The Counter Terrorist Magazine - February/March 2014

WE S T GATE MALL ATTACK • INDO NESIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE • RED HACKERS • INSURGENT S OF SYRIA

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

Counter The

FEBRUARY/MARCH 2014

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 1

UNRESTRICTED WARFARE AND DRUG SMUGGLING

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Counter

The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals FEBRUARY/MARCH 2014 VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 1

COVER STORY:

30

CONTENTS

30

8

46

56

UNRESTRICTED WARFARE AND DRUG SMUGGLING

By John Poole

FEATURES:

08

Firsthand: HOSTAGE RESCUE IN INDONESIA AND THE ART OF THE RAID

By Eeben Barlow

18

Case Study: NAIROBI’S WESTGATE SHOPPING MAIL ATTACK

By Steve Young

THE INSURGENTS OF SYRIA 46

By Dean T. Olson RED HACKERS, THE EAGLE UNION, AND UNIT 56 61398

By Jennifer Hesterman

DEPARTMENTS: 06

From the Editor

44

Book Review

69

Innovative Products

72

Training Review

Valor

Disinformation

SB15 Pistol Stabilizing Brace, MGM Thermic – Passive Thermal Targets, I Am Soldier of Fortune Basic Law Enforcement Sniper Course

U.S. Marines with 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, uncover suspected heroin during a security patrol in Sangin, Afghanistan on Jan. 1, 2010.

Photo by: Lance Cpl. Jorge A. Ortiz/ Released

Cover Photo:

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 5

Counter The

FROM THE EDITOR:

Valor

By Chris Graham

O

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 1

n 15 October, 2013, Captain William D. Swenson received the Medal of Honor for valorous actions while serving as an embedded advisor to the Afghan National Border Police under Task Force Phoenix.

The medal citation reads in part: [O]n September 8, 2009… more than 60 well-armed, well-positioned enemy fighters ambushed Captain Swenson’s combat team as it moved on foot into the village of Ganjgal for a meeting with village elders. As the enemy unleashed a barrage of rocket-propelled grenade, mortar and machine gun fire, Captain Swenson immediately returned fire and coordinated and directed the response of his Afghan Border Police, while simultaneously calling in suppressive artillery fire and aviation support… Captain Swenson repeatedly called for smoke to cover the withdrawal of the forward elements. Surrounded on three sides by enemy forces inflicting effective and accurate fire, Captain Swenson coordinated air assets, indirect fire support and medical evacuation helicopter support to allow for the evacuation of the wounded. Captain Swenson ignored enemy radio transmissions demanding surrender and maneuvered uncovered to render medical aid to a wounded fellow soldier. Captain Swenson stopped administering aid long enough to throw a grenade at approaching enemy forces, before assisting with moving the soldier for air evacuation. With complete disregard for his own safety, Captain Swenson unhesitatingly led a team in an unarmored vehicle into the kill zone, exposing himself to enemy fire on at least two occasions, to recover the wounded and search for four missing comrades. After using aviation support to mark locations of fallen and wounded comrades, it became clear that ground recovery of the fallen was required due to heavy enemy fire on helicopter landing zones… Captain Swenson voluntarily exited the vehicle, exposing himself to enemy fire, to locate and recover three fallen Marines and one fallen Navy corpsman. His exceptional leadership and stout resistance against the enemy during six hours of continuous fighting rallied his teammates and effectively disrupted the enemy’s assault. 1 Swenson’s actions are an inspiration to us all. From the most junior deputy and grunt in the field to the most senior desk-jockey in Washington D.C. we can each learn from the valorous actions of America’s Medal of Honor recipients. May way each draw upon these lessons and face the dangers of the future with both physical bravery and the courage to speak the truth.

Semper Fidelis,

Chris Graham Editor, The Counter Terrorist www.chrisgrahamauthor.com http://www.army.mil/medalofhonor/swenson/citation.html accessed 20 December 2013.

1

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

FEBRUARY/MARCH 2014 Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Production Assistants Giselle Manassa Melissa Berne Contributing Editors Kevin Freeman Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Tom Nypaver Dean Olson Steve Young Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Chris Bell Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 204 Miami, Florida 33186

ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher.

The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher.

Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 204, Miami, Florida.

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Firsthand:

HOSTAGE RESCUE IN INDONESIA AND THE ART OF THE RAID A rebel group known as the Free Papua Movement (FPM) had been waging a bloody insurgency in Irian Jaya, a province of Indonesia. Their latest action had been to abduct a multinational group that included several U.N. workers on 8 January 1996.

8 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

By Eeben Barlow

I

n exchange for the hostages’ release, the FPM demanded that Irian Jaya be granted independence from Indonesia, along with immediate diplomatic recognition by several Western governments. Understandably, the Indonesian government viewed the FPM as a terrorist group and was unwilling to entertain negotiations with them.

International pressure on the Indonesian government mounted. The

hostages from Britain, the Netherlands, and Indonesia faced certain death if the FPM’s demands were not met.

FPM leader Kelly Kwalik, known to his followers as “General Kelly,” kept changing his demands while many in the international community tried to woo and pacify him and his terrorists, thus adding to the strain felt by the Indonesian government. Meanwhile, Kwalik appeared to enjoy the hitherto unknown publicity the media provided for him and his organization.

In an act bordering on desperation, Henry Fournier, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross based in

Indonesia1, flew into the remote jungles of Irian Jaya to attempt to negotiate the release of the hostages. Unfortunately, his mission failed. Kwalik simply increased his threats against the hostages and upped his demands for their release.

By the time Brigadier General Prabowo Subianto, GOC of the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus), contacted my private military company Executive Outcomes (EO), the Indonesian government had exhausted all of its options, including foreign military intervention.2 As we developed an initial operational design together, General Subianto expressed his disappointment at the view held by several Western diplomats. He remarked, “The West seems to think that you can meet such people over a cup of tea and with a few friendly words resolve the problems and recover the hostages.”3 Having been through the mill of how the

A Marine serving with 1st Reconnaissance Battalion participates in a raid as part of the special operations capable training conducted for the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Photo by: Cpl. Timothy Lenzo

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 9

After an eight-hour gun battle, most of the FPM’s members lay dead and all but one hostage was released (that hostage having been killed by the FPM).5

West viewed “freedom fighters,” I could only agree with him. Kidnap and ransom actions to fund terrorism could not—and should not—go unpunished.

During a hasty planning cycle, EO and Kopassus agreed that a raid into the FPM’s jungle hideout would present the best option for securing the release of the hostages, while also sending a strong message of deterrence against future acts of terrorism. The political risk in undertaking such a raid was assessed and found to be acceptable. Despite this, the raid would certainly be fraught with operational and tactical risks.

To limit such risks, the raiding force required specialist training, expertise, and experience beyond that which was freely available within Kopassus. Thus, an EO team was selected to assist the Indonesian forces in completing their mission.

Following establishment of an operational timeline, the EO team infiltrated Indonesia via numerous routes.

Once on the ground, they linked up with a select Kopassus team and, under a cloak of great secrecy, began detailed planning, training, and preparation for the pending raid. It was intended to be a simple tactical raid that, if correctly executed, would provide Kopassus with several operational advantages. Not only would the hostages being held by the FPM on Irian Jaya be freed, but it was hoped that the joint EO/Kopassus force would also capture or kill members of the FPM and gather vital intelligence for any future operations against them.

The pre-operational intelligence briefing made it clear that the raid would require both daring and surprise, and that even though the objective was to rescue the hostages while simultaneously dealing the FPM a hard blow where they least expected it, our goal was not to hold ground or dominate terrain. Rather, extraction of the raiding force would take

10 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

place as soon as the operational objectives had been met.

Fournier’s failure to secure the release of the FPM’s hostages instigated initiation of the EO/Kopassus raid. Thus, on 9 May 1996, a joint team fast-roped from helicopters through the thick jungle canopy of Irian Jaya. Surprise was complete. The FPM had considered their hideout to be safe from air attack, as helicopters had often overflown their position without locating them. This time they were dead wrong. EO team leader Duncan Rykaart4 came off the fast rope and inflicted the first FPM casualty.

The team moved rapidly to secure the hostages. After an eight-hour gun battle, most of the FPM’s members lay dead and all but one hostage was released (that hostage having been killed by the FPM).5 The raiding force suffered no casualties.

The raid was tactically well executed and a resounding operational success.

Although it achieved its operational aim, the raid also had strategic implications insofar as the FPM was concerned.

Specifically, the rebel movement was destroyed and no longer posed a threat to the Indonesian government. Some were very quick to claim their role in the raid.6 Ironically, once it became known that EO was involved in the raid, the operation was rapidly condemned—even by those who had initially claimed they did it.

The aim of a raid is generally to create advantages that influence operations in the immediate combat zone. Correctly planned and executed, strategic raids can alter the course of a military campaign, create conditions necessary for victory, and place governments in a position of strength from where to conduct negotiations.

Raids, however, are not new to the battlefield. The art of raiding was employed centuries ago by tribal societies as a form of waging war. Raids were

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Marines with the 13th MEU conduct a beach landing in Zodiac F470 Combat Rubber Raiding Craft. Photo by: Cpl. Matthew Callahan

likewise used with great success—and occasionally spectacular failure—during World War II. Modern warfare has similarly seen raids used to great effect— some successful and some not.

On today’s rapidly changing battlefield, the raid is often viewed as a supporting attack. Nonetheless, as an independent operation, a raid can yield spectacular results if correctly executed. Conversely, a poorly planned and executed raid can result in failure and humiliation of the force executing the raid, thereby negatively impacting morale and public perception—especially international perception.

At the political level, a strategic raid can be sanctioned to show both steadfastness and willingness to pursue

the enemy wherever he may be. However, it is imperative that the raid does not lose sight of its political objectives or overlook the possible fallout it may create. If the potential gains of a raid exceed the expected fallout, then the decision will be taken to launch the raid.

A successful raid impedes the enemy’s decision-making cycle and has a negative impact on his morale. On the other hand, an unsuccessful raid may increase both the enemy’s brazenness and his desire to continue operations. It may also be used as an opportunity to humiliate the failed raiders and their government.

As an independent operational mission, a raid is not intended to hold ground and/or dominate terrain. Rather, it has a specific purpose and culminates

12 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

immediately after its operational objectives have been met via rapid extraction or withdrawal before the enemy can regain his balance and launch a counterattack against the raiding force.

In exceptional circumstances, a link-up force may join the raiding force and aid its withdrawal.

The size, composition and delivery technique of a raiding force is dependent on several factors—namely: • The objective(s) of the operation • The enemy • The target area • The terrain • The distribution of the local population in and around the target area At the military level, a raid is a mission-

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 13 10/21/13 9:52 AM

specific operation that can be launched for several reasons. These include: • To deceive, disrupt and confuse an enemy • To unbalance an enemy • To force the enemy to redeploy forces elsewhere, thus presenting numerous attack options against the redeploying enemy forces • To release POWs or hostages • To kill and/or capture High-Value Persons • To attack and destroy High-Value Targets • To gather intelligence • To inflict casualties on the enemy A swarm attack consists of a number of simultaneous raids from multiple directions at coordinated timings against a single target. Swarm attacks are intended to unbalance an enemy and inflict casualties. These raids

usually deliver a blow to the morale of the targeted troops or bases, and they often force the enemy commander to continually divide and redeploy his troops to counter the swarms.

When planning a raid, several important principles need to be carefully considered, including the following: • Detailed intelligence on the target and operational environment: The operational plan must be driven by sound, credible intelligence. The operational environment (OE) will dictate the insertion method, the risk of compromise by the local population, and the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) the raiding force will apply.

Similarly, the enemy deployment, strengths, and weapons will determine the size of the raiding force and help predict likely enemy counteractions.

• Detailed planning: When it comes

14 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

to raids, the adage that “failing to plan is planning to fail” certainly holds true.

Planning is driven by intelligence, and nothing should be left to chance as the risk of failure can be both disastrous and humiliating. The plan must be simple, flexible, and realistic. A good plan can only be executed if the chosen forces are correctly led, trained, and equipped.

Secrecy: Secrecy is an essential prerequisite for surprise, and it is essential to protecting the mission from compromise. To maintain mission integrity, the mission must be dealt with on an exclusive need-to-know basis. The secrecy of the mission is further enhanced by force isolation and restricted access to the “outside world.”

• Thorough training and rehearsals prior to insertion/deployment: Prior to any raid, the forces involved must be mission-specifically trained, and

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rehearsals must be conducted in an area that can simulate the target area. During rehearsals, attention must be given to actions for dealing with casualties, lost equipment, raiding parties being cut-off by the enemy, escape, evasion, and so forth.

• Timing: The raid must be timed to coincide with the period when the enemy is known to be least vigilant. Timing will also impact the method of infiltration.

For example, if the raid is to be conducted prior to first light or after last light, the raiding force must be equipped with night-vision equipment.

• Daring: A raid can be fraught with risks. To overcome these risks, the raiding force must be well-trained and confident, must believe in the plan, and must be able to immediately adapt to rapid changes on the ground. To push home the mission, troops at all levels must exercise daring.

• Surprise: Surprise is achieved by the implementation of a strict needto-know policy, the timing of the raid, the infiltration technique(s), deception, and the speed of execution. A lack of surprise or an infiltration that has been compromised will provide the enemy commander with time to prepare his forces to meet the raiding force. Surprise is also achieved by utilizing the least obvious approach route to the target.

• Aggression: Aggression coupled with speed, surprise, and focused firepower can result in rapid enemy collapse. Aggression can additionally impact the enemy’s morale and result in the enemy deserting his position(s). Aggression is a by-product of tough training, resolute leadership, and unity of effort.

• Speed of execution: Speed, when combined with aggression and controlled firepower, can result in the enemy surrendering the initiative. Speed of execution also contributes to momentum,

and momentum can be rapidly exploited to achieve mission success.

• Initiative at all levels: It is imperative that initiative is delegated to all levels within the raiding force. This will allow troops to adapt to rapidly changing situations, retain flexibility, and alter the battlefield to their advantage.

• Decentralized command and control:

16 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

It is essential that command and control is decentralized to allow for flexibility, rapid decision-making, and adaptation of plans according the situation.

• Immediate extraction or link-up plans: Due to the vulnerability of a raiding force, an immediate extraction or link-up action must be implemented, especially when hostages have been

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out by the South African Defence Force (SADF) during South Africa’s campaigns in Angola in the 1980s. Despite the fact that South Africa saw itself as being at war against communist guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists, these raids were met with harsh international criticism and sanction.

Although many valuable lessons learned by the SADF have been lost to modern planners and soldiers alike, the raid remains an important military maneuver that can yield advantageous strategic, operational, and tactical results and place a government in an uncompromising and strong position.

rescued or POWs have been taken.

• Limiting collateral damage: Collateral damage must be reduced to the absolute minimum. Failure to do so will result in the local population around the target area siding with enemy forces—especially when future operations are planned in the target area. Excessive collateral damage will furthermore act as a feeder to enemy forces.

Raiding forces can be inserted in a number of ways, including by land, by sea, and by air. Depending on the objectives of the mission as well as the terrain and the enemy’s relative strengths, raiding forces may be composed of highly mobile mechanised units. Indeed, it was this approach to raids that led to development of the Soviet Army’s Operational Manoeuvre Groups.

Numerous strategic, operational, and tactical raids were successfully carried

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

blogspot.com. The author is the chairman of STTEP International. He is the author of Executive Outcomes (Galago Publishing, 2007) and Composite Warfare: The Conduct of Ground Forces Operations in Africa.

ENDNOTES Time, 27 May 1996, p. 51.

L. E. Barlow, Executive Outcomes, Against All Odds, Galago, 2007, p. 414.

3 Ibid.

4 Duncan was killed in an air crash in 2009 while working for Bancroft Global Development in Uganda.

5 Time, 27 May 1996, p. 51.

6 Evening Standard, 22 May 1996.

1 2

Mr. Barlow is a former special operations officer of the South African Defence force. He was the founder of the company Executive Outcomes, and eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurity blog.

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Case Study:

NAIROBIâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;S WESTGATE SHOPPING MALL ATTACK On Saturday, October 5, 2013, American special operations personnel launched a maritime assault on the town of Barawe, located on the beaches of southern Somalia.1 Their target is believed to have been Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr, also known as Ahmed Godane, leader of the terrorist group al-Shabab.

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By Steve Young

G

odane had previously claimed responsibility for the September 21, 2013, terrorist attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya.2 During the on-land portion of the operation, the Americans encountered heavy small arms fire.

They withdrew in accordance with their pre-mission contingency planning and returned to a support vessel at sea. This was not the first time Americans had attacked a High-Value Target in Barawe.

In September 2009, a daylight raid killed six people, including Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, one of the most-wanted

al-Qaeda operatives in the region and an alleged plotter in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

The October 5 operation came shortly after the September 24 conclusion of the Westgate Mall attack, in which at least 70 people were killed and approximately 175 were injured. In the aftermath of the attack, many tactical questions remain.

Information released by al-Shabab on Twitter stated that the attack was conducted in retaliation for Kenyan army cross-border raids into al-Shabab strongholds in Somalia in October

2011. Dubbed Operation Linda Nchi, the Kenyan incursions were reportedly launched to rescue foreign aid workers and resulted in the killing of many alShabab members.3

WHO IS AL-SHABAB? Al-Shabab or â&#x20AC;&#x153;The Youthâ&#x20AC;? is an alQaeda affiliate based in Somalia that the U.S. State Department designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 2008. The group was founded during a period of Somali political chaos as the result of a split within al-Ittihad alIslami (Unity of Islam), a militant Salafi

2013 Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya. Photos by: Anne Knight

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Smoke rising from the Westgate Mall area in Nairobi, Kenya, after the September 2013 attacks and rescue efforts. Photo by: Kul Wadhwa

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extremist group that peaked in the 1990s after the fall of former Somali President Siad Barre’s military regime (1969– 1991). Al-Shabab then linked up with a number of extremist groups known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a loose-knit organization dedicated to the establishment of shariah law on the Somali peninsula and the prohibition of various types of entertainment (such as movies and music), the sale of khat (a narcotic plant often chewed locally), smoking, the shaving of beards, and many other “un-Islamic” activities.4 There have been unconfirmed reports of al-Shabab members kidnapping young boys and forcing them to fight for the group, similar to the child soldiers of the Uganda-based Lord’s Resistance Army.

Al-Shabab violently persecutes nonMuslims, including Christians. Several beheadings of so-called apostates have been recorded.5 Together with the ICU, al-Shabab successfully captured the Somali capital city of Mogadishu in 2006. Fearing a spillover of violence against its mainly Christian population, Ethiopia invaded Somalia and quickly evicted the extremists. Al-Shabab members then retreated primarily to southern Somalia, where they initiated a guerilla campaign against the Ethiopian troops.

In approximately 2007, the United Nations formed a regional military contingent named the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Its mission was to defend the Somali transitional government while replacing the withdrawing Ethiopians. Kenya and Uganda were the major troop contributors to AMISOM—a fact that did not go unnoticed by al-Shabab.

Although al-Shabab’s base of operations is nominally southern Somalia, it seeks to expand its influence and jihadist message beyond those boundaries. The

group’s first reported operation outside the country was in Uganda on July 12, 2010, where three al-Shabab suicide bombers killed 74 people as they watched soccer’s World Cup in the capital city of Kampala. When taking credit for the killings, an al-Shabab spokesman claimed the attack was in response to Uganda’s contribution of 6,000 troops to AMISOM and that the Ugandans were told previously to pull their troops out of Somalia.6 Similar warnings were issued by al-Shabab to the Kenyan government prior to the Westgate Mall attack.7

in 2006, intent on going to Somalia to participate in jihad. Hammami swiftly rose to a leadership role in alShabab, resulting in a U.S. government indictment for terrorist activities in November 2006 and a $5 million reward on his head. Hammami was considered important to the organization’s efforts to recruit English-speaking jihadists,

especially Americans. Unfortunately for Hammami, it is believed he ran afoul of al-Shabab’s leadership and was killed in an ambush on September 12, 2013.9 Because the group is actively recruiting American citizens in the United States, al-Shabab is considered by the FBI to be one of the “highest priorities in antiterrorism.” In fact, former FBI Director

A THREAT TO THE U.S. The vast majority of al-Shabab’s members are native Somalis. However, in the last few years the group has recruited from ethnic Somali communities in both Western Europe and the United States.

Having a European or U.S. passport is invaluable to terrorists who want to cross international borders. The actual number of ethnic Somalis who hold U.S. passports and are participating in jihad in Somalia is unknown, but their presence is undeniable. There have been at least three U.S. citizen suicide bombers who have been “martyred” in Somalia. Among the most recent was 22-year-old Abdisalan Hussein Ali, who was one of two suicide bombers who attacked AMISOM troops on October 29, 2011. Ali’s family identified him as speaking in an audio message released by al-Shabab claiming credit for the bombing.8 Ali was living in Minneapolis, Minnesota, when he was recruited for overseas jihad.

Another prominent American member of al-Shabab was Omar Hammami, also known as Abu Mansoor al-Amriki, who was born in Daphne, Alabama, just a short drive from Mobile on Alabama’s Gulf Coast. The son of a Syrian father and a staunch Baptist mother, Hammami converted to Islam and left Alabama

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Robert Mueller expressed concern that ethnic Somalis with U.S. passports may return to the U.S. and attempt to carry out an attack similar to that attempted

by Somali-Australians in August 2009, when a planned suicide attack by five individuals on an Australian Army base was foiled. Mueller stated that al-Shabab remains a source of concern because of its desire to expand operations outside Somalia and its ability to attract American recruits.

THE WESTGATE ATTACK When the attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Shopping Mall was first reported on September 21, 2013, many people compared this armed assault to the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, on November 26–29, 2008. However, there are significant differences. For example, the Mumbai attack was conducted by 10 terrorists on multiple targets,10 while the al-Shabab terrorists only numbered about four and the Westgate Mall was their sole target.

Still, in both Mumbai and Westgate, the selected targets were considered “soft” and the attackers’ chosen weapons were AK-47s, hand grenades, and, to a lesser extent, RPGs.

The assault finally ended on the evening of Tuesday, September 24, with all four known terrorists dead, thus concluding approximately 80 hours of terror in the shopping mall.

For several reasons, Westgate was considered by many security specialists to be an attack waiting to happen. Built in 2007, the mall contained relatively upscale shopping for Nairobi’s elite and was considered the place to be seen.

Many expatriates—including foreign diplomats—went there on Saturday afternoons with their families, as the mall contained a cinema and often hosted family-related activities. In fact, on the day of the attack there was a children’s food and cooking competition being held on the roof of the third-floor parking garage. Security upon entering the mall on foot or via car was relatively lax. In addition, the mall was partly owned by Israeli investors,11 and there had already been attacks against Israelis in Kenya.

For example, on November 28, 2002, alQaeda operatives launched two Russianmade shoulder-fired SA-7 surface-to-air missiles at an Israeli Boeing 757 that was departing Mombasa. Both missiles missed their target. Approximately 20 minutes later, two al-Qaeda suicide bombers detonated a VBIED in front of the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel.

Fifteen Kenyans and three Israeli tourists were killed and another 80 persons were injured in that attack.12 The assault on Westgate Shopping Mall began at approximately 12:30 pm on Saturday, September 21, 2013.

Upon entering the mall’s front entrance, the attackers fired indiscriminately and made their way to the food court and the second-level Nakumatt supermarket searching for targets. The four attackers methodically singled out non-Muslims for execution, thus fulfilling part of the al-Shabab ideology. Reports of hostages being taken or mutilated appear to be false as the terrorists continued to kill at will. For the next two days, Kenyan security forces exchanged fire with the

22 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

terrorists while continuing to rescue persons still trapped in the mall, but they failed to kill, capture, or contain the attackers quickly.

All governments are challenged by small, agile operations like the Westgate attack, but many questions remain unanswered regarding the Kenyan government’s response to the incident.

Kenyan security forces reportedly did not enter the mall until approximately three hours after the first shots were fired. Immediately after commencement of the attack, confusion arose as to who would be in charge of the response, as both Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) and Kenyan police claimed jurisdiction over the counterattack. At one time both services were in the mall, reportedly resulting in a friendly fire killing.13 Kenyan police ultimately assumed responsibility but were passive in resolving the crisis.

On Monday, September 23, possibly due to the attackers setting fire to mattresses and/or as the result of an assault by the Kenyan army, part of the roof of the mall’s third-floor parking garage collapsed, burying everything in the two floors beneath. The collapsed roof may have killed two of the attackers, as two unidentified bodies with weapons not used by Kenyan forces were found in the rubble.14 The assault finally ended on the evening of Tuesday, September 24, with all four known terrorists dead, thus concluding approximately 80 hours of terror in the shopping mall.

THE ATTACKERS Reported numbers of attackers ranged from 10 to 15 at different times during the Westgate assault. There were also initial reports of female attackers, possibly including 29-year-old Samantha Lewthwaite, known as the White Widow

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Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 12 sent a small team of Marines into Uganda, Feb. 3, to train Ugandan forces for the fight against Al-Shabab in Somalia and the hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord Resistance Army. Photo by: Cpl. Jad Sleiman because she was once married to the July 7, 2005, London bomber, Germaine Lindsay. Both Britons and Americans were said to have participated in the attack. Later, on October 5, 2013, Kenyan military spokesman Major Emmanuel Chirchir identified the perpetrators as Abu Baara al-Sudani, Omar Nabhan, Khattab al-Kene, and Umayr.15 Much early reporting eventually proved inaccurate.

A November 11 report probably identified at least two of the attackers correctly. Hassan Abdi Dhuhulow, a

23-year-old Somali native moved to Norway in 1999. Dhuhulow had gone to the Somali capital of Mogadishu for a three-month visit in 2009, then moved to Somalia permanently in March 2010.

He may have become radicalized during the 2009 visit to Mogadishu, as persons familiar with Dhuhulow said he did not feel he belonged in Norway.16 A Kenyan official also identified Mohammed Abdinur Said as another attacker. Said once lived in the Kakuma refugee camp run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which

24 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

houses 101,000 refugees, including 54,000 Somalis.

Boxes containing the charred remains of two persons found in the aforementioned rubble of the thirdfloor parking garage have been delivered to Kenyan authorities for forensic identification with assistance from Interpol and the FBI.17 More recently, it was officially acknowledged that the four known attackers were ethnic Somalis, including Dhuhulow and Said. All four crossed into Kenya from Somalia in June 2013 and based themselves in Nairobiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s

UN compound attack June 19, 2013, by Al Shabab, Mogadishu, Somalia. Photo by: Aljouf largely ethnic-Somali district of Eastleigh prior to the attack.18 As in nearly every coordinated attack, these four individuals had a support element within the local community.

Four ethnic Somalis living in Nairobi, none of whom are accused of being gunmen in the mall, appeared in a Kenyan court on November 4.

Mohammed Ahmed Abdi, Liban Abdullah, Adan Adan, and Hussein Hassan have been arrested for allegedly providing material support to the attackers.

VOLUNTEERS Perhaps unique to the Westgate attack response was the number of civilian volunteers who rushed in to either help with rescue efforts or actually battle the terrorists. For example, Abdul Haji, armed with a pistol, ran into the mall to help rescue his trapped brother. Along the way, he rescued four-year-old Portia Walton, who had been in the mall with her mother and two sisters.19 On the

roof, a British man with a reported SAS background ushered survivors through a side entrance to the third-floor Java Coffee shop, from where a fire escape led to the ground floor.20 Other civilians set up an impromptu relief center in a Hindu religious facility located approximately 650 yards from Westgate Mall. Volunteers brought in food, water, clothing, and tea for much of the time the assault was going on.21

AFTERMATH After the conclusion of the Westgate attack, three days of official mourning were observed for the victims and their families.22 Physical effects of the attack were immediately obvious, but the assault also left many survivors psychologically scarred, especially some children who have since been diagnosed with PTSD.23 In response to the attack, Kenyan police began a crackdown on Islamic activities in major cities. Allegations of mass detentions and police carrying out extrajudicial killings have allegedly fuelled Muslim

resentment. Some imams have stated that heavy-handed police tactics will ultimately help al-Shabab recruiting efforts.24 Despite the slow government response to the assault, most Kenyans initially supported the soldiers and police who were actively engaged in the firefight.

However, this support faded when the public became aware of KDF soldiers looting shops in the mall when they were supposed to be fighting the terrorists.

Although reports of such activity were initially denied by the government, security video clearly showed soldiers taking goods, including unpacked mobile

Allegations of mass detentions and police carrying out extrajudicial killings have allegedly fuelled Muslim resentment.

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 25

phone boxes from a phone store and filled plastic shopping bags from the Nakumatt supermarket.25 The Westgate Mall attack remains an active investigation. Nevertheless, chief among the remaining questions is how to protect against future attacks on soft targets, such as those represented in Mumbai and again at Westgate. In an October 21 interview, one of Interpol Secretary General Ronald Noble’s suggestions was to allow civilians to carry their own guns to protect themselves.

Noble acknowledged to ABC News that attacks on soft targets like Westgate would likely become increasingly common. He also asserted that an armed citizenry would likely have resulted in fewer casualties in situations such as the July 12, 2012, cinema attack in Aurora, Colorado by James Holmes.26

Protecting soft targets in the U.S. thus remains an important topic. Lone-wolf attacks and small-team assaults against soft targets are difficult to preempt.

They remain a concern not only for law enforcement, but for everyone associated with a soft target—from the local convenience store owner to large companies and parents of school children.

How to mitigate and/or prevent these attacks will no doubt remain a subject of national interest for years to come.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Young is a former CIA Operations Officer of the Clandestine Service with tours in the Middle East and South Asia.

He is currently the Coordinator for the Masters of Science in Security Studies at Sam Houston State University, in Huntsville, Texas.

26 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

ENDNOTES “Navy SEALs go after al-Shabab senior leader in Somalia”, October 5, 2013. CBSNews.com. Available at: http:// www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_16257606207/navy-seals-go-after-al-shababsenior-leader-in-somalia/. Retrieved November 17, 2013.

2 Lee Ferran, James Gordon Meek and Dana Hughes, “Terror group: Meet our demands or Kenya mall attack only the beginning”, September 24, 2013. ABC News.go.com. Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ terror-group-meet-demands-kenya-mallattack-beginning/story?id=20356003#.

Umc9FJqo2_Y.email. Retrieved on October 24, 2013.

3 “Operation Linda Nchi”. AEI Critical Threats Project. Available at: http://www. criticalthreats.org/somalia/operation1

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linda-nchi. Retrieved on October 24, 2013.

4 “What is al-Shabab?”, September 23, 2013. PBS News Hour. Available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ rundown/2013/09/what-is-al-shabaab. html. Retrieved on November 18, 2013.

Ibid.

5 “Somali militants claim responsibility for Uganda bombings”, July 12, 2010.

CNN.com. Available at: http://www. cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/07/12/ uganda.bombings/index.html. Retrieved on November 18, 2013.

6 Lee Ferran, James Gordon Meek and Dana Hughes, “Terror group: Meet our demands or Kenya mall attack only the beginning”, September 24, 2013. ABC News.go.com. Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ terror-group-meet-demands-kenya-mall-

attack-beginning/story?id=20356003#.

Umc9FJqo2_Y.email. Retrieved on October 24, 2013.

7 “Al Shabaab’s American recruits”, October 28, 2013. Anti-Defamation League. Available at: http://www.adl.org/ combating-hate/domestic-extremismterrorism/c/al-shabaabs-american.html.

Retrieved on November 18, 2013.

8 “Lee Ferran, James Gordon Meek and Dana Hughes, “American jihadist Omar Hammami likely killed in Somalia, father reacts”, September 12, 2013. ABC News.go.com. Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/omarhammami-american-rapping-jihadistkilled-somalia/story?id=20234254.

Retrieved on November 13, 2013.

9 Cameron Stewart and Milanda Rout, “Somali extremists on a ‘fatwa order’ from God”, August

05, 2009. The Australian. Available at: http://www.theaustralian.com. au/news/nation/somali-extremistson-a-fatwa-order-from-god/storye6frg6nf-1225758010718. Retrieved on November 19, 2013.

10 “Al Shabaab’s American recruits”, October 28, 2013. Anti-Defamation League. Available at: http://www.adl.org/ combating-hate/domestic-extremismterrorism/c/al-shabaabs-american.html.

Retrieved on November 18, 2013.

11 Steve A. Young, “Nairobi’s Westgate mall and the attack that was waiting to happen”, September 22, 2013. Agence France Presse. Available at: http://www. ndtv.com/article/world/nairobi-swestgate-mall-and-the-attack-that-waswaiting-to-happen-422076. Retrieved on November 13, 2013.

12 Jonathan Fighel, “Al-Qaeda -

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DISCLAIMER: This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number 2008-GD-T8-K015 administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMA, Training and Exercises Integration Secretariat. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

For more information please visit www.preventivestrategies.net 28 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 IPS-RDPC-DHS-2012 Ad 7.25 x 4.875.new.indd 1

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Mombassa attacks 28 November 2002”, June 13, 2011. International Institute for Counterterrorism. Available at: http:// www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/ Articlsid/942/currentpage/5/Default. aspx. Retrieved on November 13, 2013.

13 Daniel Howden, “Terror in Westgate mall: the full story of the attacks that devastated Kenya”, October 4, 2013. The Guardian. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/ interactive/2013/oct/04/westgatemall-attacks-kenya-terror. Retrieved on October 22, 2013.

14 James Meikle, “Two bodies found at Kenyan mall probably attackers, says MP”, October 18, 2013. The Guardian.

Available at: http://www.theguardian. com/world/2013/oct/18/two-bodieskenya-mall-attackers. Retrieved on November 11, 2013.

“Kenya’s military spokesman names attackers”, October 5, 2013. USA Today. com. Available at: http://www.usatoday. com/story/news/world/2013/10/05/ kenyas-military-spokesman-namesattackers/2926929/. Retrieved on November 17, 2013.

16 Jason Straziuso and Tom Odula, “One of Westgate Mall attackers lived in Kenyan refugee camp”, November 11, 2013. Washington Times.com. Available at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2013/nov/11/one-westgatemall-attackers-lived-kenyan-refugeec/?page=all#pagebreak. Retrieved on November 13, 2013.

17 Ibid.

Peter Martell, “Westgate attackers spent four months planning in Nairobi”, November 19, 2013. Yahoo News.com.

Available at: http://news.yahoo.com/ 15

kenya-mall-siege-live-report-141551678. html. Retrieved on November 19, 2013.

18 “Four linked to Westgate mall attack appear in Kenyan court”, November 11, 2013. Agence France Presse. Available at: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/ article/ALeqM5hdrqbQlUxDBygx5_ ScO-Sa93XEnw?docId=4ec5ac47-df4840d2-a0c6-2a8560d16144. Retrieved on November 11, 2013.

19 “Hero of mall massacre revealed: Selfless Muslim civilian who rushed into terror and saved life of U.S. girl, 4, and her family”, September 27, 2013. Daily Mail.com. Available at: 20 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-2434491/Kenya-mall-attackAmerican-mother-reveals-selflessMuslim-civilian-helped-usher-daughterssafety.html. Retrieved on November 22, 2013.

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UNRESTRICTED WARFARE AND DRUG SMUGGLING

A Marine hauls bags of black tar heroin captured in Shah Karez, Afghanistan.

Photos by: Staff Sgt. Robert Storm 30 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

By John Poole

Westerners often assume a straightforward approach to warfare in which overwhelming force is applied in order to obtain compliance. Other cultures, however, have historically prioritized battlefield deception, and thus approach warfare using a different set of rules.

T

hese cultures externally trade any commodity and have developed non-martial ways of making war. Much of what the U.S. government sees as dishonest in these actions, other cultures consider clever. Due to the influence of Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-tung on its culture, the People’s Republic of

China (PRC) has a tradition of engaging in this type of warfare.

China’s globally expansionist activities have been well documented for many years, primarily in non-U.S. publications.1 After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, China became the dominant Communist empire builder.

Given the role of the U.S. in the fall of the Soviet Union, China would likely have implemented a long-term plan to limit U.S. interference. Since 9/11, however, America’s political leaders have primarily focused on al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is certainly dangerous, but its ability to destroy America from within is limited.

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 31

China has far greater capability in this regard. In Unrestricted Warfare, a 1999 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy book, Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangsui revealed a number of ways in which America could be attacked without anyone realizing the attacks were happening.

DRUG WARFARE

Wei Hsueh-Kang, a drug lord of the Southeast Asian Golden Triangle.

Photo by: U.S. State Department

After introducing “smuggling warfare,” Unrestricted Warfare touts drug warfare as the process of “obtaining sudden and huge illicit profits by spreading disaster in other countries.”2 Might the Maoist expansionist method have been refined since the Vietnam War? The amount of money involved in the global drug trade would make guerrilla warfare necessary only after all political and economic subversion had failed or been exhausted.

No money trail would lead back to the attack’s ultimate instigator(s).

Unrestricted Warfare asserts that the “source country for drugs” would be safe from U.S. military attack. In the very next sentence, the book points out that “special funds can be set up to influence another country’s government through lobbying.” Then, in the footnote of the concluding section, the book promises the safety of such a “nation state attack” (one that had been made to look like organized crime).3 Their underlying point is that, due to the separation of responsibilities within the U.S. system, American political leaders tend to view a bullet-spewing assault as the only act of war. The conclusion of Unrestricted Warfare further states, “The U.S. military does not treat transnational companies … as security threats, and… they still limit threats to the military arena.”4 A more recent description of Chinese warfare capabilities repeats this warning.

32 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

According to an August 2006 GeostrategyDirect article, “China’s ‘comprehensive warfare’ strategy wears down [an] enemy using non-military means… [Chinese] National Defense University Senior Col. Meng Xiansheng… defined the term as ‘the means of defeating enemies without waging a war through deploying a wide range of political, economic, cultural, diplomatic and military tactics.’ [Col.] Meng said ‘comprehensive warfare’ advocates the use of non-violent means in handling state-to-state disputes… but [it] also fits with China’s grand strategy of ‘peaceful development.’”5 Many Western business travelers to Asia and most U.S. veterans of wars in the region can attest to the cultural practice of misdirection. On Iwo Jima, for example, frontline Americans “hardly ever” saw who they were fighting.6 The internal “disaster” that some PRC officers have advocated through drug warfare correlates with U.S. law enforcement concerns of what might follow a narcotics deluge. Basically, an influx of illicit drugs would result in an increased number of addicts who would engage in theft to secure the money for their next “fix.” Street combat would intensify as gangs vied for neighborhood control, and larger payoffs would further compromise the political and criminal justice systems.

The CIA’s World Factbook describes China as a “Communist state,” a “major trans-shipment point for heroin produced in the Golden Triangle,” and a “source country for methamphetamine and heroin chemical precursors.”7 With this in mind, if China were to attack America with narcotics, it would have at least two maneuvers and both would appear unlikely. The primary would be a massive influx of Afghani heroin, made to look

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 33

Cross-border drug smuggling tunnel discovered inside a warehouse near San Diego. Photo by: DVIDSHUB as though it had come from Central or South America. The other might be the proliferation of a drug produced by U.S. citizens (in lower quality) from cold pills.

We will discuss the more dangerous of the two possibilities—the heroin trade—first.

THE HEROIN TRADE

Heroin filled boot soles.

Photo by: Customs Border Protection

When the Chinese Communists assumed control of Hong Kong from the British in 1997, they worried its Taiwanaffiliated triads would create trouble.

Soon, the Chinese realized that—as criminal enterprises—the triads could be

34 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

“financially influenced.” That’s precisely what happened to the one with the largest overseas operation. In July 1997, freelance reporter Frederic Dannen wrote, “[H]e [Deng Xiaoping, China’s leader] bought them: the Sun Yee On. The largest Hong Kong triad society, no longer requires initiates to pledge allegiance to Taiwan; now it is to the People’s Republic of China that they swear.”8 Like the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the PLA is known to have corporate extensions and fronts. China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO)

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 35

appears to be one of them. Hutchison Whampoa Limited (HWL) makes no such admission; however, it does have five port facilities along the most frequently used Pacific smuggling corridor into the U.S: Manta, Ecuador; Balboa, Panama; and Lazaro Cardenas, Manzanillo, and Ensenada, Mexico. HWL also has ports along Atlantic approaches to America, including Cristobal, Panama; Veracruz, Mexico; and Freeport, Bahamas.9 Would all companies supporting the PLA have to be obvious, or even legitimate? A criminal enterprise

could make a valuable surrogate for secretive non-martial strategies.10 In July 1997, The New Republic reported, “[The] People’s Liberation Army owns a string of nightclubs with the Sun Yee On triad society… [T]he ‘great fear’ of the Hong Kong police is arms smuggling by triads in alliance with the People’s Liberation Army.”11 In 2003, researcher Neil Helfand also stated, “Members of the Sun Yee On triad… are involved in the trafficking of heroin and methamphetamines… to the United States.”12 In addition, Dannen’s work

36 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

asserted, “[The triads’] powerful influence is felt worldwide in counterfeiting, arms dealing, alien smuggling, and money laundering. Hong Kong is a key transit point for the Southeast Asian heroin and methamphetamine that pour into the United States, and triads play a key role in the drugs’ trans-shipment.”13 The volume of illegal drugs now flowing into America under the auspices of the Hong Kong triads is difficult to quantify. These triads are more secretive than other criminal elements, though several are known to have operations

A field of blooming poppy plants that is ready to be harvested in the Sangin district, Afghanistan, April 9, 2011. The annual poppy harvest is the largest profiting event of the year for local farmers. Approximately 95 percent of the world's heroin supply is produced in Afghanistan.

Photo by: Lance Cpl. Kowshon Ye/Released in the Americas. The largest of these operations are run by Sun Yee On and 14-K. Precursor chemical shipments to Mexico are now doing much of the drug damage in the United States. For years, the triads have distributed fully finished Asian products to U.S. users via the Mexican cartels.14 Mexicanmade methamphetamine (meth) has now been added to that mix. Relatively small quantities of Chinese precursor are involved, and many Americans still believe meth is primarily coming from

local labs. Death by a thousand razor cuts (with some looking self-inflicted) is, after all, an Oriental way of dealing with a more powerful opponent. Westerners are more culturally drawn to big events, but a rash of tiny incidents such as these can inflict more cumulative damage.

Much of the traditional Southeast Asian drug conduit has shifted from Vancouver, Canada, to Mexico. There, the Hong Kong triads let the Mexican cartels buy, smuggle and distribute the drugs.15 Although a relatively small amount of heroin is produced in

Colombia and Mexico, this homegrown inventory is hard to distinguish from Golden Triangle or Afghani imports.

Afghanistan still provides 90% of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s supply (thanks to a bumper crop every year since the U.S. arrived in 2002, including the years of opium blight from 2007 to 2009).16 It seems likely that at least some of that Afghani heroin is making it to Mexico. As far back as 1988, the director of the DEA acknowledged to Congress that more than half of the heroin on U.S. streets was coming from Southern Afghanistan.17 Some of the

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 37

current product goes east into the Hong Kong pipeline. The rest would have little trouble moving from the Emirates, to Yemen, through Somalia, across North Africa to the Ivory Coast countries, and then down into Venezuela. From there, the heroin could easily enter the Central American conduit. In addition, there has been a Hezbollah smuggling route between West Africa and Venezuela for years.18 These circumstances have created an opportunity for the Communists that transcends mere profit.

According to a 1999 American Foreign Policy Council Report, “There is a well-documented history of Russian and Chinese organized crime organizations working as tools of their governments.

In Panama… there is a dangerous convergence of well-financed Chinese… mobs with Cuban government operatives and Latin American drug lords…This dark partnership is a… direct longterm threat to Mexico and the United States.”19 As recently as August 2013, The Wall Street Journal was reporting a major increase in the availability of heroin on American streets,20 but neither the PRC-friendly U.N. nor the DEA have confirmed (in their “Drug Threat Assessments”) that much Afghani product is reaching the U.S.

THE METH TRADE On May 30, 2013, law enforcement agents involved in Operation Dark Angel arrested 20 individuals involved in methamphetamine trafficking across five American states. Reports indicate that “the leader of the trafficking network, Armando MendozaHaro, has links to Mexico, where the methamphetamine was likely produced… [T]he cash was wired to banks in China.”21 In 2004, the U.S. began regulating pseudoephedrine, a key meth ingredient found in cold medicine. For a while, the number of American meth labs decreased. Then, in 2007, their number began to increase. According to a 2013 article in The Epoch Times, “Shipments of pure pseudoephedrine were coming into Mexico in quantity from China.” At first, precursors were being smuggled across the border.

Then, it became simpler to smuggle the finished product.22 Last year, the Mexican military seized over 15 tons of pure meth (worth around $1 billion) outside Guadalajara.23 In addition, since 2011, two large Chinese shipments of meth precursors have been intercepted en route to Mexico. One of these was from Shanghai and seized by the Mexican navy, and the other was taken in Belize and intended for Los Zetas.24

Last year, the Mexican military seized over 15 tons of pure meth (worth around $1 billion) outside Guadalajara.23 Circle 343 on Reader Service Card

38 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 39

A boarding team from the guided missile cruiser USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), board and take control of one of two wooden dhows found loaded with heroin and methamphetamines. Legal officials are investigating to determine connections to Al-Qaida and the use of drug money for funding of terrorist operations worldwide. Photo by: U.S. Navy In addition, The Epoch Times reports: The type of precursor chemicals, their bulk amounts, and their origins make this [the above seizures] a true smoking gun, said Robert Bunker. . . at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

According to several sources, including China Brief, the shipments are tied to the Chinese Triads…

The nature of the Triads also ties them to

the Chinese Communist Party back in their homeland, according to… the author of “Contracted: America’s Secret Warriors.”25

CONCLUSION The PRC’s leadership has a pressing need for global resources. Those resources are more easily accessed without interference from the West.

Senior PLA officers have articulated a

plan to destabilize the United States and other target nations through the use of organized crime proxies and illegal drug smuggling. Organized crime figures in Asia have been swearing loyalty to the PRC. What quantity of illegal drugs is being smuggled into America and other nations as the result of Unrestricted Warfare? Could a large amount

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indirectly cause enough internal strife to effectively limit all resistance to China’s worldwide expansionist policy? Only a comprehensive intelligence-driven investigation can reveal the answers to these questions. Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing how much time is available to reveal the truth.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Poole is a Marine infantry veteran of the Vietnam War and a former criminal investigator. He has conducted a multi-decade study of Eastern small-unit tactics and strategy and authored a series of books on these subjects that are closely studied in special operations communities.

Mr. Poole’s most recent book is Gung Ho: The Corp’s Most Progressive Tradition (2012, posteritypress.org).

ENDNOTES Dragon Days, 2007, part one; Homeland Siege, 2009, intro. and chapt.

1; Global Warrior, 2011, chapt. 4 (all from posteritypress.org).

2 Unrestricted Warfare, by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1

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February 1999). FBIS translation over the internet.

3 Ibid., pp. 191, 223 (footnote 2).

4 Ibid., concluding section.

5 “China’s ‘Comprehensive Warfare’ Strategy Wears Down Enemy Using NonMilitary Means,” Geostrategy-Direct, 2 August 2006.

6 Iwo Jima veteran, in “Navaho Codetalkers,” Hist. Channel, 30 March 1999; former rifleman, in Iwo Jima, by Bill D. Ross (New York: Vintage, 1986), p. 135.

7 CIA—The World Factbook (as updated every three months at its website, www.odci.gov), s.v. “China.”

8 “Do I Look Dangerous to You,” Part I, Partners in Crime Series, by Frederic Dannen, The New Republic, 14 & 21 July 1997.

9 Hutchison Whampoa’s website, hutchison-whampoa.com.

10 Global Warrior, p. 72.

11 “Do I Look Dangerous to You,” by Dannen.

12 “Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Canada, 1999-2002,” by Neil S. Helfand, Fed. Research Div., Library of Congress, July 2003, pp. 25, 26.

A U.S. soldier separates confiscated materials, including AK-47 ammunition and black tar heroin, which were found inside a compound during a joint combat patrol mission in Luy Kariz, Afghanistan, Nov. 2, 2009.

Photo by: Staff Sgt. Dayton Mitchell/Released

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 41

“Do I Look Dangerous to You,” by Dannen.

14 Homeland Siege, chapt. 4.

15 Ibid.

16 “90%: Afghanistan, the Unholy Trinity, and Critical Thought,” by Louis DeAnda, Inst. for Defense and Govt.

Advancement, 26 July 2012.

17 DEA Chief Jack Dawn in testimony before the Senate Intel. Committee, and CIA assessment in September 1988, as quoted in Seeds of Terror, by Gretchen Peters (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009), pp. 28, 51.

18 “Guinea Bissau: Hezbollah, Al Qaida and the Lebanese Connection,” by Marco Vernaschi, pulitzercenter.org, 19 June 2009; “Drug Seizures in West Africa Prompt Fears of Terrorist Links,” by Jamie Doward, Guardian Observer Online (UK), 29 November 2009; World Drug Report 2010, pp. 84, 242-244.

19 Al Santoli, “The Panama Canal in Transition: Threats to U.S. Security and China’s Growing Role in Latin America,” American Foreign Policy Council Investigative Report, 23 June 1999.

20 “Heroin Makes a Comeback,” by Zusha Elinson, Wall Street Journal, 8 August 2013.

21 ‘Dark Angel’ and the Mexican Meth Connection,” by Ben West, STRATFOR Security Weekly, 14 June 2012.

22 “Chinese Gangs Fuel Meth Scourge in U.S.,” by Joshua Philipp, The Epoch Times (China Society International), 12 September 2013; CIA—The World Factbook, s.v. “Mexico.”

23 ‘Dark Angel’ and the Mexican Meth Connection,” by West.

24 “Chinese Gangs Fuel Meth Scourge in U.S.” 25 Ibid.

13

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 43

BOOK REVIEW

Disinformation

By Lieutenant General Ion Pacepa

Reviewed by: Chris Graham

ieutenant General Ion Pacepa was the highest ranking communist intelligence officer to defect to the United States. He is the author of Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism (WND, 2013). Pacepa’s account of life behind the Iron Curtain and life under Vladimir Putin reveals the amount of institutional deception that is necessary to bring an authoritarian government to power and the scope of domestic spying and manipulation that is necessary to retain that power.

Pacepa explains Disinformation: “Misinformation is an official government tool and recognizable as such.

Disinformation (i.e., dezinformatsiya) is a secret intelligence tool, intended to bestow a Western, nongovernment cachet on government lies.”

The author explains the size of the disinformation campaigns. “The [communist] bloc’s intelligence community alone had well over one million officers and several million informants around the world. All were involved in deceiving the West-and their own people-or in supporting this effort.

To them should be added the vast number of people working for the international disinformation organizations that the KGB secretly created… Some of those international “Potemkin villages” in which I was personally involved include: the World Peace Council (with branches in 112 countries); the World Federation of Trade Unions (with branches in 90

WPC pushed for global support of “those people and liberation movements fighting against imperialism.” He points out that on December 14, 2002, WPC ordered “the people of the world to organize unprecedented mobilizations against American imperialism.”

Pacepa lays out an example of a disinformation campaign undertaken through the Christian church: “In 1968, the KGB was able to maneuver a group of leftist South American bishops into holding a conference in Medellin, Colombia… The official task of the conference was to help eliminate poverty in Latin America. Its undeclared goal was to legitimize a KGB-created religious movement dubbed “liberation theology”.

The author states that Emilio Castro, an avowed Marxist, managed the World Council of Churches until 1992 and says “Castro strongly promoted the KGBcreated liberation theology, which is today putting down strong roots in Venezuela, Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua. In those countries, the peasants have supported the efforts of Marxist dictators Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, Manuel Zelaya… and Daniel Ortega to transform their countries into KGB-style police dictatorships.”

Pacepa describes the long reach of this initiative: “The… Trinity United Church of Christ in Chicago is part of this new movement. Its pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, who in 2008 became religious advisor to the presidential campaign of Senator Barack Obama, became famous for shouting, “not God bless America, but God damn America…

L

countries); the Women’s International Democratic Federation (with branches in 129 countries); the International Union of Students (with branches in 152 countries) and the World Federation of Democratic Youth (with branches in 210 countries).

Pacepa provides examples from environmental groups to peace councils that were used to advance socialist agendas.

“Most of the WPC’s permanent employees were undercover Soviet bloc intelligence officers specializing in “peace operations,” whose task was to shape the new Western peace movements into “fifth columns” for the “socialist camp.” He adds, “In 1989, when the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse, the WPC publicly admitted 90 percent of its money came from the KGB.” Pacepa alleges that even after 1991 the

44 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

Senator Obama’s presidential campaign apologized for Reverend Wright’s slip of the tongue.” But he adds, “[President] Obama had attended Reverend Wright’s black liberation theology church in Chicago for some 20 years.”

Pacepa describes another KGB campaign within the Islamic world. “Before 1969 came to an end, Palestinian terrorists trained at the KGB’s Balashikha specialoperations school east of Moscow had hijacked their first ‘Zionist” El Al plane and landed it in Algeria…” He adds, “During the next two years, various Palestinian terrorists (trained by the KGB) took credit for hijacking thirteen Israeli and Western passenger planes and for blowing up a SwissAir plane in flight…”

The author reveals, “The KGB, when I was connected with it, went to great lengths to transform an Egyptian born Marxist, Mohammed Yasser Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Husseini, nom de guerre Abu Ammar, into a Palestinian-born Yasser Arafat. It took the KGB… many years to endow Arafat with a credible Palestinian birth certificate and other identity documents, to build him a new past, and to train him at the KGB Balashikha special-operations school.”

Pacepa states, “In 1972, [Chairman] Andropov launched Operation “SIG”.

This was the code name for a ‘socialist division of labor’ aimed at turning the Islamic world into an ‘explosive’ enemy of the united States.” He adds, “According to a rough estimate received from Moscow, by 1978 the Soviet bloc intelligence community had sent some four thousand such agents of influence into the Islamic world.”

The author offers an explanation for some of the odd actions of the United Nations. “When I defected, virtually all UN employees …from the communist countries (comprising one third of the world’s population) and their Arab

allies were secretly working… for the (communist) bloc’s espionage services.”

He adds, “On august 31, 2001, a UN “World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance” opened in Durban, South Africa. A main objective was to approve another resolution asserting that Zionism was a brutal form of racism… Yasser Arafat, Fidel Castro, and the same gaggle of Arab and Third World governments that had supported the UN anti-Semitic resolution No. 3379 in 1975, urged participants to condemn Israel and the United States.”

Pacepa connects these initiatives with current events: “After September 11, 2001, thousands of people in the Islamic world danced in the streets for days to celebrate the glorious victory over the American evil. Killing Americans, Jews, and their allies became a way to energize Islamic extremists by giving them “victories’ to celebrate.”

Lt. Gen. Pacepa makes clear that he believes the disinformation campaigns continued after the Soviet financial collapse. “[Soviet President] Gorbachev’s book proposed a new utopia. The Soviet union would now be a ‘Marxist society of free people’.” He continues, “Putin consolidated Russia into an intelligence dictatorship, not a democracy. By 2003, more than six thousand former officers of the KGB who had framed Zionist spies and shot them, were running Russia’s federal and local governments. Nearly half of all top governmental positions were held by former officers of the KGB. It was like democratizing Nazi Germany with Gestapo officers at its helm… it also transformed today’s Russia into the first intelligence dictatorship in history.”

He asserts, “With the passage of time, evidence has begun to reveal that Putin’s Kremlin was involved in igniting, then stealing, the 2011 Islamic revolutions. In Egypt, the most pro-American Islamic

country, antigovernment demonstrations started on January 25, 2011, when people took to the streets to protest poverty, unemployment, and government corruption. Over the next few days, Cairo’s Tahrir Square filled with a sea of Hezbollah’s green flags mixed with red hammer-and-sickle banners.”

Pacepa cites history as a warning: “In 1945, the young British voters, also tired of five years of war and ignorant of world history, turned to Marx’s specter for help as well. Two months after World War II ended, they… brought in Clement Attlee, an undercover Marxist leader of the Labor Party. Attlee started his reign by nationalizing the healthcare system.

His appetite for socialism thus whetted, Attlee went on to nationalize the finance, auto, and coal industries, communication facilities, civil aviation, electricity, the steel industry- just as many leaders in the… United States have indicated they also intend to do. The British economy collapsed and the powerful British Empire passed into history, providing a stern-but evidently ignored- warning to all…”

In the 1980’s U.S. President Ronald Reagan orchestrated the final campaign of the Cold War successfully defeating the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Little consideration has been given to the nature of the wounds inflicted by the USSR prior to its’ reorganization. How many subversive seeds sown by yesterday’s communists are employed as weapons to undermine individual liberty, the freemarkets that made American prosperity possible and their shield, the U.S Constitution’s Bill of Rights, by today’s radicals? Read Lt. Gen. Pacepa’s book, Disinformation and decide for yourself.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Graham is a former commander of a military anti-terrorism unit and he is the editor of The Counter Terrorist magazine (www.chrisgrahamauthor.com)

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 45

THE INSURGENTS OF SYRIA

46 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

By Dean T. Olson

An estimated 100,000 people have been killed as the civil war in Syria approaches its third year. More than two million Syrians have fled the violence into neighboring countries, creating huge refugee flows into Jordan and Turkey.

A

nother 4.25 million people, nearly a third of Syriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s pre-war population of 20.8 million, have been displaced within the country since the conflict began in March 2011.1 The unrest started with popular demonstrations that spread across the nation over the following month. These demonstrations were part of the wider Middle Eastern unrest widely known as the Arab Spring. Syrian

protesters demanded the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad, whose family has oppressively ruled since 1971. The conflict spans ethnic, sectarian, and political lines and pits the Assad regime, with Iranian assistance, against an array of opposition groups that increasingly include a volatile mix of Islamic extremists.

From its beginnings as a protest movement, the insurgency has evolved

from local committees protecting their villages and cities against the regime into an organized rebellion with elements self-identified as brigades (though not actually brigade size in the military sense); these brigades coordinate their operations across multiple fronts.2 Fragmentation and disorganization have become common to Syriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s armed opposition since peaceful protestors took up arms in December 2011 and began

A close-up view of the Za'atri camp for Syrian refugees as seen on July 18, 2013, from a helicopter carrying U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh. Photo by: U.S. Department of State

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 47

Doctors and medical staff treating injured rebel fighters and civilians in Aleppo. Photo by: Scott Bobb

Car bombs hit the central Saadallah al-Jabiri square in Aleppo. Photo by: Zyzzzzzy forming rebel groups under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).3 The first provincial-level para-military structures formed under the umbrella of the FSA nominally headquartered in Turkey. The FSA traces its origin to early defectors from the Syrian army who refused to shoot unarmed protesters early in the

uprisings.4 On December 7, 2012, rebel leaders from across Syria announced the election of a new 30-member unified command structure called the Supreme Joint Military Command Council, known as the Supreme Military Command (SMC).5 The FSA is the military wing of the

48 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

opposition movement.6 Its stated goals include bringing down the government, protecting civilian protesters, encouraging army defections, and carrying out armed action. The number of foreign fighters active with the FSA is difficult to determine, but it includes militants from Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.7 Starting in December 2011, the FSA coordinated with political wings of the insurgency including the Syrian National Council and the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.8 Western observers described the FSA as a more moderate and secular part of the opposition than the overtly Islamist groups.9 There has been strife between some of the forces fighting the Syrian government and Islamist groups that often results in killings.10 Increased external support for Syriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s insurgency has contributed to its success on the battlefield. The main Syrian

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 49

A Syrian anti-government guerrilla. Photo by: VOA opposition body, the Syrian Coalition, receives logistic and political support from major Sunni states in the Middle East, most notably Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The three major supporting states have not contributed troops for direct involvement in the war, however.

Qatar reportedly funded the Syrian rebellion by as much as $3 billion over the first two years of the civil war.11 It is also reported that Qatar offered refugee packages of about $50,000 per year to defectors and their families.12 Saudi Arabia is invested in supporting

the opposition by providing arms to the rebels. Since the summer of 2013, Saudi Arabia has emerged as the main group financing the rebels.13 Turkey has trained defectors of the Syrian Army on its territory. The birth of the FSA was announced in 2011 under the supervision of Turkish military intelligence. In October 2011, Turkey provided the FSA a safe zone and a base of operations.

Together with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Turkey has also provided the rebels with arms and other military equipment.14 An unintended consequence of the

increased external support is infighting among groups competing for resources.

Many of the rebel factions are now largely concerned with fighting each other for control of territory and other key assets, including oil installations and cross-border trade routes. Unfortunately, Islamist groups are the most ideologically unified, have previous operational experience, and often use vicious means to rise to the top. Two branches of al-Qaeda have established themselves among the rebel organizations. The most prominent is the al-Nusra Front. In Arabic, the front is known as the Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham, or “the front for the assistance of the residents of Greater Syria.” The front is directly subordinate to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Al-Nusra was established in January 2012, ten months after the outbreak of the Syrian uprising.15 It is widely considered the most significant organization among the jihadists operating in Syria.16 The front has been described as the most aggressive and successful arm of the rebel force.

Its prominence among the rebel organizations traces back to its military and financial capabilities, its effective chain of command and control, and the deep ideological commitment of its

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“Free Syrian Army” insurgents on the move Photo by: Voice of America News: Rudi Bakhtiar operatives.17 The other major al-Qaeda affiliated group is the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, subordinate to al-Qaeda in Iraq. The two al-Qaeda branches have an estimated 6,000–7,000 operatives.

The al-Nusra Front identifies with alQaeda’s Salafist-jihadi ideology. It seeks to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, which includes Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority. Adhering to a puritanical variant of Islamist ideology, the group is hostile to the region’s minority sects and religions, especially the Alawites and the Shi’ites, which it views as heretics.

The group’s long-term strategies include gaining a hold over the rebel groups to establish a strong foundation in Syria for jihad that will support the overthrow of the Assad regime. That will be done through pragmatic collaboration, even if only partial and temporary, with other groups of rebels. After defeating the Assad regime, the group can be expected to move into a second stage of operations to take over the new Syrian regime

formed by the union of all the Salafistjihadi forces operating in Damascus, or at least to gain significant influence in it. This stage will likely be followed by establishing an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria to serve as the front line for al-Qaeda and the global jihad in the heart of the Middle East. The group could be expected to wage a terrorist campaign against Israel from the Golan Heights, export terrorism to the West and other countries around the world, and serve as a center for Islamic subversion and terrorism against the pro-Western Arab and Islamic countries.18 Abu Mohammad al-Golani, current leader of the al-Nusra Front, has confirmed the group’s allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.19 However, by May 2013, a faction of alNusra declared its loyalty to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).20 On April 9, 2013, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Husseini al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi, announced that its “Islamic State” will extend to al-Sham (the Levant), which officially conjoins

al-Nusra and al-Qaeda.21 In June 2013, al-Qaeda’s global leader Ayman alZawahiri insisted that al-Qaeda in Iraq and the al-Nusra Front had not merged, claiming that al-Baghdadi had “made a mistake on the merger announcement.”

The leader of the al-Nusra Front also denied the merger, claiming the front is an independent branch of al-Qaeda.

According to a U.N. report that depicts a widening and increasingly sectarian conflict, al-Nusra appears to have gained recruits and equipment since pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda.22 The accelerated radicalization of the conflict has allowed al-Nusra in particular to become more influential among Sunni Muslim extremist groups throughout the region, especially now that the Shi’ite Muslim fighters of Hezbollah are so visibly backing President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.23 The al-Nusra Front’s popularity among jihadist sympathizers might be the reason for a noticeable recent influx of foreign volunteers. According to the U.N. report, 24 “Foreign fighters with jihadist inclinations, often arriving from neighboring countries, continued to reinforce its ranks.”

It is now estimated that between 6,000 and 11,000 foreign fighters have entered Syria.25 At least 300 British citizens are estimated to have traveled to Syria with the intent of joining the civil war, according to the Times of London.26 Most of them are believed to be young Islamists. Other sources reported that four British citizens died recently in Syria’s largest city, Aleppo, while fighting alongside government troops in support of President Assad.27 They were fighting against the al-Nusra Front.

A large portion of the al-Nusra Front’s resources come from overseas. The group has admitted to recruiting fighters from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Lebanon,

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 51

Britain, and France.28 While the rank and file is made up of Syrian operatives and thousands of jihad fighters from the Arab-Muslim world—particularly Libya, Tunisia, Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—and many hundreds from the West, prominent among them are 500–600 volunteers from Europe, mainly France and the UK.29 Those who survive are expected to return to their home countries to spread jihad when the fighting in Syria is over. In addition, ISIL claims to supply the al-Nusra Front with half of its operating budget.

American intelligence officials report that dozens of Americans have traveled or tried to travel to Syria to fight with the rebels against the government of President Bashar al-Assad since 2011.30 That represents a fraction of the numbers of foreign fighters who have poured into Syria by way of the Middle East and North Africa. The number of Americans present is estimated to be no more than dozens and, unlike members of other nationalities, they have not yet distinguished themselves on the battlefield.31 One American, Nicole Lynn Mansfield, 33, of Flint, Michigan, a convert to Islam, was killed in May while in the company of Syrian rebels in Idlib Province.32 Another, Eric Harroun, 30, a former soldier from Phoenix, was indicted in Virginia by a federal grand jury this year on charges that he fought alongside the al-Nusra Front. In September, Harroun plead guilty to a lesser charge involving conspiracy to transfer defense articles and services, and he was released from custody.

The al-Nusra Front has claimed nearly 600 attacks since November 2011 and has introduced suicide bombings to the conflict.33 For example, on January 6, 2012, a suicide bomber in the central Damascus district blew up buses that

were carrying riot police to an antigovernment protest, killing 26. Suicide bombings are a signature of the alNusra Front, and the group has claimed responsibility for most such attacks carried out in Syria.

The United States has claimed that the al-Nusra Front is using the Syrian conflict to further its jihadist ideas and goals for an Islamic State.34 These goals reportedly include establishing a group that incorporates many existing jihadists and links them together into one coherent group; reinforcing the Islamist nature of the Syrian civil war; increasing the military capacity of the group by seizing weapons and training recruits and creating safe havens by taking over and controlling towns to convert to their beliefs; turning Syria into an Islamic state; and eventually establishing a Caliphate in the Levant.35 In September 2013, a new 13-member formation calling itself the Islamic Alliance announced its decision to cut ties with the Syrian National Coalition.

The Islamic Alliance declared its intention to build a state based on Islamic shariah law.36 The fragmentation of the Syrian opposition, including the moves by al-Qaeda–linked groups to impose a radical Islamic regime on territory they control in northern Syria, will continue to complicate the U.S.- and EU-backed policies supporting regime change.

Some Middle East analysts see Assad’s regime, and his principal allies Russia, the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, growing.

Although the Assad regime is known to be oppressive and is implicated in countless atrocities, the Syrian rebellion movement can most generously be described as chaotic.37

52 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Olson is a retired sheriff’s department bureau commander. He is the author of Tactical Counterterrorism: The Law Enforcement Manual of Terrorism Prevention (May 2012 release, Charles C. Thomas Publishing).

ENDNOTES Number of Syrian refugees tops 2 million, with ‘more on the way,’ – UN agency, 3 September 2013, United Nations News Centre, http://www.un.org/ apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45757#.

Uo5KdMjnbIU. Antonio Guterres, the UN high commissioner for refugees.

2 Joseph Holliday, March 2012, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 3, Syria’s Armed Opposition, Institute for the Study of War, Wash DC 3 Elizabeth O’Bagy, March 2013, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 9, The free Syrian Army, Institute for the Study of War, Wash DC 4 “Al Jazeera airs call by defecting Syrian officer”. Reuters. 7 June 2011. Retrieved 21 June 2011.

5 Ibid Note 3 6 Sherlock, Ruth, 3 November 2011. “’15,000 strong’ army gathers to take on Syria”. The Daily Telegraph (London).

7 Lebanese join the Free Syrian Army’s struggle”. Dailystar.com.lb. Retrieved 2013-08-31, “Lebanese fighter trains new generation of jihadis for Syria”. Gulfnews. com. 2012-06-02. Retrieved 2013-0831, “Foreign militants fighting in Syria battlefields”. Agence France-Presse. 7 March 2012. Retrieved 2 April 2012.

8 Zavis, Alexandra; Marrouch, Rima (2011-12-01). “Syria opposition groups agree to coordinate efforts”. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 10 February 2012, “Islamic groups reject Syria opposition bloc”. France 24. 2012-11-19. Archived from the original on 2012-11-19.

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Retrieved 2012-11-20.

9 Jamie Dettmer, January 12, 2013.

“Syria’s Rebel Rivalry Between Jihadists and FSA”. The Daily Beast. Retrieved 2013-08-31.

10 “Jordanian Salafist Leader Foresees Conflict with Secular Syrian Opposition | Editor’s Choice | Ammon News”.

En.ammonnews.net. 2013-07-16.

Retrieved 2013-08-31, March 27, 2013 (2013-03-27). “Free Syrian Army and Al Nusra Front Now Fighting Each Other | FrontPage Magazine”. Frontpagemag.com.

Retrieved 2013-08-31, Martin Chulov in Beirut. “Free Syrian Army threatens blood feud after senior officer killed by jihadists | World news”. The Guardian. Retrieved 2013-08-31.

11 Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding Smith (16 May 2013). “Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms”.

Financial Times. Retrieved 3 June 2013, and Roula Khalaf and Abigail FieldingSmith (17 May 2013). “How Qatar seized control of the Syrian revolution”. Financial Times. Retrieved 26 June 2013.

12 Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding Smith (16 May 2013). “Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms”.

Financial Times. Retrieved 3 June 2013.

13 Saudi edges Qatar to control Syrian rebel support, Mariam Karouny, May 31, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2013/05/31/us-syria-crisis-saudiinsight-idUSBRE94U0ZV20130531 14 “Syria’s opposition has been led astray by violence”. The Guardian. 22 June 2012.

Retrieved 24 October 2012.

15 Jabhat al-Nusra, an Al-Qaeda Salafist-Jihadi network, Seeks to Establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, September 23, 2013, http://www.crethiplethi.com/ jabhat-al-nusra-an-al-qaeda-salafistjihadi-network-seeks-to-establishan-islamic-caliphate-in-greater-syria/ intelligence-terrorism-information-

center/2013/#_ftn1 16 Jabhat al-Nusra, an Al-Qaeda Salafist-Jihadi network, Seeks to Establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, Monday, September 23, 2013, http://www.crethiplethi.com/ jabhat-al-nusra-an-al-qaeda-salafistjihadi-network-seeks-to-establishan-islamic-caliphate-in-greater-syria/ intelligence-terrorism-informationcenter/2013/ 17 Ibid Note 16 18 Meir Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Center, September 17, 2013 The Al-Nusra Front http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/ articleprint.aspx?id=20573 19 “Al-Nusra Commits to al-Qaeda, Deny Iraq Branch ‘Merger’”. Agence France Presse. 10 April 2013. Retrieved 18 May 2013 20 “Insight: Syria’s Nusra Front eclipsed

by Iraq-based al Qaeda”. Reuters. 201305-17. Retrieved 2013-05-18, Spencer, Richard (2013-05-19). “Syria: Jabhat alNusra split after leader’s pledge of support for al-Qaeda”. London: The Telegraph.

Retrieved 2013-05-21.

21 Zelin, Aaron Y. “Al-Qaeda Anounces Islamic State in Syria.” 9 April 2013.

Web. Accessed 9 April 2013. http://www. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ view/al-qaeda-announces-an-islamic-statein-syria 22 Hannah Allam, June 4, 2013. http://www.mcclatchydc. com/2013/06/04/192996/un-nusra-frontin-syria-gains.html#storylink=cpy, U.N.: Nusra Front in Syria gains recruits after announcing tie to al Qaida, McClatchy Washington Bureau 23 Ibid Note 22.

24 Ibid Note 22.

25 European, American, Russian fighters join both sides of Syrian war, November 22, 2013, Joseph Fitsanakis, intelNews. org, http://intelnews.org/2013/11/22/011374/

54 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

Duncan Gardham, John Simpson, Last updated at 12:01AM, November 21 2013, Four Britons die fighting for alQaeda in Syria war, http://www.thetimes. co.uk/tto/news/uk/article3927598.ece 27 Four British Jihadists killed while fighting for Al Qaeda in Syria, http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ middleeast/syria/10464423/Four-Britishjihadists-killed-fighting-for-al-Qaeda-inSyria.html#!

28 Ruth, Sherlock, 2 December 2012.

“Inside Jabhat al Nusra - the most extreme wing of Syria’s struggle.” Web. Accessed 8 April 2013. <http://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/ syria/9716545/Inside-Jabhat-al-Nusra-themost-extreme-wing-of-Syrias-struggle.html 29 Ibid Note 18.

30 Eric Schmitt, November 20, 2013, U.S. Says Dozens of Americans Have Sought to Join Rebels in Syria http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/ world/middleeast/us-says-dozens-ofamericans-have-sought-to-join-rebels-insyria.html?_r=1& 31 Ibid Note 30 32 Ibid Note 30 33 Mapping Militant Organizations, Al-Nusra Front, http://www.stanford. edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/ groups/print_view/493#note3.

34 Ibid Note 33.

35 Benotman, Noman and Roisin Blake.

“Jabhat al-Nusra.” Web. Accessed 9 April 2013< http://www.quilliamfoundation. org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/ free/jabhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf 36 Benjamin Weinthal, September 28, 2013. Syrian rebels face growing threat from foreign jihadists, http://www. foxnews.com/world/2013/09/28/syrianrebels-face-growing-threat-from-foreignjihadists/ 37 Ibid Note 37.

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Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 55

RED HACKERS, THE EAGLE UNION, AND UNIT 61398 Over the next decade, cyber-attacks are likely to become the primary domestic threat.1 James B. Comey, Jr., Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

56 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

The New York Times building in New York, NY. Photo by: Haxorjoe

By Jennifer Hesterman

In January 2013, The New York Times admitted that Chinese hackers infiltrated its computers after the newspaper published an unflattering article about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) prime minister, despite threats from Beijing about possible “consequences.”

T

he following month, American cyber-security firm Mandiant released a report containing years of detailed research on security breaches attributed to techniques referred to as the “Advanced Persistent Threat” (APT).2 In this report, Mandiant specifically identified PRC military organization APT1, also known as Unit 61398, which it said was responsible for at least 1,000

cyber-attacks on a variety of government and commercial targets since 2006.

Mandiant concluded that the Chinese government supported the extensive Unit 61398 operation, which consisted of 1,000 servers and a 12-story facility in Shanghai staffed by hundreds or perhaps thousands of cyber-specialists. China quickly insisted the reports were untrue, with Defense Ministry spokesman Geng

Shuang stating, “The Chinese military has never supported any hack attacks.

Cyber-attacks have transnational and anonymous characteristics.”

Several months later, in July 2013, the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property released a report illustrating how the pilfering of business and industrial secrets costs the U.S. economy $300 billion per year, and it

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 57

of war. Attacks range from irritating hits that slow down Google or other sites to devastating breaches, such as unauthorized access to information on defense weapons systems like the $1.4 trillion F-35 strike fighter and Patriot missile systems that protect military installations around the world.7 The list of Chinese hackers ranges from state-sanctioned and supported actors to lone wolves with a variety of motivations, as described in the following sections.

The depth and variety of Chinese hackers and hacking activities has limited U.S. engagement and mitigation efforts.

GOVERNMENT BACKED HACKERS PERSIST

named the PRC as the most prolific actor.3 Intellectual property theft (IPT) clearly impacts an already distressed U.S. economy. In fact, the Commission estimates that IPT results in the loss of millions of U.S. jobs, a negative effect on innovation in the business community, and a drag on the nation’s gross domestic product.

It is no surprise that much IPT is conducted by cyber-theft via the Internet. In fact, it now appears that cyber-spies from China have hacked more than 100 U.S. agencies, schools, think tanks, and government contractors (including Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics), successfully stealing everything from research and development (R&D) white papers to blueprints for major weapons systems.4 IPT activities on the Internet are complimented by a host of other elicitations from China, such as recruiting professors like 75-year-old

Dr. Reece Roth at the University of Tennessee through students embedded in government-funded R&D programs as an example. Roth, a former NASA scientist, was executing a classified air force plasma drone project. Not only did he give a Chinese student sensitive material, but he packed his laptop and files in a briefcase and flew to China to deliver them in person.5 The FBI intercepted Roth and he is currently serving a 48-month sentence in a federal prison.

As stories like these illustrate, China is clearly using multiple avenues to steal the technology it seeks. Analysts suggest that “conflating cyber-hacking, cyber-crime, and cyber-espionage with economically motivated cyber-theft” confuses the issue and makes engagement with China more difficult.6 Still, regardless of exact intent, many of these cyber-operations emanate from the PRC and are directed at the United States and our allies. These attacks, especially cumulatively, affect our national security and prosperity and can reasonably be considered to be acts

58 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

After Mandiant’s revelations about Unit 61398, the hackers paused some attacks or tried new methodologies, but their operations have since returned to normal.8 Despite the revelation of this extensive hacking operation (including the street address and blueprints of the primary facility), the naming of three government-sponsored hackers, and the release of video and IP address logs that support Mandiant’s claims, the PRC did not change course. Indeed, as a closed, communist society, with the U.S. government deeply financially indebted to it and relying on billions of dollars in annual exports, China can apparently go where others might hesitate.

Consider the following as a testament to China’s lack of concern about detection: Chinese government hackers reportedly initiate broad, less skillful attacks and linger at their targets longer than stealthier hackers do—all creating a larger fingerprint for specialists to identify.9 In fact, APT1 maintained access to victim networks for an average of 356 days, accessing one victim’s network for a total 1,764 days—or four years and

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 59

ten months. Whereas some hackers will hit and then go into hiding, APT1 was persistent and undeterred.

RED HACKERS (HONGKES): A GROWING THREAT In the world of Chinese hackers, APT1 is not the only game in town. Indeed, Mandiant’s outing of governmentsponsored cyber-attackers put a spotlight on the entire Chinese hacker army, including so-called “Red Hackers” or “Hongkes.” Hongkes are Chinese citizens, often motivated by patriotism or financial gain, who act as modern-day privateers attacking foreign targets. They are typically not government funded but merely government encouraged, acting as lone-wolf operators that serve as force multipliers to the People’s Liberation Army.

Chinese patriot hacking first entered the public eye in May 2001, when a Chinese jet hit a propeller-driven American surveillance plane, killing the Chinese pilot. In response, Chinese citizen hackers brought down the White House website with a denial-of-service attack.10 As this incident illustrates, Red Hackers often see themselves as a political

arm of the Chinese government. One young hacker told a security blogger of his excitement over lurking in the White House’s virtual space for a few seconds at a time before being blocked, stating, “The US is our enemy.”11 The most famous Hongke, Wan Tao, was part of a Chinese underground group known as the Green Hackers in the 1990s. He then formed the China Eagle Union, a group of hundreds of hackers who attacked foreign systems (including those in the U.S.) with the Chinese government’s tacit approval, or at least without its intervention. One of Wan’s most popular attacks was against the White House website in 2007, during which he was able to insert an image of the Chinese flag. In a contemplative Time article profiling his exploits entitled “China’s Hacker King,” Wan states that he never officially hacked for China or stole information, and that he was the “ultimate angry young man” who had an “independent, rebellious ethos shared by hackers worldwide.”12 His essay “Building Hacker Culture with Chinese Characteristics,” along with the Eagle Union’s theme song entitled “The Power of the Night,” catapulted Wan to hero status among Chinese youth and aspiring

hackers.13 Similar to other Hongke, Wan was not forced by the government to quit hacking; instead, he decided to use the knowledge he gained to help top Chinese firms to fortify their information systems. Wan eventually formed a highly successful cyber-security company with many employees hired from his old China Eagle Union hacking group. Today, he works for IBM in Beijing.14 Some hackers who are apparently not directly sponsored by the Chinese government will engage on behalf of China’s corporations to steal technology.

For example, Hidden Lynx is a privateer Red Hacker group of 50–100 professional hackers-for-hire, identified by the U.S. security firm Symantec in September 2013. Symantec said its researchers believe Hidden Lynx might have been involved with the 2009 Operation Aurora attacks, the most well-known cyber espionage campaign uncovered to date against U.S. information systems companies like Google and Adobe.15 Hidden Lynx was also responsible for the VOHO attacks of late 2012, in which 1,000 companies, government agencies, and nonprofit organizations were compromised. The group is especially known for “waterhole” attacks, in which

Standard and Reverse Polarity Views

60 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 61

it infects systems in certain industries, such as international finance, utilities, and defense, as well as the computers of all people who visit their victim corporations’ websites.16 Symantec’s recent white paper about Hidden Lynx provides extraordinary insight into Red Hackers’ targets, motivation, and capability.17 Certainly, U.S. security companies responsible for protecting major corporations and the U.S. government from malware, phishing, and intrusions are on the front line of the fight against hackers and cyber-profiteers, and they are best positioned to gather and analyze data associated with their attacks.

BLACK HACKERS As China’s transnational cyberattack activities escalated, a new threat emerged at home with the rise of internal Chinese-versus-Chinese Internet crime by so-called “Black Hackers.” According to some reports, from July 2011 to July 2012, nearly 260 million Chinese were victimized online by these individuals.18 Motivated by money, Black Hackers may also try to collect military or government data to sell on the black market. The money paid for this sensitive information is extraordinary, attracting amateur hackers to engage nation-state systems. There have even been several cases of unsophisticated hacking attempts against high-level government targets in

the U.S. by amateur Black Hackers, likely motivated by financial gain. In 2013, a group of Chinese hackers attempted to access the White House’s emergency communications system that liaises with military and nuclear forces.19 According to Wan’s Time interview, those who have been caught by police are often pressured into government employment instead of going to jail. With such little deterrent to their illegal activities, we can expect this type of internal hacking to grow.

advertised on the web and at bus stations was imprisoned.21

CHINA’S MIXED RESPONSE

The Red October hacking campaign emanating from Russia is believed to have been active for over five years, stealing military and diplomatic secrets from the U.S. as well as various targets in Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Analysts allege that the group is not sponsored by the Russian government and may actually be one of several shadowy private hacker groups that specialize in seeking out military secrets and selling them to the highest bidder.22 Although the Russian government has ordered the arrest and prosecution of Red October group members, none have been identified.

Interestingly, while initiating cyberattacks and turning a blind eye to the Hongke patriot hackers and privateers, China doesn’t stand for Internet crime that affects its own people and frequently prosecutes Black Hackers. For instance, a joint effort between the Chinese government and the FBI led to the arrest of a man running 18 child pornography websites.20 As a result of this case, China’s Ministry of Public Security sent its first officer to join the FBI’s Innocent Images International Task Force and received specialized training. China is also fighting internal issues related to online banking fraud and theft of corporate data, crimes which it considers heinous offenses against the state. The government’s lack of tolerance for internal hacking activities was further evident when the leader of a Chinese hacking school that once openly

62 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

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OTHER COUNTRIES OF INTEREST Taking a cue from China’s bold asymmetric cyber-engagements, especially the use of Hongke to do the government’s dirty work, other countries of interest have engaged in similar activities.

RUSSIA

IRAN Iran appears to have a shorter hacking history but its intrusions are bolder. Iran arrived as a major player on the hacking scene in 2011, with the breach over 300,000 targets worldwide, including some in the United States. The hackers were not directly tied to Iran’s government but may have been acting as proxies. Iranian hackers have also hit American banks in retaliation against U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran.

In recent months, these hackers’ attacks have become increasingly daring. For example, in September 2013, Iranian hackers boldly and directly accessed the U.S. Navy’s intranet. The unsophisticated

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 63

nature of the attack led many to believe the Iranian government did not instigate the operation, but that it was carried out by a proxy group. Some specialists even suggest that although Chinese hackers received more press in 2013, Iranian hackers could prove more lethal.23 For instance, in May 2013, Iranian hackers were able to access the computer networks running U.S. energy companies, possibly giving Iran the means to sabotage power plants. Also, while China appears to have so far restrained from going beyond espionage into sabotage, Iran is believed to be actively attacking the U.S. power grid and military.

Supporters of Edward Snowden. Photo by: See-ming Lee

ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK According to the FBI’s director, cyberattacks are becoming the primary threat against the United States.24 To help counter this threat, the presidents of the U.S. and China agreed in June 2013 to launch a bilateral working group to discuss cyber-security issues. The group has met twice since.25 However, after the working group announcement, former U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden released information regarding NSA cyber-operations.

Snowden is currently in hiding and inaccessible in Russia. It is unknown what documents he may have to support his claims or whether he was recruited as an agent of China, Russia, or another entity.26 Meanwhile, Chinese hackers are hiding in plain sight, and their government has demonstrated a lack of concern for international scrutiny. Their attacks are bold, broad, and able to be tracked by open-source collectors like Mandiant and other industry specialists. For instance, the blog The Dark Visitor: Inside the World of Chinese Hackers, written by retired U.S.

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Army intelligence officer Scott Anderson, provides updates on attacks, methods, funding, and methodology.27 Anderson’s book by the same name is perhaps the most comprehensive insider’s view of Chinese hacking available today28 and the

PRC strategy book Unrestricted Warfare reveals the context in which the PLA planned to employ cross-spectrum attacks against the United States in the modern age.

As China, other countries, and nonstate actors employ hackers of all varieties with varying interests, the solution set for combatting hacking attempts must be equally unique and decentralized.

It has proven difficult for defending governments to engage. Regulations and oversight further centralize and standardize our resources for targeting.

The strategic fusion of information gleaned from those targeted about the source of the attacks and information lost is critical to connecting the dots.

International laws and treaties that prevent the purchase of foreign national products produced as a result of cyberespionage are only of value when upheld and enforced. Finally, law enforcement

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agencies must realize the strategic nature of the crimes they are investigating.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Ms. Hesterman is a retired USAF colonel. Her most recent book is The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized Crime, and Terror Groups.

CT readers get a 20% discount on the book and free shipping by ordering from http://www.crcpress.com/product/ isbn/9781466557611 and using code JWL23.

ENDNOTES http://rt.com/usa/fbi-cyber-attackthreat-739/ 2 http://intelreport.mandiant.com/ Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf 3 http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ IP_Commission_Report_052213.pdf 1

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http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/02/ damballa-hackers-botnets-technologysecurity-google.html 5 http://www.businessweek.com/ articles/2012-11-01/why-the-professorwent-to-prison 6 http://www.geekwire.com/2013/ snowdens-latest-claims-present-perilscompanies/ 7 http://articles.washingtonpost. com/2013-05-27/world/39554997_1_u-smissile-defenses-weapons-combat-aircraft 8 http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/tag/ Unit%2061398/ 9 http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/tag/ Unit%2061398/ 10 http://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/ technology/article/1219328/spotlightchinas-hackers-after-accusations-againstpla-unit 11 http://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/ technology/article/1219328/spotlight4

chinas-hackers-after-accusations-againstpla-unit 12 http://content.time.com/time/ magazine/article/0,9171,2136810,00.html 13 http://www.thedarkvisitor. com/2007/10/china-eagle-union/ 14 http://www.networkworld.com/ news/2012/110812-chinese-ex-hackersays-working-for-264074.html 15 http://www.symantec.com/connect/ blogs/hidden-lynx-professional-hackershire 16 http://www.eweek.com/security/ government-agencies-utilities-amongtargets-of-voho-cyber-spy-attacks/ 17 http://www.symantec.com/content/ en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/ whitepapers/hidden_lynx.pdf 18 http://world.time.com/2013/02/21/ chinas-red-hackers-the-tale-of-onepatriotic-cyberwarrior/ 19 http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/tag/

Cyber%20War/ 20 http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/ october/websites_101111 21 http://world.time.com/2013/02/21/ chinas-red-hackers-the-tale-of-onepatriotic-cyberwarrior/ 22 http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/tag/ Unit%2061398/ 23 http://www.motherjones.com/ politics/2013/05/who-has-scarier-hackerschina-or-iran 24 http://rt.com/usa/fbi-cyber-attackthreat-739/ 25 http://in.mobile.reuters. com/article/internetNews/ idINBRE9A51AN20131106 26 http://www.newsweek.com/ how-edward-snowden-escalated-cyberwar-1461 27 http://www.thedarkvisitor.com/ 28 http://www.lulu.com/spotlight/ thedarkvisitor

29-30 APRIL 2014 | OLYMPIA, LONDON

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70792-11_CTX03b_Advert (A&S)_2014_v1 .indd 1

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March16/10/2013 2014 11:15 67

INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES PATRIOT 3 Patriot3 is a premier provider and authority in elevated tactical systems, ballistic shields, complete mobile ballistic barrier systems and specialized maritime products. Patriot3 is a leader in innovation with its one-of-a-kind products designed especially for law enforcement and military agencies throughout the world.

Security Solutions International LLC provides the elevated tactics training using specialized equipment and tools such as those manufactured by Patriot3. Improve your tactical surprise and force protection with additional operational options provided through elevated, special-use vehicles during this two-day introduction and awareness training.

For more about Patriot visit www.Patriot3.com For more about elevated tactics training visit www.homelandsecurityssi.com

TACTICAL PRODUCTS GROUP Tacprogear is a leading manufacturer of tactical equipment used by professionals around the globe. The Tacprogear product lines include apparel, armor, bags and packs, nylon pouches, accessories and more.

Bridging the gap between outdoor functionality and real world requirements, Tacprogear is designing new solutions through the innovative use of lightweight materials and cutting edge manufacturing techniques. Tacprogear relies heavily upon the constant feedback and input from operators in the field, and seeks to continually evolve the product offerings. www.tacprogear.com or www.tacprogearblack.com

XGO XGO is a leading manufacturer of highly technical base layer garments.

XGO’s Phase system of next-to-skin garments is designed for performance, protection, comfort and durability. XGO base layers allow the wearer to maximize comfort and performance for any temperature or activity. Our Phase 1-4 system helps you choose the layer that’s right for you –no matter what the conditions.

The system is available in Acclimate Dry, Flame Retardant and new for 2013 PT wear lines. The garments have been tested by outside testing labs, Natick and in theatre by our armed forces. The features of the fabrics meet and exceed the military standards. The Acclimate FR is the patented proprietary blend of flame-retardant fibers in all XGO FR garments that are inherent to the fibers and stay in the fabric for the lifetime of the garment. The XGO FR garments meet and exceed the ASTM 06413 standard for after flame and no drip properties.

XGO is 100% Made in the USA and Berry compliant.

68 The Counter Terrorist ~ December February/March 2013/January 2014 2014

Innovative Products I AM SOLDIER OF FORTUNE To the uninitiated the term mercenary or soldier of fortune is an insult. To the informed they are neutral terms. While mercenaries have served immoral causes ranging from National Socialism to Soviet Socialism and Islamic supremacist groups, soldiers of fortune have also rescued hostages and fought oppressors around the world. Former US Army Special Forces officer Robert K. Brown has chronicled these exploits in “Soldier of Fortune” magazine since 1975. This is the biography of his lifetime of colorful adventures. www.sofmag.com/store/i-am-soldier-fortune-1

MGM THERMIC – PASSIVE THERMAL TARGETS These targets use no batteries, no wires, no equipment – they are compatible with all thermal imaging equipment. Ambient energy is reflected and presented as thermal heat. They can be used for zeroing, grouping and boresighting. Multiple human, vehicle and target silhouette images are available. Black-hot and white-hot (reverse polarity) options are available on all images. They are capable of taking hundreds of hits and are designed to be easy to patch and repair. www.mgmtargets.com

SB15 PISTOL STABILIZING BRACE This accessory appears to be a clever, legal circumvention of onerous short barrel rifle regulations. It enhances accuracy and reduces felt recoil for AR-style “pistols”. It is made from elastopolymer and manufactured to fit pistols equipped with an AR-style buffer tube 1.0” – 1.2” in diameter. The manufacturer states, “The ATF has reviewed this product and determined that attaching the SB15 to a firearm does not alter the classification of the firearm or subject the firearm to NFA control.” www.sigsauer.com

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 69

Counter

ADVERTISER INDEX

The

FEBRUARY/MARCH 2014 VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 1

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals To request detailed product information, visit our website http://thecounterterroristmag.com/readerservicecard.php or scan this code. Select the appropriate Reader Service Number (RSN) on the web-form and submit your contact information. Individual advertiser’s websites are also provided below for your convenience.”

Page

11 75 42 13 4 33 28 35 67 43 14 16 66 2 21 26 29 64 43 61 60 15 50 23 62 27 17 40 39 53 65 71 49 73 59 42 38 55 7 3 63 41

Ad/Company • website and/or email........................................................................................................ RSN Number

707 Tactical Gear• www.adamsindustries.com................................................................................................. 291 Adams Industries • www.adamsindustries.com................................................................................................ 116 Adamson Police Products • www.policeproducts.com............................................................................131 Advanced Homeland Security Training in Israel • www.homelandsecurityssi.com.................................211 ALLRed - Armadillo Tactical Gear • www.armadillotacticalgear.com......................................................121 American Public University • www.amuonline.com/counter-terrorist......................................................271 Axis• www.axis.com/ptz.......................................................................................................................265 Barrett Firearms Manufacturing • www.barrett.net/training.................................................................208 BioStat LLC • www.biostatllc.com...........................................................................................................267 Center for Rural Development • www.preventivestrategies.net...............................................................305 Counter Terror Expo • www.counterterrorexpo.com/exhibit...................................................................74 Cyalume Technologies Inc. • www.visipad.com.....................................................................................103 Diamond Back Tactical • www.diamondbacktactical.com.......................................................................277 DSG Arms • www.dsgarms.com............................................................................................................170 Elite K9 • www.elitek9.com....................................................................................................................221 Frazer, Ltd • www.frazerbilt.com...........................................................................................................83 Golden Engineering • www.goldenengineering.com..............................................................................285 Golight Inc • www.golight.com..............................................................................................................113 IDGA’s Tactical Power Summit• www.tacticalpowersourcessummit.com..................................................155 J & N Tactical • www.jntactical.com.......................................................................................................279 K9 Cop Magazine • www.k9copmagazine.com.....................................................................................231 Longworth - XGOtech • www.proxgo.com............................................................................................329 Mattracks • www.mattracks.com...........................................................................................................309 MGM Targets • www.mgmtargets.com...................................................................................................335 NTOA • www.ntoa.org..........................................................................................................................191 Patriot3 • www.patriot3.com.................................................................................................................235 Phantom Scout • www.phantomscout.com.............................................................................................303 PoliceOne • www.policeoneacademy.com..............................................................................................178 PoliceTraining.net • ww.policetraining.net.............................................................................................117 Portable Vehicle Barrier - SSI PVB • www.ssipvb.com..........................................................................301 Precision Reflex Inc • www.precisionreflex.com.....................................................................................179 Reconyx • www.reconyx.com................................................................................................................215 Ring Power - CAT • www.ringpower.com/tacticalsolutions......................................................................228 Southern New Hampshire University • www.snhu.edu/ct....................................................................317 Southern Police Equipment • www.southernpoliceequipment.com..........................................................313 SSI Corporate Security • contact@homelandsecurityssi.com....................................................................111 SSI MACTAC • www.homelandsecurityssi.com.........................................................................................343 Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. • www.ruger.com...........................................................................................226 Tactical Products Gear • www.tacprogearblack.com..............................................................................101 Tactical Products Group Inc. • www.tacprogroup.com...........................................................................145 The Counter Terrorist magazine - Asia edition • www.thorshield.com..................................................255 Thorshield - G Squared Consulting • sales@counterterrorismpractitioner.com.........................................146 Vertx • www.vertx.com.........................................................................................................................

70 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

The Advanced Global Security Workshop in

Israel ®

The experts on training in:

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Since 2005, SSI has taken nearly 500 First Responders to Israel and shown them the basics of the Israel security concept.

Thanks in part to that program, we are better able to defend ourselves in the United States. In response to demand, we are now offering a once-in-a-lifetime experience covering the following advanced subjects:

May 16–24,

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Hezbollah - a threat as deadly as al-Qaeda - Learn about them in their own territory, along Israel’s northern border.

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Israel Counter Terrorism units - Learn how they operate.

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Sensitive Installations - Participate in a day-long exercise and training program in how to set up a complete security system.

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Phone: 866-573-3999 Fax: 866-573-2090 info@homelandsecurityssi.com Circle 50 on Reader Service Card Circle 215 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 71

TRAINING REVIEW

Basic Law Enforcement Sniper Course

By Caylen Wojik

A

t Magpul Dynamics our approach to training law enforcement snipers is to provide a shooting intensive course intermixed with lecture and practical applications of the skills that a sniper should have to be a force multiplier on any crisis site. The bottom line is to produce a sniper that has the confidence to conduct operations in a wide variety of situations, and one who has clear awareness of their capabilities and limitations. Our purpose is not to create standard operating procedures, or change any that are already in place on the studentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s team. Our purpose is to expose the student to a multitude of shooting drills, practical application exercises that showcase basic sniper skills, and classroom lectures that increase knowledge and awareness. This allows the student to identify strengths and weaknesses, as well as foster thought provoking ideas for employment on operations and in team training after they have returned to their unit. Our goal is to provide students additional skills, and a positive outlook for future training.

At the moment any armed professional is called upon to utilize their unique skills, the application of the fundamentals of marksmanship should be second nature; developed to the level of unconscious competence. This can only be achieved through consistent and realistic training.

Snipers have a wide variety of tasks to accomplish while on a crisis site. Most of those tasks require cognitive thought process and those processes take up valuable bandwidth as it relates to compartmentalizing stress. Our shooting drills reinforce all of the fundamental aspects of employing a precision rifle.

The fundamentals of marksmanship are covered in great detail, as well as telescopic sight theory and external ballistics. Very little time is spent in the prone position, and the prone shooting that we do is done under various forms of physical and mental stress. Based upon our cadreâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s operational experience, rarely is a shot taken from the prone.

The goal of our drills is to create a well-rounded and confident shooter who can think for themselves and rapidly solve problems as it pertains to choosing and constructing shooting positions in less than ideal situations. Close work involves 70 yard engagements from barricade supported positions while under stress, executing command fire, and rapid bolt manipulation dot drills under the stress of a time constraint. Hostage shoots are conducted at 100, 150, and 200 yards. All from unconventional shooting positions incorporating both physical and mental stresses. We also teach and demonstrate terminal bullet performance

72 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

on intermediate barriers of various types of glass.

An area that most law enforcement snipers are lacking in (from a lack of exposure) is the ability to shoot from a tripod supported position. The tripod is the only guaranteed shooting platform the sniper has at his/her disposal, and with the proper training can be employed with an extremely high level of precision.

We expose our students to ranges of 500 yards, all from various tripod supported positions. While this is outside the normal engagement distances typically seen, we do this to build confidence, as consistently hitting a 12â&#x20AC;? round plate at 500 yards from a tripod standing position is a feat that most of our students would have not thought practical. Night vision equipment and techniques of night vision employment are covered in a demonstration where the student is taught the benefits of quality night vision equipment. The drills shot while at the 5 day basic sniper course are also preparing

The National Homeland Security Association is partnering with the City of Philadelphia to host

The 2014 National Homeland Security Conference.

Conference Sessions Our sessions promise to be dynamic, interactive and multi-disciplined, filled with timely and relevant topics, world-renowned speakers, and unique perspective!

Session tracks include: 

Responding to Unplanned Events



CBRNE Response



Training for Preparedness



Program Management & Sustainment



Role of the State Administrative Agent



The Emergency Medical Response Community



Port and Transit Security



Enhancing Emergency Capabilities



Intelligence & Information Sharing

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Preparedness Partnerships for the Whole Community

Who should attend?

Attendees typically include Homeland Security professionals, Emergency Managers and planners, public safety representatives from every response discipline, local, State, and Federal government leaders from the largest metropolitan areas in the 50 states and U.S. territories, as well as subject matter experts from the private sector.

For more information and to register, visit: nationaluasi.com Circle 317 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 73

the student for final qualification, which is comprised of eight parts, all of which are directly related to critical skills the student will need to be effective in a wide range of situations.

Intermixed with the shooting drills are lectures and periods of instruction on various topics that are pertinent to law enforcement snipers and their skills.

Topics such as employment, techniques of observation, target detection, collection and reporting of information, crisis site management, camouflage, individual movement and terminal ballistics are covered in detail. Lecture periods are broken into small and manageable blocks to facilitate maximum comprehension and retention of information. Some topics are purely lesson purpose, meaning the purpose of instruction is mental exposure, where other topics are reinforced with practical application exercises. Field skills are challenged with exercises that directly

relate to the application by the student in real world scenarios. Camouflage, individual movement, and concealment are incorporated into a half day evolution where each student practices fundamental skills in a controlled environment.

Exercises are also incorporated to teach the student valuable observation skills and attention to details while on a crisis site.

These exercises are all meant to hone the studentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s initiative and creative thinking for problem solving.

Our ultimate goal is to produce well rounded, confident, and competent law enforcement snipers that provide an additional capability at future crisis sites. Using a philosophy for training that focuses on fundamental skills allows students to identify personal strengths and weaknesses. By understanding his capabilities the sniper can make informed and realistic decisions about sustainment training and employment in

74 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014

real world situations. By understanding limitations and weaknesses, the sniper can focus on training that turns those limitations into capabilities. Magpul Dynamics offers a 5 day basic and 4 day advanced curriculum. We also offer an aerial platform course for heloborne marksmanship skills, as well as a 3 day surgical shooting course that focuses on law enforcement sniper shooting skills with little classroom lecture. We do not require any prerequisites for the basic or surgical shooting courses, only that the student is a certified law enforcement officer occupying a sniperâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s billet. www.magpuldynamics.com

â&#x20AC;˘

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Wojcik is the director of training of precision rifle operations at Magpul Dynamics. He is a former USMC scout/ sniper and instructor and veteran of combat operations in Iraq.

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2014 75 8/19/2013 10:35:35 AM

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