The Counter Terrorist Magazine - August/September 2014

P I P E L I N E T O J I HA D • M C D ONA L D ’S G A N G • I MI R AT K AV K A Z • W E A PO N I ZE D T ULEREMIA

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2014

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 4

IRANIAN ECONOMIC WARFARE

INTERNATIONAL

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Counter

The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2014 VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 4

COVER STORY:

29

CONTENTS

29

8

16

46

IRANIAN ECONOMIC WARFARE

By Kevin D. Freeman

FEATURES:

08

Firsthand: THE LAST DAYS OF THE MCDONALD’S GANG

By Larry Winston and Brian Davis

16

Case Study: JOHN WALKER LINDH AND THE PIPELINE TO JIHAD

By Walter Purdy TULAREMIA AS A WEAPON

By Jeffrey D Shuman

46

56

UMAROV’S LEGACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE IMIRAT KAVKAZ

By Michael S. Toney

DEPARTMENTS: 06

From the Editor

44

Book Review

69

Innovative Products

72

Training Review

We Don’t Negotiate Comrade J

Strategic Rifleman, LMT DMR Stock, Broco Jimmy Vehicle Engagement Tactics

Cover Photo: After the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-1981), the walls of the former US embassy were covered in anti-US-murals. Photo by: Phillip Maiwald

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 5

Counter The

FROM THE EDITOR:

We Don’t Negotiate

By Chris Graham

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 4

O

n June 30, 2009, U.S. Army Private First Class Robert Bergdahl deserted and fell into the hands of the Taliban near the town of Yahya Kheyl in Paktika Province, Afghanistan.

On May 31, 2014, The U.S. government traded five senior Taliban commanders in custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for Bergdahl. This appears to have been a trade that the Taliban has proposed for years. Based on what we have seen in the past, we can expect these five to receive a hero’s welcome, be promoted and resume killing Americans and our allies.

Does the timing of this trade have anything to do with the latest domestic scandal? As systemic corruption and incompetence at the Veteran’s Administration began to bubble to the surface, members of the public observed that Islamist terrorists in Guantanamo receive superior medical care to American combat veterans. Resistance to the unpopular “Affordable Care Act” stiffened as Americans gained their first glimpse of what government run healthcare looks like.

As coincidental as the timing of this trade may be, the opportunity now exists to determine the full details of Bergdahl’s time with the Taliban. Of course, there is plenty of downside to the terrorist trade. The U.S. government’s claim not to negotiate with terrorists is now dead, just like so many other standards eliminated in the last few years.

All adversaries in the world now have proof that if they can bring some leverage to bear against the U.S. government, they can get what they want. How many Americans do you think will be kidnapped in the coming year?

Semper Fidelis,

Chris Graham Editor, The Counter Terrorist www.30-10pistol.com

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2014 Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Production Assistants Giselle Manassa Melissa Berne Contributing Editors Kevin Freeman Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Tom Nypaver Dean Olson Steve Young Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Chris Bell Bell@homelandsecurityssi.com 305-632-2309 Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 103 Miami, Florida 33186

ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 103, Miami, Florida.

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Firsthand:

THE LAST DAYS OF THE MCDONALD’S GANG

8 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

Photo by: iboy daniel

By Larry Winston and Brian Davis

In August 1989, a series of McDonald’s fast food robberies took place in the city of Los Angeles. The suspects—three to four male Hispanics, wearing various types of facial covering and armed with blue steel revolvers and blue steel automatics—would force all employees into the rear portion of the store.

T

he suspects would then cover the victims’ eyes with duct tape and wrap duct tape around the victims’ wrists.

On several occasions, plastic ties were used to bind the victims’ hands. The suspects would have one of the victims open the safe. If the safe had an inner door and no key was available, the suspects would force the door open with a hammer and chisel.

Most of the robberies occurred in the early morning hours, usually on a Monday with most of the weekend receipts in the safe. As the robberies continued into September and October of 1989, it became apparent that the suspects were familiar with McDonald’s operations due to some of the questions that they asked employees present during the

robbery. The suspects would also take keys from the employees and shut off alarms, open locked doors, and open safe doors. On several occasions, the suspects would follow the last employee leaving the business at closing (presumably the manager) to their home, kidnap them at gunpoint, return the victim to the business, and force the victim to open the store.

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 9

McDonald’s corporate security personnel contacted the L.A.P.D. Robbery/Homicide Division in late September 1989. McDonald’s security reported that two former employees were thought to be involved in as many as 25 robberies. Both had been former assistant managers at various stores before leaving the company in 1988. Many of the stores where these two men had worked had theft, burglary and robbery problems.

One of the men was administered a polygraph. The polygraph examiner determined the man to be deceptive, giving conflicting statements.

In mid-January 1990, Robbery/ Homicide contacted the Special Investigation Section, (SIS), with the above information. They provided photos of the two former employees along with a residence address for one of the men.

Surveillance was conducted by SIS on six separate occasions with no unusual activity noted until February.

On February 11, 1990, at approximately 2200 hours, SIS surveillance observed three male Hispanics (two formerly identified and a third unknown), exit a home, walk to a white Ford Granada parked in front of the location, and remove two large black duffle bags from the trunk. The suspects placed the bags into the trunk of a black Ford Thunderbird. All three then went back inside the home.

A short time later, four suspects exited the residence, entered the black Thunderbird, drove for approximately 40 minutes, and entered a McDonald’s parking lot located in the Sunland/ Tujunga area of Los Angeles. The suspects drove around to the rear of the restaurant and exited the property. They continued to drive slowly through the residential area located just north of the McDonald’s for 15 minutes, finally parking on a side street facing south, approximately 200 yards north of the business with a view of the front of the restaurant. The vehicle remained there for approximately 1-½ hours. During that period, SIS detectives on foot observed three suspects go to the trunk of the T-bird, put on additional clothing, and re-enter their vehicle.

Additionally, Detective Larry Winston reported seeing the driver using binoculars to observe the front of the restaurant.

10 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

SIS trains to react to the actions of the suspects it follows, whether in a vehicle or on foot. In this case, it was apparent that the suspect’s actions were indicative of “casing” the location. The unit could not be sure that a robbery would occur, however. It has been our experience that many suspects perform a “dry run” and may not be prepared to commit the crime; therefore foot surveillance becomes an essential part of a successful observation in order to determine if a crime is occurring or if an arrest needs to be made.

At approximately 0030 hours, 12 February 1990, the suspect vehicle

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relocated, parking facing westbound at the north curb of the major street. The vehicle was now parked directly across the street from the front doors of the restaurant, approximately 50 yards away.

A short time later, SIS detectives observed one suspect exit the vehicle, cross the major street, walk to the Northwest corner of the restaurant, look into a window, and walk to the east parking lot of the restaurant looking all around. He then returned to his vehicle, entering the passenger side.

Approximately 10 minutes later, two suspects exited their vehicle, repeating the previous actions. Both suspects returned to their vehicle. Approximately 30 minutes later, SIS detectives observed the suspects’ vehicle trunk open, followed by three suspects exiting their vehicle and reaching into the trunk area. The three suspects walked across the street to the restaurant, one positioned at the west

doors, out of the footman’s view, two at the rear service door. SIS detectives were on foot at various locations so as not to lose track of the suspect’s actions.

Our primary concern was the two suspects at the rear service doors. In prior robberies the suspects had waited for the last employee to lock up, leave using the service doors, and then force the employee back inside to open the safe.

The driver now exited his vehicle and walked to the west side of the business while periodically looking up and down the major street.

SIS field supervisor Brian Davis was monitoring the divisional radio frequency and reported that a radio call “211 (robbery) suspects outside the McDonald’s” was just broadcast to patrol units in the area. Rather than have uniformed officers respond to a robbery call with plainclothes officers already present, Detective Davis advised

12 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

communications to cancel the uniformed response and that plainclothes detectives were already at the scene. Shortly thereafter, SIS detectives observed two suspects in the lobby of the restaurant.

It was later determined that the suspects at the west door used a coat hanger to open one of the doors by pulling down on the door’s panic bar. This had never been reported as a method of entry, and if it had been seen by the SIS detectives and had they had time to move in, we would have made an arrest prior to their entry. One of the suspects now inside opened the service door at the rear. Now, all four suspects were in the business.

Moments later, the driver returned to his vehicle’s trunk via the west door, removed a small toolbox, and re-entered the business. SIS detectives on foot closest to the restaurant reported hearing loud hammering noises coming from within the building. Detectives then observed the interior restaurant lights go off in a systematic pattern as the driver exited the business, placed the tool box and a dark bag into the trunk of his vehicle, entered the driver’s side of the vehicle, started his

An out-of-service Gold Line train stationed at the Atlantic station, East Los Angeles. Photo by: Tim Adams vehicle, and turned its lights on. Seconds later the remaining three suspects were observed running back to their vehicle.

As the suspects were preparing to drive away, SIS Detectives performed a vehicle containment technique to prevent the vehicle from driving away. This technique is designed to surprise the suspects with overwhelming manpower and weaponry while they are contained in their vehicle.

SIS detectives were armed with S&W 4506 .45s, 18" Remington 870s, and M1/A4 rifles with ACOG optics.

A minimum of four detectives are required, and based on circumstances as many as eight men have been used for this technique. Using and perfecting this technique has resulted in 97% of all vehicle containments conducted with a safe arrest and no shots fired. It has been demonstrated that once suspects enter their vehicle to drive off, they tend to relax for just a moment, believing that they are about to get away with their crime, and they can be isolated from the majority of bystanders. Timing is critical, though:

arrive too soon and the suspects will flee on foot, creating a foot pursuit and a possible running gun battle. Arrive too late, and the suspects will have driven off.

On the morning of 12 February, several of the responding detectives observed the suspect in the left rear seat point a gun in the direction of one of the officers. Detectives opened fire.

Three suspects died, and the fourth was critically wounded.

Detectives entered the McDonald’s and rescued the manager, who had been

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 13

Detectives entered the McDonald’s and rescued the manager, who had been bound and gagged in the locked office area.

bound and gagged in the locked office area. The property from the robbery was recovered from the trunk of the suspect vehicle along with two replica .45 pellet guns. Two additional pellet guns were found in possession of two of the deceased suspects.

The fourth suspect survived and was ultimately convicted for robbery and the

death of his three co-suspects as a result of their actions, which caused our officerinvolved shooting. No detectives were injured. It is interesting to note that this is not the first time SIS detectives have been confronted by suspects armed with pellet guns. The psychology of suspects who bring a pellet gun to a gunfight is itself a subject that has been written about many times.

It is also worth noting that surveillance of suspects often does not allow detectives the opportunity to arrest the suspects prior to the crime being committed.

Tactical concerns based on distance and locations of the suspects (in this case spread out over a large parking lot) may dictate that it would be safer for all involved, including victims, for officers to allow the suspects to commit the crime, let them leave the premises, and then make the arrest away from victims and bystanders. It can be extremely dangerous to allow uniformed officers to respond to a location where plainclothes detectives are already on scene in a fluid situation.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mr. Winston’s 30 years of service with the Los Angeles Police Department includes 17 years with the Special Investigation Section (SIS) as a Detective Supervisor. He also served six years in a deep, long-term undercover investigation of terrorist organizations, and today provides instruction as a consultant (www.train2tail.com).

Mr. Davis’ 35-year career with the Los Angeles Police Department includes 30 years in criminal surveillance and crime scene analysis with 19 years as team supervisor, including nine years of homicide investigations and general crime investigations. He served as supervisor of the Special Investigation Section (SIS), and now provides

14 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

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Case Study:

JOHN WALKER LINDH

AND THE PIPELINE TO JIHAD “What’s your name? Who brought you here?

How did you get here? Why are you here?”

Mike Spann, November 25, 2001

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Photo by: LoggaWiggler

By Walter Purdy

Thirteen years ago in the southern courtyard of Qala-i-Jangi prison in Northern Afghanistan, Mike Spann, a CIA case officer, asked these questions of a captured fighter.

Spann thought the long-haired, pale-skinned prisoner wearing a British military-style sweater might be a member of the IRA.

L

ittle did he know that the man he was attempting to question was an American from Marin County, California.2 At no time did this trained fighter answer Spann or tell him he was an American fighting with the Taliban.

John Walker Lindh was born in

Washington, DC on February 9, 1981.

As a child his family lived in middle income neighborhoods in Takoma Park and Silver Springs. The family moved to San Anselmo, California when he was ten. Six years later he converted to Islam, began wearing Middle Eastern clothing,

John Walker Lindh in custody.

Photo by: American military personnel

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 17

A registration form for Harkat’s Khalid bin Whalid training camp. The form says ‘‘Jihad’’ on the top of the page, and common Islamic prayers cover the group’s seal. The form asks for a recruit’s name, age, nationality, religious education, code name, skills, languages, military experience and blood type. Photo by: Unknown

and started using the name Suleyman al-Lindh. His family afforded him the opportunity to travel to Yemen to study Arabic and Islam.3 Lindh spent time studying at al Iman University (Faith University) in Sanaa, Yemen, operated

by Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani,

18 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

a supporter of Usama bin Laden.4 In December 2000, Lindh traveled to Bannu, Pakistan to study at the Madrassa al Arabia. In May 2001, Lindh left the madrassa and attended a training camp run by Harakat ul-Mujahidin. He then attended al-Qaeda’s al Farooq training camp.5 After meeting Usama bin Laden he fought for the Taliban in Northern Afghanistan until the group he was with surrendered.

Mike Spann would become the first American casualty in Afghanistan not long after questioning Lindh. Taliban prisoners rose up against their Northern Alliance guards and started an uprising, gaining control of weapons and fighting for a week. On December 2, 2001, Robert Pelton, a CNN journalist, was informed that 18 fighters from the Qala-i-Jangi uprising were taken to the hospital and one of them was an American. Surprised by this news, Pelton and a Special Forces medic raced over to the hospital and discovered an injured John Walker Lindh.6 Pelton’s video of his interaction with Lindh was the first that anyone knew that there was an American fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Robert Pelton captured Lindh’s mindset when he asked “Was this the right cause and the right place?” Lindh responded, “This is exactly what I thought it would be.”7 After enduring a week of bombardment and fighting, that was where John Walker Lindh wanted to be. Lindh was not the first American to convert to Islam, travel to Afghanistan and train in the camps. I have had the opportunity to spend time with the first American who travelled to Afghanistan and trained in the Khalid bin Walid camp.8 Aqil Collins, a young convert to Islam from California, shared a tent in the training camp with Omar Sheikh, who would later kidnap American journalist Danny Pearl. After

Aqil completed his training he traveled to Chechnya and waged jihad against the Russians. Aqil’s jihad was cut short when he stepped on a landmine and lost his right leg.9 The questions that Mike Spann asked John Walker Lindh are the same questions that need to be asked today of Americans waging jihad in places like Somalia, Pakistan, Yemen, and Syria. Often a recruiter will manipulate, motivate and radicalize Americans to travel abroad and fight jihad. Other times, individuals will radicalize themselves, often using the Internet to accomplish this task. More often than not, there are others who participate in the recruiting, radicalization, and raising money for travel to train for jihad.

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Often a recruiter will manipulate, motivate and radicalize Americans to travel abroad and fight jihad.

Aqil Collins, a young convert to Islam from California. Photo by: Dominique Mainon

to Mogadishu.10 Much of the recruitment took place at the Abubakar As-Saddique Islamic Center and the Cedar Square public housing complex known as “Little Mogadishu.” Before departing, the individuals would listen to Anwar al Awlaki’s lecture Constants on the Path of Jihad.11 Others raised money to pay for travel and weapons for the fighters. Some went door to door collecting money under false pretenses from Somali-Americans, while others donated funds to purchase weapons and provide for fighters.

20 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

In 2007, the first group of radicalized Somali-Americans traveled to fight with al Shabaab (which means “the youth” in Arabic). Shirwa Ahmed was part of the first group of Americans that traveled from Minneapolis. On October 28, 2008, Ahmed became the first known suicide bomber from America when he drove a Toyota truck packed with explosives into the Puntland Intelligence Service (PIS) compound in Bosaso, Puntland.12 It appears that on September 17, 2009, Omar Mohamud, from Seattle, became

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The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 21

the second American suicide bomber.

Driving a stolen white United Nations vehicle, he was able to detonate at the AMISOM Headquarters at the airport.12 On May 30, 2011, another American from the Twin Cities, Farah Mohamed Beledi, armed with a suicide bomb vest, was killed before he was able to detonate at a government checkpoint. Abdisalan Hussein Ali’s family had fled the fighting in Somalia and spent time living in a refugee camp in Kenya. The family was

22 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

able to finally move to Seattle in 2000.

They later moved to Minneapolis, where Ali graduated from Edison High School, the home of the “Tommies.” The former University of Minnesota student became the third known American suicide bomber on October 29, 2011.13 Since 2006, over 100 individuals have traveled to Somalia from America to wage jihad. Probably the most noted American to join al Shabaab was Omar Hammami. Hammami went from the Jubilee City of Daphne, Alabama, to waging jihad in Somalia. Growing up, Omar and his sister were raised as Baptists like his mother and attended the Perdido Baptist Church. Omar played soccer, had a basketball hoop in the driveway, and listened to Nirvana.

Omar converted to Islam and went to

Toronto, where he married a Somalian wife. In 2006, he arrived in Somalia and quickly rose in importance within al Shabaab due to his computer skills and his ability to put together media and propaganda. Omar, known by his kunya Abu Mansoor al Amriki, came to the attention of two al-Qaeda operatives, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan.14 Under their leadership, Abu Mansoor al Amriki put out a number of propaganda videos and conducted a number of interviews for al Shabaab.

Many of his efforts led to recruitment of a number of English speaking fighters.

Abu Mansoor al Amriki wrote about his life and journey to Somalia in The Story of an American Jihadi: Part One.15 He writes of his conversion to Islam and how he “began reading more Salafi books and

articles.”16 During his time in Somalia with al Shabaab, the American fighter from Daphne, Alabama had contact with numerous foreign fighters. He stated that “those Minnesota Brothers have almost all left their mark on the Jihad and many have received martyrdom; while the rest are still waiting.”17 Disputes with the leadership of al Shabaab led to a number of false reports of his death. But Ahmed Abdi Godane was on a mission to remove anyone who questioned his authority within al Shabaab. On September 12, 2013, Omar Hammami was killed along with a British jihadi, Usama al Britani. From Hammami’s Twitter account came the following: “We confirm the martyrdom of Omar Hammami in the morning of Thur 12 2013.”18 A fellow jihadi with access to Hammami’s Twitter account tweeted that Omar “was killed because he refused to bow down to Godane’s deviation from shariah.”19 Unfortunately, the list of Americans who have traveled to fight jihad continues to grow. Robert Mueller, the former director of the FBI, speaking about Americans who had gone to Somalia to fight, stated, “it raises the question of whether these young men will one day come home, and, if so, what might they undertake here.”20 Today, Americans can use social media to gain access to information and “follow” any number of jihadis who are fighting in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and Syria. Terrorist groups use English language social media to recruit and radicalize potential American fighters. We have seen a number of American fighters who have taken selfies and created digital propaganda of themselves posing with various weapons on international battlefields. These Internet-based technologies are just some of the tools that are being used by terrorist groups to recruit and radicalize Americans.

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 23

Since the Syria conflict escalated in 2011, over 75 Americans have traveled to fight in Syria. Nicole Lynn Mansfield, a convert to Islam, from Flint, Michigan, was killed in Syria last year. Eric Harroun, a former soldier from Phoenix, Arizona, fought in Syria. On May 25, 2014, a video was posted by Jabhat al-Nusrait that announced Abu Hurayra al Amriki had carried out a suicide bombing attack on Syrian forces in Idlib. The video showed Abusalha loading a truck with explosives and driving off to conduct the attack. Moner Mohammad Abusalha had taken the kunya Abu Hurayra and now has the distinction of being the first known American suicide bomber in Syria. He grew up in a gated community in Vero Beach playing basketball.

24 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

Today, the same questions Mike Spann asked 13 years ago might have been asked of this Florida native, or of the Virginia Five who went to Pakistan for jihad, or the Lackawanna Six, or those who travel to Yemen, Somalia, Syria, and Iraq to wage jihad.

Who brought you here? How did you get here? Why are you here?�21

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Walter Purdy is the President of the Terrorism Research Center, Inc., a Virginia-based company that provides cutting-edge training and research on terrorism, counterinsurgency, and homeland security issues. His book, Blue Mako Five: Exploits in Counter Terrorism will be published this fall.

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ENDNOTES

Transcript of Robert Young Pelton Video Qala-i-Jangi Prison Uprising and John Walker Lindh Interview.

8 Aukai “Aqil” Collins, Interview by Author, Phoenix, AZ, January 28-29, 2002.

9Aukai “Aqil” Collins, Interview by Author, Washington, DC, January 9, 2003.

10 FBI Press Release, Minneapolis Man Pleads Guilty to Terror Offense, July 18, 2011.

11 Interview with Unnamed Law Enforcement Officer, Minneapolis, MN, June 8, 2010.

12 TRC Study of Significant Worldwide Suicide Bombings, p. 37, March 2013.

13 Ibid. p.42.

14 Elliott, Andrea, The Jihadist Next Door, New York Times, January 27, 2010 7

Transcript of Robert Young Pelton Video Qala-i-Jangi Prison Uprising and John Walker Lindh Interview 2 Robert Young Pelton, Interview by Author, May 2006 3 Terrorism Research Center Inc., TRC Report: The Path of John Walker Lindh From California to Jihad, March 24, 2012 4 Timothy Roche, Brian Bennett, Anne Berryman, Hilary Hylton, Siobhan Morrissey and Amany Radwan, Time, The Making of John Walker Lindh, October 7, 2007 5 U.S. Department of Justice Indictment: United States v. John Phillip Walker Lindh: February 5, 2002 6 Robert Young Pelton, Interview by Author, May 2006.

1

Abu Mansuur al-Amriiki, The Story of An American Jihaadi Part One, accessed at http://azelin.files.wordpress. com/2012/05/omar-hammami-abc5abmane1b9a3c5abr-al-amrc4abkc4ab22the-story-of-an-americanjihc481dc4ab-part-122.pdf 16 Ibid, p. 18.

17 Ibid, p. 122.

18 Unknown Person Tweeted from Abum@abumamerican (September 15, 2013) retrieved June 6, 2014 from https://twitter.com/abuamerican.

19 Ibid, September 28 2013.

20 Johnston, David, Militants Drew Recruits in US, FBI Says, New York Times, February 23, 2009.

21 Transcript of Robert Young Pelton Video Qala-i-Jangi Prison Uprising and John Walker Lindh Interview 15

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The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 27

IRANIAN ECONOMIC WARFARE President Barack Obama talks with President Hassan Rouhani of Iran during a phone call in the Oval Office, Sept. 27, 2013. Photo by: Pete Souza 28 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

by Kevin D. Freeman

The United States has been in an economic war with the Islamic Republic of Iran in one form or another since the 1979 hostage crisis.1 This war intensified in 2007 when President George W. Bush ordered sanctions designed to force Iran to give up nuclear ambitions.2

T

he sanctions were increased multiple times under President Obama. According to The New American: “David Axelrod, senior advisor to the president, said on ABC’s This Week on March 4th of this year [2012] that the president had

succeeded in “bringing the entire world together over the last few years with the most withering economic sanctions that have ever been administered against any country.”

On August 1st, both the House and Senate approved even more

sanctions, which the president signed into law.3” There should be little doubt as to whether the sanctions were serious or powerful. Yet, there should be substantial doubt with regard to whether or not the sanctions have been effective in terms

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 29

Vice President George Bush and other VIP's wait to welcome the former hostages from Iran home. Photo by: Templeton

Recently freed Americans held hostage by Iran disembark Freedom One, an Air Force VC-137 Stratoliner aircraft, upon their arrival. Photo by: Don Koralewski

30 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

of achieving their primary objective.

In fact, some observers believe that the Iranians matched the United States in the economic war, albeit at great cost.

We threw everything at them, inflicting “a currency collapse, hyperinflation, and a bank run and… caused a scarcity of food, gasoline and consumer goods, through the expedient of cutting Iran out of the global payments system.”4 Despite this, we have seen no real evidence of slowdown in Iranian nuclear development and the government remains as defiant as ever. Even if the Obama administration would like to credit the sanctions process for bringing Iran into negotiations,

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta tells the audience at the Saban Forum, held at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D. C. on Dec. 2, 2011, that the United States and its allies and partners in the international community must do everything possible to make sure Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon. Photo by: R. D. Ward/Released the truth may be much less flattering.

According to the Los Angeles Times: “Sanctions did not bring Iran to the table. Not only Iranian officials but other undeniably objective observers concur that the reason negotiations have commenced is emphatically not because Iran could endure the pain no longer.

‘Total nonsense,’ scoffed former U.S. Ambassador William Miller when I put the question to him.

Miller has closely monitored Iranian affairs since he was stationed in that country in the 1960s, and has close contacts with the current leadership.

“Sanctions only made them more

defiant,” and they always had ways of getting around them. The deal that’s being discussed now is almost exactly the same one the Iranians offered back in 2003—full transparency on their nuclear program, but recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium.5”

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 31

Iran concluded negotiations about nuclear capabilities on November 2013. Photo by: U.S. Department of State from United States

Iranian Nuclear Negotiators. Photo by: Dragan Tatic This is one of the great untold stories of the past few years, at least untold in the American media. Iran, with an economy equal to a little over 3% of that of the United States,6 and roughly the size of New Jersey7, went toe-to-toe against the

economic might of the United States and remained standing. The failure to provide a knockout punch, however, risks damaging American credibility at a crucial time when financial warfare and sanctions appear to be the only

32 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

instruments of power that the current administration is willing to deploy in an increasingly complex world.8 The United States backed down on the sanctions and accepted a 10-year-old Iranian proposal that had been repeatedly rejected by both

Anti-aircraft guns guarding Natanz Nuclear Facility, Iran. Photo by: Hamed Saber Presidents Bush and Obama. We loosened sanctions without getting anything new in return. Quoting James Rickards, author of “The Death of Money”: “Iran had fought the United States to a standstill in its financial war,

despite enormous disruption to the Iranian economy. The U.S.-Iranian financial war of 2012–13 illustrates how nations that could not stand up to the United States militarily could prove a tough match when the

battlefield is financial or electronic.9” To be clear, there has been considerable collateral damage inflicted upon the Iranian people, but not all of Iran has suffered. In fact, the leadership, especially the “supreme leader” Khamenei and his

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 33

Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine (2014-03-04). Photo by: The Presidential Press and Information Office

supporters, actually found ways to enrich themselves and further consolidate power during the sanctions.10 One Reuter’s estimate suggests that a single entity controlled by Khamenei has a value approaching $100 billion.11 The wealth is largely based on seized assets, some of which were achieved under the cover of sanctions.12 The holdings are largely secret and subject almost exclusively to Khamenei’s control, thus wielding tremendous power and influence even in a country potentially rocked by division.

To understand the context, the roughly $95 billion of wealth controlled by

Khamenei is about 40% greater than the total annual oil exports from Iran. It also is a powerful base of funds from which retaliatory economic warfare might be launched. Some estimate this to be far in excess of the wealth controlled by the Shah at his peak prior to the 1979 revolution that deposed him.13

HOW IRAN SURVIVED SANCTIONS The simple answer to how Iran could survive under sanctions is that they learned to operate without using the

34 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

dollar. By instituting new payment arrangements as well as utilizing centuries-old mechanisms, Iran found a way to buy and sell without access to American-controlled systems.14 They used gold,15 barter,16 non-dollar currencies, and hawala17 (an ancient Arabic method of transferring funds) to circumvent controls. According to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (as quoted in The Cornerstone Report): “The hawala system can be utilized by criminal organizations to transfer funds in or out of a country with little or no detection

by law enforcement. Hawalas allow the transfer of millions, if not billions of dollars tracked only by a secret code and disposable scraps of paper. Transfers of money take place based on communications between members of a network of hawaladars…18” Oil for gold also became commonplace in significant transactions with Turkey and India, among others. The growth in gold trade became so significant that the United States attempted to enforce a gold ban on Iran in July 2013.19 When the gold trade tightened, Iran began processing sales in other non-dollar currencies. Although less convenient than the dollar-based system, it was ultimately effective and exposed the reality that there are other currencies in the world. In some cases, it actually provided a convenience to not have to convert currencies back to dollars for trade.

The Iranians also worked through Chinese and Russian banks that served as fronts for them to the international system. Iran had used Western banks for this purpose during the Bush administration, but the banks were caught and had to pay stiff penalties.20 Chinese banks supported some $40 billion in transactions, largely avoiding the political pressure because of the political complications for the U.S. Russian, Turkish, and Indian banks also supported Iranian oil sales in spite of U.S. sanctions.21 Even British banks had found it difficult to turn down the profits associated with helping Iran circumvent American sanctions. Standard Chartered was responsible for $250 billion in transactions, and when caught paid over $300 million in fines.22 Interestingly,

British resentment of American sanctions can be summed up in the following email comment quoted from Reuters: “You fucking Americans. Who are you to tell us that we’re not going to deal with Iranians.23” It’s one thing to quietly attempt to go around the sanctions. It’s quite another, however, to boldly reject them. Yet, that is precisely what Vladimir Putin’s Russia did in a multi-billion dollar deal announced in advance of the Winter Olympics.24 This was perhaps foreshadowing of how Putin would respond to American complaints after seizing Crimea.

Even after the negotiated agreement allowed increased Iranian oil shipments, the Islamic Republic has found creative ways to blow past the limits.25 There seems to be little, if any interest in abiding by the watered-down agreements.

IMPLICATIONS GOING FORWARD One of the consequences has been the exposure of American weakness. Once Iran demonstrated that it could survive, despite serious hardship, without the dollar-based system, others took notice.

Many accurately expected the sanctions approach to fail or at least fall far short of its objectives. I made the following observation in my blog on February 22, 2012: “The economic weapon the government is using against Iran is sadly exposing our greatest vulnerability. In essence, to punish Iran for continued nuclear development, we have threatened to deprive them of access to the U.S. dollar. That is a serious threat and has serious implications for the domestic Iranian economy. The

The problem is that at the end of the day, the world may prefer to have their oil rather than our paper.

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 35

problem is that at the end of the day, the world may prefer to have their oil rather than our paper. Certainly that is what the market is telling us as the price of oil in dollars has been rising.

Given the global situation, do we remain so arrogant as to believe that the world prefers American paper to oil from any source? At a minimum, we know that the amount of American paper available (whether in the form of currency or Treasury debt) has and continues to grow exponentially while the amount of available oil reserves are reasonably stagnant (at least by comparison).

Add to this the fact that oil has enormous use and the demand for it will grow markedly over the long term. As for American paper? Nearly every major nation of the world including our best trading partners have begun to question (some publicly, some privately) its longterm usefulness.26” Frighteningly, I wasn’t alone in this observation. In fact, it almost seemed as if the defeat of sanctions was part of a larger plan being instituted with the

involvement of Russia, China, and the BRICS nations to de-Americanize the world and destroy the dollar.27 Putin has long been close to Iran and sympathized with their position regarding dollarbased attacks.28 When the United States cut Iran off from dollar-based transactions, the Russians helped build alternative payment systems that in turn undermined the dollar. Then, when sanctions were placed against Russia, Putin requested Iranian assistance in circumventing them.29 The Islamic world was also watching closely as sanctions were imposed, with some expecting their failure to expose American weakness. Consider this from February 2012, “How Iran Changed the World” in al-Akhbar, a daily Arabiclanguage newspaper: “Imagine: Iran stops selling oil to the EU; China tells the US to take a hike on currency values; India starts trading in large quantities of rupees; Russia’s central bank becomes a depot for holding dollars that don’t need to pass through New York; the creation of a global payment messaging system competing

36 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

with SWIFT. Now imagine that a combination of actions—triggered only by an attempt to circumvent some really very silly sanctions—can suddenly unleash some unexpected possibilities that were beyond the realm of imagination a mere few years ago.

Imagine the emergence, say, of regional economic hubs, powered by the currencies of the local hegemonic powers, where bartering natural resources, goods and services becomes as commonplace as transactions involving currency transfers. Because of the frailty inherent in dealing with these new local currencies and a bartering system, nations tend to trade most with those closest to them in geography and culture. Shocking?

Maybe not. Sometimes it just takes a need for change... and a handy tipping point.

“This is not the time to fan the flames,” someone should have told the United States. “You and your pals are sitting in a jalopy tottering on the cliff’s edge — why

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risk making moves now?” they should have warned. “Be a little less arrogant”…

But Washington is absolutely, irrevocably, dangerously fixated on showing Iran who’s boss, and spends a good part of every day trying to tighten the screws around the Islamic Republic. For the most part, the US’s pursuit of this dubious objective has instead stripped it of the vital political tools it once wielded.

No more UN Security Council resolutions, no more unscrutinized military adventures. The only thing left is the nefarious tentacles of the United States Department of Treasury and its financial weapons.30 Unfortunately, the “Almighty Dollar” has been shown to be mortal after all. Sanctions were unable to achieve their objective and the world has seen it. With the Russian conflict over the Ukraine, the issue has become increasingly serious.”

CYBER BATTLES Of course, sanctions, oil sales, and currency battles are just part of the

economic war already underway. Iran has borrowed from the Unrestricted Warfare playbook and created combination efforts built around a cyber strategy.31 The Iranians coordinated specific attacks directly targeting American banks as retaliation for economic sanctions.

Even the largest banks were found to be vulnerable to disruption and the tactics were beyond what had been previously experienced.32 This shouldn’t be a surprise. Iran has built a very sophisticated hacking network. According to Foreign Policy: “In March 2012, Ayatollah Ali Khameini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, publicly announced the creation [of ] a new Supreme Council of Cyberspace to oversee the defense of the Islamic republic’s computer networks and develop new ways of infiltrating or attacking the computer networks of its enemies. Less than two years later, security experts and U.S. intelligence, officials are alarmed by how quickly Iran has managed to develop its cyber warfare capabilities—and by how much it’s willing to use them.33”

Anti-American mural in the Iranian capital Tehran. Photo by: Ali Abbas

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The Iranians have become a “firsttier cyber power.”34 They have launched sophisticated attacks against military websites. It took four months and $10 million to clear Iranian penetration from the Navy Marine Corps Intranet.35 The Iranians also penetrated major energy networks and control systems with the potential to damage or sabotage pipelines, energy distribution, and the electric grid.36 A disruption in any of these areas has the potential to create catastrophic economic and human costs.

Iranian cyber efforts have also targeted U.S. officials to seek intelligence, undermine sanctions and detect vulnerabilities. This is an extraordinarily broad effort: utilizing Facebook, fake emails, password theft, and other clandestine tactics to augment more direct attacks.37 Iran has developed a cyber army intended to win 21st Century wars. It is also responding to the cyber capabilities reportedly demonstrated by the United States and Israel that disabled 1,000 centrifuges used to enrich uranium: the so-called Stuxnet virus attack.38 The Iranians adapted to alleged U.S. government attacks and developed their own capabilities with frightening speed.

THIS IS WAR The Iranian leadership has made it clear that it is preparing for a multi-phased war with the United States using physical, economic and cyber means. After decades of Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks, there is now sufficient evidence to conclude that the war is underway in the economic and cyber realms as well.

The American reduction of sanctions in response to a promise of transparency regarding nuclear development is only

a slight detour in direction, not a pathway to ending conflict. We cannot be complacent. The government of Iran was not beaten by sanctions and remains as defiant as ever. It was just February when the “supreme leader” Khamenei openly called for his cyber hacking units to prepare for war.39 By May, despite the promise of eased tensions, Khamenei was calling for renewed jihad “until America was no more.”40 We face a number of national security challenges. Economic war with Iran is certainly among the most serious.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Freeman (CFA) is the author of Secret Weapon: How Economic Terrorism Brought Down the U.S. Stock Market (www.secretweapon.org) and Game Plan: Your Secret Weapon to Protect Yourself From Economic Attack (Regnery, 2014). He authors the blog: www. globaleconomicwarfare.com.

ENDNOTES “UN Sanctions Against Iran.” Global Policy Forum. GPF, n.d. Web. June 2014. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/securitycouncil/index-of-countries-on-thesecurity-council-agenda/iran.html>.

2 Mohammed, Arshad, Justyna Pawlak, and Warren Strobel. “Special Report: Inside the West’s economic war with Iran.” Reuters. N.p., 18 Dec. 2012. Web. June 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/ article/2012/12/28/us-iran-sanctionsidUSBRE8BR04620121228 >.

3 Kenny, Jack. “Sanctions: The Economic War on Iran.” The New American. N.p., 13 Nov. 2012. Web. June 2014. <http://www.thenewamerican. com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/13486sanctions-the-economic-war-on-iran >.

1

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Wiggin, Addison. “How Gold Helped Iran Withstand U.S. Financial Fury.”

Forbes. N.p., 23 May 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ greatspeculations/2014/05/23/how-goldhelped-iran-withstand-u-s-financial-fury/ >.

5 Cockburn, Andrew. “Why sanctions don’t really work.” Los Angeles Times.

N.p., 19 Mar. 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://articles.latimes.com/2014/ mar/19/opinion/la-oe-cockburnsanctions-20140320 >.

6 “Iran.” The World Bank. N.p., n.d. Web. June 2014. <http://www.worldbank.org/ en/country/iran >.

7 “Current-Dollar GDP by State, 20092012.” US Bureau of Economic Analysis.

N.p., 6 June 2013. Web. June 2014. <http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/ industry/gsp/gsp_statec.xls >.

8 Griffin, Christopher. “The War of Wills Between U.S. and Iran.” Real Clear World. N.p., 8 Feb. 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://www.realclearworld.com/ articles/2014/02/08/the_war_of_wills_ between_us_and_iran_110280.html>.

9 Wiggin, Addison. “How Gold Helped Iran Withstand U.S. Financial Fury.”

Forbes. N.p., 23 May 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ greatspeculations/2014/05/23/how-goldhelped-iran-withstand-u-s-financial-fury/ >.

10 “To expand Khamenei’s grip on the economy, Iran stretched its laws.” Reuter Investigates. Reuters, 13 Nov. 2013. Web. June 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/iran/#article/part3>.

11 Stecklow, Steve, Babak Dehghanpisheh, and Yeganeh Torbati.

“Khamenei’s conglomerate thrived as sanctions squeezed Iran.” Reuters Investigates. Reuters, 12 Nov. 2013. Web. 4

June 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/iran/#article/part2>.

12S tecklow, Steve, Babak Dehghanpisheh, and Yeganeh Torbati.

“Khamenei controls massive financial empire built on property seizures.” Reuters Investigates. Reuters, 11 Nov. 2013. Web. June 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/ investigates/iran/#article/part1 >.

June 2014. <http://www.forbes.com/ sites/greatspeculations/2014/05/23/howgold-helped-iran-withstand-u-s-financialfury/>.

20 Bajaj, Vikas, and John Eligon.

“Iran Moved Billions via U.S. Banks.”

The New York Times. N.p., 9 Jan.

2009. Web. June 2014. <http://www. nytimes.com/2009/01/10/business/ worldbusiness/10bank.html?_r=0 >.

21 Wouk, Joseph. “Iran’s $40 billion Transfers to Chinese Banks Sidestep Financial Isolation.” A Sclerotic Goes to War. Wordpress, 23 Mar. 2012. Web. June

13 IBID

“Iranian banks bypass electronic money payment systems.” Gulf News. Al Nisr, 10 Feb. 2013. Web. 9 June 2014. <http://gulfnews.com/business/banking/ iranian-banks-bypass-electronic-moneypayment-systems-1.1144334 >.

15 Wiggin, Addison. “How Gold Helped Iran Withstand U.S. Financial Fury.” Forbes. N.p., 23 May 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ greatspeculations/2014/05/23/how-goldhelped-iran-withstand-u-s-financial-fury/ >.

16 Saul, Jonathan, and Parisa Hafezi.

“Exclusive: Iran, Russia negotiating big oil-for-goods deal.” Reuters. N.p., 10 Jan. 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://www. reuters.com/article/2014/01/10/us-iranrussia-oil-idUSBREA090DK20140110 >.

17 The Editors. “Global Insider: Iran’s Informal Financial Sector Has Boomed Under Sanctions.” World Politics Review.

N.p., 31 Jan. 2013. Web. June 2014. <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ trend-lines/12681/global-insider-iran-sinformal-financial-sector-has-boomedunder-sanctions >.

18 “Hawalas.” The Cornerstone Report.

N.p., n.d. Web. June 2014. <http://www. ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/ cornerstone/cornerstone7-2.pdf>.

19 Wiggin, Addison. “How Gold Helped Iran Withstand U.S. Financial Fury.” Forbes. N.p., 23 May 2014. Web. 14

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The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 39

2014. <http://warsclerotic.wordpress. com/2012/03/23/irans-40-billiontransfers-to-chinese-banks-sidestepfinancial-isolation/ >.

22 Rappaport, Liz. “Bank Settles Iran Money Case.” The Wall Street Journal.

N.p., 15 Aug. 2012. Web. June 2014. <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1 00008723963904443181045775893804 27559426>.

23 Salmon, Felix. “Counterparties: “You f—ing Americans. Who are you to tell us that we’re not going to deal with Iranians.”.” Reuters. N.p., 6 Aug. 2012. Web. June 2014. < http://blogs. reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/08/06/ counterparties-you-fucking-americanswho-are-you-to-tell-us-thatwe%E2%80%99re-not-going-to-dealwith-iranians/>.

24 Saul, Jonathan, and Parisa Hafezi.

“Exclusive: Iran, Russia negotiating big oil-for-goods deal.” Reuters. N.p., 10 Jan. 2014. Web. June 2014. < http://www. reuters.com/article/2014/01/10/us-iranrussia-oil-idUSBREA090DK20140110 >.

25 Caruso-Cabrera, Michelle. “Iranian oil exports on course to blow past limits.” CNBC. N.p., 3 June 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://www.cnbc.com/ id/101727475 >.

26 Freeman, Kevin D. “Our Paper or Their Oil?” Global Economic Warfare.

N.p., 22 Feb. 2012. Web. June 2014. < http://globaleconomicwarfare. com/2012/02/our-paper-or-their-oil/ >.

27 The Counter Terrorist—June/July 2013 Cover: Russia, China and The New Global Democratic Peace 28 CNN Wire Staff. “Russia slams new sanctions against Iran.” CNN World. N.p., 22 Nov. 2011. Web. June 2014. <http:// www.cnn.com/2011/11/22/world/meast/

iran-sanctions/ >.

29 Kredo, Adam. “Russia Asks Iran: Help Us Skirt U.S. Sanctions.” The Washington Free Beacon. N.p., 8 May 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://freebeacon.com/nationalsecurity/russia-asks-iran-help-us-skirt-u-ssanctions/ >.

30 Narwani, Sharmine. “News Politics Culture & Society Economy Opinion Portraits In Focus Blogs GI Files Syria Files Arabic Edition Follow AlAkhbar on Twitter Like Al-Akhbar on Facebook Subscribe to our RSS Feed How Iran Changed The World.” alakhbar. N.p., 17 Feb. 2012. Web. June 2014. < http://english.al-akhbar.com/ blogs/sandbox/how-iran-changedworld?utm_source=feedburner&utm_ medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3 A+AlAkhbarEnglish+(Al+Akhbar+Engli

40 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

sh) >.

31 Wiggin, Addison. “How Gold Helped Iran Withstand U.S. Financial Fury.”

Forbes. N.p., 23 May 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ greatspeculations/2014/05/23/how-goldhelped-iran-withstand-u-s-financialfury/>.

32 Perlroth, Nicole, and Quentin Hardy.

“Bank Hacking Was the Work of Iranians, Officials Say.” The New York Times. N.p., 8 Jan. 2013. Web. June 2014. <http://www. nytimes.com/2013/01/09/technology/ online-banking-attacks-were-work-ofiran-us-officials-say.html?_r=0 >.

33 Harris, Shane. “Forget China: Iran’s Hackers Are America’s Newest Cyber Threat.” Foreign Policy. N.p., 18 Feb. 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://complex. foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/02/18/

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34 IBID 35 Neal, Ryan W. “US Navy Needed Four Months And $10 Million To Clear Iranian Hackers From Marine Corps Network.”

International Business Times. N.p., 18 Feb. 2014. Web. June 2014. < http://www. ibtimes.com/us-navy-needed-four-months10-million-clear-iranian-hackers-marinecorps-network-1556377 >.

36 Neal, Ryan W. “US Navy Needed Four Months And $10 Million To Clear Iranian Hackers From Marine Corps Network.”

International Business Times. N.p., 18 Feb. 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://online.wsj. com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732 3336104578501601108021968 >.

37 Gorman, Siobhan. “Iran-Based Cyberspies Targeting U.S. Officials, Report Alleges.” The Wall Street Journal.

N.p., 29 May 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://online.wsj.com/articles/iran-basedcyberspies-targeting-u-s-officials-reportalleges-1401335072 >.

38 Sanger, David E. “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran.”

The New York Times. N.p., 1 June 2012.

Web. 9 June 2014. <http://www.nytimes. com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/ obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacksagainst-iran.html?hp >.

39 Haaretz. “Prepare for cyber war, Iran’s supreme leader tells students.” Haaretz.

N.p., 13 Feb. 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/middleeast/1.574043 >.

40 Kahlili, Reza. “Iran’s Supreme Leader: Jihad Will Continue Until America is No More.” The Daily Caller. N.p., 25 May 2014. Web. June 2014. <http://dailycaller. com/2014/05/25/irans-supreme-leaderjihad-will-continue-until-america-is-nomore/ >.

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The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 43

BOOK REVIEW

Comrade J

By Pete Earley

C

olonel Sergei Tretyakov— “Comrade J”—is the highestranking Russian SVR officer to defect to the United States. He collaborated with writer Pete Earley to share his insights in Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia’s Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War (Berkley, 2009). Tretyakov’s account of life behind the Iron Curtain and life under Vladimir Putin reveals the amount of institutional deception that is necessary to bring an oppressive government to power and the scope of domestic spying and manipulation that is necessary to retain that power.

The author opens quoting Colonel Tretyakov, “I want to warn Americans.

As a people, you are very naïve about Russia and its intentions. You believe because the Soviet Union no longer exists, Russia now is your friend. It isn’t, and I can show you how the SVR is trying to destroy the U.S. even today and even more than the KGB did during the Cold War.” He goes on to warn Americans how Soviet socialists achieved their aims by quoting Stalin: “the people who cast the votes don’t decide an election, the people who count the votes do.”

Tretyakov recounts a KGB operation that he believes is representative of Russian schemes to manipulate world opinion. “[LAZAR] was a coworker of Arthur’s at the Canadian arms control disarmament center in Ottawa. He had a close relationship with members

Reviewed by: Chris Graham

of the Canadian Parliament.

LAZAR’s expertise was in international environmental law, and the KGB used him whenever it could to cause headaches for the U.S. The Center in Moscow provided LAZAR with scientific information that was specifically written to disrupt relations between Canada and the U.S. over environmental issues. LAZAR would deliver these anti-U.S. reports to his political connections in the Canadian parliament. They in turn would cite these reports, drafting legislation on environmental concerns. LAZAR never believed he was committing treason… he thought he was protecting the… environment.” The author quotes writer Michael Creighton describing another Russian enviro-scam as a “well orchestrated media campaign.”

And adds, “This is not the way science is

44 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

done, it is the way products are sold.”

Tretyakov relayed to the author that “Gorbachev and Yeltsin did not fire the generals who ran the [KGB] Center.

Nor did they put an outsider in charge of foreign intelligence and order him to clean house. Instead, Gorbachev promoted a former KGB lieutenant

general to take charge of the SVR.” In the days following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia agreed to stop engaging in active measures (disinformation campaigns). Tretyakov reports, “we said, ‘okay, now we are friends. We will stop doing this’ and the SVR shutdown Directorate A (A stood for active measures), but Directive A basically underwent a name change.

That’s all. It became department MS (measures of support) and the very same people who had run it under the KGB were still doing it for the SVR.” The author explains how Saddam Hussein and the SVR exploited corruption in the U.N. to beat an oil embargo and specifies, “[U.N. Secretary General Kofi] Annan’s son, Kojo Annan, had earned as much as $485,000 in ‘consulting fees’ related to Iraqi oil transactions.” Tratyakov continues, “Politicians from nearly every country at the U.N.—except the U.S.—received money from Saddam’s scam. Many of them were U.N. diplomats.”

Tretyakov relates, “officers brazenly met their sources inside the U.N.’s main building.” This was against rules, but

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“we ignored this rule because we had so many sources at the U.N.” The colonel explains, “We looked for diplomats who disliked the U.S. even though they were from countries that were considered by America to be a friend… I was always amazed at how cheaply we could get U.N. diplomats to work for us…We would buy jewelry at Walmart and they would gobble it up as if it were some precious treasure when they were actually betraying their countries… for a few hundred dollars worth of gold trinkets.”

Tretyakov tells us, “from my parents I had learned neither communism nor socialism worked in Soviet society…

As new citizens we found ourselves… offended when we see how natural born Americans take liberties for granted.

Sometimes I believe only someone who’s lived in a corrupt society can truly understand the importance of America’s liberties.”

Colonel Tretyakov warns, “During the Cold War in the Soviet military doctrine there was the definition of the Main Enemy, which was also used by intelligence as a basic principal.

It was the United States, followed by NATO… What is the official guideline for the SVR today? The terms have changed. It is now called the Main Target. But it is exactly the same, the United States followed by NATO.” He identifies the targets he was instructed to penetrate in New York: “military and government, New York financial institutions including the New York Stock Exchange… New York University [and] Columbia University.”

Little consideration is given to the enduring wounds inflicted by the KGB’s subversive activities. Even less consideration is given to the current efforts of Vladimir Putin’s SVR. How many subversive seeds sown by yesterday’s communists are employed as weapons by today’s radicals? Read Comrade J and decide for yourself.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Graham is the former commander of a military anti-terrorism unit, the creator of 30-10 training (www.3010pistol.com) and he is the editor of The Counter Terrorist magazine.

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 45

TULAREMIA AS A WEAPON

Tularemia is a bacteria-based disease that is highly contagious and potentially fatal. It spreads to humans through insect bites, skin contact with infected animals, ingesting contaminated water or food, or inhaling contaminated dusts or aerosols.

46 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

Photo by: James R. Evans

By Jeffrey D. Shuman

R

abbits, hares, squirrels, mice, and other rodents are especially susceptible and die in large numbers during outbreaks.¹ Birds, reptiles and fish may also be carriers.2 The disease is often called “rabbit fever” due to its virulence among rabbits. The disease is endemic throughout North America, continental Europe, Russia, China, and Japan. It is rare in the United Kingdom, Africa, and Central and South America.3 The Amarillo, Texas International Airport experienced a tularemia outbreak in 2006. An entomologist was the first

to observe a mass jackrabbit die-off, and suspected tularemia. This person contacted airport and city officials, who quickly enacted quarantine protocols and appear to have successfully stemmed the spread of the disease to other rodents or humans.4

EFFECTS ON HUMANS There are six types of tularemia.

Each has specific symptoms and all are accompanied by fever. Symptoms are displayed within ten days of infection.

The type of infection depends on where the bacteria enters the body.

Most common routes are through the skin or mucous membranes, but the bacteria may also be inhaled or eaten.

Ulceroglandular tularemia is the most common. Symptoms include skin ulcers at the site of infection, swollen and painful lymph glands, chills, headache, and exhaustion. Glandular tularemia exhibits the same symptoms as ulceroglandular but without the skin ulcers. Oculoglandular tularemia affects the eyes and causes eye pain, redness, eye

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 47

A culture of Francisella tularensis. Photo by: MarcoTolo

The image, taken with a fluorescent microscope, shows mouse macrophages 12 hours after infection with a virulent strain of Francisella tularensis. The cells on the left are untreated, while the cells on the right were treated 3 days in advance with CLDC+MPF. The untreated cells fail to control replication of F. tularensis. In contrast, cells activated with the CLDC+MPF therapeutic have nearly eliminated all of the bacteria.

Photo by: National Institutes of Health (NIH)

48 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

swelling and discharge, and an ulcer on the inside of the eyelid. Oropharyngeal tularemia is usually caused by eating infected game that is improperly cooked, or by drinking contaminated water.

Symptoms include sore throat, mouth ulcers, tonsillitis, swollen lymph glands in the neck, vomiting, and diarrhea.

Pneumonic tularemia is more common in elderly people. It displays symptoms of pneumonia, and may be contracted in conjunction with the other forms of tularemia. Typhoidal tularemia is rare and more serious than the others. Symptoms include high fever, extreme exhaustion, vomiting and diarrhea, enlarged spleen, enlarged liver, and pneumonia. Of all the types listed, typhoidal tularemia

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The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 49 10/21/13 9:52 AM

A Tularemia lesion on the dorsal skin of the right hand. Photo by: CDC Public Health Image Library

in an inhaled form would be the most dangerous and successful if weaponized.

This is due to the seriousness of its symptoms when compared to the other forms.1, 3 Tularemia is rare and shares symptoms common with other diseases.

This makes proper identification difficult.

Doctors may check for the bacteria in blood or sputum. Chest x-rays may show signs of pneumonia. All forms of the disease may be successfully treated if diagnosed early and treated with antibiotics. There are no known vaccines for tularemia, but the symptoms may be treated with streptomycin or doxycycline.2

PAST OUTBREAKS Several tularemia outbreaks have been recorded throughout the twentieth

century in the United States, Europe, the former Soviet Union countries, and Japan. Outbreaks may have occurred as early as the nineteenth century, but were likely improperly identified as isolated cases and not associated with a larger infectious process. In the early part of the twentieth century, a Japanese physician noted a comparison between the number of dead rabbits and the number of people becoming sick who had somehow handled or been exposed to these rabbits.3 Around the same time in the United States, physicians in California investigated dead rats and squirrels in an attempt to tie them to an outbreak of plague in San Francisco.

These doctors noted lesions in infected samples that were different from plague samples, and this led to their discovery

50 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

of a form of tularemia. There is some speculation about a tularemia outbreak along the German-Russian front in 1942. Soldiers on both sides reportedly contracted the disease. Some believe the Russian forces released the bacteria as a form of defense to stem the German attack. Russian soldiers may have been sickened because this weapon does not discriminate. Others dispute this and claim the outbreak may have been due to a breakdown in health and hygiene and an increase in contact with diseasebearing rodents.3 One of the largest outbreaks of tularemia occurred in Sweden between 1966 and 1967.3 The outbreak coincided with a large increase, then sudden drop, in the number of voles in that country.

Sweden reported 2,739 cases of tularemia

that year which is nearly half of the total number of cases the country reported between 1931 and 1993.3 The United States has reported between 200-300 cases of tularemia each year with the most occurring in Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Tennessee. The disease has been reported in all states except Hawaii.3 While there is no known immunization for tularemia, the spread of the disease appears to be halted by minimizing contact with infected animals, following good hygiene standards, and treating people who have the sickness. Victims of the disease go through a clinical program to treat the symptoms.3 This has proven successful in past cases and outbreaks.

Not treating the symptoms has the potential to allow the disease to progress to respiratory failure, shock, and possibly death.3 In 2000, the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense noted a mortality rate for pneumonic tularemia, if untreated, as high as 60%.3 In 1970, a World Health Organization committee asserted that roughly 100 pounds of tularemia dispersed as an aerosol over a population of 5 million could result in an estimated 250,000 casualties, including nearly 19,000 deaths.3, 5

successful. The sound of the detonation would alert people that something had happened. Investigators could discover the biological agent and enact procedures to limit contamination.

Employing any biological agent as a weapon requires patience. A biological release would not garner the immediate headlines associated with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detonated in a populated area. However, the eventual confusion and fear following a successful bioterrorist attack could be unimaginable. Sickened people, depending on where the agent was introduced, could easily number into the thousands. Victims could overwhelm hospitals and emergency rooms. Local, state, and federal government offices would be inundated with calls for action.

Bioterrorists realize this potential and may attempt to covertly release their agent on unsuspecting communities. An attack would likely occur at night and

Bacillus anthracis Bioterrorism Incident, Kameido, Tokyo, 1993, Fluid collected from the Kameido site cultured on Petri dishes to identify potential Bacillus anthracis isolates.

Photo by: Centers for Disease Control

WEAPONIZATION Biological agents are difficult to successfully weaponize. They are living organisms that die if not maintained within the limits of their required environment. Weaponization conjures images of vials filled with bio-agents either inside a bomb or secured around an explosive. In this case, the biological agent is released upon detonation. That is a possible form of dissemination.

However, the heat from the explosion would likely kill a large amount of the agent and render the attack less

Kasumigaseki Station, one of the many stations affected during the attack.

Photo by: WikimediaCommons

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 51

A template for a bioterrorist attack would be the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. The Aum Shinrikyo cult placed plastic bags filled with home-made sarin gas on five subway cars during Tokyoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s early morning rush hour. The gas dispersed throughout the subway cars and Kasumigaseki station. Twelve people died and an estimated 5,000 were injured.6 A biological agent could be released in a similar fashion.

Innocent people would be sickened and a percentage will likely die. The ideal biological weapon would be effective in small doses, have a short incubation period, withstand the stresses of dissemination, and be minimally contagious to the person, or persons, employing it.

IMPACT OF A BIOTERRORIST ATTACK

A chest X-ray showing increased opacity in both lungs, indicative of pneumonia, in a patient with SARS. Photo by: PerPlex

As the disease spreads and knowledge of the attack grows, so too would fear spread.

employ a quiet dispersal device such as a fan or sprayer. Alternately, the bioterrorist may simply open or secrete a container downwind from the target or near a public area such as an office building, courtyard, stadium or mass transit station. A night attack would minimize the sunâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s adverse affects on the agent. The incubation period takes time and this could allow a bioterrorist to escape the area. The bioterrorist risks the threat of self-contamination, but if they understand the disease and the nature of their attack, then they may take the necessary precautions to protect themselves.

52 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

One of the greatest unknowns regarding a bioterrorist attack is how far the disease could spread before being discovered. As discussed above, releasing a biological agent would most likely take place quietly and in a non-descript manner. People would not know they were exposed until after symptoms appeared. Victims would eventually be identified through hospitalization, from family members reporting sicknesses or deaths, or from people not showing up to work. Hospital emergency rooms would be the first to notice an increase in people seeking treatment for related ailments. Eventually medical professionals and other specialists would put the dots together and realize that a biological agent has been released. They may even be able to pinpoint the date, time, and location of the release. This would help with clean-up efforts but little else.

Stopping the spread would require

Entrance to the headquarters of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Photo by: Daniel Mayer

knowing how far the disease travelled.

A disease such as typhoidal tularemia in its inhaled form could spread like wildfire. The 2002 spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is a good comparison for how tularemia may spread. The SARS disease was first discovered in China in late 2002 and spread to over two dozen countries before being contained in mid 2003.7 The disease first crossed into countries nearest to China, such as Vietnam and Hong Kong, and then travelled to the Philippines, Europe, and North America.

It is probable that the disease travelled to these cities via airports. If tularemia was dispersed in a city with an international airport or an international population, such as New York City, then it would be possible for the disease to travel

throughout the world in a very short time.

As the disease spreads and knowledge of the attack grows, so too would fear spread. People would avoid public places including mass transit, shopping centers, and parks. People would stay away from work for fear of coming into contact with an infected person. The area around the initial exposure may completely shut down. If this area was a city government or federal building then that function could, conceivably, be shut down until disinfected. Tourism would end either by mandatory notices from governments or voluntary bans on travel from tourists. Businesses would suffer as goods and services into and out of the affected area would grind to a halt. Least known would be the cost of clean-up after an attack. This could range

into the billions of dollars based on lost productivity, insurance claims, the money expended by governments for emergency response, and countless man-hours for police and other investigators, hospital staffs, clean-up crews, etc. Finally, the fallout from dealing with diseased persons could be unconscionable. Mandatory treatments might be enforced as well as the quarantine of entire neighborhoods.

The legal issues of these procedures are almost limitless.8

CONCLUSION The Center for Disease Control and Prevention has identified tularemia as a Category A Bioterrorism Agent.

Category A agents are easily transmitted from person to person, result in a high mortality rate, have the potential for

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 53

The Aeromedical Isolation Team of the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Photo by: US Government

a major public health impact, may cause panic and social disruption, and require special action for public health preparedness.1 The United States has historically done well fighting conventional adversaries. This was evidenced by the success of the first Gulf War and the quick defeat of the Iraqi Army in 2003. However, the government is still coming to grips with Unrestricted Warfare and unconventional adversaries. A biological attack, while not immediately gratifying for a terrorist, does have the potential to produce massive casualties, chaos, and fear. These asymmetric warriors may be the most likely to employ biological agents or other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) against the United States or other free societies. A biological agent release would be difficult to determine until after the damage has been done.

Deterring potential adversaries and being prepared to react to a release may be the most successful approach to dealing with a bioterrorist attack.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Shuman is a former U.S. Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal technician and master sergeant. He works as a government consultant in the Washington D.C. area.

outbreak at a metropolitan airport, Texas.

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 7(3).

Retrieved from Academic OneFile database.

5 World Health Organization. (1970).

Health aspects of chemical and biological weapons. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization; 1970:105-107 6 Seto, Y. (2001). The sarin gas attack in Japan and the related forensic investigation. Retrieved from http:// www.opcw.org/news/article/the-sarin-gasattack-in-japan-and-the-related-forensicinvestigation/ 7 Hunter, N.D. (2009). The Law of Emergencies Public Health and Disaster Management, Butterworth-Heinemann.

8 Tognotti, E. (2013). Lessons from the history of quarantine, from plague to influenza A. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 19(2). Retrieved from Academic OneFile database.

ENDNOTES Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (2014). Tularemia.

Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/ tularemia 2 Mayo Clinic. (2014). Diseases and conditions tularemia. Retrieved from http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/ tularemia/DS00714 3 Texas Department of State Health Services. (2010). History of tularemia – tularemia through the ages. Retrieved from https://www.dshs.state.tx.us/ preparedness/bt_public_history_ tularemia.shtm 4 Alexander, J. L., Bell, T. E., Duke, D., Thomas, S. G., Rush, P. Jr., & Richardson, J. M. (2009). Tularemia 1

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The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 55

UMAROV’S LEGACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE IMIRAT KAVKAZ

56 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

Photo by: Angelliuel7

By Michael S. Toney

In a mixture of Arabic and heavily accented Russian, Dokku Umarov’s successor, Aliashab Alibulatovich Kebekov, also known as Sheikh Ali Abu Mukhammad ad-Dagestani, announced that he was the new emir of the Imirat Kavkaz (IK).1

U

marov, often referred to as Russia’s bin Laden, was declared dead at age 49 on March 19, 2014.2, 3 Various sources reported that he had been seriously wounded in a battle against Russian forces, succumbing to his injuries sometime between January and

March 2014.4 He had been reportedly killed eight times before, forced to retire by senior Chechen commanders, and then been reinstated as emir by an IK shariah court; however, this time he would not be returning from the dead.

Umarov’s death was confirmed by

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 57

Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting on the “environmental” aspects of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. Photo by: premier.gov.ru

He attempted to enrage his followers with messages such as “they plan to hold the Olympics on the bones of our ancestors.”

an IK media release and other terrorist organizations from Turkey to Syria. It was also confirmed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB).5 Umarov’s death was a major accomplishment for Putin, ending a decades-long manhunt for Russia’s most wanted terrorist, an event similar in importance to the killing of Osama bin Laden for the U.S. government. Russian authorities have accused Umarov of ordering Chechen rebels to carry out some 2,400 insurgency operations, including 54 suicide attacks, resulting in as many as 9,000 casualties.6 In addition to the more recent bombing of the Domodedovo airport in January 2011, and two metro stations using female suicide bombers in September

58 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

2010, Russian authorities believe that Umarov was behind other high casualty attacks such as the Moscow theater siege in 2002, which resulted in the deaths of 129 people.7, 8 In the months leading up to the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi, Umarov intensified his threats, resulting in significantly increased security actions by the Russian government. Umarov had encouraged his followers to use “any methods that Allah allows” to stop the Olympic Games, including biological weapons.9, 10 He attempted to enrage his followers with messages such as “they plan to hold the Olympics on the bones of our ancestors.” To his dismay, his demands went unanswered and led to nothing more than threats, fear and

the arrest of his followers. The Olympic Games concluded successfully and his aspirations for violence had been a humiliating failure.

Omar al-Shishani, a Chechen commander in the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Abdullah Mansour, the leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), announced condolences and gave eulogies to Umarov.11, 12 According to the Kavkaz Center, processions were held in several cities in Turkey, which were reportedly attended by thousands of Turkish Muslims.4 Mukhtar Abu al-Zubeir, the leader of al Qaeda’s branch in Syria, the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement, offered his condolences as well.13

Domodedovo Airport, lobby and check-in desks. Photo by: A.Savin

UMAROV’S RISE TO POWER Umarov, also known as Dokku Umarov, was born April 13, 1964, in the village of Kharsenoi in the Shatoysky District of Southern Chechnya.14 Umarov’s first run-in with the government was in 1980 with a conviction for reckless homicide.

Following this incident, in 1992, he was wanted for murder and later for kidnapping. His military career began before 1994 when he served in the special forces under Ruslan Gelayev, a prominent commander in the Chechen separatist movement against Russia.15 In 1997, Umarov held the position of Secretary of the Security Council of the selfproclaimed Republic of Ichkeria.16 Chechnya is recognized as a Republic, or subject of Russia, split into two parts, the Republic of Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic, also referred to as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

In the first Chechen War with Russia, Ichkeria established independence, but surrendered this independence back to

“Dozens killed in Domodedovo airport blast”. Law enforcement officers guard the entrance to Domodedovo airport as part of increased security measures following the deadly blast.

Photo by: Andrey Stenin Russia following the second Chechen War.17 Chechen extremists continue to battle Russian forces with the goal of establishing an independent Islamic state. Umarov’s IK is supposed to be the manifestation of an independent Islamic state; however, it is recognized not as a

territory, but as a terrorist organization by Russian authorities.

Umarov’s rise through the ranks accelerated after Russian forces killed his predecessors, Aslan Maskhadov, in 2005, and then Khalim Saydullayev, in 2006.16, 18 Umarov formed the IK on

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 59

Aslan Maskhadov.

Photo by: Natalia Medvedeva

Overcrowded surface public transport lines on the day of the 2010 Moscow Metro bombings.

Photo by: Anton Nossik

People mourning the victims and bringing flowers and candles at the scene of the terrorist attack in the Lubyanka metro station in Moscow. Photo by: Leonid Dzhepko

October 31, 2007, citing liberation, and that he was following Allahâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s path.6 He divided the Caucasus into six fronts, some further subdivided into sectors, each headed by its own Emir who reported directly to Umarov personally.

Although he had declared himself as the supreme Emir in 2007, most Chechens rejected this proclamation.19

UMAROVâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;S LEADERSHIP STYLE Based upon a detailed analysis of Umarovâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s video messages,20 he can be described as an exploitative leader who used his followers as a means for creating, validating, and perpetuating his power in the Northern Caucasus and within

60 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

the global jihadist community. The tentativeness of his messages reflected a form of adaptive control in which he adjusted his messages in response to the political environment and mainstream media. Umarov rationalized his thought processes and actions while implying a sense of insight into future events from a narcissistic point-of-view. He was hypersensitive to managing social perception, and likely considered it imperative to his survival and role as regional unifier.

Umarov likely anticipated that at some point, perception and reality would converge, materializing into an acceptable variation of his political objectives, but his death leaves this convergence to his successor. Legitimization of his role and the ongoing validation of the IK were extremely important to him, particularly the perception within the IK ranks, as this was his only means of protecting the organization from fragmentation. While he was self-focused, he also demonstrated an emotional attachment to the IK and its ideology as an altruistic participant.

The religious context of his messages in effect, served as a recruitment tool for attracting disillusioned Muslim youths and the sustainment of his organization

Emergency meeting following explosions at Domodedovo Airport with head of Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation Alexander Bastrykin, Prosecutor General Yury Chaika and Transport Minister Igor Levitin (right). Photo by: The Presidential Press and Information Office

during times of crisis.

Umarov viewed his efforts with permanence and resoluteness, to the degree of denying real-world circumstances and obstacles. This behavior reflected the intent to drive group cohesion by emphasizing the IKâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s successes and future objectives, which is a common practice by jihadist organizations. Communications were important as he frequently addressed

his followers, providing status of his efforts and the state of the IK as facts and strategic imperatives. His rhetoric followed a tentative format allowing the maximum number of outcomes to align with his insights and forecasts. Contrary to other news reports, his behaviors demonstrated a political savvy and sensitivity to the critical observations of his followers and opponents. It was this political savvy that enabled him to unite Chechen

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 61

A mountain outpost of the 33rd Mountain Rifle Brigade in Dagestan. Photo by: Sergey Pyatakov

jihadists with other terrorist groups in the North Caucasus as well as extending his relationships beyond the Caucasus.

MUKHAMMAD AND THE IK’S FUTURE Hidden away in the North Caucasus, Mukhammad declared his acceptance of the role of IK Emir via recorded video.

Mukhammad was born in 1972 in the Sovyetsky District of Dagestan.21 He studied shariah law in Syria in the early 2000s under his nephew, Murtuzali Magomedov. Since 2010, he has held

62 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

the position of “Qadi,” chief theologian, judge and ideologist, monitoring organizational compliance with the Koran and Sunna.6 It is unclear if he will maintain that role in addition to Emir.

He has already earned a position on Russia’s list of most wanted terrorists and will likely take on the priority for “kill or capture” once held by his predecessor.

The IK as an organization will likely go through a period of chaos while Mukhammad seeks to impose his authority and organize his command structure. As a Caucasian Avar, a non-

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Chechen, it is not clear yet if he will be capable of holding the organization together.22 Mukhammad’s video releases demonstrate an increase in the radical nature of the IK, indicating that he will rule with an iron fist under an extremist’s interpretation of Islam. Umarov’s efforts to unite the Northern Caucasus and legitimize the IK will likely dissipate into disorganization. Sub-factions may form and break away from IK-proper, as has happened to many other violent organizations during periods of major transition.

It is equally possible that the IK will reject Mukhammad’s heavy-handed rule by shariah law. In a video release, he stated “If you consider yourselves Muslims, then impose shariah law, and we shall stop waging war against you.”21 Included in this message was a warning that his men will target those who engage in promoting depravity and vice, such as owners of liquor stores, saunas, and bordellos. He expects strict adherence to the Koran and Sunna.

Mukhammad’s ideological position aligns with the extremist values of the broader jihadist movement, but it fails to demonstrate the larger view and goals of regional unification and establishment of an Islamic state that his predecessor held. He has several pending actions awaiting his attention. Organizations such as the Syrian Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), and the Ukrainian Right Sector expect support in the form of people, weapons and funding.23 The global jihadist community awaits Mukhammad’s first actions as the IK Emir, particularly al-Qaeda. While it would be a logical first action to build upon the relationship with the mujahidin in Syria because it presents

an opportunity to gain access to Assad’s chemical weapons cache, he ordered his fighters to remain in the Caucasus.24 It remains to be seen whether he will inspire and order violent actions or drive away the more liberal Chechen prospects. His rigidity and obsession with shariah law, as noted in his blanket statement of waging war against noncompliant Muslims, may become his Achilles’ heel in sustaining an active and cohesive organization.

Under Mukhammad’s self-admission, he lacks the combat training and handson experience that enabled Umarov to evade capture by Russian forces for so many years.25 Although Umarov’s political and strategic competencies are considered far worse than his predecessors, Mukhammad seems to be a step further away from increasing the tactical competency of the IK or garnering international sympathy.

With the death of Umarov and the inexperience of Mukhammad, the FSB has the clear strategic advantage, equipment, and force strength to quickly dismantle the IK threat, beginning with a kill or capture order for Mukhammad.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Toney holds a doctorate in business administration with specialization in organizational behavior from the University of Phoenix. He has worked with the U.S. Department of Defense for more than 25 years, teaches graduate courses at Ashford University, and has published three books on terrorism: Terrorist Organizational Behavior, Organizational Behavior Profile: AQIM, and Terrorist Leader Profiles and Comparative Behavioral Analysis.

FOOTNOTES 1

Kavkaz Center, Caucasus Emirate’s

64 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

Sharia Judge, Ali Abu Muhammad, elected as new CE Emir by leaders of CE provinces, in Kavkaz Center. 2014, Kavkaz Center: Online.

2 Winter, J., US, Russian forces hunt jihadist widow feared inside Olympic zone, in Fox News. 2014, Fox News: Online.

3 News, F., Islamic group reports death of Chechen warlord who threatened Sochi Olympics, in Fox News. 2014, Fox News: Online.

4 Kavkaz Center, Thousands prayed for martyr, Insha’Allah, Dokku Abu Usman in Turkey in Kavkaz Center. 2014, Kavkaz Center: Online.

5 Baczynska, G., Russia confirms death of Islamist militant, its most wanted man, in Reuters. 2014, Reuters: Online.

6 Roggio, W., House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Hearing. 2014, Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc: Online.

7 Lister, T., Moscow attack renews spotlight on ‘Emir of the Caucasus’, in CNN. 2011, CNN: Online.

8 RT, Two blasts in Moscow Metro, dozens killed, in RT. 2010, RT: Online.

9 Kavkaz Center, Circassians got no reply from the IOC. Perhaps, Dokku Umarov and his friends answer them in Kavkaz Center. 2013, Kavkaz Center: Online.

10 de Carbonnel, A. and S. Gutterman, Russia says foils plot to attack chemical arms facility, in Reuters. 2013.

11 SITE Monitoring Service. Chechen ISIL Commander Gives Eulogy for Former IEC Leader Doku Umarov. 2014 [cited 2014 May 27]; Available from: https:// news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/ chechen-isil-commander-gives-eulogyfor-former-iec-leader-doku-umarov.html.

12 SITE Monitoring Service. TIP Leader Expresses Solidarity with Chechen Fighters Over Umarov Death. 2014 [cited 2014 May 27]; Available from: https://news. siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/tip-

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leader-expresses-solidarity-with-chechenfighters-over-umarov-death.html.

13 SITE Monitoring Service. Shabaab Leader Links France, Missionaries to Car Attacks. 2014 [cited 2014 May 27]; Available from: https://news. siteintelgroup.com/Western-JihadistForum-Digest/shabaab-leader-linksfrance-missionaries-to-car-attacks.html.

14 Opperman, J., Latest Report of Umarov’s Death Leaves Details Unclear, in Radio Free Europe. 2014, Radio Free Europe: Online.

15 Kavkaz Center, Combats in Western Ichkeria in Kavkaz Center. 2003, Kavkaz Center: Online.

16 Kavkaz Center, Caucasus Emirate’s Emir Dokku Abu Usman martyred, Insha’Allah. Obituary in Kavkaz Center.

2014, Kavkaz Center: Online.

17 Schaefer, R.W., The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From

Gazavat to Jihad. 1 ed. 2011: Praeger Security International.

18 Anthony, L. and W. Helen, Russia’s bin Laden dead, rebels admit, in The Times (London, England). 2014, News International Trading Limited: London (UK). p. 26.

19 Kavkaz Center, Caucasus Emirate, in Kavkaz Center. 2007, Kavkaz Center: Online.

20 Toney, M., Terrorist Leader Profiles and Comparative Behavioral Analysis: Abdullaah Yusuf Azzam, Abdelmalek Droukdel, Osama bin Laden, Dokku Umarov Abu Uthman and Ayman al-Zawahiri. 2013: CreateSpace Independent Publishing.

21 TRAC. Ali Abu-Muhammad (aka Aliashab Alibulatovich Kebekov). 2014 [cited 2014 May 27]; Available from: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/ group/ali-abu-muhammad-aka-aliashab-

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22 TRAC. Caucasus Emirate chooses a new leader. 2014 [cited 2014 May 27]; Available from: http://www. trackingterrorism.org/what-to-watch/ caucasus-emirate-new-leader-old-choiceand-uncertain-future.

23 Kavkaz Center, Ukrainian Right Sector declares mobilization and appeals to Caucasus Emirate’s Emir Dokku Abu Usman, in Kavkaz Center. 2014, Kavkaz Center: Online.

24 Paraszczuk, J. New Caucasus Emirate Emir Kebekov: Jihad In North Caucasus Priority Over Syria. 2014 [cited 2014 May 27]; Available from: http://www. chechensinsyria.com/?p=21203.

25 Radio Free Europe, Avar Theologian Named To Succeed Umarov As Insurgency Leader, in Radio Free Europe,. 2014, Radio Free Europe,: Online.

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The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 71

TRAINING REVIEW

Vehicle Engagement Tactics

By Max Joseph

W

e all spend a great amount of time in and around our vehicles. Considering this, it stands to reason that our chances of becoming involved in a lethal force encounter in a vehicle is high. In recognition of this fact, I created a threeday Vehicle Engagements Tactics course for personnel who may be required to employ their firearms from, in, and around their vehicles. Here are some of the topics we cover:

COUNTER AMBUSH PROCEDURES Being caught in an ambush while in our

vehicles is a real possibility. Our highest chances of being hit may occur while we are arriving or departing from venues.

There are four basic options presented to us if we are caught in a vehicle ambush.

DRIVE THROUGH The safest way to survive a shootout is to not be there when it happens. This is where the drive through option comes into play. For example, we may be taking sporadic hits from a hasty or far ambush.

The sooner we can get out of the kill zone, the safer we will be. We refer to this as “duck your head / punch your gas / and pucker your ass.” Our vehicles will

72 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014

drive over or through many obstacles that seem impassible to those who are not trained in vehicle dynamics.

The driver should focus on nothing but driving. This man is critical to our survival. He has one job: “Drive the car!”

Everyone else has one job also: “Protect the driver!” Only after a vehicle is completely incapacitated does it make sense for the driver to become another shooter.

RAM THROUGH We should always use the most effective weapons at our disposal. Your vehicle is often your best weapon. Why reach for a four-pound weapon when

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The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2014 73

you have a 4,000-pound one available?

If the enemy deploys a barricade or vehicle blockade to stop your forward movement, the best option may be to ram through the obstacle. Care should be taken in controlling the speed used when making contact with the barricade. The maxim that has been taught for quite a while is to slow down as if you are going to stop. This will momentarily lull the enemy into thinking that you are in fact complying with their orders. When about 25 yards out, accelerate and prepare for contact. Too high a rate of speed on your part may cause disabling damage to your own vehicle. We are normally looking for contact between our front end and their rear axle to have the best leverage for pushing that barricade out of our path.

REVERSE OUT If the enemy has conducted surveillance on us and knows that our

SOPs would be to ram through any obstacles they present, they may choose to beef up their barricade. An armored car or cement truck will pose a more formidable obstacle and will negate the ramming option. In this case, either a straight reverse out or a J turn would be the next option. When involved in motorcade operations, coordinating this procedure with multiple vehicles in training is crucial.

DEBUSS The option to dismount is a critical decision, and it is generally best to drive through when possible. The debuss is performed in only two occasions. First, if the vehicle is fatally disabled and it becomes a bullet trap. Dynamically deploying from the vehicle using coordinated fire and movement may allow the passengers to move to a more advantageous position.

A second reason that the team may deploy from the vehicle is that it may be their mission to serve as a counter assault team for a motorcade. While the principalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s vehicle is departing the kill zone, the CAT will be delivering accurate fire into the threat to mitigate their desire and ability to continue the attack.

Always seek cover. Understand what parts of your vehicle will and will not stop rounds. Always be aware of your muzzle control. While we are scrambling across seats and providing covering fire for our teammates who are deploying from the vehicle, we must be cognizant that our muzzles never flags our teammates or any part of our bodies. Keep your finger straight except when actually firing. In debuss drills, we may be firing through the windshield one second then the next second be opening our doors to deploy.

During this mental transition between firing and then moving, our fingers must come out of the trigger guards and our weapons must be either decocked or put back on safe. Always remember that a well-executed ambush is fast and violent with a maximum amount of firepower brought to bear on the kill zone. As in any ambush, the faster those in the kill zone can drive through and get rounds on target, the better chance they will have of surviving the ambush. www.tftt.com

â&#x20AC;˘

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Joseph is the founder and training director of both TFTT)and the Direct Action Group. He is a former Recon Marine and has trained and worked with personnel from Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and South America and has worked protective details in Central America, South America, Eastern Europe, and Afghanistan.

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