The Counter Terrorist Magazine - February/March 2012

60 minutes • jordan bombings • community policing • qods force

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

Counter The

FEBruary/march 2012

Volume 5 • Number 1

Is The U.N. Above The Law?

An SSI Publication ®

February/march 2012 USA/CANADA $5.99

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Counter

The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals feburary/march 2012

Volume 5 • Number 1

COVER story:

30

Is The U.N. Above The Law?

By Eeben Barlow

contents

FEATURES: 8

20

46

58

8

First Hand: Rosie Khan, 60 Minutes, and Task Unit Bravo

By Bravo 25

20

Case Study: Amman, Jordan Hotel Bombings Luke Bencie and Katie Mikalnik

46

Community Policing, Counterinsurgency, and Converging Threats

By Anthony Abati, Michael P. Downing, and John Zambri

58

Qods Force: Iranian Unit Tied to U.S. Plot

By Mark Sexton

departments: 6

From the Editor

44

Book Review

Courage

The Coming Insurrection

69 Innovative Products TruDefender, E/T Light, Mag5-60

72 Training Review Tactical Firearms Training Team Pre-Deployment Training

Cover: Tijuana-San Diego border deaths. Photo: Tomas Castelazo

The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 5

Counter The

From The Editor:

No Rest for the Weary

By Chris Graham

I

Volume 5 • Number 1 FEB 2012/MAR 2012

Editor Chris Graham

t appears that one or more European nations may enter the accelerated stages of financial collapse within the next year.1 Deficit government spending policies have resulted in nations servicing debt payments with additional debt. It appears that the point has been hit at which it is no longer possible for some nations to support their debt legitimately.

As the most poorly positioned debtor nations face crisis first, the possibility exists that their inertia will adversely influence events in other interdependent debtor nations.

The “free world” is in a uniquely vulnerable position whether national and ideological adversaries take action to further exploit the situation or not.

Those of us who have taken the oath to “…support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic…” have supported an extremely high optempo for the past decade. It would appear that future crime and conflict may only accelerate this pace of operations while adding an additional layer of moral dilemmas as we come to grips with the most effective ways to protect the lives, liberty, and property of citizens.

The Counter Terrorist remains committed to bringing you useful information on our adversaries’ tactics and techniques that are frequently unappreciated in conventional media outlets. When the experience of your duties provides insight that will benefit others, share it here. Do not force our brothers and sisters to relearn what you have discovered.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Semper Fidelis, Chris Graham Editor, The Counter Terrorist

*Editor’s note: Vol. 4 No. 6, “Improvised Chemical Dispersal Devices Detonated Against Civilians” incorrectly stated that Abu Musab al Zarqawi led al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2007 (page 23). Zarqawi was killed on June 7, 2006. Thanks to a vigilant reader (SSG H, USASOC) for catching the error that I did not. http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/205285/analysis/20111130-portfolio-imfunable-save-italy accessed Dec 15 2011 1

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Director of Production Kelli Richardson Contributing Editors Eeben Barlow Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Tom Nypaver Steve Young Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Office Manager Lily Valdes Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 204 Miami, Florida 33186

ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher.

The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher.

Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 204, Miami, Florida.

33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99.

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Firsthand:

Rosie Khan, 60 Minutes, and Task Unit Bravo

By Bravo 25

I had just returned from another mission on a blistering Afghan summer night. Twenty-nine teammates and I headed back to our compound to lay our heads down for a few hours. We were abruptly awakened by the task unit chief and informed that we had gotten an intelligence “hit� on a high value target that U.S. forces had been searching for since 2001.

Counter The

8 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

T

he target’s name was Rosie Khan. He was a powerful Taliban commander known for recruiting fighters from Pakistan, controlling funds that supported some Taliban organizations, building IEDs, and training IED makers. Khan had American blood on his hands.

We headed to the briefing room where we were met by the task unit commander and about 20 army and navy support personnel. Army and navy special operations forces had

long been jointly prosecuting targets of interest in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. A warning order was issued to our team directing us to conduct a mission in support of capturing this high value target in a remote Afghan province. We were briefed on the situation and, over the course of the next four hours, our team assessed the tasking and planned how we would be most likely to succeed in carrying out our mission. We presented this to the task unit commander, and appropriate changes were made based

U.S. Army soldiers disembark a CH-47 Chinook helicopter. Photo: U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 3rd class Shawn Hussong (RELEASED) The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 9

A CH-47 helicopter drops off coalition force members into the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan.

Photo by Staff Sgt. Jeremy T. Lock, USAF

on our previous experiences with this specific target and knowledge of his past movements. The mission was approved and we were ready to go.

Unbelievably, we were ordered to bring along a CBS news crew from “60 Minutes II”. The chain of command directed us to allow correspondent Lara Logan and her crew to join us on our helicopters. The addition of the news team, our obligation to dedicate personnel to their protection, and our need for an additional helicopter to transport our non-mission essential guests were demands that we were unaccustomed to. As a result, we moved forward with a sense of unease.

Waiting on target indicators to embark on a mission is one of the most frustrating tasks in a war. The guys are simultaneously on edge, nervous, anxious and excited to do their chal-

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U.S. sniper in Afghanistan. Photo: SSgt. Ezekiel R. Kitandwe lenging jobs. Sometimes, indicators come quickly; other times they seem to take an eternity. We busied ourselves with different things. All of us did walkthroughs. Some prepped and reprepped their gear, bullshitted with fellow operators, slept, and even prayed.

Every aspect of a mission is time sensitive, and we always created ways to calm our nerves and get focused.

After two long hours, we got the go ahead from the task unit commander and started hastily grabbing gear. As if we weren’t already hot enough, we added 100 lbs each to our person: 40 lbs of body armor and 60 lb packs.

After suiting up, we headed to the transport vehicles. They took us to the airfield, where several CH-47 helicopters were waiting. We began loading up, but received an order to stand

down. The location of the target was not confirmed. We hung around on the tarmac waiting to get confirmation.

After another long hour, we headed back to the compound, amped up and frustrated.

Another hour went by and the task unit commander gave the order for a second time. The unit became impatient with the uncertainties and stresses of the pre-mission mind set.

It was around noon that the second order was received. We loaded up and headed to the airfield once again, only to be greeted with another order to stand down. Once we got back to the compound, some of us hit the sack and some headed for the chow hall.

Waiting on target indicators could drag out over days, so those of us who ate had to check our radios and listen

The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 13

U.S. Army soldiers and M-ATV’s in Afghanistan. Photo: Petty Officer 2nd Class Jason Johnston for another “go” order. After a few hours, we got the go ahead and loaded up again. This time, we got on the helicopters and into the air. It was about a 45 minute flight to where we “thought”

FIRSTHAND AC COUNTS AND FROM FRONTL INE PERSONNE ANALYSES L AND ExPERT IN THE wAR AG S AINS T TERROR Based on

Understanding

edite

ophir falk and hed by nry Morgenstern

Understandin

g and Confro nting the threat

and Confront ing the threat

U.s. and policymakers, first israeli experiences and detailed interv responders, and threat of suicide students of home iews with frontline personnel, terro Suicide Terror enab land security to understand and for future attacks. r. it analyzes recent suicide attac deal with the grow les ks as well as our following the expe current vulnerabili Moreover, they learn ing rt authors’ advic ties e, readers learn how to prepare possible measures and likely scenarios and losses in the event of an attac for and implement an effective and quick response to prevent an attack. k. following an overv to minimize casualties iew and historical review of suicide terror, the book cover • Global jihad s: • Israel’s confron tation with suicide te rrorism • America’s expe rience with suicide b ombi ngs • Internationalizat ion of suicide terroris m • High-risk scena rios and future trends • Methods for co nfronting suicide terror • Medical manag ement of suicide terro rism Using eye-witnes s accounts, the text recreates the studies help reade look and feel of rs actua these very dangerousget into the minds of suicide terro rists in order to unde l terrorism incidents. Detailed threats. case rstand how to best This book is a defin prevent and confr itive study of suicide ont experts who have terror, synthesizing t dealt with it firsth he experience of wel devastating threa and. anyone respo l-known Is t should read this book and consider nsible for understanding, preventing raeli and American its recommendation , and confronting OPHIR FALK, LLB, this s with all seriousness. institute for Coun MBA, is a Partner at the Naveh, K ter terrorism, wher of experience in e he has published antor Even-Har law firm and a Rese vario numerous articles carried out risk asses us security capacities and serve in the field. Mr. falk arch Fellow at the d as a sments for olympic has over a decade venues and critic consultant for the 2004 olympic HENRY MORGEN al national infras games, where he STERN is the Presi tructure. than 500 federal, dent of security solut state ions international, first responders to Is , and local agencies to effectively a company that of suicide terror. He rael to study Homeland Security. Mr. confront the threat of terror and regul has trained more radio stations, and has offered expert commentary on tMorgenstern is a widely publishe arly takes groups of d aut Web broadcasts. error-related issu es for NBC, ABC hor on the subject , CBS, Fox, numerous

SUICIDE TERROR

SUICIDE TERROR

falk Morgenstern

Ophir Falk and Henr y Morgenstern have serious about winn compiled a book that should be read ing the war on terro better understan r. By painstakingly by anyone who is d the nature of analyzing the empi our enemies and rical data, they they offer important why they employ help us insights on how these barbaric tacti terrorism can be In so doing, they cs. Most crucially, effec have performed tively confronte an invaluable servi d and ultimately crucial battle. ce for all those defeated. who are committed to winning this —Benjamin Neta nyahu, former Prime Minister of Israe l

the target was located.

It wasn’t like getting pumped up for a football game with high-fiving and head butting. We spent our time getting into the right mental state and

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focusing on what we were about to do, mentally “what-iffing” all of the possible mission events.

En route to the primary objective, our unit received another call to stand down and return to base. The target was not in the prospective village.

We all started cursing and groaning.

Shortly thereafter, we received another transmission. This one alerted us that the target had moved to another village in close proximity. We were ordered to divert to the new objective.

Very shortly, we could see the small village that consisted of nearly 100 mud huts and a large exterior wall.

The first helicopter landed with the guys who would take higher ground.

The people of Afghanistan were used to the appearance of U.S. forces, so most of them didn’t overtly react to the presence of our helicopters. Then our helicopter dropped us—the assaulters—off about 1000 meters outside the village.

Once the over-watch was set, we began to move into our respective positions. As we neared the structures, we started to analyze the village and the movement of the people. We continued and took positions with cover in areas where we could watch the village.

We noticed that there was a group of elders speaking to an individual who fit the description of our intended target.

The target appeared to be very nervous, looking around and over his shoulder.

It seemed as if he might have known that he had been compromised. He knew that we were watching. The man retreated up a small hill and took cover behind some large boulders.

The mobile element— two operators on an ATV—headed out to observe him from the outskirts of the village.

Within 50 meters of their approach, the man opened fire with an AK-47.

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Meanwhile, we couldn’t see what was happening; we could only hear the gunfire and our mobile guys hollering “Troops in contact!

Troops in contact!”

The mobile element dismounted and blasted back with a MK-46 (medium machine gun). Meanwhile, we couldn’t see what was happening; we could only hear the gunfire and our mobile guys hollering “Troops in contact! Troops in contact!” over the radio. We got information from over-watch that there appeared to be only one combatant.

Over-watch joined in the short fire fight with precision rifle fire. Gunfire ceased within about 45 seconds, and over-watch indicated that the target wasn’t moving.

We had to assess the situation. Some of our elements converged on the location while my group moved uphill to check on the downed man. The mobile unit explained that the man had opened fire and they had responded.

After the initial assessment of the area, the mobile unit combed the scene and

18 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

attempted to find materiel that might have intelligence value. The individual had 10 AK-47 mags, U.S. currency, and 2 grenades. Other unit members interviewed villagers to determine the identity of the individual.

We removed the man’s body. He had been shot in the chest and head. It was, in fact, Rosie Khan. We transported his body to our base. Once we returned to the compound, we headed over to debrief the commanding general and his staff. Congratulations were spread around. Mission accomplished.

Rosie Khan is no longer feared by the Afghans.

•

About the Author Bravo 25 is a U.S. military veteran of multiple international deployments.

He is a principal of Norse Security Group (www.nsgglobal.com).

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Case Study:

Amman, Jordan Hotel Bombings

By Luke Bencie and Katie Mikalnik

Counter The

20 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

Hyatt Hotel, Amman, Jordan. Photo: David Bjorgen

On November 9, 2005, the Radisson SAS Hotel, the Grand Hyatt Hotel, and the Days Inn in Amman, Jordan, were the targets of a coordinated suicide bomber attack in which 60 people were killed and another 115 injured, including four Americans.

A

husband and wife team targeting a wedding ceremony carried out the bombing at the Radisson. Those killed at the Grand Hyatt included Syrian movie producer, Moustapha Akkad.

Deaths at the Days Inn included three members of a People’s Liberation Army delegation from China. Apart from the wedding guests at the Radisson, the casualties primarily included Palestinian, Syrian and Chinese businessmen and political and military delegates.

The attacks were perpetrated by suicide bombers loyal to the Jordanian-born leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. They demonstrate the vulnerabilities that hotels and other public venues face. Despite the fact that Americans have recognized this possible threat

The devastating damage caused by three suicide bombings at the Radisson, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn hotels in Amman, Jordan.

Photo: FBI

for many years, we have yet to encounter a hotel attack similar to those experienced in Amman, Cairo, Mumbai, Jakarta, or Islamabad.

The three hotels were presumably chosen because of their appeal to Western travelers, however most victims were Jordanian citizens.1 Apparently motivated

by U.S. operations in neighboring Iraq, these Western-owned locations were chosen specifically by Jordanian-born terror leader Zarqawi because they were alleged to be “centers for launching war on Islam,”2 and were thus targets of military jihad. This rationale was possibly based, in part, on the fact that Iraqi military forces were trained in Jordan, and Jordan’s King Abdullah supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 21

Although terrorist plots had previously surfaced in the country, Jordan had never before been the target of such a deadly terrorist attack. Perhaps more alarming was the prospect of future attacks; indeed, this incident demonstrated that Zarqawi’s al- Qaeda fighters could easily cross the border and act on Zarqawi’s orders.

The Attackers

The aftermath of the strike that killed Zarqawi. Photo:

22 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

An al-Qaeda website claiming responsibility for the attacks reportedly revealed information that led to the capture of the attackers—Iraqis identified as Ali Hussein Ali al-Shamari, Rawad Jassem Mohammed Abed, and Safaa Mohammed Ali. The bombers had entered the country several days prior to the attacks and stayed in furnished “safe houses” that they had rented in an Amman suburb. Apparently, they had driven across the border in a white car and used fake passports for entry. On the day of the attacks, the

bombers are believed to have traveled to their targets by taxi.

Sajida Mubarak Atrous al-Rishawi, one of the would-be Radisson Hotel wedding ceremony attackers and the sister of a Zarqawi aide, survived because her explosive device reportedly malfunctioned.

Her husband, al-Shamari, was successful in detonating his bomb, which consisted of the plastic explosive RDX with ball bearings added for fragmentation.

Al-Rishawi was sentenced to death on September 21, 2006, and has been appealing her case since that time. In her publicly aired confession, Rishawi revealed details of her preparation for the attack, “My husband wore a belt and put one on me. He taught me how to use it, how to pull the [detonator] and operate it.” When Al-Rishawi’s explosives failed to detonate, al-Shamari pushed her out of the ballroom to avoid drawing attention.3 Also known as “al-Qaeda in the Land

of Two Rivers”, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was created by the Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the early 1990s.

The branch fought with core al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, but moved to Iraq to prepare for the coming U.S. invasion. The group’s popularity peaked from 2003-2007, but al-Zarqawi’s death in 2006 coincided with a decline in the group’s power.4 The early stages of the investigations into the attacks revealed that Zarqawi’s 2005 bombings represented a shift in tactics from the 150 previous attempts that the Jordanians had foiled.5 Previously, the plots against Jordan had involved political targets, such as embassies. Moreover, in contrast to the earlier plots, the hotel bombings were executed using materials assembled entirely outside of Jordan. It was also unusual that the bombers were not Jordanian.

The Jordanian government wanted to

“My husband wore a belt and put one on me. He taught me how to use it, how to pull the [detonator] and operate it.”

— Sajida Mubarak Atrous al-Rishawi

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act quickly to prevent similar follow-up attacks. It was believed that Zarqawi could have been planning additional attacks to avenge al-Rishawi’s arrest, either in Jordan or on Jordanian targets traveling abroad. With tourism being Jordan’s largest industry, time was of the essence.

Initial Response

King Abdullah Ibn Al Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, addressing the Opening Plenary session of the World Economic Forum on the Middle East 2008. Photo: World Economic Forum

King Abdullah was adamant that attacks such as these would not happen again.

He immediately took to the airwaves to condemn the attacks and promised to hunt down the perpetrators.

Much like the feeling of unification in America following the 9/11 attacks, large numbers of Jordanians reacted to the bombings with outrage. Within hours of the attacks, thousands of people in Amman participated in protests, chanting, “Burn in hell, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi!” Jordanian flags waved from honking cars, while marchers displayed images of King Abdullah.

King Abdullah and his wife, Queen Rania, visited several victims of the bombings in the hospital. The Jordanian government began a strategic communication plan that defamed al-Zarqawi and may have successfully deterred further attacks in the county.

The Use of Strategic Communication According to the U.S. Department of Defense, strategic communication is defined as: Focused government efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

The Jordanian government used strategic communication to denigrate terrorism; consistently coordinating media efforts to push a unifying message

24 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

designed to influence public perception.

With controlled content and dissemination of the message, they engaged their audience to take action against al-Qaeda.

This campaign should not be confused with propaganda because it was based on truthful information. It was a legitimate response from the Jordanian government, expressing intolerance for terrorism.

This outcry, although intentional, was also genuine.

The campaign consisted of three phases: • Demonstrating leadership and control; • Discrediting/denigrating the attackers; • And, providing measurements of effectiveness to the public for reinforcement.

Leadership King Abdullah was adamant that attacks such as these would not happen again. He immediately took to the airwaves to condemn the attacks and promised to hunt down the perpetrators.

The King was keenly aware of al-Qaeda’s intention to divide the Jordanian population against the monarchy. Jordan was one of the most liberal countries in the Arab world, and itt was only a matter of time before Islamists focused additional efforts on the tiny nation.

Following an outpouring of international support, King Abdullah told American television that the Iraqis had deliberately tried to kill Jordanians rather than westerners: This [attack] was nothing to do with the west. This targeted Jordanian citizens—innocent men, women and children. The majority of the country poured out to denounce what Zarqawi and al-Qaeda did, calling for Zarqawi to

be brought to justice, for him to burn in hell.

By addressing the situation on a global stage—while not allowing the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq to serve as an excuse— the King helped refocus his countrymen on the problem at hand—radical Islamic terrorism.

Denigrating the Attackers Utilizing strategic communication, the Jordanian Government was able to largely redirect the initial fear experienced by the civilian population into mass feelings of anger, unity, and disgust toward the terrorists. Government-run media outlets publicly “shamed” the lone surviving terrorist, Sajidah al-Rishawi, by referring to her as “the whore.” This reference caught on with the population. As a result, the idea of a female suicide bomber took on new negative connotations.

Additionally, al-Rishawi was repeatedly pictured wearing the inert suicide vest, her head hung low. She was publically condemned as a “bad Muslim,” preventing even the most fervent radical Islamist from coming to her defense or acknowledging support. On November 14, she was shown on Jordanian television confessing to the attacks—a confession she later retracted. She claimed that she watched as her husband detonated explosives that were strapped to his body after entering the Radisson SAS Hotel in Amman. She said she survived because the explosives she was wearing did not detonate.

Providing Measures of Effectiveness to the Public as Reinforcement

What is now most noticeable to visitors in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is the security that accompanies the average hotel stay.

Public opinion—whatever its attitudes toward al-Qaeda before the attacks—

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The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 25

turned against the terrorist mentality. In fact, a survey of 1,014 people published in Al-Ghad newspaper revealed that 64% reported a more negative perception of Al Qaeda, while 2.1% reported a more positive opinion.6 Following the bombings, the residents

of Zarqa—Zarqawi’s hometown—who initially voiced their support for al-Qaeda in Iraq suddenly changed their tune. The family of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—born Ahmed Fadheel Nazzal al-Khalayleh of the al-Khalayleh tribe—took out halfpage advertisements in Jordan’s three

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main newspapers denouncing him and his actions. Fifty-seven members of the family, including al-Zarqawi’s brother and cousin, also reiterated their strong allegiance to the king. The ads read: As we pledge to maintain homage to King Abdullah and to our precious Jordan... we denounce in the clearest terms all the terrorist actions claimed by the so-called Ahmed Fadheel Nazzal al-Khalayleh, who calls himself Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi...

We announce, and all the people are our witnesses, that we— the sons of the al-Khalayleh tribe—are innocent of him and all that emanates from him, whether action, assertion or decision...We sever links with him until doomsday.

Today and Tomorrow In September 2006, the Jordanian House of Representatives approved legislation increasing the State Security Court’s power to monitor and detain those suspected of terrorism—a bill similar to U.S. and European legislation created for the same purposes.7 This move was part of Jordan’s controversial security crackdown, which, to ordinary Jordanians, seemed antithetical to the government’s narrative about greater transparency and democratization.8 What is now most noticeable to visitors in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is the security that accompanies the average hotel stay. Separate vehicle entrances, armed guards, CCTV cameras, and security screening areas are all part of the lodging experience. This is the new world that Jordanian citizens live in.

•

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About the Authors Mr. Bencie is Managing Director of Security Management International, LLC (www. smiconsultancy.com). He has performed security consulting work in Jordan

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end notes 1

2006. “Amman Hotel Bombings.” Back-

ground Information Summaries 2. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed November 15, 2011).

2

Powell, Bill; Scott MacLeod; Saad Hat-

tar; Michael Ware; Sally B. Donnelly; and Timothy J. Burger. 2005. “A War Without Borders.” Time 166, no. 21: 48-49. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 15, 2011).

3

MSNBC. 2005. “Iraqi woman con-

fesses to role in Jordan blasts.” MSNBC.com, November 13. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ Circle 346 on Reader Service Card

id/9979747/ns/world_news-terrorism/t/iraqiwoman-confesses-role-jordan-blasts#.TsvLm7K5NGQ (accessed November 22, 2011).

4

Kirdar, M. J., 2011. “Al Qaeda in Iraq.”

Aqam Futures Project. CSIS. http://csis.org/ files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdf (accessed November 22, 2011).

5

Slackman, Michael, 2005. “Jordan Says

al-Zarqawi Sent Hotel Bombers.” New York Times, November 13 http://articles.sfgate. com/2005-11-13/news/17400025_1_al-zarqawi-king-abdullah-hand-grenades (accessed November 22, 2011).

6

2006. “Amman Bombs Impact.” Middle

East Monitor: East Med 16, no. 1: 1-8. Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 15, 2011).

7

2006. “Jordan Anti-Terror Bill Passes De-

spite Islamic Bloc Opposition.” Geo-Strategy Direct. p. 13.

8

2006. “Amman Bombs Impact.” Middle

East Monitor: East Med 16, no. 1: 1-8. Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 15, 2011).

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Is The U.N. Above The Law?

By Eeben Barlow

The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945 after the Second World War by 51 countries committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights.

Counter The

30 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

T

he work of the United Nations reaches every corner of the globe.

Although best known for peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance, there are many other ways the United Nations and its System (specialized agencies, funds and programmes) affect our lives and make the world a better place. The Organization works on a broad range of fundamental issues, from sustainable development, environment and refugees

protection, disaster relief, counter terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation, to promoting democracy, human rights, gender equality and the advancement of women, governance, economic and social development and international health, clearing landmines, expanding food production, and more, in order to achieve its goals and coordinate efforts for a safer world for this and future generations.1 –

—United Nations website

UN personnel, hiding behind the immunity offered by the Vienna Convention of 1961, are seldom, if ever, prosecuted or punished.

An armed US Military Special Operations Security Team Member observes a United Nations (UN) MI-8 Hip helicopter approaching the US Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia. Photo: TSGT JUSTIN D. PYLE, USAF The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 31

But, it is not only Africa that has suffered from the UN’s lack of organizational discipline and lawlessness.

There can be no doubt that these noble aspirations, if implemented well, could lead to improved living standards, crime reduction, and the ability for people to live with a decreased fear of conflict and violence. The extremely checkered history of the UN’s accomplishments, however, goes largely unnoticed and its inefficiency is generally not publicized. Now, crimes committed by UN personnel may undermine any claim of moral authority and bring into question the value of the very existence of the organization.

In a statement made by previous UN Secretary General Kofi Atta Annan, he stated: Let us never forget, Mr. President, that our Organization was founded in the name of “We, the Peoples”—the words I have chosen as the title of my Report. We are at the service of the world’s peoples, and we must listen to them. They are

telling us that our past achievements are not enough. They are telling us we must do more, and do it better. 2 In 2000 the organizers of the UN’s Millennium Summit declared that their meeting would “undertake a comprehensive review of successes, best practices and lessons learned, obstacles and gaps, challenges and opportunities… leading to concrete strategies for action.”3 This may have been intended to usher in a new approach on how the world is governed and appears to have been intended to increase the power of the UN and theoretically herald a new era of peace and stability.

However, the UN’s record, prior to and after the UN’s Millennium Summit, is not impressive and appears to have accomplished little for the very people it claims to represent. Indeed, previous Secretary-General Boutros

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Boutros-Ghali played a leading role in supplying weapons to the Hutu regime in Rwanda that carried out a campaign of genocide against the Tutsi tribe in 1994. The weapons were smuggled into Rwanda under the guise of being “relief material.” Boutros-Ghali stated that it was merely his job as foreign minister to sell weapons—an excuse that is likely unsatisfactory for the Tutsis (the people who bore the brunt of the genocide in that country).4 The very people the UN claimed to represent were slaughtered in the thousands while the UN looked on with apparent indifference.

The Washington Times stated that “U.N. peacekeepers in the war-torn, refugee-rich Liberia have been accused of selling food for sex from girls as young as 8. They are the latest victims

in a growing tragedy that includes girls from Burundi, Ivory Coast, East Timor, Congo, Cambodia and Bosnia....” The UN responded saying that the report was “outdated.” The Washington Times went on to report that it took UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan nearly a year to respond to similar allegations from a UN mission in the Congo, but assured reporters that he was taking the matter “seriously.” 5 UN personnel, hiding behind the immunity offered by the Vienna Convention of 1961, are seldom, if ever, prosecuted or punished.6 Instead, they may be merely transferred to another country to continue afresh with their activities while reports on their activities are not made readily available. Crimes committed by UN personnel, often—but

not only—related to sexual abuses litter the African continent. But, it is not only Africa that has suffered from the UN’s lack of organizational discipline and lawlessness.

The rape of an 18-year old man in Haiti in July 2011 by five UN “peacekeepers” within the confines of their base, and captured on video,7 makes a mockery of the UN’s claim to “help nations work together to improve the lives of poor people, to conquer hunger, disease and illiteracy, and to encourage respect for each other’s rights and freedoms.”8 By September 15, 2011, the people of Haiti had had enough of the UN’s efforts and began rioting, demanding the UN withdraw its 12,000-man presence. The cholera outbreak, allegedly brought about by the

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U.N. peacekeepers from Nepal stand by as Haitian citizens wait for rice at a distribution point in Kenscoff, Haiti. Photo: U.S. Navy, Senior Chief Mass Communication Specialist Spike Call.

UN battalion from Nepal, suggests that incompetence may also have been part of their grievances.

Likewise, Bosnians have complaints arising from the presence of UN’s peacekeepers. With the arrival of the UN peacekeepers, there was a massive increase in human trafficking, mainly women, including girls as young as 12 years old, from Eastern Europe.9 They were taken to Bosnia to serve in brothels servicing UN personnel. The trade of “sex slaves” hardly existed in Bosnia until the mid-1990s. It was fuelled by the arrival

of tens of thousands of UN personnel in the wake of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord by Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia in 1995.

In 2003 Madeleine Rees, the UN high commissioner for human rights in Bosnia, broke the policy of silence that continues to protect the UN and demanded that “UN officials, international peacekeepers and police who are involved in sex crimes be brought to justice in their home countries.”10 Rees said, “Visiting brothels where women have been gang-raped into submission,

The cholera outbreak, allegedly brought about by the UN battalion from Nepal, suggests that incompetence may also have been part of their grievances.

The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 37

into slavery, is not part of the UN’s mandate.”11 Unfortunately, these activities seem to be common from the UN and worse still these despicable actions do not stop with rape and human trafficking.

One could easily believe they were studying a large, organized crime syndicate when reading the submissions by the BBC and Human Rights Watch regarding “evidence that the United Nations covered up evidence of gold smuggling and arms trafficking by its peacekeepers in Congo. The peacekeepers are said to have had illegal dealings with one of the most murderous militias in the country, where millions have died

in one of the bloodiest yet least visible conflicts in the world.”12 Inga-Britt Ahlenius, as the head of the Office of Internal Oversight Services at the United Nations, claimed that there was no need to prosecute or further investigate the matter. Matthias Basanisi, a UN investigator charged with looking into allegations against Pakistani peacekeepers in Congo, would later comment: “…I was the investigator in charge of the United Nations team that in 2006 looked into allegations of abuses

by Pakistani peacekeepers in Congo and found them credible. But the investigation was taken away from my team after we resisted what we saw as

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38 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

Displaced Haitians wait in line for fresh drinking water from a United Nations water truck at the Lifeline Christian Ministries Mission in Grand Goave, Haiti. Photo: U.S. Navy, Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kristopher Wilson attempts to influence the outcome. My fellow team members and I were appalled to see that the oversight office’s final report was little short of a whitewash.”13 Appalled at the Office of Internal Oversight’s view of UN activities that he described as being “little short of a whitewash,” he resigned in May 2007.

The UN welcomes news coverage that favorably reports attempts to bring alleged war criminals to justice and stop genocide, and regularly condemns the use of rape as a psychological weapon while keeping its own shady activities well hidden from public knowledge.

A 2008 Save the Children report covered the rape and pedophilia of children by UN peacekeepers in Haiti, Ivory Coast, and South Sudan:14 “Of the 341 children in Haiti, South Sudan, and Ivory Coast who spoke to the British agency during its 12 month investigation, more than half reported

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Boutros Boutros-Ghali at the 1995 World Economic Forum. Photo: World Economic Forum from Cologny, Switzerland

cases of being coerced into sex, often in return for the very food or protection aid staff or peacekeepers were there to provide.

A third reported knowledge of other children who had been raped.

Elizabeth (not her real name) knew nothing of the commitments [by the UN] to stop this exploitation as she walked to her mother’s fields with her brother early one June morning last year.... The men with the blue helmets who called to her from behind the sandbags of their camp’s guard position, however, should have known.”15 These tragic stories have been repeated time and again around the globe.

Any sizable force will have occasional incidents of impropriety on behalf of a small number of members, especially when subjected to the pressures of

deployment. Of course, competent forces maintain internal discipline by selective screening of personnel and with real investigations of credible allegations resulting in appropriate punishments for any crimes committed.

The UN has long amassed a reputation for inefficiency and regularly demonstrates operational ineffectiveness.

Criminality, corruption, and cover-ups, however, are even more serious challenges that raise the question of the value of the very existence of the organization itself.

The UN can be expected to be the first to cry foul and demand that judicial action be brought against those guilty of such crimes if committed by others, but the UN’s record in troubled and areas of conflict demonstrates that not only does the organization fail to adhere to any reasonable selection criteria for

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“peacekeeping” troops, but it also sees itself as being above the law.

•

About the author

The UN has long amassed a reputation for inefficiency and regularly demonstrates operational ineffectiveness.

Mr Barlow (on File Pseudo Operations article)

Endnotes http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index. shtml 2 http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/ report/state.htm 3 http://www.un-ngls.org/spip. php?page=article_s&id_article=1963 4 http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=1671 5 http://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2006/may/09/20060509-0908269806r/ 6 http://www.glica.org/topics/show/50 7 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldlatin-america-14796970 8 http://www.nytimes.

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Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012Service 43 Card Circle 136 on Reader

Book Review

The Coming Insurrection

By The Invisible Committee

T

he Coming Insurrection was first published in French (La Fabrique, 2007), then in English (Semiotexte, 2007) and is attributed to “The Invisible Committee.”

The book discusses seven topics. The committee describes: individuality, relationships, work, economy, geography, the environment, and civilization.

The book prescribes the formation of communes and revolutionary struggle around the world that will attack in moments of crisis (financial, political, and environmental) to support an anti-capitalist revolution. Insurrections envisioned by the Invisible Committee revolve around “the local appropriation of power by the people, of the physical blocking of the economy, and of the annihilation of police forces.”

The writers attempt to motivate pacifists with the statement, “An authentic pacifism cannot mean refusing weapons, but only refusing to use them.

Pacifism without being able to fire a shot is nothing but the theoretical formulation of impotence.” It is unclear if the idea of communist power acquisition without killing is self-deception, or deception targeted at the reader.

The revolutionaries provide an unexpected acknowledgment of the deterrent qualities of competent combatants. “From a strategic point of view, indirect, asymmetrical action seems the most effective kind, the one best suited to our time: you don’t attack an occupying army frontally. That said, the prospect of Iraq-style urban guerrilla warfare, dragging on with no possibility

Reviewed by: Chris Graham of taking the offensive, is more to be feared than to be desired.” The committee writes, “Even more than to actions, we must commit ourselves to their coordination. Harassing the police means that by forcing them to be everywhere

they can no longer be effective anywhere.”

The writers observe, “An insurrection triumphs as a political force. It is not impossible to defeat an army politically.”

They also state, “Thus, wherever the economy is blocked and the police are neutralized, it is important to invest as little pathos as possible in overthrowing the authorities.”

The committee’s strategy is unsophisticated, requires only tiny quantities of “off-the-shelf ” technology and little strategic vision, but it provides the ability to cause significant damage to property, injury to citizens, and possibly the manipulation of public policy. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Michael

44 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

Mullen acknowledged to CNN in 2010 that “The most significant threat to our national security is our debt.”1 Debt related instability has been witnessed around the world. Western governments that are a few steps deeper into their own debt debacles than the United States have already experienced civil disorder. Socialist provocateurs, anarchist adventurers, and others have rioted in Greece, Spain, Ireland, England, France, Italy, New York and elsewhere.

Will the combination of elastic currencies and human nature encourage the deficit spending crises of Western governments to accelerate until catastrophe? Maybe and maybe not.

Obviously, we hope that political leaders will choose to reverse this trend, but the world is already witness to significant instability. It is reasonable to anticipate the possibility of social friction in your jurisdiction or area of operations and it is always prudent to be operationally prepared to uphold your oath to defend the Constitution and protect the lives, liberty, and property of citizens.

The Coming Insurrection may sound like the stoned ramblings of a euro-student’s Che Guevara fantasy, but it is a valuable read. This book provides insight into ideology and techniques that have been recently witnessed in riots around the world. Much useful information can be obtained from this book.

•

http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-27/ us/debt.security.mullen_1_pentagonbudget-national-debt-michael-mullen?_ s=PM:US accessed 10-10-11 1

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Community Policing, Counterinsurgency, and Converging Threats

Sign in Gretna, Louisiana showing support for the controvercial actions of the police to block the bridge over the Mississippi River from being crossed by New Orleaninas trying to escape the flooding. Photo by Infrogmation

Counter The

46 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

“Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of the state, in my view, is not far off; but if law is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then the situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the Gods shower on a state.”1 — Plato

By Anthony Abati, Michael P. Downing, and John Zambri

T

he twenty-first century presents law enforcement with a monumental challenge: to prevent increasingly violent, well-financed, and equipped criminal groups from perpetrating acts that threaten the functionality and security of democratic society. These globally connected, functionally interactive groups—hereafter referred to as convergent threats—include transnational terrorists, street gangs, drug cartels, ethnically aligned organized crime, and a host of domestic and foreign extremists.2 The resulting criminal network conducts interactively complex, technologically adept activities that are influenced by dynamic socioeconomic and political factors around the world.

An examination of convergent threat methods and effects provides insight to improving the effectiveness of current community policing enterprises. Although different in organizational composition and motive, the individual threats employ

similar methods (e.g., drug trafficking, document fraud, surreptitious weapons trading, kidnapping, extortion, etcetera) to achieve their respective objectives.3 Furthermore, each threat’s criminal activities reduce the security, stability, and resulting prosperity of associated societies, deliberately undermining the effectiveness, viability, and resulting legitimacy of governments. In total, such methods and effects are consistent with those of traditional insurgencies,4 leading us to posit that effective counterinsurgency (COIN) principles may prove useful in ongoing community policing efforts to disrupt, degrade, and ultimately defeat convergent threats.

Community Policing Community policing concepts emerged in the 1820s with Sir Robert Peel’s formulation of nine general principles defining basic ethical requirements for British police officers to follow while

In such communities, citizens view themselves and their contributing peers as essential catalysts to resolving public security challenges, improving their respective lives, and marginalizing miscreants, confident in the knowledge that “no person or institution is above the law—including government officials and local elites.”

The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 47

Peel’s Nine Policing Principles • Police exist Robert to prevent crime and disorder • Ability to perform police duties depends upon public approval of police actions • Secure the willing co-operation of the public in [observing] the law, [in order] to secure and maintain the respect of the public • Public cooperation diminishes

engaging with the populace, building shared trust and respect, and enforcing community laws. In conjunction with the Metropolitan Police Bill of 1829—legislation Home Secretary Peel composed in an effort to reform British criminal law—these principles guided the establishment and subsequent operations of the London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).5 Based at London’s Scotland Yard, the 1,000 MPS constables or “bobbies” were unpopular at first; however, they soon proved very successful in cutting

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crime in London, prompting other United Kingdom cities to form similar police organizations.

In accordance with Peel’s principles, MPS constables were physically immersed and mentally invested in their respective communities, employing recurrent personal interactions and physical presence to gain and maintain intimate, firsthand knowledge and understanding of the local populace’s culture, expectations, priorities, and concerns. In so doing, the constables embodied Peel’s fundamental belief that the “police are the public and the public are the police,” creating invaluable, twoway information gateways that formed the basis for identifying and rectifying local security problems, arresting criminals, and reducing the likelihood of future criminality.

Such enterprises require police officers to possess expertise in standard law enforcement functions,6 conflict resolution, and negotiation theory, as well as knowledge of neighborhood cultures and dynamics, applicable languages and customs, and other societal characteristics.

Recurrent face-to-face interactions and personal relationships are the norm.

Day-to-day police operations embrace neighborhood collaboration, emphasizing foot patrols and ride-along programs, organizational manning that attempts to reflect local demographics, and other activities that facilitate the sharing of security/policing responsibilities with individual citizens.

The sharing of security responsibilities is a fundamental aspect of community policing, linking interests and objectives across individuals, law enforcement personnel, and, ultimately, the community at large. In fact, the authority to police comes from the people, with policing success positively correlated to public approval. Underlying personal decisions to trust each other, to share and pool

IR available resources (e.g., time, effort, intellectual energy, and physical assets) reflect mutually beneficial exchange opportunities where participants believe they are better off working together. The end result is a lawful community where the majority of people desire and act in accordance with the rule of law, trusting the police, reporting crimes, serving as witnesses, and relying on socially accepted practices and the justice system to protect individual property rights.

In such communities, citizens view themselves and their contributing peers as essential catalysts to resolving public security challenges, improving their respective lives, and marginalizing miscreants, confident in the knowledge that “no person or institution is above the law—including government officials and local elites.”7 Like community policing, traditional insurgencies require the active involvement of the local populace to succeed; however, insurgencies strive to overthrow or force the change of governing authorities “through the organized use of subversion and violence.”8 Possessing a rich history that includes multiple protagonists, venues, and circumstances, traditional insurgencies have altered the perspectives and actions of governments, civilian populaces, and related entities across the globe since at least 207 BC, when a group of rebel peasants forced the last ruler of China’s Qin Dynasty to abdicate authority and surrender.9 Some traditional insurgencies have relied almost exclusively on violence and terrorism to effect change; others have favored sedition and “passive resistance” to build support across key leaders and community groups. Regardless of selected employment methodology, all traditional insurgencies share a common objective: to usurp the authority and resulting viability of the “targeted” government and, in so

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Convergent threats have poignant parallels with traditional insurgency, attempting to undermine the authority, effectiveness, and resulting public perceptions of constitutional functions: namely, law enforcement entities, the criminal justice system, and rule of law.

Additionally, they threaten and frequently ignore nonmember property rights—a fundamental characteristic of voluntary trade and commerce. Unfettered illicit activities and resulting rewards entice other community members to practice criminal behaviors and beliefs.10 Learning a trade and abiding by societal rules are time-consuming, difficult tasks that can appear foolhardy when juxtaposed with the money, lifestyles, and excitement offered by powerful criminal gangs, drug cartels, and ethnic-based criminal groups.

The same dichotomy applies to radical extremism and accepted societal behaviors because impassioned messages and

50 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

goals convince ill-informed, disaffected members of the populace to reject democratic principles and transform their volatile emotions into destructive actions.

Whereas most convergent threats do not fully satisfy the definition of traditional insurgencies (i.e., primarily seeking to overthrow an existing government), all of them unquestionably seek to change the actions of government authorities through sedition and various forms of violence. Street gangs in the United States, for example, do not necessarily advocate or strive for the violent overthrow of local, state, or national government organizations. Nonetheless, through brutal criminal acts, dedicated recruiting, and other destabilizing influences, street gangs are de facto assuming leadership roles, supplanting legitimate government functions. Unchecked, this menacing threat will continue to grow, exploiting ready information exchange across geographically disparate gangs, connectivity with other convergent threats,

and subsequent learning across criminal networks.

Protecting individual citizens and their way of life from the destabilizing, typically violent effects of traditional insurgencies has been the raison d’être for COIN strategies and supporting operations.

Based on contemporary news reports and resulting public perceptions, many people mistakenly associate COIN with military-centric applications of national power.11 Some COIN practitioners have employed force-based, military-centric approaches that concentrate on capturing/ killing enemy insurgents at the expense of diminished civil liberties and rule of law; however, such approaches neither define nor embody COIN. Instead, COIN is actually a synchronized blending of available civilian and military resources to defeat insurgent forces, address core grievances, and resolve other causal factors.12 Furthermore, depending on situation-specific considerations (e.g., civilian populace preferences, insurgent modus operandi, constitutional authorities, etcetera), an effective COIN strategy could actually minimize direct military involvement while emphasizing law enforcement and other nonmilitary elements of national power.13 This is true in both post-conflict zones and challenged high-crime societies with weak or corrupt governments and ineffective civilian police institutions.

Situational variability is an essential characteristic of successful COIN strategies. Insurgencies and contributing factors vary across cultures, geographic regions, and time; moreover, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that worked during a particular COIN endeavor may not apply in another venture. Prudent counterinsurgents embrace such distinctions, incorporating general principles14 rather than hard-fast rules or situational-specific TTPs, while

assessing insurgencies and developing appropriate remediation strategies. These principles provide time-proven intellectual guides.

The COIN operational environment is not a geographic area or region on a map, although it possesses physical components and includes the targeted nation’s land mass and infrastructure. It is also not defined by conflicts between an insurgent group and national government. Rather, the operational environment is a dynamic, interactively and structurally complex system15 that includes the thoughts and actions of multiple thinking, adaptive entities and a host of other evolving elements. In total, it comprises all the factors, conditions, and characteristics that a beleaguered government must assess and understand to protect its people, maintain sovereignty, and defeat an insurgency.16 Three interactive components form the operational environment’s nucleus: the affected nation’s people, government, and insurgency. The resulting trilogy embodies several basic, yet critical COIN considerations. First and foremost is the essential nature of the populace in both governing and undermining a democratic nation. Gaining populace support and resultant participation are fundamental objectives for the government and insurgency because the purpose for democratic government is to serve its citizens and insurgencies cannot thrive without support. Our constitutional government must seek willing participation of its citizens in the governing processes—to include security attainment and rule of law adherence— whereas an insurgency may employ truth, deception, and various coercive measures (e.g., extortion, blackmail, and outright violence) to gain support.

Populace members choose between these opposing entities, assessing the legitimacy of competing claims and actions in

Select COIN Principles • Gain, retain, and actively involve the civilian populace—the nation’s most important “natural resource” • Perceived government legitimacy is directly proportional to the government’s ability to fulfill societal expectations • Eliminating enemy forces and infrastructure is often less important than positively influencing the populace • When possible, execute actions in accordance with societal rule of law and the concurrence of civilian populace leaders • Complementary interests promote the collective pursuit of mutually beneficial objectives and resource sharing • Build partnerships on complementary characteristics, while harnessing and integrating differences • Physical capabilities, strong organizations, and unwavering desire are critical to governments and insurgencies • Reconciliation and reassimilation are more important than revenge and retribution; former enemies can be strong allies • The COIN environment necessitates a whole of government approach that employs all elements of national power

The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 51

The importance of community involvement in government processes—to include local security patrols, intelligencegathering efforts, and other activities—cannot be understated or undervalued.

conjunction with personal preferences, anticipated costs and benefits, and what they personally see and hear.17 Citizen perception of legitimacy is critical. Individuals assess relative legitimacy based on perceived fulfillment of expected functions and adherence to stated commitments. The government and insurgency influence perceptions through various means, including physical actions and compelling messages. During the assessment process, social and personal expectations are not static; changing in accordance with evolving knowledge, cultural norms, and other factors. The government, insurgency, populace members, and a variety of external influences can also affect expectations and subsequent legitimacy assessments. In the end, assessments and resulting support depend on the congruence of personal expectations and competitor actions, rather than reliance on platitudes and promises.

In tandem with efforts to positively influence citizen perceptions through recognizable actions and messages, the government and insurgency strive to enhance organic capabilities and diminish those of their opponent. The government seeks improved governance capacity18 and underlying resolve while conducting and pursuing actions that will degrade the insurgency’s abilities, determination, and popular appeal. Eliminating insurgent leaders, capturing propaganda material and computer hard drives, and destroying weapon stockpiles are common elements.

When executed with excess or inefficiency, outside the rule of law, such force-based offensive activities can unintentionally benefit the enemy by alienating populace segments and inciting individuals to support or join the insurgency. COIN practitioners must consider potential second and third order effects, eschewing actions and policies that would imperil government legitimacy and individual

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commitment to the governance processes.

Readily observable, force-based actions against the enemy are often of little value. Eradicating insurgent forces and equipment unilaterally, without populace support, can be less beneficial than persuading the citizenry to shun insurgent overtures and voluntarily provide security forces with timely information on insurgent intentions. Recognizing and correctly evaluating such competing actions and results are paramount to successful COIN operations and, as a consequence, the government’s continued survival.

While assessing insurgent capacity and resolve, it is natural to focus on elements such as leadership, infrastructure, controlled territory, or techniques. Doing so exclusively can be shortsighted because the insurgency gains “combat power” from at least two cognitive components: the ideology and supporting narrative that describe insurgent grievances, objectives, and methods, and negative public perceptions of government leaders, institutions, and abilities to fulfill expected functions or adhere to the rule of law.

The importance of community involvement in government processes—to include local security patrols, intelligencegathering efforts, and other activities— cannot be understated or undervalued.

The government must create circumstances that promote partnerships between and with seemingly distinct civilian groups by highlighting shared interests and mutual advantages that exist across the groups.19 Throughout such processes, the watchword is individual participation and commitment, rather than “buy-in” to government-generated concepts.

To successfully counter an insurgency across a nation that encompasses multiple cultures, preferences, and communities, national government organizations cannot dictate the ways, means, and objectives of

Caption coming. Photo by

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Policemen in riot control gear operating in Lausanne. Photo: Rama

COIN is more than killing, arresting, and incapacitating government adversaries and political opponents.

COIN efforts that are designed to address local circumstances. Instead, leaders must identify strategic-level goals and priorities, provide “commander’s intent,” and empower and assist local COIN programs.20 Concurrently, national and local entities must work in tandem to integrate local actions and desired effects into national-level aspirations, “blending” national and local efforts into mutually supporting activities. Collaborative thought is, of course, difficult to achieve, necessitating candid dialogue, reciprocal learning, and earned trust between and across national and local government elements.

Insurgencies are internecine conflicts, pitting family members, friends, and others against one another. National prosperity and development are incompatible with such internal distrust and enmity. Reconciling destabilizing internal conflicts are critical COIN objectives. In fact, to achieve sustainable, long-term success, counterinsurgents must convince large segments of insurgent group members and supporters to shun illicit, seditious activities and “join” productive, “legitimate” enterprises and political processes.

COIN is more than killing, arresting,

54 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

and incapacitating government adversaries and political opponents. It must also provide disaffected protagonists with incentives to pursue attainable goals, offer constructive suggestions, and prompt change “within the system,” while operating in accordance with established laws and social dynamics. Such options present disruptive, lawbreaking individuals and parent groups with viable opportunities to transform themselves and join/rejoin society as respected, accepted members—without fear of incrimination for past misdeeds—as long as they genuinely commit to and actively support constructive, lawful behavior.21 Whole-ofgovernment approaches that are tailored to meet specific situational circumstances, yet are flexible enough to adapt to unforeseen and intended changes, are necessary.

One component of a nation’s capacity— regardless of size, power, and financial potential—will not suffice.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHORs Mr. Abati is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel.

Mr. Downing is a Los Angeles Police Department assistant chief and serves as the commanding officer, CounterTerrorism and Special Operations Bureau.

Mr. Zambri is a detective in the Los Angeles Police Department, CounterTerrorism and Special Operations Bureau, Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section.

ENDNOTES Cooper, John et al. Complete Works by Plato, (Hackett Publishing, 1997), p 1402.

2 California Department of Justice, 2005, CAL/GANGS statistics for City of Los Angeles; retrieved from http:// www.lacp.org/2005-Articles-Main/ LAGangsInNeighborhoods.html.); Archibald, R.C., 2009, “Mexican Drug Cartel Violence Spills Over, Alarming U.S.,” The New York Times, 1

retrieved from http://www.nytimes. com/2009/03/23/us/23border.html).

3 Department of State. (2009). U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide.

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

Per Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 31 July 2010).

4 Per Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 31 July 2010), a traditional insurgency is “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.”

5 Retrieved from http://www.met. police.uk/history/peel.htm and http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Peel#cite_ ref-0 on November 20, 2010 and August 28, 2010, respectively.

6 Standard law enforcement functions include criminal investigations, traffic control, service calls, community problem solving efforts, counternarcotics, and gang suppression.

7 As presented by the National Strategy Information Center in ongoing research pertaining to cultures of lawfulness (see http://www.strategycenter.org/articles/ teaching-the-rule-of-law).

8 Op.cit. (JP 1-02). Traditional insurgencies and resistance movements are different: traditional insurgencies are internal struggles, whereas resistance movements confront invading or occupying forces of an external power.

9 Historic examples illustrate the diversity and social significance of insurgency: revolts in Flanders (13231328) attacking taxation; the English Civil War (1642-1653) and resulting Commonwealth; American Revolution (1774-1783) creating a nation; China’s Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) causing over 25 million deaths; American

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Civil War (1861-1865) pitting states’ rights against national will; Russian Revolution (1905-1917) overthrowing a government and formalizing socialism; Indian Revolt (1920-1947) securing India’s independence from the British Empire; Chinese Revolution (1927-1949) replacing the Nationalist Party with the People’s Republic; Southeast Asian Rebellion (1941-1955) ending regional French colonialism; Cuban Revolution (1956-1959) empowering Fidel Castro; Iranian Revolution (1987-1979) replacing a monarchy with a radical Islamic theocracy; and Chechen Rebellion (early 1990’s to present day) pitting Islamic fundamentalists and nationalists against Russia.

10 Retrieved from International Relations and Security Network, at http://www. isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/SecurityWatch/Detail/?id=110419&lng=en, on March 15, 2011.

11 In this context, elements of national power are “all the means available to the government in pursuit of national objectives” (Note: See JP 1-02, Ibid).

This paper employs an expanded definition of national power: specifically, diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (i.e., DIMEFIL).

12 This definition is consistent with the definition presented in JP 1-02 (Ibid).

13 See William Colby’s Lost Victory, Robert Komer’s The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect, and Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency.

14 This paper focuses on insurgencies that beset nascent, developing, or developed democracies, rather than totalitarian or Marxist regimes. Hence, specified COIN principles and relationships differ from those repressive governments consider and employ while addressing insurgencies. For a discussion of such distinctions, see retired Army

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56 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

Colonel Rod Paschell’s article, “Marxist Counterinsurgencies,” in the summer 1986 issue of Parameters.

15 A system is “a functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements … forming a unified whole” (Ibid, JP 1-02). Based on space limitations, we will not discuss system theory and associated assessment methodologies (e.g., systemic operational design, effects based operations, etcetera) in depth. For additional information on systems theory and related assessment methods, see chapters 2 and 4 of JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 Sep 2006 (with change 2, as of 22 March 2010).

16 This comprehensive set of information is consistent with a recently defined US military term: battlespace (see JP 1-02 and FM 1-02, Ibid).

17 This discussion assumes that government, insurgency, and populace members are rational decision makers— individuals who deliberately seek attainment of desired objectives in accordance with underlying rationale and purpose. Along these lines, rationality does not imply that everyone agrees with selected outcomes or assesses particular choices in the same manner; instead, all that is required is that decision makers have a rationale for their respective decisions.

18 Capacity consists of the physical abilities, resources, and knowledge required to conduct required actions.

19 The identification of shared interests and areas of mutual advantage is simply applied microeconomic theory.

20 This is a critical point, highlighting the fact that national governments are built from the bottom up.

21 The Sons of Iraq provide an example, where various sectarian groups aligned in pursuit of collective objectives.

The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 57

Qods Force:

Iranian Unit Tied to U.S. Plot

Counter The

58 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Air Force. Photo: Shahram Sharifi

The United States’ imminent withdrawal from Iraq and force drawdown in Afghanistan has likely encouraged Iran’s ruling regime to hold course on its current political and military strategies. The Iranian government can be expected to continue its operations to shape the political climate in target countries and further consolidate its gains through the use of political, intelligence, and paramilitary operations conducted by its Qods Force operatives.

By Mark Sexton

Q

ods Force

The Iranian paramilitary organization known as Qods (also spelled Quds) Force is Arabic for Jerusalem, in reference to the Holy City. Qods Force is one of the five military branches of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG), also identified as a council and abbreviated IRGC.1 Iran deploys Qods Force operators to conduct unrestricted warfare campaigns and export a unique brand of Shia-based Islamic terror outside Iranian borders.

Qods is deployed globally and acts as an intelligence-gathering and operational arm of the Iranian government that may carry out orders from the ayatollah as a Western-styled force might or exercise

initiative in the pursuit of “commander’s intent” as Eastern forces often do. The United States has designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Qods Force as terrorist organizations.2

Organizational Structure Qods is believed to have begun as a militia after the 1979 revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini3 and it was officially established in 1990.4 According to author Mohammad Mohaddessin, the Qods Force is under the IRG Central Headquarters with directorates such as Operations, Intelligence, Training, and Finance.

Each directorate is headed by an

The Qods Force specializes in a unique form of unconventional warfare.Qods Force appears doctrinally tasked with “exporting the revolution.”Qods, like the U.S. Army Special Forces, is organized based on geographic specialization.

The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 59

IRG General.5 Qods directorates are organized to support Qods’ operatives while on missions. The number of Qods personnel has been estimated at 5,000.6 This number is likely inexact because of the organization’s secrecy. The current commander of Qods, according to the U.S. government, is Qassem Soleimani.7 General Soleimani also acts as the advisor to Iran’s supreme leader on Qods’ operations within Iraq and Afghanistan.8 Qods chain of command appears to go directly from the commander and IRG directorate to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The Iranian president and Ministry of Interior do not appear to be in the chain of authority for Qods.

Qods Force Operational Areas and Missions The Qods Force specializes in a unique form of unconventional warfare.9 Qods Force appears doctrinally tasked with “exporting the revolution.”10 Qods, like the U.S. Army Special Forces, is organized based on geographic specialization.11 Qods regional areas of responsibility are Iraq, Palestine,

Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, former Soviet Republics,12 Europe, and the United States.13 It can be surmised that Qods’ operatives receive additional advanced training in languages and cultural issues particular to their operational area.14 Qods’ members train Islamic terrorist groups and conduct preattack target surveillance and planning.

60 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

Qods’ members outside of Iran may operate out of Iranian embassies under official diplomatic mission cover.15 Qods’ members have trained Hezbollah personnel in Lebanon for their fight against the Israeli army’s occupation of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is the archetype protégé to Qods and has become the most successful and reliable proxy of Iran. Qods and Hezbollah

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members have also been implicated in the U.S. Marine barracks and embassy bombings of 1983 in Lebanon. Qods’ involvement is generally accepted in the bombing of the Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 in which 19 Americans were killed.16 Qods-trained Hezbollah has operated within the Lebanese diaspora of the triborder regions of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.17 Hezbollah has used South America and Mexico to position itself within the narcotics and weapons trade18 to transfer funds back to Lebanon to finance Hezbollah operations.

IRGC Qods’ officers have reportedly trained a special operations unit for Hamas within Gaza. This new Hamas unit is designed to conduct urban guerilla-type operations along the border with Israel and is equipped with weapons

smuggled into Gaza allegedly originating from Libya. At least two Qods’ officers reportedly infiltrated Gaza (using Bedouins as guides) through Egypt, entering smuggling tunnels into Gaza.19 Qods’ Force leaders have been indicted in Argentina for their alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association that killed 85 people.20

Qods in Iraq According to a report by Anthony Cordsman for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in January 2006 the Qods were placed in charge of Iranian operations in Iraq.21 An unclassified assessment provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence asserted that the Qods’ Force was providing funding, weaponry, and

Qods’ operations in Iraq have directly threatened U.S. military forces.

Khobar Towers bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on 25 June 1996. Photo: United States Federal Government The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 63

Iran has kept Qods actively deployed on campaigns regardless of criticism and threats of increased sanctions from the former Bush administration and President Barack Obama.

training to Iraqi insurgents.22 These reports show that Iran gave clandestine assistance to elements (generally Shia) within Iraq to influence the political situation and act as a counter to U.S. efforts to install a pro-West government.

Qods’ operations in Iraq have directly threatened U.S. military forces. This threat was demonstrated January 20, 2007, by a bold daylight attack against U.S. forces at a U.S. Army Provincial Joint Coordination Center located in the Iraqi city of Karbala. Reports of the attack indicate it was extremely sophisticated to the degree that the attackers utilized were English speakers, dressed in Western clothes, and drove SUVs similar to those popular with U.S. government agencies.

Karbala is home to one of the holiest shrines in Shia Islam, and it appears that Iran gained cooperation of the police and local officials to conduct the attack. The Iranian Qods’ Force has been implicated in that attack and suspected of assisting local Shia insurgents with planning for the assault on the Joint Center. The contribution Qods seems to be not just in the planning but also in the support needed, such as obtaining American-style vehicles and clothing,23 and training in urban assault tactics.

Other activities linked to Qods’ members in Iraq are the deadly improvised explosive devices (IED) known as explosively formed penetrators

64 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

or EFPs. These specialized explosive devices are just a small percent of all IEDs, but they produce significant casualties. These devices require machinetooled metal plates, usually a malleable metal such as copper, that when projected from a cylinder by the detonation of an explosive charge form a semi-molten metal slug that travels at such a high velocity that the projectile is able to defeat armor. The amount and type of explosives require careful measurements and assembly of the device, not like the ordinary IEDs that can be put together in a garage and placed in or along the road. EFPs have to be placed in a specific manner to be effective.24

Qods’ Tactical Approach in Iraq and Afghanistan Insurgent supply lines into Iraq from Iran have been traced to determine the origins of the EFP devices and the United States has acknowledged that the Iranians are providing training to insurgents.25 It is interesting to note that the introduction of EFPs occurred well after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and after the United States had begun to look toward a more unified and pluralistic-style political system to govern the Iraqi people.

These same threats are now appearing in Afghanistan. Iranian

influence of Afghan government and increased sophistication of attacks and the insurgents’ networks, reveal Qods involvement. Qods supplies and trains Afghan Taliban to fight U.S. and coalition forces.26 With the 2012 drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, the Iranians Qods Force has been given a prime window to influence the Afghan government and populace.27

uncovered assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador on U.S. soil suggests indifference to Western rhetoric.

U.S. Assassination Plot On October 11, 2011, the New York U.S. district attorney announced a five–count, 21-page indictment of a

naturalized U.S. citizen of Iranian birth, Manssor Arbabsiar, and Iranian national Gholam Shakuri, in a plot to murder the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States. The indictment outlined the conversations, money transfers, and plans to hire narcotics organization members to assassinate the ambassador and to blow up embassies and restaurants frequented

The Arab Spring and Qods Qods has fomented protest and dissent in Bahrain.28 Qods predictably has used the chaos in Libya to mask the acquisition of weapons for Hamas in Gaza and it is unknown how deeply it is entrenched there.29 Iran is believed to have Qods Force operatives currently assisting Syrian security forces in their suppression of demonstrators calling for the removal of President Bashar al-Assad from power. A recent video on YouTube was uploaded by the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) organization purportedly showing two hooded Syrian dissidents holding an identification card of what appears to be a IRGC Qods’ member who was reportedly killed in Syria.30

Dialogue Irrelevant Iran has kept Qods actively deployed on campaigns regardless of criticism and threats of increased sanctions from the former Bush administration and President Barack Obama. When running for president, candidate Obama asserted that dialogue with Iran was possible. The current reality is that no productive engagement has occurred despite President Obama’s declaration of extending his hand to the Iranian government. Iranian nuclear capabilities’ development continues and the recently

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PERSIAN GULF (Jan. 6, 2008) Small craft suspected to be from the Islamic Republic of Iran Revolutionary Guard Navy (IRGCN), maneuver aggressively in close proximity of the U.S. Navy Aegis-class cruiser USS Port Royal (CG 73), Aegis-class destroyer USS Hopper (DDG 70) and frigate USS Ingraham (FFG 61). Photo: U.S. Navy

S-003 horizAd_Layout 1 16/12/2011 10:08

by U.S. senators. The indictment also identified Shakuri as a senior Qods Force operative.31 Some have speculated that the plot was launched by members of the Iranian government to discredit Ayatollah Khamenei or that an Iranian dissident and U.S. agencies, such as the Pagefaction 1

CIA, facilitated the plot to precipitate a confrontation with Iran.32 Another theory was that the plot would be uncovered and stopped, justifying a limited U.S. military action to divert attention from internal financial problems and disaffected segments of society or to provoke U.S. military action that could prevent dissident activities against the Syrian government from being emulated in Iran.33 Iranian operatives have a history of questionable operations with mixed results, however. David Belfield, AKA Dawud Salahuddin, is an example. The American-born Islamic convert murdered Ali Akbar Tabatabai, Iranian dissident and critic of the Iranian Islamic regime in service of the Iranian regime. Salahuddin fled the United States to Iran via Canada after shooting Tabatabai to death at his home in Bethesda Maryland, in 1980.34 That was not the first time Iranians

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have been implicated in a botched assassination in the United States. In 2010 Mohammad Reza Sadeghnia was charged and imprisoned for attempting to pay another Iranian American to murder anti-regime broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd. Sadeghnia is also believed to have conducted surveillance on Londonbased Voice of America commentator Reza Nourizadeh. Sadeghnia was released on bail after a year in custody to visit his sick father in Iran, but he has not returned and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

Department of State cables released by WikiLeaks described FBI cooperation with British authorities and described Sadeghnia as a self-admitted Iranian agent according to information shared with British authorities.35 It is entirely possible that the current alleged U.S. assassination conspiracy is a Qods’ operation, whether a direct order from the chain of command or as an initiative-based action that is popular with agile non-Western forces.

Conclusion Tehran can be expected to continue to deploy Qods’ operatives in a clandestine war against the United States, Western nations, and Israel. The Iranian regime will likely expand its Qods’ operations because there appears to be no real incentive not to.

Qods Force members are a force multiplier used as an instrument to influence, shape, and manipulate the policies of other nations.

•

End Notes Telegraph. (2007, October 4).

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards: Quds force. Retrieved April 23, 2010, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/1565107/Irans-RevolutionaryGuards-Quds-force.html 2 Treasury, U. D. (2007, October 25). Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and 1

Support for Terrorism. Retrieved April 23, 2010, from http://www.ustreas.gov/ press/releases/hp644.htm 3 Spiegel, B. D. (2007, February 15). Iran’s elite and mysterious fighters.

Retrieved April 23, 2010, from http:// articles.latimes.com/2007/feb/15/world/ fg-quds15 4 STRATFOR. (2010, June 21).

Iranian Intelligence and Regime Preservation. Austin: STRATFOR Global Intelligence.

5 Mohaddessin, M. (1993). Islamic Fundamentalism - The new Global Threat.

Seven Locks Press.

6 Cordesman, A. H. (2007). Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds.

Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

7 Treasury, U. D. Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism.

8 Darling, D. (2005, October 5). Meet Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s anti-American Qods Force. Retrieved April 24, 2010, from http://intellibriefs.blogspot. com/2007/02/how-iranian-qods-force-isoperating-in.html 9 Cordesman. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds.

10 STRATFOR. Iranian Intelligence and Regime Preservation.

11 Clancy, T. (2001). Special Forces.

Berkley Publishing Group: New York.

12 Mohaddessin, M. Islamic Fundamentalism - The new Global Threat.

13 Iran Terror Database. (2005, July 19). The Qods Force. Retrieved October, 21, 2011, from http://www. iranterror.com 14 Clancy, T. Special Forces 15 Global Security. (2005, April 26). Qods (Jerusalem) Force. Retrieved April 23, 2010, from http://www. globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/ qods.htm

An abandoned Tiran-5 main battle tank in en:South Lebanon, now displaying a wooden display of late Ayatollah Khomeni.

Photo: Eternalsleeper at en.wikipedia

The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012 67

Shane, S. (2007, February 17).

Iranian Force, Focus of U.S., Still a Mystery. Retrieved April 24, 2010, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/17/ world/middleeast/17quds.html?_ r=2&oref=slogin 17 Gato, P. (2007, May 9). Hezbollah builds a Western base. Retrieved October, 21, 2011, from http://www.msnbc. msn.com/id/17874369/ns/world_newsamericas/t/hezbollah-builds-western-base/ 18 Kephart, J. (2011). Indicting Hezbollah in Mexico. Retrieved October, 21, 2011, from http://www.cis.org 19 Frontline. (2011, July 21). Iranian Revolutionary Guards train new Hamas commando brigade in Gaza. Retrieved October, 23, 2011, from http://www. israelifrontline.com/2011/07/iranianrevolutionary-guards-train-new.html 20 Department of State. (2011, February 17). Background Note: Iran.

Retrieved October, 21, 2011, from http:// www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm 21 Cordesman. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds.

22 McConnell, J. M. (2008). SSCI ATA Feb 2008–Dni Statement For The Record.

23 Zoroya, G. (2007, July 17). U.S. Army report analyzes Karbala attack.

Retrieved April 24, 2010, from http:// 16

www.usatoday.com/news/world/ iraq/2007-07-11-karbala-report_N.htm 24 EFP IEDs in Iraq. (2006, February).

Retrieved April 24, 2010, from www. nh-tems.com/.../EFP_IEDs_in_SE_Iraq_ Basrah_RROC_G2.pps 25 Conroy, S. (2007, February 11). U.S. Sees New Weapon In Iraq: Iranian EFPs. Retrieved April 24, 2010, from http:// www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/11/ iraq/main2458318.shtml 26 Three Years Later: A Socio-Political Assessment of Uruzgan Province from 2006-2006. (2009, September 18).

Kabul: The Liaison Office.

27 Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran. (2010, April). Secretary of Defense.

28 Bahrain News Agency. (201, October 22). Bahraini Intelligence Totally Aware of Shakuri’s Activities”. Retrieved October, 21, 2011, from http://www.bna. bh/portal/en/news/477754 29 Frontline. Iranian Revolutionary Guards train new Hamas commando brigade in Gaza.

30 Coughlin, C. (2011, October 5).

Iran embarrassed by Revolutionary Guard death in Syria. Retrieved October, 21, 2011, from http://blogs.telegraph. co.uk/news/concoughlin/100109105/ iran-embarrassed-by-revolutionary-guard-

68 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

death-in-syria/?tr=y&auid=9644523 31 Department of Justice. (2011, October 11). Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States. Retrieved October, 23, 2011, from http://www. fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/ two-men-charged-in-alleged-plot-toassassinate-saudi-arabian-ambassador-tothe-united-states 32 Mackey, R. (2011, October 12).

Some Experts Question Iran’s Role in Bungled Plot. Retrieved October, 24, 2011, from http://thelede.blogs.nytimes. com/2011/10/12/iran-experts-ponder-analleged-terror-plots-b-movie-qualities/ 33 DEBKAfile. (2011, October 14).

Iranian radicals look for a limited armed clash with the US. Retrieved October, 24, 2011, from http://www.debka.com/ article/21387/ 34 Peterson, S. (2011, October 14).

Former Iran assassin says alleged plot ‘makes no sense’. Retrieved October, 21, 2011 from http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/ set/print/content/ view/print/415574 35 Man Who Targeted Iran Critics Skips LA Court Date. (2010, December 3). Retrieved October, 21, 2011, from http://losangeles.cbslocal. com/2010/12/03/man-who-targetediran-critics-skips-la-court-date/

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Training Review

Tactical Firearms Training Team Pre-Deployment Training

o

ne would think that being engaged in conflict as long as we have that the training our soldiers receive would be at the highest level of realism and demanding standards. I find over and over again that this is not the case.

Although there is no doubt that special operations forces generally receive very good training, the standard infantryman usually does not. On most military bases there is such an obsession with artificial safety standards that the overall mental and physical preparation of soldiers is often less than adequate. Tier one units often seek off-base training with private companies to circumvent the dreaded “Range Control,” whose mission seems to be to throw a wrench into any quality training plan.

I have been training warriors full time for over 25 years and I feel that I have a better-than-average perspective on how to maximize training time and get the utmost from students to make them as confident and skilled operators as possible in the time allotted.

I was recently tasked to train a unit in a wide range of pre-deployment skills.

I was given 12 days to train a 24-man unit. Upon arrival at the training site, the unit immediately began to assume the duties of a forward operating base (FOB) complete with guard posts, checkpoints, and react positions. FOB operations were conducted 24/7 complete with armed sentry posts throughout the night. From training day one, every time the students

By Max F. Joseph deployed from the FOB to report to their assigned training area, they moved as a tactical convoy.

Phase One: Weapons Marksmanship Training—M-4/M9 This first phase began with proper weapons indoctrination. Each day started with a troop formation at which time a detailed safety brief was issued. A negligent discharge by a student would mean immediate removal from the course. The men burned through 48,000 quality rounds over 12 days. I do not believe in wasting ammunition, so every drill that the men shot had objectives and the men were accountable for every round fired.

After reconfirmation of zero they worked on combat firing positions and use of cover. Drills were fired on both paper and steel targets out to 200 yards. Range firing at 50–200 yards was the focus at first as the men learned their different holds at varying ranges. Following this was close quarter shooting from 10 yards to 50 yards.

The combat pistol drills focused on dynamic close quarter engagements.

Students executed stationary turns, use of cover, shooting on the move, and engaging multiple targets. Transitioning from the rifle to the pistol was also covered. In addition to the marksmanship training, combat medic skills were taught and practiced by the students.

72 The Counter Terrorist ~ Feburary/March 2012

Phase Two: Close Quarter Battle There was a fairly large emphasis on close quarter battle (CQB) during this course because this particular unit anticipated operating in military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) environments. In phase two, we began with an open-air façade house; first dry fire then live fire. Once we sorted out weapon handling errors and other safety issues, it was off to the shoot house. This was the first time that many of these men had ever been inside of a live fire kill house. They had plenty of experience with Simunitions and blanks inside of a MOUT house, but live fire is a different animal entirely. We began with 2-man room combat then progressed to 3 men.

Once they had these basic tactics down safely, we then began to conduct hits as a 12-man element. The students worked on multiple rooms with open and closed doors and hallways.

The next progression of CQB was mechanical breaching. The students were given periods of instruction on the proper use of sledgehammers, Halligan tools, breaching shotguns, chain saws, and quickie saws. The students then began to incorporate these tools into all their CQB scenarios. Finally, hand-to-hand combat and defensive tactics combined with prisoner securing and searching techniques were rolled into the missions.

Phase Three: Tactical Convoy Movements The proper organization of motorcades and convoys was put into play in phase three. Proper vehicle load and preparation were discussed as well as pre-rigging vehicles with tow straps front and back.

Live fire vehicle contact drills and antiambush drills were practiced during the day and at night. Nighttime driving with night observation devices became an important part of the team’s movement on various missions. Vehicle rescue and vehicle evacuation scenarios were all executed with live fire.

Phase Four: Patrolling During phase four, patrolling techniques were taught and put into practice.

The students conducted foot patrols to

accomplish various missions. Land navigation using map/compass and GPS units were also incorporated. Included with the patrolling techniques were live fire break contact drills, hasty ambushes, and envelopments. Raids and camp attacks were also conducted. These drills were the most intense of the live fire scenarios that the students had yet encountered in the course. In addition, surveillance and reporting missions gave the student tools needed for the final phase.

Phase Five: Field Training Exercise Missions During the final phase, operation orders and mission planning were the priority. The students were given a briefing on the abduction of several U.S personnel.

They began to use all the skills they had been given over the previous nine days to try to locate and rescue the hostages. They

received much less sleep and were tasked with missions throughout the night. The course culminated with a live fire camp attack on an insurgent base where the final hostage was known to be held.

This was an intense 12 days that the students will remember for a long time regardless of their MOS or tier level. I hope this brief account motivates other military instructors to maximize the training time of their troops. The last thing men going to war need is another PowerPoint presentation and sexual harassment brief. www.tftt.com

•

About the author Mr Joseph is a former reconnaissance Marine and Department of State AntiTerrorism Assistance Program instructor.

He is the founder of Tactical Firearms Training Team.

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