Journal of Public Policy Research-Volume I, Issue II

April 2016

Volume I, Issue II

Journal of Public Policy Research GRADUATE JOURNAL OF SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY & GOVERNANCE Regulation of Information in Agricultural Markets: A Qualitative Exploration | Sunny Roy Regulation of Water Supply in Tier-Two Cities of Uttar Pradesh: A Case Study of Lucknow | Jyotsana Joshi Negotiating Gender in the Lives of Women Officers in the Indian Army | Aswathy Chandragiri The Woes of Being Politically Visible in an Aspirational Global City: A Case Study of Auto Rickshaw Drivers in Delhi | Ishita Trivedi The Case of Mitigating Congestion: Understanding its Political Economy Through the Study of Haldwani cum Kathgodam Urban Agglomeration | Navneet Joshi A Study of Tribal Livelihoods in Post Joint Forest Management Era: A Case Study of West Midnapore District | Saity Roy

HYDERABAD CAMPUS

TATA INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,HYDERABAD,INDIA

The Journal of Public Policy Research (JPPR) is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on different aspects of public policy and public affairs in India and the world. It invites scholars to apply diverse disciplinary lenses, methodologies, social science theories and concepts to pressing issues of public policies and public affairs. It endeavours to study governance, accountability and institutional frameworks that can create better human opportunities, promote well-being, generate wealth and deepen democracy. The journal serves as a platform to publish original and high quality research articles, perspectives, commentaries, book reviews, and case studies. Initiated by the graduate students of the School of Public Policy and Governance at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad, the journal is published biannually. It welcomes contributions from all persuasions. 

Editor-in-Chief Lakshmi Lingam, Professor & Deputy Director, TISS Hyderabad, India 

Editors Aseem Prakash, Professor and Chairperson, School of Public Policy and Governance, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad Chinmay Tumbe, Assistant Professor, School of Public Policy and Governance, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad Amit Upadhyay, Assistant Professor, School of Public Policy and Governance, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad Samyukta Bhupatiraju, Assistant Professor, School of Public Policy and Governance, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad Ekta Singh,Assistant Professor, School of Public Policy and Governance, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad

Managing Editors Shruti Prasad, Graduate Student, School of Public Policy & Governance, TISS Hyderabad

Divya Ruth Jose, Graduate Student, School of Public Policy & Governance,

Amish Sarpotdar, Graduate Student, School of Public Policy & Governance, TISS Hyderabad

TISS Hyderabad

Editorial Advisory Board Ajey Sangai, Research Fellow, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, New Delhi, India Badri Narayan Rath, Assistant Professor & Head, Department of Liberal Arts, Indian Institute of Technology, Hyderabad, India Himanshu, Associate Professor, Centre for Economic Studies & Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Joerg Friedrichs, Associate Professor at Oxford Department of International Development, St Cross College, Oxford, England Mitu Sengupta, Associate Professor, Department of Politics and Public Administration, Ryerson University, Canada Mohammed Ahsan Abid, Associate Professor & Chairperson, School of Human Resource Management, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad, India Padmini Swaminathan, Professor & Chairperson, School of Livelihoods and Development, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad, India Rekha Pappu, Associate Professor & Chairperson, Azim Premji School of Education, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad, India Sanjeev Routray, Sectional Instructor, Department of Sociology, University of British Columbia, Canada Sony Pellisery, Associate Professor, National Law School of India University, Bangalore, India.

Vidhu Verma, Professor, Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Vindhya Undurti, Professor & Chairperson, School of Gender Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad, India

Foreword It is our pleasure to introduce the next issue of the Journal of Public Policy Research (JPPR). Having made history with the launch of a first-ever graduate journal on public policy and governance in India, it was important to maintain momentum and avoid the ennui of resting on our laurels. This issue of the journal dwells on important issues straddling the urban and rural divide; from regulation of information in agricultural markets to regulating water-supply in tier-two cities in India.

Continuing our strong contribution to understanding the urban in the Indian setting, the issue also looks at congestion as well as the fraught political visibility of auto drivers in New Delhi. There is also attention on morphological categories: while the journal issue focuses on questions of gender in the armed forces, it also examines what has happened to tribal lives in the aftermath of the joint forest management era.

A word about our nascent journal: the JPPR is a forum for young policy researchers to share their research findings with the world. Conceived and launched by the graduate students of the School of Public Policy and Governance, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad it is managed and published by group of young editors, thereby making it a journal by and for young researchers.

It supports policy students and professionals in need of a vibrant platform to share their field experiences with the wider epistemic community. The peer review process, unlike most professional journals which only gauge the standard of the submitted essay, is designed to help prospective young contributors to structure their paper in a manner that orchestrates their arguments, refines the theoretical underpinnings that form the basis of their writing, and make richer sense of their data. With the help of its innovative peer review policy, the JPPR will encourage students from small towns and universities to publish their papers thus reducing the time taken to disseminate these internationally. It also endeavors to facilitate the democratization of knowledge generation and dissemination, ensuring that geographical and social spaces are not a handicap for publication of innovative and well-researched ideas.

We hope you will find this issue of the JPPR rewarding.

Editors, School of Public Policy & Governance, TISS Hyderabad

Contents Regulation of Information in Agricultural Markets: A Qualitative Study 1 Sunny Roy Regulation of Water Supply in Tier-Two Cities of Uttar Pradesh: Case Study of Lucknow 23 Jyotsana Joshi Negotiating Gender in the Lives of Women Officers in the Indian Army 53 Aswathy Chandragiri The Woes of Being Politically Visible in an Aspirational Global City: A Case Study of Auto Rickshaw Drivers in Delhi 87 Ishita Trivedi The Case of Mitigating Congestion: Understanding its Political Economy Through the Study of Haldwani cum Kathgodam Urban Agglomeration 99 Navneet Joshi A Study of Tribal Livelihoods in Post Joint Forest Management Era: Case Study of West Midnapore District 138 Saity Roy 131 Note for Contributors 160

Regulation of Information in Agriculture Markets: A qualitative exploration SUNNY ROY1

Abstract: Information in many forms permeates all aspects of human life and behavior and in markets, it is an important factor that determines peoples’ actions. However, the way information is viewed varies across different schools of thought. Neoclassical economics simply assumes availability of full and free information, while new institutional economics stresses on the role of institutions in access to information. Prices were thought to be the only necessary information in markets, but research on the field has well-established other views on information. The constituents and role of information in agriculture markets is poorly understood, and is particularly interesting because agriculture market yards are a meeting point of formality and informality in markets. A field study conducted on onion trading in Kurnool agriculture market yard to understand the constituents of information and the determinants of regulation has revealed that the expanse of information is vast than understood by economic theories.

External demand and credit information are two major determinants of prices in a market yard and collusion among market players significantly affects information availability and hence affects prices. Social cohesion among traders and economic power are the major determinants of regulatory power.

Keywords: Information, agriculture markets, neoclassical economics, new institutional economics, price mechanism, credit, regulation 1

Sunny Roy, Former Graduate Student of School of Public Policy and Governance, Junior Research Fellow Andhra Pradesh Planning Commission, sunnyroy.kolla@gmail.com

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

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Introduction Information is regarded by most people as an important and most basic component of daily life. Information in many forms permeates all aspects of human life and behavior. In markets, it is an important factor that determines peoples’ actions. As a commutative rule, markets are also seen as ‘aggregating and conveying information across a population’ (Easley et.al, 2010, p. 691). The role of information in decision making is most widely discussed these days that a new branch of markets have emerged, called the ‘Information Market’, which trade information itself as a good (Chen, 2005)2.

The study of information in markets has been popular, especially in the context of the major economic theories that exist today. Several authors have extensively researched on the role of information in determining market outcomes, in sectors such as insurance (Stiglitz, 1976, 1977, 1997), credit (1981, 1990), labour market (Toikka, 1974; Stiglitz, 1975), sharecropping (Stiglitz, 1977) etc. Research on information in relation with market equilibrium and efficiency also exists (Kripke, 1980; Cyert, 1993).

However, there has not been any major study in understanding the constituents and regulation of information in an agriculture market setting in India. Agriculture markets are an important node in the supply-chain of agriculture produce from the farmers to the consumers. Huge degree of price volatility is known to exist in the agriculture markets, especially in commodities such as onions, cotton, rice etc. and the issue has been a part of political debate. Looking at the issue through the lens of information as an analytical category is expected to draw out some important knowledge on the way information access and regulation works in the marketplace.

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Information was historically traded for money and other gains.

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This paper seeks to explore information as an analytical category in agricultural markets. More specifically, this paper seeks to understand what constitutes information in an agricultural market, their modes of regulation of information and the underlying factors that enable regulation in the marketplace. However, as it is impossible to map complete information in markets and attempting to do so is a herculean task, this paper starts with an assumption that ‘price determination’ is a major task of any marketplace and hence attempts to understand ‘that’ information which substantially affects prices.

A field study for this purpose was conducted in Kurnool agricultural market yard, which is the largest market for onions in Andhra Pradesh. Interviews were conducted with all the important players, viz. farmers, traders, commission agents, hamalis, market committee staff and also a journalist who possesses key information about the dynamics in agricultural markets.

Following second section of the paper will deal with theoretical conception of information according to various scholars and economic theories, followed by a section on constituents of information in the agriculture market. The fourth section highlights on the methods of regulation of information, followed by its determinants. The concluding chapter will situate knowledge acquired on information into the existing theoretical framework.

Theoretical Conception of Information: To the question of what constitutes information that is desirable in a market, several scholars (Marshall, 1920; Hayek, 1945; Walrus, 1954; Stigler, 1961) have given primacy to prices as the information sought by market players.

Conventional economics deal with prices as a cost that the buyer incurs based on the benefit that arises from its possession (Marshall, p. 78). Hence, prices are determined by the demand-supply mechanism and the utility of a particular good, "3

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in other words, an equilibrium determination of prices. The same view is put forward by another neoclassical scholar, Leon Walras (De Vorey, 2009 p. 709). This conception of determining prices is widely taught as basics in economics all over the world, of course as an ideal case scenario. F.A. Hayek in his paper published in 1945 acknowledges the importance of knowledge (or information). Transactions involve a huge set of interactions among different players and all information cannot possibly be fed to a central system to determine the value of a good. For example, one does not have to know all the hardships performed to mine diamonds and the demand in store for them, but all that information can reflect in the price people are willing to pay for a diamond, which is its current value. A change in the value of diamonds (price signals) gives out necessary information to the market players and they in turn act according to the price signals. Though not perfect, Hayek suggested that no other system of conveying information has come close to being useful as the price determining mechanism (Hayek, 1945 p.

528). Hence, prices are an aggregate of all information in markets. Neoclassical economic theory suggests that all information necessary to carry on market decisions and maintain equilibrium prices is fully and freely available. It is in fact one of the basic assumptions of neoclassical theory that “people act independently on the basis of full and relevant information” (E. Roy, 1993). Perfect information is assumed to exist and that information is freely available to in order for the economic transactions among individuals to happen.

George Stigler in his paper titled ‘The Economics of Information’ (1961), through a simple example, explained that most often, it is not costless to obtain necessary information in a market (p. 216). It incurs significant costs to identify different buyers and sellers and reach price equilibrium, sometimes greater than the marginal utility of the good itself. Markets are imperfect and not centralized; hence, the prices offered by a seller or prices sought by a seller is not easy to "4

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obtain. On the question of what constitutes information, Stigler propounded that identification of buyers and sellers and the prices offered is not the only information, but only a small part of the vast information in markets, say for example, the quality of goods etc. When such information is not available in order to make a rational choice, institutions pitch in to serve the purpose.

New Institutional economics goes against the assumption of free availability of information and stresses on the role of institutions in altering its availability.

Institutions by definition are the rules of interaction formed by groups or individuals by repetitive interactions (North, 1986; Coase, 1998). The role of such institutions gives rise to a condition where some players have better access and some players have no access to necessary information. This gives rise to information asymmetry, much against the assumptions of neoclassical thought.

North suggested that specialization and division of labor are two primary reasons for institutions shaping up information asymmetry (p. 231) and hence, transaction costs are huge. Every market player tries to maximize his utility, seeks to lower transaction costs and hence forms organizations/firms. The basic role of a firm/ organization is to seek necessary information at a lower cost. Though new institutional economics does not delve on what constitutes information, there is a general agreement that information not only means prices but a myriad of many others in a complex economic network (quality of a good, information on markets etc.). Coercion, cheating, opportunism etc. arise out of maximizing behavior and hence, third party institutions (regulatory mechanisms and governments) play a role in providing vital information and suppressing opportunistic behavior through legal and other means.

Kenneth Arrow (1962) in his paper on uncertainty in resource allocation viewed information as a possible commodity. Optimal allocation of resources requires all the necessary information about inputs and outcomes in the process. But, similar "5

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to uncertainty in weather conditions and its impact on the agricultural production, uncertainty also prevails in resource allocation. When a research produces an outcome that affects the allocation, the result is an outcome that is commoditized.

Not only through research, but through network connections, everyday transactions etc., information can be obtained and can be used for one’s gain. In such a scenario, information can be theorized as such knowledge which can be used for optimal allocation of resources. Through sufficient legal measures, that information can be made to be used by others for a fee, making information a commodity that can be traded between players in the economy.

Another strand of knowledge on information is obtained from the literature by Stiglitz, who pioneered the field of economics of information and eventually won the Nobel Prize for the same. Stiglitz sought to understand why standard economic models failed to explain the realities like unemployment, risk in credit markets etc. Unlike Stigler, who only saw obtaining information as a transaction cost (Stiglitz, 2001 p.477); Stiglitz saw it as something that seriously affects the equilibrium. The assumption of perfect information and the lenience with imperfect information in markets were questioned and explained that even small imperfections could affect the equilibrium in every aspect of examination (labor markets and credit systems alike). Even minute gaps in information proved costly and existing models could not account for such cases. For example, existence of unemployment and high wages simultaneously in Kenya goes against standard labor market equilibrium and such a scenario can only be explained by limitations in information (p. 479).

However, there is not a single set that determines the whole of information in Stiglitz’s writings. Information varies from sector to sector and purpose. Quality of a particular good/person is an important information in screening and selection (1975, p. 283). While information about potential risks or defaulting by insured is "6

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important in insurance markets (2002, p.481), equity markets suffer because information about risks is either unavailable or costly (1993, p.17) and banks ration credit to play safe as information about borrowers is costly to obtain. What causes information asymmetry and the implications of costly, imperfect and asymmetric

information on equilibrium is the central question, rather than what constitutes information in Stiglitz’s writings. Asymmetry in information is both natural to certain markets and also created by market players to gain edge over the competitors (2002, p.488). Also, information asymmetry in markets cannot be completely overcome, but only mitigated to the extent possible. Stiglitz suggests a number of methods to eliminate information asymmetry, which will not be "7

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discussed here. As there is a cost involved in obtaining information, institutions/ governments play a role in easing the constraints to access of information.

Real Demand and Credit Information: As already suggested, the information is categorized as that which influences market prices. The reason to do so stems from the fact that prices were considered to be the most important information in a market. The fieldwork has yielded two important strands of information that affects market prices; first, the external demand that in-house traders in a marketplace receive from the other regions and second, information on credit. These two aspects play a critical role in determining prices and hence are valid to be called information. While other strands of information have emerged, these two strands have the highest visible impact on prices. (i) Real Demand: It is no new discovery that prices in a market are determined by the equilibrium between demand and supply. However, the ‘real demand’ in our context is different from ‘demand’ in the demand-supply equation in terms of ‘information’ availability. What I consider information in this context is the knowledge of larger markets to farmers from where the demand arises, and I call this the ‘real demand’. Price setting in local agricultural markets occurs between farmers and local traders depending on the demand and supply situation between them. However, theoretically, it is absolutely possible that the traders hide/mask their real demand with a fake demand situation thus controlling the price setting mechanism. This precisely is what happens in the agricultural market in question.

Pertaining to the market for onions, only a minor quantity of onions produced caters for the local needs and the surplus is exported to various locations across the country. The largest markets of onions from Kurnool are the eastern states, viz.

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Odisha, West Bengal and also Bangladesh. In other words, the agriculture market is largely export driven. This might be true for most markets, but the problem arises when information on true demand is crucial in determining market prices.

Observations from the study have indicated severe variations the in the price of onions, even though the demand for onions from external markets remains high.

For example, the peak price would rise to around Rs.1300 per quintal one day and falls to Rs.600 per quintal in just two days. In a period with no observable disastrous events in the external markets, such a fall in demand is highly unlikely in a short span. The only plausible explanation to this fluctuation in prices can be through control of information on real demand by the traders in order to regulate prices. This is drawn as a conclusion by many informants of the study. Thus, information on external markets is crucial and leaves scope for regulation of such information in the market. As farmers are totally cut-off from the information cycle, lack of information on real demand makes the farmers ‘price receivers’ rather than playing a part in price determination.

External demand for onions is only available for the traders and everyday prices of onions are determined by the traders alone. Except when the inflow of onions into the market is low, the prices usually follow what the traders determine.

Traders don’t reveal the amount of onions required on a particular day to the farmers and also are not obliged to do so at it do not directly fall into the purview of the market committee (regulating authority). But not revealing real demand (information) has implications on the prices of onions on a particular day.

All interviewed farmers suggested that traders collude among themselves to obtain prices lower than the market clearing prices. Knowledge of real demand enables them to collude among themselves and portray a false demand situation to the farmers, thus forcing them to agree to a trader decided price. Had the farmers known the true demand present for their onions, the bargaining capacity "9

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would fetch them a higher price. Thus, real demand seems to help the traders determine market prices through collusion. The processes of collusion will be discussed in the coming sections.

This determination of prices by the traders goes against the normal economic principles of demand and supply. When information in markets is complete, price is determined only by the principles of demand and supply and no other factors should play a role in the prices. If the farmers knew how much demand exists in the market on a particular day, they would decide how much produce to send to the market. Farmers can rapidly respond to changes in demand in either direction by cutting down the supply in case of low demand and by supplying more in case of high demand. However, onion markets are asymmetric in this aspect.

Information asymmetry exists not by regulation, but by the nature of market organization itself. Traders act as intermediaries between farmers and the final

buyers who determine the true demand and earn a profit for transacting. As farmers do not have direct access to the end users, this asymmetry in information is structural and hence cannot be avoided unless a change occurs in the market organization.

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(ii) Credit Information: The second strand of information that plays a major role in price determination is the information on credit. Informal credit is the largest component of the total credit market for agriculture and in the current scenario, the largest creditors are the commission agents (otherwise called middlemen). All the farmers interviewed have mentioned that their primary source of credit apart from banks are commission agents, who provide them with credit for rights to trade farmers’ produce in the market in return. Providing credit to the farmers is a way through which the commission agents maintain their market share. This connection might seem not to have any effect on prices, but not quite so.

Commission agents have no stake in the market except acting as an intermediary between the farmers and traders. Their role as commission agents is to seek a fair bargain between traders and the farmer they represent during an auction.

However, the market dynamics act otherwise to create a scenario where a lack of incentive exists on part of the commission agent to obtain a fair price. The reason for this behavior is as follows.

According to the rules of the market committee, the traders are expected to pay off the farmers for their produce on the same day in cash, but this seldom happens. The traders, due to an informal agreement with the middlemen pay them only after a few days, after they receive their payments. The commission agents are therefore obliged to pay the farmers on the same day by deducting the principal and interest of the loan and commission for the sale. This linkage between the middlemen and traders is crucial for our case. The number of operating traders in the market are very few and the commission agents prefer to transact with those traders who they trust due to the nature of monetary transactions with the traders (This is also a reason why new entrants are hard to come into the market, as commission agents prefer to transact with established "11

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traders than new ones). As farmers are bound to the agents through credit, no choice is available to the farmers to choose a different agent. The commission agent - trader collusion prioritizes traders’ interests than that of the farmers. As commission agents pay the farmers for their produce, the principal, interest and commission are deducted before the farmer is paid, ensuring that the agents’ profits remain intact. This situation has a direct impact on price determination.

The commission agents prefer transacting with trusted traders who pay them on time. The best way a commission agent-trader relationship is kept intact is to provide traders with more quantum of sales at a lower price. This acts as a disincentive for commission agents to lower selling prices than the fair price.

Many farmers who source credit from commission agents have reported that credit linkage binds them to those credit providing commission agents, thus accepting any price that the commission agents offer the farmers.

It is important to note that information on credit availability and access to the same seems to play a major role in regulating the market across the country. As of 2002, Institutional agencies such as nationalized banks, cooperative societies, commercial banks, regional rural banks etc. have catered to 57.1% of rural credit, while non-institutional players like moneylenders, landlords etc. have provided 42.9%. This component was as high as 92.8% in 1951 (Pradhan, N. C., 2013).

While formal credit institutions are seen as the most preferred source of credit, it is interesting to note that nearly half of the credit availability is through informal sources. Evidence (Swain, 2002) suggests that formal credit is highly restricted due to credit rationing by formal credit institutions, especially in agriculture.

According to the All India Debt and Investment Survey conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (2006), about 2.6% of the total rural credit is supplied by traders and commission agents. This is particularly interesting in our scenario because traders and commission agents are the primary constituents of "12

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agricultural markets and their participation in the credit market enables them to have a control on determining prices in the market. A similar effect of commission agents on agrarian credit markets in Punjab has been documented by Anita Gill (2004) in her paper and provides an empirical analysis on the issue.

It was also observed that the commission agents convince farmers to sell their produce without an auction. An agent is usually associated with a particular trader and he makes sure all his farmers produce (located in different parts of the market) is sold out as soon as possible. Out-of-auction prices are less than the auction prices and hence farmers are at a disadvantage. A commission agent doubling both as credit providers and mediators and also the informal financial dealings between agents and traders creates a unique situation of influencing market prices.

Imagine a scenario where all the farmers are provided credit from sources that do not have any market linkage. In such a scenario, commission agents would have a limited role to play, only as mediators between farmers and traders. The best possible way to maximize their income would be through helping the farmers get

a better price and hence increase their commission. As evidence suggests, such a scenario doesn’t exist and hence information on credit plays a major role price determination.

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Regulation of Information: Information affecting price determination have been discussed in the above section, real demand and credit information are seen as major price determinants.

The current section focuses on the determinants of regulation of information in the agriculture market setting. Auctions are the allowed method of price setting in the agriculture market in study and the focus will remain on how auction prices are regulated by the market players. Though auctions are traditionally seen as the most preferred and efficient method of price setting, literature suggests that auction prices can be controlled by the players (Bannerji et al, 2004, 2002; Palaskas et al, 1998). This study corroborates existing literature and also draws out important trends on the process of regulation.

Observing the auction process in market yard space is an important exercise to understand how auctions are controlled by those who possess information, i.e., on real demand and credit. The two market players who hold this information predominantly are traders (on demand) and commission agents (on credit).

Collusion among these two market players results in regulation of information and hence prices. Two kinds of collusions have been observed, (i) between the traders (trader-trader collusion) and (ii) between traders and commission agents (traderagent) collusion. (i) Trader-Trader Collusion: Trader-trader collusion is made possible because of their greater economic influence on the market, despite their smaller numbers.

Informal discussions with commission agents and farmers have revealed that these big traders act in collusion with each other to lower the prices in an auction.

An observation of the auction process has revealed that the participating traders use a series of signs and gestures to cut the auction price to a convenient level through informal mechanisms if they sensed a situation of high auction prices than "14

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what they are willing to pay. The produce brought in the auction would be shared among the bidders. This leaves the farmer at a compulsive situation to accept the auction price or take the produce back. Taking back the produce or storing it locally will increase the transaction costs, leading to an unfavorable outcome for the farmers. Furthermore, out-of-auction selling would attract a price smaller than the auction price and hence farmers practically have no say on the price. (ii) Trader-Agent Collusion: Trader-Agent Collusion on the other hand, also plays an important role in determining the prices that a farmer receives. The role of commission agents in a marketplace and the economic relationship between commission agents and traders is already described in the previous section on credit. Most agents have reported that traders take time to clear the bills and therefore, they are obliged to pay the farmers immediately (excluding the arrears).

It is thus logical for the commission agents to sell the produce to those traders who are trustworthy and assure the agents of the payment on time.

Apart from the above reason, it was observed that a competition among commission agents to clear their part of the produce has resulted in a situation where commission agents prefer to transact with traders without an auction, for a lesser price. During the period of study, it was observed that farmers had to stay for days in the market waiting for their turn to sell their produce and this delay was often used as a reason by the agents to pursue the farmers to sell their produce without an auction.

Determinants of Regulation: Regulation of information and price determination cannot occur without any social/economic relation between the market players. An investigation into the social and economic composition of the market has revealed some important determinants of collusion. The first determinant is power structure within the "15

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market. A hierarchy can be observed in the order of who holds the most information and who holds the least, which helps them determine the market price and processes as discussed above. The traders hold most information and are the highest in the hierarchy, followed by the commission agents, market committee and then the farmers at the end of the table, considering that information that affects prices and processes. A tabular representation is shown below, on the power structure and the components of information held by the market players.

Traders invariably are the strongest in the hierarchy and hold the highest economic power in the market. They are the sources of money into the local market system and they earn a profit by intermediating trade between farmers and outside traders. In order to maximize his profit, a trader has to buy the produce at a less price as possible and this is where information plays a crucial role in determining the market prices. All the information described above that the trader holds plays its part in ensuring that the trader buys the produce at a low price. Economic power assures that the information that is held earns a profit to the traders.

Commission agents, who are assigned a hierarchy below the traders and above the farmers, hold some information in the market, primarily of credit linkage.

Availability of credit (which is classified as important information) from the "16

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commission agents enables them to control who the farmers sell their produce to.

But this information does not enable them to control the traders, hence a hierarchical rank below the traders. While the commission agent is supposed to find a bargain that maximizes the farmers’ received price, he works in the opposite direction in reality. It is necessary for the commission agents to have a favorable linkage with the traders (higher hierarchy) in order to seamlessly facilitate the transaction to the farmers, but in reality, they work in favor of the traders owing to the same financial linkage with the traders. Here too, the hierarchy in flow of money is prominent along with the amount of information held, which is paramount. In a hypothetical condition, if the commission agents had as much information of external demand and price trends as the traders did, their bargaining power with the traders would be equal and he would work in favor of the farmers. But since the role of commission agents is limited to act as a mediator but not to buy the produce for himself, there lacks an incentive for the commission agent to gather such information and hence have to act according to the information available to him. This condition shows a relationship between power and information held. Farmers at the end of the hierarchy possess least information and hence are at the bottom of the hierarchy. Lack of information ensures that the farmers are ‘price receivers’ rather than ‘price seekers’.

Apart from economic power structure, the second important determinant of regulation is social cohesion. Observations reveal that social cohesion is strong enough among the traders as most big traders belong to one religious group.

The numbers of traders not belonging to the group are very few and these traders operate in close cooperation among themselves. Collusion among the traders ensures availability of information of larger markets and demand among themselves. As this information is important in determining the market prices, these traders may ensure that this information is not known to the other traders "17

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too. As long as the social cohesion exists in the market, information also will be restricted to a handful of traders, thus controlling information and prices.

Conclusion The above understanding of information is the result of fieldwork on the study of onion markets in Kurnool agriculture market space and it has drawn out important insights on information, its constituents and the role of different factors in enabling regulation of information for gains, thus ensuring unfair market outcomes. What remains to be explored is whether the knowledge on information and regulation obtained corroborates or rejects the assumptions of dominant economic theories.

In relation to the neoclassical understanding that information that all information can be condensed into a price mechanism, the fieldwork observations speak otherwise. Prices of onions in the market and at the end-users never matched the true price of the commodity. The price that farmers receive is far less than what it would have actually obtained, in the event of a fair market process. Also, the intermediaries within the marketplace increase the prices of a good without any value addition to the product. Thus, information condensed in prices is never an efficient and true estimate of information and hence has to be rejected. Also, the neoclassical assumption that information is freely and fairly available seems to be grossly wrong. In the agricultural markets, information is only differentially accessible, and determinants like social and economic structure play an important role in accessing information and thus, this assumption proves not to be valid.

In relation to the neoclassical thought, information is not truly defined, but it stresses on the role of institutions in determining the access to information. This statement is not necessarily true as institutions that have been created to ensure fair market outcomes are seldom useful in doing so. In this scenario, the APMC, "18

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which is the regulatory institution, has no effect on the market outcomes, except facilitating a market place. Formal institutions like APMC might play a defining role in markets, provided that the market players are equal in some aspects.

Market operations between unequal players dominate the regulatory mechanism.

Also, informal institutions like caste, etc. play a role in regulation. The new institutional thought will only be partially apply in this case.

In the views of other scholars on information, information accessibility in markets

is highly differential, as suggested in the section on theoretical conceptions of information. Necessary information in the markets is controlled by a few players while disseminating information to the other players will be beneficial to all and enable an efficient outcome. Information asymmetry is a major fuel for regulation and is beneficial for those who hold it.

In a nutshell, while the neoclassical thought of information availability and prices is completely rejected, new institutional thought of the role of institutions is partially supported. Also, the fieldwork observations are in full conformity with the thoughts of other scholars who proposed information asymmetry as a "19

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determining role in the markets. Informal institutions such as power structure and social groups play an important role in facilitating this process.

References Arrow, K. (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention.

In The rate and direction of inventive activity: Economic and social factors (pp.

609-626). Princeton University Press.

Banerji, A., & Meenakshi, J. V. (2004). Millers, commission agents and collusion in grain auction markets: Evidence from basmati auctions in North India. Delhi School of Economics Working Paper, 129.

Coase, R. (1998). The New Institutional Economics. American Economic Review, 72-74.

Cyert, R. M., Kumar, P., & Williams, J. R. (1993). Information, market imperfections and strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 14(S2), 47-58.

Easley, D., & Kleinberg, J. (2010). Networks, crowds, and markets: Reasoning about a highly connected world. Cambridge University Press.

Gill, A. (2004). Interlinked Agrarian credit markets: Case study of Punjab.

Economic and Political Weekly, 3741-3751.

Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. The American economic review, 519-530.

Kripke, H. (1980). Inside information, market information and efficient markets.

Financial Analysts Journal, 36(2), 20-24.

Marshall, A. (1920). Principles of economics: an introductory volume. Retrieved from http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1676/Marshall_0197_EBk_v6.0.pdf Newbery, D. M., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1977). Share Cropping, Risk Sharing and the Importance of Imperfect Information. Economic Theory Discussion Paper Department of Applied Economics University of Cambridge (UK).

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North, D. C. (1986). The new institutional economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 230-237.

Palaskas, T. B., & Harriss‐White, B. (1996). The identification of market exogeneity and market dominance by tests instead of assumption: An application to Indian material. Journal of International Development, 8(1), 111-123.

Pradhan, N. C. (2013). Persistence of Informal Credit in Rural India: Evidence from All-India Debt and Investment Survey and Beyond. RBI Working Paper Series, WPS (DEPR): 5.

Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1976). Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information (pp. 329-349). Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1997). Competition and insurance twenty years later. The Geneva papers on risk and insurance theory, 22(2), 73-79.

Stigler, G. J. (1961). The economics of information. The journal of political economy, 213-225 Stiglitz, J. E. (1975). Incentives, risk, and information: notes towards a theory of hierarchy. The Bell Journal of Economics, 552-579.

Stiglitz, J. E. (1977). Monopoly, non-linear pricing and imperfect information: the insurance market. The Review of Economic Studies, 407-430.

Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. The American economic review, 393-410.

Stiglitz, J. E. (1990). Peer monitoring and credit markets. The world bank economic review, 4(3), 351-366.

Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics.

American Economic Review, 460-501.

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Swain, R. B. (2002). Credit rationing in rural India. Journal of Economic Development, 27(2), 1-20.

Toikka, R. S. (1974). The Economics of Information: Labor Market Aspects.The Swedish Journal of Economics, 62-72.

Yiling, Chen. (2005). Markets as an Information Aggregation Mechanism for Decision Support. Available from http://yiling.seas.harvard.edu/publications/.

Accessed on 5th September 2013.

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Regulation of Water Supply in Tier-Two Cities of Uttar-Pradesh: A Case Study of Lucknow Jyotsna Joshi1 Abstract: Set in the context of organically expanding cities, one of the plausible reasons of the lack of access to safe and potable water can be the insignificant funds devolved to the local tiers of government that further decomposes to lesser allotment by it to strengthening the water supply infrastructure of the city. The second can be the imprudence of the local governments to appropriately raise finances accruing to 30% of the total expenditure to be made by them. Among few of the findings of this work are the correlations between paying patterns of people in a city and the average amount paid by a household in that city. Talking of Lucknow specifically and having said that institutional arrangements of service delivery have been in practice since past two decades with evolving management practices, can privatization really fit into the city sphere where most of the people till date think of water as a public good and falter the payment of even nominal taxes? This study tries to bring forth the underpinnings of the political economy of an urban agglomeration, in the context of water.

Keywords: Urban Agglomeration (UA), Tier-two cities, Service Level Benchmarking, and Water Charges.

1

Jyotsna Joshi, Former Graduate Student of School of Public Policy and Governance, Research Fellow, Andhra Pradesh Planning Commission

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

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Introduction: Water as a good has seen a drastic transformation from being characterized as a public good to an economic good. This has been an outcome of the urbanization effect which has led to about 30 percent of India’s population residing in urban centers accounting for about 340 million persons in absolute term. The urban population of India is likely to increase by 590 million, constituting about 40 percent of total population by the year 2030; constituting the largest growing work force. At the outset of this avalanche, Cities will account for 70 percent of all new jobs created in India during 2010 to 2030 (McKinsey, 2010). This transformation of urban landscapes, which has also been witnessed through the evolution of urban water sector, has taken place has been a precursor to the shift in the role of State vis-a-vis governance structures. Eventually this transformed role of State has borne with it a certain implications of prioritizing economic interests over equity2 like: (i) demand side interventions focusing on management of demand and efficiency in usage of any utility; (ii) making services chargeable by pricing them; (iii) introduction of cost recovery.

With an objective to understand the nature of water supply networks in the city and their evolution, the instrument of water supply schemes in the city was taken and a research strategy assessing the growth of institutional set-up providing the service delivery was designed. For understanding this situation in a bigger picture, two large data sets of NSS-69th Round (2012) and 54th Round (1998) representing data on Drinking Water, Sanitation, & Hygiene in India were taken; and the increase in institutionalized governance was observed during this one and a half decade through the municipal water supply. Thus the magnitude of a tiertwo city’s expansion was realized through this exercise after which the micro-level

2

Phillippe Cullet, Water Law, Poverty, and Development- Water Sector Reforms in India, 71-72, OUP, 2009.

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field study was employed to assess the impact of these expanding cities on infrastructure development and institutional set up. As can be seen from Map 1(a) and 1(b), the increased spread of institutionalized governance post 74th Amendment is not only an indicator of increased urban area but also the urban population. Secondly, the top fifteen urban agglomerations in terms of population (Census 2011 data) were taken and compared in terms of four key variables viz. principal source of water supply in them, water quality, payment status of water charges, and average amount paid per month by a household in these UAs. This has indicated (at a macro level) the service delivery status by these municipal bodies/ institutions of State, and the revenue generated by these bodies through water-charges. This process is further narrowed down to the State level and tiertwo cities of Uttar-Pradesh (top 50 UAs, Census-2011) were visited through these key variables.

As the objective of the study was to understand the regulatory nature of the State under the ideal of welfare; in the context of expanding cities, the micro level study involved examining the city of Lucknow through the lens of institutionalized governance, municipal finance, and user-charges. For this purpose interviews of the Government officials representing the Urban Local Bodies were conducted and municipal-finance data was collected from them. According to the service level benchmarks issued by the Ministry of Urban Development, each zone of the m u n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n w a s e v a l u a t e d i n t e r m s o f Wa t e r S u p p l y parameters(coverage of municipal water supply in the city3 , quality of water

3

Data of number of households covered by each of the six zones of Lucknow Municipal Corporation collected from six zonal offices of Lucknow Municipal Corporation. The data for total households in that particular zone was collated from the ward level data in Primary Census Abstracts for Lucknow UA, Census 2011.

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supply4 , hours of water supply5 , metering of connections6,and grievance redressal7 )

This paper is divided into five sections. The first section tries to review the existing literature on regulation of utilities. The second section is an engagement with the research questions through data. While the third section deals with the central arguments associated with poor cost recovery, the fourth section is an attempt to designing an affordable and sustainable drinking water reform by taking lessons from the diverse Indian experiences. Finally the last section of the paper presents the conclusion with scope for future research.

4

Data collected from household survey (Sample of 50 Households)

5

Data collected from household survey

6 7

Data collected from Lucknow Municipal Corporation Seen from the data of Control Room of Lucknow Municipal Corporation

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Literature Review Regulatory State Scholarship on regulation also refers to the regulatory state as the one in which economic management becomes proceduralized through juridical approach to economic governance. (Dubash & Morgan, 2011) refer to a regulatory state with law-backed specialized agencies and institutions operating through administrative means to achieve the goal of economic efficiency. However many also look at regulation and regulatory state as an instrument for outsourcing and privatization8. Taking the case of water service provision in a city, with an objective of achieving the economic efficiency of resource delivery in terms of cost-benefit and outreach, a regulatory state will do so either through law-backed specialized agencies and institutions or through privatization of the water supply.

So the question that looms now is that what form of governance does a regulatory state represent? Moreover, how have these specialized agencies or institutions representing a regulatory state, evolved with the transforming cityscapes? The second question is built upon the understanding of regulatory state as the expansion of federal government, which will be a proposition of this work.

In the context of India being a developing nation and being one among many nations of the Global South the concept of Regulatory state holds interesting explanations. Seeing institutional reforms as the epicenter of the regulatory structures, one side of the explanatory tale elucidates these reforms for basic infrastructural amenities. With their inception in the industrialized nations, which represent much of the Global North, this trend had flown into the South as well

8

‘Politics, Position, and Power: From the Positive to the Regulatory State’, H. Seidman, and R.S. Gilmour, OUP, 1986

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owing to the increased economic integration between the two (Dubash & Morgan, 2011). One extension to these institutional reforms is given by the logic of welfare state scholarship which deems social justice and fiscal transfers as the pillars of a welfare state; and these pillars can be erected through the institutional reforms. Simultaneously, other extension of the institutional reforms is based on the market logic and a self-supposed axiom which deems competition as the epicenter of institutional reforms. Likewise the second side of the explanatory tale deems privatization as the cause of regulatory governance.

A vast amount of the literature on States does not see welfare states and regulatory states in conjunction with each other. Instead the two are perceived as a trade off in terms of state organization, its own logic (social justice vs. procedural fairness), with its own legitimacy (output vs. procedural) and with its own primary instrument of choice (fiscal transfers vs. rulemaking) (Levi-Faur, 2013).

But this work attempts to explore the relationship between the welfare functions of a regulatory state in the wake of expanding administrative boundaries and functions of the state as a resultant of urbanization. In essence, it recognizes that a regulatory state and a welfare state may not be distinct monomorphs that cannot coexist simultaneously.

The main objects of analysis will be the state administration and the city population which will be instrumental in the analysis of regulation of water systems through the policy instruments of social expenditure (fiscal transfers) and social regulation.

Evolution of Regulation via the instrument of Regulatory State Regulation is considered as a technocratic and secondary instrument of the State with a nominal central redistributive effect. The reason behind this effect stems from the fact that regulation which is seen in phase reversal with welfarism, is "28

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actually much in conjunction with the latter. In essence redistributive aspect of regulation and regulatory aspect of redistributive process are in close sync (LeviFaur D., 2005). The evolution of regulatory state has been a two-step process which has taken place with the changes in international environment and domestic political and economic demands parallel to the social construct of the place.

Phase I- Command-and-control State: The market failure and financial crisis led to the rationale of government intervention as a remedy to them. As a result, Government and bureaucratic expansion via specialized independent agencies came in vogue (Anderson, 1960). It made the Government accountable for all the fiscal functions pertaining to housing, medical and public health inclusive of water supply and sanitation, family welfare and social insurance, public works, etc. This phase was typified by the state in need of reform.

Phase II- New regulatory state: This phase tended to use limited government by proxy and more of steering than rowing to achieve administrative and economic efficiency. The only difference between the earlier version of regulatory state and the evolved New Regulatory State is based on the latter’s reliance on selfregulatory organization, and other practices and techniques substituting direct command and control (Levi-Faur D. , The Welfare State: A Regulatory Perspective, 2013). This also links decentralization of the state as one of the forms of regulation.

Thus the earlier version of the regulatory state that saw fiscal transfers as the main policy instrument, now metamorphosed to a hybrid of policy instruments of fiscal transfers (social expenditure) and social regulation. Using the case of water policy (water access to people) and studying water status in a tier two city, the dynamics between the two policy instruments can be analyzed based on the framework

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given by David Levi-Faur. This analysis can be characterized by three distinct states of retrenchment, stagnation, and expansion.

Social regulation in this case of water policy is seen as the sum of functions like timings of availability of water in the localities of the city, and water tariff structure.

Likewise, Social Expenditure is taken as fiscal/cash transfers (made to the urban local bodies in addition of their revenues earned through cost recovery) and subsidies on water consumption. Nine different combinations (see Table 1.1) that are theoretically possible through fitting the above mentioned distinct states into these two policy instruments of Social Regulation and Social Expenditure are explained below: a.Double Expansion (e3): It signifies the extension of eligibility of water service from developed regions of the city to the underdeveloped regions of the city and with fiscal transfers (larger part of the cost borne by the state through subsidies on consumption to the beneficiary). b.Double Stagnation (e2): This occurs when both an extension of water rights to underdeveloped regions is denied and fiscal transfers are stagnating. c.Double Retrenchment (e1): This occurs when both the extension of water rights to underdeveloped regions and subsidies on water consumption to the beneficiary are restricted or withdrawn.

This is illustrated in the Table below. The other six cells are mixed-forms and are shaped by different political and institutional constellations.

Mixed Dynamics (e4, e6): This occurs when one of the two policy instrument stagnates and the other retrenches.

Regulation-led expansion: It occurs when regulation expands but fiscal transfers either retrench (e5) or stagnate (e7). This implies expansion of social rights (through increased access in terms of timings of the service, robust consumer grievance redressal), but retrenchment or stagnation of fiscal transfers "30

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(implications seen in the form of not subsidizing water consumption and instead water tax hike).

Fiscal transfers-led expansion: Here fiscal transfers expand but social regulations are either being cut (e8) or stagnated (e9). This may imply a greater degree of relaxation for non-revenue water and limiting the water accessibility to a certain pockets of the city.

The case of Lucknow city is that of Regulation-led expansion e3 and e9.

The various techniques and strategies of regulation are fusing together to form hybrid governance structures (Levi-Faur D., 2010). Contemporarily, it is the third party regulation which is being mostly adopted by institutions. In this, the relations between the regulator and the regulatee are mediated by a third party that acts as independent or semi-independent regulatory auditor; auditing being the most popular forms of the third party regulation. The form of governance being followed in the city of Lucknow is of the type SSS with the first S representing the regulator as State, the second as representing the regulatee "31

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(also the State), and the third S representing the third party regulator (State, again).

(I) Main Research Question Formulation 1.Current Status of Water supply in top 15 UAs Comparing the top 15 UAs (in Table 2.1) on the basis of principal source of water and quality of drinking water leads to few very intriguing observations. We can observe that payment of water charges is strongly associated with the principal source of water supply.

Analyzing the data from NSS-69th Round, in UAs that get water mainly through tube wells/ boreholes, water charges are paid by less than fifty percent of the people. Examples of this are Kanpur, Lucknow, Ghaziabad, and Indore. The ethnography study of Lucknow carried out by me indicates the laid back attitude of people towards the payment of water charges- most of those that had done bore well works at their house. This brings into consideration another point of ground water levels which are seriously at a threat of getting depleted. The lack of particular Laws related to restoration of ground water level and regulation in Lucknow, further deteriorate the situation and give an incentive to the people to pervade the invisible wrap zone where the State cannot penalize them.

Few of the findings at macro-level that were culled from the NSS-69th round data are summarized below. The case of Kolkata is peculiar with 44% of 1316 households covered with piped water supply (into the dwelling or in the yard/ plot); and still only 10% of these households actually pay the water charges.

Among all the UAs, Mumbai had the largest coverage of piped water (92%). Here the reported number of houses paying water charges was the largest as of 1233 households 92% of them paid. This may be one of the effects of the institutionalization in Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation with the setting up of "32

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MWRRA and proposing of bulk water tariff entitlements. Delhi too has 75% of coverage through pipe water. However in Delhi, only 68% households actually pay water charges. This may be attributed to the water tariff structures which are greater in Delhi than any other UA (seen in next section).

Chennai and Bangalore represent a glimpse of privatization of water with 40.74% and 20.29% of households respectively using the bottled water. Also other method of privatization seen here is through the tanker source. This domain is exploited by these private players through either the tanker-mafia operating in the developing areas of the city or through the upfront collections from potential users of the utility (Ranganathan, 2014). The case of Ahmedabad is also worth mentioning here which reformed its municipal services through an institutionalized practice and set up Gujarat Water Infrastructure Development Company. The efficiency of service delivery in Ahmedabad is a resultant of financing municipal services through issuing Municipal bonds in Ahmedabad in early 2000s. Through this not only the status of service delivery improved but also large amount of money was raised at the cost of set goodwill.

Therefore from this data it can be inferred that despite the institutionalized governance of public utilities, water here, has been expanding, large costs are borne by the local tiers of government alone in the absence of citizens paying for the water charges regularly. Graph 2.1 illustrates this.

2.Average Amount paid per month by a household Of a sample of 99,550 households the median for the variable average amount paid per month by a household is INR. 60 for India. Narrowing it down to urban India, a median amount of INR 75 per month on average by a household is reported for 42,156 households. The median for this variable for non-urban households (53,394) is INR 50. All in all, at India level, 68.57% of the households

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do not pay water charges. This figure of the defaulter households in the urban areas is 52.36%.

Graph 2.2 represents the average amount paid per month by top 15 UAs. The two most striking observations from the Table 2.1 in context of regulation of water service delivery are: a.Chennai, Bangalore, and Hyderabad are among the few cities that have undergone privatization of the water sector partially. A comparative evolution of privatization in the states can be seen from Map-2(a) and 2(b). The average amount paid per month by a household for these three UAs is greater than the mean of the average amount paid per month by these 15UAs (which comes out as 126.56). Thus leaving the outliers of Delhi (INR 300 per month) and Lucknow (INR 50 per month), almost all other UAs that have institutionalized set up of water distribution through the municipal corporations pay close to this mean value.

Lucknow is the city which pays the least average amount as water charge per month. b.Privatization of water has necessarily ensured a higher percentage of households paying water charges per month (case of Bangalore- 81.25% and Chennai-71.3% from Table 2.1); earlier in India only 31.43% of households actually paid water charges. But on the contrary, UAs with more efficient institutionalized structures have been generating greater revenue by more number of households paying (case of Mumbai-92% and Ahmedabad-86.71%, Table 2.1). Thus the effect

Graph:2.1 "34

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of regulation of water supply structures can be seen in greater citizen participation. c.Though the privatization of water supply has increased from 1998 to 2012 (Map 2(a) and 2(b)), it has been minuscule in front of the increased coverage of the municipal governance and service delivery of water under it.

Graph 2.2

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3.Current status of water supply in tier two cities of UP Comparing the status of water supply in tier-two cities of UP through variables ‘principal source of water’, ‘water quality’, and ‘payment of charges’ we observe the following: a.From Table 2.2, Varanasi, Agra, and Allahabad are the best cities in terms of payment of water charges. While the principal source of water for Agra is tube wells and bottled water, for Varanasi and Allahabad it is the piped water supplied by the Municipal Corporations there. But Agra in some respects represents privatization of water and the average amount paid per month by the household here is as high as INR 200. Still as compared to the other tier two cities of UP that have institutionalized governance and nominal water charges (illustrated by the variable average amount paid per month), percentage of households paying water charges in Agra (witnessing privatization) is higher. b.Varanasi is the best tier two cities among UP representing municipal service delivery, with 68.75% households paying the water charges. However the average amount paid per month by a household for Varanasi is the least not only among the tier two cities of UP but also lesser than the mean for urban India (INR75).

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Apart from Kanpur and Agra for all the other tier two cities of UP (refer Table 2.2), average amount paid per month is less than the mean of urban India.

The notable feature of this table is that a pre-dominant principal source of water for the tier two cities of UP is tube well/borehole. This point’s towards the lack of regulation of the institutionalized structures in the domain of ground water level

conservation.

1.Average amount paid per month is strongly positively associated with the principal source of water supply (For example Agra).

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2.Average amount paid per month is negatively strongly associated with the payment status of water charges. This essentially means that, even if the percentage of households paying the water charges is high, it would imply a lesser value for the variable average amount paid per month (For example Varanasi).

4.Service Level Benchmarking (Table 2.3) Narrowing down further and confining to the city of Lucknow, a critical look at the service level Benchmarks enables to assess the status of water service delivered by the Municipal Corporation. This gives a skewed representation of the six zones of the city (Graph 2.3). a.Zone-1, Zone 2, Zone 5, and Zone 6 are the old parts of the city, with Zone 2 being the location of oldest Water Works. Thus these areas are catered by the Head Water Works of the city which is approximately 150 years old. The status of pipelines in these parts is hence very weak. Also a majority of the population in these zones get water from the river. Thus the dependence of a majority of households in the city is on the two water purification plants namely, Head Water Works (Aishbagh) and Second Water Works (Balaganj). b.Water Source for Zone 3 is tube well and that for Zone-4 is Sharda Sahayak Canal the water from which is fed into the newly constructed and operational post the first phase of JNNURM. As it can be seen from the above table, maximum cost recovery is from Zone-4. Whereas on the other hand maximum number of grievances are also received from this Zone. This clearly portrays a paradox of people not getting the service despite of paying.

Two of the plausible reasons that can be associated with this paradox can be: One, the newly functional Third Water Works with a capacity of 65 MLD, caters to a large number of households, many of which have a boring work done. Thus the "39

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rate of drawing water by these borings is faster as compared to the normal flow in the pipelines. This is making the water distribution skewed between the regions of Zone-4. Two, since many of the households in this Zone consist of a working class population as compared to the other zones; they are more aware of their water supply rights and entitlements and simultaneously proactive in registering their grievances. c.Thirdly, the small scale manufacturing cluster and the industrial cluster is located in the Zone-1, Zone-2, Zone-5, and Zone-6. This makes these zones dump a lot of their by-products into the river thus polluting the source. This is the main reason why water supplied in these zones is not drinkable, and is just average to be used for the daily purposes. On the other hand, Zone-3 being tube well zone supplies fine quality of water.

Thus the main research question that arises in the wake of abysmal cost recovery is whether city planning through State Municipal fiscal relations an adept way to cater to the increasing water demand in growing urban centers?

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(III) Central Arguments flowing through the paper 1.Poor cost recovery due to people evading payment of water charges despite nominal tariff structure:

Look at Regression Table in the adjoining page, associations can be made between the payment status of a household and principal source of water, tenurial dwelling, and social group. Coefficient for the payment status of households having principal source of water supply as piped water is the least. This indicates poor performance put up by the municipal corporations in cities of UP, which are the providers of piped water. All other sources other than the piped water have comparatively higher coefficients (statistically significant). The largest coefficient is however for tube wells and surface waters as the principal source; indicating a maximum number of users is covered by these.

Insights from the field work say that a majority of households in UP draw water through tube wells/ boreholes which are managed by the Municipal Corporations.

But since there is no regulation put on the usage of from these tube wells; neither has there been regulations on ground water level maintenance, the users of tube wells continue to use them recklessly. In addition to all this the water charges that are still following the older-tariff models are too less in comparison with the exorbitant usage of water by the households. Therefore even if those people who "41

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are paying the water charges are not commensurate in terms with the usage of water they are doing.

Secondly, the tariffs in use currently are basically based on bulk-tariff model which operates in lieu of the property area in which the water-tap exists. Thus a household in x square feet area having 5 members pays equal to the household in a similar area but having 10 members (and too much consumption of water).

These factors are leading to a poor cost recovery.

1.Loop-holes of institutionalized governance: grey areas where individuals escape the norms of the State

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Lucknow (like all tier two cities of Uttar Pradesh except Agra) represents regulatory governance with respect to institutionalized structures working as per the service level benchmarks, and ensuring water supply to most parts of the city.

Also the case of Lucknow and other tier two cities of UP is in adherence to the Welfarist ideal of distributing water as a public good and thus setting up of minimal tariffs. Having said that the governance structure represented by a regulatory state is supposed to offer new opportunities of inclusion to the weak and marginalized (in essence of providing a wide range of regulators to develop the regulatory capacities) the scenario in Lucknow is a mixed bag. There are few grey areas that the State misses to acknowledge; and under this grey space many households are escaping from their responsibilities of citizenship. Few of these are: a.Metering of water is still not implemented, despite one of the service level benchmarks of metered connections. This is the lack of political will among the bureaucrats that fear rising against the general order prevalent among the people of the city. In essence, water is one of the factors on the basis of the accessibility of which municipal elections are contested. A majority of people in Lucknow have a perception of water as a public good and do not even think of paying exorbitant prices towards its service. Metering of water may imply lesser and calculated consumption by the consumer, which is totally opposite to the set perception. Thus volumetric tariffs are designed and implemented by the local governments. But the revision of these tariffs has not been done since 1997. b.A household on a specific property size consisting of seven people, and similar land-size household of three people, both pay equal water taxes (which are also determined by the property area). This defies the per capita consumption law and encourages landowners to keep more and more tenants on their property. In older parts of the city few houses that were built long back on 1500 sq. ft. area "43

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have as many as five tenants- a total of twenty people living in one house and paying a nominal amount of Rs.2500/- to INR. 3000/- per annum. Whereas in other parts of the city a house on same area having four-five people pays this much amount per year. c.Lack of environment regulation and regulation towards the conservation of ground water is incentivizing many households to dig a bore well in their house and enjoy unlimited water supply, at a shoestring charge. Old city has few examples of households that have a hand-pump of their own and that sell water to the adjoining slum areas at INR. 200/- per month. Not only are these households burdening the ground water but escaping from paying optimum water taxes.

(IV)Designing an affordable and sustainable drinking water reform: lessons from the diverse experiences The past three decades have witnessed a gradual shift from nationalization to institutionalization to privatization. Meanwhile the span of one and a half decade that is observed in this paper stresses on the last two. Analyzing the drawbacks of the institutional governance promulgated by the 74th Amendment, it can be observed that in this model, all the three key governance functions— policymaking, service provision, and regulation—were concentrated in the hands of state-owned agencies. The two major weaknesses of these state-owned agencies that affected service provisioning were: One, interference of political
 ideologies and interests with the key administrative and economic decisions such as pricing, investments, and purchases of the state-owned agencies. Two, lack of effective accountability by these state-owned agencies. These two weaknesses circumscribed the transparency and accountability of these service providing agencies towards cost and quality of the delivered services. Thus the policy prescription given to the water sector by the International Financial Institutions in "44

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the post-harvesting period of liberalization 2005), consisted of two broad categories of reforms: (i) institutional and governance reforms, (ii)economic and financial reforms (IDFC, 2011).

While Ahmedabad, and Mumbai have set an example for impeccable municipal governance through municipal bond financing method and compatible tariffmodel respectively; Chennai Water Board has been an example of the statement that ‘governments should not be involved in the businesses like provision of amenities like water to citizens but instead should regulate the pricing structure and the quality of water supply, keeping in mind the maintenance of ground water levels.’ Though Privatization has been seeing a quite slow spread in water sector in India, the municipal bodies representing institutionalized governance have been working in principles of a welfare state, treating water as a social good and not a commercial one. Despite of municipal governance cities of Ahmedabad and Mumbai have fared up quite well in the municipal water gamut owing to efficient cost-recovery. These diverse examples are by large, a representation of the political economy of that particular place. According to the socio-politicalgeographical and other regional considerations, the success stories of the municipal governance of these states can be adopted by others as well.

(V) Conclusion Summing up the paper would involve the addressing of the research questions and eventually graduating to the research objective.

Research Question 1: Is City Planning through State Municipal fiscal relations an adept way to cater to the increasing urban population?

The main issues through which I engage with this question is by answering ‘whether people should pay water charges in two-tier cities of UP? And if they do, what is the average amount should be paid per month?’ The answer to the first part of this question is that 85.52% of households in UP do not pay water charges "45

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(Sample: 11531 households, NSS-69th Round). For urban UP, 62.88 % of households not paying water charges (Sample: 4159 households, NSS-69th Round). The average amount paid per month by a household in UP is INR.35 (median value). However this statistics is INR. 37 (median value) for urban UP. This leads to the second sub question of ‘what is the expenditure on urban water supply over the last few years?’ Having said that the funds devolved to the states have been 33% of Union’s net tax receipts (as per Thirteenth Finance Commission). The revenue expenditure for the State of Uttar Pradesh (estimated) for the year 2013-14, has been 135 crores in Water Supply and Sanitation Schemes and that of 1734.7 crores in Urban Development. However this amount finances only 50% of the new infrastructure projects. 30% of financing is done by the State Governments. Therefore, the cost recovery of the provided water service through water charges by the municipal bodies becomes utmost important so as to finance the remaining 20% of infrastructure cost.

Viewing Lucknow among top 15 UAs and comparing the average amount paid per month by a household gives a low figure of INR. 50 per month (median value).

This is the lowest among the top 15 UAs according to Census, 2011. From the ethnography study of the city and evaluating its administrative zones formed by the Lucknow Municipal Corporation on the basis of Service Level Benchmarks, about 56% of the city pays towards the water service according to the Municipal Records (63% of a sample of 264 households: according to the data of NSS-69th Round). This is an example of mixed dynamics and fiscal-led expansion (Table 1.1).

Comparing between tier two cities of UP in terms of Municipal revenues generated through taxes, taking average amount paid per month by a household as the indicator, we find that people in Varanasi paid the least (Rs.25) followed by Meerut (INR.40), followed by Lucknow (INR.50), followed by Allahabad (INR. 60). It "46

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is notable that this amount is even lesser than the national median of INR.75. Thus average amount paid per month by a household for almost all the seven tier two cities of UP except for Agra and Kanpur is less than the national median. Given the fact that in UP, municipal organizations pay a vital role in supplying water to the city, it is a failure of these organizations in the front of cost-recovery that may feed as investments for infrastructure in water sector.

This implies that municipal Fiscal relations are not sufficient to carry out water infrastructure planning, in two-tier cities of UP, at the outset of urbanization. 
 Research Question 2: Do the user charges necessarily and sufficiently cover the production costs of supplying water or expenditure on sewerage? (Supply Side) Taking the case of Lucknow, with reference to Service Level Benchmarks issued by the Ministry of Urban Development (MOUD) for water: State agency is the regulator (MOUD), State agencies (Jal Sansthan, Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam, Lucknow Municipal Corporation) and market actors (tanker service in new areas/ private developers) are the regulatee, and the State itself is the Third Party mediating between the regulator and the regulatee through Uttar Pradesh Water Management & Regulatory Commission. Therefore the resulting form of governance is SSS or SSM (State-State-Market) Since the form of governance is pre-dominantly containing State, minimum user charges stem from the Welfarist ideology of the State. In essence, user charges of Lucknow are less than the median charges for urban areas and India. These water charges are based on volumetric tariffs that are very nominal. Meanwhile the cost of production for water in Lucknow is INR. 10 per kiloliter. Thus the total estimated revenue of 8493.62 lakh in 2014-15, to be generated from 667.25 MLD of water produced in the city the actual revenue (forecasted based on the existing paying patterns in the city) is only 50% of the estimated figures.

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This amount is barely sufficient for covering the establishment costs including the salaries of the staff. Thus user charges unless raised optimally by revising existing tariffs, cannot be sufficient in covering the production costs of supplying water. In the light of privatization of water service delivery, which apparently appears to be a solution to the challenges put forth by the traditional municipal systems and institutionalized governance (of individuals escaping the formal spaces and systems and adopting to illegal means of heavy power motor installation without metering of the connection and using unlimited water supply), privatization of some parts of water service have been done in the city of Lucknow. This includes the operation of tube wells. But, this in and of itself does not remove the inefficiencies of existing governance as the functions of price setting, maintenance and revenue generation are still controlled by the municipal bodies.

Also, setting of prices for water supply in the city is based on tariff system which has not been revised since many years.

Therefore the Hypothesis with which I had started this research ‘Prices of any public service/ amenity are not determined based on economic principles that comprise of costs involved in producing and delivering that amenity but are based on socio-political considerations of that region’ is found to be NULL in the case of city of Lucknow (and other tier-two cities of Uttar Pradesh). 
 Research Question 3: Are the consumer/ beneficiary receiving the service efficiently represented at each level? (Demand Side) Talking of Lucknow city specifically, Zonal level comparisons indicate that some zones are better off in terms of water service (quality and quantity-Zone 3) than the others. Though the population of Zone 3 is comparatively higher than the other zones, still each and every citizen of the state has a right to access of good quality of water. This skewed water distribution illustrates inefficient representation of the beneficiary at each level by the municipal bodies.

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Secondly, inter-zonal disparities in water distribution based on the proximity of a household with the zonal pumping station or overhead tank act as an impediment to equal water distribution to all regions. In addition to this the installation of heavy power motors, submersibles by affluent households in a particular region of a zone suck up all the water vigorously and sends residual supply to the slums in that region. Thus regulatory aspect of the redistributive process is not taken care of appropriately by the municipal bodies and state led agencies responsible for water supply.Therefore the consumers/ beneficiaries receiving the water service are not adeptly represented at each level.

Research Objective: Understanding the nature of regulation of water supply networks in the city and how have they evolved with the expansion of the city.

Water supply networks in Indian cities have basically evolved from a close-ended scheme called Public Health Engineering Training, Research and Development Programs in 1956 to the visionary shift towards strengthening the water supply infrastructure through ample number of schemes in the Ninth and Tenth Five Year Plan to finally the Urban Renewal focusing mega project of JNNURM. Each of these programs has led to the development or upgradation of few institutions in the cities that were linked to the delivery of the service. These institutions marked the birth of regulatory state. The inception of this regulatory state has been a gradual process with intent of monitoring the regulatory aspect of the redistributive process.

Graduating from the earliest water supply schemes implemented under a Command-and-control state to the latest urban renewal schemes with limited government but an independent regulator; the entire shift has been ideologicalfrom centralization and fiscal dependence to decentralization and fiscal autonomy.

Overlapping this paradigm shift in governance with the expansion of cities and urban areas, the responsibility of service delivery on the institutionalized "49

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governance has increased by manifold times in terms of geographical area and population coverage.

Talking of the city of Lucknow, that is second largest tier-two city in UP after Kanpur (in terms of population- Census, 2011), the decadal rate of growth of population in Lucknow Urban Agglomeration has been 28.05%

and

simultaneously the population covered by the Lucknow Municipal Corporation as a percentage of population of Lucknow Urban Agglomeration is 96.99% . This implies that 96.99% of people of Lucknow Urban Agglomeration (that is the 12th largest UA- Census, 2011) are catered to by the Lucknow Municipal Corporation.

Catering to this population the water supply systems in the city have also upgraded in terms of administrative divisions and operations, to institutionalized service delivery mechanisms (Service Level Benchmarks).

Thus water supply (infrastructure, maintenance, operations, and delivery) in Urban UP and more specifically tier-two cities is a subject of municipal bodies, renovated under institutionalized ethic post-1991. Since the Water is treated as a public good by large, among the perception of a common citizen of UP, minimal water charges are expected by them. This expectation of the population is met by the municipal bodies by charging for consumed water through a tariff system following nominal rates.Besides an exponential rise in the urban population of these tier-two cities over the last two decades, a great burden is put on the existing water infrastructure that demands for renovation and up-gradation. This up-gradation demands greater investments which are nevertheless met by the Governments at all levels.

However the contribution made by the local governments (municipal) is largely dependent on the revenues generated through water charges which are paid by less than 50% of the population of these tier two cities. Therefore the present system of governance needs a greater participation and awareness of the "50

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beneficiaries and realization of their duties towards paying for the State provided services used by them.
 Since under increased rates of urbanization, water which has always been a pure public good (marked by non-Rivalrous consumption and non-excludable nature) is gradually evolving to a common pool resource (Rivalrous consumption and nonexcludable nature) in urban areas; it becomes the imperative of the State to devise tariff rates based on the economic principles governing water supply and move on from the current existing practices of tariff-rate determination by socioeconomic variables prevalent in a region.

The future research scope of this paper can include seeing for the associations between the payment status of households and their tenurial dwelling status, social composition, occupation, and education.

References Anderson, J. E. (1960). The Emergence of the Modern Regulatory State.

Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.

Dubash, N. K., & Morgan, B. (2011). Understating the Rise of the Regulatory State in Global South. Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance , 4-12.

Levi-Faur, D. (2010, February). Regulation & Regulatory Governance. Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance , 8-15.

Levi-Faur, D. (2005). The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism. . The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 598, 12-32.

Levi-Faur, D. (2013). The Welfare State: A Regulatory Perspective. Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance , 4-7.

McKenzie, D., & Ray, I. (2009). Urban water supply in India: status, reform options and possible lessons. Water Policy , 442-460.

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McKinsey. (2010). India’s Urban Awakening: Building Inclusive Cities, Sustaining Economic Growth. Mc Kinsey Global Institute . Seoul, Seoul: MGI. Ranganathan, M. (2014). Paying for Pipes, Claiming Citizenship: Political Agency and Water Reforms at the Urban Periphery. International Journal of urban and regional research, 590-608.

Bakker, K. (2003). Archipelagos and Networks: Urbanization and Water Privatization in the South. The Geographical Journal, Vol 169, 328-341.

IDFC. (2011). India Infrastructure Report. Water: Policy and Performance for Sustainable Development.New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
 IIHS. (2011). Urban India 2011: Evidence. India Urban Conference (pp. 19-22).

Delhi: Indian Institute of Human Settlements.

Rai, N., & Singh, A. (2014). Decentralized Urban Governance in India. Lucknow: Regional Centre for Urban and Environment Studies.

(2014). Water Tariffs in the City. Lucknow: Lucknow Jal Sansthan.

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Negotiating Gender: Women Officers in the Indian Army Aswathy Chandragiri1 Abstract Hypermasculinity, machismo and public patriarchy are some of the terms that go hand in hand with an institution like the armed forces. It is also an undeniable fact that there are many females serving in the armed forces of many countries including India. The aim of this paper is to examine the various gender negotiations women officers undergo to become a part and parcel of the Indian army.

It looks at the culturally written and unwritten norms of behaviours and

expectations within the institution and the Government policies that impact women in their professional work and family lives.

Keywords: Indian army, women, gender, organization, leadership

Introduction Time and again many researchers have tried to get to the basics of understanding gender. My research too is directed at analyzing gender subjectivities within a certain organizational, cultural set up. The novelty of this research lies in the fact that this particular organizational set up has not been much researched upon. The research, therefore, is focused on exploring how women officers assert themselves and takes on the role of a leader in the Indian army.

Indian army, a colonial remnant operating in the postcolonial terrain, underwent various changes with time like any other institution to fit within the global and

1

Former Student of South Asian University

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

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local context it serves. One such change is the induction of women into the armed forces. This was done on the one hand due to global trends and on the other within limits of local understandings of gender roles. “Female officers have been in the Armed Forces for about 80 years and served with competence and distinction. They were inducted in the Military Nursing Service in 1927 and in the Medical Officers Cadre since 1943. Following Cabinet approval, induction of lady officers in other branches in the three Services started in 1992� (Press Information Bureau, 2008).

The cabinet decision was to induct them into the noncombat wings of the armed forces as short-service commissioned officers with 14 years as the maximum period of recruitment. They are commissioned into combat support arms and services. The Government does not admit them in any direct combat duty.

Neither can female officers fly fighters nor can they serve on warships or submarines. The Indian army accounts for 2.44 percent, the Indian Navy 3.0 percent and the Indian Air Force 6.7 percent women in its ranks. The Government approved permanent commission in the legal and educational wings of the three Services in 2008 (Bhattacharya, 2012: 318). The reasons for this limitation include, among others, unwillingness by Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and those of other ranks to accept women as leaders in combat situations where a high amount of trust is placed on the Commanding Officers (Singh, 2012). The population sex ratio in India is an unhealthy 940 females per thousand males and the sex ratio in the army is much worse. This data clearly shows that though women have started venturing into new arenas that were at one time controlled by the men folks single-handedly; their gendered construction is somehow preventing them from complete assimilation into the institution.

There are many unique problems that female officers face in the army. For instance, as an officer, she is expected to lead male troops. Jawans mostly come "54

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from villages where women are not expected to lead men. Consequently, taking orders from a woman officer might be an experience of cultural aberration for them. Bonding with her troops is an important part of an officer’s job and here in the Indian army the troops are all men as women are commissioned only at the officer ranks and not below. So how does she bond with them, especially when everyone in her troop is a male? Female officers face problems such as these which their male counterparts do not.

Though women are slowly becoming an integral part of the army, they are not taken into the combat wings of the army. They even have to work twice as hard as men in order to prove their worth. “Acceptance among the male soldiers is low” (Bhattacharya, 2012: 319).

Research Methods I adopted qualitative research methods of data collection because depth and detail are two essential factors that are of utmost importance considering the topic of my research. As I did not have much knowledge about the way of life of female officers within the army, I wanted to look at how women assert and negotiate their gender identity everyday by conducting in depth interviews of 10 female officers. By doing so, I collected first-hand information about their lives. I also conducted in depth interviews of 10 male officers so that I get more clarity and balance on the topic. I preferred to conduct semi structured interviews as it helped me collect as much information as possible about the whole setting. This helped me to locate women in this set up and view their perspectives about the issues they confront and also the men’s take on these issues and negotiations. I also used questionnaires to get answers for some particular topics. The questionnaires were distributed to 20 male officers of whom 18 responded and to 15 women officers of which 12 responded. I used the data from both: responses "55

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to questionnaires and formal and informal interviews of lady and male officers, to complete my research.

The interview questions majorly focused on the day to day interactions particularly between women officers and jawans, parity on matters between male and women officers, motivational factors for choosing and staying in this profession etc.

I

took notes of the conversations and prepared field notes about my visit to interview the officers to keep my data secure. The data was compared and analyzed.

Research Site As the number of women officers in the army is very low and they are posted in different areas throughout the country, I did not adhere to a specific research site.

The site varied depending on the availability of interviewees. However I received maximum of my respondents from cantonment areas in Delhi and Punjab. The time line for acquisitions started from mid-year of 2014 to 2015.

Leadership in the Indian Army Being a leader means different things to different people. Therefore, we have a multitude of definitions and a wide variety of literature stressing on its diverse aspects. Everybody leads or follows somebody at various points of life.

Organizations especially, be it the military or otherwise, require leadership that is more structured and definite. Among organizations too, the leadership styles differ. Here the focus is on constructing the meaning of leadership as required and is practiced by defence establishments.

Lt Gen. H.B. Kala, Former Army Commander, Western Command and author of military books gives us the core ideas on which military leadership is built. A leader should be a man of character (honest, loyalty, selflessness etc.), "56

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courage( moral and physical), competence, commitment, dynamism, decisiveness, magnanimity, accessibility, spirituality, transparency and both humanitarian and ruthless without overdoing both (H.B. Kala, 2003: 57-68).

All the military

academies look for officer like qualities while selecting the candidates and then they are grilled for some years through training to produce leaders.

Difference between Male and Female Leadership in the Military The essential understanding of military leadership or even leadership per se becomes more complex when gender dimensions come into play. As every officer is a leader and as Indian army has opened its door to women only at the officer level, it is important to find if there are any differences in their leadership styles that are affecting women positively or negatively within the institution. There is one set of literature which supports the idea that leadership patterns differ between men and women and another set which debunks these variations.

“Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, and van Engen’s (2003)meta-analysis revealed that, compared with

male leaders, female leaders were (a) more transformational

(significant in general and on all but one subscale) and (b) engaged in more of the contingent reward behaviors (i.e., exchanging rewards for followers' satisfactory performance) that are one component of transactional leadership”(Eagly and Carli, 2003: 817). “The arguments for a “female advantage” in leadership generally stem from the belief that women are more likely than men to adopt collaborative and empowering leadership styles, while men are disadvantaged because their leadership styles include more command-and-control behaviors and the assertion of power (Paustian-Underdahl, Walker and Woehr, 2014: 1129). They also found that in older studies men were considered more effective leaders and in recent studies the conclusion is vice versa. The results thrown up by these studies have however become more of a common sense knowledge that is spun "57

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with stereotypical notions of both the genders. Therefore there is still no final word due to the conflicting turnouts these studies have found themselves in.

But there were no such conflicts among army officers of both the genders when asked what constitutes leadership in the army. Both men and women touched upon almost the same traits while describing what leadership meant to them personally. They were of the opinion that integrity, loyalty, truthfulness and selfconfidence are some of the important requirements.

Similarly, both men and women who were interviewed vehemently denied that there is any gender difference when it comes to leadership. Yet, through this research, it is found that, within the Indian army, leadership roles provided to men and women are not the same. Women can only become sub unit commanders and not the Commanding Officer of the complete unit. This is because the Commanding Officer of the battalion should have put in a service of minimum 15 years and women are allowed to serve the army only up to a maximum of 14 years. It is after 14 years of service that a person gets a chance to be promoted as Colonel and so the topmost rank a woman can achieve in the army (leaving out the medical core and certain other cores) is the post of Lieutenant Colonel.

Permanent commission was not allowed in any arms of the army until 2008. Now women are allowed permanent commission in legal and education sector and not in any other sector. This is because in both these sectors women do not have direct command of troops but will only have staff under them. They are the only sectors which are not involved in battles at all.

Besides this, one has to serve in the army for a minimum of 20 years in order to be eligible for pension. As most women are not provided with permanent commission they do not get pension once their stipulated period in the army is completed. Women have been fighting cases for becoming permanent commissioned officers, thereby to become eligible for pension.

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While some officers view the denial of permanent commission as an injustice meted out towards women, some believe that the time is not ripe for it as of now.

Captain Vikram is of the opinion that permanent commission can come once troops also have women (Vikram, interview data 2014).

Some male officers who were interviewed were of the opinion that most women don’t want permanent commission because of social problems (Vikram, Mahesh, Jeevan, interview data 2014). The ‘social problems’ here included getting married, having kids, taking care of the house etc. But the real problem lies in the double standards meted out by the government policy where short service commissioned officers are given an option to stay back in the establishment or to leave but women mandatorily have to leave. While many officers leave the army after their short service stint, male officers assume that women anyway would not want to take up permanent commission.

However, some male officers feel that women must be given permanent commission. For instance, in Capt. Mahesh’s words, “They (women officers) must be given permanent commission because they put everything into it (army).

Suppose in cantonment, she happens to take a bullet… why is she not given permanent commission. Rather many male officers who did badly in the battle fields were given permanent commission. Their (male officers) moral integrity is questioned. Still they (male officers) are not denied per manent commission.”(Mahesh, interview data 2015) The research found that women are also not very keen on taking up the permanent commission. For instance, when asked what Maj. Tulsi wanted to do after she left the army, she replied that she will be getting permanent commission but is not very sure if she would take up that option or not (Major Tulsi, interview data 2014). Yet there are many women who would like to be permanently commissioned in the forces and all the court litigations stand as a testimony to it.

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The situation is similar to the male soldiers. Not all officers who enter army through short service commission want to stay back after their stipulated tenure.

While they are given a choice whether to stay back or not to, women are denied of the same. Therefore, denial of opportunity to become a Commanding Officer spills over to denial of the provision of pension. The cascading effect of the disadvantage meted out to women is visible in this scenario. It also reflects the negative perception of women officers within Indian Army.

The position of Commanding Officer commands high respect and trust from junior officers and troops alike. Commanding Officers are directly involved in leading and planning wars. During life and death situations, the cohesive unit looks up on the commander to take the lead. It is here that women lose out due to a number of reasons discussed above. However, this research found that jawans find women officers to be more competitive than their male counterparts when it comes to listening to their problems and solving them. Both men and women agree that women are good administrators and are better than men at desk jobs (interview data 2014-15).

Therefore, it is evident that the military

establishment views leadership of women as being different from leadership of men though they do not agree to it verbally.

Reasons for Secondary Role for Women Stereotypical notions about females restrict them to enact only in particular ways established by the culture. The ideal notions of femininity and women found in the Indian society spills over to engulf institutions like the army. Therefore, to get work done and to be accepted by the troops, women sometimes enact themselves as mothers and sisters. For instance, a senior female officer addresses troops as ‘beta’ while ordering duties to them. Similarly, jawans prefer to approach women officers regarding their problems as women are considered "60

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good listeners and councillors. It is the same stereotypical notion of women’s arena of work that stops the army in providing equal opportunities for women from direct combat. There is a lack of trust in women’s ability. “To be a woman in a masculinist culture is to be a source of mystery and unmeasurability for men.” (Blackmore (1998) in Pirouznia, 2006: 206). This is perhaps the reason why jawans lack trust in women when it comes to combat situations. As matters of life and death come to play in combat situations, trust on the leader is an essential factor for the troops to improve their morale and if it is a woman who leads them in such adverse conditions, they tend to be doubtful of her abilities to lead, especially when it comes to her physical prowess. The onus of taking care of the family, especially the children, still lies with the women and this puts to test the obligation women have for the work. One of the utmost important qualities of a leader is the commitment to work and the army doubts the preparedness of women regarding this. This becomes all the more important when it comes to combat situations. Policy of the government does not allow women to become COs by compulsorily reducing the time period of their retirement from the army.

They are also not provided with the required training for leading men during combat.

The prejudice that one sees in the policy is but the duplication of the biases perpetuated by the society. The invisible thread that connects the above mentioned reasons is nothing but the domination of patriarchal norms in myriad ways that are not always obvious.

Women Officers and Family Life Marriage is yet another instance which has the potential to either help women develop her personhood fully or to discourage her achievements and disempower her in the process. In a scenario where marriage almost defines the lives of "61

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women in India, its importance in the lives of women officers has to be documented. Working women, who are married, take up many, varied roles in their daily lives. Balancing work and family is more or less like walking on a thin rope where leaning slightly towards one side can affect the harmony of these multiple roles.

Both work to family conflict and family to work conflict is vividly seen among men and women serving in the army. “A broad review of existing literature on barriers to women’s career advancement suggests that one of the most important reasons inhibiting women’s rise to the top positions in management is the work-life conflict that women professionals experience because of their strong commitment to family responsibilities” (Buddhapriya, 2009: 31) One of the reasons for a stronger commitment to family might be the halo around the ideology of motherhood. Motherhood is usually seen as the natural and primary destination and responsibility of women (Dutta 1990:84). In India, motherhood is like a double edged sword where the culture of mother goddess worship echoes through the deification of women at one hand and on the other, it signifies many restrictions. According to Alimo-Metcalf, Kumra, Vinnicombe, Lyness, Schrader, Mainiero, Sullivan, Ohlottet, there is considerable evidence that men’s careers tend to be linear while women’s are characterized by interruptions and exits” (in Ezzedeen and K. G. Ritchey, 2009 : 389). The interruptions and exits are usually related to motherhood and husband’s income. These factors too find its roots in the cultural context.

There is a complete dearth of material regarding the work and family life conflicts of officers in the Indian army. Therefore, this research has looked at how men viewed married women officers and how the latter saw themselves while enacting roles within the families and within the profession.

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Men’s Perspective of Married Women Officers The findings point to the fact that most of the male officers believe that, woman, be it an army officer or pursuing any other job, should or will prioritise home and family above her career. Some interesting responses among many were: “It (woman’s job priorities) depends on the partner. Compatibility is the key of any successful marriage. If partner is understanding then there should be no problem in the profession. No. It (own job priorities) all depends on time management.”(Capt. Vivek, interview data 2014).

“Yes…Both will be posted in different areas…Time at which one gets leave, other might not. No. Personal and official lives are two different things” (Lieutenant Uttam, Interview data, 2015) These responses point to the perception that while women’s responsibilities increase with marriage thereby affecting her job priority. Similarly, while some officers believe that job competencies affect both men and women, the reasons for the same are different.

Women’s Perspective of Married Women Officers It was first of all difficult for women officers to find partners to settle down with.

Women officers preferred to get married to male officers but were equally willing to accept civilian men who would understand their work. The main reason some women preferred civilian husband was that their husbands would be able to provide time for kids. Capt. Saumitra who received her new posting order to a very remote location just a few days before the interview has to leave her kids behind with her civilian husband. In her words, “when you leave your kid behind, it pinches. I can’t take my daughters. They need their mom. Till I was not married, I enjoyed. With marriage, things change” (Saumitra, interview data 2015). This response points to the fact that there is glorification of motherhood among "63

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women officers. They believe that they are better nurturers than men. Similarly, Maj. Vaishnavi gave the reason of taking care of her daughter for not taking up permanent commission which was offered to her by the army (Vaishnavi, interview data 2014).

The policy of the army provides a good period of maternity leave that women can combine with other types of leaves if required. This has not gone well with male officers as they believe that the shortage of officers becomes even more acute with women taking leave and that they would have to do the share of the woman officer’s work too. However, Maj. Tulsi opined that her Commanding Officer gave her extra work and asked others also to get things done from her soon before she would start with her maternity leave. She herself did all that she could before her maternity leave commence (Tulsi, interview data 2014). Capt. Brilanda opined that there are women who take advantage of the situation and compromise on the job front but one cannot give sweeping conclusions. She says that men also compromise at work owing to family pressures. “If one lady takes leave, they (male officers) crib. 5 men don’t do work, they don’t crib. Not all men work equally” (Brilanda, interview data 2015). The responses point to the findings that family and marriage disables women in committing fully into their profession. The mind set of male officers and women officers themselves perpetuate the notion that women are primary caretakers of the home. It is found that even if women do not want to be the primary care takers, they are made to be so out of societal compulsions or out of love for the husband/family.

Government Policy and Women In 2011, guidelines of the Defence Ministry mandated that women in armed police forces like the Border Security Force and Indo-Tibetan Border Patrol would be posted at border posts close to their hometowns depending on administrative "64

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and operational requirements. “The new guidelines also mandate that if a woman personnel is married, she should be stationed at the same place where her husband is posted provided he too is a government employee” (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2011). Though these guidelines are not applicable to the army, the above said policies by the Government, being exclusively for women and not for men throws light at the attitude that women are more embedded into familial works and responsibilities than men.

Identity Formation For women, it is easy to connect to other women across the globe as the common platform of gendered discrimination puts them in many similar situations and experiences, thereby helping each one to understand the other more effectively.

Therefore, the problems women officers face in India has its similarities in other armies where women work. For instance, women officers in most parts of the world are not wholly involved in combat duties and their responsibilities vary in degrees in conflict situations. However, the social construction of gender happens not in vacuum but is embedded within the web of culture and therefore there occurs certain differences due to difference in environment where women officers negotiate their identity and form one of their own.

Social Construction of Gender The term ‘social construction’ might be “both obscure and overused” (Ian Hacking 1999: VII) for some scholars but it still retains its utility in studying murky concepts like gender. R W Connell, in her book Gender and Power, discusses the trajectory of understanding what femininity and masculinity is right from the unitary models and sex difference researches which stressed on biology and psychology to gender related traits to multiple models enmeshed with "65

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possibilities to cathaxis and to defining what is hegemonic masculinity and emphasised femininity. “‘Hegemonic masculinity” is always constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to women” (Connell 1987:183). This brings forth the view that there is not just one category of masculinity or femininity but many variations of it.

Similarly, West and Zimmerman look at gender as “a routine, methodical, and recurring accomplishment” (West and Zimmerman 1987: 126).”Doing gender involves a complex of socially guided perceptual, interactional and micro political activities that cast particular pursuits as expressions of masculine and feminine “natures”” (West and Zimmerman 1987: 126). The notion of people doing gender therefore warns us that the everyday naturalness we devout to performances of men and women is least bit unpretentious. But is it possible to stereotype and draw counters for every activity and compartmentalize them as feminine, masculine or gender neutral? “It is time to put the spotlight squarely on the social processes that underlie resistance against conventional gender relations and on how successful change in the power dynamics and inequities between men and women can be accomplished. Namely, we need to shift from talk about doing gender to illuminating how we can undo gender (Deutsh 2007: 107).

For instance, what do women joining the Indian army feel about them? Do they see themselves as imitating men or do they use their agency in their professional front? It is important to understand why do at all, women join the army, given the circumstances that they do not get permanent commission, pension, direct combat engagements and have to face obstacles in leading a ‘normal’ family life.

Why Do Women Join The Army?

Most women who were interviewed joined the army to prove themselves. They were women looking for adventure, to challenge the societal notions of being a "66

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woman, to travel and to serve the nation. Those women, who were originally from ‘army background’ i.e. their fathers served in the forces, were influenced by the lives of their dads. Most women emphasized that they receive respect from the society once they join the army which made them happy. Among the various reasons that women pointed out, one important factor that was found missing was the requirement to attain power. However, among men, the motivation for power was one of the factors that drew them towards the profession. “Most women leaders are driven by a vision, mission or cause. They are motivated by a compelling agenda that they want to achieve , not primarily by either a desire for the hierarchical status of being president, prime minister or CEO, or a desire for power per se”( Adler, 1997: 189). Within the women officers of Indian army, the fact that the highest post they can achieve is only that of lieutenant colonel has not deterred women from joining the army. But women feel that for the training that they have undergone, the army is not utilizing their talents fully.

Training It is during the process of training that there occurs a sea of change in the behaviours and the thought process of both men and women. It’s only in OTA Chennai that men and women cadets get their training together. Every other academy in the country is dedicated exclusively for men. During the process of training they are put through a large amount of physical and psychological stress.

They are provided with the knowledge of using weapons, survival techniques etc. along with refinement of mannerisms like how to walk, sit and behave. It is in the academy that they learn not to question their seniors and how to be disciplined.

While the training was not provided equally for men and women until a few years ago, presently the standards are the same. But training for combat is not provided

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for women cadets. This research also found that both male and female officers regard high of women’s abilities they showcased during the training.

Capt. Jeevan opined, “They (women officers) do better than us in courses. There is a 2.4 km run in the academy. They also have to run but time frame is increased for them. For a girl to run 2.4 km is harder. Many men are not able to do. To come under 11 minutes is tough…We have speed march when we go for camps. We have to come back running. Out of 10, about 7 women are able to complete but men are not” (Jeevan, interview data 2014).

Women officers feel that there occurs a huge change within them after the academic life is over. They become physically and mentally stronger after the training. Major Tulsi said, “We were just girls brought up in a secure environment.

Now we are more cautious, have iron nerves to withstand pressure and high expectations.” Once she went home after the training, her family commented that “fauj admi bana diya hai (Army has made her a man)” (Tulsi, interview data 2014).

The transformation, however, is not exclusively for women. Men too, see themselves differently after training.

There occurs a change both in women and men which transforms them to become soldiers. Many studies have pointed out that, women, once they join the army, become more masculine or that they imitate masculinity traits. Also, the army is portrayed as masculine or hyper masculine institution (Sasson-Levy 2003).

But, can these changes that happen within the cadets be summarily classified as masculine has to be questioned as masculinity itself is a murky concept to begin with.

The acceptance of women in the army was almost at the rock bottom when the first batch joined in 1993. Even now, women face myriad problems. Many

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newspaper reports2 have cited the problem of acceptance by troops who come from rural areas as the main predicament for women being well acknowledged into the defence forces.

As Capt. Pratyusha puts it, ‘While interacting with the troops, one has to be business minded’ (Pratyusha, interview data 2015). Both lady and male officers try and bond with the troops in similar ways. They play games; go for patrolling and firing with the troops and engage in many other such routine activities. However, as troops are made up of men only, it is not easy for women to bond easily with them. Women have to first prove themselves to be accepted by the troops. For example, while playing basketball they would play around the female officer and would not pass her the ball. Once she shows her mettle on the ground, then the troops accept her and they play together. However, some male officers have countered this view by observing that the troops generally let the lady play and do not come onto her way when she gets the ball. Without questioning the authenticity of what actually happens, it can be found that during both the circumstances, there is denial of women’s attempt to bond with the troops.

Another problem women face with the troops is that, sometimes, jawans do not obey the orders passed by them. During such instances, female officers resort to threatening the man in question by warning that she would complain about him and fearing the repercussions, the soldier obeys her orders. Maj. Tulsi is of the opinion that if women uses slang as male officers do, it is something a soldier cannot take in. So, simply by threatening that she would start using slangs would be enough to make him obey the orders. “One needs to be harsh while dealing with the troops” (Tulsi, interview data 2014).

2

Sagar,Pradip R. 6 June 2014.' Forward march: Women may get to serve Army for longer tenure' DNA Singh,Gyanant. September 17 2012. 'Indian Army against granting permanent commission to women in combat roles' Indian Today. Rajagopal ,Krishnadas.January 27, 2015.'Permanent commission for women hanging fire’ The Hindu

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Most of the narratives we read in the newspapers about the army do not speak openly about the level of acceptance male officers have for their women counterpart. Newspaper reports portray that women are well accepted by male officers and the problem lies with the troops as they hail from rural India.

Saluting the senior officer is one of the basic etiquette that is taught during the training. Some female officers have faced instances where their juniors do not salute them just because of the gender. Many female officers let such instances pass without reporting or correcting his behaviour then and there. Most are of the opinion that they should “take it professionally and not personally” (Saumitra, interview data 2015).

Women in the first few batches had more problems in dealing with men as women were a novelty in the all-male den. Officers would “laugh and chat” (Brilanda, interview data 2014) without wishing the female officer. Capt.

Vikram recounted an instance when he was told to not salute a lady officer by another officer. The reason was that a lady is trained less than them (Vikram, interview data 2014).

Army life is not complete without attending frequent parties. During these parties, female officers who might be just one or two in number are confused whether to join the officers or the wives of the officers. They are not accepted fully into the company of both the categories.

Identity formation does not stop with the training process and as mentioned above by Capt. Shashank, the role of senior officer who commands the unit plays a huge role in character building. During the research, some men complained that women copy men, especially their Commanding Officers and they try to do the same without thinking (Bakshi, Mahesh, interview data 2015). But female officers opined that it is not just them but men too copy their seniors. Also, the way the Commanding Officer treats the women either helps them grow positively within "70

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the institution or makes their lives worse. Capt. Shivshakti recalled an instance where a senior officer told her that she is not fit for joining an institution like the army (Shivshakti, interview data 2014). Capt. Anamika opined that probably out of jealously, commanding officers give them very challenging work “to teach a lesson”.

All the women who were interviewed said that they did not deliberately imitate men. However, Maj. Tulsi opined that she prefer wearing tracks most of the time whenever uniform is not necessary as it gives her more confidence. She also said “Women who join now are more comfortable within the institution than us. I have seen them wearing salwar kameez to office on Sundays. But I cannot imagine me doing that. We had to transform ourselves into male version to be accepted as we were the first few batches that joined. They don’t care if they are accepted that way or not” (Tulsi, interview data, 2014).

Combat Many countries in Europe like Denmark, Finland, Germany etc., Australia, Canada, North Korea among others allow women in front line combat positions. (Max Fisher January 25 2013). As a matter of fact, Pakistan too permits its female officers to fly fighters. But the women in the Indian army that accounts for 2.44 percent only (Bhattacharya, 2012: 318) are still fighting the battle in courts.

“The reason put forth by the service chiefs before the Parliamentary Committee on Women's Empowerment was that in the case of women being captured by the enemy, the troops would be demoralized. So it is not women's safety which is the concern here but that male morale would be affected if "their" women were captured. Women as trophies for the enemy or women as symbols of the nation; nothing about the sovereign rights of women themselves” (Karat 2014). The army in an affidavit to Supreme Court in 2012 pointed out that: "71

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“War has no runners-up, hence the need for an efficient war machine that will ensure victory.’’ “The interface between the leader and the led must be without any reserve or preconceived notions, especially in battle conditions where jawans repose full faith in decisions/orders of the leader who is their role model and are prepared to make the supreme sacrifice in the line of duty”. “The possibility of becoming prisoners of war, frontline trauma and combat hazards were cited in the affidavit.” “There is an ever growing demand for spouse/choice postings, which is adversely impacting the management of officers to the detriment of male officers” (Rajagopal, 2015).

The possibility of prisoners of war came up again and again during the research conducted. According to Capt. Amit, “our neighbours are fundamentalists and if they catch them (women officers)...God forbid... no one adheres to Geneva convention”( Amit, interview data 2014). Men per se were not willing to part the combat duty with women.

Women’s opinions were divided as to whether they wanted to be part of combat or not. Capt. Sudekshana said that “in combat things are 100 percent different.

Every man is important (in combat).Women will not be able to take that pressure.

Women are mentally weak and with marriage priorities change. It is not men’s duty to take care of family” (Sudekshana, interview data, 2015). Capt. Shivshakti had an alternate viewpoint. “Blaming our neighbours is stupid reason. Combat is not men to men fighting. It is tactical or weight lifting women can join the army” Capt. Shiv Shakti chuckled to herself. (Shivshakti, interview data 2015) The current scenario in the army is such that let alone combat situations, even solitary field postings are not provided to women. As already mentioned during the camping situations, protection of women from other men is seen as a cause to not provide women field postings that are faraway and hard to access. Women also face difficulty in attending to nature’s call while patrolling or travelling. The "72

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female officer is usually the lone woman travelling with many jawans and male officers.

The attitude towards women and the attitude of women both come to play in such situations. Women are seen as requiring protection from men and therefore are restricted in their professional front. Women too are cautious and sometimes feel threatened by men within the institution. The abysmally low numbers makes women seemingly vulnerable. In the culturally constructed web, simple, every day acts like attending nature’s call itself becomes a burden for women who are surrounded by men.

Conclusion One of the jobs undertaken by feminists is to consciously make women visible in our histories. There has been quite of few rewritings of history where the role of women is deliberately made visible. The disciplines like sociology had ignored women in its early days. Women are still excluded in the production and representation of many social and cultural activities and even they are included, they do not receive their due recognition (Uberoi, 1990:41). The case of women serving the armed forces throughout the world is an example for this. This research, conducted on women officers working with the Indian army is an attempt to make visible the lives of the handful females serving the country.

The research found that the entry of women has impacted the lives of these women and the army as an institution in myriad ways. When women joined the army for the first time, the academy was not sure how to train women as they were unaware as to how much to expect from them. It is through the process of feedbacks from the outgoing commissioned women officers and the various studies conducted, that the academy is slowly incorporating a more or less gender neutral standards of training. Women do not have the opportunity to "73

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receive training in the prestigious NDA or IMA as they are reserved for the permanent commissioned officers. Just like the academy, women too are not fully convinced as to how much they can commit to the job. While some want combat engagements, some do not. Similarly, all women do not want permanent commission in the cores where they already have been given the option. But the problem lies with the availability of choice. Women should be given a choice whether to take up permanent commission or not, just like men. The denial of this fundamental choice point to a certain attitude the army harbours towards female officers. If women are given permanent commission, then invariably they would become Commanding Officers which the army does not want to provide women with. Though the army is incorporating certain changes in its functioning to accommodate women, it is happening in a snail’s pace. Army has to transform itself into a shared arena of human capabilities and presently the paramilitary institutions are faring better than the army in this respect. For instance, the CRPF has three exclusive women battalions and one platoon of each of these battalions is deployed for anti-Maoist operation. Some ITBP women personnel are serving in the Congo and Afghanistan (Chaitanya Mallapur, 2015). However, the army is still mulling over the option for taking women as troops or in providing more opportunities to showcase women’s talents.

The army is hesitant because it thinks the attitude and the mind set of people within the institution has to change. Though no generalizations can be made, it can be seen that there are a large number of changes that is occurring in the organization. The training standards have improved, women are provided with permanent commission is some ranks etc. which are of course positive changes.

But these changes are more or less like a ripple in the vast waters.

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institution. Women currently are grappling with a crisis of identity though they are proud to proclaim themselves as army officers. They are not fully integrated into the army due to the various policies of the Government and also due to reluctance in the minds of male officers and the jawans. The defence ministers of India have always been male except for Smt. Indira Gandhi and so was everybody in the army till a few years ago leaving the medical core. The norm is that a soldier is a male. The idea of perceiving women as equal human beings have not arisen. Women’s bodies are still perceived as troupes of nation’s honour and therefore in requirement of protection. Strong women who can be violent challenge the gender stereotyping and therefore are explained through discourses of mental stability, whore narrative and so on. “It has been taken for granted for a long time, even though there has been a lot of fighting women, that war is something men do and therefore also militarism belong to men” (Hearn in Holmgren, 2015 :12). The thunderous images of goddesses like Shakti, Durga and Kali has not helped the cause.

The idea of protecting its own citizens and its soldiers are ingrained in the culture of army and therefore it thinks that it is its right to protect women by even restricted them. However, in the organisations that are illegal like that of the Maoists in India and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, women are involved more deeply and are known to take up combat unlike the Indian army. Rahul Pandita mentions that it took time for Maoists to change their patriarchal ideas and to think in a more gender neutral terms. Maybe, women find more freedom not in the legitimate laws of a patriarchal state but in the illegal institutions that challenge the state and its laws. It is time to question the performative effectivity of laws where woman is a subject.

Women in the Indian army, however, are not senile and submissive to these policies that oppress them. On-going court cases stand as a testament to this.

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Women here are not passive recipients of training and are not imitating men to try to become masculine, so as to be accepted. The newly commissioned officers are comfortable with their sexuality which is evident while they opt to wear clothes like salwar kameez on Sundays to office and not track suits as women who joined earlier. The attribution of toughness to men and sensitivity to women is not biological but historical and it is the context that one finds oneself in, shapes one’s identity ((Connell in Holmgren, 2015: 4). It would be absurd to categorize every day activity of these women as either masculine, feminine or gender neutral. Stereotyping of human behaviour might be problematic in the long run to understand our changing selves. While female officers out rightly denied that they deliberately mimicked what is considered as masculine characteristics, they defined their conduct as being more mature and diplomatic which they think is a way to get things done for the State. Yet, many a times, we find women repeating and reflecting the notions held by men about them while conducting professionally and within families. Majority of Army officers, both men and women believe that the primary care taker at home is always the womenfolk. Such a notion arises from the collective and shared belief of the wife and husband that women are better nurtures and that family is more important for a woman than her job.

Presently the Government and the media are making only a token effort to assimilate women into the defence forces. The portrayal of women as liberated beings through republic day parade where a woman led the guard of honour or showcasing pictures of women brandishing guns by the media is simply not enough. Right before the parade showcasing ‘Nari Shakti’ (women empowerment), the army made it clear that frontline combat deployment restrictions would continue. The responses from the army in the court cases showcases that the institution is unwilling to give women their due but is "76

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compelled by the changing world view to provide women with some platform within the institution. It is as though the army is doing a favour to the women in the country by inducting them into the forces as it has worked in all its history without the representation of the 50 percentage of population it vows to protect.

It is another matter that currently the defence forces are grappling with shortage of officers as never before in its history.

As the institutions within a society tend to mirror the society itself, the army is no exception. It mirrors the patriarchy, the changing global scenario, the shifting contours of gender, new ideas of leadership, the woes of women and the other transformations of the societal flux. Therefore, the gender negotiations of a female officer are an on-going process which directs the path towards probably a utopian idea of undoing gender.

References Bhattacharyya, Arundhati (2012). “Women in Military in India: The Cry for Parity”, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 317-25.

Buddhapriya, Sangamithra (2009). “Work-Family Challenges and Their Impact on Career Decisions: A Study of Indian Women Professionals”, Vikalpa, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 31-45.

Deutsch, Francine M. (2007). “Undoing Gender”, Gender and Society, Vol. 21, pp.

106- 27 Dutta, Sangeeta (1990). “Relinquishing the Halo: Portrayal of Mother in Indian Writing in English”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 42/43, pp. WS84WS94.

Eagly Alice H. and Linda L. Carli (2003). “The Female Leadership Advantage: An Evaluation of the Evidence” The Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 6, pp. 807– 834.

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Ezzedeen, Souha R.and K. G. Ritchey (2009). “Career Advancement and Family Balance Strategies of Executive Women” Gender in Management: An International Journal, Vol. 24, No. 6, pp. 388 – 411.

Hacking, Ian, (1999). ‘The Social Construction of What?’ Harvard University Press Holmgren, Petter (2015). “Men, Masculinity and the Military”, available at http:// lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOld=33580852, site accessed on 9th March, 2015 Karat, Brinda (2014). “Indian Army's Shameful Treatment of Women Recruits “in NDTV, 28 November available at http://www.ndtv.com/opinion/indian-armysshameful-treatment-of-women-recruits-706717, site accessed on 6th April 2015.

Lt. Gen. H.B. Kala (2003). “Basic Essentials of Military Leadership”, Pp57-68. In Demystifying Military Leadership. New Delhi: Manas publication.

Mallapur Chaitanya (2015). “Eighty-Eight Years On, 5% Of Indian Military Officers Are Women” available at http://scroll.in/article/712735/Eighty-eight-yearson,-5%-of-Indian-military-officers-are-women, site accessed on 9th March, 2015.

Fisher, Max (2013). “Map: Which Countries Allow Women in Front-Line Combat Roles?” in The Washington Post, 25 January, available at http:// www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/01/25/map-whichcountries-allow-women-in-front-line-combat-roles/#, site accessed on 6th April 2015 Paustian-Underdahl Samantha C. and Lisa Slattery Walker and David J. Woehr (2014). “Gender and Perceptions of Leadership Effectiveness: A Meta-Analysis of Contextual Moderators” Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 99, No.6, pp. 1129– 1145

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Pirouznia, Mahshid (2006).“The Obstacles in Women’s Pathway to Principalship” available at http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi,site accessed on 17th Feb 2015 Press Information Bureau, Government of India. 2011. “Fresh Set of Guidelines Issued for Women Personnel” Outlook May 17.

Rajagopal, Krishnadas (2015).

“Permanent Commission For Women Hanging

Fire” in The Hindu, January 27.

Sasson-Levy, Orna (2003). “Feminism and Military Gender Practices: Israeli Women Soldiers in “Masculine” Roles”, Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 73, pp. 440-65 Uberoi, Patricia (1990). ‘Feminine Identity and National Ethos in Indian Calendar Art’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 17, pp. WS41-WS48 West and Zimmerman (1987). “Doing Gender”, Gender and Society, Vol. 1, No.2, pp. 125- 51

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The Woes of Being Politically Visible in an Aspirational Global City: A Case of Auto Rickshaw drivers in Delhi Ishita Trivedi1 Abstract This paper tries to demystify the political economy that motivates commuters in Delhi to perceive auto rickshaw fares as ‘high, and unfair’ and auto drivers as inherently ‘greedy and nonchalant’ people. I argue that the perception about this sector is simplistic and fuelled by the middle class’ need to shoot the messengeror, the most visible part of that process- i.e. the auto-rickshaw driver. My argument is presented in five sections- a brief introduction of the auto financier’s mafia-like credit systems, and monopoly of permits that allows total control over the operation of three-wheelers on-road; underlining the post-colonial roots of Delhi’s Global City aspirations and how that translates in a regulatory system that is discriminatory to drivers; how the drivers, as a collective, participate in the democratic politics of the city, and relate to the state; the ubiquity of the autorickshaw on Delhi roads, and the consequent ramifications of being politically visible; finally, I turn the spotlight on the middle-class milieu, their activism, and the bourgeoisie environmentalism of the Indian Supreme Court.

Keywords: auto rickshaw, political economy, middle-class, global, aspirations

1

Ishita Trivedi is a LAMP fellow

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

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Introduction In Delhi, auto rickshaw drivers have a reputation of being nonchalant, greedy and, inconsiderate to commuters- charging over and above government approved rates, refusal to take one to their choice of destination, and an unwillingness to go “by meter”, are just a few of the problems city commuters face. (Harding & Hussain, 2013) This behaviour instigates middle-class activists, who are regular users of auto services, to “take up the cause of” protesting against the existence and continuation of auto rickshaws as a part of the urban transport system; the widespread persistence of this problem further gives credence to the cause.

Simon Harding rationalises, that it isn’t possible for all of one lakh people, the approximate number of auto drivers in Delhi, to be intrinsically corrupt or inconsiderate? Surely, there must be a political economy that is responsible for producing and sustaining such wretched behaviour?

This brief introduction, aims to answer the question just posed, and give a succinct overview of the bureaucracy, corruption, and authorities that need to be traversed to get an auto rickshaws to ply on Delhi roads, “legally”. The main actors here are the owner-drivers, renter-drivers, financiers, the transport department, Delhi government, and the Supreme Court.

In the mid-90s, a new auto-rickshaw with permit cost around Rs.1 lakh for the auto and a few thousand more for the permit, taxes and administration costs. Today, the new auto costs a comparable amount but the permit itself now costs three time the cost of the three-seater vehicle i.e. Rs.3 lakhs. (Harding & Hussain, 2013) This spiralling of prices has its origin in the court ruling of 1997, which froze the number of auto-permits in a bid to control vehicular pollution. Later, during the CNG switchover, around 20,000 drivers lost their permits because they weren’t able to afford the new engines. Between 1997 and 2013, Delhi’s population grew

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by 64.8% whilst there was a clear decline in the number of autos on the streets2. It is worth noting that at this time, circa 1997, Delhi had no metro rail connectivity either, so the only affordable way of commuting was the city bus fleet. The public transport system of Delhi was broken and lacked options for last-mile and doorto-door connectivity. With auto rickshaws being the closest answer for those afore-mentioned lacunae in the transportation system, it was no wonder that there was a high demand of auto-permits. Prices sky-rocketed, and anything up to Rs. 6.5 lakhs was the going price for an auto permit on the second-hand or black market which was established by financiers (Harding, 2011). Aspiring ownerdrivers took credit from the financiers, and to repay them, overcharged users (VIkram, 2012). Thus, the courts unintentionally created a monopoly for the autofinanciers who took advantage of the now highly priced permits.

To date, a few financiers control more than 90% of all permits, which are usually never in the name of the financier, but exist with proxy names or details of the first driver they were sold to. The debt structure is oppressive- a 16-18% interest rate, complete with penalty charges. Many have been paying debts since 10 years with penalty fees amounting to as much as 3 lakh rupees (Harding, 2010). The autopermit is only transferred in their name once all the debts have been cleared, this means up till that time these autos are plying “illegally” (Aggarwal, 2011). The credit system is constructed to be unsustainable, so that the auto financier never really “sells” its autos; the financier is aware that re-possession is almost inevitable. This vicious cycle of reselling and repossessing can go up to five or six times, in some cases. Those renting autos on a daily basis, pay almost 50% of 2Delhi’s

population in 1997, at 122.8 lakhs increased to 202.24 lakhs in 2013 (http://www.delhi.gov.in/wps/ wcm/connect/DoIT_Planning/planning/economic+survey+of+dehli/content/demographic+profile) Also, the Delhi Government filed an application in the Supreme Court in November 2014 requesting permission for 2 lakh more autos to ply and highlighted that the population of Delhi had doubled since 1997, resulting in a steep demand for cheaper modes of public transport. (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Delhigovt-seeks-SC-nod-for-2-lakh-more-autos-in-capital/articleshow/45040426.cms)

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their day’s earnings to meet the rent and fuel costs. 80% of all drivers rent their vehicles, in contrast to “owning” their three-wheeler, even though owning remains a misnomer. Renter-drivers usually pay 250-300 rupees for a 10-12 hours shift, and earn the same amount in profit (Harding & Hussain, 2013). Many drivers are also cheated as they are coerced to sign blank contracts, which can be used against them to increase interest rates without warning; as most migrants are illiterate, they may not possess an understanding of how much, and when they owe payments.

This is just the proverbial tip of the iceberg- the drivers are also at the behest of the traffic police and transport officials, who arbitrarily challan them for not carrying any one of the sixteen documents3 that they are required to carry at all times- most of them superfluous, as they are forged by the financier anyway (Faruqui & Sud, 2001).

Section I: Post-colonial roots of Global City aspirations Delhi is the archetype of a city in transition- its aspirations to be a world-class, or global city skews its sensibilities and policies in a direction that disjoints it with its reality. Through most of the subcontinent’s history, Delhi has been many kingdoms’ choice to be their seat of power, and is the current administrative capital of the country- it has always sustained a political discourse that is telling of the nation’s modus operandi, at large. Since the country’s economic liberalization in the 90s, Delhi is no more content in being called one of only fifteen megacities, a category based on its size, but has aspirations of being what Sheila Dikshit refers to as a “world-class” city i.e. a Sassen-esque city that is closely

3For

step-by-step information on all the permits required, and from where auto-rickshaw drivers must procure them, please see (Faruqui & Sud, 2001)

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linked to globalized trade and politics- a Delhi which can yield power beyond its national borders (Hasan, 2014).

The liberalisation had a far-reaching impact on India’s urban economies (Fernandes, 2004) (Khilnana, 1999), and was responsible for the rise of the ‘new’ Indian middle class which was both materially, and discursively tied to economic liberalization and globalization (Ellis, 2011). This was because of the growth of new forms of employment, particularly information and communication technologies, and other “new economy” work; the class of people who were in a position to take advantage of the turning tide of the 90s, are now intolerant of any feature of their urban setting that mars their sanitised idea of it. The work towards Saskia Sassen’s conception of the definitive, global city has already begun; the removal of industrial activity from within the city to its peripheries and neighbouring rural hinterlands has been underway from over a decade4 . It’s no wonder that today’s Delhi is less equal and more intolerant of the poor. Now, those migrating from rural areas have no industrial jobs to get successfully proletarianized, and must, somehow, imperfectly, get absorbed by the predominant service industry, which is only creating polarised job profiles in the cities.

The idea of belonging to a global city is seductive to a post-colonial society- the elite classes, not pressed by the nagging vicissitudes of daily subsistence, are preoccupied with nursing their imperial hangover. The discourse of urban order that gets espoused by middle-class groups still resonates with notions of sanitation and containment that sought to order the colonial city (McFarlane, 2008). The semantics of this was clearly visible in the statement Sheila Dikshit,

4Re-location

of industries from Delhi’s centre to its periphery was the outcome of a PIL filed by environmental lawyer, and Magsaysay awardee, M.C. Mehta in 1985

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then Chief Minister of Delhi, made about banning auto rickshaws during before the 2010 Commonwealth Games; the CM’s desire to see visitors return home “with the impression that they have been to a truly civilised city” (Harding, 2010) led her to comment that, “Auto rickshaws are not a good option - they are uncomfortable and pollute the environment. Also, auto rickshaw drivers are unruly and harass passengers. Most of them ply illegally.” This statement typifies Amita Baviskar’s (2003) understanding that Delhi’s special status and visibility as national capital has made state anxieties around the management of urban spaces all the more acute: Delhi matters because very important people live and visit there; its image reflects the image of the nation-state.

I will return to this statement from time to time to highlight the gap between perception, and fact of who congests and pollutes the city, and what is meant by “illegal” in this context.

The characteristics of citizen-state relations in India are very different among the urban middle class, and the informal working class. People of the informal working class of Delhi, like the auto-rickshaw drivers, relate to the state as defined “populations” and are defined as such, to be the targets of policy, and to be controlled by the state (Harris, 2006). Chatterjee (2001) theorises that their relationship of being governed by the state opens up a space of negotiation where they make demands for their rights to welfare, which is defined as the ‘political society’- this is distinct from the conception of a ‘civil society’ which is based on participatory dialogues of the elites with the political class. This ‘new politics’ centred on the civil society and middle-class associational activity disregards the participation of the informal working class (Jodhka & Prakash, 2011). As political bargaining may be the only resource available to the informal workers, they are thus more active in electoral politics. Poorer people have a higher propensity to secure representation through political parties, as compared "85

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to wealthier people i.e. they are more likely to be politically active- defined in terms of electoral participation as well as presence in political rallies and demonstrations. Political parties respond to this by mobilising electoral support centred around the auto rickshaw drivers’ occupational identity, and participation.

Therefore, party politics, is generally oriented towards the denizens of political society, rather than the middle class citizens of the civil society (Harris, 2006) .

Section II: The politics of visibility Auto rickshaws, known as tuk-tuks in other parts of Asia, have been long romanticised for their novelty value in western pop-art. In a bid to cater to such “western” audiences, organisers of the Delhi Commonwealth Games managed to fetishize their own banality with a showcase of pimped-up models of auto rickshaws and push street carts in the Commonwealth Games’ dining hall ironically, just months before, for the purpose of these very Games, Sheila Dikshit had called to phase-out autos, and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was busy evicting street vendors.

PICTURE 1: DISPLAY AT COMMONWEALTH GAMES Source: http://kafila.org/2010/09/24/the-banality-ofshame/

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This inimical attitude of officials towards autos, though, is something of a universal phenomenon. Thailand, another place famous for its tuk-tuk rides, banned them briefly in the 1980s. Mumbai, India’s biggest city, and Mombasa, Kenya’s secondbiggest, ban them from parts of the central business district to keep the streets clear. Rickshaws are forbidden in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad. Sri Lanka’s government has sharply raised customs duties on them. The tuk-tuk’s rising popularity in Egypt worried its establishment and on February 12th, it imposed a one-year ban on imports of three-wheelers. Unlikely as it sounds, ministers claim they are being used as getaway vehicles by criminals. (The Economist, 2014) The construction of Delhi’s working class identity is also bound to the perpetuation of their identity as migrants, which signals that they belong elsewhere and keeps them from being recognised as full residents of Delhi. This perception disenfranchises them from civic citizenship (Baviskar, 2003) There are 1.25 lakh auto rickshaw drivers in Delhi, and they constitute a sizeable chunk of the migrant population from Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar; this is a number political parties cannot afford to ignore. Their ubiquity and visibility on Indian roads means they aren’t “invisible” informal workers with no leverage. Though they may reside there, they can’t be rendered invisible like the countless shanty towns that were hidden behind impassive screens for the benefit of the global audiences of the Commonwealth Games. Yet, what is not to be forgotten is that these ‘visible’ auto rickshaw drivers aren’t fully immune to the whims of the stateindeed, Sheila Dikshit did want to phase-out auto rickshaws from Delhi’s streets in 2010- though she was unsuccessful, it shows the highly precarious state of this skewed “quid pro-quo” arrangement.

Till the early 1990s, before the mass advent of internet and related communication channels, autos were a crucial part of election campaigning in Delhi, with political parties using them to display their flags. A party's chances of "87

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victory was presumed to be dependent on the number of auto rickshaws displaying its flag (Danish, 2013). In other countries too, auto rickshaws have a long history of displaying political statements. In Pakistan, radical Islamists have long used the rickshaws as a canvas to market slogans in support of religious warfare, and to foster hatred against the United States, but in February 2013 that legacy was modified to promote peace. Syed Ali Abbas Zaidi, head of the Pakistan Youth Alliance, is turning this strategy on its head with a fleet of rickshaws emblazoned with peace slogans and decorated with colourful designs, similar to those found on many trucks and buses in the country. "We need to take back this romanticized art form and use it for peace sloganeering and conflict resolution." (Abbot, 2013) One would think political strategies have evolved, but the high stakes, minutely covered Delhi elections of 2013 were telling of the significance that auto rickshaws occupy in the tug-of-war of vote banks. The new entrants in the electoral race for the Delhi Legislative Assembly- the Aam Aadmi Party- managed to display their posters on around 10,000 auto rickshaws for no charge, through the support of NyayaBhoomi, an NGO, working for the rights of auto rickshaw drivers.

In an open letter to Arvind Kejriwal, the Chief ministerial candidate from AAP for the 2013 elections, Pawan Khera, the political secretary of Sheila Dikshit, then sitting Chief-Minister, said: “I write to bring to your attention a rather uncouth campaign on auto-rickshaws hitherto not seen in this city known for a dignified political culture.” Consequently, many auto rickshaws were caught in the cross-fire - drivers of vehicles carrying these ads were fined by the traffic police. AAP’s campaign strategy did not go down well with the state government. In the first week of June 2013, the Delhi government issued an order banning the display of advertisements on auto rickshaws, a move that AAP claims was taken to muzzle its "88

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campaign. On 19 June, the Delhi High Court stayed the ban after AAP member, and prominent lawyer, Prashant Bhushan, argued that the ban was discriminatory, as it dealt only with auto rickshaws and was silent about similar advertisements displayed on other modes of transport (Danish, 2013).

However, the example of Delhi’s political process cannot be extrapolated even within India. There are a breadth of circumstances that change the fortunes of the informal working class from place-to-place. For example, In Mumbai, the strategy of right-wing regional parties like Shiv Sena, and Maharashtra Navnirman Sena has been to explicitly harass and target the rickshaw drivers by magnifying their occupations’ correlation with their “outsider” identity. Whilst Delhi’s political parties choose to use the same migrant identity to get leverage for their electoral opportunities in neighbouring states by keeping up appearances of being tolerant of them.

The middle class concerns itself with the quality of regulation by the state, and rightfully so, as its interests are affected by this sort of vote-bank politics. Yet, they do not consider the side-effects of these politics on the ‘vote-banks’ themselves, before they denounce it as a perversion; the informal working class are mocked for being no more instrumental than a ‘vote bank’- the elites are convinced that this politics is somehow a poor, illegitimate substitute to the grand, normative design of democracy.

Section III: Ramifications of being politically visible Why is it that any and every tangential issue of urban crisis somehow manages to boil down to the harrowing auto-rickshaw driver? Does the middle class perception of them as forever-venal and inherently criminal allow the city’s government to pass the buck to their stand-in scape-goats? The insidiousness

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with which social justice and anti-graft messaging5 has been framed by the middle class against them, which is perpetuated by mainstream media and promoted through social media, is astonishing in its conclusive dismissal of the urban poor as their fellow citizens- they are only regarded as criminals, leeching off the prosperity and slickness of their gleaming metropolitan space.

This is evident by the responses of the Delhi Government to the Nirbhaya rape case of December 2012. After the death of the rape victim, one of the first in a slew of “corrective” measures by the Delhi Government, was to re-tout a directive made by the Delhi High Court, earlier in the same year, for the compulsory installation of GPS meters, and ticket printing machines in autos. In 2014, this has still not been actualised because of its infeasibility, and the reluctance of auto rickshaws to buy from another government created monopoly- GPS monitors costing 5,000 rupees in the open market are available to auto-rickshaws at an inflated cost of 13,000 rupees. (Harding, 2012)

Picture 2:Poster of a Bangalore based Organisation, Change India, which floated this poster where the drivers are portrayed as ‘rakshasas’ Source: http://kafila.org/2010/09/24/the-banality-of-shame/

5Read

the full text of the Change.org petition that appeals for need of an efficient system to complain against errant auto drivers in Bangalore: https://www.change.org/p/ma-saleem-need-an-efficient-system-tocomplain-against-errant-auto-drivers-in-b-lore

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After another recent rape case that was highlighted by the media i.e. the Uber cab rape case, there were again renewed calls to make GPS systems mandatory for all autos (Pereira, 2014). So, no matter where, or why a rape takes place- the former rape case took place in a bus, and the latter happened in a private cabthe first call for regulation, and stricter control always falls on the auto rickshaws.

In addition to the above, there have also been numerous attempts to ameliorate the “unruly” migrant to the sensibilities of the city by conducting Basic English language classes, gender-sensitivity programs etc. It’s as John Harris phrases in his paper, rather than citizens, they are treated as people “to be done unto”.

This makes me wonder whether it could be a strategy for the political class to preserve the numbers of such groups. Even though there are currently only around 80,000 autos plying on the streets, which is a small number considering the total population of Delhi is 2.5 million, it allows for the subsistence of a much larger number of auto drivers, as there may be more than one driver who rents the same auto in shifts of 6-7 hours. To consider then are the dependants of these drivers, that are also by an extension, a part of this electorate. Clamping down on the auto-finance mafia may affect political dynamics in two ways- either, directly, if the mafia is in cahoots with the politicians and indirectly, it will be likely that once the financier’s grip is lost on the permits- in the short run, it may immediately push many renter-drivers out of a job, and the city; this might significantly diminish the size of the politician’s major vote bank.

Auto rickshaws are paradoxically oppressed by the very identity that makes them visible- they’re instrumental to the state by serving as the face of quick fixes for complex problems, and various governance failures.

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Section IV: Bourgeois Environmentalism6 & the Courts Sheila Dikshit’s hastiness to get rid of the auto rickshaws in favour of “nonpolluting” e-rickshaws and shuttles for last mile connectivity is especially shameful because it brings to the fore, either how little politicians and administrators really understand what’s going on, or how little they care for anything other than popular perception. “Clean” e-rickshaws operate on electrically-charged batteries that does nothing more than export the pollution to wherever it is that electricity is being produced, most of our electricity needs are still met by combusting coal in thermal power plants; it’s also well-known that coal is a dirtier fuel than Compressed Natural Gas- a fuel on which all public vehicles, including auto rickshaws, have been mandated to ply since 19987.

Mohan and Roy (2003) in their paper further evaluate why auto rickshaws are more environmentally sound than cars/ taxis. Autos have the capacity to carry, on an average, the same number of people, it takes one-third the parking area and half the space while in motion, when compared to a car. Since it weighs one-third of a car, it also wears out the road much less, has less tyre/rubber use. These facts show that autos are a much more resource-efficient answer to a growing metropolis’ urban transport crisis; it uses one-third of the national resources private vehicles would consume. Autos also have a considerably smaller engine, even when compared to cars with the most frugal motors (175 c.c. vs 800 c.c. for Maruti 800). This means they pollute much less, per passenger, and because of 6‘Bourgeois

environmentalism’ is a term coined by Amita Baviskar in 2002, which terms this phenomenon as the emergence of middle and upper class concerns with visual beauty, entertainment, cleanliness, and safety in a bid to shape metropolitan space solely according to this vision.

7It

is also true that mega power plants which produce electricity are subject to economies of scale and thus produce energy more efficiently, and are more closely regulated for meeting certain emission norms.

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the small capacity of the engine, they can't go faster than 50 km/h. These speeds have the potential to streamline the traffic on the congested roads of Delhi. Lower speeds and lighter weights, also means that they are less likely to result in fatal road accidents. (Mohan & Roy, 2003) Surely, the urban middle class who use the autos to commute in the city face considerable hardships in the form of constant haggling to negotiate for fares; they believe they are being fleeced when charged above the government approved rates- but just because these fares are government approved, doesn’t make them fair. The auto rickshaws and the middle class to some extent bear the cost of the inefficiencies cause by the graft in the transportation department, and the auto-finance mafia that is given tacit approval by the Government. So, when the middle-class public misunderstands the auto rickshaw drivers, it’s excusable, but when voices from the administration make such ignorant statements, it’s unforgivable. Sheila Dikshit’s statement is the ultimate articulation of the elite bias that gets rebooted time and again in our policies.

In this case, the auto rickshaw drivers were unable to protect their own interests because the democratic political channels through which they exercised voice and agency were rendered null and void by the adjudication intervention (Gill, 2010).

The Supreme Court for all its judicial activism, in spite of its well-intentioned introduction of Public Interest Litigations, staunchly remains the saviour of the middle class, or those who have the privilege to access the courts via its language and grammar. It is infamous for making wide-ranging rulings which results in policies that are skewed in the favour of the litigator or self-proclaimed activists.

The Court’s disdain for procedure leads to under-examined policies which have ramifications on sectors that were never considered; it’s a state institution that clearly doesn’t command the resources or jurisdiction for making policy.

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M.C. Mehta’s bourgeois environmental litigation for vehicular pollution, though resulted in many favourable outcomes for the health of the city, caused unfair hardships to the auto rickshaw drivers, and had unintended consequences on the public transport system in Delhi. In July 1998, the Supreme Court came out with a judgement in the M.C. Mehta v/s Union of India which directed that all buses, auto rickshaws and a part of the city taxi fleet should now use CNG fuel.

The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case invoked the constitutionally enshrined, Right to Life to extend to the right to a clean and healthy environment, as a response to a “deteriorating public health situation” (Down To Earth: Science and Environment Online, 2014). Owner-drivers were faced with a cost of 30,000 rupees for a CNG conversion kit and the threat of having their permits cancelled if they did not get their engines changed in time. In 2000, just before the switch, there were 83000 auto-rickshaws on the roads, but just eighteen months later there were 55000. (Harding, 2010) The Delhi Finance Corporation was aware that owner-drivers wouldn’t have disposable cash to comply with this regulation and made “soft’ loans available, but the auto finance mafia and the Transport Department are allegedly wellknown to be hand in glove- they came to an arrangement whereby they stalled the loans for six months, in addition to arbitrarily cancelling thousands of permits.

This meant thousands of drivers were forced to sell their autos and accompanying permits to financiers at throwaway prices. This way, nearly 35,000 auto rickshaw drivers were cheated off their livelihood by government officials, and many more were adversely affected.

Ironically, the same provision, i.e. Article 21, the Right to Life, was applied to stop eviction of hawkers without prior notice under the Olga Tellis & Ors vs. Bombay Municipal Council, where the court observed that "no person can live without the means of living, which is the means of livelihood. If, the right to livelihood is not "94

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treated as a part of constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his (sic) right to life would be to deprive him of his means of his livelihood to the point of abrogation."

Conclusion The attitude of the officials and middle-class citizenry must shift, to understand that alienating the drivers by simply “banning� them from the urban political space narrows the conception for the future of our cities; it leaves the crux of the matter unresolved- one cannot simply shoot the messenger. The analysis in my paper points to the need for deregulation of permits, which will allow this consistently mis-regulated sector some breathing space, and create potential for auto-drivers to take the lead in guiding the sector towards decent employment.

This will allow auto rickshaw drivers to participate in urban spaces as more than just vote banks for politicians, and would give them agency to be part of a capable, and streamlined urban transport sector that can consequently reflect in a genuinely world-class city.

References Abbot, S. (2013, February 8). Eye-catching rickshaws promote peace in Pakistan.

Retrieved December 23, 2014, from Associated Press: http://bigstory.ap.org/ article/eye-catching-rickshaws-promote-peace-pakistan Aggarwal, R. (2011, October 1). Caution, dead end ahead. Retrieved from GOI Monitor: http://www.goimonitor.com/story/caution-dead-end-ahead Baviskar, A. (2003). Between violence and desire: space, power, and identity in the making of metropolitan Delhi. International Social Science Journal, 89-98.

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Chatterjee, P. (2001). On Civil and Political Societies in Post-colonial Democracies.

In S. Kaviraj, & S. Khilnani (Eds.), Civil society: History and possibilities (pp.

165-178). Cambridge University Press.

Danish. (2013, June 27). For Dikshit, Kejriwal or BJP: Why Delhi auto rickshaws are a key votebank. Retrieved December 23, 2014, from Firstpost: http:// www.firstpost.com/politics/for-dikshit-kejriwal-or-bjp-why-delhi-auto-rickshawsare-a-key-votebank-910499.html Down To Earth: Science and Environment Online. (2014, February 4). CNG price slashed by Rs 15 in Delhi; CSE lauds Centre's decision. Retrieved December 23, 2014, from http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/cng-price-slashed-rs-15-delhicse-lauds-centres-decision Ellis, R. (2011). The Politics of the Middle: Re-centring Class in the Postcolonial.

ACME, 10(1), 69-81.

Faruqui, D., & Sud, R. (2001). CCS Working Paper No. 2 (Licenses & Livelihood)Auto-rickshaws in Delhi: Murder by Regulation. Retrieved from Centre for Civil Society: http://ccs.in/auto-rickshaws-delhi-murder-regulation Fernandes, L. (2004). The Politics of Forgetting: Class Politics, State Power, and the Restructuring of Urban Space in India. Urban Studies, 41(12), 2415-2430.

Gill, K. (2010). Of Poverty and Plastic. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Harding, S. (2010, March 24). Auto-rickshaws in Delhi: Why Sheila Dikshit’s comments are misguided. Retrieved December 23, 2014, from Kafila: http:// kafila.org/2010/03/24/auto-rickshaws-in-delhi-why-sheila-dikshit%E2%80%99scomments-are-misguided/ Harding, S. (2011, November 20). A few questions about a few thousand new auto-rickshaws in Delhi. Retrieved from Kafila: http://kafila.org/2011/11/20/a-fewquestions-about-a-few-thousand-new-auto-rickshaws-in-delhi-simon-harding/

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Harding, S. (2012, September 27). GPS and receipts will not stop Delhi’s autowallahs from overcharging. Retrieved December 24, 2014, from Kafila: http:// kafila.org/2012/09/27/gps-and-receipts-will-not-stop-delhis-auto-wallahs-fromovercharging-simon-harding/ Harding, S., & Hussain, A. (2013). On the road to nowhere? Auto-rickshaws in Delhi: The System, Problems and Recommendations. Delhi: AMAN Charitable Trust.

Harris, J. (2006). Middle-class Activism and the Politics of the Informal Working Class. Critical Asian Studies, 38(4), 445-465.

Hasan, A. (2014). Between the People and the Polis: South Asia's megacities and the urban future. HIMAL Annual Lecture. Delhi.

Jodhka, S., & Prakash, A. (2011). The Indian Middle Class: Emerging Cultures of Politics and Economics. Kas International Reports, 42- 56.

Khilnana, S. (1999). Chapter 3: Cities. In S. Khilnana, The Idea of India (pp.

107-149). New Delhi: Penguin.

McFarlane, C. (2008). Governing the Contaminated City: Infrastructure and Sanitation in Colonial and Postcolonial Bombay. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32(2), 415-435.

Mohan, D., & Roy, D. (2003, January 18). Operating on Three Wheels: AutoRickshaw Drivers of Delhi. Economic and Political Weekly, 38(3), pp. 177-180.

Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4413089 Pereira, A. (2014, December 9). Live: After Delhi cab rape, activists demand GPS in all auto-rickshaws, taxis. Retrieved from Firstpost: http://www.firstpost.com/ india/live-after-delhi-cab-rape-activists-demand-gps-in-all-auto-rickshawstaxis-1838045.html The Economist. (2014, February 22). Tuk-tuking the world by storm. Retrieved December 23, 2014 "97

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VIkram, K. (2012, December 2). Auto mafia continues to flourish in Capital: Delhi government's insistence on permits and GPS fails to curb overcharging. Retrieved from Mail Online India: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/ article-2241665/Auto-mafia-continues-flourish-Capital-Delhi-governmentsinsistence-permits-GPS-fails-curb-overcharging.html

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The Case of Mitigating Congestion: Understanding its Political Economy Through the Study of Haldwani cum Kathgodam Urban Agglomeration Navneet Joshi1 Abstract This study is an attempt to engage with the critical and urgent aspects of mitigating congestion through understanding the interplay of micro and macro causes at work. The significance of the study lies in its endeavour to go beyond the technocratic definitions of understanding mitigating congestion in Haldwanicum-Kathgodam Urban Agglomeration.It is an attempt to situate macro understanding of congestion in the ethnographic insights drawn from the local political economy contributing to high congestion. The study shows that the technocratic solutions, an never be an absolute solution for mitigating congestion in itself if they don’t take into account the local political and social factors. The study reflects the importance of tracking the institutions of informality and their indispensable association with formal institutionalised structures of governance.

The research eventually aims at understanding these underlying causes of congestion and accordingly suggests policy measures for mitigating congestion.

Keywords: Congestion, markets, in-migration, informality, political economy

1Navneet

Joshi, Former Graduate Student of School of Public Policy and Governance, Junior Research Fellow, Andhra Pradesh Planning Commission.

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Introduction How would one explain a market structure which exacerbates the case of congestion while deeply getting engrossed in the local political-economy? How could one understands the situation where strong predilections to cultivate immediate political and economic gains become the biggest stumbling block in the path towards urban regeneration? Small Indian cities and towns indeed are exquisite examples of regions of high internal turbulence and informality underneath “seem-to-be” evenly emerging spaces. When big and medium shopkeepers, in already congested city centres, due to their inherent self interests encroach a certain space of the road and allow mobile vendors to transact in front of their shops, again constraining the available road space, then one can sense a larger political economy playing its part in increasing the congestion. Before starting off an engagement with my central argument and the subsequent analysis of it, I shall begin with understanding the entire idea of congestion and what lies beyond its formal definition. a) The concept of congestion: The word “Congestion” evokes varied connotations in the urban development space. One interpretation defines Congestion as a condition in which demand for roads exceeds supply (Managing Urban Traffic Congestion, 2007). It is seen as impedance (obstruction) that vehicles impose on each other (ibid). This alludes to the general perception where the concept is basically understood as a physical phenomenon actually hinting on to the way in which vehicles obstruct each other’s progression, as the need for limited road space reaches full capacity. Besides this, the similar interpretation argues that congestion can also be viewed in terms of a psychological phenomenon where the users define it in terms of their relative expectations vis-à-vis road system performance. Overall, in popular literature, "100

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congestion as a term broadly connotes to traffic congestion. Having said that, I believe its actual meaning and implications can’t be straitjacketed into traditional technocratic definitions of over-crowding of vehicles in proportion to the space, but to numerous other indirect factors at play which I would engage within the following pages.

The problem of congestion is true for all cities, even those who adapted to the process of urbanisation and also for those who are still struggling to come to terms with the phenomenon. Congestion in urban spaces is affected by various macro and micro factors at play. Micro causes are the direct reasons that contribute to congestion in the cities which in turn can be classified as recurrent and non-recurrent causes. The recurrent causes include differential vehicle speed, fluctuations in driving behaviour like unpredictable acceleration and deceleration, jumping queues. On the other hand, the non-recurrent causes, which have immediate implications on the level of congestion, are unexpected unplanned events like protests on the roads, accidents, road works, fog or rain. Essentially, these are the issues that are caused by failure to anticipate and plan the infrastructure in the city. Without any doubt, the micro causes primarily affect the core of my concerns. However, this is only one, albeit critical factor, through which I seek the answers for mitigating congestion. I also argue that the problem of congestion cannot be understood solely through micro causes. There are numerous macro causes which contribute to the congestion of the city. Macro explanations help us to focus on understanding the causes of congestion through several inter-related factors. It includes political-economic explanation on why certain cities economically grow faster than others, expansion and diversification of markets, in-migration etc. While explaining the macro causes, I shall also analyze the policy challenges of the same.

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b) Relationship between economic growth and congestion - the phenomenon of city expansion: A 2003 study2 helps us to get into the relationship between congestion and economic growth by establishing the meaning of congestion and analyzing the ways through which it affects economic efficiency and market competition. The study defines congestion as “a condition of traffic delay (i.e., when traffic flow is slowed below reasonable speeds) as the number of vehicles trying to use a road exceeds the design capacity of the traffic network to handle it.�(Weisbrod & Fitzroy, 2008). There are different interpretations relating to the ways by which the economy is affected by the high population and vehicular density (occupied space per unit area) and thereby congestion. The study by Fitzroy brought out peculiarities of rapidly growing urban and semi-urban areas in terms of characteristics like availability of skilled labour, total cost of acquiring inputs, and the overall size of customer delivery market which attract large working population from nearby areas into the city center. While engaging with the above features it becomes extremely important to understand them within specific contexts, which are different for different geographies. Like even if at the macro level we could have agreement with the above stated differential between rural and urban areas which eventually facilitates in-migration to urban areas, there are still huge differences in the degree of that in-migration at the micro level. The scale of migration depends upon the location and its perceived economic value.

In addition to this, the study goes on to prove that the industries or markets with higher dependency on the skilled labor and transport are more gravely impacted by increased congestion. “It also showed that traffic congestion can nullify some

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A study conducted under National Cooperative Highway Research Program on the correlation between congestion and economy

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of the agglomeration benefits (economies of scale) associated with operating a business in larger urban markets” (ibid).

In tandem with the discussion about economic growth, one can’t understate the entire phenomenon of urbanisation which drives city expansion. In effect, we need to explicitly argue over the critical inter-linkage between urbanisation and congestion, to understand the important features of the former severely affecting the later. At the outset, urbanisation is seen as a process where the occupation of majority of people changes from primary to secondary and tertiary sector, essentially a shift from rural to urban areas. In some ways, it is a phase of rapid economic growth with increased in-migration into the main center from nearby areas because of the high increase in the availability of economic opportunities there. To explain urbanization, I shall make use of standard models that have emphasized rural-urban migration under the entire gamut of urbanization. Ruralto-urban migration models focus on rural push factors and urban pull factors (Jedwab, Christiaensen, & Gindelsky, 2014). The former event relates to wellknown factors of increasing farm-mechanization or low return from agriculture, that in turn drives the labour out of the primary sector. The closely related later situation of urban pull alludes to growing industrialization initially kick-started by urban-biased policies both pre and post-independence and thereafter developing its own inertia and expanding on its own. Congestion, hence, is often seen as an outcome of this crowding in urban areas and implicitly as the result of urban policies claiming to bolster economic growth and efficiency. It can’t be denied that, “if capital (e.g., houses, schools, hospitals and roads) cannot be accumulated as fast as population grows, the cities grow too fast and the stock of capital per capita is reduced” (Christiaensen, Gindelsky, & Jedwab, 2013). This argument is supported by an evaluation done by Matthias N. Sweet, which suggests that,“higher levels of congestion are initially associated with faster economic "103

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growth” (Sweet, 2012). This could be understood through an association between economic growth and level of congestion (‘economic growth’ as a function of ‘level of congestion’), which first proceeds in a direct relationship and then after a certain point takes an inverse direction. In other words, there is a clear representation that after helping the local economy to leverage on increased movement of vehicles and people, excessive congestion becomes a drag on growth after a certain optimum level. c) Implications of aggravated congestion-the causes and consequences: Interestingly at the first place, there are advantages attached to increased concentration/density, which is basically spurred from agglomeration and clusterization patterns. The most important benefit of density is the presence of agglomeration externalities, which simply implies to the fact that productivity increases when firms’ location is in close proximity with each other. But what eventually perceived is actually the opposite. With the passage of time, congestion in urban regions clearly shows a negative externality as someone’s commuting decision restricts or places some degree of costs on other commuters passing through similar passages. Therefore, an efficient policy would be to internalize and mitigate those negative costs incurred by the residents of the city.

Now, what this indicates is that there are two offsetting externalities at work in urban areas, a positive agglomeration externality and a negative congestion externality, where both are related to the clustering of employment and economic growth (Brinkman, 2013). An important point which Brinkman brought out is that congestion or higher concentration of population and vehicles is a consequence of agglomeration or clustering due to aggravated in-migration of people. This in turn expands the local market as more people from the adjoining areas flood-in due to elevated economic activities. In the light of the above argument it is also

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critical to note is that policy formulation has to take up a combined approach rather than dealing with either of these externalities in isolation.

d) Structure of the paper: My analysis, therefore, will attempt to engage with these intriguing and urgent aspects of mitigating congestion through understanding the various macro causes at work. The study becomes peculiar and significant in terms of its endeavor to go beyond the obvious through bringing on board an ethnographic investigation of the local political-economy aiding high congestion. I believe that creation of new economic infrastructure or expansion of the existing ones can never be an absolute solution for congestion mitigation in itself if they are not viewed through the critical lens of local political and social factors. The primary attempt is to actually excavate the deep entrenched economic and social ideologies or sometimes the political exigencies at play in different times that deepened the problem of congestion. The explanation is closely knitted with my actual field work experiences through which I strive to put forth a reasoning which explains the various intricacies of the local market structure through the framework of political-economy, i.e. expansion of market through domination and its contribution to congestion. Eventually, my curiosity in uncovering the relationship of market expansion and State intervention, lands me in the world of informality which is tightly bordered with formality. I here seek to argue the case of continuum which exists between the two, hence needs to be taken care of while formulating the policy prescriptions.

2. Market expansion and congestion: Markets of small cities and towns in India are peculiar of certain characteristics.

These essentially include primary transactions in terms of agricultural produce and "105

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raw materials for building settlements. Besides these, the markets of towns or emerging small cities also act as a critical interface between small and large markets (small/large: in terms of volume of goods transacted). The agriculture market plays an important role in the daily economic activities of the region. The agriculture market is regulated under specific state acts. In effect the entire regulated wholesale market is considered as the most important site, as being the ‘first contact’ between primary producers (the farmers) and the first buyers (middlemen/retailers) of their produce.

A study conducted in 2011 on the state agricultural commodity market (specifically, tomato as a product) helps us make out a clear picture of preference of farmers regarding buyers of their produce. It revealed that 55% of farmers prefer selling their produce to local vegetable collectors only (Bhardwaj, Sikka, Sharma, Singh, Singh, & Arya, 2011). The reason being a farmers’ apprehensions "106

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to take any kind of risk and the fear of not getting expected prices at the local Mandi which eventually could inflate post- harvest losses and transportation costs.

Besides this, around 25% of farmers sold their produce at the local Mandi while 15% sold tomatoes directly to consumers in local haats. The rest of the 5% sold their produce to processors of that area (ibid). What it essentially hints at is on something which lies beyond the usual day-to-day interactions between the producers, intermediaries and the consumers.

a) The agriculture market-efficiency, extraction, and exploitation: The market functions on the principles of efficiency, extraction and exploitation (ibid). These can be understood firstly, through the concept of terms of trade pertaining to the profits and investments made by merchants, i.e. the initial interactions between buyers and sellers. These interactions transform agricultural markets into instruments of resource extraction from agriculture to secondary sector. The understanding can be further affirmed through the notion of multiple exchanges within the market that take place in the process of commercial exchange. They too become the territory for exploitation of peasants and labourers. The literature written on markets in general and agriculture commodity markets in particular can’t simply be weighed through neo-classical or neoinstitutional lens of efficiency and price integration analysis. During the course of my analysis of these agriculture markets, locally called ‘Mandi’, I acquired deep insights that went beyond the usual theory. My arguments and analysis are drawn from my field observation to contest the primary generalization made by the schools of neo-classical and neo-institutional economics, though I would not delve much into it for the sake of more specificity. Engaging more with the political-economy framework not only enriches us with the complexities and variations of existing markets, but also suggests realistic policymaking targeting "107

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congestion.In some literature, the institution of inter-linkage is viewed as an instrument of monitoring the agent’s activities in the relationship. In effect, when lenders are not able to monitor or gauge the activities and behaviour of borrowers, it could give rise to moral aberrations and inept selection within the market. E.g. traders may refuse to lend to a farmer who tried to cheat one of them in a previous transaction, thus threatening the farmer’s subsistence. The issue may then be resolved by creating contracts that target to inter-link markets.

As it could be argued that, in the midst of market imperfections like risks and high transaction costs, these mutually profitable agreements are the most apt responses. As also backed by writings of Pranab Bardhan (Bardhan, 1983), the experiences from the field validates the above arguments through the phenomenon of labour tying, which has transgressed from purely rural to semiurban settings. All these issues have critical links with the political-economy framework.

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b) The Political Economy framework: Oppressor-oppressed relationship How do we define aberrations within a neatly regulated system of transactions?

How can we look into the complex terms of trade within the market that eventually makes certain group of people more preferable and help them cultivate larger share of profits? Most of these things will be answered through the framework of political-economy within the entire system of demand and supply as per traditional economic grammar. Specifically, not just in case of smaller or closely knitted systems (where caste, class and power are more conspicuous), but also every market in general deem extreme importance to the social relations of production and exchange. Against the neo-classical reasoning of markets as independent entities, political economy angle helps one engage with the fact that the flow and prices of commodities, their volume and frequency of supplies and the extent of involvement of intermediaries into the system is not completely isolated from other parts of the economy.

In my field area in particular, these other parts are actually the socio-political linkages within the market structure. There are instances of certain sections leveraging on their established networks and social and political capital. The traditional mercantile class of the region, in-migrants that have been well-settled long ago as well as the neo-rich class who is investing more capital is seen as major players who control the system. They have a strong hold over commodity and money markets and in a way are able to appropriate and perpetuate greater profits in order to be reinvested in other parts of the wholesale market, retail market or in land and property. This also helps them affirm and protect their monopoly position in the market. To further explain my arguments, I would be engaging with a key aspect which substantiates how political-economy framework works within the local market context. This is through the institution of "109

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middlemen, which make way for the power relations to get established and flourish. Thereafter, I would attempt to substantiate the above aspect as well as the important point of expansion of market through domination and its contribution to congestion through my field findings.

c) Institution of middlemen: market capture by powerful groups: In the system of agricultural commodity markets, the Arhatiyas (middlemen) forms an important institution across many parts of India. They are the agents that operate between the farmer and the buyer. An agent, in a typical setup, establishes relationships with peasants on a long term basis. This relationship is on the mechanism of pre-harvest credit advancement and tying of farmer’s produce post-harvest. Arhatiyas, then not only become an important source of agricultural credit (inter-locking of two markets, discussed earlier), but also in many cases, act as a critical resource to the functioning and organization of the agriculture commodity market space, where they are chiefly accountable to both the farmer and retail businessmen, facilitating the transactions. Through the instruments of preference and commissions across different class of people and commodities respectively, the Arhatiyas further the agenda of maintaining extraction and exploitation and in turn class and caste hierarchy in the system. In some states, such as Punjab and Haryana (benefitted enormously by Green revolution), Arhatiyas are a part of strong political lobbies and hence, at times creates a restricting mechanism which makes it difficult for the State to deal directly with the farmers, especially regarding direct payments to peasants during public procurement by the government.

In terms of structure of market, my field area Haldwani also tells a similar story. It consists of a large market, mostly informal and highly concentrated in a small area, catering to the hill as well as the plain economy (due to its unique "110

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geographical location). It basically serves as a twin market: one, as a market for goods (fruits and vegetables) coming from the hills, which would go to plains from there, and second, as a market for goods (food grains, fruits and vegetables, construction raw materials) coming from the plains, which would go to the hills.

The size of the market could be captured through data provided by the Sales Tax department, who has divided the whole region into four sectors. The main market, taxed under sector-1, has 1281 registered dealers. This number represents only those shopkeepers who show their annual income over a certain cap (annual turnover of more than 5 lakhs) and follow the institutional norms.

Major part of the main market due to its very informal setting, not covered by taxation regime, is a highly congested area (0.2 sq. km. area approximately, excluding the local Mandi) and hence with the number of registered shops, nonregistered smaller units and the street vendors, the main market becomes highly dense. In terms of volume too, the local market presents a promising picture as we establish its critical importance for both hills and plains (south-eastern Uttarakhand). Apart from being a large retail market for garments, the town of Haldwani primarily transacts in three important types of goods: ‘Fruits and Vegetable, Food grains, Construction raw materials’. The first two products are transacted within the purview of Agriculture commodity market (Mandi), while the third one is left purely to private discretion. Haldwani in the Kumaon region and Dehradun in Garhwal are the biggest vegetable markets as per the annual arrival of vegetables and fruits. Importance of these markets is that they receive vegetables from hills as well as plains and hence serve as primary, secondary as well as a major retail market for vegetables.

The other important market of Haldwani, i.e. of construction raw material, also makes it a prime marketplace in the entire region. The primary products which are traded and sold from Haldwani are sand, big boulders, bricks and iron. The "111

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booming market has catered well to the rapid demands of real estate in the city especially due to heavy in-migration after 2013 flash floods3 in the hills. According to the estimates provided by Uttarakhand Forest Development Corporation (Kumaun Division)4 for the financial year 2013-14, Haldwani (Gaula River) region alone had a mining produce5 of 34, 08,758.96 cubic meters and earning revenue of around Rs.7,58,680,758.42. Fine sand is not a majorly transported mineral to the hills. The gravel and crushed boulders (Gittis) form the major part of the transit. Besides this, bricks market in the southern part of the city claims to transport exponentially high amounts of units per day.

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A multi-day cloudburst, in June 2013, centred on the North Indian state of Uttarakhand caused havoc through devastating floods and landslides 4Uttarakhand

Forest Development Corporation is a statutory body constituted by the State Government for supervising the automated and centralized transaction management of minor mineral collection. UKFDC buys the forest produce from Forest department and then facilitate its availability in the market.

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Mining Produce consists of fine sand, gravel and small & big boulders

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d) Understanding these markets through the prism of ‘domination’: The entire political economy of the region and its contribution to congestion could easily be understood through the primacy of market led growth in the neoliberal era. The political economy signals at the interaction of different power groups operating in the region. Inside stories reveal that the major chunk of the local market is increasingly controlled by in-migrants or the people who came after partition and have gradually accommodated themselves into the regional culture. This attempt to get fused with the native culture should not be perceived in terms of simply imitating the customs and traditions of the place but rather as a conscious attempt to intermix with the local people without doing away with their national and international networks. Hence, in a way, it’s an attempt to reap twin benefits. As a matter of fact, Sindhis control the major share of high-quality fruits market in the city with smaller middlemen (colloquially called arhatiyas) from various communities. In addition to this, the vegetable market has more local people involved due to the system of procurement, which is largely from the hill and nearby rural areas. It’s important to note that the people who had inhabited the region after the partition have made noticeable progress. In this league, the Mona Sikhs and the Pashtunis have an upper hand in the wholesale cloth market.

By the virtue of their national and international networks, high-risk taking abilities and unconditional trust and solidarity among themselves, they are unarguably the big names of the local market. Not surprisingly, these groups have high degree of involvement not only with the local politicians and government officials but also with other tradesmen within different other sectors of the market. The construction market on the other hand is predominantly controlled by the ‘Sikh and Muslims’ communities who also happen to reside in the southern part of the town which is in close proximity with the plains. The reason for control and dominance can also be understood by their location and the perennial links they "113

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harbour in the nearby cities of Bareilly and Rampur from where the materials like bricks and iron are transported to Haldwani. High presence of Punjabis in the transport sector also validates their unchallenged advantage in the construction sector. As stated earlier, by the virtue of their positive and proactive association within their influential peers and also within the local governance structure, these groups go on elevating their social and economic positions in the region. This transformation of small towns into more economically viable and efficient spaces has automatically lent its support to the process of urbanization, attracting more number of in-migrants into its borders.

e) Tracking the current in-migration trends into Haldwani: As stated above, Haldwani-Kathgodam agglomeration is a door to the entire hilleconomy (Kumaon region) of the state in terms of providing them a viable and competitive market and better connectivity to the hills. It is also home to one of "114

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the largest vegetable, fruit and food grain markets of Kumaon. Being the gateway to most of Kumaon and parts of Garhwal, it is an important revenue center of Uttarakhand based on its advantageous location as a base depot for goods in transit to the hills (Joshi, 2013). The following analysis helps one understand the peculiarity of the region as it stands out in terms of luring a lot of people from the hinterlands into the main city.

To track the enormity of population growth unlike the general trend, one needs to engage with the population statistics of the town. India’s average natural population growth is to the tune of 1.6%. Anything above it can be attributed to the reasons which we discussed at the outset, specifically mentioning the ruralurban in-migration. The census data (Table 1.2) reveals that Haldwani had continuously high annual population growth rates of 3.47% in 1991, 5.25% in 2001 and 4.6% in 2011. This strictly suggests the fact that even a very high natural increase can’t justify these figures. Hence, the statistics directly hints at the uncomfortable position the town is in where there is not only higher natural increase in population but also elevated degrees of rural-urban migration as well as burgeoning size of outgrowths in the surroundings. The evolution of city can be tracked through its story of expansion and congestion. With the rapid growth of "115

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city, the large increase in number of private vehicles and the average fluctuations in the speeds and flow of these vehicles help tap current condition of congestion in the city. When tracking the expansion of city in terms of its people, it was observed that about 96% families migrated from remote rural area of hill districts of Kumaun belonging to medium economic group (ibid).

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Due to its distinct geographical advantages, Haldwani-Kathgodam UA is has come across as the most sought after location for the migrants in terms of Work/ Employment and Businesses. As per the census 2011, out of total migrant population residing in a UA, Haldwani-Kathgodam UA attracts most number of migrants for work/employment (24.68%) and business (0.88%) related issues. This also bolsters the fact that the given UA puts forth unmatched availability of economic opportunities to the population. This unprecedented amount of inmigration in the Urban Agglomeration has exposed the vulnerability of the unplanned infrastructural support in the foot-hill city while attempting to accommodate the influx of new population and their increased mobility.

Therefore, the in-migration can be largely attributed to availability of economic infrastructure and resources. f) Cultural reasons attributing to in-migration: How Haldwani became home to such a large and diverse population in a very short span has cultural reasons too. Culturally, the region of Haldwani-Kathgodam "117

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holds peculiar prominence as the meeting point of hill tradition, expanded market and better infrastructural facilities (than rest of the Kumaun division). This confluence of cultures can be validated through the distinct contributions made by diverse communities in the growth story of the city. Hence, for understanding the local tone and tenor, it becomes important to delve into the type of people who inhabited the area, especially, in the last three decades. Though it’s hard to track who were the first settlers of the town, my ethnographic study shows some evidences of almost simultaneous movement of people from hills and plains (mostly from western Uttar Pradesh), acquiring northern and southern parts of the town respectively. Demographically, some studies strengthen the fact that there are primarily four types of people that inhabited the Bhabhar region. They are essentially armed and allied personnel, government servants, private workers and businesses-men. More specifically, the population is majorly dominated by the families of armed and allied personnel. The state’s contribution is one of the largest in defense in terms of manpower, families who then settle down in the region when their head is in-service or retired. The other noticeable group is of government servants, where most of the family heads and other family members reside outside of the present place for their respective jobs with their dependents still there for better social and infrastructural facilities. The third important group of people is the private workers who are employed in industry or Private Company located at near to the present residence (as discussed in the earlier bar graph-reasons of migration). This pattern has surged especially after new state creation, i.e. with the formation of State Industrial Development Corporation of Uttarakhand (SIDCUL) in Pantnagar town, a state government enterprise which develops industrial infrastructure and promotes industries in the hill state. The fourth kind of inhabitants are the ones who leverage on the informal market structure of the town through their small businesses including real estate, "118

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educational institutions, vegetable and fruit, construction raw materials etc. (as discussed in the earlier bar graph-reasons of migration). Analyzing the various push and pull factors responsible for drawing such a migration pattern from hills to the town, it can be concluded that the critical factors include division of paternal property, costly agriculture and poor yield, high disaster risks, poor infrastructural, health, education and livelihood facilities in the hills (ibid).

In addition to this, it is found that in-migrants are largely attracted to areas with high concentration of people belonging to their own culture or ethnic group. In the context of my field: Haldwani, the above fact can be verified by some early inhabitants as well as through the story told by dilapidated buildings of the past, that the city has expanded from east to west in the last three decades with more of hill migrants residing in the eastern parts of the city. The rationale behind choosing the eastern part has again a cultural value to it. Since, the early migrants from hills were the well-to-do Brahmin and Kshatriya families. They chose to inhabit the eastern part of the city due to its proximity to the hill culture and its people. The region was alleged to be on the right side of the Gaula River and also a bit away from the habitation of emigrants from plains. Now, most of the well-to-do middle class families who occupied the peripheries of the main city and went outwards only, didn’t hesitate in owning private vehicles to access the city center and lumped market, thereby contributing to heavy congestion.

g) Simultaneous process of economic expansion and urbanization: creating ‘regional centres of growth’: Now, the above settled facts and the related arguments incites a crucial question that where is this escalating urbanisation concentrated? Kundu (2003 and 2011) in his writings argued that in the recent years the process of urbanisation is largely concentrated in the developed areas and bigger cities, neglecting the backward "119

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areas and the smaller towns. Though the claim could not be bought as such, some recent studies have also shown that Indian urbanisation is materializing in new regions. Pradhan (2013) substantiates this fact and discusses that new census towns accounted for nearly one-third of India’s urban growth between 2001-2011 (Pradhan, 2013). This goes on to suggest strongly that the urbanization pattern in India has drifted towards smaller cities now. High in-migration has been a major cause behind this skewed distribution of population, a phenomenon which got aggravated due to improved accessibility to market activities in urban areas facilitating the creation of regional centres of growth.

h) Increased availability of economic opportunities and its contribution to congestion: As explained earlier, market and congestion have close positive connections which flows till an optimum level. Until that level, congestion supports higher productivity of the market. Perhaps, this might be the reason why the local tradesmen don’t oppose the entry of vehicles in the heart of main market with already narrowed streets. This is a perfect case in which the consumers compromise with speed of the delivery of services with the accessibility to goods still intact. Hence, a high level of congestion has acceptance from both sellers and buyers. The local shopkeepers in fact encourage more of vehicular movements (at least the two wheelers) in the otherwise highly concentrated space, in a bid to accumulate greater profits from well-to-do buyers. These well-to-do buyers own vehicles and feel more convenience in entering the market with their vehicles. To add up to this misery, the case of micro or the direct factors affecting congestion in the city where we can identify Haldwani as a center of lumpy infrastructure with urban planning often taken up in project modes (building brick-and-mortar structures whenever required). This provision has made certain spaces extremely "120

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attractive to access and reside, while rendering the town unarranged in general.

Again, drawing from the migration pattern that followed in the city, one can argue over the interplay of market and State and thereby their participation in the process of congestion. The preliminary analysis suggests that in the region, while cash income has a substantial predominance over exchange and reciprocity mechanisms, much of that is in the informal sector rather than the formal. This in turn hints towards the level of State intervention in terms of regulation through taxation and thorough licensing of certain specific businesses.

Hence, deriving a pattern between the type and extent of in-migration and the subsequent expansion of markets (mainly informal) in urban areas, we can observe that rapidly emerging regional centres of growth like Haldwani are a case of high rural-to-urban migration with higher number of agglomeration outgrowth. This indicates that semi-urban centres or small cities and towns follow a unique trajectory of population and economic growth. Due to coming together of diverse social groups and religious communities as in-migrants to the place, one has to excavate the underlying socio-political factors that defined their expansion in the city. Afterwards, the preference and mobility pattern can be derived, which has direct bearing on congestion. Moreover, one also can’t deny the close relationship between in-migration and market expansion in the city as the bulk of population had migrated in search of work/employment and business opportunities.

3. Understanding informality in the midst of formal institutions: Till now we have established that the problem of Congestion can’t simply be solved through ad hoc solutions targeting its micro causes. More importantly, one needs to ask some fundamental questions about which macro factors work towards compounding the problem of congestion (section-1). One of the major "121

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macro causes thereafter discussed was the case of market expansion (essentially an informal type) linked closely with in-migration (section-2). Improved avenues for employment and businesses, the newly emerging regional centres of growth come across as highly favorable regions for in-migration, often to unanticipated degrees. This coupled with the mindset of market driven framework with some degrees of State withdrawal helped the informal space to stretch its feet underneath the institutionalized structures of regulation. This notion is reaffirmed through the coming together of various power groups within the market structure who have deep vested interests in keeping the informality intact. Hence, in this final section, I intend to track those regions of informality and its indispensible association with institutionalized structure of governance, to eventually understand and suggest policy measures for mitigating congestion. Eventually, I conclude to understand the shape of informal space through political-economy framework and tackle it so as to handle congestion.

Technically speaking, defining informality lucidly has never been an easy task, especially in the backdrop of various local level socio-economic complexities.

Though, it can never be ruled out that the informal space is seen as one that consists largely of ‘unorganized’, ‘un-incorporated’ enterprises, “to which legal restrictions on employment (wage minima, regulations affecting working conditions, etc.) and on acquisitions of non-labour inputs (licenses, quotas, etc.) do not apply”(Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, & Ostrom, 2006). In addition to that, the terms ‘informality’ and ‘informal sector’ have few subtle differences. The latter alludes to more practical and visible aspects while the former suggests the space where these processes operate. Hence, in the course of my analysis, I would attempt to engage with that informal space primarily by taking help and examples from the visible informal sector processes.

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a) The continuum: Formality and informality aren’t watertight: Out of many causes leading to the genesis and subsequent definitions of formality and informality, the usual description which had come to the fore during the colonial times was that one can see formal as those activities which fall beneath colonial rules and regulations, and informal as those that were beyond the legal and administrative reach of the colonial government (Kanbur R, 2013).

The post-colonial world especially the country like ours is still not of this colonial hangover of compartmentalizing the twin concepts and hence subscribe to colonial administrative literature’s notion of ‘a wall’ separating the formal from the informal. On the right side of the wall, there is a well-regulated and neatly ordered State system which is subjected to a predefined set of laws, enforced and managed by appointed officials and administrators. While on the other side of the ‘wall’, there is a (predominantly native) informal sector, which one discerns to be chaotic, disorganized, with criminal elements and hence, deeply misunderstood by colonial era policy makers. b) Managing the formal and informal space in Haldwani: In the context of economic activities in emerging towns and cities, one can’t rule out a high share of informality in the daily businesses chiefly due to predominance of market economy framework where the State intentionally recedes from being too interfering. The formal regulatory apparatus works through a licensing regime where certain services of identified criticality are mandatorily placed.

As discussed in above sections, one can’t compartmentalize the spaces which are created as an outcome of direct and indirect State interventions. I would engage with two critical (informal) economic activities which directly impact the level of congestion in Haldwani, i.e. street vending and freight transport.

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Street Vending or Tehbazaari within the city centre is the most crucial of economic activities having deep connections with the lives of people (chiefly migrants) who had come towards the main city in search of livelihood. The term basically refers to the selling of commodities on road-side pavement where the hawkers move to different places on mobile carts. One can also attaches it to another inevitable consequence of agglomeration building which has deep bearing on the increased congestion within a limited space.

Though generally, the main sources of non-tax revenue for the ULBs are the money from tehbazaari (Rs. 25 per day from each cart) along with other instruments like license fees, income from property fines and entry fees into certain areas. Tehbazaari, apart from being a source of livelihood and daily sustenance for a large number of people pose serious challenges to the process of mitigating congestion. Much of these problems can be attributed to either a "124

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complete absence or a faulty implementation of street vending policies by the state government. Moreover, if we think of mitigating congestion as an eventual goal, we should never think of a clearance or removal of this important informal space but should carefully handle street vending within the circumference of institutionalized spaces.

The freight transport, in the context of an economy which is highly driven by agricultural commodities, food grains and construction raw materials, is another factor having direct bearing on densification and congestion. As stated above, major markets in Haldwani, i.e. the agricultural commodity, construction raw material and the retail markets are closely interlinked to each other. The interconnection can be understood in a manner that dominant parties or communities in all these markets have overlapping. Like, Sikhs and Punjabis are better placed in the entire political economy due to their networks and connections in each of the markets including an upper hand in the crucial freight transport. Hence, it can be said that the dominance in the market is perpetuated by an advantageous position in the freight transport sector. In addition to this, in the presence of collusion between the State and these dominant groups with their respective vested interests, unchecked freight mobility and unauthorized parking takes place. This straight away has serious implications on daily congestion at the city center. This problem is compounded by high levels of encroachment by the shopkeepers within the market area, which clearly has political backing. Visibly, an unchallenged condition of informality is therefore preferred by these dominant groups in the entire economic structure, and hence need to be tackled carefully.

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4. Conclusion: Hence, in terms of aiming policy prescriptions for the above discussed continuum, one needs to be extremely careful of the fact that the policy conclusion should not be a usual attempt to drag the informal into the formal space by simply trying to stretch out the formality deep into the regions of informality, say for example, the removal of street vendors from the premises of the main city or relocating the auto-stand from already congested areas to a bit far away locations. The major tirade against such mental make-up for tackling informality is that as being different in a lot of ways, the formality can’t simply be implanted in the informal space. Therefore, without the full understanding of the contextual realities and the unpredictable outcomes in the informal space one can’t go with taking formal and informal as being one. All the more critical thing in this respect is to analytically engage with the limited capacity of the present policy perspective to handle informality, which essentially hints that the principal problem in tackling informality can be traced back to the rigid and ill-informed policy mind-set. A prejudiced mind-set which on one side is mesmerized by the phenomenon of ‘on the other side of the wall’ while on the other side are being complacent based on their imagination that in-formalization is bound to reduce while formalization is anticipated to increase during the process of growth and development.

For better placing the arguments, it would be proper to initiate an all-pervasive discussion regarding a sheer disconnection between the socio-economic outlook of those who make the policies and those for whom the policy is made. Though the intention of this specific discussion is not to establish the ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’, but rather to capture the neglect of the space which has come up due to the overlap of formality and informality. One example common to small and emerging growth centres is the issue of street vending within the urban space. What we see "126

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in these areas is either complete State withdrawal from its regulatory functions or ill-informed choices of thrusting institutionalized (often formal) norms into the informal space for the sake of regulating it better, eventually leaving an illmanaged and un-implementable regulatory framework. These unilateral mind-sets only strive to drive away street vendors from the city centres to the peripheries in the pretext of making cities more decongested and resident friendly. In terms of regulating the existing market infrastructure and its utilization by the permanent shopkeepers, the loitering and vending rules are often inadequately used by the local administrative authorities, who sometimes may not be the primary regulatory authorities. The vagrancy laws are often imposed by the local police, at the behest of Urban Local Body (ULB) to clear away street vendors from public spaces. To no surprise, these drives are not only biased and oppressive but it also creates a huge space for twisting the intended regulation through corruption and rent seeking. This is where the market capture takes shape and translates to the benefit of powerful groups. Street vendors usually are seen as unwanted entities within the shape and size of the main parts of the city that aggravate the problems of congestion and disorder within that area. It is not a rare sight to see the individual or group of informal vendors/traders being decamped frequently, many times at the whims of local administration or police officials who eventually end up playing a cyclical game and come back to the same place from where they were removed. This process criminalizes the entire informal economic activity which ironically is the major form of livelihood for many. Had the regulatory framework not been unidirectional and biased, it would have created a better mechanism for the indispensible informal space to work in tandem with the formal space. In the rush to become what they think Singapore looks like, cities in the developing world are trying to sweep away the informal economy (Kanbur & Ghani, 2012). This dis-enchantment towards informality will ultimately leave the "127

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entire regulatory framework oppressive and in turn unsuccessful. There is no doubt in establishing that urbanization goes hand in hand with in-formalization and thus can’t be neglected but needed to be dealt with proper institutional channels.

References Bardhan, P. (1983). Labour Tying in a Poor Agrarian Economy. Quarterly Journal of Economics , 501-514.

Bhagat, R. (2011). Emerging Pattern of Urbanisation in India. Economic and Political Weekly .

Bhardwaj, R. K., Sikka, B. K., Sharma, M. L., Singh, A., Singh, N. K., & Arya, R. (2011). Sustainable Agriculture for Increasing Efficiency of Tomato - Value Chain in Uttarakhand (India). International Conference on Technology and Business Management , 1-26.

Brinkman, J. C. (2013). Congestion, Agglomeration, and the Structure of Cities.

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia , 13-25.

Chandrasekhar, S., & Sharma, A. (2014). Urbanization and Spatial Patterns of Internal Migration in India. Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai , 1-39.

Christiaensen, L., Gindelsky, M., & Jedwab, R. (2013, October). Rural Push, Urban Pull or... Urban Push? New Historical Evidence from 40 Developing Countries.

Retrieved January 20, 2015, from Editorial Express: https://editorialexpress.com/ cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=NEUDC2013&paper_id=56 Guha-Khasnobis, B., Kanbur, R., & Ostrom, E. (2006). Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies. Oxford University Press.

Hodgson, G. M. (1988). Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics. Cambridge: Polity Press .

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IIHS. (2012). Urban India 2011: Evidence. New Delhi: Indian Institute of Human Settlements.

Jan, M. A., & Harriss-White, B. (2012). The Three Roles of Agricultural Markets: A Review of Ideas about Agricultural Commodity Markets in India. Economic & Political Weekly , 39-52.

Jedwab, R., Christiaensen, L., & Gindelsky, M. (2014, September). Demography, Urbanization and Development: Rural Push, Urban Pull and... Urban Push?

Retrieved January 20, 2015, from The George Washington University: http:// home.gwu.edu/~jedwab/JGC_Sept2014.pdf Joshi, B. K. (2013). Socio-economic services and migrational constraints: a case study from Himalayan foot hill. Elixir International Journal , 1-4.

Kanbur, R. (2013). Politics Trumps Economics: Mindsets, Trends and the Informal Economy. Economic Development Department of the Presidency of the Republic of South Africa .

Krishnamurthy, M., & Kapur, D. (2014). Understanding mandis: market towns and the dynamics of India’s rural and urban transformations. Center for the advanced study of India: University of Pennsylvania , 1-19.

Kundu, A. (2013). Exclusionary cities: The exodus that wasn’t. Infochange Agenda .

Kundu, D. (2013). Slowdown in urban growth, InfoChange Agenda, Urban Transition.

Olsen, W. K. (1996). Rural Indian Social Relations: A Study of Southern Andhra Pradesh. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Pradhan, K. (2013). Unacknowledged Urbanisation: The New Census Towns of India. CPR .

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Sweet, M. N. (2012). Traffic Congestion’s Economic Impacts: Evidence from U.S. Metropolitan Regions. Transportation Research Board (pp. 1-23). Toronto: School of Urban and Regional Planning.

Weisbrod, & Fitzroy. (2008). Defining the Range of Urban Congestion Impacts on Freight and their Consequences for Business Activity. Presentation at the TRB Annual Conference. Boston: Economic Development Research Group, Inc. Young, T., & Colman, D. (1997). Principles of Agri-cultural Economics: Markets and Prices in Less Developed Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Tribal Livelihoods in Post Joint Forest Management Era: A Study in the West Midnapore District of West Bengal Saity Roy1 Abstract Scheduled Tribes have been defined by the policy makers as those communities which have indications of primitive traits, distinctive culture, shyness of contact with the community at large, geographical isolation and backwardness. JFM came as a path breaking step towards participatory development of the natural resource which was so far under the draconian policies of the State. The primary objective of the JFM programme was to engage local communities in regenerating degraded forests. This Paper attempts to focus on the sustainability of the livelihoods of the forest fringe communities, especially the tribal communities in the post-JFM situation, in the same place where it was first conceived of, that is, in Arabari region and also another region called the Nayagram region, close to the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur in the West Midnapore district of West Bengal.

Key words: Scheduled Tribes, JFM, Forest Fringe Communities, West Midnapore

Introduction Scheduled Tribe population in India constitutes a numerical minority. However there is a significant diversity within them. The diversity reflects in the form of 1

Saity Roy is a Former Student of Graduate School of Livelihoods,TISS Hyderabad,

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differences in languages, ecology surrounding them, physical features, size of the population, level of development and exposure to the modern world. According to the Report of the High Level Committee on Socio-Economic, Health and Educational Status of Tribal Communities in India, Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Government of India, May 2014 the majority of the tribal population in India is spread over the states of Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. According to this Report around 27.64 percent of the Scheduled Tribes inhabit the western part of the country, 12.41 percent in the north-eastern region, 5.31 percent in the southern part and 2.03 percent in the northern part of the country.

Over generations tribal people have exhibited dependence on forests for their livelihood and firewood needs and have protected those forests and their indigenous values. Different varieties of economic activities are carried out by the tribal communities as part of their livelihood earning initiatives. The major occupations of tribals include hill and plain cultivation, sal leaf plate making, sale of non-timber forest product, pastoral and cattle-herding, agricultural and nonagricultural labour, and sericulture. Collection of non-timber forest products and making a livelihood out of it form a significant part of the many livelihood sources of many tribal communities.

In spite of this mutually beneficial relationship between the forest fringe communities and the forests they depended on, there have been instances of conflicts between these people and the State since the colonial times with mostly the former being deprived of their rights over the forests and the forest products.

It was only in 1988 that the forest policy saw a remarkable shift, with the new policy giving importance to the preservation of forests and the needs of the communities dependent on forests. The priority now was on the fuel wood, fodder, small timber and minor forest products needs of the tribal and minority "132

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communities dependent on forests. In the June, 1990 circular it was made clear by the government that the requirements and needs of the tribal communities are to be “treated as first charge” on forest produce. What was evident from this was the experience gathered from the Joint Forest Management (JFM) experiment in Arabari, which was carried out in the 1970s by A.K Banerjee, a divisional forest officer and silviculturist from south division in West Midnapore district of West Bengal by involving people from ten villages in Arabari region in protecting 1,250 hectares of totally degraded natural sal forest and plantations (Roy,1992). Though there was no mention of the term “joint forest management”, it gradually became prominent.

JFM came as a path breaking step towards participatory development of the natural resource which was so far under the draconian policies of the State. The primary objective of the JFM programme was to engage local communities in regenerating degraded forests. The purpose of regenerating the degraded forests was to meet the requirements of the locals in the form of need of firewood, fodder, small timber, over which the communities have “first charge”.

JFM in fact had three main objectives: environmental: as evident from the goal of regenerating degraded forests and protecting them, economic: clear from the idea of providing the forest fringe communities with means of livelihood and efficient management of the local resources which is ensured because the problem of free-rider is solved through their collective action, and socio-political: this was present in the form of giving decision-making power to the local communities for forest use and also because people have the fundamental right to managing their local environment (Roy, 1992).

The core idea behind JFM remained same across all the states. In 1998, the central Ministry of Environment and Forests created a “JFM cell” for guiding the implementation of JFM across the entire country. A new set of guidelines was "133

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issued by this cell in 2000 and modifications in 2002. JFM has now been adopted by all the states and the union territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands as the official approach to forest management in the country.

Along with JFM, came up the Forest protection Committees (FPCs) which were the institutions at the village level composed of the forest fringe community members and engaged in forest protection and management in collaboration with the government. Partnership also existed within the community. As of 2011, there were about 1,18,000 forest protection committees (FPC) across the country protecting about 22.93 million hectares of forests which is approximately a third of the land with the forest department in the country (Bahuguna. 2011). However, in spite of JFM being a promising venture to put an end to the long persisting conflicts between people and the government in the domain of management of forest resources, it had its own share of problems in terms of proper implementation. One of its main goals of providing a sustainable livelihood to the forest fringe communities has not been satisfactorily and adequately achieved.

With the implementation of JFM, access of the community to forest products was restricted as a precondition for achieving one of the goals of JFM, which was to regenerate the degraded forests. This was one of the factors contributing to the beginning of a new struggle, for the poor. Over the years after JFM implementation, problems have arisen in the form of those relating to the distribution of benefits among the users of forest and that between the users and the forest department.

This Paper attempts to focus on the sustainability of the livelihoods of the forest fringe communities, especially the tribal communities in the post-JFM situation, in the same place where it was first conceived of, that is, in Arabari region and also another region called the Nayagram region, close to the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur in the West Midnapore district of West Bengal. This Paper "134

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also discusses about the livelihoods which were available to the forest fringe people as a result of JFM. However, the sustainability analysis takes into consideration the UK Department for International Development (DFID) framework. Hence for understanding how sustainable the current livelihoods are, the vulnerabilities of these communities have also been examined.

The state where this study was conducted, that is West Bengal has no scheduled areas in it, but it has 5.1% of the country’s tribal population. While West Bengal has a total of 40 Scheduled Tribes (STs), out of these 40 STs , there are 9 tribal communities, whose population together form a little more than 90% of the total ST population of the State. These 9 communities are Santhal, Oraon, Munda, Bhumij, Kora, Mahali, Lodha/Kheria, Bhutia and Maipahariya. The tribe currently under study is the Santhal tribe. The tribe constitutes 54% of the tribal population of West Bengal (Census,2001). In West Bengal, the Scheduled Tribes have the highest representation in the districts of Jalpaiguri, Purulia, Dakshin Dinajpur, Paschim (West) Midnapore, and Darjeeling. The area under the current study is in the West Midnapore district of West Bengal. The research was conducted in six villages in the Arabari Reserve forest region of the Salboni block and three villages in the Nayagram block of the West Midnapore district.

This study in the Arabari region is of importance because the implementation of JFM in this area is a pioneer in the state of West Bengal and the region has not been studied in terms of the performance of JFM in making livelihoods sustainable for the forest fringe communities, and also the livelihood situation for these communities after JFM started declining. Understanding how the people have coped after the conflict coming up in the benefit sharing aspects of the programme and what livelihoods have they opted for are areas which will give fair idea about how sustainable their current livelihoods are.

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In addition to this section, this Paper has six more sections. The second section focuses on JFM as has been discussed in the relevant literatures so far. The third section explains the methodology in which this research was conducted. The fourth section on Livelihoods discusses both the livelihoods during and post-JFM era in Arabari. The next section explains the sustainability of the current livelihoods, with the penultimate section taking up a precise discussion of the vulnerabilities of these communities in Arabari and Nayagram regions. The final section consists of the conclusion along with the recommendations.

Joint Forest Management in Literature Vemuri (2008) observes that when India’s National Forest Policy came up in 1988, the central government laid down the broad guidelines of Joint Forest Management (JFM) which encouraged participation of local people in forest conservation. She also explains that forests provide not only livelihoods to these communities, but also the crucial subsistence needs of housing materials, food, medicine, fuel-wood, small timber and non-timber forest products.

The socioeconomic environment in West Bengal along with the dispersed yet large scale Sal (Shorea robusta) forests with good root stocks and coppice vigour had resulted in regenerating the assigned degraded forests. This was evident from the committed grassroots cadres of the Marxist government of the state of West Bengal, which played an important role in the successful achievement of the two main objectives of JFM, in certain regions of the State in the early nineties.

They had ensured the involvement of the people in forest conservation through highly politicized Panchayats. Early incomes of the people were ensured through intermediate yields from non-wood forest products (NWFP) such as sal leaves and early harvests from short rotation coppice crops (Sharma, 1995).

However, continuation of the interests of the community in this would require sustained incomes of these poor people. This is where JFM received a setback.

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Mukherjee (1995) discusses to ensure that sustained community participation continues in forest protection and management, what is necessary is meeting the livelihood needs of the communities. However, several scholars (Sarker and Das, 2008; Mukherjee, 1995; Dutta et al, 2004; Pattanaik and Dutta, 1997) have highlighted the not so impressive performance of JFM in providing an increase in income from legal forest products and forest wage income for the communities dependent on forests. The continued illegal felling of trees and thus, degradation of forests even after JFM got initiated could be attributed to the seasonal livelihood needs and food insecurity among the forest fringe communities, which were not met adequately by JFM. Sarker and Das (2006) have focused on the fact that for sustainability of the JFM system, immediate sustenance needs of the poor forest communities need to be met. D.N (2001) is of the view that various JFM experiments in India to institute village-level control over access to non-timber forest products (NTFP) have been proved difficult to implement and also leads to inequality. The better off sections and those who depend less on forests easily decide to set aside forest lands for regeneration. JFM though attempted to meet the needs of the poor first; they were the ones who got further marginalized.

Sarker and Das (2002) observed that Women Environment Development provided two main arguments- first was that the improvement of the status of women will assist the solution of environmental problems and second was that within environment, women’s sole participation will improve the project’s efficiency. The Gender and Development (GAD) perspective stresses on the importance of gender-sensitive planning for JFM to find ways for women to institutionalize their bargaining strength. But, in spite of these and women’s greater involvement in forest related activities of the community, the state JFM resolution of West Bengal has proved inadequate for ensuring their participation in community institutions.

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Sarker (2009) argues that though JFM, which started with commitments to meet the needs of the poor, has failed to fulfill them. The sharing of benefits of commercial timber and bamboo products is discriminatory for the forest fringed communities in the areas where JFM has been implemented. This is more so because there is no national policy on the ratio of benefit sharing between community and the state.

While JFM as a programme failed in providing sustainable livelihood options to the tribal people, the forest fringe communities have adapted to newer occupations with time and in fact, have diversified their income earning sources.

It is important to understand what the other livelihood opportunities besides NTFPs are, that have come up post JFM in the same region, in the West Midnapore district of West Bengal where JFM had originated. While the existing literature on JFM and its implementation focuses on the reasons for its achieved success and also gradual decline, the literature focuses less on the alternative opportunities of income earning, the forest fringe communities have gradually adopted to. Pati and Shit (2012) highlights through their study in Paschim (West) Midnapore district of West Bengal, the numerous ways in which the tribal people are dependent on forests for their livelihood sources and various other sources.

Making of sal (Shorea robusta) leaf plates, growing back stead vegetables, selling eggs and bamboo crafts, making puffed rice, weaving mats, ropes are some of the livelihood activities practiced by women other than the NTFP collection activities. It is necessary to examine the sustainability of these livelihood earning opportunities to get an idea of the lives of these tribal people, and that can be understood only when these are seen with respect to the income they accrue, the needs that are getting satisfied by that income and the vulnerabilities within which these communities operate. Until there is a fair idea about the livelihood situation after the gradual decline of a much hyped policy aiming at the economic "138

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upliftment of these forest fringe communities, the current role of the government (Forest Department) and types of future interventions needed cannot be understood.

Methodology To achieve the goal of this paper, cross-sectional study was undertaken. Crosssectional study refers to the studies carried out across a short period of time to estimate the prevalence of any outcome over a population by examining a crosssection of the population.

The study was conducted in two blocks of West Midnapore district of the state of West Bengal and they are the Salboni block and Nayagram block. In these two blocks, the Arabari region was chosen in Salboni block to understand the sustainability of the livelihoods post JFM, because it is in Arabari region that the first JFM experiment took place in the 1970s. The Nayagram block was chosen to understand the situation of JFM and post JFM livelihoods of a Block from the same district, with no place like Arabari in it.

Sample Size In the Salboni block 2 forest beats were covered, namely Socio Beat and Arabari Beat. Two Forest Protection Committees (FPCs) from the Socio beat were studied, namely Sakhisol and Arabari-Socio FPCs. Three FPCs were studied from the Arabari beat, namely Ghagra, Nephurakhuerkhal and Buramara FPCs. In the Socio beat, the Sakhisol FPC is formed of 1 village and the Arabari-Socio FPC is formed of 15 villages. From among these 15 villages of the Arabari-Socio FPC, 2 villages, namely, Mohanto Raima and Ekdasol and the village Sakhisol of the FPC with the same name were studied. 63 households were studied in all from these three villages.

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In the Arabari Beat, the Ghagra FPC is formed of 12 villages, the Nephurakheurkhal FPC is formed of one village with the same name and the Buramara FPC is also formed of one village with the same name. One village of the name Aatabanda from Ghagra FPC, and the villages Nephurakheurkhal and Buramara from FPCs with the same names were the ones studied from this beat.

30 households were studied in all from these three villages.

In the Nayagram beat, three FPCs were studied and they all belonged to one beat. The three FPCs studied, each was formed of one village and of the same name as that of the FPC. Each of these villages was studied. 30 households were studied in all from these three villages. The names of the FPCs and so of the villages were Dhansola, Shirishboni and Khanamuri.

The sample details have been summarized in Table 1.

Sampling Procedure The FPCs met the goal of the research by representing all three categories, tribal FPC, women headed FPC and non-tribal FPC. All the FPCs in the area were studied.

In case of the Socio beat, random sampling was done for choosing the two villages out of the fifteen villages of the Arabari-Socio FPC, and since Sakhisol FPC which is an all-women FPC, consists of one village, all the members were interviewed. Sakhisol has 43 members. The two villages which were chosen from the Arabari-Socio FPC were Ekdasol and Mohanto Raima, both being tribal households with 35 and 18 households respectively. From each of these two villages 10 members were interviewed, along with few other non-member households. For the Arabari beat, random sampling was done for choosing one village from the twelve villages of the Ghagra FPC. The village chosen was

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Aatabandha, a tribal village. The other two villages formed the remaining FPCs from this beat.

Therefore the two other villages were also studied. They were the Nephurakheurkhal FPC and the Buramara FPC, the former being a mixture of tribal and non-tribal members and the latter being completely tribal FPC. In the Nayagram block, all the chosen three FPCs were tribal FPCs. Here the FPCs were composed of one village each. So, FPC members from each village were studied.

Livelihoods The most important and fundamental institution working in the case of JFM is a Forest Protection Committee (FPC). FPCs also represent some of the stakeholders

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of this policy. Therefore, the understanding of livelihood opportunities under JFM needs understanding of FPCs. The Forest Protection Committees (FPCs) are the ones which came up post the 1990 resolution of the Government of India (GOI). After the order was issued for JFM by the GOI in 1990, the Government of West Bengal came up with an order to modify its PFM (Participatory Forest Management) order issued in 1987 to JFM in South West Bengal. Through this resolution every family of South West Bengal living near the forest patches is eligible to become a member of a Forest Protection Committee (FPC). The FPCs composed of members from these forest fringe communities were the ones involved in forest protection activities as part of JFM policy. In exchange for their involvement in forest protection the FPC members were entitled to receive 25 per cent of the net sale of timber subject to conditions decided by the Forest Department and the right to collect fallen twigs, grass, fruits (except cashews), flowers, seeds without paying royalties to the government (Roy, 1992). The rights of the tribals over the forest products continued to remain in this way.

This paper studies eight FPCs in all from both the Blocks of Salboni and Nayagram. While in the Salboni Block, the Ghagra FPC is the oldest one having formed as early as in 1991; the Arabari Socio FPC is the latest one of the five, having formed in 1997. The remaining three have been formed in the following years- Nephurakeurkhal (1992),Sakhisole (1993), Buramara (1994). Of the FPCs studied in Nayagram, the oldest one is the Khanamuri FPC formed in 1992. The other two were formed in 1993. The Shirishboni FPC was initially together with a part of another FPC named Jadukota, and they together were the ShirishboniJadukota FPC formed in 1993. However, in 2001, these two FPCs separated and formed two FPCs, protecting their respective forest parts. The reason for their

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separation was the easiness the separation would bring to the process of protection of their respective forests.

Over time FPCs in the Salboni and Nayagram Mandal of West Midnapore have become redundant in terms of their participation as agents of forest protection from the community side. The villagers rarely attend meetings which FPC members are supposed to attend as part of JFM. The villagers in the Salboni Block are of the view that there is hardly any initiative for forest protection. The Beat Officer of the two Beats of the Salboni Block has himself admitted that initiative is lacking on the parts of both the stakeholders. At least in the Nayagram Block, villagers are aware of their responsibilities as part of JFM but they admit lack of initiative from both the community as well as forest department to undertake forest protection at any time of the day, let alone at night.

JFM and Livelihood Opportunities Traditionally collection and sale of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) from forests constitute one of the most important sources of livelihoods for the tribals. The gums, fruits, nuts, flowers, leaves, seeds, fallen leaves and fallen twigs from the forests form a significant part of the livelihood opportunities available to the forest fringe communities. If explained according to the DFID framework, dependence on these natural capitals has been an integral part of the livelihood initiatives of these communities. So, regeneration of the non-timber forest products through the involvement of these communities were considered to be an ideal option and this was planned by the policy of Joint Forest Management.

In the Salboni Block of the West Midnapore district, while the major livelihood under JFM has been collection of NTFPs such as fuel wood, sal leaves, sal seeds, flowers, mushroom, dry leaves, resins, nuts, grasses, honey, this collection work

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has always been done by women from the tribal households and even in the past it was done by women as a part of JFM. The villagers hardly remember any FPC meetings being held in the recent past or any monetary benefit from felling accruing from the Forest Department to them as part of the JFM initiative. Whatever share of benefits from felling they received arrived to them a decade ago, following which, there were no more shares. This was the issue which was highlighted in two of the five villages in this Block studied. Among these two villages, namely Nephurakheurkhal and Aatabandha in the Nephurakheurkhal and Ghagra FPC respectively, while the former has a significant tribal population, the latter is a completely tribal village. The remaining three villages namely, Mohanto Raima, Ekdasol and Buramara last received some money from felling three years back. The situation is no different in the Nayagram Block. The traditional occupations of this Block include rope making from sabai grass- a grass form found typically in the Nayagram region of West Midnapore used in making ropes, puffed rice making, sale of non-timber forest products (NTFPs). These have continued over generations. JFM had given them access to forest products like fire wood, sal leaves and seeds, mushrooms, mohua flowers in exchange for their forest protection and regeneration activities. However, none of the three villages which have been studied has members who remember being part of the JFM. When asked, they do remember being members of FPCs, but JFM is history. Since all the three villages within this Block are tribal villages, truth is more stark here, by establishing the failure of the JFM scheme, and thus, resulting in its logical decline. A feature of this Block, which differentiates it from Salboni Block, is that the people are relatively more aware of the details of the JFM policy. A major reason for this can be the presence of a non-governmental organization (NGO) Amjam Radha Madhab Social Welfare Society, headed by the Principal of the Nayagram High School, in that area, involving the local youth in its "144

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activities. The latest information about JFM as an initiative they have in their lives is that the last felling took place in Nayagram region some 16 years back and they had then been told about Rs.40,000, which was fixed in the name of their FPC. Now it has amounted up to Rs.2,00,000.

In spite of people knowing their rights and duties, nobody questions or rather are in a position to reach anybody to question about their responsibilities and share.

Thus, though the villagers in the Dhansola village know about some Rs.2,00,000, they also know that asking the Forest Department for their shares is futile.

According to them, the dirty politics which are being played in rural Bengal by the party in power and the parties in opposition, allows many middlemen and politicians to escape with their money, with them being in no position to ask for it, let alone question the people with power. Though two decades ago when JFM started, people’s dependence on forests for different types of livelihood options was quite high, it has now ceased to be an option. According to Sujeet Datta of the NGO Amjam Radhamadhob Welfare Society working in the Nayagram region, people don’t have any resource on which they can fall back at the times of crisis.

According to him the villagers are poor and can’t afford morals. He had taken the example of a participant marginal farmer and had explained a poor farmer of the village Dhansola, earns just Rs.600 at the end of each month from the little bit of agriculture he does. Now, if someday someone offers him some money in exchange for some expensive wood from the forest, he has every reason to agree to the proposal. Can a person who is already hunger and poverty stricken afford morals or can he remember his responsibilities of forest protection when he cannot feed his own children? This is in fact the story of every other poor in this country.

It can be said that ever since JFM has been introduced, what the tribal people have gained is very less in comparison to what they have lost over the years. In "145

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fact they continue to lose every year due to the various vulnerabilities they are prone to and their current livelihoods continue to suffer.

While people have become more and more detached from forests, there has been a gradual shift to professions which are far from being associated with forests. Nevertheless, dependence on forests by these forest fringe communities has not become completely a thing of the past. However, it cannot be denied that there are situations where there is indifference from the Forest Department, and there are several instances of timber-smuggling in which the villagers have engaged in the hope of instantly gaining large sums of money. Also villagers are in dire need of increasing the area under cultivation; their local knowledge which had helped them to survive till now is at risk and is likely to reduce with time with changes taking place in their natural, social as well as political environment.

While no special initiatives or government schemes for employment of the people are available here, majority of the people presently earn a living through various unskilled activities. These unskilled activities are generally in a sector in which they have never worked. Thus, there has been a shift in the occupational structure of the forest fringe communities over the years.

Current Livelihood Opportunities A few varieties of livelihood opportunities have come up in the current times on which these tribal people depend on. This is more so because people can engage in varied income earning activities only if they have the required skill set.

According to the Capabilities Approach of Amartya Sen, capabilities are the various freedoms of any individual to enjoy the things a person values. With the complete absence of the required capabilities or any mechanisms to train the people or to make use of the potential resources or local talents for enabling the people to get a “decent� income earning job, what the poor people in the "146

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regions under study are currently engaged in are mostly the jobs of agricultural labourers. By “decent” here it means an income which is enough to sustain and meet the needs of all the family members adequately and should be above the subsistence level. Working as labourers they can manage an income which is not even enough for subsistence, let alone can be called “decent”. This not only degrades their inner potential but also a large section of the youth population becomes redundant with their inherent urge to work gradually fading away.

Across all the five villages studied in the Salboni Block, the predominant occupation of the people is working as labourers in the agricultural fields of either large farmers in the adjacent villages or as labourers migrating and getting engaged in masonry activities in the nearest cities.

The main crops of these regions are rice and potatoes. Besides these two crops, there are other vegetables which are grown from season to season. The mass employment season for the agricultural labourers therefore occurs in certain months of the year. For example, the labourers get work during the months of November and December, which are the months when rice is harvested and potatoes are planted. All the big farmers employ the labourers for paddy crop harvesting and preparing the soil beds for planting the potato plants. The next major season of employment of agricultural labourers are the months of February, March and April, during which potatoes are harvested and July-August when paddy is planted. So, there is six months of agricultural labour work available as the livelihood strategy for the poor households. They, in fact, have to compete with each other for getting hold of the labour works from the large farmers.

Besides agriculture, it is the masonry activities, in which these people are mainly engaged. It is as unskilled labour as in construction work. Other than these labouring jobs, the tribal people are also engaged in labouring activities for the Forest Department. Activities with the Forest Department includes among others, "147

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working in the nursery, in the main office and in the guest house for its maintenance. In fact working as labourer has become the primary occupation of the people in all the villages in both the Blocks Salboni and Nayagram.

Income from various livelihood opportunities is so less that the tribal people have no choice but diversify their income earning opportunities and try earning from different sources. For example, dependence on forests for achieving their livelihood objectives continues to be there, besides the other occupations. Dry leaves, fire wood, sal leaves, mushrooms, Banglar aloo (a form of root typical to the forests in the Salboni region), sal seeds, mohua flowers are some of the products from the forests on which the forest fringe communities have depended traditionally and still continue to depend. It is this natural capital which enables them to get some money for sure, at the end of the day, besides, their work as a labourer anywhere, for which they might not be assured payment. Most participants who work as labourers admitted that they were not paid daily and often they received payment of ten-fifteen days at once. This created problems for these poor people with a habit of improper savings. They often end up spending more having received a large sum of money at one time and almost nothing for each day of laborious work. Men who are alcoholic usually end up spending most of their wages in the local alcohols or mohua (juice from mohua flowers).

Sabai grass- a grass found typically in the Nayagram region of West Midnapore used in making ropes, considered to be an important natural capital of the forest fringe communities in the Nayagram Block, is not found in the region of the Block covered by this study. The farmers are of the view that in the present times they have failed to make use of this natural resource. Selling home-made puffed rice is another common livelihood strategy of this region. Besides these, there are certain other occupations of the people which have come up over the years.

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Animal husbandry, poultry farming, working as watchmen and security guards, as traffic constables in Kolkata, care-taking of the Forest Department guest house are some of the livelihood opportunities that have come up in recent times and these works fall out of the major categories of the livelihood strategies discussed so far. These works have come up gradually over the years, with mostly men of these forest fringe households moving out of the boundaries of their villages and the adjoining villages to find work elsewhere, with the hope of coming across better income earning opportunities. For a female participant of the Aatabanda village in the Salboni Block, her husband’s occupation makes her stand out among the fellow women in her village. She explained how her husband who initially used to work in Chandrakona Road of Midnapore, found job as a traffic constable in Kolkata, According to her, after the Poriborton (change of government at the State), Didi (referred to the Chief Minister of West BengalMiss Mamata Banerjee) created the jobs of civil police and thus many people were offered jobs. For her, this job of her husband helped in a considerable shift out of the clutches of poverty. She is now relieved that she no longer has to seek help from friends and neighbours, which she was often forced to do by the poverty; and how insecurity was ridden off to a considerable extent with the increase in the family income after her husband migrated to Kolkata. Another participant of Nephurakheurkhal village has a poultry farm of his own at his home in the village. The poultry is owned by him and his two brothers. He earns his share of Rs10,000 from the poultry. He also owns land and thus earns income by growing paddy and the seasonal crops. A yield of around 25 quintals of potatoes is obtained from around 10 kathas or 0.84 acres of land of planted potato crops.

A very good yield of potato, according to him, is when around 50-60 quintals of the crop is obtained from a bigha of the land from 1-1.5 quintals of seeds. In his view, a very good yield of potato is quite rare. It is totally dependent on rain.

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There is no irrigation facility available at all. This proves that even large farmers and comparatively well to do households also lack a proper means of irrigation.

Even comparatively better off households are not completely shielded from the various crises present in the region. Properly targeted interventions are necessary to address individual vulnerabilities of these communities.

Sustainability of the Current Livelihoods For a livelihood to be categorized as sustainable what is essential to understand is its resilience- that is its ability to recover from shocks and unforeseen circumstances creating stresses and move towards enhancement of resources and assets. The Sustainable Livelihoods definition as provided by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), in 1999 goes, A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from shocks and stresses and maintain and enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, whilst not undermining the natural resource base (DFID, 1999a).

This definition of sustainable livelihoods becomes important to understand the appropriateness of it to the livelihood opportunities, now available to the people currently under study. What is necessary to understand is whether the current livelihoods are providing with more income, increased well-being, reduced vulnerability, food security, sustainable use of the natural resource base of the region?

The livelihoods opportunities and strategies discussed so far includes a wide variety of activities- that of agriculture labourer, minimum or backyard agriculture, dependence on forests, animal husbandry, and different types of livelihoods that have come up over the years which involve migration out of the village.

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Poor people make use of numerous livelihood opportunities to make a living. So, to understand their sustainability it is not possible to take them one at a time. At certain instances, a farmer who has a few kathas of land does the work of agricultural labourer at a bigger farmer’s field as well, besides his wife engaging in leaf plate making and agricultural labour. So, their sustainability cannot be assessed by taking each one of them, at a time. What needs to be understood is whether they are together meeting the minimum basic needs of the households considering them as livelihood strategies. All the occupations currently practiced by these people together do not provide them subsistence level of income, let alone expenses on health and education.

Except for as few as one household per village who have managed some work from the Panchayat, no one can be said to be sure of what is going to happen to them the next day, given that they don’t do any permanent work but depend on large farmers, remittances from cities and on market.

Women engage in a number of livelihood strategies. The work of collection of the NTFP and their marketing is mostly considered to be the work of women in these villages. Gendered division of work has led to these works to be considered particular to the domain of women. With women also being hired as labourers, they need to negotiate workloads both inside and outside the households. This had been the reality even when JFM provided legal access to the natural capital within the forest. This is also true for the current livelihoods. Often the women respondents were of the view that they need uninterrupted and substantial amount of money to support their households as men of the family were mostly alcoholic. With there being discrimination in wages paid to the women agricultural labourers, the burden on them increases. Thus, the need for sustainable livelihood opportunities for women is evident. But what they are

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currently engaged in does not satisfy either of the preconditions for a sustainable livelihood, as provided by the DFID framework.

Current Vulnerabilities of the Forest Fringe Communities The current situation in the Arabari and Nayagram region of the West Midnapore district showcases the inadequacy of the State JFM resolution, resulting in disinterest of communities in participating in the community institutions and processes like JFM. People hardly remember the benefits they received from JFM.When the various processes within JFM were seen to lose importance, appropriate measures were not taken.

JFM as a scheme has not rendered any secured livelihood source to these people and thus, people have, over the years, taken to different occupations. There has been a shift of these communities dwelling in forests and adjoining areas to occupations which have never been associated with them traditionally. But with these shifts there have not been any programs or schemes of the government which would meet their changing needs and train them in a manner which would help them in adapting to new jobs and environments. Also, this shift has resulted in the local knowledge of these communities becoming redundant. Thus, the pursuit of “development� could not make a community based natural resource management process work. Neither could it help promote the livelihoods of the people by using their local knowledge. In the current times, in spite of a change of government in West Bengal, the much awaited poriborton (change) could not bring any remarkable change in the lives of the people. Thus, much of the human capital can be said to be getting wasted as they are moving into unskilled labour jobs.

The vulnerabilities, within which these communities operate, come mostly under seasonality and shocks. Seasonality refers to shifting seasonal constraints and "152

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opportunities. It refers to seasonal shifts in prices, employment opportunities and food availability. Since these change from season to season, they affect the poor in a variety of ways, particular to different seasons. Shocks occur suddenly and can destroy the assets of the people directly. Shocks can even make people abandon their homes and dispose of their assets like land, prematurely, as part of their coping strategies in the face of such uncertainties and insecurities. Shocks can include among others human health shocks, natural shocks, economic shocks, conflicts, and crop and livestock health shock. The inherent delicacies of the current livelihoods of the poor people make them more prone to these stresses and also make it difficult for them to cope with these stresses.

Seasonality strikes when employment opportunities are available just during the planting and harvesting seasons of crops because members of most households work as daily labourers. The main crops being paddy and potato, the options for this also are reduced. For them who work as daily labourers, work availability is the highest in these seasons. In the other seasons they have to go to different places in search of work. The absence of proper implementation of much hyped programs like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) is felt in these cases. Majority of the sample studied showcased that with lack of skills, knowledge, capitals, these communities are not ready for new occupations that can ensure them a better living standard. Further, the fluctuation of prices of fertilizers and pesticides are also a cause of concern for both small and large farmers. There is no mechanism through which seeds at subsidized prices could be made available to the tribal farmers here. However, the Government, both at Centre and the State advertises of the Minimum Support Prices (MSP) at which seeds are made available to the poor farmers.

Shocks in the form of repeated attack of droughts followed by scarcity of drinking water and irrigation water even for large farmers during the long summers, and "153

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pest attacks on crops (especially on the main crop- paddy) also contribute to the vulnerabilities of these communities. Agriculture is one of the main sources of livelihoods of the tribals other than dependence on forest based resources. Land holding sizes are as such small in West Bengal. It is smaller for tribal farmers, with them having just enough land to practice subsistence agriculture. Therefore, absolute scarcity of water provides tremendous setbacks to their farming practices as well as food availability. In the name of irrigation what they have are small pumps, called “mini� by the villagers, provided either by the Panchayat or the Forest Department at various instances. Most villages have one or two such pumps fitted in the middle of the village. Since tribal farmers have very little land holdings and most of them practice agriculture at their backyards, provision of water to their fields becomes a real difficult task from the limited water sources at their disposal. Further the wells in the villages dry up with time, given the irregular rainfall. If rainfall betrays or the minimum water available also finishes (which usually lasts till the Bengali month of Phalgun, that is, till February after monsoons in September), they have to go in search of water. What this means is that people face the insecurity in terms of getting something as basic as water. This affects not only their livelihood strategies but even their day to day life.

Vulnerabilities with respect to gender perspective The vulnerabilities the women are exposed to, require special attention given their different role within the forest economy. The first FPC in 1972 was started with 618 male members and it had achieved tremendous success. But with time, perceptions regarding the role of women as protectors of forest can be the same as men has been accepted. Gendered division of work entails collection of NTFP by women. Hence association of women with forests and forest resources is more in comparison to men. In fact, women led FPCs came up because of this. It can be "154

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said to be a reflection of the ideas Women, Environment and Development (WED) and Gender and Development (GAD). The former had the argument that women by virtue of gendered division of work engages in gathering of fuel wood, and fodder, while men engages in cultivation of crops for profit, women’s participation will improve projects. The latter highlights how gender-sensitive planning for JFM can institutionalize women’s bargaining power (Sarker and Das, 2002). Thus, women FPCs came up with the idea that with woman deriving so much benefit from forests which is ultimately benefitting their households, they will take special interest in protecting their sources of capital. Further, they can also bargain for receiving the benefits they are entitled to get under JFM because of collective strength.

The reality in Arabari and Nayagram is quite different now. Sakhisol, the womenFPC consisting of 43 women members has mostly poor widows who faintly remember being part of this scheme as its members. Some of them attend meetings which are held once in three months now. They recall having received a meagre sum of thousand rupees from felling, almost a decade ago and that was the last time they received any benefit till now. What remains now is going to the forests for collecting the various forest products (natural capital) to be sold in the market (mostly done by them) or to be used at home. While women did household work along with collection of NTFP during the initial years of implementation of JFM, this continues even now with women having to take up labour work to supplement family income. This work of labourer takes up their entire day with them having to perform household work early in the morning before going to work and doing the same after coming back. This strenuous work levels take a toll on their physical health also. Further, they are not paid equal wages as men. Most women labourers are paid Rs.38-40 less than what is paid to the men. What this means is that for the same level of work in the fields, while "155

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women are paid Rs.110-120, men are paid Rs.160-170 and even Rs.180. It should not be forgotten that this work is an addition to the already existing household work done by women.

Further under JFM these communities being FPC members had access to the NTFP, but since protection by communities are almost not being practiced, and there is large scale theft of the timber, the forest officials doubt the villagers and forbid them from accessing these resources. In the process the poor and the innocent people suffer and the repercussions of this are worse for women with them having to procure large logs of wood from places miles away from their villages instead from nearby forests.

Conclusion Since JFM practices hardly exist among the community members as well as the Forest Department in both Salboni and Nayagram Blocks of the district, the livelihood opportunities which was made available by JFM constitutes in only the memories of the people.

Over the years the tribal and the other forest dwelling communities have shifted to a number of occupations beyond their traditional knowledge and known territories. In the absence of any initiatives so far which would promote development of the skills of these people and use of the available resources, the human capital in not only these tribal areas but many such areas of the country are suffering.

Dependence on forest products for livelihoods continues to be a feature among these forest fringe communities. But they have a risk attached to it. Accesses to these are restricted. This is what JFM has done. While not only does the benefit of 25 per cent from sales out of felling no longer accrues to these communities in the study regions, the access to the non-timber forest products have also become "156

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restricted to these people. This has taken the form of women who have traditionally been engaged in firewood collection, engaging in stealing of even dry twigs and branches, as men are now easily caught by forest officials if they go for firewood collection. However, under JFM they are entitled to such firewood collection.

Some livelihood opportunities have come up in recent times among these community members. However, they mostly involve working as a labourer.

Labouring activities are such that both men and women engage in these. Further, work under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) is almost insignificant in these two areas. This has also resulted in the need for men and women going in search for new labouring jobs every day, far and near.

The livelihoods that have come up in the current times for these people are far from being sustainable. They don’t even meet the subsistence needs, let alone being a provider in the long term. One of the greatest proofs of this is the fact that these poor people depend on a variety of livelihood options for earning their day to day living. Income from neither of the sources is large enough to last a day, let alone a month.

The constituents of the vulnerabilities within which the forest fringe communities of these two Blocks operate includes the boundaries to non-timber forest products access that have been created by JFM, the repeated droughts attacking the region, pest attacks ravaging crops, absence of irrigation facilities even for large farmers given the scarcity of water, high prices of fertilizers and inputs, the lack of skills which make negotiation with higher paying jobs difficult for these communities, and difficult adaptations to new jobs, given the traditional dependence on forest resources by these communities.

Therefore there is a need to think beyond the existing policy. It is high time to observe the fact that JFM which was deemed to be a path breaking policy in "157

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history has gone wrong in the very region where it began. To make people the partners in development process, it is necessary that those people get shares of the fruits of the development.

The tribal people prefer their traditional practices and knowledge. The need for migrating out not only makes their traditional knowledge redundant but also makes them more vulnerable with them having to face new conditions outside of their known territories. Therefore, measures should be such that they are directed towards improvement of the traditional livelihoods, along with trainings and developments which make them suitable for better jobs. If social entrepreneurship ventures are taken up with a view to use the rich forest resources in a sustainable manner, then benefits can be rendered to these forest fringe communities along with conservation practices of resources.

Provision of proper water supply for their households as well as their crops, good houses with toilet and bathrooms can be interventions which help these communities get some kind of stability and security.

The issues of poor irrigation facilities need intervention as soon as possible.

Government interventions are necessary in the form of increasing the water availability through different measures. If implementation of NREGS is properly taken care of, then digging of ponds as a work under NREGS can be promoted.

This is more needed given the fact that it is a rain fed area. In this way irrigation facilities can be extended in these villages, besides creating some jobs.

In sum, this paper has tried to highlight the areas which need government intervention in post joint forest management scenario, besides portraying the current scenario. It tries to draw the attention to the contentious issues post the gradual decline of a much hyped policy. Since a policy which attempted two significant goals have declined, there is need for policies which not only

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addresses the damages already taken place but also comes with a new and innovative perspective to meet the needs of the forest fringe communities.

References Arora, D. (1994). From state regulation to people's participation: Case of forest management in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 691-698.

Balooni, K., & Inoue, M. (2009). Joint forest management in India: The management change process.

DfID, U. K. (1999). Sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets. UK DFID Department for International Development: London.) Available at: Www. Livelihoods. Org/ info/info_guidancesheets. Html (accessed 25 January 2015).

Dutta, M., Roy, S., Saha, S., & Maiti, D. (2004). Forest protection policies and local benefits from NTFP: Lessons from West Bengal. Economic and Political Weekly, 587-591.

D'Silva, E., & Nagnath, B. (2002). Behroonguda: A rare success story in joint forest management. Economic and Political Weekly, 551-557.

Dhanagare, D. N. (2000). Joint Forest Management in UP: People, Panchayats and Women. Economic and Political Weekly, 3315-3324.

Kumar, A., & Kaul, R. N. (1996). Joint forest management in India: points to ponder. The Commonwealth Forestry Review, 212-216.

Lele, S., & Menon, A. (Eds.). (2014). Democratizing Forest Governance in India.

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Mukherjee, N. (2002). Measuring social capital: Forest protection committees in West Bengal. Economic and Political Weekly, 2994-2997.

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Nicholls, A. (Ed.). (2006). Social entrepreneurship: New models of sustainable social change. Oxford University Press.

Pattnaik, B. K., & Dutta, S. (1997). JFM in South-west Bengal: A study in participatory development. Economic and Political Weekly, 3225-3232.

Sarker, D., & Das, N. (2006). Towards a Sustainable Joint Forest Management Programme: Evidence from Western Midnapore Division in West Bengal. South Asia Research, 26(3), 269-289.

Sarker, D., & Das, N. (2008). A study of economic outcome of Joint Forest Management Programme in West Bengal: the strategic decisions between government and forest fringe community. Indian Economic Review, 17-45.

Sarker, D., & Das, N. (2002). Women's participation in forestry: some theoretical issues. Economic and political weekly, 4407-4412.

Sarker, D. (2009). Joint forest management: Critical issues. Economic and Political Weekly, 15-17.

Sarin, M. (1996). Joint forest management, the Haryana experience. Centre for Environment Education.

Sharma, R. A. (1995). Participatory forest management in India. Ambio, 131-133.

Shit, P. K., & Pati, C. K. (2012). Non-Timber Forest Products for Livelihood Security of Tribal Communities: A Case Study in Paschim Medinipur District, West Bengal. Journal of Human Ecology, 40(2), 149-156.

Vasan, S. (2005). In the Name of Law: Legality, Illegality and Practice in Jharkhand Forests. Economic and Political Weekly, 4447-4450.

Vemuri, A. (2008). Joint forest management in India: An Unavoidable and conflicting common property Regime in Natural Resource Management. Journal of Development and Social Transformation, 5, 81-90.

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Note for Contributors The Journal of Public Policy Research (JPPR) is a peer-reviewed journal that publishes articles, review articles, perspectives, research notes/commentaries and book reviews. It encourages original contributions in order to promote debate and discussion on social, economic, political and legal concerns from the public policy perspective. Expression of all shades and opinions is welcome. Articles should range between 7000-8000 words, perspectives between 4000-6000 words, and notes/commentaries between 2000-3000 words. Manuscripts should be sent in electronic format (Microsoft Word Document) and addressed to Editor at editors.jppr@gmail.com

Each contribution should be accompanied by an abstract/summary of around 150 words and short biographical note/s on the author/s.

Notes in the text should be numbered and expanded at the end of the text in the form of Endnotes. Use of any reference in the endnotes should be in a consistent style similar to that of the text (for example: (Sen: 2015) and should be expanded separately in the “Reference� section with all relevant information according to the Reference format.

All figures and tables should appear at the relevant places in the text and not at the end of the article. All figures and tables should be referred to by their numbers in the text (for instance, 'See Table 1', 'See Figure 3'). The titles of the tables and figures should be brief and to the point. Tables and Figures should mention the Source which should be placed at the bottom of respective tables and figures.

References should be embedded in the text in a consistent style, for instance, (Sen, 2015). The full details of this Reference should then be provided in the Reference list in alphabetical order starting with the author(s)' surname(s) in the following format.

Book titles:

Deshpande, Ashwini (2011). The Grammar of Caste: Economic

Discrimination in Contemporary India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi (page number(s) if required)

Chapters within books: Uruena, Rene (2013). “ Global Water Governance and the Rise of Constitutional State in Columbia” in Navroz K. Dubash and Bronwen Morgan, The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South: Infrastructure and Development in Emerging Economies, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp.

27-52

Articles: Moe, Terry (2005), “Power and Political Institutions” Perspectives on Politics, June 2005, Vol. 3, Number 2, pp. 215-233.

Reports: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank (2008), “The Growth Report Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development”, Commission for growth and Development, Washington

Working paper: Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi (2003).

“Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development”, Working Paper 9305, National Bureau of Economic Research, Washington "162

.

Ph. D thesis: Mandal, Dipankar (2010). Social mobility among Dalit in West Bengal: A Study of the District in West Bengal (Ph. D thesis), Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.

Mimeo: Virmani, Arvind (2004), “Economic Reforms: Policy and Institutions Some Lessons from Indian Reforms”, Mimeo, Indian Council for Research on Economic Relationship, New Delhi

Newspaper report: Dasgupta, Ashok (2006). “India's Reform Path a Role Model for Morocco” in The Hindu, 11 December.

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About the School of Public Policy & Governance at TISS Hyderabad The SPPG is a novel research based teaching and training space designed to equip young professionals to contribute to the policy arena. The SPPG provides opportunities to its students to think beyond conventional models of growth and development and encourages them to generate ideas for developing institutional frameworks for accountable governance, richer human opportunities and the establishment of a socially equitable society. Our multi-disciplinary curriculum and innovative pedagogy, combining theory with experiential learning, will transform the learning experience and facilitate the students to become thought leaders and able field personnel. Students are also encouraged to specialise in particular policy concentrations thereby enabling them to join policy and research groups catering to specific sectors. The School aims to participate in broader policy debates and strengthen policy making through systematic research, evidence gathering and engagement with civil society and institutions.

Teaching Programmes M.A. in Public Policy and Governance (MA-PPG): Building the capacities of students from India and other countries to contribute towards the positive transformation of their nations.

Executive Education Open Programmes: Focused on topical policies for senior and mid-level government functionaries Customised Programmes: To meet the specific needs of client organisations; International Programmes: Exposing international bureaucrats and development practitioners from the global south to development experiences from across the world.

Research Areas Regulation & compliance Small town capitalism Sustainable cities Peace and conflict studies International and local migration Human rights Development and institutional economics

Email: sppg-si@tiss.edu "164 PUBLISHED ELECTRONICALLY ON BEHALF OF THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY & GOVERNANCE, TISS HYDERABAD CAMPUS