The Counter Terrorist Magazine June / July 2016

PSYCHOLOGY OF RADICALIZATION • MAVC-SOG • WOMEN IN COMBAT • GITMO

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

JUNE/JULY 2016

VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 3

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TERRORISM

INTERNATIONAL

EDITION An SSI Publication ®

JUNE/JULY 2016 USA/CANADA $5.99

thecounterterroristmag.com

ACCURACY

REDEFINED

MRAD

338 LAPUA MAG 338 NORMA MAG 300 WIN MAG 300 NORMA MAG 7MM REM MAG 308 WIN 260 REM 6.5 CREED

AMBIDEXTEROUS CONTROLS. USER INTERCHANGEABLE CALIBERS. ADJUSTABLE MATCH GRADE TRIGGER.

COMBAT PROVEN Barrett will not sell to government agencies in the State of California or New York.

Learn more at barrett.net

2 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

Circle 121 on Reader Service Card

21061 Counter Terrorist Magazine Ad v1_Layout 1 5/10/16 1:33 PM Page 1

Online Undergraduate, Graduate & Certificate Studies in

Public Safety & Homeland Security Meeting the professional advancement needs of those committed to protecting the public.

Earn your career credentials without job interruption through Fairleigh Dickinson University’s respected online degree and certificate offerings. Established in 1942, FDU is New Jersey’s largest private university with 12,000 students worldwide.

Degree Offerings

• Master of Administrative Science • Master of Science in Homeland Security • Bachelor of Arts in Individualized Studies Certificate Studies Career-relevant programs are available at the graduate and undergraduate level in such areas as terrorism, forensics, global security, disaster and emergency management, transit safety, homeland security, and more. Credits earned can be applied toward the appropriate degree program.

• FDU is proud to participate in the Yellow Ribbon G.I. Education Advancement program enabling eligible veterans to attend FDU at no charge.

• FDU accepts Federal Tuition Assistance (FTA) for undergraduate and graduate courses (restrictions apply).

• No entrance exams required.

For More Information

Undergraduate Programs

Graduate Programs

JoAnna Steiner 201-692-7357 online@fdu.edu

Ronald E. Calissi 201-692-6522 calissi@fdu.edu

fdu.edu/mas

REGISTERING NOW FOR FALL 2016. CALL TODAY. Circle 10 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 3

4 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

Circle 319 on Reader Service Card

Counter

The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals JUNE/JULY 2016

VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 3

COVER STORY:

32

CONTENTS

32

8

46

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TERRORISM: ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE 21ST CENTURY

by Jeff S. Sandy, CFE, CAMS, PI, Special Agent retired

FEATURES:

08

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RADICALIZATION

by Sheila Macrine, Ph.D.

20

TO DIE FOR: A WARRIOR’S ANALYSIS OF WOMEN IN COMBAT

by SSG Derek Goeriz United States Army Special Forces NCO

46

TIME TO BUILD ANOTHER WING ONTO GITMO: OBAMA’S DESIRE TO CLOSE DOWN THE DETENTION FACILITY AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

by Jeffrey F. Addicott

56

INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING TECHNOLOGY INTO MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

by Nick Perna

DEPARTMENTS: 06

From the Editor

42

Book Review

68

Innovative Products

72

Training Review

A Zero-Sum Game It IS about Islam

Improvised Weapons, A Higher Standard in Education, Lenco, Patriot3 Alternate Reality Environment

56

Cover Photo: A money exchanger displays Somali shilling notes on the streets of the Somali capital Mogadishu. Some money transfer companies in Somalia have been accused of being used by pirates to launder money received form ransoms as well as used by Al Qaeda-affiliated extremist group al Shabaab group to fund their terrorist activities and operations in Somalia and the wider East African region. Photo by: STUART PRICE.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 5

Counter The

FROM THE EDITOR:

A Zero-Sum Game

by Garret Machine

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 3 JUNE/JULY 2016

T

errorist organizations are no longer fringe groups we fight from afar; what is happening right now in France, Belgium, the UK, and Germany is at our back door. These are our Western counterparts, our allies. Make no mistake that Islamists wants to commit genocide, not only on their own countrymen in the Middle East and Africa, but also on Western nations who have naively invited them to do so. Little by little they chip away at us; nothing is more evident of this as the current situation in Germany. As of now, privately owned German railway company Mitteldeutsche Regiobahn has introduced “women only” train cars, an action the company has undertaken to protect women from Syrian migrants. The women will put their heads down and take to the special cars without incident. In fact, it is the men who need to be in “special” rail cars and sequestered, but this will not happen because it will incite rioting, burning, and violence from that very population. Perhaps women in Germany should also have a curfew and only leave the house when escorted by a male family member. Sound familiar?

I often think back to the sentiment that my grandfather felt towards the Japanese after service in WWII or the contempt my parents felt in the ‘60s for communism. Strangely, they nor the administration ever made a differentiation between “moderate communists” or noncombatants when fighting the Axis of evil in WWII. “Expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth,” said President Truman, calling for Japan to surrender in 1945 before he made good on his promise.

Let’s be honest: if the U.S. wanted to, it could destroy, decimate, and kill all terrorist organizations, but if the powers were reversed, would they show such restraint? Unfortunately, moderate Islam is irrelevant and geopolitically inconsequential, therefore they are either radical or nonexistent in this theater.

Islamists act on the assumption that the U.S. forces they frame as “The Great Satan” will be deterred by their use of human shields. Ironic that a combat doctrine which they have adopted relies on the fact that we do not want to kill noncombatants, like women and children. This alone is the single greatest ethical disparity between us and them.

And all the while, they indoctrinate their youth from a young age to glorify violence against the West in the name of Islamism. In every Muslim country, religion and politics are codependent and comingled. The aim of U.S. involvement in the Middle East is simply a peaceful existence, while the aim of our adversaries both there and abroad is seventh century theocracy and barbarism. There is no way that these two objectives can coexist.

Even on a U.S. soldier’s worst day at war he will show more compassion than any Islamist combatant anywhere.

Garret Machine Editor, The Counter Terrorist

Editor Garret Machine Director of Operations Carmen Arnaes Director of Advertizing Sol Bradman Administrative Ashley Villegas Contributing Editors Jeff S. Sandy Derek Goeriz Jeffrey F. Addicott Nick Perna Sheila Macrine Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Sol Bradman bradman@homelandsecurityssi.com 305-302-2790 Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 103 Miami, Florida 33186

ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 103, Miami, Florida.

33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99.

(1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090.

For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact: Security Solutions International at villegas@homelandsecurityssi.com or call 786-573-3999 Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:

www.thecounterterrroristmag.com © 2016 Security Solutions International

6 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

BALLISTICS • • •

• • • •

FLEX FIELD

Sizes Available: 98”W x 48”H NIJ Level 3A (65 lbs) or 90”W x 48”H NIJ Level 3 (155 lbs) Can be configured in rigid and non-rigid state Protects against Fragmentation 1775 ft/s

XPS-G2

Base Unit 28 1/2”W x 75”H Fits through Commercial & Exterior Doorways Deployable 18” Ballistic Wing Extentions Available in NIJ Levels 3 & 4 For More Information Visit: www.patriot3.com

• • •

LIBERATOR

Hydraulically Operated, Single Ramp Elevated Tactics System Designed to be lightweight and fit a variety of vehicles like the Lenco BearCat (G2 and G3) and many other ARV’s Capabilities include elevated entry, bus assault, sniper positioning, mass evacuation and more all while maintaining existing ARV functions and capabilities.

ELEVATED TACTICS Circle 301 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 7

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RADICALIZATION

8 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

by Sheila Macrine, Ph.D. University of Massachusetts Dartmouth

Terrorism is not new, but in today’s world it is different. Over the past decade, we have seen a shocking transformation in the nature and uses of terrorism.

A

ccording to Banco (2014), during the 1970s, it was a widely held belief that terrorists “wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead”; however, today, it appears to be more accurate to say that terrorists “want a lot of people dead, and even more people crippled by fear and

grief.” This shift in terrorists’ strategy has signaled a dramatic change in the tactical intent of modern terrorists, which included attacking high profile targets like the World Trade Center and the Pentagon to cause the greatest stress in the general population. However, ISIS and al-Qaeda have stepped up efforts

to attack soft1 targets. They are now targeting places where people felt safe, like hotels, cafés, super-markets and shopping malls. This evolution of the terrorist tactics has resulted in attacks on places like Charlie Hebdo and a small kosher grocery store in Paris, among others. ISIS also claimed responsibility

1

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 9

…radicalization involves changes in beliefs, feelings, or behaviors and increased support for intergroup conflict.

10 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

for these attacks as well as one on a sports stadium, the Bataclan concert hall, and a Cambodian restaurant.

So what drives people to terrorism?

As a psychologist, I was curious about why someone would become radicalized and become a terrorist. In other words, what is the psychology behind the radicalization of seemingly normal people, especially young Muslim males? The definitions of radicalization are broad, with no commonly accepted definition. Understanding terrorism or radicalization is difficult. Most psychologists agree that there are three different ways to study these concepts: through macro-sociological, psychological, and/or psychosocial approaches (De la Corte 2006). The first, macro-sociological, involves the study of various social dysfunctions or problematic changes in the social system (ibid). Yet the recent research has found this perspective to be inconclusive (Crenshaw 1995; De la Corte 2006; Newman 2006). The next perspective is the psychological, which includes disruptive or psychopathological personalities. This involves examining the individual for abhorrent behaviors, as in their propensity for violence or an inability to control their aggressive impulses (De la Corte 2006). However, these two approaches have also been found to be inconclusive. The final view, which combines both perspectives, is the psychosocial. This multifaceted perspective includes cultural factors, i.e., poverty, desperation, fanaticism, political influence, globalization, economic development, greed, war, intergroup polarization, within-group glorification, moral exclusion, the power of the situation, nationalism, and partisan perceptions (De la Corte 2006).

According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), radicalization involves changes in beliefs, feelings, or

behaviors and increased support for intergroup conflict. The Netherlands Intelligence and Security Service’s definition of radicalization focuses on “the pursuit and support of changes in society that harm the functioning of the democratic legal order” (AIVD 2004, p. 24). Shira Fishman, et al.

(2010), a researcher at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, writes that, “Radicalization is a dynamic process that varies for each individual, but shares some underlying commonalities that can be explored” (p. 32). Despite being composed of multifarious definitions and pathways, radicalization involves reinforcing processes that scholars have identified a series of individual pathways to radicalization (McCauley and Mosalenko 2009).

In their recent 2009 book, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us, Clark McCauley and Sofia Mosalenko identify the various routes to radicalization. They identify the Personal Grievance, Group Grievance, Slippery Slope, and Love pathways as well as the Risk and Status and Unfreezing pathways.

The Personal Grievance is when a person seeks revenge “for real or perceived harm inflicted by an outside party.” Next, the Group Grievance pathway is similar, but in this instance the individual, “perceives harm inflicted on a group that he/ she belongs to or has sympathy for.”

McCauley and Mosalenko argue that this path explains “the larger portion of political and ethnic radical violence, in which action is taken on behalf of the group at large, rather than as an act of personal revenge.” Next, they offer the Slippery Slope pathway, which “represents a gradual radicalization through activities that incrementally narrow the individual’s social circle, narrow their mindset, and in some cases desensitize them to violence.”

Delta Block captives kneel during midday prayers at Camp 6, a steel and cement prison building on March 18, 2011 at the U.S. Navy Base at Guantanamo Bay Cuba.

Photo by: David P. Coleman

Another pathway that the authors suggest is the Love pathway, which is about “romantic and familial entanglement that is often an overlooked factor in radicalization.” The authors argue that many extremist groups relate to this particular structure, which involves “a tight-knit group of friends who share religious, economic, social, and sexual bonds” (McCauley and Mosalenko 2009) Pape and Feldman (2010) write that “Disproportionate involvement in risk taking and status seeking is particularly true of those young men who come from disadvantaged family backgrounds, have lower IQ levels, are of lower socioeconomic status, and who therefore have less opportunity to succeed in society along a traditional career path” (2010). Individuals become susceptible to indoctrination and radicalization when

they are isolated, in some cases in the prison system. In prison, the strong prey on the weak. Prisoners also come together over “racial, religious, and gang identity to a greater degree than in the outside world and often bring their newfound radical identity beyond prison to connect with radical organizations in the populace at large” (Fighel 2007, p.1).

There are also group-level factors, according to McCauley and Mosalenko (2009). They write that a group is a “dynamic system with a common goal or set of values.” As a result, an individual can become more radical. One of the group-level factors is called Polarization and Isolation, in which “the discussion, interaction, and experience within a radical group can result in an aggregate increase in commitment to the cause, and in some cases can contribute to the

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 11

Iraqi Army and Hashed al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces of Iraq) fighting against the Islamic State in Saladin Governorate.

Photo: Ahmad Shamlo Fard

formation of divergent conceptions of the group’s purpose and preferred tactics” (p. 3). In addition there is, like with most groups, concerns about internal dynamics, which “can contribute to the formation of different factions as a result of internal disillusionment (or, conversely, ambitions) with the group’s activities as a whole, especially when it comes to a choice between violent terrorism and nonviolent activism.” As a self-isolated minority, Islamic groups in the West are especially vulnerable

12 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

to this form of radicalization. Lorenzo Vidino (2010) adds that, “Being cut off from society at large through language barriers, cultural difference …, Muslim communities become more vulnerable to additional pathways of radicalization” (2010). Essentially, an aversion or a failure to assimilate into Western society is an aggregating factor. There is also Competition among radical groups who compete for notoriety and press and become more and more violent to get attention.

With the concept of Mass Radicalization (McCauley 2006), the goal is to force the enemy to question their own political and ideological beliefs or disseminate counter-narratives while strengthening their radical beliefs (Rosebraugh 2004). David KilCullen (2008), a counterinsurgency advisor to David Petraeus during the Iraq Surge, adds that, “al-Qaeda lures the West into ground wars, while avoiding engagements that would allow the American military to draw on its technical superiority”

57 99 Slim-Tuk $3999

KINGSTON CAR SEAT $ TM

IDEAL FOR SURVEILLANCE!

™

MSRP

MSRP

Style N92

Style 137

2HOLSTERS 1 IN

• Precision molded from Kydex®

Tuckable™ 360

• Tuckable 360™ C-Clip affords unlimited mounting options

• Holster kept close at hand • Positioned between legs by means of adjustable nylon belt with buckle closure • Holster doubles as our best selling IWB holster, Style N87

• Features a rugged nylon clip • Ambidextrous

MINI SCABBARD ®

6199

$

Conceived for Men, but Women Love it Too!

MSRP

Style 019

• Premium cowhide • Detailed molding • Adjustable tension device

800-GUNHIDE 800-GUNHIDE

631-841-6300 631-841-6300

Dept Dept #CT66 #CT66

431 431 Bayview Bayview Avenue, Avenue, Amityville, Amityville, NY NY 11701 11701

www.desantisholster.com Circle 262 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 13

A local Iraqi man tries to comfort an injured relative as U.S. Army Spc. Timothy Jovanovic a combat medic from the 3rd Battalion 187th Infantry Regiment 3rd Brigade Combat Team 101st Airborne Division prepares to administer intravenous fluids to the injured Iraqi man after his Concerned Local Citizen checkpoint was attacked by a suicide bomber in Owesat Iraq Dec. 18 2007. Photo by: 1st Sgt. Adrian Cadiz

14 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

(2008, p. 2). Another dynamic used among radicals is developing a “Hatred Mantra,” which positions the enemy as less than human (Royzman 2005).

Finally, suicide bombers seeking martyrdom die for a cause (or rewards of the flesh in the afterlife, seemingly unattainable in their societies) in the act of jihad. This act within the field of radicalization signifies the absolute commitment of a radical’s way of life and dedication to the cause, perceived or actual. While the why and wherefore of radicalization is still a mystery, there are many commonalities that can help us better understand the psychology of radicalization and what radicalization offers. The Pulitzer-winning author of The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and The Road to 9/11, Lawrence Wright (2006), writes that certain recurring narratives serve as a springboard for resentment— most prominently, the notion or mantra of an unjust occupation of the Muslim nations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But he concludes that after nine years, “there is no single consensus explanation for why some forgo peaceful forms of protest and instead opt to become terrorist and attempt mass-murders.” Unfortunately, there is no consensus regarding a terrorist personality and hence there is no one pathway to radicalization (Rinehart 2013, p. 7).

The purpose of this article was to identify pathways to radicalization, not to posit a solution. The solution or solutions are still inconclusive. Even The Washington Institute’s Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence adds that it has become clear that, “America is at war with a larger enemy: the extremist ideology that fuels and supports Islamist violence.” Adding that unfortunately, the United States is not well equipped to fight on this ideological battleground, and U.S. efforts to confront the ideology

CYBERWARFARE HAS A NEW FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE. LEARN FROM THE LEADER. B.S., CYBERSECURITY M.S., CYBERSECURITY STUDIES

AMUONLINE.COM/COUNTER-TERRORIST

We want you to make an informed decision about the university that’s right for you. For more about the graduation rate and median debt of students who completed each program, as well as other important information—visit www.APUS.edu/disclosure.

Circle 25 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 15

worldwide have not kept pace with more successful military targeting of high-level al-Qaeda and ISIS leaders.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Sheila Macrine, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. Her research focuses on connecting the cultural, political, psychological, and institutional contexts of pedagogy as they relate to the public sphere, democratic education, and social imagination.

E-mail: Smacrine@umassd.edu

REFERENCES Arendt, H. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Schocken Books, 1951.

Banco, E. 2014. “Why do people join ISIS?” International Business Times. http://www.ibtimes.com/why-do-peoplejoin-isis-psychology-terrorist-1680444.

Crenshaw, M. Terrorism in Context.

Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 1995.

DeAngelis, T. 2009. “Understanding Terrorism.” American Psychological Association, 40(10): 60. http://www.apa. org/monitor/2009/11/terrorism.aspx.

De la Corte, L. 2006. La Lógica del Terrorismo. Madrid: Alianza. http:// www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index. php/pot/article/view/8/html.

De la Corte, L. 2010. “Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach.”

Perspectives on Terrorism. http:// terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/ article/view/8/html.

Fighel, John. “The Radicalization Process in Prisons.” International Institute for Counterterrorism. Presented at NATO workshop, Eliat, 2007.

Fishman, Shira, et al. 2010.

“UMD START: Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force.” PediaView.

16 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

com. https://pediaview.com/openpedia/ Radicalization#cite_note-11.

Gerstenfeld, M. “Radical Islam in The Netherlands: A Case Study of a Failed European Policy.” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 4, no. 14 (2005).

KilCullen, D. 2008. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McCauley, C. 2006. “Jujitsu Politics: Terrorism and Response to Terrorism,” in Collateral Damage: The Psychological Consequences of America’s War on Terrorism, ed. P.R. Kimmel and Chris Stout. Westport, CT: Praeger Press.

McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism.”

Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–433. doi:10.1080/09546550802073367 McCauley, C. Mosalenko, S. “Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us.” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

McCoy, T. “How ISIS and Other Jihadists Persuaded Thousands of Westerners to Fight Their War of Extremism.” The Washington Post (Washington, DC), 2014.

Newman, E. “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006): 49772 NRC Handelsblad. 2004. “Nota AIVD: ‘Westerse Leefstijl Doelwit Radicalen.’”

Pape, R., and Feldman, J. 2010.

“Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It.” http://english.my-definitions. com/en/define/radicalise.

Post, J. “Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior.” Terrorism: An International Journal 7, no. 3 (1984).

Rinehart, C. Volatile Social Movements

Best Location in Orlando – The Florida Hotel and Conference Center What a fantastic hotel. Rooms were nicely appointed, the staff was courteous, and the business center was by far the best I’ve seen. And if you love to shop, you can’t beat having the mall attached to the hotel.

–Top rated by TripAdvisor

Counter The

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

presents: 11th Annual

HOMELAND SECURITY PROFESSIONALS CONFERENCE AND EXPOSITION October 25-26, 2016 • Orlando, FL We sold out in 2015 Get your registration in as soon as possible: • Best speakers in Homeland Security • Premiere opportunity to network with your peers in US Homeland Security and across the Globe • Attended by more than 100 Federal, State and Local agencies • Selected Vendor expo of the latest in HS Technologies

This year’s The Counter Terrorist Magazine Annual Homeland Security Professionals conference will celebrate its first decade. This will be a highly publicized event throughout the country and abroad.

REGISTER NOW REGISTRATION COST $399.00 *Government and group rates available. Call us for details.

www.thecounterterroristmag.com/conference

LEARN MORE at: Call now for more information.

Phone: 866-573-3999 Fax: 866-573-2090 Villegas@homelandsecurityssi.com

Circle 177 on Reader Service Card

The Counter TerroristTerrorist ~ February/March 2015 17 73 The Counter ~ June/July 2016

and the Origins of Terrorism: The Radicalization of Change. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013.

Rosebraugh, C. The Logic of Political Violence. Portland, OR: PW Press, 2014.

Royzman, E.E., McCauley C., and Rozin, P. “From Plato to Putnam: Four Ways of Thinking about Hate,” in The Psychology of Hate, ed. R.J. Sternberg.

Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2005.

Schmid, A. P. “Radicalisation, DeRadicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review.” The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 4, no. 2 (2013).

The Dawa Report. “Rekrutering in Nederland Voor de Jihad Van Incident Naar Trend,” AIVD (2002): 6. [Dutch] U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2010. “Community-Level

18 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force. Science And Technology.”

Varshney, A. “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality.” Perspective on Politics 1 (2003): 85–99.

Vidino, Lorenzo. “Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe.” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, Nov. 2010.

Winter, C. 2016. Why ISIS Propaganda Works. The Atlantic. http:// www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2016/02/isis-propagandawar/462702/ Wright, L. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and The Road to 9/11.

Camberwell, VIC.: Penguin, 2006.

Circle 20 on Reader Service Card

and bandanas. Years of successful gang conspiracy and RICO cases have taught them that this is bad juju and only gets them more prison time. Most wear the same clothes that most young adults their age wear. So, back to the Vietnam analogy, it’s not unlike monitoring a village where everyone wears black pajamas (friend and foe) and trying to determine who the good guys and bad guys are. Or, in more modern terms, in Afghanistan or Iraq, where insurgents

301 on Reader Service Card Circle 329

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 19

TO DIE FOR A WARRIOR’S ANALYSIS OF WOMEN IN COMBAT

20 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

by SSG Derek Goeriz, United States Army Special Forces NCO

For over 200 years, the role of women in the American military has been limited to non-combat positions due to an inherent understanding of the multitude of problems associated with the inclusion of women in this deadly domain.

D

espite the fact that females have been an important part of the U.S. Armed Forces to varying degrees since the country’s inception, the recent opening of combat positions to women, without significant public debate or discussion, will fundamentally alter the cultural essence and capability of our fighting forces for the worse. Originally announced by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and further implemented

by his successor Ashton Carter, this drastic policy change has lifted the ban on women in combat positions. The ramifications of this decision will be far reaching, affecting the very nature of our combat units and their ability to accomplish their missions. Although certain limited situations may exist where employing females in direct support of combat units might make sense, allowing women access to a broad array of combat

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 21

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter conducts a press briefing at the Pentagon Aug. 20 2015. Carter answered questions from the media on a variety of issues including regional threats across the globe and potential logjams in Congress over the budget this fall. Carter also pointed out the recent graduation of the first two female soldiers of Army Ranger School a significant milestone in DoD's plan to test the integration of women in combatant roles. Photo by: Glenn Fawcett

‌politics over practicality.

22 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

jobs is a fundamentally irresponsible policy that will lower unit morale, adversely affect good order and discipline, and increase both mission failure and loss of American life.

Arguments for women in combat tend to emphasize three points: the unfairness and inequality of precluding women from combat specialties, the existence of females with peak fitness who can meet the physical demands of war, and the need for the presence of females in

certain culturally sensitive combat-related missions. Clearly founded on principals of equality under the law and protection of inalienable individual rights, the U.S. government has progressed toward ever greater fulfillment of these ideals in society. But to misuse the mantra of equality to justify foundational changes to the structure of units engaged in violent battle, with only perfunctory concern for the pernicious effects of such a policy on survivability and mission readiness,

clearly puts politics over practicality.

Additionally, some argue that there are without question a very small number of women of outstanding physical prowess who could likely handle the intense physical demands of warfighting. Yet the myriad of other issues caused by the inclusion of women in male-dominated fighting units still persist, beyond the very real physical problems associated with feminine hygiene during prolonged exposure to austere environments (as noted by former Director of the National Security Agency, Lieutenant General William Odom, in the author’s national security policy seminar at Yale in 2003).

Finally, in traditional Islamic cultures such as the culture of Afghanistan, women are not to be touched by men outside of kinship. For coalition forces to do so would cause a loss of rapport with the indigenous people, making a sound counterinsurgency strategy more difficult to successfully employ. In these situations, Female Engagement Teams or Combat Support Teams made up of women have been attached to combat units in dangerous environments but in a supporting role. Even in this limited combat related position, incidents of poor performance and even cowardice under fire have endangered the lives of American combat soldiers. In fact, two of the author’s colleagues were nearly killed in separate incidents due to their attached women’s inability to perform under fire in deadly engagements with enemy forces.

Despite the largely superfluous arguments for opening combat jobs to women, proponents of such a policy cannot compellingly address the essential issue of decreased unit performance due to lowered morale resulting from this misguided policy. The great general Napoleon declared that in war the moral is to the physical as three is to one, meaning that the human dimension of

warfare and a combat unit’s morale carry great weight in determining that unit’s ability to survive and accomplish its brutal mission. The inclusion of women on combat teams would undoubtedly degrade morale for a multitude of reasons. First, the type of men who volunteer to kill and face death on their nation’s behalf are by necessity rough and aggressive by nature. This coarseness and potential for violence is fostered and magnified by a combat culture designed to transform men into merciless instruments of death and destruction.

Therefore, the presence of females among hard men of this type would precipitate a multitude of problems ranging from romantic relationships—resulting in morale-harming jealousies and readiness-diminishing pregnancies—to the imposition of stifling speech and behavioral regulations that would effectively neuter men’s combat culture.

These issues of unit morale are even more acute for special operations units, which operate in small, isolated groups, often within confined quarters in austere environments. Privacy concerns and sexual issues are magnified in this context, along with the inevitable friction with the servicemen’s wives and girlfriends precipitated by the presence of females with the team in such intimate circumstances. Anything that induces further stress on a man’s relationship at home while on a deployment will without question harm unit morale and its ability to successfully accomplish the mission. Known to be key to a warfighting unit’s success in battle, unit morale must be upheld and strengthened by common sense policies, not made a casualty in service of utopian schemes of social engineering.

Far from the ivory tower of academia and intellectual theory, at the pointy end of the spear in combat on the ground,

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 23

During battle, men displayed an utter loss of control upon seeing their female comrades injured or killed.

24 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

discipline is an essential component of battlefield success that will be greatly diminished by the invasion of women into the brotherhood of men trained to kill. Strict adherence to hierarchy and discipline is absolutely essential for the performance of combat duties under the extreme stresses of war. Such penetrating control over individuals is necessary in order to compel them to act contrary to their instincts for personal safety and security when threatened with loss of life. The inclusion of females into this hardened culture of male warrior units would simply add an additional stressor to an already corrosively stressful environment, thereby diminishing discipline. Feelings of lust, jealousy, and the innately irresistible urge to protect female team members will compound the stresses that tax a warrior’s emotional resources while under fire. In his book On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, LTC (Ret.) Dave Grossman recounts major problems in the Israeli Defense Forces stemming from male soldiers reacting to the inclusion of females in their infantry units. During battle, men displayed an utter loss of control upon seeing their female comrades injured or killed. For this reason, the IDF banned women from direct combat roles from 1948 until 2000, when the mixed gender Caracal Battalion was established. Women do not serve in direct action combat capacities in IDF Special Operations Forces or any of the four front line infantry battalions.

The unnecessary psychic burden created by introducing women into combat roles will no doubt result in decreased battlefield discipline, and therefore increased casualties, among men in mixed-sex fighting units.

In addition to the problems of decreased control and lowered performance among men who are

negatively impacted by women’s presence on the battlefield, the fundamental issue of substandard physical performance by women will doom servicewomen themselves, as well as their integrated combat units, on the battlefield. For instance, Katie Petronio, a 28-year-old Marine Captain who deployed alongside Marine infantrymen for seven months in Afghanistan, recounts in her article, “Get Over It: We Are Not All Created Equal,” the severely debilitating injuries she suffered trying to keep up with her male counterparts: muscle atrophy, spinal injury, and becoming infertile.

Based on her real-world, on-the-ground experience of infantry life, she concluded that placing women in combat roles would lead to health issues and overall diminished team performance. This fact of substandard female performance in the infantry realm is further detailed by a Marine Corps study evaluating both women in infantry training as well as gender integrated teams as compared to their all-male counterparts. The exercise found that women were getting injured twice as often as men, employing their weapons less effectively, and struggling far more in moving casualties. These last two findings are particularly troubling as these serious combat deficiencies, largely inescapable due to women’s physiological make-up, will no doubt lead to the deaths of American servicemen if the current policy is allowed to continue into effect. Moreover, the all-male units performed at a higher level in 69 percent of the evaluated tasks when compared with mixed-sex teams. Furthermore, the male group outperformed the mixed group in 132 of the 134 tasks evaluated, particularly those involving obstacle negotiation and casualty evacuation. So young American men—sons, brothers, fathers—will die due to this misguided policy based not on the realities of

The Caracal Battalion conducted a concluding exercise in Southern Israel testing the cadets' abilities and knowledge in the field. The Caracal Battalion was created to accommodate women seeking to join a combat unit and fight alongside men. In 2004 the unit was recognized as an official battalion.

Photo by: Israel Defense Forces

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 25

A combat instructor at the Infantry Training Battalion observes as a female student removes her pack after failing to keep up with the other students on a 5-kilometer hike during the first week of training at Marine Corps Base Camp Geiger, N.C., Sept. 28, 2013. Students will be counseled for failing any of the first three hikes during their training, but must pass the 20-kilometer hike midway through the cycle to continue training. Fifteen female Marines were given the opportunity to attend the training after boot camp for the first time in Marine Corps history as part of ongoing research into the acceptance of women into combat-related job fields. The female Marines go through the same training and are held to the same ITB standards as their male counterparts. Photo by: Cpl. Chelsea Flowers Anderson

the differences between the sexes and battlefield truths, but on what LTG (Ret.) Jerry Boykin calls, “a social experiment.�

Beyond substandard physical performance by women under the acute stress of combat training and operations, another pernicious effect of this ill-advised policy will be the resulting decrease in perceived prestige of combat units, especially among Special Operations Forces, leading to lowered recruitment and thereby diminished U.S. national security. Many men choose to pursue service in the infantry, and

26 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

especially Special Operations Forces, due to their challenge and prestige.

They know that only the very best men will make it through the arduous, soul-wrenching nightmare of earning their way into elite combat units. Being primarily motivated by this pride, based on the perception of honor associated with the conquering of extreme hardship, many men who otherwise would have tried out for and gained acceptance into combat units will choose not to volunteer if women are allowed to apply as well. It is entirely immaterial whether

this mindset is perceived by some in the supple class to be anachronistic or misogynist or chauvinist. What matters is that this is a pervasive attitude among military-aged men in the U.S., especially those inclined to sign up for combat jobs. So the practical result of this policy change, allowing women admittance into this deadly-serious men’s club, will be the decreased recruitment of future American warriors, thereby making the world a more dangerous place.

In addition to the negative impact on national security stemming from the domestic attitude of fighting men toward women in combat, male cultural paradigms throughout the world preclude the successful inclusion of women in American combat units engaged in unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and other operations that rely on close interaction with foreign allies. Certain Special Operations units, most prominently the U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets), work “by, with, and through” indigenous partner forces in order to accomplish their missions. The simple fact is that if American warriors show up with female team members to meet with a guerrilla chief or warlord and their militias, the Americans’ ability to build the essential respect and rapport crucial to successful joint operations will be disastrously undermined. Undoubtedly, the vast majority of warrior cultures potentially allied with U.S. Special Operations Forces would scorn the inclusion of women in combat positions, thereby sabotaging gender-integrated units’ successful completion of these already challenging and sensitive missions.

Another often overlooked yet crucial aspect of the debate about women in combat is the fact that virtually all of the current ground warriors are vehemently against opening their ranks to women.

Having been tasked with completing multiple surveys on their view of women in combat, war-fighters’ opinions have nonetheless been purposefully disregarded by policymakers far removed from the unforgiving realities of war.

Clearly, the warriors themselves are the best positioned to provide informed feedback as to the feasibility of such

a drastic and transformative policy change. Moreover, they will be the ones most directly affected in ways that, as previously depicted, will make it harder for them to complete their missions and return to their families alive and uninjured. Therefore, one is compelled to ask why senior officials would even go to the trouble of surveying our nation’s

FREE

FOR ALL ACTIVE MILITARY AND GOVERNMEN T

July 25-27, 2016 – Enterprise, Alabama Building Next Generation Vertical Lift Capacity: Rising to Tomorrow’s Challenges www.MilitaryHelicoptersUSA.com Circle 117 on Reader Service Card

August 29-31, 2016 | Tampa, FL Sustainable, Effective, and Affordable Approaches to Enable, Train and Equip Central Region Security Partners NO-COST PASSES FOR ALL U.S. MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES!

www.SecurityCoOperationSummit.com Circle 115 on Reader Service Card

JUNE 20-22TH, 2016 WASHINGTON, D.C.

Technology Applications to Meet Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges Get an In-Depth Understanding of the Latest Requirements and Technology Gaps from Subject Matter Experts and Military Leadership On: • Electromagnetic Railgun (EMRG) • Hypervelocity Projectile (HVP) • Active Denial System (ADM) • High-Power Radio Frequency (HPRF) Weapon Systems • Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC)

W W W. D I S T R I B U T E D L E T H A L I T Y. C O M Circle 113 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 27

…the dominant political class in America is not concerned with whether allowing women into combat roles will help our fighting forces better accomplish their missions and increase their survivability.

warriors in the first place if their nearunanimous opposition to this policy would not preclude its implementation.

Unfortunately, the answer is inescapably obvious: the dominant political class in America is not concerned with whether allowing women into combat roles will help our fighting forces better accomplish their missions and increase their survivability. Tragically, they are, as C.S. Lewis would say, men without chests.

Laughing at honor, they proclaim to know best the way of the warrior. Sadly, the price for their hubris and reckless disregard for the timeless truths of war and human nature will be paid in blood.

Considering the multitude of serious problems that will be caused by allowing women into combat roles, an unlikely middle-ground may nonetheless exist. If women combatants were not integrated into male units but organized into their own all-female fighting forces, many of the problematic aspects of mixedsex dynamics outlined herein would be obviated. Nonetheless, women would still be afforded the opportunity to pursue the perceived panacea of fairness and equality, while not endangering their male counterparts’ ability to accomplish their

AVAILABLE AT:

missions and survive. In this manner, data could be collected regarding female casualties and combat performance without putting men at greater risk of capture and death. Also, this course of action would allow the military additional opportunities to analyze associated ramifications of females at war, such as how the enemy forces react to being confronted by women on the battlefield or how the American public responds to female POWs being raped, tortured, and murdered. This ability to afford women their desire to be combat specialists, while not risking the lives or mission success of male warfighters, make this option more suited to an objective pursuit of “fairness.” If women are truly able to perform to standard in the poisonous chaos of combat, such segregation by sex should result in no loss of warfighting efficacy.

Upon deeper reflection, the deadly consequences of allowing women into combat roles become painfully stark.

Unfortunately, senior military and political leaders have failed in their duty to put the mission and U.S. national security first, above politicized impulses to dream up utopian schemes

CONTRACT # GS-07F-0273T

SOUTHERN POLICE EQUIPMENT P: [800] 542.5243 southernpoliceequipment.com @southernpoliceequipment

STRIKE 8 ” E07008

- Southern Police Equipment Ad.indd 1 28BTS_16054 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

3/25/16 11:51Card AM Circle 343 on Reader Service

www.homelandsecurityssi.com Find out more at:

TAKE YOUR TRAINING TO A HIGHER LEVEL...

SSI ELEVATED TACTICS TRAINING Enhance the tactical flexibility of your SWAT or SOP team with elevated training using specialized equipment and tools such as those manufactured by Patriot3. Improve your tactical surprise and force protection with additional operational options provided through elevated, special-use vehicles. In this two-day introduction and awareness training, you’ll learn: • • • • • • •

Vehicle driving and operating techniques in a variety of situations Global case studies of real-world operations using the specific equipment Using vehicle platforms for observation, structure multiple entry techniques, and linear assaults Elevated obstacle negotiation and firing platforms Emergency evacuations, climbing and descending options Distraction and deception techniques ® SECURITY and much more...

SOLUTIONS

SSI

INTERNATIONAL

Protecting the Homeland Together ®

Call now for more information.

Elevated Tactics Training provided in partnership with Patriot3.

Circle 291 on Reader Service Card

Phone: 866-573-3999 Fax: 866-573-2090 contact@securitysolutionsint.com Circle 313 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist 2016Card 2015 29 Circle 183~onJune/July Reader Service

A student at the Infantry Training Battalion awaits her turn to perform a portion of the High Intensity Tactical Training assessment aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Geiger N.C. Sept. 27 2013. Fifteen female Marines were given the opportunity to attend the training after boot camp for the first time in Marine Corps history as part of ongoing research into the acceptance of women into combat-related job fields. The female Marines go through the same training and are held to the same standards as their male counterparts. Photo by: Cpl. Chelsea Anderson

of social engineering and lifestyle experimentation. Such proclivities are the indulgence of a civilization so affluent and leisured and cloistered as to have become exhausted in the lethargy of its therapeutic repose. But the tragic reality of man’s nature persists: the

30 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

strong are but those who are perceived to be so, taking what they can while the weak endure what they must.

Transplanting women into the fiber of America’s front-line fighting forces will make her seem weak and invite needless yet certain suffering and pain.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Staff Sergeant Derek Goeriz is a United States Army Special Forces 18E and a Yale Alumni.

20162017

POLICE K-9 POLICE K-9 CONFERENCE & VENDOR SHOW

CONFERENCE & VENDOR SHOW

March 14-16, 2017 Tuscany Suites & Casino

ATTENDEES RECEIVE A CERTIFICATE FOR 16 HOURS CONTINUING LAW ENFORCEMENT K-9 EDUCATION

March 8-10, 2016

62 TOP NOTCH VENDORS • 30 WORLD CLASS INSTRUCTORS 800+ ATTENDEES FROM AROUND THE GLOBE For more information, visit policek9magazine.com or call (270) 534-0500

policek9magazine.com 2 | Police K-9 Magazine

Circle 279 on Reader Service Card

#2017policek9conference The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 31

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TERRORISM ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE 21ST CENTURY 32 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

By Jeff S. Sandy, CFE, CAMS, PI, Special Agent retired

Tariq Aziz died in prison on June 5, 2015 after being incarcerated since April 24, 2003. What can intelligence and law enforcement officers learn from the former Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister?

T

ariq Aziz was the Iraqi Foreign Minister (1983–1991) and Deputy Prime Minister (1979–2003) and a close advisor of President Saddam Hussein. Because of security concerns, Saddam rarely left Iraq, so Aziz would often represent Iraq at high-level diplomatic summits. He was the face of Iraq to the world.

After surrendering to American forces on April 24, 2003, Aziz was held in prison, first by American forces and subsequently by the Iraqi government, in Camp Cropper in Baghdad. In 2009, he was sentenced to fifteen years for the executions of 42 merchants and seven years for relocating Kurds. In 2010, he was sentenced to death. Iraqi President

Tariq Aziz. Photo by: Tpbradbury

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 33

The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center was well funded with approximately $400,000 to $500,000.

Jalal Talabani declared that he would not sign Aziz’s execution order, thus commuting his sentence to indefinite imprisonment. Aziz remained in custody the rest of his life and died of a heart attack last year.

In 2003, President George W. Bush signed an Executive Order authorizing the U.S. Treasury to enter combat zones to investigate violations of United Nations sanctions and terrorism finance.

Aziz had been held in prison by the U.S. forces, and many felt he was not cooperating since he could not supply information when asked the question “Where are the weapons of mass destruction?”

When Special Agent Jeff Sandy was introduced to Aziz, he quickly stated, “I have been asked dozens of times and I

34 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

will tell you the same, I know nothing about weapons of mass destruction.”

Aziz looked in disbelief when Agent Sandy stated, “I am here to talk to you about money.” Aziz’s facial expressions showed he knew a lot and could help.

However, he refused to talk at this time.

Since the beginning of time, scholars have articulated that money is the root of evil, but many intelligence and law enforcement officers for whatever reason fail to discuss this piece of the puzzle. Most intelligence and law enforcement officers want to solve the crime, not necessarily what financed the crime. We have had so many occasions in history when agents of evil spoke of the need for money to facilitate their acts of terrorism.

Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, who was convicted for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, stated that with more money they could have brought the towers down. A majority of terrorist scholars state that without money there is no terrorism. Usama bin Laden, in a 2001 interview with a Pakistani journalist, stated that alQaeda’s supporters are as “aware of the cracks in the Western financial system as they are aware of the lines in their own hands.” Without question, Usama bin Laden wanted to obliterate the U.S. by destroying the U.S. economy. Usama bin Laden was surrounded by financiers who controlled billions of dollars and knew the weaknesses of our financial system. The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center was well funded with approximately $400,000 to $500,000.

Usama bin Laden knew the importance of every target that was attacked and made sure the soon-to-be martyrs were well funded.

It should be quite clear to all intelligence and law enforcement officers that an effective anti-terrorism program requires authorities at all levels to look in advance of the terrorist attack and be proactive in stopping the flow of money required to finance the terrorist act before it happens.

After several visits with Aziz, talking pleasantries, eating grapes, and smoking Cuban cigars, Agent Sandy asked Aziz if he would like to watch TV, if approval could be obtained from the military. Aziz stated that that would be wonderful, and the U.S. Army approved.

On September 21, 2003, Sandy and Aziz went to a private room that contained a television that was showing the NCAA football game between sixth-ranked Kansas State and Marshall University.

Sandy advised Aziz that he was alumni of Marshall University and asked Aziz if he was alright with watching American football. Aziz stated, “Where else could I go, back to my cell?” Marshall upset Kansas State that day and Aziz stated it had been a long time since he had seen anyone so happy as Agent Sandy.

Aziz looked at Agent Sandy and asked, “What do you want to know about the money?” Aziz was now willing to cooperate.

For hours Aziz explained: • How Iraq circumvented United Nations sanctions and moved money in and out of Iraq.

• How oil was sold in violation of United Nations sanctions.

• How front companies were used to conceal and disguise the movement of money.

The flow chart written by Aziz explains how companies were used to purchase missile casings from North Korea and

Photo by: Jeff Sandy

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 35

A member of an Afghan and coalition security force seizes multiple passports and money during a night operation in Nahr-e Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan, April 27, 2013. The operation resulted in the detention of a Taliban leader and two other extremists, the leader was in charge of a cell of fighters responsible for planning and executing attacks against government officials in Helmand province. He also facilitated the production and distribution of home-made explosive materials for use in afghan enemy operations, and possessed significant experience with improvised explosive devices. Photo by: Sgt. Richard W. Jones Jr.

36 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

evade detection by the U.S. and the United Nations.

So what can we learn from Aziz?

Before we start, it is important to note that the majority of ISIS is former Iraqi military and intelligence officers that served under Saddam Hussein. These individuals were fired from their jobs by the coalition forces, primarily by the U.S. military. They were experts in espionage and many of them were trained by the Soviet Union’s KGB.

They were experts in using front companies and they were trained to purchase many untraceable assets we are now seeing on TV, like their new Toyota trucks.

So let’s take a look how ISIS can be driving new Toyota trucks and the world is wondering how.

SOURCE OF FUNDS: ISIS acquires money from the sale of oil and antiquities, and even steals

money from banks in the cities they have captured.

STEP ONE OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING: The money is deposited into the bank accounts of high ranking military or intelligence officers or even their family members. They also have a history of depositing funds into the accounts of unknown or unaware individuals and even fictitious business bank accounts.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 37

Lance Cpl. Justin R. Harris, a disbursing clerk augmented to the Sahl Sinjar Airfield Marine Corps Exchange in northern Iraq, counts money from his change drawer, Mar. 3, 2009.

The exchange is run by Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 7, 2nd Marine Logistics Group (Forward), and provides services to all personnel on Sahl Sinjar.

Photo by: Cpl. Bobbie A. Curtis

38 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 39

STEP TWO OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING: The individuals in Step One transfer the funds into a bookkeeping or law firm bank account that services multiple clients. The firm makes the deposit and comingles the funds with other clients’ legal funds.

STEP THREE OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING: The bookkeeping or law firm negotiates a contract with a trading company to purchase the Toyotas. The trading company receives a commission for their services. The trading company only knows the trucks are being purchased by the bookkeeping or law firm.

STEP FOUR OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING: The trading company sends out notice and asks for bids for Toyota trucks. The distributor only knows the trucks are being purchased by the trading company.

STEP FIVE OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING: The trading company secures a contract to purchase the Toyota trucks, and forwards the contract to the bookkeeping or law firm and requests payment.

STEP SIX OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING: The funds are transferred from the bookkeeping or law firm to the trading company.

An Afghan Local Police member counts his money after receiving his month's pay at the Nilay checkpoint in Nawbahar district, Zabul province, Afghanistan, Jan. 12. The ALP is a defensive, community-oriented force that brings security and stability to rural areas of Afghanistan.

Photo by: Petty Officer 2nd Class David Brandenburg

40 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

STEP SEVEN OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING: The funds are then transferred from the trading company to the distributor.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

In most cases the distributor will not know, want to know, or even ask who is purchasing the trucks.

STEP EIGHT OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING: The trucks can be shipped to one or more of any of the surrounding countries, where customs officials can be bribed to allow the trucks to enter ISIS controlled areas.

Organized crime has operated for centuries and ISIS is currently the new syndicate on the block. They are also the most vicious organized gang operating in the world today, and they learned their financial prowess from some of the besttrained intelligence officers in the world.

It is imperative that the world cooperates to strangle their financial strength.

•

Jeff Sandy is currently is the head of the Forensic Accounting Unit for Perry & Associates, Certified Public Accountants. He is a highly decorated Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Special Agent and former Sheriff of Wood County, West Virginia.

He is a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), and a Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS). He received the Honor Award from the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury and a Department of Defense Joint Services Achievement Medal from U.S. Army General Keith W. Dayton for his financial investigations in Iraq. He is guest lecturer for the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, West

Virginia State Police, and dozens of colleges and universities across the United States. During the last 36 years, he has investigated and supervised some of the nation’s largest financial fraud cases. He has been admitted as an expert witness in the field of money laundering in five U.S. District Courts. He has taught financial investigative techniques to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers, Iraqi police, and police officers and dignitaries from Russia and the Baltic countries. He is the author of a book for law enforcement titled “Trace It”: A Law Enforcement Officer’s Guide to Simple, Accurate, and Convicting Financial Investigations.

CONFERENCE & VENDOR SHOW

November 14-16, 2016

Circle 277 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 41

BOOK REVIEW

It IS about Islam

by Glenn Beck, 2015

B

eck’s book is worth the time it takes to read, if only for the first few chapters alone. The book begins by doing two critical things that I believe the average American can immediately benefit from reading. The introduction to the book tells the story of Thomas Jefferson’s interest in learning about Islam. The book describes in great historical detail about how Jefferson owned the first Koran in North America and was the first president to go to war with Islamic radicals. Beck argues, “It is clear, however, that Jefferson was, to put it mildly, suspicious of Islam. He compared the faith with Catholicism, and believed that neither had undergone a reformation. Both religions, he felt, suppressed rational thought and persecuted skeptics.

When combined with the power of the state, religion would corrupt and stifle individual rights. Islam, to Jefferson’s mind, provided a cautionary tale of what happened when a faith insisted on combining religious and political power into one…”

Further, Jefferson gives credit to Islam for showing him why the new nation of The United States of America should not have an official religion and that church and state must be separated with equal rights for all. Beck writes,

42 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

Reviewed by Editorial Staff

Both religions, he felt, suppressed rational thought and persecuted skeptics.

Official Presidential portrait of Thomas Jefferson. Photo by: Rembrandt Peale (1778–1860)

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 43

“As a member of the Virginia House of Delegates, Jefferson cited Islam as an example for why Virginia should not have an official religion. A state religion, he argued, would quash ‘free enquiry,’ as he recorded in his notes at the time.

He knew Islam held little tolerance for other faiths…”

The second criticality is covered by section one, on the history of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad and how the current statuesque came to be normalized.

Geography plays a big part in this explanation, and although a historian will not learn anything new, most readers would benefit from learning a little history, if not for context alone.

The next section of the book exposes facts and fictions and debunks common misconceptions. The final section outlines what the average person can do and how they too can be effective in combatting what some would say is a threat to liberty.

Professionals Special Operations

ENT BAGHDAD I • MS-13 RECRUITM RESCUE IN IRAQ • ISIS WARLORD PUTIN’S RING OF STEEL •

ANN

IV

7

TH

SUE

The

IS

AW

D WINNIN AR N T H Y E A E Counter

R

ER 4 E 8 • NUMB 2015 2014/JAN DEC VOLUM

V

The

G

Counter

2015 JUNE/JULY nals Professio

SE

nce & Special Operations Journal for Law Enforcement, Intellige

•

LET US SHOWCASE YOUR PRODUCTS, SERVICES AND TRAINING TO OUR FIRST RESPONDERS...

IO AZTE CA PAND A • BARR • PRC’ S DEEP • 18TH ST. K&R SE SCHO OL PLOT TROJ AN HOR

& rcement, Intelligence Journal for Law Enfo

To me, one of the most interesting assertions made in the book is as follows.

In WWII, the Greatest Generation did not make the distinction between Nazis and those who sympathized with them or were moderate Nazis. It was made very clear who was part of the Axis and that we would combat Germany first and Japan second. During the Cold War, the administration never made the distinction between moderate communists or extreme communists.

Nazis and Communists as a whole were openly recognized as enemies of the free world. This is largely due to the fact that the moderate or sympathizer was equally an adversary and we had little tolerance for Nazis or Communists of any kind.

E R S A RY

UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL JIHAD EBOLA AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 6

L INTERNATIONA

EDITION An SSI Publication

The Counter Terrorist is a peer journal, that is read in the USA and in ASIA by:

We are now committed to bring valuable tools to the attention of our First Responders through:

• Police • Fire • Emergency Management • Emergency Medicine • The Military • Special Forces

• Detailed Product Reviews • Innovative Product launches • International Resources

Call Sol Bradman now at 305-302-2790 or write him at bradman@homelandsecurityssi.com

®

g.com

thecounterterroristma JUNE/J ULY 2015 $5.99 USA/CANADA

INTERNATIONAL

EDITION An SSI Publication

Whether it’s the magazine, our online sites and e-blasts or our annual conference...he’ll help you reach your audience!

®

DECEMBER 2014/JANUARY USA/CANADA $5.99

2015

www.thecounterterroristmag.com 2014/January 2015 1 The Counter Terrorist ~ December

★ 44 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

Counter The

Homeland Security Professionals Conference and Exposition Circle 33 on Reader Service Card

Tactical Tools to Achieve The Mission!

• Pelican® Brand 1740 case attached to custom hitch that inserts in standard two inch tow receiver. Adaptable to replace push plate on Bear® and Bearcat®. Textured powder coated black • Custom Laser Cut Foam insert for all kit items • 4 Carabiners rated for over 6,000 lbs. each • Two 30 foot custom made “black” tow straps rated at over 10,000 lbs. tensile strength each • Two custom made hooks extra open non-gated for easy insertion – textured powder coated black for non-slip grip • Custom-made 39” long, 1” diameter rolled steel window spear with rounded ends, and 6 foot chain - textured powder coated black for non-slip grip • Custom made elongated Thor hammer 12 pound custom head with 3 foot composite handle

Universal Mounting Options Available!

Call now for more information. Pricing dependent on quantity

and delivery location. Call Solomon Bradman at: (305) 302-2790 or email bradman@homelandsecurityssi.com Circle 179 on Reader Service Card

Circle 179 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 45

TIME TO BUILD ANOTHER WING ONTO GITMO OBAMA’S DESIRE TO CLOSE DOWN THE DETENTION FACILITY AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

46 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

“We are at war. We are at war with al-Qaeda.”1 –Barack Obama

by Jeffrey F. Addicott

I

n late February 2016, President Obama made yet another pitch to the American people and the Congress for the complete closure of the detention facility for radical Islamic unlawful enemy combatants at the naval facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GITMO).

Offering no specifics in his new “plan” of where the remaining detainees would

actually go, Obama stated: “The plan we’re putting forth today is not just about closing the facility … This is about closing a chapter in our history.”2 This call for closure and the accompanying rhetoric is nothing new.

President Obama has repeatedly expressed this desire from day two of taking his oath of office, almost eight years

President Barack Obama delivers a statement on the global campaign to degrade and destroy ISIL as well as Syria and other regional issues at the U.S. Department of State in Washington D.C. on February 25 2016.Photo by: U.S. Department of State from United States

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 47

Soldiers assigned to the 115th Military Police Company of the Rhode Island Army National Guard stand guard at a sally port inside Camp Delta at Joint Task Force Guantanamo. The Rhode Island Army National Guard unit is on a one-year deployment providing security at the Joint Task Force Guantanamo detention facilities. Photo by: Tech. Sgt. Michael R. Holzworth

ago. At that time, instead of creating an interagency task force to conduct a detailed study of all viable options and recommendations on how best to proceed in the shutdown of GITMO,

48 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

Obama naively issued an executive order on January 22, 2009, for the closure of GITMO within one year.3 It is now 2016 and a frustrated Obama laments that GITMO is still

Army and Navy guards cross-train while escorting a detainee to a recreational area in Camp One at Joint Task Force Guantanamo September 30, 2007. Detainees at Camp One spend up to two hours daily in the recreational area.

Photo by: Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Michael Billings

open. Yet, the so-called “chapter in our history” is far from over. While Americans are not used to long wars (Europe had the Hundred Years’ War), this is a long war.

Indeed, considering that the conflict with al-Qaeda and their off-shoot ISIS is accelerating, it is actually time to build another wing onto GITMO, not close it down.

Following the al-Qaeda terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration instituted a series of policy and legal initiatives designed to disrupt the Islamic terror organization

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 49

A Navy guard assigned to Joint Task Force Guantanamo’s Navy Expeditionary Guard Battalion patrols Camp Delta’s recreation yard during the early morning of July 7, 2010. Camp Delta is a communal living facility and the detainees housed at Camp Delta are able to use the recreation yard for up to 20 hours a day. The Sailors of the NEGB provide a portion of the guard force inside Joint Task Force Guantanamo’s detention facilities. Photo by: U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Michael R. Holzworth

(and its affiliates) and to prevent future terror attacks against the homeland. As part of this ongoing war, confinement facilities were established to detain certain unlawful enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan and other parts of the world at Bagram Air Force Base, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.4 In conjunction with the War on Terror, the Bush Administration designated certain individuals as enemy combatants

50 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

and detained them indefinitely.

Under the law of armed conflict, an enemy combatant—whether lawful or unlawful—can be held indefinitely until the war is over. The purpose of detention is not penal in nature, but necessary to keep the enemy combatant from rejoining enemy forces and continuing the fight.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the validity of the premise

A detainee goes after a soccer ball within the outdoor recreation area of Camp Six at Joint Task Force Guantanamo.

Photo by: Petty Officer 2nd Class Jordan Miller

The purpose of detention is not penal in nature, but necessary to keep the enemy combatant from rejoining enemy forces and continuing the fight.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 51

An Air Force service member attached with the 118th Base Engineer Emergency Force in support of Joint Task Force Guantanamo welds chain link fencing to an exterior structure at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay June 18. The 118th BEEF is constructing a storage unit while deployed here for training. JTF Guantanamo conducts safe humane legal and transparent care and custody of detainees including those convicted by military commission and those ordered released by a court. Photo by: Spc. Cody Black

Army 1st Sgt. Tina Brown Army Maj. Jennifer Reed and Army Sgt. Rosalyn Anderson deployed here with the 525th Military Police Battalion in support of Joint Task Force Guantanamo run in front of the Honor Bound sign at Joint Task Force Guantanamo's Camp Delta during a physical fitness session. Photo by: Petty Officer 3rd Class Joshua Nistas

52 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

that the United States is engaged in a state of war with “al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.” Therefore, the United States is entitled to detain such fighters as unlawful enemy combatants.

The Court has only considered narrow issues dealing with status and review processes applicable to detainees in Guantanamo Bay. The Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that, although the detainees were not entitled to POW status, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did in fact apply to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay. In 2008, a bitterly divided (5-4) Supreme Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that aliens designated as enemy combatants and detained at Guantanamo Bay had the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus review of the legality and possibly the circumstances of their detention.

At one time, GITMO had a peak population of around 700 detainees from approximately 40 countries, with Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Yemen the most represented. When President Bush left office in January 2009, around 250 detainees remained; Bush had released those he deemed to be “rehabilitated.” Today around 90 detainees remain, as Obama has released about 150 under the same theory as Bush—they were rehabilitated and posed no threat.6 Of course, as we now know, as much as a third of these “reformed” radical Islamic terrorists had lied and returned to the battlefield.

The misguided idea that we need to close GITMO implies that the United States has been in the moral and legal wrong for the past 14 years and must make atonement. It was al-Qaeda that incinerated 3,000 people on 9/11.

We are at war and under the law of war have every right to detain them indefinitely. America has nothing to apologize for.

Watchtower security teams at Camp X-Ray man positions during a rehearsal for handling incoming detainees. Camp X-Ray will be one of the holding facilities for Taliban and Al Qaida detainees. Photo by: PhotographerÕs Mate 1st Class Shane T. McCoy

Thankfully, President Obama’s desire to close the detention facility at GITMO never happened and will not happen. In part this is because Obama’s reasons for wanting to close GITMO are fallacious, but in the larger picture, the battle against Islamic extremism is increasing, not declining. With the rise of ISIS, the war is far from over and the need for detention more necessary than ever.

While President Obama and his Justice Department may wish to blame his inability to close GITMO on the Republican-controlled Congress and “uniformed Americans,” the facts show just the opposite. First, Obama’s strong desire to close the facility has always

been met with a firestorm of opposition from the American people, even from his own Democratic Party.

For the first two years in office, Democrats controlled the Senate and the House of Representatives, not Republicans. Not only did the Democrat-controlled Congress in 2009 refuse to provide the Obama Administration with the $80 million it requested to close the facility, but the Democrat-controlled Congress also placed numerous caveats on when, where, and how the President could transfer detainees, particularly if he wished to send them to the United States.7 The Republican-controlled Congress has simply followed suit.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 53

Detainees in orange jumpsuits sit in a holding area under the watchful eyes of Military Police at Camp X-Ray at Naval Base Guantanamo Bay Cuba during in-processing to the temporary detention facility on January 11, 2002. The detainees will be given a basic physical exam by a doctor to include a chest x-ray and blood samples drawn to assess their health. Photo by: Petty Officer 1st class Shane T. McCoy U.S. Navy

54 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

Second, while other radical Islamic terrorists must be processed by domestic criminal law, the War on Terror is a real war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. These qualify as unlawful enemy combatants, not domestic jihadists. Obama has always thrived off of a lack of clarity to distinguish the domestic jihadist from the unlawful enemy combatant. This lack of leadership only provides fuel for America’s enemies to perpetuate the false propaganda that the United States is acting illegally by detaining people without trial at GITMO. If the events of 9/11 have taught Americans anything, it is that the United States must operate under the law of war against those individual al-Qaeda and ISIS Islamic terrorists designated as unlawful enemy combatants. The next president will have to come to terms with this matter in a bipartisan manner that rests firmly in the proper rule of law.

•

ENDNOTES Obama, Barack. 2010. “Remarks by the President on Strengthening Intelligence and Aviation Security.”

Available at 2010 WL 40113. (“We are at war. We are at war against al-Qaeda, a farreaching network of violence and hatred that attacked us on 9/11, that killed nearly 3,000 innocent people and that is plotting to strike us again. And we will do whatever it takes to defeat them.”).

2 Korte, Gregory and Tom Vanden Brook. “Final Push to Shut Down GITMO.” USA Today, February 24, 2016.

3 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009); see also Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009) (establishing a special task force on detainee disposition).

4 Joint Task Force Guantanamo.

Accessed February 25, 2016. http://www.

1

jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/. The mission of the U.S. military task force is to conduct “safe, humane, legal and transparent care and custody of detainees, including those convicted by military commission and those ordered released.”

5 Traditional law of war authority allows the government to hold enemy combatants until the end of hostilities.

See Geneva Convention III, supra note 17, art. 118.

6 Korte, Gregory and Tom Vanden Brook. “Final Push to Shut Down GITMO.” USA Today, February 24, 2016.

7 Murray, Shailagh. “Senate Demands Plan for Detainees.” Washington Post (Washington, DC), May 20, 2009.

See also Linzer, Dafna and Peter Finn. “White House Weighs Order on Detention.” Washington Post (Washington, DC), June 27, 2009.

(Explaining that the appropriations bill signed by President Obama “forces the administration to report to Congress before moving any detainee out of Guantanamo and prevents the White House from using available funds to move detainees onto U.S. soil.”)

Channel, MSNBC, CNN, BBC, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, and USA Today (with over 4,000 media interviews). Addicott is a prolific author, publishing over 60 books, articles, and monographs on a variety of legal topics.

His most recent book (2014) is entitled Terrorism Law: Cases, Materials, Comments, 7th edition. e-mail: jaddicott@stmarytx.edu Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (ret.), Professor of Law and Director, Center for Terrorism Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law. B.A. (with honors), University of Maryland; J.D., University of Alabama School of Law; LL.M., The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School; LL.M. (1992) and S.J.D. (1994), University of Virginia School of Law. This article was prepared under the auspices of the Center for Terrorism Law, located at St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lt. Colonel (U.S. Army, ret.) Jeffrey F. Addicott is a full Professor of Law and the Director of the Center for Terrorism Law at St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. An active duty Army officer in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps for twenty years, Professor Addicott spent a quarter of his career as the senior legal advisor to the United States Army’s Special Forces. As an internationally recognized authority on national security law, Professor Addicott not only lectures and participates in professional and academic organizations both in the United States and abroad (over 700 speeches), but he also testifies before Congress on a variety of legal issues. He is also a regular contributor to national and international news media outlets, including Fox News

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 55

INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING TECHNOLOGY INTO MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

56 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

by Nick Perna

Robert McNamara was Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. President Johnson inherited him from the previous administration, and to a certain extent he was an anomaly. McNamara was a large-brained individual of exceptional cerebral talents.

O

ne of the tasks he was assigned was coming up with a winning strategy for the Vietnam War. Like most people, when faced with a dauntless task, he fell back on his strengths. In McNamara’s case this was his superior intellect. McNamara, in part, attempted to use technology to defeat

the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong guerillas. When large numbers of men and materiel were coming into South Vietnam by way of Laos and Cambodia via the Ho Chi Minh trail, McNamara tried to stem the flow. He was the chief proponent of what would come to be known as the McNamara Line, which

Guerillas assamble shells and rockets delivered along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Photo by: U.S. Army

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and General Westmoreland, Vietnam Assistance Command Commander, talks with General Tee on condition of the war in Vietnam.

Photo by: United States Marine Corps

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 57

MACV-SOG reconnaissance team in Vietnam

was a series of electronic sensors strewn about the jungle that were designed to alert American units to the presence of incoming enemy troops and equipment.

It was an invisible electronic line that the enemy would trip, allowing U.S. forces to launch air strikes, artillery barrages, and so on to prevent the enemy from getting into South Vietnam.

A great idea but doomed from the start. The Ho Chi Minh trial was not an

58 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

Interstate highway that could be easily monitored. It was hundreds of trails, highly camouflaged and invisible from the air, leading from the North to the South. Some trails were barely wide enough for one man to walk on. Even given the technology of today it would be impossible to make an electronic wall hundreds of miles across in the middle of a war zone designed to detect all movement. (If you don’t believe me, look

at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan or, closer to home, the U.S./ Mexico border). Large amounts of enemy men and materiel flowed into South Vietnam throughout the war despite the best efforts to stop it (Daugherty and Mattson 2001).

As the war dragged on, many Americans, including McNamara, began to feel the war was unwinnable. I can’t help but wonder if this was due in part

to the fact that, despite his best efforts, McNamara wasn’t able to outsmart an enemy lacking in the same level of technical expertise.

This is true in law enforcement as well.

When a problem or challenge presents itself, we often try to come up with a technological or cerebral approach to the problem. If the problem is gang violence in a particular area, the heavy-minded approach may consist of the following: analysis of times when gang violence is most prevalent, generation of lists of known gang members who frequent an area, installation of pole cameras and license plate readers to track the coming and going of people and vehicles.

All good ideas, right, but like McNamara’s line it isn’t a stand-alone solution. In my experience, gang members frequent areas within a specific neighborhood, gravitating toward certain places but often remaining mobile. They leave their territory to attack rival sets and commit other crimes such as robberies, residential burglaries and drug deals. They may operate out of a specific “hood” or area but they are relatively mobile when “conducting operations” (not unlike the Viet Cong or Taliban). I doubt many agencies have the financial wherewithal to have cameras installed throughout their cities to monitor this activity and, if they do, I think the ACLU would have a field day with them.

Along those same lines, gang members, like most criminals, are relatively unpredictable when it comes to times and days of the week when they are active. There may be some patterns that evolve (most gangsters don’t get out of bed until noon, for example) but when (and where) they do their dirt is hard to predict. It can even be difficult to tell who the members of the gang are. Unlike in the movies, they don’t generally stand around all wearing the same color clothes

MACV-SOG Insignia

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 59

Police officer conducting surveillance from a hide site during a counter narcotics operation. He relayed timely information to undercover officers on the ground regarding narcotic sales in an area known for that activity. A remotely operated camera in his place would be useful as well, freeing him up to assist in other areas.

60 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

Counter The

Asia Pacific Edition The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific Edition is finally available for the Asia Pacific region counter-terrorism and homeland security practitioners. The Asia Pacific Edition not only gives the readers a worldwide counter-terrorism perspective but also in-depth information about counter terrorism activities in Asia. The Asia Pacific Edition provides an excellent platform for counter-terrorism and homeland solutions providers to access and penetrate the Asia Pacific market.

Circle 255 on Reader Service Card

Email: sales@thecounterterroristmag.com Circle 13 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 61

The author in Iraq briefing a mission. A map can’t display the latest changes in terrain, human or otherwise. Without timely information from intel-gathering nodes, there’s no way to ensure the information briefed is timely or relevant.

look pretty much like everyone else in their neighborhood.

Around the same time that the McNamara Line was attempted, there was another way U.S. forces attempted to close the door on the Cambodia and Laos route into South Vietnam. A highly secretive organization known as MAVCSOG (Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group) was using a different tactic.

Small units of Green Berets augmented

62 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

by Nung and Montagnard mercenaries and, in certain cases, South Vietnamese commandos, clandestinely entered Cambodia and Laos (usually by helicopter). The small units would conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in areas believed to be used by the enemy to infiltrate South Vietnam. These teams would roam through the jungle quietly looking for signs of enemy activity, especially the roads and trails used by them. When a team would find such

The most important reason to get timely, accurate intelligence is make sure it is in the hands of the operators who will be using it.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 63

a location, they would monitor it for enemy activity (Plaster 1997).

When large numbers of enemy supply trucks or personnel would venture down a trail, the green berets would call in air strikes on them. A couple of trucks here, a squad of enemy there, and the Special Forces teams chipped away at the enemy.

Similar missions were conducted in South Vietnam by U.S. Army LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol) units.

The “Lurps” would also move in small teams, seek out the enemy, and either kill them in ambushes, call for air or artillery support, or request conventional units to deploy to the area to seek them out and attack them.

Unfortunately, the idea didn’t appeal to more conventional military forces, so the MACV-SOG and LRRP teams were never deployed in sufficient enough numbers to accomplish their goal. We can only speculate as to what the effect there would have been regarding the outcome of the war if we had hundreds of these teams operating near the border and elsewhere with sufficient tactical air power on hand. Pound for pound they were some of the most successful units in theatre, killing and capturing large numbers of the enemy disproportionate to their own numbers and casualties.

Interestingly enough, though, some MACV-SOG teams actually located enemy convoys by using information provided by acoustic sensors that were part of the McNamara Line. The combination of technology coupled with “boots on the ground” proved a successful combination. Along those same lines, the Green Berets used overhead aviation assets in the form of pilots and spotters in single engine prop planes to provide aerial observation and to better coordinate for air support.

An acoustic sensor, a pole camera, or even a plane is of limited value if there

64 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

isn’t way to act on the intelligence it provides. It’s one thing to have actionable intelligence; it’s another thing entirely to act on it. Here are some suggestions that would not only apply in law enforcement but the military as well: Place intelligence-gathering nodes in locations recommended by operators. The ones who actually work the terrain (or the hood) can best say where an intelligencegathering device should be placed.

Deciding on a location by looking at an overhead image or basing the decision on where the activity has been in the past may garner some success, but isn’t it better to ask the ultimate end user of the information where he thinks it would best be placed?

This can become a bit of a “chicken and egg” argument, but it’s always best to deploy your assets based on input from sources that have recently had “eyes on.” In addition to providing input as to where intelligence gathering nodes should be placed, operators should (whenever possible) be put in a position to be part of that process.

As part of MACV-SOG, there were forward air controllers (FACs) who were the observers in the single engine prop planes. The FACs themselves were experienced Special Forces operators who had worked on the ground as team leaders in previous tours. Their experience was essential when making decisions in choosing helicopter landing and pick up zones, locations for air strikes, and so on. When fixed or rotary wing assets are used for law enforcement surveillance operations, accommodations should be made to have specialized officers in the aircraft who aren’t involved in flying.

Rather, their focus should be providing intelligence to operators in the field during suppression operations.

Give operators real time access to the intelligence. Armed with current, up to

date information, operators can directly target criminal (or enemy) activity as it happens. This may have been difficult in 1968 but in 2016 it really isn’t. In the agency where I work, we deployed a vehicle containing a series of hidden cameras in an area where multiple gang shootings had occurred. The video could be observed via a smart phone app. The app was provided to detectives assigned to gang suppression activities there. We were able to respond almost immediately to issues and eventually the problem was negated through rapid responses to in-progress activity based on the timely intel provided.

This could also be done with aviation assets as well. If it’s not reasonable or feasible to have an experienced detective on board an aircraft, why not have the information gathered remoted to a device such as a tablet or laptop? Officers on the ground could vector aircraft into an area and view what the aircraft can see via its onboard cameras. To take it a step further, the detectives on the ground could remotely operate those camera systems, requiring the pilot only to stay at a certain altitude and heading.

My experiences working with aviation assets in law enforcement have required the use of non-visual assets (radios) to guide aircraft so they can use their visual assets (FLIR, cameras), only to have the information they passed back to me using the radio. Time is wasted and an accurate picture isn’t painted.

Everyone remembers the scene in Blackhawk Down when the relief column lead by LTC McKnight is trying to get to the beleaguered rangers to rescue them. The convoy is receiving guidance from a rotary wing aircraft high above. The information provided by the observers in the helicopter is a few seconds too late and, because of the lag time, the convoy fails to make crucial

lefts and rights. Intel, like bad news, doesn’t get better with time.

Military Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACS) currently use a system that allows them to do this.

JTACs are responsible for requesting Close Air Support (CAS) from military aircraft. They request and coordinate missiles and bombs as well as gun runs from everything from helicopters to fast-moving attack craft. To ensure accuracy, they use the Video Scout system (Golembresky and Bruning 2014). With Video Scout, a JTAC can remotely access live video feeds from aircraft tasked to support them. In this way, the JTAC sees what the pilot sees, rather than trying to relay back and forth what each of them are seeing.

This ability becomes crucial when using highly lethal munitions when “danger close” to friendly troops. Similar systems are seeing limited use by Tactical Flight Officers on law enforcement aircraft.

With all that being said, it’s also important to not over-rely on aviation surveillance assets. Prior to the current conflict, airborne intelligence came from either satellites or manned reconnaissance aircraft. With the advent of unmanned drones and their use in the current conflict, decision makers often depend too much on its use. I’ve heard more than one operator who has returned from the sandbox complain that commanders won’t launch missions unless a drone flies over the battle space first, possibly compromising the operation.

Embed intelligence analysts with field units. I’ve never been able to do this as a cop since I’ve never been assigned to a team with its own intel analysis assets.

I’m familiar with gang and narcotics suppression units that have this available to them and I know they quickly become indispensable. I’ve observed them being used in investigations and gang task

With the advent of unmanned drones and their use in the current conflict, decision makers often depend too much on its use.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 65

forces I’ve been on temporary assignment to and I can attest to their usefulness.

I have however seen it used extensively in the military, though. We had an intel analyst assigned to my unit in Iraq, which was very beneficial, especially given the volumes of intel data received through both open and classified sources. On the modern battlefield, it’s usually not a lack of information but rather too much information that is the problem.

Direct action assets don’t have time to process it as well as act on it. As a street crimes suppression team detective, we often had large amounts of information gathered through surveillance, interviews, informants, social media, and other sources. What we didn’t have was the time to analyze it and connect the dots.

Intel analysts are also useful when it comes to deconfliction. Very important for both the near and far battlefields to avoid fratricide. In law enforcement, there is also the need to avoid ruining other agency’s investigations. On the West Coast we have WSIN, Western States Information Network. WSIN does many things, but, most importantly, it is a clearing house/fusion center for information regarding law enforcement operations. It’s like an electronic dry erase board where current law enforcement operations that are being conducted are listed. If you have an operation such as a high-risk search warrant you can contact WSIN and tell them when and where you are going. In a very short time, they will let you know if you are about to land in someone else’s area or compromise another agency’s operation.

CONCLUSION Here at home, as well as abroad, specialized units are spread pretty thin.

Whether it be military special operators deployed all over the world in support of current operations or their counterparts

66 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

in law enforcement, gang suppression units, and narcotics task forces, there just aren’t enough of them to go around.

Unfortunately there is no shortage of terrorists overseas, or their gang banging, drug dealing counterparts here at home.

Technology, in and of itself, is a force multiplier that can help fill the gaps in manpower. But it only works well when it is used properly for the direct benefit of the end user, the operator in the field. If not, it’s just a line in the sand.

•

REFERENCES:

Daugherty, Leo and Gregory Mattson.

Nam: A Photographic History. New York: Metro Books, 2001.

Golembresky, Michael and John R. Bruning. Level Zero Heroes: The Story of U.S. Marine Special Operations in Bala Murghab, Afghanistan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2014.

Plaster, John L. SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam.

Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1997.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Nick Perna is a Police Officer with the Redwood City Police Department in Northern California. He has spent much of his career as a gang and narcotics investigator. He is a member of a MultiJurisdictional SWAT Team since 2001 and is currently a Team Leader. He previously served as a paratrooper in the U.S. Army and is a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He has a Master’s Degree from the University of San Francisco.

The Advanced Global Security Workshop in

Israel ®

The experts on training in:

the Homeland Security professionals best resource

Since 2005, SSI has taken nearly 500 First Responders to Israel and shown them the basics of the Israel security concept.

Thanks in part to that program, we are better able to defend ourselves in the United States. In response to demand, we are now offering a once-in-a-lifetime experience covering the following advanced subjects: Nov. 11–19

2016

Hezbollah - a threat as deadly as al-Qaeda - Learn about them in their own territory, along Israel’s northern border.

Hostage Rescue - Discover how they go wrong.

Hospital Response - Find out how Israel’s critical response hospitals handle surge and multi-casualty incidents.

Israel Counter Terrorism units - Learn how they operate.

Israel National Police - National Academy; See how they train?

Sensitive Installations - Participate in a day-long exercise and training program in how to set up a complete security system.

Secret Israel Homeland Security Simulator - See how this works at a base south of Tel Aviv.

Stay in Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and visit some of the most amazing sites! Register now if you are US Military, a Homeland Security Professional, a Security Professional, an EMS, or an EMT.

www.homelandsecurityssi.com

LEARN MORE at: Call now for more information.

Circle 215 on Reader Service Card

Phone: 866-573-3999 Fax: 866-573-2090 info@homelandsecurityssi.com Circle 50 on Reader Service Card Circle 215 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 67

Innovative Products PATRIOT3 Patriot3’s US Patent pending Quad-Purpose Tactical Ladder was developed to be a compact, lightweight, and portable aluminum ladder system. The Q-PTL may be used as a mobile ballistic barrier, standard straight ladder, hanging ladder, litter, A-frame ladder, or a unique horizontal bridge. The Q-PTL utilizes identical 2' long sections, which may be joined together with pins to create a ladder and/or bridge up to 12' long. The Q-PTL has the option of two NIJ IIIA ballistic blankets that join together and can be mounted to the ladder system to protect the user. The Q-PTL baseline kit includes six ladder sections and two breaching hooks.

A HIGHER STANDARD IN EDUCATION

LENCO

American Military University (AMU) provides quality higher education to the nation's national security, intelligence, and military communities. We understand where you’ve been, what you’ve done, and what you’d like your team to achieve.

We offer career-relevant and affordable online programs that help equip students for roles within the intelligence field. With more than 190 degree and certificate programs—including Intelligence Studies, Homeland Security, and International Relations—our degrees prepare students for service and leadership in a diverse and global society.

AMU’s faculty combines relevant theory with real-world experience. They’ve earned degrees from many of the top institutions around the world, and many are leaders in government, business, and nonprofit organizations, including the United Nations, U.S. Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and more.

Take the next step, and learn from the leader.

PublicSafetyAtAMU.com

The BearCat X3® boasts a large rear bed with a cargo capacity of 70–85 cubic feet based on configuration with a 2,000+ lb. load rating. The X3® offers a wide variety of interior layouts to include Lenco’s 360 degree rotating hatch and gunner stand and seating for 4–6 personnel. In addition to the large standard rear cargo Utility bed, configurations include networked Radar Surveillance for Border Security Operations, a selfcontained Water deployment package, Weapons mounting and storage and Medical Evacuation.

The BearCat X3® is also designed for Border Security Operations, which includes integration of the Telephonics Radar and Video Enforcement Network-Mobile (RaVEN®-M) system along with NetCom and TruLink intercom units.

The Lenco BearCat X3® is a versatile package that creates a fleet of protected vehicles with low cost of ownership and scalable capabilities for today’s mission and tomorrow’s evolving threats.

68 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

IMPROVISED WEAPONS Oftentimes, a security detail will have to work overseas or in an environment where hot weapons are not permitted or available. Hot weapons are weapons that use combustion. Cold weapons are ones with a more limited range and that are often restricted to the power generated by the user. When working for the government, typically a liaison at your embassy in the host country will arrange for entry with weapons. In the U.S., we use a system called APACS, and in other countries I have worked with they simply work directly with the consulate.

When working private security, it is often not possible to get the permissions that you may want to have in order to bring weapons into the country. One option is to hire local police to augment your team with drivers and outer circle security. This can often help you put the best foot forward by hiring the local government and creating an official relationship.

Always go to the highest ranking person you can to arrange this. Never hire an officer personally.

In some countries in Africa, you can circumvent this by getting hunting permits and then becoming legally able to carry weapons on or about your party when on your business.

This may be limited to rifles, but it is better then nothing in a place where deterrence can be your best defense.

This is typically the case when you are in the mining or precious metals industry and coming from North America for business.

In many situations, you cannot have a weapon at all or the trip is too short notice to make the proper arrangements and hire the right locals. In these cases, it is best to go the low-visibility route to stay undetected and blend in with your environment. Several factors go into this. However, we will only address the weapons issue here. I have amassed a small collection of weapons I have traveled with nationally and internationally without incident. Items pictured from top left to bottom right:

Titanium Charge Card, Titanium Ice Pick, Emerson Karambit, The Stinger Key Chain, Carbon Fiber Pen, CIA Letter Opener, Titanium Pen, The Defense Wrench, The Impact Kerambit, Plastic Knuckles. All available from Shomer-Tec.com To conclude, there are many more nonmetallic and disguised weapons available on the Internet, and with today’s manufacturing your imagination is really your only limit. I have outlined here some of the basic ones that are of high quality, but each situation will dictate what is possible.

Remember that it is not the weapon but the user. The right person can make or find a weapon from their environment and the wrong person on the job will be useless even with the best technology. Always obey the law.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 69

ADVERTISER INDEX

Counter The

JUNE/JULY 2016

VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 3

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals To request detailed product information, visit our website http://thecounterterroristmag.com/readerservicecard.php or scan this code. Select the appropriate Reader Service Number (RSN) on the web-form and submit your contact information. Individual advertiser’s websites are also provided below for your convenience.”

Page

Ad/Company • website and/or email.......................................................................................................... RSN Number

15

American Public University • www.thecounterterroristmag.com/conference........................................................... 25

61

Asia Pacific - The Counter Terrorist • sales@thecounterterroristmag.com............................................................ 255

2

Barrett Firearms Manufacturing • www.barrett.net........................................................................................... 121

13

DeSantis Holster & Leathergoods • www.barrett.net........................................................................................ 262

5

Fairleigh Dickinson University • www.fdu.edu/mas............................................................................................ 10

27

Military Helicopters 2016 • www.militaryhelicoptersUSA.com............................................................................. 117

27

International Security Cooperation Summit • www.SecurityCoOperationSummit.com...................................... 115

27

Directed Energy & Next Generation Munitions • www.DistributedLethality.com.............................................. 113

31

2017 Police K-9 Conference & Vendor Show • www.policeK9magazine.com.................................................. 279

18

2016 K-9 Cop Conference & Vendor Show • www.k9copmagazine.com......................................................... 277

19

NTOA • www.ntoa.org/tactical-conference.............................................................................................................. 329

7

Patriot3 • www.patriot3.com................................................................................................................................. 301

76

Phantom Products Inc. • www.phantomlights.com............................................................................................... 209

41

Resco Instruments • www.RescoInstruments.com..................................................................................................... 20

28

Southern Police Equipment • www.southernpoliceequipment.com........................................................................ 343

17

11th Annual Homeland Security Professionals Conference • www.thecounterterroristmag.com/conference... 177

29

Elevated Tactics training by SSI • www.homelandsecurityssi.com....................................................................... 313

67

Advanced Homeland Security Training in Israel • www.homelandsecurityssi.com........................................... 215

71

MACTAC • www.homelandsecurityssi.com............................................................................................................... 228

45

SSI Pull Kit • bradman@homelandsecurityssi.com................................................................................................... 179

75

SSI PVBs • www.SSIPVB.com................................................................................................................................. 226

4

Surveilance One • www.survone.com................................................................................................................... 319

44

The Counter Terrorist • bradman@homelandsecurityssi.com.................................................................................... 33

70 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

MACTAC MULTIPLE-ASSAULT COUNTER TERRORISM ACTION CAPABILITY

TM

The Newest, Most Dynamic Training Program from SSI . ®

MACTAC is the new tactical philosophy offering your

department and agency training for an extremely flexible and scalable response to any Active Shooter situation while maintaining the ability to respond to additional attacks.

Tiered for full-spectrum training of your department personnel to meet multiple challenges.

• MACTAC Officers Course • MACTAC Leaders Course • MACTAC Instructors Course

Contact us today at:

www.homelandsecurityssi.com Call now for more information.

Phone: 866-573-3999 Fax: 866-573-2090 contact@securitysolutionsint.com Circle 228 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 71

TRAINING REVIEW

Alternate Reality Environment

I

magine walking down the street in downtown Anytown, USA, and not being sure if the car across the street is tailing you. Is the garbage man watching you or the woman behind you taking a picture? Someone bumps into you and drops their newspaper. Was that on purpose? So you enter a coffee shop and take a seat at a table with your back to a wall. You’re watching the door and a man enters the room. He fits the description of the guy you’re meeting, but another enters, looking the same. You get a text on a secure phone from your counter surveillance team that the mark entered the coffee shop. But which one is it? He ordered the drink you both agreed on.

You move to his table and set your cup on the table. He picks up the cup and examines it, then places a USB drive in the gap between the cup and the table.

You slide it over and the USB drops in your lap. Just then, you put it in a small case tethered to your inside pocket. He leaves. Strangely, the second man fitting the description is watching you closely, or so it would seem.

Exiting the coffee bar, you round the corner, making your way back to your car. A sedan cuts you off as it pulls into an alleyway in front of you. Two men exit the car and walk around back, making eye contact with you. They open the trunk and show you what’s inside: it’s your counter surveillance man, bound and gagged. They ask you, “Hey asshole, you know this guy?” You glance at the cop down on the corner, outside his patrol car. He seems unaware. Or is he

72 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016

by Editorial Staff

very aware? You don’t answer, but that alone is an answer. They offer him for the USB. What do you do? The secure phone starts vibrating in your pocket. The cop is talking into his radio, still about fifty meters away. Your colleague is looking up, so you— Several times a year, and all in select locations throughout the country, there are members of the special operations and intelligence community creating an alternate realty environment. These events are not at a single location or at any one facility, but they are a road show that uses the environment to create the course.

Most of the people who were in my class came from very diverse backgrounds, and some from the CT, security, and intelligence world.

There are two versions of the event they call Jedburgh (a throwback to the Jedburgh teams from WWII): one that is based in an urban and another set in a woodland environment. Both events last about twenty-four straight hours, starting with ten hours of classroom presentations and ending with fourteen hours of team-based missions in the alternate reality environment. Classes are given in one-hour blocks and cover topics like cover story development, counter surveillance, restraint defeats, dead drops, and mission planning.

In parallel to the training team is the role player team of adversaries that your team will be interacting with.

Interestingly, you never actually know who is a role player and who is a real citizen or police officer. Oftentimes,

actual store clerks, law enforcement, and taxi drivers alike will be in on the game. You need to have some buy-in if you want to get the full benefit of this training environment. Your missions will test what you learned in the classroom setting and your “Jedburgh Team” will operate in small units on short missions or interactions testing your ability to surveil, dead drop, meet, handoff, follow, escape, and negotiate various situations.

Finally, at the culmination of the event, your team will come together with all the other Jed teams to plan a final mission, which could be a hostage rescue, an escape from interrogation, or a myriad of other scenarios perpetrated by your event cadre and role players.

You can look at this event in two ways.

One way is as a great training experience designed to test your leadership, decisionmaking, teamwork and improvisation.

The other way to look at it is as exposure to a totally unique experience only a few will ever experience. It is fun. www.goruck.com

•

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 73

Subscribe Today!

I would like to subscribe to The Counter Terrorist Magazine! q One year $34.99 Domestic q Two-year $64.99 Domestic q eZine $19.99 (International subscribers – must include email address) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION (please print clearly) NAME____________________________________________________________________ ADDRESS_________________________________________________________________ CITY_________________________ STATE________ZIP_____________________________ EMAIL____________________________________________________________________

q PAYMENT ENCLOSED q Visa q MC q Amex q Discover q Check (Please make checks payable to Security Solutions International.)

Name on Card______________________________ Card #__________________________

*

Exp. Date_______________________ Billing Address______________________________

FREE MEMBERSHIP TO THE HOMELAND SECURITY NETWORK WITH EVERY SUBSCRIPTION

Scan to subscribe

GO ONLINE TO: www.thecounterterroristmag.com • Call us (866) 573-3999

Subscribe Today!

I would like to subscribe to The Counter Terrorist Magazine! q One year $34.99 Domestic q Two-year $64.99 Domestic q eZine $19.99 (International subscribers – must include email address) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION (please print clearly) NAME____________________________________________________________________ ADDRESS_________________________________________________________________ CITY_________________________ STATE________ZIP_____________________________ EMAIL____________________________________________________________________

q PAYMENT ENCLOSED q Visa q MC q Amex q Discover q Check (Please make checks payable to Security Solutions International.)

Name on Card______________________________ Card #__________________________

*

Exp. Date_______________________ Billing Address______________________________

FREE MEMBERSHIP TO THE HOMELAND SECURITY NETWORK WITH EVERY 74 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 SUBSCRIPTION

Scan to subscribe

GO ONLINE TO: www.thecounterterroristmag.com • Call us (866) 573-3999

New and improved

( portable vehicle barrier ) When Law Enforcement in Dallas wanted a product to protect the greatest sporting event in the US they chose SSI’s PVB. The reason the PVB is used by agencies and militaries across the globe is that it transfers the momentum of the threatening vehicle upwards and stops it in its tracks. Two adults can deploy the barrier in minutes, and there is no need for electricity whatsoever.

The Portable Vehicle Barrier comes with several customized configurations: • You can put wheels on it so that it acts as a swing barrier and easily opens a road • You can toughen the line by adding anchoring cables or place the PVB’s in one single row or even three rows to stop anything • Additional safety features can be added PVBs can be folded down quickly –moved and stored with ease – the PVB is reusable and durable.

Best of all NO maintenance is required.

Made in the USA means jobs in the USA and supporting our national economy. Ordering is quick and easy allowing us to make the PVB available to your agencies immediately. Besides being the most cost effective barrier in the business today, the PVB is a VBIED killer. CALL NOW.

Call now for more information. Pricing dependent on quantity and delivery location. Call: (305) 401-6906 or email info@homelandsecurityssi.com

Or visit our website: www.SSIPVB.com

Circle 308 on Reader CircleService 317 onCard Reader Service Card

Circle 226 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 75

Circle 209 on Reader Service Card