 4.3.1: A picture showing Amman's flash flooding in 2015 (100 Resilient Cities, 2017, p52).

²⁹ Information obtained from focus group discussions.

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As concluded from analyzing Amman’s growth and planning, the city expanded from an area of 31 km² in 1946 to become a metropolis with an area of 800 km² (100 Resilient Cities, 2017). This mainly refugee-driven growth accrued with a lack of strict urban planning and without clear goals and thus led to the lack of open spaces, traffic congestions, roads with poor pedestrian accessibility, and air pollution (ibid).

To conclude, with the decrease of annual per capita water from 3,600 m³/person in 1946 (before the Palestinian influxes) to 123 m³/person in 2013 (after the Syrian influx) (Al-Karablieh and Salman, 2016), and with estimates showing a projected water supply gap of 26% in 2025, future generations in Amman will suffer from unsustainable infrastructure systems (Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 2016). Hence, those systems have not been able to cope with the refugee crisis, and they lack the qualities of being redundant and robust30.

Fig 4.3.2: A graph showing the available water resources after implementing an intended improvement project is implemented and projected water demand in (million cubic meters/annum). This project, if implemented, will only bridge 6% of the total 26% gap (Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 2016, p11).

³⁰ Please refer to the qualities that make a system resilient in chapter one.

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4.4 Conclusion As cities around the world are encountering resilience challenges, whether caused by human actions or by natural disasters, they should learn from past experiences and other cities. In the case of Amman, each wave of refugees was dealt with in an improvised manner, like it is a temporary situation that will vanish and fade with time. What happens is ultimately the opposite, as the first wave of Palestinian refugees in 1948 showed that they are a reality and long-term residents. Hence, the later refugee influxes showed the unsustainable and non-resilient way of handling this challenge, as the city now is facing shortages in addressing adequate services for its residents and still far away from achieving refugee-integration.

While coping with present stresses and shocks does not necessarily mean that the city -with its communities and systems- is resilient, it is its flexibility and ability to cope and adapt to changing circumstances that make it resilient. The continuous influxes of refugees show that there is no specific equilibrium state for the city to retreat to after every shock, but instead, it should have been evolutionary as it concerns communities that are constantly changing.

Amman, as a city with limited resources, tried to provide equilibrium state and to cope with present situations without trying to convert these challenges exerted by mass displacement into strengths for future generations, which furthermore affected its systems and presented a resilience challenge for the city more than ever.

As a result of not being reflective as a city with its systems, Palestinian refugees – taking Talbieh Camp as an example- after 53 years are still not integrated, and the development gap between Amman and refugee camps is still evident. Studying and analyzing socio-economics, housing, and infrastructure systems in both a refugee camp and Amman, and based on the research definition of urban resilience, it is concluded that Amman did not achieve sustainable development for its residents; refugees and Jordanians. Socio-economically, while the whole country is put under economic pressure, refugees –especially camp refugees- are amongst the most vulnerable groups that are affected more intensively, showing high poverty, unemployment, and crime rates. In addition to refugees’ tough economic conditions, they suffer from social inequality and isolation from the rest of the community, either because of their status as refugees or camp location. Thus, socio-economically, Amman shows low resilience in adapting to the refugee crisis.

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As for housing, there is a quality and quantity gap between Amman and refugee camps. A quality gap that can be summarized in the temporary way of building -even after realizing that they are staying and not leaving- and in overlooking the application of the Housing Regulations in refugee camps, which has a side-effect on health amongst many other sideeffects. Also, there is a quantity gap in affordable housing that existed in Amman even before the crisis, and was made worse once the refugee influxes. Hence, Amman scores very low resilience state in reaching equality in housing which needs to be addressed as a priority, as it concerns people’s health and well-being. Lastly, in addition to the country’s very limited resources and its dependence on imports from nearby countries in its supply, Amman has an aging infrastructure, which resulted in the unpredictability of the prices and unreliability of continuous, high-quality supply. Talbieh Camp was established in 1968 and it was not until 2006 that the camp underwent an infrastructural improvement project, which is still insufficient as the camp is still facing disruption in services. Therefore, Amman is failing to be a resourceful and redundant city, and represents a low resilience for the infrastructure system, which will affect future generations in Amman.

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Fig 4.4.1: A table showing comparison results between Amman and Talbieh Camp that indicate Amman's very low resilience towards refugee crisis and camps (Author’s own, 2020).

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Conclusions show that, despite official reports being very useful, such focused analysis and conclusion for each aspect of refugee communities' lives requires devoted, adapted, in-depth research and information collecting. This type of research is needed so as to maintain a direct realistic connection to those refugees' needs, lifestyles and conditions regarding certain aspects, and how they relate and are affected by measures taken by host cities, reflecting an open, direct channel of communicating needs and reality that are not accurately accounted for in the literature.

From this research, Amman’s low urban resilience -with low adaptability and ability of its urban elements, local governments, and stakeholders to adapt, absorb, and integrate rapid influxes of refugees into the wider urban system- was concluded. Considering this, research poses certain questions to authorities and stakeholders in achieving urban resilience; could Amman sustain and be resourceful and inclusive towards its future generations and refugees?

Could Amman initiate certain measures to make the city inclusive for refugees? Could Amman be able to utilize the additional human resources efficiently as its strength in achieving sustainable growth?

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Appendix A: Sample Interview Questions Method and objectives: Qualitative semi-structured interviews were used as they allow open ended answers but within the topic of the interview. The main aim was to gain an insight on how service suppliers perceive the camp conditions regarding socio-economics, housing, and infrastructure.

Questions mainly targeted understanding the capacity of the camp’s infrastructure to cope with increasing demands, the resilience of the camp over the years, and priority interventions needed.

The sample: Based on that, five semi-structured interviews were conducted with some of the key service suppliers; these include the Project Manager of Talbieh Camp, Camp Service Officer, manager of the Woman Program Center, manager of DPA in Talbieh Camp, and Head of Camp Service Committee. Choice of interviewees was based on their diverse backgrounds and experiences in the camp in addition to their knowledge regarding the evolution of the camp -within the socio-economic context- in housing and infrastructure.

Questions: 1. What aspects do you cover in the camp?

2. Are the programs you provide making difference?

3. Can you describe the services situation regarding the following: • Shelters • Waste Management • Roads Network • Water System • Sewage System • Electricity • Safety and Security 4. What are the major problems or challenges facing the camp and service provision for (shelters and infrastructure)?

5. How do concerned bodies plan to solve the previously mentioned problems in services? Are there any possible action plans? How much is really implemented?

6. Is there any expansion for the camp? If yes, who provides services for that area?

7. Is there any conflict or tension between refugees living in camps and local citizens? If yes, does this affect accessibility and availability of services?

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Appendix

8. Can you describe the social life in the camp? Do people meet or visit each other? Do they have any relationships other than inside the camp?

9. Does the camp face interruption in services? How frequently does that happen? What is the average period until the interruption is fixed?

10. How do refugees reach to agencies that provide services for them if there is a disruption in services?

11. How is the living conditions in Talbieh Camp assessed and perceived by other organizations?

On what standards is this assessment taken?

12. Will the services provision and infrastructure systems able to cope with increasing demands? Do you think it will continue to cope in the future?

13. How would you describe the evolution and transformation of shelter, Infrastructure, and socio-economic conditions in Talbieh Camp over time?

14. Does the location of the camp being far from Amman cause any challenges for the camp?

15. Are there any environmental risks/hazards related to the location of the camp?

16. Is the camp built according to Jordanian regulations? (fire/housing/..)

17. What are the main challenges/ priority problems that need intervention in the camp?

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Appendix B: Focus Group Discussions Method and objectives: Based on the research problem and to supplement to the interviews, four FGD were conducted.

These were divided based on four main topics; socio-economics, housing, infrastructure, and integration with surroundings. This method was used to get better understanding and insights of people’s beliefs, concerns, observations, and assessment of their living environment.

Moreover, in order to achieve the main aim of this research, which is the assessment of Amman’s resilience to refugee crisis, exploring refugees’ experiences becomes crucial.

The sample: Since the main aim is the assessment of the current situation in the camp, the sample was diverse and not gender or age specific. Each session had 8 to 10 attendants and lasted for almost one and half hour.

The Focus Groups: First Session: Socio-economics 1) Where do you meet or gather for social purposes?

• Female • Male • Kids 2) Public Spaces: - Do you feel safe using the available community facilities?

- Can you locate on the map the spaces that you find particularly unsafe?

- What kind of public space do you think missing in the camp?

- Why are they missing?

- What are the results if it is available?

3) What kind of activities you like to do?

• Female • Male • Kids 4) Employment: - What is your source of income?

• Employment • Profession • Aid/Donations • Others • None

Appendix

94

- Who is the main bread earner?

Ratio of families who Female bread earner Male bread earner has: Out of 30 families % %

Kids bread earner %

- How many people are working in your family?

Ratio of families who has: Out of 30 families

Female workers Male workers %

Kids workers

%

Unemployed

%

%

- Expenses Paid: Shelter Invoices Food+water Clothes Transportation Rental/ (electricity+water) maintenance

Education

5) Do you have any loans? Why did you take it?

6) Are you a tenant or owner of the house you live in? Do you think being an owner would make you take care of the place you live in? How? 7) In your opinion, has the economic situation of people in the camp changed (improved/got worse) over the years? How? 1967 Income source Expenses Psychological Aspects Shelters Availability and Affordability of shelters Public Spaces

1997

2019

Appendix

95

Second Session: Shelters (housing) 1) How many household members are living in your shelter?

2) Shelters Construction: - Temporary Roof Shelters Bad

Acceptable

Good

Notes

Area/person Layout Facilities Construction material Gender separation Lightness Ventilation Dampness Water System Sewage system Accessibility by handicaps/Elderly Safety from weather Safety from violence I. What is the roof material?

II. Do you think it needs maintenance?

III. What would you modify in the design? Why? IV. Do you suffer from any chronic disease or health issues due to shelter condition?

Appendix

96

- UNRWA Shelters Bad

Acceptable

Good

Notes

Area/person Layout Facilities Construction material Gender separation Lightness Ventilation Dampness Water System Sewage system Accessibility by handicaps/Elderly Safety from weather Safety from violence I. Do you think it needs maintenance?

II. What would you modify in the design? Why? III. Do you suffer from any chronic disease or health issues due to shelter condition?

- DPA Shelters Bad

Acceptable

Good

Notes

Area/person Layout Facilities Construction material Gender separation Lightness Ventilation Dampness Water System Sewage system Accessibility by handicaps/Elderly Safety from weather Safety from violence I. Do you think it needs maintenance?

II. What would you modify in the design? Why? III. Do you suffer from any chronic disease or health issues due to shelter condition?

Appendix

97

- Self-constructed Shelters Bad

Acceptable

Good

Notes

Area/person Layout Facilities Construction material Gender separation Lightness Ventilation Dampness Water System Sewage system Accessibility by handicaps/Elderly Safety from weather Safety from violence I. What is the roof material?

II. Do you think it needs maintenance?

III. What would you modify in the design? Why? IV. Do you suffer from any chronic disease or health issues due to shelter condition?

Appendix

98

Third Session: Infrastructure 1) While living here, have you faced shortage or cut-offs in water system? For how long did the cut-off continue before finding solution?

2) While living here, have you faced problems in sewage system? Explain.

3) How much water do you use every day? Is it enough? If not, how much do you pay for extra water?

4) What source of drinking water do you use? How much do you pay?

5) Do you describe the water in your house/area to be safe and clean? If not, have your health or people’ health around you been affected by contaminated water?

6) Can you describe your satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the waste management operation and frequency in the camp?

7) Is there anything that could be done to support the cleanliness of your neighborhood?

8) Do you describe your area as well connected with the road systems and nearby areas?

9) How do you describe the roads connections (houses connected with roads) and conditions (pavement, width, pedestrian, parking space, and lighting)?

10) Are there any car accidents in the camp? What do you suggest to avoid them?

11) In your opinion, have these systems improved or got worse over time. How? 1967 Roads Water System Sewage System Electricity

1997

2019

Appendix

99

Fourth Session: Integration with surroundings 1) Describe your relationship with surrounding neighborhoods if there is any.

2) Do you feel that you get the same services and rights as people living outside the camp?

Explain.

3) While living here, have you faced any sort of conflict (verbal/bad behaviors/‌) with surrounding areas? If yes, why?

4) In your opinion, does the situation regarding acceptance of refugees in the society have better/worse throughout the years?

1967

1997

Families’ Social Relations Community Social Relations Surroundings Social Relations Behaviors Violence 5) Can you locate spaces particularly causing conflicts on the map?

2019

Samar Manneh Manchester School of Architecture University of Manchester Manchester Metropolitan University MA Architecture and Urbanism 2019 - 2020