car bombs
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hezbollah
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GSG 9 capture
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c t f o r s wat
Counter The
Official Journal of the Homeland Security Professional Dec 2009/Jan 2010
Volume 2 • Number 6
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Counter The
December 2009/january 2010
Volume 2 • Number 6
Official Journal of the Homeland Security Professional
COVER story:
contents
US Prison Recruitment for jihad 30 by Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser and Raphael Shore
30
8
46
FEATURES: 8
20
Firsthand: GSG 9 Terrorist Apprehension by Dieter Munzinger Case Study: Britain’s June, 2007 Car bombs by Andy Oppenheimer
The party of god, 2009 46 Hezbollah: by Jennifer L. Hesterman Solo RAPID response to 54 active shooters
A Necessity For Deployment
by Michael Stepien
departments: 6 From the Editor 28 Book Review 65 Innovative Products 66 Training Review
Cover Photo: Scott Morrison
54 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 5
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From the editor:
Thanks, Vets
By Chris Graham
O
Official Journal of the Homeland Security Professional
Volume 2 • Number 6
ne might have expected either of the two most recent presidential administrations or the United States Central Command to have articulated clear, unchanging objectives in Iraq that would constitute victory. Victory in Iraq, however, was ill-defined. For the sake of discussion and with the benefit of hindsight, let us consider the removal from power of Saddam Hussein and the interdiction of alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to have been the initial primary goals of Operation Iraqi Freedom. These goals were accomplished within weeks of undertaking them. Also for the sake of discussion, let us agree that additional goals created while coalition forces were committed to Iraq were to defeat or co-opt the many emergent militant opposition forces so that coalition elements could assist the Iraqis in establishing an elected representative government. Despite years of vacillating orders and inconsistent diplomatic effort, American and British soldiers, Marines, mercenaries, and others have delivered that to the people of Iraq as well. These veterans battled Ba’athist insurgents, al-Qaeda terrorists, Iranian agents and, numerous other factions. The unwavering efforts of these magnificent few have provided the gift of this opportunity to the Iraqi people. The American citizen has generously accepted many hundreds of billions of dollars of debt to provide this gift. For better or worse, two presidential administrations took the decisions that accomplished this. President George W. Bush initiated this operation and President Barack Obama saw Mr. Bush’s campaign through to the fruition that provided this incredible (though unrequested) gift. Will this achievement bring benefit to the coalition partners commensurate with the cost of effort? Only time will tell. But, the Iraqi people have been given the gift of self-determination. It is in their hands to determine if that nation is capable of producing her own George Washingtons or if she shall succumb to corruption, tribalism, shari’a law, and subversive neighbors.
Semper Fidelis, Chris Graham Editor of The Counter Terrorist
december 2009/january 2010 Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Director of Production Kelli Richardson Contributing Editors John Andrews Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Chuck Pfarrer Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Office Manager Lily Valdes Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 204 Miami, Florida 33186
ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, The Official Journal of the Homeland Security Professional, is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 204, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090. For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact: PARS International Corp. Web: www.magreprints.com/quickquote.asp Email: reprints@parsintl.com Phone: 212-221-9595 • Fax: 212-221-9195 Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:
www.thecounterterrroristmag.com © 2009 Security Solutions International
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Firsthand:
GSG 9 Terrorist apprehension By Dieter Munzinger
On November 16, 1982, Christian Klar was the most wanted terrorist in Germany. He was listed as a second generation leader of the Red Army Faction (RAF) and, according to Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), he was responsible for more than 20 terrorist attacks resulting in nine deaths and many injuries.
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8 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
W
e were briefed that Klar, a former history and philosophy student, was very intelligent and extremely brutal. The RAF history is divided into three generations of terrorists. The first generation (leaders: Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhoff, Jan-Karl Raspe, and others) primarily wanted to cause the destruction of the German “governmental machinery.” The second and third generations crimes additionally attempted to recover imprisoned RAF terrorists. The organization carried out assassinations and abductions of important representatives from the financial and political fields. May 14, 1970, can be considered the birthday of the RAF. On that day, Andreas Baader, the first RAF leader, escaped from a prison in Berlin with the help of two terrorists. They shot and seriously injured two judicial officers during a firefight. After finishing their training in Jordan (in Al-Fatah camps), the RAF members finalized their “urban guerrilla” plan. They returned to Germany, robbed seven banks within 12 months (stealing approximately one million DM), and raided several weapon shops to prepare for action.
On May 11, 1972, the RAF executed a bomb attack against U.S. Army personnel in Frankfurt, killing Lt Col. Paul Bloomquist and injuring 13 additional U.S. soldiers. This incident was followed by bomb attacks on German police stations in Augsburg and München the following day, injuring 17 people. On May 19, 1972, the RAF carried out another bomb attack on the Axel Springer publishing house in Hamburg, injuring 17 people. Senior U.S. Army personnel in Heidelberg were targeted with a bomb on May 24. U.S. soldiers Clyde Bonner, Charles Peck, and Ronald Woodward were killed; five others were wounded. Andreas Baader was arrested with other RAF members on June 1, 1972. The second generation of RAF terrorism emerged in 1974 with the rise of Christian Klar. Under his leadership, RAF terrorists killed chief federal prosecutor Siegfried Buback and his drivers Wolfgang Göbel and Georg Wurster on April 7, 1977. On July 30, 1977, Klar and Brigitte Mohnhaupt (an RAF member) killed Jürgen Ponto, chairman of Dresdner Bank, in his home. On September 5, 1977, Klar and other RAF members abducted Federal Employer Association President Hanns Martin Schleyer and shot his close protection team and his
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 9
GSG 9 Fragmentary Order. Photo courtesy of the author.
Again and again they received clear clues to his whereabouts, but he was always already gone when they arrived.
driver (Reinhold Brändle, Helmut Ulmer, Roland Pieler, and Heinz Marcisz). The RAF terrorists fired more than 200 rounds at Schleyer’s motorcade. The police officer Brändle was hit by more than 60 bullets. German media named the Schleyer abduction the beginning of “German Fall 77.” On October 13, 1977, four Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorists hijacked the Lufthansa Aircraft Boeing 737, named “Landshut,” to support the Schleyer kidnappers. They demanded the release of all imprisoned RAF terrorists. The German government was determined not to concede. On the night of October 18, at 00.05, German special operations police (GSG 9) stormed the Landshut in Mogadishu, killing three terrorists and capturing one, and rescuing 86 hostages. On the same night, in StuttgartStammheim Prison, Baader, Raspe, and Ensslin committed suicide. One day later police found the body of Hanns Martin Schleyer in the trunk of an Audi 100. He was killed by a gunshot to the neck. After multiple bank robberies netting approximately 900 000 DM, and
10 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
multiple firefights leaving three dead, Klar and his RAF team attacked senior U.S. Air Force personnel in Ramstein. This bomb attack injured 14 on August 31, 1981. On September 15 RAF shot U.S. Army General Frederick Kroesen’s limousine with a rocket-propelled grenade, injuring four people. The RAF third generation continued its “resistence against imperialism,” but Klar went into hiding. BKA invetigators were on Klar’s heels. Again and again they received clear clues to his whereabouts, but he was always already gone when they arrived. In 1982 the RAF terrorist Verena Becker was moved from jail in Cologne to jail in Kassel, apparently because of bronchial disease. (Becker was arrested on May 3, 1977, four weeks after Buback was killed by RAF. She carried the pistol used in his murder). In reality, she indicated willingness to cooperate and was debriefed by BKA investigators for two weeks. Becker delivered “firsthand information” about 13 different RAF arms caches and their exact locations. Furthermore, she believed that Klar was
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GSG 9 Training. Photo courtesy of the author. the user of the arms cache “Daphne” (each cache had a name), which was located in Aumühle near Hamburg in the “Sachsenforest.” She drew a precise sketch and explained the marking (notches at four Spruces) of Daphne as well as descriptions of the two forest trails used to get to the cache. The public was later told that hikers stumbled upon the cache. A special commission (under BKA leadership) was convened. It was decided to carry out the mission as a joint operation of BKA, GSG 9, and state police special operations (SEK-Eutin Schleswig-Holstein). To avoid too much traffic in the area of operation (A/O), a six-member reconnaissance team (two BKA, four GSG 9) was sent to August Aumühle to recon August Mission: 21-29, 2009 November November Daphne. TheMission: team found the cache6-14, at 2009 the exact described spot, about 90 meters (m) off the path in a dense forest in the underbrush between four marked Spruces. Concealed by the trees, the
team opened the arms cache carefully. It was “hot.” The team emptied Daphne of 15 firearms and several forged ID cards and informed BKA. Reinforcements were dispatched. Aumühle is a small community of about 2000 citizens 20 kilometers east of Hamburg. The A/O was located east of Aumühle in a recreation area named Friedrichsruh, which included a few guesthouses and the remains of the former castle of Otto von Bismarck, whose descendants still lived there. The A/O was about 6000 square meters, primarly “Sachsenforest” and Aumühle in the west, bordered by Europestreet 26 (North), Majorroad 404 (East), and Countryroad 208 (West,South). Within one day, more than 120 operatives infiltrated the small-sized area and 200 stand-by forces were held ready in Hamburg. The A/O was subdivided into three different-sized circles with one common center: Daphne. The first circle, (the assault team) was
Within one day, more than 120 operatives infiltrated the small-sized area and 200 stand-by forces were held ready in Hamburg.
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 13
The team remained in the holes for 72 hours, then it was replaced by a new team. The replaced team always renewed the gametrails before leaving.
formed by six Special-Forces (SF) members (three teams of two). Team memberes dug themselves in three hides close to Daphne (distance 5 m) in an L-shape. Their only function was “Tango’s” (Klar’s call sign) apprehension. Each hide (length 200 centimeters [cm], width 150 cm, depth 120 cm) was manned with two operators plus equipment, including pistols, revolvers, MP 5s, flashlights, night-vision devices, water, MREs, and etcetera. The earthwork took more than six hours (disposal was done delicately with plastic bags). The hides were covered with hatches and thoroughly camouflaged. To cover tracks, team members created simulated game trails. The team remained in the holes for 72 hours, then it was replaced by a new team. The replaced team always renewed the game-trails before leaving. Needless to say, this was the trickiest
part of the mission. Movement was almost impossible. Team members left their hides only for a short time during the night. Defecation was collected in plastic bags and disposed of after three days. Members could not see what happened outside because the hatches had limited views covering Daphne. Daphne was equipped with a movement device. (When the device detected movement, it would send a radio signal to the assault team). The team depended upon the radio-reports of the second and third circles for situational awareness. The second circle (on forest trails in radius 500 m around Daphne) consisted of observers disguised as hikers or joggers (normal in Sachsenforest). This team reported every suspicious movement by radio. In addition, BKA technicians installed several hooded cameras which, due to the chillness (4°C) and the almost persistent drizzle, rarely performed.
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The third circle included observers located at the edge of Sachsenforest (e.g., parkings of guesthouses or rented guest rooms), and mobile observers with cars or motorcycles on the streets around Sachsenforest and in Aumühle (e.g., railway station). The locations of the observers from the second and third circles were “tactically designed” (like a Spider web), so that it was (mostly) not necessary to follow a suspicious person. It was possible to pass a sighting on (after description by radio) to the next observer position. The operations center was situated in the main building of a former castle. While coordinating the complete operation, the center was permanently in contact with BKA. Radio traffic was reduced to a minimum and not encrypted. If using a scanner (which for the RAF was standard), Klar would have been alarmed upon hearing encrypted radio sounds. He knew very well that only SF operated encrypted. Days passed but nothing happened. Repeatedly, hikers and mushroomcollectors were observed, but nobody approached Daphne. After two weeks, doubts arose among the involved forces as to whether it made sense to continue the mission. The third circle observers had already attracted attention from some residents in Aumühle and had to be replaced by stand-by forces from Hamburg. Moreover the temperature was near the freezing point and inside the hides the continuous rain pooled. At the end of the third week, the Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) gave the word to abort the operation after four weeks because the costs were devastating and mission success was questionable. On November 16 (fourth week), at about 11:45 a.m., third circle observers in Friedrichsruh announced the appearance
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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 17 Circle 75 on Reader Service Card
of a male person at the railway station. The person was described as very slim and about 180 cm high. He was dressed in blue jeans and a blue rain jacket with a hood on his head (it was still raining), and he carried binoculars and (paradoxically) a spade. He was heading for Sachsenforest. He passed the former Bismarck castle and went on the forest path in an eastern direction. Sometimes he stopped, looking around. At 12:20 p.m. he was reported on Saw-MillFriedrichsruh, about 1000 m away from Daphne. He used exactly the forest path that led to the arms cache, but after about 500 m he vanished into the forest in an eastern direction. He was out of sight for more than 30 minutes. The assault team near Daphne was ordered by the operations center to arrest the person as soon as he tampered with the cache. Nobody knew at this time whether the person was Klar, however,
a situation assessment by the operations center, the man’s suspicious behavior, and the risk of losing him led to the decision to make an arrest. He approached Daphne from the north and nearly walked over the hides, they were so well camouflaged. He checked the environment for a few seconds and examined the soil. Then he started digging. The assault team burst out of their hides and aimed their weapons at him hollering “Police, don’t move!” He was psychologically shattered, and fell backward on the ground. A team member handcuffed and searched him. In his belt were a pistol (Colt Combat Commander), a wallet containing 465 DM (from a bank robbery in Bochum), and a forged Dänish passport. He was in bad shape (weighing about 50 kilograms) and very unkempt. When asked “Are you
18 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
Christian Klar?” he answered, “I am the one you waited for.” Klar was sentenced to five life terms plus 15 years for murder in nine cases and 11 attempted murders. He was imprisoned in Bruchsal in 1982. He was released in December of 2008. Paradoxically, attention has gone almost exclusively to the offenders of the RAF. Many books, articles, and even movies about the motives and passions of RAF members have appeared over the years. The victims and their relatives are almost forgotten.
•
About the author Dieter Munzinger (pseudonym) served in German Police Special Forces (GSG 9, SEK) for more than 23 years. The author was an assault team member and participated in numerous hostage rescue operations and operations against RAF. He currently works as an instructor for close protection teams.
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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 19
Case Study:
Britain’s June, 2007
car bombs By Andy Oppenheimer
Barely two years following the most lethal terrorist attack on UK soil— the transit bombings on July 7, 2005 in which 56 people died and 700 were injured, many severely — a reprise of these horrific events came in the form of an attempted double car bomb attack in London, and another attack with more devastating results one day later at Glasgow Airport.
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Glasgow International Airport—site of the second of two attacks on British soil in a 24 hour period. ©istockphoto.com/Rockfinder
20 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
London Targeted Again
O
n June 29, 2007, two Mercedes cars loaded with fuel, six 13-kg Calor patio gas canisters, homemade detonators, and 2,000 nails were left on a busy street in the center of the capital, poised to detonate. The first vehicle was parked outside the Tiger Tiger nightclub, one of the West End’s night hotspots with 400 partygoers inside at the time. The car was packed with up to 60 liters of fuel and two cell phones linked together, one on the back seat, one in the trunk. The gas cylinders were opened to allow the vehicle to fill with flammable gas. A second Mercedes, also packed with gas canisters and nails, was later found a few hundred meters from the first, just round the corner on Cockspur Street. It had been parked so that it would be in the path of those escaping from the first car bomb explosion. It was fortuitously removed by local authorities at 03:15hrs because it was illegally parked and only discovered later when suspicions were aroused by the smell of petrol and gas emitting from it. The first device was set to function at 02:00, when the nightclub would have been disgorging its partygoers, and the second 15 minutes later. Whereas the first device may have been rendered safe by prompt police action, the
second failed to function presumably because of faults in the initiator construction. When the vehicles failed to explode, Bilal Abdulla, a 27-year-old diabetes specialist who worked at the Royal Alexandra Hospital in Paisley, Scotland, and Kafeel Ahmed, an Indian engineering student, realized their attempts at mass murder had failed. They left the area separately on cycle rickshaws, meeting up just after 02:00 on nearby Edgware Road. They also knew the forensic evidence contained intact within the unexploded vehicles would lead to their arrest. Abdulla had already been under surveillance. After spending the night at an east London hotel, the pair left the capital the following morning and traveled to the English Midlands, where they met up with a third man, Mohammed Asha, a 28-year-old Jordanian neurologist, near the University Hospital of North Staffordshire where he worked as a doctor. Abdulla and Ahmed then went to Glasgow, where they assembled their makeshift canister devices in a suburban house.
Terminal Attack
Barely 24 hours later, on June 30, 2007, these same two British Muslims, who had tried to blow up hundreds of people on the streets of London, rammed a petrol-filled, four-wheel-drive, green Jeep Cherokee at speed into the main glass door entrance to the terminal at Glasgow International Airport. The vehicle became stuck in the
London police removed one of the potential car bombs as the result of a routine parking violation.Šistockphoto.com/Rockfinder
The first device was set to function at 02:00, when the nightclub would have been disgorging its partygoers, and the second 15 minutes later.
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 21
©istockphoto.com/Rockfinder airport entrance main terminal doors. After the Jeep crashed into the entrance, one of the men got out, carrying what appeared to be an already lit incendiary device, and began pouring gasoline on and under the vehicle. The other man, who was not carrying a device, began removing gas cylinders from it. The vehicle then burst into flames. Footage of the flaming vehicle and its extensively burnt occupant emerging from the vehicle was flashed around the globe on 24-hour news channels within minutes. Abdulla was arrested at the scene. Ahmed had doused himself in petrol and set himself on fire at the scene. Police and brave members of the public restrained the men, despite their vigorous resistance. Ahmed died from burns a month later. All flights were cancelled for the day at the height of the vacation season with families leaving on holiday. Ahmed was also found to be wearing what appeared to be a suicide device, which led to an evacuation and security operation at the hospital. It was later reported that the suspected article was in fact not a device. Because the main charge was a mixture of flammable gas and liquid, it could have been ignited by heating the exposed filament of a bulb in a kindling of petrol-saturated cotton wool. The flammable material could have undergone near-spontaneous
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22 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
combustion — a fireball, which could have caused hundreds of deaths and appalling injuries.
Why the Attacks Failed
Of prime importance for assessing this and possible future attempts is to examine why the attacks failed in their deadly mission. Why didn’t the highly volatile cargoes in the vehicles detonate? The cars left outside the London nightclub contained improvised “detonators” consisting of two mobile phones wired to a lightbulb surrounded by match heads. Once a safe distance away, Abdulla and Ahmed attempted to trigger the bombs, repeatedly calling the two mobile phones they had left on the front seat of each car. A phone call was supposed to trigger the homemade device igniting the vapors swirling inside the cars. Only one detonator sparked, but even that was quickly snuffed out because the mixture of petrol and gas was too thick. The police said that if the car windows had been opened the bombs could have gone off; however, there was not enough oxygen to trigger the devices. The attacks failed because an oversight of a gap of less than 1 mm between the phones and detonators broke the circuit: a simple loose connection saved hundreds of late-night
revellers from death and injury. However, the Glasgow attack, while causing “only” one fatality — the perpetrator — caused horrid mayhem and injury to airline passengers in the terminal. Local hospital casualty departments had to be cleared for emergency admissions. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) had pioneered cell phone remote detonation in the 1990s but it did not attempt such attacks because it regarded the method unreliable and likely to kill civilians wholesale if the signal set off devices prematurely. The 2004 Madrid transit bombers had no such compunction, killing more than200 people in multiple attacks by mobile phone initiation. The IRA tried to make its own detonating tube by distilling the components of Semtex high explosive through lengths of clear plastic flex when the U.S.-origin Ireco and other supplies dried up. The IRA actually tried to deploy these homemade detonators but many devices failed to go off.
An adaptation of the terrorist’s favored weapon, the car bomb, was attempted as a weapon of indiscriminate effect. Closedcircuit television footage recorded during the attack shows dozens of passengers running in terror as the Jeep crashed into the main terminal building doorway. Many travellers abandoned their luggage, but in the mayhem others caused luggage trolley pileups at doorways. The doors that the vehicle tried to break through were adjacent to the passenger check-in desks. The Glasgow Airport and London vehicles contained gas canisters that would have been devastating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) had the mobile phone detonation in each vehicle succeeded. The London attempts were similar to an earlier plot in which an al-Qaeda militant planned to blow up gas-filled bombs inside limousines in London, and another plot where a major nightclub was one of a range of targets. The attacks had been six months in the
An adaptation of the terrorist’s favored weapon, the car bomb, was attempted as a weapon of indiscriminate effect.
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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 23
planning. The men had purchased large amounts of nails, fuel, and gas canisters without attracting attention. There was no information on Abdulla and Ahmed available to police — they simply weren’t on the police radar yet (though they had been the subject of intelligence interest). The men also had at least two more vehicles and more supplies of gas, petrol, and electronic detonators.
Why Not IEDs?
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24 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
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Why didn’t the group build classic vehicle-borne IEDs, as had the IRA in dozens of attacks (including the biggest terrorist explosions on UK soil, the London city bombs of the early 1990s), and al-Qaeda in Bali in 2002 and many other attacks? Rather than a hurried attempt, Ahmed, the would-be “bombmeister,” had spent months in India working on a design for the car bombs. The Indian-born engineer modeled the devices on those used by insurgent forces in Iraq, but the tests he carried out in India used fuel that was more flammable than that found in the UK. The vehicles were intended to act as large incendiary devices. The perpetrators apparently did not have access to conventional detonators or conventional explosives; none were found in any of the vehicles. They also apparently lacked the expertise to make hydrogen-peroxide-based explosives such as triacetone triperoxide (TATP) or, as was likely used in the July 7, 2005, attacks, hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HTMD). Had either of these been used, a detonator would be superfluous to requirements because just a slight vibration can ignite these very volatile mixtures. With some engineering experience, Ahmed had begun work on a PhD at the Faculty of Science and Technology at Anglia Ruskin University in Cambridge in 2004 but he did not complete his degree. This is often the case with would-be attackers; they possess just enough expertise to plan and assemble the improvised means of mass murder but do not com-
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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 25
plete their training. Therefore, their attacks sometimes, as on this occasion, fail. The plotters’ medical and engineering profile was, chillingly, more fitting to bioterrorism rather than classic bomb-making.
Infiltration
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26 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
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Groups with ill intent, however, are not short of intelligence. While the 2007 attempted attacks were not CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) attempts, as such, the fact that medical employees were involved alerted the authorities to the possibility of expertise being offered or applied for radiological or other nonconventional purposes. The attacks may not have involved VX or sarin nerve agents, but the intended enhanced incendiary effect would have killed and injured hundreds as improvised chemical devices. Similar infiltrators into the British health system and other biological facilities with further expertise or contacts would pose a biological or chemical weapons risk. Ahmed is believed to have arrived in Northern Ireland in 2001, enrolling at Queen’s University Belfast to study aeronautical engineering, graduating in 2003, and staying on as a paid researcher. He was suspected to be an al-Qaeda operative in Ireland, adding a potentially deadly element to what had been decades of terrorism and conflict in Northern Ireland and the UK mainland. Asha had been employed at Addenbrookes Hospital in Cambridge. The British Intelligence Service, MI5, has uncovered multiple attempts at infiltration into British labs and universities. The IRA for example, had infiltrated British Telecom and the post office for years. Abdulla had been in the crosshairs of British intelligence for 13 months prior to the attacks. Ahmed was also distantly related to Mohammed Haneef, an Indian doctor detained in Australia after the attacks in Britain. Haneef was released by the Australian authorities at the end of July 2007. Kafeel Ahmed, who came
from Bangalore, was the brother of Sabeel Ahmed, who was also arrested and charged in relation to the attempted attacks.
Convicting Terrorists
Several recent terrorism trials have failed to convict. In the Glasgow attack trial in December 2008, only Abdulla was found guilty of plotting with the fatally burnt driver, Ahmed. Abdulla was sentenced to prison for 32 years in December 2008. Mohammed Asha, who was accused of providing financial aid and “spiritual guidance,” was cleared of any involvement but faced deportation.
Conclusion
Whatever the judicial problems, the threat is constant. The Glasgow incident was a stark reminder that London is not the only U.K. city at risk. While such attempts may have fallen short of the ruthlessly high standards achieved by the IRA,
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Hamas, al–Qaeda, and others overseas (or are being preempted), the terrorist learning curve may not last long. Therefore, vigilance — especially within communities — must be eternal.
•
about the author Mr. Oppenheimer is Editor of World Security Report and author of IRA The Bombs and the Bullets: A History of Deadly Ingenuity (Irish Academic Press). The author serves as a CBRNE consultant specializing in counter-IED.
ENDNOTES Quick Look Report, Attempted Suicide-Initiated Vehicle-Borne Incendiary Device Attack on Glasgow Airport, 30 June 2007, Hazmat Solutions (HMS) Ltd, 2 July 2007. from trial evidence, October 2008. Quick Look Report, Attempted SuicideInitiated Vehicle-Borne Incendiary Device Attack on Glasgow Airport, 30 June 2007,
Hazmat Solutions (HMS) Ltd, 2 July 2007. From trial evidence, October 2008. Matthew Taylor, Just one open window would have caused carnage, The Guardian, 16 December 2008. A. R. Oppenheimer, IRA: The Bombs and the Bullets – A History of Deadly Ingenuity, Irish Academic Press, 2008, p. 204. Personal communication, EOD operative in Northern Ireland, 2006. Quick Look Report, Attempted SuicideInitiated Vehicle-Borne Incendiary Device Attack on Glasgow Airport, 30 June 2007, Hazmat Solutions (HMS) Ltd, 2 July 2007. Raffaello Pantucci,“Appearance is key in tackling terrorism, The Guardian, 4 May 2009. Matthew Taylor, Profile: Kafeel Ahmed, The Mastermind, The Guardian, 16 December 2008 A. R. Oppenheimer, Explosives in the 21st Century, Aviation Security International, Vol 15 Issue 1, February 2009. Henry McDonald, MI5 targets Ireland’s alQaeda cells, The Observer, 2 March 2008.
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 27
Book Review
Unrestricted Warfare By: Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xaingsui
C
ol. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangsui, two military strategists from the People’s Republic of China, define “unrestricted warfare” as warfare that transcends all boundaries and limits. They advocate fluidity, combining of methods and technologies, and careful tailoring of efforts to circumstances, locations, and enemies. They assert that all methods, including “military, trans-military and nonmilitary,” constitute unrestricted warfare. The writing of these men reveals an intimate knowledge of history and warfare from ancient China to recent U.S. Army doctrinal publications. The writers unhesitatingly express both admiration and ridicule for American methodologies. A portion of their work, Unrestricted Warfare (People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, 1999), is available in English at www. terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/ unrestricted.pdf. Many of the disciplines these strategists identify will be recognized by Westerners. Additionally, they speak of “financial warfare, trade warfare, ecological warfare, regulatory warfare, electronic warfare, smuggling warfare, drug warfare, terrorist warfare,” and others. Interestingly, when these officers speak of financial warfare, for example, they are not using the term as a slogan, as a commerce association might. Rather, they advocate the concept of an entity enforcing its will upon another by means that include attacking, manipulating and destroying a nation’s financial system. As another example, when they speak of drug warfare, they do not use the term as a police chief
Reviewed by: Chris Graham seeking funds might. The writers explain drug warfare to be flooding a nation with drugs (and associated crime) as one more discipline to be strategically combined for the purpose of imposing one’s will upon another. The colonels rhetorically ask, “Can special funds be set up to exert
“The 9-11 attacks may have been just the beginning of Unrestricted Warfare. Many terrorist nations and groups will try to imitate this operation . . . and China’s war book Unrestricted Warfare will be their text.” Major General John Singlaub, United States Army (retired special operations officer) greater influence on another country’s government and legislature through lobbying? And could buying or gaining control of stocks be used to turn another country’s newspapers and television stations into the tools of media warfare?”
28 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
Former Chinese intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Ji Shengde’s generous financial contributions to American politics seems to suggest the answer. Many recognize that modern warfare encompasses more than martial matters. The United States coordinates political, financial, and other measures to include strategic alliances and partnerships to pursue national objectives. But, it would be a mistake to believe that pursuing objectives through nonmilitary means makes the imposition of will acceptable to an adversary. Liang and Xiangsui state, “War is still the ground of life and death, the path of survival and destruction, and even the slightest innocence is not tolerated.” Suggesting reference to widely accepted rules such as the Geneva Conventions or Laws of Land Warfare, the writers state, “Whether or not each nation acknowledges the rules often depends on whether or not they are beneficial to themselves.” This statement is a logical conclusion when one sees that many of these laws, enacted long ago, provide privileges and protections to nations and individuals who fought within them, and deliberately withheld protections from individuals who did not such as “spies” and “saboteurs.” However, when one witnesses modern anomalies such as attempting to reward noncompliant illegal enemy combatants abroad with the same privileges as legal combatants, or inexplicably advocating the application of domestic civil and criminal laws on international battlefields, it would appear that one is witnessing the violation of principles for successful warfare.
The strategists state, “Even though the United States bears the brunt of being faced with the threat of this type of nonmilitary war and has been the injured party time after time, what is surprising is that such a large nation unexpectedly does not have a unified strategy and command structure to deal with the threat.” Using terror groups as an example, the authors write, “These multinational, nonstate, and supranational organizations together constitute an up and coming worldwide system of power.” The authors understood the comparatively inferior agility of nation-states a decade ago. Best sellers such as The Starfish and the Spider (Brafman and Beckstrom, 2006) recount numerous modern business failures as the result of centralized decision making and the inability to adapt. Nassim Taleb discusses similar phenomena in his brilliant 2007 book, The Black Swan. Tragically, in time of crisis, one may see organizations attempt to further centralize power and decision making, inadvertently creating greater vulnerability to all manner of challenges. The colonels also state, “Americans tend to pursue unlimited objectives as they expand their national power. But this is a tendency which in the end will lead to tragedy. A company which has limited resources but which is nevertheless keen to take on unlimited responsibilities is headed for only one possible outcome, and that is bankruptcy.” Policy makers who do not make space next to their favorite copy of The Prince for this text will find themselves in the dark. Military officers who do not study this work as a companion to The Art of War will likely be judged by history as derelict. In fact, any individual tasked with counter terrorism or anti terrorism duties will find Unrestricted Warfare to be a revelation about the near future of warfare and eye opening to the complexities of current events.
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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 29
US Prison Recruitment for Jihad
Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser and Raphael Shore
In May of this year, four men were arrested and charged with plotting to blow up New York synagogues and shoot down airplanes with antiaircraft missiles. The men were arrested after planting what they believed to be explosives outside two synagogues. 1
Counter The
30 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
Photo: Scott Morrison
T
he men had been under FBI surveillance for months and were provided simulated explosives when they tried to follow through with the act of terror.2 All four were Muslims who are believed to have converted to the faith while in prison.3 This case is but one example of what has long been a growing problem of Islamic extremism in the U.S. prison system. Extremism is not unique to Islam, nor can the faith be said to be synonymous with radicalism.4 However, prison converts to Islam are often exposed to a version of Islam that is militant and extreme—Wahhabi Islam. Many, after leaving prison, are already far along the path toward radicalization and can eventually, with a few more wrong turns, go on to commit acts of terrorism.5 What are the roots of this problem? Are there other potential threats that can be traced back? What can be done to counter the emerging fifth column arising out of prison Islamist radicalization?
Prison Conversions
There are hundreds of thousands of Muslims in state and federal prisons.6 An estimated 80 percent of faith seekers turn to Islam while imprisoned, with an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 converting each year.7 While some ultimately leave Islam when they leave prison, for most who convert while incarcerated, the change is real. For many inmates, the transformation is a largely positive one. Islam and
other forms of religious observance provide a way to cope with the difficult challenges of prison life.8 Additionally, there is considerable evidence to show that faith observance can provide viable resources for rehabilitation. It can teach self-discipline, humility, and healthy social skills. In many cases, it can act as a counterweight against extremism. These can be useful tools which, if done “right” with religious values free of “political Islam’s” societal mission and Wahhabism’s extremism, will give inmates one way to be able to lead productive lives when they return to society.9 In fact, many Muslim converts will go on to lead lives as productive members of American society. Unfortunately, others will not, having been influenced by Islamist teachings while behind bars.10 A distinction here is important to make between the faith of Islam and the political movement of Islamism. Islamism is a theocratic movement that attempts to create societies that implement shar’iah law (Islamic jurisprudence) through government. Wahhabi Islam is one of the more potent militant, extremist, exclusivist versions of Islam that teaches that any means necessary can be employed to establish its own extreme version of the Islamic state and impose Islamic law. Despite its relatively obscure origins within tribal Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism emerged in the twentieth century as a particularly potent influence upon global Islam because of the profound influence of the unending
There are hundreds of thousands of Muslims in state and federal 6 prisons. An estimated 80 percent of faith seekers turn to Islam while imprisoned, with an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 converting 7 each year.
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 31
©istockphoto.com/JJRD fuel of petrodollars. Petrodollars have fueled the Wahhabis’ ability to spread their message, texts, imams, and influence within Muslim institutions all over the world. The number of inmates radicalized while in prison might be comparatively small, but elements that become militant are very dangerous.11 According to a recent report, “The potential for radicalization of prison inmates in the United States poses a threat of unknown magnitude to national security. Prisons have long been places where extremist ideology and calls to violence could find a willing ear, and conditions are often conducive to radicalization.”12 One of the primary concerns is that radicalization can be “full” or “partial.” There is a continuum of radicalization in which most Muslims may never be affected
as devotional orthodox adherents to their faith, but others will, from within that psychological absorption, and the influence of other contacts, complete a journey to radicalization. The New York Police Department reported on this very process in 2007.13
Factors Leading to the Rise of Extremism in Prisons
Sociological and psychological factors14 in prisons as well as the need for protection from gangs have been profound elements of prison radicalization.15 Unfiltered hiring practices have allowed Islamist imams easy access to inmates, and an extreme staffing shortage has allowed radicalized prisoners and volunteers to serve as
32 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
primary sources of spiritual guidance.16, 17 Problematic literature fills prison libraries.18 Additionally, some Islamist organizations provide support to inmates reentering society, using this as a recruitment opportunity, leaving former inmates at risk for involvement in terrorist activities.19 Note that beneath all this are the driving commonalities of those who believe in political Islam. Many “Islamist” organizations may condemn terrorism but they do so halfheartedly with obvious apologetics for the advocacy of political Islam. Make no mistake, their Islamist ideologies and apologetics serve as a gateway for the possible future susceptibility of their constituencies to radicalization. The Islamist ideology includes a focus on “Muslim victimization and grievances” as a minority and fosters separatism. It drives converts toward an Islamic state and Islamic law (shari’a), and away from American society and Western law. The followers replace an American identity with an all-encompassing Islamic community (ummah). Another problem lending fodder to this crisis is that many of the men come from dysfunctional backgrounds without intrinsic values and are disillusioned with the society they came from. The Center for Islamic Pluralism writes that “Islamist radical recruiters and extremist Wahhabi clerics use their demagogy to attract the disfranchised, disgruntled and others who may feel marginalized.”20 A Georgetown report notes that “Radical religious groups allow the inmates to demonize their perceived enemies and view themselves as righteous.”21
Radical Religious Leaders
One way Islamist teachings have crept into the prisons is through imams,22 prisoners,23 and volunteers giving radicalized interpretations of Islam to inmates. This problem is caused
by reasons ranging from ineffective oversight24 to severe religious staffing shortages.25 The pervasiveness of the radicalism of Muslim chaplains needs further study because many are not from a supremacist mindset, but the problem is certainly profound. For example, the former head Muslim chaplain for the New York State Department of Correctional Services, Imam Warith Dean Umar,26 a former convict himself, oversaw the hiring of most of the 45 Muslim chaplains and clerics in the New York system, while he also lead regular Islamic religious services for inmates himself.27 He indoctrinated his clerics in Wahhabism with Saudisponsored trips to Saudi Arabia and preached an extreme form of Islam to convicts, with the New York authorities completely oblivious.28 Umar said he found that prisons “are a powder keg” and “the perfect recruitment and training ground” for his Wahhabi ideas and radicalism “under the cover of the Islamic religion.”29 Shockingly, Umar was quite open about his radical beliefs. In an interview with the The Wall Street Journal in February 2003, Umar said that “the 9/11 hijackers were martyrs” and that America would face “warfare” that would “be carried out by prison inmates who’ve converted to radical Islam.” 30 As a result of his extremism, Umar was eventually barred from the prisons.31 But even up until August 2009, this overtly radical imam had yet to be barred from American Islamist groups in the United States who present themselves as so-called voices of moderation. The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) invited Umar to conduct a session at its annual conference in Washington, D.C., this summer. The Investigative Project quickly revealed that his speech entitled “Jews and Salaam” was riddled with anti-Semitism and obvious Islamic extremism.32 So one can see how Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups like ISNA,
which openly claim to be nonviolent, will overlap with more radical Islamists like Imam Umar. ISNA quickly tried to dismiss their association with Imam Umar.33 Unfortunately, other Muslims are also the target of this extremism. Salahuddin Muhammed, a prison imam hired by Umar and the chaplain of the mosque attended by the men recently arrested for plotting to blow up New York synagogues, was accused by Shiite prisoners of inciting hostility against them in his sermons, calling them “infiltrators and snitches.”34 Oversights have also allowed problematic groups to play an important role in hiring. Until recently, two American Islamist organizations with Saudi Wahhabist roots and leanings were responsible for the training and certification of Muslim clerics in the prison system.35 ISNA was an unindicted co-conspirator in the recent trial of the Holy Land Foundation36—the largest terror-finance case in U.S. history demonstrating ISNA’s Muslim Brotherhood roots and connections.37 Prisoners as well as volunteers often take on leadership roles because of the severe shortage of qualified imams. A Florida official said that most inmates, in fact, are radicalized by other inmates. The case involving the JIS (Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam As-Saheeh, or Assembly of Authentic Islam) is one of the most prominent examples of this. In that case, Kevin James, a charismatic leader imprisoned at Folsom, was able to recruit a terrorist cell that almost went operational. Among its targets were Los Angeles-area Army recruiting offices and the Israeli consulate.38
Islamist Literature
Inadequate supervision of religious events and informational materials entering prisons has helped to reinforce the grip of fundamentalist chaplains, despite regulations that require the
Prisoners as well as volunteers often take on leadership roles because of the severe shortage of qualified imams.
screening of such materials.39 The Center for Islamic Pluralism recently reviewed the inventory of Islamic literature in prisons, and found a significant number of Wahhabi and other fundamentalist texts, including works by leading Muslim Brotherhood figures Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Sayed Qutb.40 A particularly disturbing case is that of the Noble Quran distributed by the AlHaramain Islamic Foundation41 and the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington D.C.42 In 2004 the U.S. Treasury Department froze the assets of Al-Haramain for funneling money to al-Qaeda and rebels in Chechnya.43 This Saudi-Wahhabi printed version of the Quran, distributed to over 10,000 prisoners, contains inflammatory rhetoric attacking nonMuslims, and preaches violent jihad.
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 33
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Since 9/11, members have remained in the United States training at their encampments to avoid the scrutiny of law enforcement. Reentering Society
FBI director Robert Mueller said that the threat of radicalization does not end when prisoners are released. Extremists exploit “their socio-economic status and placement in the community” as another way of reaching this vulnerable group.44 At a Senate hearing in 2006, Frank Cilluffo, director of the George Washington University Homeland
Security Policy Institute, addressed this subject further. Former inmates are vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment because many leave prison with very little financial or social support. To the extent that radical groups may draw upon funding from well-financed, extremist backers, they can offer much more support to released prisoners than other more legitimate community programs that would facilitate genuine reintegration into society. By providing for prisoners in their time of greatest need, radical organizations can build upon the loyalty developed during the individual’s time in prison. If connections are made with a radicalized community group, the recently released inmate may remain at risk for recruitment or continued involvement in terrorist networks.45 One organization that appears to have taken advantage of this is a group called Jama’at al-Fuqra.46
Jama’at al-Fuqra/ Muslims of the Americas
Jama’at al-Fuqra (JF), or “community of the impoverished,”47 was founded in New York by Pakistani cleric Mubarak Gilani in 1980.48 It’s an example of a potential threat that can be traced, in part, to prison radicalization. When JF was formed, Gilani targeted African American converts to Islam—primarily those with criminal backgrounds—who were living in the inner city. This, in and of itself, is not the problem. As previously stated, religious groups often provide a positive influence on inmates. In the case of JF, the problem is the kind of Islam they are turning to. One dossier on the group gives an indication of this when it writes that “Gilani used their hostility and cynicism toward Western society to aid in their adoption of his extremist beliefs.”49
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 35
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Though Gilani runs JF from Pakistan,50 it has continued to operate in North America under two front groups: Muslims of the Americas (MoA) and the International Quranic Open University.51 The group’s goal is to purify Islam of Western influences through violence.52 They have openly supported Muslim Kashmiri separatists against India, and have declared as their enemies Israelis, Hindus, Jews, Hare Krishnas, Buddhists, and the U.S. government, among others.53 The State Department listed JF as a terrorist organization until 1999,54 and the Department of Defense handbook, A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, did the same from 2003 to 2005.55 JF is believed to be responsible for dozens of bombings and murders across the United States and abroad, including the first World Trade Center attack in 1993.56 JF has also been linked to “shoe bomber” Richard Reid,57 alQaeda operative Ayman Faris, who was convicted for plotting attacks on the
Brooklyn Bridge and other targets,58 and D.C. sniper John Allen Muhammad.59 Although members have not been arrested for violent activities in several years, they continue to support Gilani financially through extensive white collar crimes, by taking advantage of a variety of social services programs, including workers’ compensation, public health care, welfare, and the Food Stamp Program.60 In one recent case, Khadijah Ghadur, a JF member in California, was convicted of bilking the state of more than a million dollars through a charter school she ran. Evidence never introduced in court indicated that the money may have gone to Gilani.61
Muslim radicalization in American prisons is a deep-seated, multilayered problem that will require an overhaul of the approach to “Islam” behind bars.
Sheikh Gilani
Sheikh Gilani is as controversial as JF. He espouses extremist views, telling his followers that “Zionist plotters” plan to rule the world and encouraging them to leave America’s cities to avoid the “decadence of a godless society. “”62 He has militant connections to al-Qaeda
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and Osama Bin Laden,63 Hamas, and Hezbollah,64 and reportedly was a former member of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).65 Gilani has also trained fighters for Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir.66 American reporter Daniel Pearl was trying to interview Gilani in Pakistan when he was kidnapped and beheaded.67 Gilani was arrested but later released by Pakistani authorities, denying any involvement in the murder. Gilani currently denies any connection to JF, as do residents of the MOA compounds, who say the “terrorist” group was created by enemies of Islam hoping to destroy their communities.68
Compounds
The group, which has 1,000–3,000 members, maintains about 20–30 compounds across America.69 These compounds, in rural hamlets, shelter hundreds of members, some of whom, according to intelligence sources, have been trained in the use of weapons and explosives in Pakistan. Since 9/11, members have remained in the United States training at their encampments to avoid the scrutiny of law enforcement. There are reports of gunfire and explosions coming from these compounds and anyone not affiliated with the organization, including law
38 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
enforcement, is barred from entering the encampment.70 A blogger who posted a negative story about the town in 2007 was threatened with violence.71 Members of these enclaves submit to laws set out by Gilani, which are considered to be above local, state, and federal authority. The MOA university has portrayed itself as a religious, charitable, and educational institution dedicated to home study and public awareness of the Koran. However, MOA has made antiSemitic, anti-Christian, anti-American, and homophobic statements as well as statements promoting violence.72 Gilani’s appearance in a recruitment video shows JF’s true face. The video shows individuals being trained in the use of firearms and explosives and Gilani, wearing a camouflage jacket over traditional Pakistani dress, declaring, “We give highly specialized training in guerrilla warfare . . . . We are at present establishing training camps . . . . You can easily reach us at Koranic Open University offices in upstate New York or in Canada or in Michigan or in South Carolina or in Pakistan. Wherever we are you can reach us.” Muslim radicalization in American prisons is a deep-seated, multilayered problem that will require an overhaul of the approach to “Islam” behind
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bars. There must be a coherent process by which we can allow prisoners the “freedom” to embrace a personal faith that they choose to help promote their rehabilitation while also protecting them and the American public against the spread of the very real threat, which is radical Islam.
About the Authors Dr. Jasser is a devout practicing American Muslim and a former physician to the U.S. Congress. He is the narrator of The Clarion Fund’s documentary, “The Third Jihad” (www. TheThirdJihad.com), as well as the founder and president of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD, www.aifdemocracy.org). Mr. Shore is a producer of documentary films and the founder of The Clarion Fund, a nonprofit organization dedicated to educating the public about national security threats. Shore is well known for producing
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the documentary “Obsession: Radical Islam’s War Against the West.” His latest documentary, “The Third Jihad” (www. TheThirdJihad.com), explores radical Islam in America.
endnotes
1 “Four men indicted in NY synagogue bomb plot.” Reuters, June 2, 2009. http:// www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/ idUSTRE5517KU20090602 2 Gendar, Alison, and Corky Siemaszko, “Terrorist ‘Candid Camera’: Alleged wannabe Bronx jihadists under surveillance for nearly a year.” NY Daily News, May 23, 2009. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ ny_crime/2009/05/23/2009-05-23_terrorist_ candid_camera_wannabe_bronx_jihadists_ under_constant_surveillance_for_.html 3 De la Llosa, Luis Torres, “New York Synagogue bomb suspects plead not guilty.” AFP, June 2009. http://www. google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ ALM5gi3UMIih1vMke8QL8vyRcpMLtvRw 4 “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization.” George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute and The University of Virginia, Critical Incident Analysis Group.
The MOA university has portrayed itself as a religious, charitable, and educational institution dedicated to home study and public awareness of the Koran.
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 39
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5 Hamm, Mark S., “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups Final Report.” Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, December 2007. 6 Islam, Mufti Siraj, “Islam in American Prisons.” IslamOnline.net, August 31, 2001. http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/ Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1156077734 147&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_ Affairs%2FMAELayout 7 Hamm, Mark S., “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups Final Report.” Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, December 2007. 8 Malik, Imaad, “Black America, Prisons and Radical Islam: A Report.” Center for Islamic Pluralism, September 2008. 9 Hamm, Mark S., “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups Final Report.” Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, December 2007. 10 Zoll, Rachel. “U.S. prisons becoming Islam battleground.” Associated Press, July 14, 2005. http://www.library.omc.ca/ mtarchives/000073.htm 11 Hamm, Mark S., “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups Final Report.” Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, December 2007. 12 “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization.” George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute and The University of Virginia, Critical Incident Analysis Group. 13 Silber, Mitchell D., and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat”. New York City Police Department. 2007. 14 “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization.” George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute and The University of Virginia, Critical Incident Analysis Group. 15 Hamm, Mark S., “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups Final Report.” Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, December 2007. 16 Ali, Javed, “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?” Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, September 19, 2006. 17 Cilluffo, Frank J., “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?” Testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
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Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006. 18 Malik, Imaad, “Black America, Prisons and Radical Islam: A Report.” Center for Islamic Pluralism, September 2008. 19 Cilluffo, Frank J., “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?” Testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006. 20 Malik, Imaad, “Black America, Prisons and Radical Islam: A Report.” Center for Islamic Pluralism, September 2008. 21“Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization.” George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute and The University of Virginia, Critical Incident Analysis Group. 22 Van Duyn, Donald, “Statement… Before the House Homeland Security Committee Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment,” September 20, 2006. http://www. fbi.gov/congress/congress06/vanduyn092006. htm Cited in “Radicalization: An Overview and Annotated Bibiliography of Open Source Literature. Final Report.” Homeland Security Institute, December 15, 2006. 23 Cilluffo, Frank J., “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?” Testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006. 24 “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization.” George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute and The University of Virginia, Critical Incident Analysis Group. 25 Cilluffo, Frank J., “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell
Blocks?” Testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006. 26 Umar was born Wallace Gene Marks and converted to the Nation of Islam in 1971 after being sentenced to two years in prison on weapons possession charges as part of the Harlem Five conspiracy. When he moved into more orthodox Sunni Islam and Wahhabism he changed his name to Warith Dean Umar, meaning “inheritor of the religion.” Umar was one of Muhammad’s successors and companions. 27 Schwartz, Stephen, “Prison Poison,” New York Post, January 10, 2006. 28 Barrett, Paul M., “Captive Audience: How a Chaplain Spread Extremism To an Inmate Flock — Radical New York Imam Chose Clerics for State Prisons; Praise for 9/11 ‘Martyrs’ — Saudi Arabia’s Helping Hand,” The Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2003. 29 Barrett, Paul M., “Captive Audience: How a Chaplain Spread Extremism To an Inmate Flock — Radical New York Imam Chose Clerics for State Prisons; Praise for 9/11 ‘Martyrs’ — Saudi Arabia’s Helping Hand,” The Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2003. 30 “Jihad: at a Prison Near You,” The New York Post, February 6, 2003. 31 Schwartz, Stephen, “Prison Poison,” New York Post, January 10, 2006. 32 “Warith Deen Umar: Jews ‘Have Control of the World.’” The Investigative Project on Terrorism, July 5, 2009. http:// www.investigativeproject.org/1081/warithdeen-umar-jews-have-control-of-the-world 33 “ISNA’s Non-Apology Apology.” The Investigative Project on Terrorism, July
42 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
13, 2009. http://www.investigativeproject. org/1090/isnas-non-apology-apology 34 Silverberg, Mark, “Wahhabism in the American Prison System.” May 6, 2006. http://www.jfednepa.org/mark%20silverberg/ wahhabi_america.html 35 ibid 36 United States of America vs. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et. al, 3:04-C12-CR-240-G “List of Unindicted Co-conspirators and/or Joint Venturers.” 37 Trahan, Jason,”5 decry jail terms in Holy Land Foundation case.” The Dallas Morning News, May 27, 2009. http://www.dallasnews. com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/ 052809dnmetholyland.209bc6fd.html 38 Hamm, Mark S., “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups Final Report.” Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, December 2007 39 Barrett, Paul M., “Captive Audience: How a Chaplain Spread Extremism To an Inmate Flock — Radical New York Imam Chose Clerics for State Prisons; Praise for 9/11 ‘Martyrs’ — Saudi Arabia’s Helping Hand,” The Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2003. 40 Malik, Imaad, “Black America, Prisons and Radical Islam: A Report.” Center for Islamic Pluralism, September 2008. 41 Founded in 1992 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the Al-Haramain Organization is a private charity with branches in more than 50 countries. Its worldwide annual operation budget was estimated at $40–50 million. The charity no longer exists as its own entity as it was merged into the Saudi National Commission for Relief and Charity Work
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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 43
Abroad. 42 Waller, Dr. Michael, Testimony for the Committee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, “Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in the United States: Prisons and Military as an Operational Base.” Senate Committee on the Judiciary, October 14, 2003. 43 “U.S. Based Branch of Al Haramain Foundation Linked to Terror.” U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, September 9, 2004. http://www.ustreas.gov/ press/releases/js1895.htm (accessed December 18, 2007). Branches in Tanzania, Kenya, Afghanistan, Comoros Islands, Albania, India, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Somalia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were also shut down for involvement in funding terrorist operations around the world. 44 Mueller, Robert, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, February 16, 2005. 45 Cilluffo, Frank J., “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?” Testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006. 46 “Jamaat ul-Fuqra: Gilani Followers Conducting Paramilitary Training in U.S.”
Regional Organized Crime Information Center, 2006. 47 Crowley, Zachary, “Jamaat al-Fuqra Dossier.” Center for Policing Terrorism, March 16, 2005. 48 ibid 49 “Jamaat ul-Fuqra: Gilani Followers Conducting Paramilitary Training in U.S.” Regional Organized Crime Information Center, 2006. 50 Organized Crime in California: Annual Report to the California Legislature.” California Department of Justice, 2004. 51 Boland, Mira L., “Sheikh Gilani’s American Disciples: What to make of the Islamic compounds across America affiliated with the Pakistani radical group Jamaat al-Fuqra?” The Weekly Standard, March 18, 2002, Vol 7, No 26. http://www. weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/ 000%5C000%5C000%5C996lxfmd.asp 52 “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999.” U.S. Department of State, April 2000. http://www.state.gov/www/global/ terrorism/1999report/patterns.pdf 53 Kane, John, and April Wall, “Identifying the Links Between White-Collar Crime and Terrorism,” National White Collar Crime Center, Doc. 2090520, Award #2003-IJ-
44 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
CX-1018, September 2004, p. 18. http://www. ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209520.pdf 54 See “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994,” U.S. Department of State, April 1995: Appendix B: Background Information on Major Groups Discussed in the Report. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_94/ append.html and “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999.” U.S. Department of State, April 2000, April 2000. http://www.state.gov/ www/global/terrorism/1999report/patterns. pdf.. JF were no longer listed as a terrorist organization in 2000. The State Department responded to a reporter’s question as to why this was so on January 31, 2002, saying that because the group had been inactive over the years in terms of terrorist activity they were no longer included. Moreover, the State Department report’s designation did not have a legal definition in the same way al-Qaeda was designated. 55 See “A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century.” U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity – Threats, October 12, 2004 and Zachary Crowley, “Jamaat al-Fuqra Dossier.” Center for Policing Terrorism, March 16, 2005. http://centerforpolicingterrorism.net/pdf/
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JAMAATAL-FUQRA2.pdf 56 Clines, Francis X., “Specter of Terror; U.S.-Born Suspect in Bombing Plots: Zealous Causes and Civic Roles.” New York Times, June 28, 1993. http://www.nytimes. com/1993/06/28/nyregion/specter-terror-usborn-suspect-bombing-plots-zealous-causescivic-roles.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all 57 Stockman, Farah, “Bomb Probe Eyes Pakistan Links Extremist May Have Influenced Reid.” The Boston Globe, January 6, 2002. 58 Raman, B., “Al-Qaeda Clone Takes Roots in the US.” Asia Times Online, July 3, 2003. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_ Asia/EG03Df07.html 59 “United States: The Jamaat al-Fuqra Threat.” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, June 3, 2005. http://www.stratfor.com/ united_states_jamaat_al_fuqra_threat 60 Kane, John, and April Wall, “Identifying the Links Between White-Collar Crime and Terrorism,” National White Collar Crime Center, Doc. 2090520, Award #2003-IJCX-1018, September 2004, p. 17. http:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209520. pdf 61 Bailey, Brandon, and Sean Webby, “The mysterious saga of Sister Khadijah.” Mercury
News, February 11, 2007. http://www.hvk. org/articles/0207/100.html 62 Levanthal, Rick, “Quiet Muslim-Only Town in N.Y. Founded by Alleged Terrorist,” Fox News, March 23, 2009. http://www. foxnews.com/story/0,2933,510218,00.html 63 See David Kohn, “Sheikh Gilani: CBS’ Man in Pakistan Tracks Him Down.” CBS News, March 13, 2002 http://www.cbsnews. com/stories/2002/03/13/60II/main503644. shtml; and Jamie Glazov, “Terrorist Camps in America.” FrontPageMagazine.com, February 3, 2009. http://www.frontpagemag.com/ Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=7C52675D-0E6C4026-BADE-D2A80C777099 64 “Jamaat ul-Fuqra,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/jamaat-ulfuqra.htm# 65 Mira L. Boland, “Sheikh Gilani’s American Disciples.” The Weekly Standard Vol. 7 Issue 26, March 18, 2002. http://www. weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/ 000%5C000%5C000%5C996lxfmd.asp?pg=1 66 ibid 67 See David E. Kaplan, “Made in the U.S.A.: Hundreds of Americans have followed the path to jihad. Here’s how and why,” U.S. News and World Report, June
FIRSTHAND AC COUNTS AND FROM FRONTL INE PERSONNE ANALYSES L AND ExPERT IN THE wAR AG S AINS T TERROR Based on
Understanding
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ophir falk and hed by nry Morgenstern
Understandin
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U.s. and policymakers, first israeli experiences and detailed interv responders, and threat of suicide students of home iews with frontline personnel, terro Suicide Terror enab land security to understand and for future attacks. r. it analyzes recent suicide attac deal with the grow les ks as well as our following the expe current vulnerabili Moreover, they learn ing rt authors’ advic ties e, readers learn how to prepare for possible measures and likely scenarios and losses in the and imple ment event of an attac to prevent an attac an effective and k. quick response to k. following an overv minimize casualties iew and historical review of suicide terror, the book cover • Global jihad s: • Israel’s confron tation with suicide te rrorism • America’s expe rience with suicide b ombings • Internationalizat ion of suicide terroris m • High-risk scena rios and future trends • Methods for co nfronting suicide terror • Medical manag ement of suicide terro rism Using eye-witnes s accounts, the text recreates the studies help reade look and feel of rs actua these very dangerousget into the minds of suicide terro rists in order to unde l terrorism incidents. Detailed threats. case rstand how to best This book is a defin prevent and confr itive study of suicide ont experts who have terror, synthesizing t dealt with it firsth he ex perie nce of well-known Is devastating threa and. anyone respo t should read this book and consider nsible for understanding, preventing raeli and American its recommendation , and confronting OPHIR FALK, LLB, this s with all seriousne ss. institute for Coun MBA, is a Partner at the Naveh, K ter terrorism, wher of experience in e he has published antor Even-Har law firm and a Rese vario numerous articles carried out risk asses us security capacities and serve in the field. Mr. falk arch Fellow at the d as a consultant sments for olympic has over a decade for the venue 2004 s and olym HENRY MORGEN critical national infras pic games, wher STERN is the Presi e he tructure. than 500 federal, dent of security state solutions internation first responders to Is , and local agencies to effectively al, a company that of suicide terror. He rael to study Homeland Security. Mr. confront the threat of terror and regul has trained more radio stations, and has offered expert commentary on tMorgenstern is a widely publishe arly takes groups of d aut Web broadcasts. error-related issu es for NBC, ABC hor on the subject , CBS, Fox, numerous
SUICIDE TERROR
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falk Morgenstern
Ophir Falk and Henr y Morgenstern have serious about winn compiled a book that should be read ing the war on terro better understan r. By painstakingly by anyone who is d the nature of analyzing the empi our enemies and rical data, they they offer important why they employ help us insights on how these barbaric tacti terrorism can be In so doing, they cs. Most crucially, effectively confr have performed onted and ultim an invaluable servi crucial battle. ately defeated. ce for all those who are committed to winning this —Benjamin Neta nyahu, former Prime Minister of Israe l
10, 2002. http://www.usnews.com/usnews/ news/articles/020610/archive_021602. htm; and Unmesh Kher, “The Odd Ordeal of Daniel Pearl”, Time, February 11, 2002. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,1001778-2,00.html 68 “Imam El Sheikh Gilani Sets the Record Straight,” Muslims of Americas Online Press Release, June 12, 2007. http://www.islamberg. org/ 69 Ali, Farhana and William Rosenau, “Jama`at al-Fuqra’: An Overblown Threat?” CTC Sentinel, October 2008, Vol 1, Issue 11. 70 “Probe Finds Terrorists in U.S. ‘Training for War’: Neighbors of Muslim Encampment Fear Retaliation if They Report to Police.” WorldNetDaily.com February 17, 2006. http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article. asp?ARTICLE_ID=48868 71 Judi McLeod, “Blogger Who Posted CFP Islamberg Story Had Life Threatened,” Canada Free Press, May 15, 2007. http:// www.canadafreepress.com/2007/cover051507. htm 72 “Muslims of the Americas: In Their Own Words.” Anti-Defamation League. http://www.adl.org/extremism/moa/default. asp
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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 45
Hezbollah: The Party of God, 2009 By Jennifer L. Hesterman
Counter The
A Hezbollah flag flies over Beaufort Castle, Lebanon. Šistockphoto.com/RichVintage
46 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
Today, non-state actors confidently engage powerful nations in irregular warfare, despite an obvious mismatch in resources. When these groups are successful, they often pull their opposition into a long, expensive, and casualty-ridden conflict. Hezbollah is a powerful non-state actor that is growing in complexity and influence.
D
espite decades of overt and covert attempts to dismantle the group, it is still one of the world’s most effective terrorist organizations. A review of Hezbollah reveals an organization that leverages unique sources of power, and continues to wield influence not only in the Middle East, but globally.
Recent Operations 2009: When Israel engaged Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah did not intervene militarily (possibly at the behest of Syria), but influenced the battlefield in a variety of ways. Prior to the conflict, Hezbollah’s leadership invited Arab nations to join it in protesting Israel’s embargo of goods entering Gaza. This contributed to the propaganda associated with the conflict and also demonstrated Hezbollah’s ability to engage from afar via psychological operations.1 During the battle, Hezbollah’s influence on Hamas’s tactics was apparent with the group again relying more on rocket attacks and less on suicide operations. Iranian sources report that Hezbollah trained Hamas in military tactics used to attack Merkava tanks, the main battle tank employed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).2
2008: After three days of bloodshed, heavily armed fighters seized West Beirut. This is the first use of Hezbollah’s military arsenal against their host state to increase territory and span of control. The conflict was sparked by government action to shut down Hezbollah’s telecommunications network. 2006: Hezbollah militants kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in northern Israel, sparking the month-long “Lebanon War,” which devastated the country’s infrastructure. During the conflict, Israel bombed Lebanon and sent in troops and tanks. Hezbollah fired 4,000 rockets across the border into Israel. More than 1,000 Lebanese, mostly civilians, died, and 120 Israeli soldiers and 43 Israeli civilians were killed.3
According to the State Department, Hezbollah remains the most technically capable terrorist group in the world.13
Methods
Hezbollah has a history of suicide bombings, however, this tactic appears to have fallen out of favor in the past 10 years. Kidnapping has been utilized as a way to engage in prisoner exchange. Rockets and missiles are the primary military weapons, and recent unconfirmed reports indicate the presence of chemical weapons at a bunker leveled by a blast earlier this year. Hezbollah also fields a unique weapon: the group is very
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 47
adept at leveraging the global audience through press campaigns, political activity, and humanitarian engagement.
Objectives
Hezbollah is also known to have killed more Americans than any other terrorist group prior to 9/11.4
Hezbollah has stated that one of its goals is to eliminate the state of Israel. Other demonstrated objectives include freeing Hezbollah prisoners in Israel; supporting the humanitarian and basic needs of Lebanon’s Shi’ite civilian populace; maintaining a political presence in Lebanon’s parliament; and fund-raising through both legitimate and illicit means. Hezbollah is also known to have killed more Americans than any other terrorist group prior to 9/11.4
Primary Area of Operations
Gaza Strip. ©istockphoto.com/sweetandsour
Hezbollah operates in the formerly Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. It has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia.5 The training bases are mostly in the Bekaa Valley, and its headquarters and offices are in southern Beirut and in Ba’albek.6 Hezbollah is now a “state within a state,” similar to how the Palestinian Liberation Organization used to operate in Lebanon.
Global Operations Iran and Syria: Hezbollah continues to methodically expand its sphere of influence around the world while receiving weapons and training support from Iran and Syria. It now operates in the same space as other major terrorist organizations such as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia and al Qaeda. Sharing resources, tactics, or established trafficking routes between the groups would have dire implications. Latin America: U.S. officials are concerned that Hezbollah sympathizers are raising funds in the tri-border area through illicit activities (such as DVD pirating) but also through solicited 48 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
donations from sympathizers in large Middle Eastern communities.7 Venezuela: Hezbollah has received support and sympathy in Venezuela. In 2006, following the end of hostilities in Lebanon with Israel, Hassan Nasrallah (Hezbollah leader) called Hugo Chavez his “brother,” and signs that said “Gracias, Chavez” in thanks for the president’s backing during the conflict were hung in Lebanon. In response to the Israeli engagement in Gaza earlier this year, President Chavez ejected the Israeli ambassador and staff from his country. Europe: According to the U.S. State Department, the European Union (EU) as a whole remained reluctant to take steps to block the assets of charities associated with Hamas and Hezbollah.8 Uncharacteristically, in 2007, the Swedish government shut down the al-Aqsa Foundation in Malmo when it was suspected of facilitating fund-raising for Hezbollah and/or Hamas. Its leader, Khaled al-Yousef, a Swedish citizen, was charged with financing terrorism in Israel. Although he was acquitted of supporting terror, he was confirmed to be sending money to various “charities.” West Africa: Hezbollah is active in several West African countries, reaping profits from booming narco-trafficking routes, diamond trade, and solicitation of funds from Muslims—either voluntarily or through an imposed “tax.” Funds are illegally transferred from Africa to Lebanon and bulk cash smuggling is rampant. For instance, in 2003 a charter flight en route to Beirut from Benin crashed on takeoff killing all onboard, including senior Hezbollah members who were carrying $2 million.9 Iraq: In 2006 the Iraq Study Group (a 10-person panel appointed by Congress in 2006) revealed that Hezbollah trained thousands of soldiers of the Mahdi Army (an Iraqi Shi’ite militia) in Lebanon. Hezbollah operatives also traveled to Iraq to advise the Mahdi Army. The report revealed that Iran facilitated these activities.10
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West Africa’s diamond trade is just one of many sources of illegal funding for Hezbollah. ©istockphoto.com/cristi_m
Organization
Hezbollah was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department in 1995. It consists of several thousand supporters and militants. Although the United States does not distinguish between Hezbollah’s departments, the group’s structure is clearly defined by distinct activities—adding to an already complex diplomatic challenge.
Paramilitary
Hezbollah’s military philosophy revolves around the guerrilla-based concept of “Muslim Resistance.” Its strategy is that soldiers should have a military role and a civilian role. They are integrated into the civilian populace during times of peace, and form a well-trained, disciplined military force during war.11 The civilian populace has demonstrated support for this concept and is a catalyst for its success. Following repeated defeats of Arab forces by the IDF, Hezbollah adopted a new command structure that encourages initiative in junior ranks. A decentralized command structure allows for rapid response to any situation without consulting with group leadership. The military wing, however, answers directly
to Hezbollah’s central council of clerics for direction.12 According to the State Department, Hezbollah remains the most technically capable terrorist group in the world.13 A formidable paramilitary force in the region, the group continues to demonstrate that it can blend unconventional warfare tactics with strategies typically employed by conventional forces. It has spent decades posturing, preparing, and rebuilding its arsenal. Israeli officials claim Hezbollah has completely replenished its ranks, possesses more short- and medium-range rockets than it had before the 2006 war, has moved arms back to southern Lebanon, and is providing training to Hamas operatives from Gaza.14 In June, reports surfaced that 40,000 rockets were placed by Hezbollah on the border of Lebanon and Israel. One month later, an explosion at an ammunition bunker in a Lebanese village 12 miles from the Israeli border gave further cause for concern. The weapons cache at this location, wrongly believed by the United Nations (UN) to be abandoned, consisted of AK-47s, artillery shells, mortars, and 122-millimeter rockets. A UN officer
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Tank in Israel. ©istockphoto.com/sweetand-
stated that the facility was a violation of UN Resolution 1701, which imposed a cease-fire and arms ban after the war.15 Hezbollah is undeterred by the presence of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which fields 13,000 troops at an annual budget of $590 million.16 UNIFIL’s mandate is to ensure compliance with resolutions, and it attempts to do so in a very unstable environment. Following the July cache explosion, UNIFIL attempted to inspect a similar facility in the neighborhood but it was repelled by villagers throwing rocks, injuring 14. Iran is supplementing Hizbollah’s arsenal. According to the State Department, in 2008 Iran’s Qods Force continued to provide weapons, training, and funding to the group and trained more than 3,000 fighters at camps in Iran.17 Finally, there are unconfirmed reports
50 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
that Hezbollah is procuring Russianmade SA-8 and SA-18 surface-to-air missiles.18
Political
Hezbollah seeks to improve its political position in Lebanon whose government and the majority of Arab nations recognize the group as a legitimate “resistance group” and political party, namely the Lebanese Islamist party. Since 1992 its political arm has fronted candidates in parliamentary elections. In 2005 Hezbollah secured an all-time high of 14 of the Lebanese Parliament’s 128 seats. As part of the government, Hezbollah has participated in meetings with the EU and the International Monetary Fund. After taking over West Beirut in 2008, the group’s political power increased. As part of an Arab-brokered deal to end the fighting, Hezbollah was granted enough
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seats to have veto power over government decisions. Illustrating the synergy between its political and military efforts, Hezbollah’s election campaign posters contained a mushroom cloud with the inscription: “Oh Zionists, If You Want This Type of War Then So Be It!”19 Likely a message from their Iranian sponsors, intended as a warning for Israel.
Community Outreach
Hezbollah’s civilian wing provides a variety of social services for Lebanese Shi’ites, which comprise nearly onethird of the population of Lebanon. Providing protection and basic necessities to the populace has naturally increased the group’s popularity among citizens.
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Hassan Nasrallah, a former military leader and Shi’a religious expert, has led Hezbollah for more than 17 years. Nasrallah is widely credited for driving Israel from Lebanon and for the successful prisoner exchange with Israel in 2004 that freed hundreds of Palestinians and Lebanese. Nasrallah demonstrated his animosity toward the United States in 2002 when he stated, “Let the entire world hear me. Our hostility to the Great Satan is absolute . . . regardless of how the world has changed after 11 September, Death to America will remain our reverberating and powerful slogan: Death to America.”20 Two men who wield significant power within the organization and often serve as spokespersons for Hezbollah are Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem, Nasrallah’s second in command, and the most senior Hezbollah member of parliament, Mohammed Raad.
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It publishes a newspaper and monthly magazine, operates radio and TV stations, and runs hospitals, schools, and orphanages. The group also has a substantial Martyrs Fund to provide support to families of dead, injured, or imprisoned Shi’ites.
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Groups like Hezbollah are not controlled by any one nation, so traditional means of applying pressure through diplomatic, economic, and military means are not effective, or even possible. International norms and laws are difficult to enforce upon such groups, particularly for organizations like the UN. In the last three years, the U.S. Department of Defense has allocated $61 million to Lebanon for counter terrorism assistance.21 The State Department provided $6 million in 2008 to support the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ efforts in
Lebanon. INL is actively training and equipping Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces, which are reportedly countering Hezbollah and attempting to maintain stability in the country.22 We must learn from Hezbollah’s 30 years of growth, adaptation, and unique activities.
•
About the Author Ms. Hesterman is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel. She is a senior analyst for The MASY Group, a global intelligence and risk management firm, and a professor at American Military University. Her book “Transnational Crime and the Criminal-Terrorist Nexus” was published in 2005.
ENDNOTES
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_ cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34575 2 http://www.jamestown.org/ single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_ news]=34575 3 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=20601087&sid=aeol1KbCen kM 4 https://www.cia.gov/newsinformation/press-releases-statements/ press-release-archive-2004/pr07192004. html 5 http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/10300.pdf 6 http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/para/hizballah.htm 7 http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/122599.pdf 8 http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/122599.pdf 9 http://www.strategycenter.net/ research/pubID.118/pub_detail.asp 10 http://www.nytimes. com/2006/11/28/world/ middleeast/28military.html 11 www.fride.org/download/Lebanon. pdf 12 http://www.jamestown.org/ single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_ news]=860 13 www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/ crt/2006/82738.htm 14 http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/122599.pdf 1
http://www.nytimes. com/2009/07/25/world/ middleeast/25briefs-Lebanon.html 16 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ missions/unifil/index.html 17 http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/122599.pdf 18 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=20601087&sid=aeol1KbCen kM 15
http://www.michaeltotten.com/ archives/2009/04/hezbollahs-mush. php 20 http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2006/09/20060905-7.html 21 http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/ organization/128331.pdf 22 http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/121735.pdf 19
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solo
Rapid response to active shooters A Necessity for Rapid Deployment By Michael Stepien
Counter The
54 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
Photo: Scott Morrison
The “active shooter” response doctrine and its burgeoning nationwide training programs have done much to expedite American law enforcement’s response to in-progress attacks on citizens.
U
ndoubtedly, there will be more police on scene faster to an active shooter than would have been possible a mere 10 years ago. However, many current active shooter response tactics require multiple officers in the same place to make entry and neutralize the threat. Under the high-stress scenario of an active shooting, coupled with the unfamiliar settings likely for patrolmen to encounter and the possibility of barricaded entry points, police arrival is in no way guaranteed before a new “high score” of dead victims is a reality. A new thought process must be propagated throughout law enforcement to again increase the speed of responding officers to an ongoing attack, even if that means a solo officer entering a school, an office building, a hotel, and so forth, without assistance, currently taught throughout the country. Of note: The following examination focuses specifically on an active shooter in a school setting. However, the principles discussed are easily applied to any possible scenario, from a lone, disgruntled student or transient in a school to a professional terrorist siege
of multiple targets such as the attacks in Mumbai.1 The overarching principle is that the first responding officer or operator cannot wait for the “optimal” level of backup desired to engage the suspect(s) and must make contact as fast as possible. Regardless of the officer’s level of training and equipment, it can be expected to be superior to that of the individuals targeted. Thus, even if the first responder cannot stop the threat entirely, his mere presence and actions serve several vital purposes. By making contact with the perpetrator without delay, the attacker cannot actively engage helpless targets, fortify his position, move hostages, barricade entry points, disperse improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and etcetera. Moreover, tactics that utilize a small number of operators during a response to an active shooting/takeover must be formalized and trained as it may be required by the perpetrators actions. Government personnel responding to attacks at multiple, high-profile, “soft” target sites as well as peripheral target sites, created by the perpetrators to sow chaos and strain responding agencies
The need for the fastest response time possible is imperative because of one inescapable fact: the average school shooting is becoming increasingly deadlier in a shorter period of time.
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 55
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(as executed in Mumbaii, the Oasis compound of Khobar in Saudi Arabia, Egypt in 1997, and planned for St. Petersburg in 2006 and Manhattan in 1993) may force a change from the “first arriving officer” scenario. Regardless, speed is the universal imperative and is vital during any level of response. The need for the fastest response time possible is imperative because of one inescapable fact: the average school shooting is becoming increasingly deadlier in a shorter period of time. Undoubtedly, this is the result of ongoing efforts by law enforcement (LE) professionals to learn from the devastating lessons taught by previous active shooter incidents. According to Ron Borsch, manager and trainer at the SEALE Regional Training Academy in Bedford, Ohio, the duration of active shooter incidents is shrinking while lethality is increasing—a phenomenon he called the “Stopwatch of Death.” Following a study of the murder statistics
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56 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
of the 44 active shooter incidents (for which data are available) that have occurred in North America since 1966, Borsch concluded that, undeniably, “the time frame in active shooter incidents is getting tighter.” Specifically, Borsch reported: A Virginia Tech insider shared that 30 dead and 25 wounded were accomplished in 7 minutes. The Stopwatch of Death factor here is 7.9 (murder attempts per minute)—four times that of Columbine (2.1), and over twice that of Dawson College in Montreal (2.9). In other words, at Virginia Tech, the worst mass murder by a solo active shooter to date, one shooter committed twice as many murders (32 casualties) in less than half the time it took the two Columbine shooters to kill 13. Although the Virginia Tech shooting reportedly lasted closer to 10 minutes,2 the numbers presented by Borsch are eye
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 57
Photo: Scott Morrison opening. As aptly summarized by Borsch, “Time is our worst adversary in dealing with active killers . . . . Victims are often added to the toll every several seconds.” Few, if any, formalized strategies beyond the current “active shooter” training have been adopted with this horrific reality in mind. When the dead and injured are added by the second, a new strategy to combat this reality is needed.
Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision — Sun Tzu Unquestionably, waiting for a “hasty” team of the five to six plus officers necessary to properly execute “rolling thunder” or the four to five officers mandated for the “diamond” formation is ideal. These tactical manifestations attempt to apply the lessons gleaned from prior active shooter atrocities— expedited entry, speed of movement, known areas of responsibility, superior firepower, room dominance, and so forth. Although the viability of the “diamond” or “rolling thunder” is a topic of incessant debate, the above principles are vital
58 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
and must be drilled to the point where any possible combination of patrol, SWAT, school resource officer (SRO), detective, or supervisory personnel can move effectively and efficiently through a large area filled with doorways, halls, and staircases. Police departments must endeavor to practice the tactics they deem appropriate for their organization—preferably in their city’s schools or in a similar shoot house or offsite facility—until any group of officers are comfortable with their responsibilities and the general principles adopted. The question, however, is: how many children’s lives are worth the wait for four plus officers to arrive on scene, coordinate positions in an unfamiliar and stressful environment, and breach an entry point near the sound of gunfire, assuming it has not been barricaded or chained? Kind estimates, presumably with moderately sized police departments in a suburban or an urban environment, peg the time for two officers’ arrival in concert at 6 minutes. Others cite 30 minutes3 as the time needed for four “plain-vanilla” patrolmen to make entry into a given target.
Gary Marbut, president of the Montana Shooting Sports Association, conducted a study of the Montana University System and Firearms Authority4 to determine exactly how much damage an individual armed with a handgun can incur in a given period of time. Even with the devastating memories of contemporary shootings still reverberating, the numbers are shocking. Per the study, six targets—standard humanoid scoring targetswere set up seven yards from the shooting position. The targets, arranged a target-width apart, were designed to simulate a relatively congested environment likely to be found in a school classroom or lecture hall. Using a shot timer, the shooter, loaded and holstered, was allotted a 15-second window and instructed to change targets for each shot fired. Six shooters were run through the test. The fewest shots fired in 15 seconds was 17, a mean of ~25, and maximum shots were 34 (most of the shots fired were considered fatal, or at least fatal without immediate medical attention). Extrapolated to a time of one minute, the range of accurate shots fired into different targets ranges from 68–136 rounds. Therefore, according to the above estimate of six minutes for two officers to coalesce into a viable entry team, an active shooter could fire between 408 and 816 aimed rounds at as many targets. (Note: According to John Giduck of the Archangel Group, in addition to the 174 rounds he fired in less than 11 minutes, Seung-Hui Cho, the student responsible for the Virginia Tech shooting rampage, possessed an additional 203 unfired rounds stored in preloaded magazines in his backpack. For active shooters motivated by the new “highest score,” taking large quantities of ammunition is becoming the norm, not the exception.) To be fair, the Montana University study was conducted using experienced shooters and static targets, which could arguably detract from the viability of
the test. The case of Michael Carneal, however, attests that even the most seemingly benign, untrained child can display extremely proficient firearms skills in a dynamic, real-life scenario. Recounted in Dr. Grossman’s Stop Teaching our Kids to Kill: A Call to Action Against TV, Movies, and Video Game Violence, Carneal, a 14-year-old who had never previously fired a real gun, engaged a student prayer group at his school in 1997. Carneal fired eight shots and hit eight different children, killing three. Like the accomplished shooters in the Montana University study, all the shots fired were at different targets and were unforgivingly accurate—five head and three upper torso shots.
Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe which he is facing — Sun Tzu American LE is painfully aware of the dangers of a delayed response to active shooters. Departments that neglect preparing their personnel for the possibility of such incidents and the doctrine adapted post-Columbine are arguably in dereliction of duty and risk allegations of negligence. Indeed, active shooter training is now commonplace, with little question remaining about the standard response protocols and standard operating procedures regarding such incidents, even across multi-jurisdiction responses. However, with the above understanding of how fast casualties are occurring, new tactics must be implemented. LE must tailor its response to a higher degree. The current “Active Shooter/Rapid Deployment” doctrine was an enormous paradigm shift from the “barricaded subject” and subsequent
Indeed, active shooter training is now commonplace, with little question remaining about the standard response protocols and standard operating procedures regarding such incidents, even across multi-jurisdiction responses.
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 59
Photo: Scott Morrison perimeter default. A solo-officer response goes against the deep-seated (and unarguably necessary) contact and cover mantra taught across the country but, in light of current trends, it is profoundly important to mentally and logistically prepare individual officers to engage active school shooters without the assistance that is so often assumed to be in place. As reported by Robert O’Brien in Police: The Law Enforcement Magazine,5 a modified active shooter response, wherein a single patrol officer is permitted to enter a site solo to engage the suspect(s) as an alternative to spending valuable seconds waiting for multiple cover officers, as the initial stage of a multi-tiered response, is needed. The principle of this strategy is that an officer should be expected to be better trained and mentally prepared for confrontation in contrast with the suspect whom, by the nature of his or her targets,- seeks easy prey and thus will likely not stand for a protracted fight with a single officer, not to mention the waves of reinforcements that are likely to follow. At minimum, the officer is exponentially better equipped and prepared for such
an occasion than the individuals being targeted and who are otherwise helpless to defend themselves. Contemporary active shooter incidents, e.g., Columbine, Colorado, Bailey, Colorado, New Life Church, Colorado, and Virginia Tech, illustrate that the perpetrators of these attacks are ill prepared and unmotivated for a determined law enforcement response. Barring deliberate hostage taking such as Beslan, Russia,6 history has shown that individuals performing this type of attack can be devastating during the initial stages, but will often stop upon resistance; thus, the importance of a fast response. The suicidal responses (approximately 90 percent commit suicide on-site according to Jeffrey Denning of the Force Science Research Center) of active shooter suspects upon initial confrontation encourage an emphasis on a fast response by law enforcement. Once again, speed is the necessity for the best outcome possible.
Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots . . . If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in — Sun Tzu A solo-officer entry is, by necessity, a simple, albeit challenging, prospect. If shots are observed upon arrival, the objective is to breach the target area preferably as close to the last known shots fired as possible and engage the subject. At the very least, the officer can distract the shooter with rounds down range, hopefully encouraging the shooter to commit suicide, seek cover, flee, and so forth. In any event, the shooter will not be actively engaging innocent children, fortifying his position, or gathering hostages.
60 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
If shots are not observed upon the first officer’s arrival, the officer should attempt to enter the school in the areas known to occupy large numbers of students, i.e., the cafeteria, auditorium, library, lounges, and etcetera. Because the shooter may be pursuing the new “highest score,” these areas remain likely targets. Arriving officers unaware of active shooting should secure these areas first and, to borrow a counter-insurgency term, “inkblot” their presence throughout the school. This tactic of securing ground and gradually expanding control as additional resources arrive puts officers immediately into the likely areas of attack and allows them to cut off the supply of victims. SROs will be encouraged to employ this thought process versus leaving the interior of the school to meet up with arriving officers. Leaving the interior puts the officer at risk of losing secured ground as well as surrendering the guarantee of an unopposed entry into the school. Again, the inkblot tactic should be employed when there are no observable shots being fired. If that is not the case and shots are being fired, the initial officers should flow into the area of the attack through any opening possible. There is no guarantee that the doors most likely chosen, and identifiable by multiple officers directing incoming resources, will not be barricaded or chained. Copycat shooters learn their lessons well and the trend of gaining more time to add victims to their “score” via chains and barricades, even IEDs, cannot be ignored. Officers seeking any opening possible are more likely to gain entry in a shorter period of time than attempting to coalesce at commonly known entry points, which will likely be fortified. If necessary, the first arriving officer can employ his/her vehicle as a “ram” if they are unable to breach otherwise. Not only will this ensure entry, but the noise and intimidation—a small-scale “shock and awe” factor—may cause hesitation in the shooter, if not inspiring suicide all together.
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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 61
62 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
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The first officer in place, a patrolman or SRO, also serves to augment the information available to responding resources. Because citizens are not conditioned to observe and effectively report relevant intelligence, an officer trained to obtain and vet tactical information is profoundly important. A review of the false and incomplete information relayed from citizens to dispatchers during the Columbine and Virginia Tech attacks underscores how vital accurate information is, and how bad intelligence can impede an effective response. Undeniably, a first responding officer acting as a scout/observer, even if he/she cannot effectively stop the threat, can profoundly contribute to a favorable outcome through disciplined intelligence gathering and dissemination. By relaying the number of perpetrators, their weaponry, location (even where they are not located), existing fortifications, clothing, armor, open entry points, and so forth, the officer is augmenting the speed of response. Opponents of this strategy that point out that a lone officer entering a school during an active shoot incident has a higher likelihood of being killed, and thus is only supplying the shooter with more ammunition and firepower, are simply missing the point. Of course, every officer with any sense would choose not to enter a target building alone. However, the prospect of being in close proximity to an ongoing tragedy, equipped with the means to put an end to it and not acting, is equally distasteful. One of the most prominent differences between the antiquated doctrine before the shift to the active shooter/rapid deployment tactic is the re-prioritization of the value of life spectrum, with “officer safety” subjugated to a lesser value over innocent bystanders and hostages/victims. Those questioning a solo-officer response are questioning the cornerstone of the “active shooter” doctrine: cops’ lives are prioritized below innocent citizens’ lives. If detractors of this tactic are worried
There is no more important asset to America than its youth. There is also no softer target and no higher guarantee of media coverage than an attack on its schools. about friendly fire, their concern is justified. If anyone has gone through a shoot house with live fire, under any amount of stress (not to mention the immense stress inherent in a school shooting), they are aware of how difficult it is to discriminate between a target holding a gun and a target holding a gun and a badge. However, target discrimination is what officers train for, and in a setting with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people, it will undoubtedly be in the forefront of every officer’s mind. Perpetrators have the luxury of keeping their finger on the trigger, LE officers do not. This is a hazard every officer must accept. There is no more important asset to America than its youth. There is also no softer target and no higher guarantee of media coverage than an attack on its schools. A formalized solo-entry tactic must be implemented to prepare for the entire scope of possibilities of response to the next school shooting or any possible active shooter scenario. New training with this possibility in mind must be disseminated. In addition to Ron Borsche’s offerings, Israeli police and security forces have operated with this paradigm in mind for some time and numerous veterans of these forces currently offer the Israeli perspective on the matter. At the very least, a dialogue must occur within individual departments regarding the many possible
responses to an active shooter in their area. Officers must be authorized to enter an active shooter scene alone if necessary. The scenario of an officer in place to stop an active shooter but who hesitates breaking protocol for fear of sanction is not unlikely. LE must continue to adapt and train in order to respond as quickly and effectively as possible to active shooters, even if it is a single officer armed with standard patrol weaponry.
•
About the Author Mr. Stepien is a police officer in the Denver area and holds a Master’s Degree in International Security from the University of Denver.
Endnotes Magnie, Mark, and Sharma, Subhash. “India terrorist attacks leave at least 101 dead in Mumbai.” Los Angeles Times 27 Nov 2008 accessed.08 Aug 2009. <http:// articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/27/world/ fg-mumbai27>. 2 Giduck, John, and Chi, Walter. “After Action Review: An Evaluation and Assessment of the Law Enforcement Tactical Response to the Virginia Tech University Shootings of Monday, 16 April 2007.” Archangel Group, Ltd. 05 Sep 2008 accessed.01 Jan 2009. <www. antiterrorconsultants.org>. 3 Marbut, Gary. “Testing Reality Potential ‘Active Shooter’ Toll,” The Montana University System and Firearms Authority, Policy, Discussion, and Conclusions, 2008. http://progunleaders.org/university/ TestingReality.html 4 Ibid. 5 O’Brien, Robert. “Active Shooter Response Revisited-Part 1.” Police: The Law Enforcement Magazine 05282008 accessed.17 Feb 2009. <http:// www.policemag.com/Channels/ SWAT/2008/05/28/Active-ShooterResponse-Revisited-Part-1.aspx>.>. 6 Giduck, John. Terror at Beslan. 1. Canada: Archangel Group Inc., 2005. Print. 1
The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 63
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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 65
Training Review
Counter Terrorism Operations for SWAT Units
By Richard A. Ganey II
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law enforcement (LE) tactical teams possess an impressive array of skills, techniques, and tools to deal with the threats that they typically encounter during their standard operations. Around the country, teams have shown a remarkable ability to adapt to new and evolving threats and situations in their areas of responsibility, such as the active shooters that we have seen all too often in the past few years. This adaptability demonstrates the professionalism and experience of those chosen to serve with tactical teams. Though hardly a new threat, the post9/11 reality of international terrorism perpetrated domestically has provided U.S. LE tactical teams with perhaps their greatest challenge to date. Forwardthinking teams have faced this challenge with a determination to be prepared for the day they are called upon to protect citizens in their charge from the threat of terrorists. These teams have understood that to truly be prepared to combat terrorism, they must adjust their existing capabilities to the realities of counter terrorism (CT) and acquire new capabilities as well. Though certain tactics and techniques utilized against criminal activity are transferable to the CT realm, there are many that would be ineffective and actually work to the benefit of the terrorists. From October 2008 to October 2009, Security Solutions International (SSI) conducted 12 SWAT CT courses around the country with hosting agencies. The courses have been taught on the East Coast, on the West Coast and in the Midwest, with a total of 48 LE agencies participating. In addition to LEOs, members of federal agencies and the U.S.
Operator provides security to EOD technicians dealing with a booby trap hostage. Photo: Courtesy of SSI. military have taken part as well. The primary training objective of the SWAT CT course is to provide teams with operational tools, based on experience, for dealing with terrorists in their jurisdiction. The curriculum reflects the international experience of SSI instructors who are veterans of U.S. and Israeli special operations and CT units. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) presented are based on real-world experience in combating terrorism around the globe and across the operational spectrum, from highrisk terrorist arrests to terrorist hostage rescue (HR). Instructors acquired their skills and knowledge through operations conducted in the United States, Europe, Israel, Lebanon, Gaza/ West Bank, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Utilizing personal experience
66 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
as the primary instructional platform, the absolute emphasis is on placing global CT experience into the context of the domestic, local reality. This includes complex operational scenarios combining restrictive rules of engagement and useof-force parameters. The training commences with classroom presentations on CT operations to include dealing with suicide terrorists. Case studies are utilized to facilitate discussion on the unique facets of fighting terrorism that require altering traditional LE TTPs. Participants are encouraged through a dynamic classroom environment to â&#x20AC;&#x153;think outside the boxâ&#x20AC;? that they are familiar with. Case studies and specific operational examples are used throughout the course to explain TTPs presented and to place them into context for the students. The morning session of the first day includes a presentation of the
A scenario debrief. Photo: Courtesy of SSI. topics to be addressed during the course and the rationale behind them. Students are also briefed on safety procedures that will guide them during the scenario-based training exercises. The afternoon session of the first day opens with a safety brief and inspection, followed by movement to the training facility. The first subject introduced is a method of clearing a structure, which is alternately referred to as “secure search” or “deliberate clearance.” This method places an emphasis on techniques that maximize force protection and minimize exposure to threats during operations dealing with terrorism, whether serving arrest warrants or search warrants involving terrorist elements. Emphasis is placed equally on mission accomplishment and mitigating
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risks to team members. Techniques are taught through fundamentals that are relevant and critical to all tactical movement and engagement of threats. This teaching methodology not only increases understanding of the efficacy of the techniques, but also aids in applying them to varying contexts and circumstances. All scenarios are initiated with a short brief to place the students in context and to provide them with clear rules of engagement, two critical elements affecting real-time decision making. The second topic introduced is containment and isolation of the target structure. An emphasis is placed on detailed planning, control measures, and positioning of elements to maximize containment and provide safe fields
of fire 360˚ around the objective. The students are introduced to both stealthapproach techniques and rapid-vehicular options which maximize surprise, thereby increasing the probability of successful containment and preventing escape of the terrorists. Subsequent to containment, callout procedures specific to CT and potential suicide terrorists are discussed and practiced. A third topic presented is terrorist HR, including bus assaults and structure assaults. Building on existing team skills, advanced bus HR techniques are taught with a focus on simultaneous assault from all sides in a safe and effective manner in order to overwhelm the threat before he can begin executing hostages or detonate an explosive charge.
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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010 67
Counter
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December 2009/january 2010
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68 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2009/January 2010
Individual techniques are tied together in full profile exercises, both dry fire and using Simunition. Techniques taught for terrorist HR operations in structures also build on existing LE TTPs, altering and adapting them to the CT reality, particularly the presence of explosives and multiple breach points. The subject of suicide terrorist interdiction is addressed through the scenario of a suicide cell en route to its target in a vehicle. The fundamentals of the interdiction are explained and demonstrated, with a military style L-shaped ambush as the basis. The effectiveness of the technique is shown while dealing with several different contingencies during scenarios. In addition to TTPs, relevant technologies that contribute to the success of the mission and the safety of the team are discussed. As with all topics, numerous examples from the personal experience of the instructors are presented to aid in explaining the realities of dealing with suicide terrorists. The course culminates on the last day with a “rolling exercise,” which incorporates several scenarios tied together through intelligence provided by instructors and information discovered during preceding scenarios. As an example, the day may open with an HR operation leading to information on cell
leaders who planned the hostage taking. The students are given the mission of arresting these leaders in their safe house, where they will find information on a suicide terrorist cell due to launch its attack. After interdicting the cell en route to its target, the interrogation of one terrorist who surrendered provides information on an additional safe house that doubles as an explosives lab that must be neutralized. Throughout the week of training, liberal use is made of role players, pyrotechnics, simulated explosive devices, flash bangs, and Simunitions to add realism and to provide context. After each scenario is run, quick debriefs are conducted to ensure lessons are learned. Those lessons are then integrated into subsequent scenarios for reinforcement. The course begins with basic CT TTPs and progresses through increasingly complex scenarios that build one upon another. A crawl, walk, run progression from a focus on individual skills to teamlevel techniques is employed to ensure that the material is absorbed by students. Time is set aside on the last day to evaluate the course, and to discuss lessons learned throughout the week and possible methods for their implementation in future operations. While many aspects of operations combating terrorism overlap traditional
tactical LE operations, SWAT teams must recognize those elements that are particular to terrorism. CT, in the past a responsibility solely of military special mission units and dedicated federal government organizations, is now understood to be well within the realm of local LE in the United States. Experience has shown that the first responders to a domestic terrorist event, the tip of the homeland security spear, will be local LE teams. It is imperative that teams plan and prepare to successfully engage terrorists in their jurisdiction. SSI’s SWAT Counter Terrorism Operations Course provides teams with a valuable base of knowledge and tools for developing capabilities critical to CT operations.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Ganey has more than 28 years of military experience in the United States and Israel. He retired last year from the Israel Defense Forces with 18 years’ of service with special operations and counter terrorism units. He holds a BA in International Affairs, an MA in Middle East Studies, and is pursuing a PhD in Middle East History. He currently leads SSI Basic and Advanced CT courses.
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